# NDCA R3 Neg vs Strake JW

# 1NC

### 1

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust and may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of the resolution – they don’t

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

1. In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Outer space is above the Earth’s Karman line – private entities in fiction or alternative universes can’t be within or outside of something that exists on a different plane of reality

World Atlas n.d. “What is the Karman Line?” World Atlas, <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-karman-line.html> TG

Karman line is the boundary between the Earth's atmosphere and outer space.

Its 100km (62 miles) above sea level

Anything past the Karman line is not subject to control by countries like their airspace

The Karman line is an imaginary line that scientists use to define the border between outer space and the Earth’s [atmosphere](https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/the-layers-of-the-atmosphere.html). The Karman line is at an altitude of approximately 62 miles. It is considered to be the starting point of outer space in various space treaties and also for aerospace record keeping.

#### Appropriation is an independent violation – the 1AC repeatedly cites exploration and space travel as something they end

Trapp 13, Timothy Justin. "Taking up Space by Any Other Means: Coming to Terms with Nonappropriation Article of the Outer Space Treaty." U. Ill. L. Rev. (2013): 1681. (JD Candidate at UIUC Law School)//Re-cut by Elmer

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217

[\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]

The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were try3ing to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep. They can specialize in 1 area of literature and 1 ficticious reality for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months and locks us into a predictable null set of monolithic criticisms that are susceptible to the perm.

#### Fairness is an impact –

#### a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity which they’ve ceded validity to by participating,

#### b] probability – individual ballots can’t alter subjectivity even if long term clash over a season can, but they can rectify skews which means the only immediate impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins,

#### c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 2] Clash - putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship – our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs

Resnick 19 [Brian Resnick is a science reporter at Vox.com, covering social and behavioral sciences, space, medicine, the environment, and anything that makes you think "whoa that's cool." Before Vox, he was a staff correspondent at National Journal where he wrote two cover stories for the (now defunct) weekly print magazine, and reported on breaking news and politics. Intellectual humility: the importance of knowing you might be wrong. January 4, 2019. https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2019/1/4/17989224/intellectual-humility-explained-psychology-replication]

I’ve come to appreciate what a crucial tool it is for learning, especially in an increasingly interconnected and complicated world. As technology makes it easier to lie and spread false information incredibly quickly, we need intellectually humble, curious people.

I’ve also realized how difficult it is to foster intellectual humility. In my reporting on this, I’ve learned there are three main challenges on the path to humility:

1. In order for us to acquire more intellectual humility, we all, even the smartest among us, need to better appreciate our cognitive blind spots. Our minds are more imperfect and imprecise than we’d often like to admit. Our ignorance can be invisible.

2. Even when we overcome that immense challenge and figure out our errors, we need to remember we won’t necessarily be punished for saying, “I was wrong.” And we need to be braver about saying it. We need a culture that celebrates those words.

3. We’ll never achieve perfect intellectual humility. So we need to choose our convictions thoughtfully.

This is all to say: Intellectual humility isn’t easy. But damn, it’s a virtue worth striving for, and failing for, in this new year.

Intellectual humility, explained

Intellectual humility is simply “the recognition that the things you believe in might in fact be wrong,” as Mark Leary, a social and personality psychologist at Duke University, tells me.

But don’t confuse it with overall humility or bashfulness. It’s not about being a pushover; it’s not about lacking confidence, or self-esteem. The intellectually humble don’t cave every time their thoughts are challenged.

Instead, it’s a method of thinking. It’s about entertaining the possibility that you may be wrong and being open to learning from the experience of others. Intellectual humility is about being actively curious about your blind spots. One illustration is in the ideal of the scientific method, where a scientist actively works against her own hypothesis, attempting to rule out any other alternative explanations for a phenomenon before settling on a conclusion. It’s about asking: What am I missing here?

It doesn’t require a high IQ or a particular skill set. It does, however, require making a habit of thinking about your limits, which can be painful. “It’s a process of monitoring your own confidence,” Leary says.

This idea is older than social psychology. Philosophers from the earliest days have grappled with the limits of human knowledge. Michel de Montaigne, the 16th-century French philosopher credited with inventing the essay, wrote that “the plague of man is boasting of his knowledge.”

Social psychologists have learned that humility is associated with other valuable character traits: People who score higher on intellectual humility questionnaires are more open to hearing opposing views. They more readily seek out information that conflicts with their worldview. They pay more attention to evidence and have a stronger self-awareness when they answer a question incorrectly.

When you ask the intellectually arrogant if they’ve heard of bogus historical events like “Hamrick’s Rebellion,” they’ll say, “Sure.” The intellectually humble are less likely to do so. Studies have found that cognitive reflection — i.e., analytic thinking — is correlated with being better able to discern fake news stories from real ones. These studies haven’t looked at intellectual humility per se, but it’s plausible there’s an overlap.

Most important of all, the intellectually humble are more likely to admit it when they are wrong. When we admit we’re wrong, we can grow closer to the truth.

One reason I’ve been thinking about the virtue of humility recently is because our president, Donald Trump, is one of the least humble people on the planet.

It was Trump who said on the night of his nomination, “I alone can fix it,” with the “it” being our entire political system. It was Trump who once said, “I have one of the great memories of all time.” More recently, Trump told the Associated Press, “I have a natural instinct for science,” in dodging a question on climate change.

A frustration I feel about Trump and the era of history he represents is that his pride and his success — he is among the most powerful people on earth — seem to be related. He exemplifies how our society rewards confidence and bluster, not truthfulness.

Yet we’ve also seen some very high-profile examples lately of how overconfident leadership can be ruinous for companies. Look at what happened to Theranos, a company that promised to change the way blood samples are drawn. It was all hype, all bluster, and it collapsed. Or consider Enron’s overconfident executives, who were often hailed for their intellectual brilliance — they ran the company into the ground with risky, suspect financial decisions.

The problem with arrogance is that the truth always catches up. Trump may be president and confident in his denials of climate change, but the changes to our environment will still ruin so many things in the future.

Why it’s so hard to see our blind spots: “Our ignorance is invisible to us”

As I’ve been reading the psychological research on intellectual humility and the character traits it correlates with, I can’t help but fume: Why can’t more people be like this?

We need more intellectual humility for two reasons. One is that our culture promotes and rewards overconfidence and arrogance (think Trump and Theranos, or the advice your career counselor gave you when going into job interviews). At the same time, when we are wrong — out of ignorance or error — and realize it, our culture doesn’t make it easy to admit it. Humbling moments too easily can turn into moments of humiliation.

So how can we promote intellectual humility for both of these conditions?

In asking that question of researchers and scholars, I’ve learned to appreciate how hard a challenge it is to foster intellectual humility.

First off, I think it’s helpful to remember how flawed the human brain can be and how prone we all are to intellectual blind spots. When you learn about how the brain actually works, how it actually perceives the world, it’s hard not to be a bit horrified, and a bit humbled.

We often can’t see — or even sense — what we don’t know. It helps to realize that it’s normal and human to be wrong.

It’s rare that a viral meme also provides a surprisingly deep lesson on the imperfect nature of the human mind. But believe it or not, the great “Yanny or Laurel” debate of 2018 fits the bill.

For the very few of you who didn’t catch it — I hope you’re recovering nicely from that coma — here’s what happened.

An audio clip (you can hear it below) says the name “Laurel” in a robotic voice. Or does it? Some people hear the clip and immediately hear “Yanny.” And both sets of people — Team Yanny and Team Laurel — are indeed hearing the same thing.

Hearing, the perception of sound, ought to be a simple thing for our brains to do. That so many people can listen to the same clip and hear such different things should give us humbling pause. Hearing “Yanny” or “Laurel” in any given moment ultimately depends on a whole host of factors: the quality of the speakers you’re using, whether you have hearing loss, your expectations.

Here’s the deep lesson to draw from all of this: Much as we might tell ourselves our experience of the world is the truth, our reality will always be an interpretation. Light enters our eyes, sound waves enter our ears, chemicals waft into our noses, and it’s up to our brains to make a guess about what it all is.

Perceptual tricks like this (“the dress” is another one) reveal that our perceptions are not the absolute truth, that the physical phenomena of the universe are indifferent to whether our feeble sensory organs can perceive them correctly. We’re just guessing. Yet these phenomena leave us indignant: How could it be that our perception of the world isn’t the only one?

That sense of indignation is called naive realism: the feeling that our perception of the world is the truth. “I think we sometimes confuse effortlessness with accuracy,” Chris Chabris, a psychological researcher who co-authored a book on the challenges of human perception, tells me. When something is so immediate and effortless to us — hearing the sound of “Yanny” — it just feels true. (Similarly, psychologists find when a lie is repeated, it’s more likely to be misremembered as being true, and for a similar reason: When you’re hearing something for the second or third time, your brain becomes faster to respond to it. And that fluency is confused with truth.)

Our interpretations of reality are often arbitrary, but we’re still stubborn about them. Nonetheless, the same observations can lead to wildly different conclusions.

(Here’s that same sentence in GIF form.)

For every sense and every component of human judgment, there are illusions and ambiguities we interpret arbitrarily.

Some are gravely serious. White people often perceive black men to be bigger, taller, and more muscular (and therefore more threatening) than they really are. That’s racial bias — but it’s also a socially constructed illusion. When we’re taught or learn to fear other people, our brains distort their potential threat. They seem more menacing, and we want to build walls around them. When we learn or are taught that other people are less than human, we’re less likely to look upon them kindly and more likely to be okay when violence is committed against them.

Not only are our interpretations of the world often arbitrary, but we’re often overconfident in them. “Our ignorance is invisible to us,” David Dunning, an expert on human blind spots, says.

You might recognize his name as half of the psychological phenomenon that bears his name: the Dunning-Kruger effect. That’s where people of low ability — let’s say, those who fail to understand logic puzzles — tend to unduly overestimate their abilities. Inexperience masquerades as expertise.

An irony of the Dunning-Kruger effect is that so many people misinterpret it, are overconfident in their understanding of it, and get it wrong.

When people talk or write about the Dunning-Kruger effect, it’s almost always in reference to other people. “The fact is this is a phenomenon that visits all of us sooner or later,” Dunning says. We’re all overconfident in our ignorance from time to time. (Perhaps related: Some 65 percent of Americans believe they’re more intelligent than average, which is wishful thinking.)

Similarly, we’re overconfident in our ability to remember. Human memory is extremely malleable, prone to small changes. When we remember, we don’t wind back our minds to a certain time and relive that exact moment, yet many of us think our memories work like a videotape.

Dunning hopes his work helps people understand that “not knowing the scope of your own ignorance is part of the human condition,” he says. “But the problem with it is we see it in other people, and we don’t see it in ourselves. The first rule of the Dunning-Kruger club is you don’t know you’re a member of the Dunning-Kruger club.”

People are unlikely to judge you harshly for admitting you’re wrong

In 2012, psychologist Will Gervais scored an honor any PhD science student would covet: a co-authored paper in the journal Science, one of the top interdisciplinary scientific journals in the world. Publishing in Science doesn’t just help a researcher rise up in academic circles; it often gets them a lot of media attention too.

One of the experiments in the paper tried to see if getting people to think more rationally would make them less willing to report religious beliefs. They had people look at a picture of Rodin’s The Thinker or another statue. They thought The Thinker would nudge people to think harder, more analytically. In this more rational frame of mind, then, the participants would be less likely to endorse believing in something as faith-based and invisible as religion, and that’s what the study found. It was catnip for science journalists: one small trick to change the way we think.

But it was a tiny, small-sample study, the exact type that is prone to yielding false positives. Several years later, another lab attempted to replicate the findings with a much larger sample size, and failed to find any evidence for the effect.

And while Gervais knew that the original study wasn’t rigorous, he couldn’t help but feel a twinge of discomfort.

“Intellectually, I could say the original data weren’t strong,” he says. “That’s very different from the human, personal reaction to it. Which is like, ‘Oh, shit, there’s going to be a published failure to replicate my most cited finding that’s gotten the most media attention.’ You start worrying about stuff like, ‘Are there going to be career repercussions? Are people going to think less of my other work and stuff I’ve done?’”

Gervais’s story is familiar: Many of us fear we’ll be seen as less competent, less trustworthy, if we admit wrongness. Even when we can see our own errors — which, as outlined above, is not easy to do — we’re hesitant to admit it.

But turns out this assumption is false. As Adam Fetterman, a social psychologist at the University of Texas El Paso, has found in a few studies, wrongness admission isn’t usually judged harshly. “When we do see someone admit that they are wrong, the wrongness admitter is seen as more communal, more friendly,” he says. It’s almost never the case, in his studies, “that when you admit you’re wrong, people think you are less competent.”

Sure, there might be some people who will troll you for your mistakes. There might be a mob on Twitter that converges in order to shame you. Some moments of humility could be humiliating. But this fear must be vanquished if we are to become less intellectually arrogant and more intellectually humble.

Humility can’t just come from within — we need environments where it can thrive

But even if you’re motivated to be more intellectually humble, our culture doesn’t always reward it.

The field of psychology, overall, has been reckoning with a “replication crisis” where many classic findings in the science don’t hold up under rigorous scrutiny. Incredibly influential textbook findings in psychology — like the “ego depletion” theory of willpower or the “marshmallow test” — have been bending or breaking.

I’ve found it fascinating to watch the field of psychology deal with this. For some researchers, the reckoning has been personally unsettling. “I’m in a dark place,” Michael Inzlicht, a University of Toronto psychologist, wrote in a 2016 blog post after seeing the theory of ego depletion crumble before his eyes. “Have I been chasing puffs of smoke for all these years?”

What I’ve learned from reporting on the “replication crisis” is that intellectual humility requires support from peers and institutions. And that environment is hard to build.

“What we teach undergrads is that scientists want to prove themselves wrong,” says Simine Vazire, a psychologist and journal editor who often writes and speaks about replication issues. “But, ‘How would I know if I was wrong?’ is actually a really, really hard question to answer. It involves things like having critics yell at you and telling you that you did things wrong and reanalyze your data.”

And that’s not fun. Again: Even among scientists — people who ought to question everything — intellectual humility is hard. In some cases, researchers have refused to concede their original conclusions despite the unveiling of new evidence. (One famous psychologist under fire recently told me angrily, “I will stand by that conclusion for the rest of my life, no matter what anyone says.”)

Psychologists are human. When they reach a conclusion, it becomes hard to see things another way. Plus, the incentives for a successful career in science push researchers to publish as many positive findings as possible.

There are two solutions — among many — to make psychological science more humble, and I think we can learn from them.

One is that humility needs to be built into the standard practices of the science. And that happens through transparency. It’s becoming more commonplace for scientists to preregister — i.e., commit to — a study design before even embarking on an experiment. That way, it’s harder for them to deviate from the plan and cherry-pick results. It also makes sure all data is open and accessible to anyone who wants to conduct a reanalysis.

That “sort of builds humility into the structure of the scientific enterprise,” Chabris says. “We’re not all-knowing and all-seeing and perfect at our jobs, so we put [the data] out there for other people to check out, to improve upon it, come up with new ideas from and so on.” To be more intellectually humble, we need to be more transparent about our knowledge. We need to show others what we know and what we don’t.

And two, there needs to be more celebration of failure, and a culture that accepts it. That includes building safe places for people to admit they were wrong, like the Loss of Confidence Project.

But it’s clear this cultural change won’t come easily.

“In the end,” Rohrer says, after getting a lot of positive feedback on the project, “we ended up with just a handful of statements.”

We need a balance between convictions and humility

There’s a personal cost to an intellectually humble outlook. For me, at least, it’s anxiety.

When I open myself up to the vastness of my own ignorance, I can’t help but feel a sudden suffocating feeling. I have just one small mind, a tiny, leaky boat upon which to go exploring knowledge in a vast and knotty sea of which I carry no clear map.

Why is it that some people never seem to wrestle with those waters? That they stand on the shore, squint their eyes, and transform that sea into a puddle in their minds and then get awarded for their false certainty? “I don’t know if I can tell you that humility will get you farther than arrogance,” says Tenelle Porter, a University of California Davis psychologist who has studied intellectual humility.

Of course, following humility to an extreme end isn’t enough. You don’t need to be humble about your belief that the world is round. I just think more humility, sprinkled here and there, would be quite nice.

“It’s bad to think of problems like this like a Rubik’s cube: a puzzle that has a neat and satisfying solution that you can put on your desk,” says Michael Lynch, a University of Connecticut philosophy professor. Instead, it’s a problem “you can make progress at a moment in time, and make things better. And that we can do — that we can definitely do.”

For a democracy to flourish, Lynch argues, we need a balance between convictions — our firmly held beliefs — and humility.

We need convictions, because “an apathetic electorate is no electorate at all,” he says. And we need humility because we need to listen to one another. Those two things will always be in tension.

The Trump presidency suggests there’s too much conviction and not enough humility in our current culture.

“The personal question, the existential question that faces you and I and every thinking human being, is, ‘How do you maintain an open mind toward others and yet, at the same time, keep your strong moral convictions?’” Lynch says. “That’s an issue for all of us.”

To be intellectually humble doesn’t mean giving up on the ideas we love and believe in. It just means we need to be thoughtful in choosing our convictions, be open to adjusting them, seek out their flaws, and never stop being curious about why we believe what we believe. Again, that’s not easy.

#### Turns the case – the skills and culture of intellectual humility is especially valuable for critical scholarship – without the requirement to clash, literature devolves into posturing and footnoting without being accountable to full bodies of work – that hollows out any potential for radical social change

Gottesman 16 [Isaac Gottesman, Ph.D., Social and Cultural Foundations of Education, Associate Professor and Division Head, Teaching, Learning, Leadership, and Policy at the Iowa State University School of Education. The Critical Turn in Education: From Marxist Critique to Poststructuralist Feminism to Critical Theories of Race (Critical Social Thought). 2016]

The turn to critical Marxist thought is a defining moment in the past 40 years of educational scholarship, especially for educational scholars who identify as part of the political left. It introduced the ideas and vocabulary that continue to frame most conversations in the field about social justice, such as hegemony, ideology, consciousness, praxis, and most importantly, the word 'critical' itself, which has become ubiquitous as a descriptor for left educational scholarship. Initially sequestered in curriculum studies and sociology of education, today critical scholarship is frequently published in the journals of some of the field's most historically conservative areas, such as educational administration and science education. The critical turn radicalized the field.

Since its beginnings in the 1970s and 1980s, critical educational scholarship has also pushed far beyond the Marxist tradition and its focus on political economy and social class. Although the critical Marxist tradition remains a foundation for much of the work that followed, critical educational scholars now engage a range of intellectual and political traditions that help us better understand culture and identity, gender and sexuality, race and ethnicity, constructions of ability, ecological crisis, and their myriad intersections. Critical scholarship has also radically altered the way we inquire, from the way we conceptualize our research to the way we gather and interpret evidence to support our claims. The critical turn has contributed greatly to educational scholarship. This is something to celebrate.

However, while celebratory of the critical turn and the scholarship and conversations it has fostered in the field, this book is written from a standpoint of concern. Much critical scholarship is insightful, but ubiquity has come with a price. Our theoretical tools are not always sharp; they are often dulled by thin readings of ideas, a failure to consider tensions between theories, and an overzealousness to be all things to all people. Too often our scholarship is sloppy; we too frequently reference texts that don't support our claims, rarely go back to original sources for ideas, and don't spend enough time carefully constructing our arguments and situating them within specific scholarly or activist conversations; and too often we resort to sloganeering and posturing.

These problems have led to a crisis of clarity. As Gloria Ladson-Billings (2014) recently noted, "The word 'critical' has become so much a part of the English lexicon that its academic meaning has begun to lose currency" (p. 259). It is too often unclear what we mean when we call our scholarship critical. And this lack of clarity has come at a cost—we seem to rarely understand what we are trying to communicate with one another much less what we are trying to communicate to the outside world. Critical scholarship may not be in a state of crisis, but it is in a state of dilution and fragmentation—our critical conversation lacks a sense of wholeness, of unity, of solidarity. Critical educational studies too often feels like a blur of articles, books, names, and words. Is there something central, something core? If the name of the game is to publish, we are fine, but if the name of the game is radical social change, we are in trouble.

I am certain this book succumbs to many of the failings that I decry. I am not lobbying for perfection, nor am I claiming to be immune. I am part of the 'we.' My intention is simply to push, and in doing so contribute to a conversation that will help critical scholars develop nuanced and sophisticated social theory and engage in more strategic political advocacy. It is no exaggeration to say the world is on fire. Ego must be put aside and humility embraced. We must ask ourselves difficult questions, such as how we situate our critical educational projects within the broader radical struggle

to squelch the inferno. We must ask ourselves if our social analysis is robust enough—can it see the world outside of schooling? We must ask ourselves if our political advocacy is strategic enough—are we acting in concert with other struggles, do we see the intersections? We must ask ourselves if we are moving forward with the thoughtfulness and analytical care that radical social change requires, and if our inquiry and our advocacy, our scholarly publishing and our on-the-ground activism, is helping us realize the world of our radical imaginations.

I think we can rise to the challenge of these questions. In fact, as I will discuss in the conclusion to the book, I believe many in the field already are. But there is much work to do. If we are going to truly push for a feminist, anti-racist, democratic-socialist society (my advocacy)—one that can forcefully push against the structures and ideologies that support and entrench patriarchy, white supremacy, and capitalism—I believe we have to address these questions honestly, rigorously, and as a critical educational community. We have to engage in debate, be willing to move out of our respective camps and shift our perspectives, and to do all of this I think we have to be clear about our intellectual and political commitments. What are our values and belies? Where do they conic from?

#### 3] TVA – the appropriation of outer space by western imperial nations is unjust – private space industries favor wealthy nations that became first movers in space at the expense of colonized African states – rejecting private appropriation opens the possibility for growing African space sectors to expand, resisting imperial power

#### AT Conquergood (standardization/textuality DA)

#### 1] Some sort of standardization is inevitable – they’ve disclosed, followed speech times, and switched sides all of which are standardized rules of the game. There’s no reason the addition of T is uniquely worse than any of those other and the 1ar didn’t draw any distinction between those norms and T which means any 2ar distinction is new and you should strike it off the flow.

#### 2] They link just as hard – they have forced the neg to negate the aff which limits what we can do and creates a standardized role for us – within that role though, debate is only reciprocal when the aff is constrained

#### 3] Some stasis point is a prereq for discussion

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

Their no rvis justification – they can dump for 4 minutes

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

### Case

#### The advantage:

#### 1] Vote Negative on Presumption – the reason people don’t re-purpose Affs read on TWO different topics is because they lack a topic key card – the form of tech superiority the Aff has identified are “cloning, gene mapping, GMO, virtual reality, nanotechnology”, etc. NONE of it is intrinsic to Space – just because he’s going to Space doesn’t mean its necessary to cybergenetic transformation.

#### 2] No Appropriation Key warrant – C/A T-FW Interp – he’s doing “space travel” not the actual appropriation of territory – colonizing is a word that only appears once in the Aff in the tags and none in the cards.

#### 3] Cerebral Energy into Outer Space is not a material form of appropriation – there also isn’t a terminal impact ot this attached.

#### 4] Outer Space in 1AC Clark is about Cyber Space AND its literal not-unique to Space Travel since they dump and do germ warfare anyways.

#### This case is incoherent – irregardless of the method – they don’t do anything to stop anything in the story of the Aff – punish them for re-purposing Affs and highlighting in a borderline unethical way.

### Method

#### Top-Level – Debate INS’T story-telling – stories are about the past, debate is about hypothetical implementation in the future – these aren’t forms of stereotypes because they aren’t re-tellings but predictive analysis.

#### AT Shukaitis – Just not what the Aff does – Shukaitis is about Space as a positive trope being used for imagination – the 1AC makes arguments about why Space is bad which means they don’t get access to this – nowhere does the Aff represent space in a positive or radical light.

#### AT Knaller – Even if story-telling IS good in a vacuum or by African scholars is good – Justin commodifying African story-telling for the ballot IS BAD – it is de-centering and abstracting away from traditions – the Africans that are using story-telling are de-centered by Justin using it which is anti-unifying

#### AT Knaller 2 – No Form over Content Distinction – even if Narratives are true – it doesn’t necessitate that they exist in a purely fictional space – that’s a violent distinction because it assumes that racist discourse cannot be material or exists now

#### AT McDonald – Science Fiction Bad isn’t about intellectual inferiority – its indicting specific scholars that use phrases like “anti-cognitive” and “contamination” NONE of which we did – we think they can be valid as intellectual exercieses BUT they trade-off w/ material strategies in debate

#### AT Black – Non-Unique – this story has been dissemated, its been published, read by Mitty and Lexington – proves voting Aff isn’t uniquely key to it.

#### Ballots fail.

Ritter 13. (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### AT DSRB: The notion that ballots create social change is cruel optimism – ask yourself whether recycled black scholarship read by a non black kid at a rich big school being voted up will 1. Impact norms and subjectivities and 2. Impact them in a positive way

#### AT: Friedman - extemp

#### AT: Quantum

#### This is so messed up – was Indigenous genocide or the middle passage “inconclusive” and “only objective in 1 interpertation of reality” – even if multiple realities did exist it is pedagocially bankrupt to disregard a reality where we know lived oppression exists

#### They’re also just scientifically wrong

#### No evidence for this experiment happening in the context of the aff – only experiment performed was on a single photon, no one has made an alternate reality with General Torro in it

#### Quantum mechanics is incorrect – prefer our evidence from a PhD in physics

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[Sabine Hossenfelder (German author and theoretical physicist who researches quantum gravity. She is a Research Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies where she leads the Superfluid Dark Matter group. She is the author of Lost in Math: How Beauty Leads Physics Astray, which explores the concept of elegance in fundamental physics and cosmology.), 5-14-2019, "Quantum Mechanics is wrong. There, I’ve said it.", Back Reaction, https://backreaction.blogspot.com/2019/05/quantum-mechanics-is-wrong-there-ive.html, Accessed 12-20-2020] LHSSN

So, you have developed a new theory of quantum mechanics. That is, erm, nice. No, please don’t show it to me. I’m almost certainly too stupid to understand it. You see, I have only a PhD in physics. All that math has certainly screwed up my neural wiring. Yes, I am sorry. But I have a message for you from the depth of abstract math: We know that quantum mechanics is wrong.

Seriously, it’s wrong. It’s as wrong as Newtonian gravity is wrong, as hydrodynamics is wrong, and as spherical cows are wrong. Quantum mechanics is an approximation. It works well in some cases. It does not work well in other cases.

You see, in quantum mechanics we give quantum properties to particles. But we know that, strictly speaking, the interactions between these particles must also have quantum properties. If we give these interactions quantum properties, we call that “second quantization.” It is not used in quantum mechanics. Second quantization results in a larger mathematical framework called “quantum field theory”. The Standard Model of particle physics is a quantum field theory. Sometimes we use the word “quantum theory” to refer to both, quantum mechanics and quantum field theory together.

Moving from quantum mechanics to quantum field theory is more than just a change of name. Quantum field theories inherit many properties from quantum mechanics: Entanglement, uncertainty, the measurement postulate. But they bring new insights – and also new difficulties.

The best known insight brought by quantum field theory is that particles can be created and destroyed, and that each particle has an anti-particle (though some particles are their own anti-particles). Another remarkable consequence of quantum field theory is that the strength of interactions between particles depends on the energy by which one probes the interaction. The strong nuclear force, it turns out, becomes weaker at high energies, an odd behavior that is known as “asymptotic freedom.”

The probably best known difficulty of quantum field theories is that many calculations result in infinity. Infinity, however, is not a very useful prediction. Such results therefore have to be dealt with by a procedure called “renormalization,” whose purpose is to suitably subtract infinity from infinity to get a finite remainder. No, there is nothing wrong with that. It works just fine, thank you.

Quantum field theories lead to other complications. For example, we know how to calculate what happens if two electrons bump into each other and create a bunch of new particles. This is called a “scattering event”. But we don’t know how to calculate what happens if three quarks stick together and form a proton. Well, we do know how to put such calculations on super-computers in an approximation called “lattice QCD”. But really we don’t have good mathematical tools to handle the case. At least not yet.