# HWL RR R6 Neg vs Presentation

# 1NC

### 1

#### Interp and Violation: The affirmative must only defend that the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust and may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of the resolution – decolonization of outer space AT LEAST requires ending public appropriation

#### Private entity is defined by

Cornell Law n.d. “private entity” <https://www.law.cornell.edu/definitions/uscode.php?width=840&height=800&iframe=true&def_id=6-USC-625312480-168358316&term_occur=999&term_src=title:6:chapter:6:subchapter:I:section:1501> TG

(A) In general Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the term “private entity” means any person or private group, organization, proprietorship, partnership, trust, cooperative, corporation, or other commercial or nonprofit entity, including an officer, employee, or agent thereof.

#### Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty defines outer space and appropriation

OST 66 “2222 (XXI). Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.” UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, 1499th plenary meeting, Dec 19, 1966, <https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html> TG

ARTICLE II. Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Fairness – post facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep. They can specialize in 1 area of literature for 4 years which gives them a huge edge over people switching topics every 2 months and locks us into a predictable null set of monolithic criticisms that are susceptible to the perm. Fairness is an impact –

#### a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity which they’ve ceded validity to by participating,

#### b] probability – individual ballots can’t alter subjectivity even if long term clash over a season can, but they can rectify skews which means the only immediate impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins,

#### c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### 2] Clash – argumentative testing along a stable tether and SSD are good – they force debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives through nuanced 3rd and 4th level testing that only occurs alongside a stasis point for preparation. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism – our argument is that the process of defending and answering proposals against a well-researched opponent is a benefit of engaging the topic regardless of the truth value of those proposals.

#### 3] TVA – colonial powers expand their influence into the solar systems through loopholes in Ilaw that allow them to use private entities as proxies for themselves

* AT Space Mining DA – turns the private innovation link because it proves dominant purpose of private space mining is to enhance national soft power and acquire space resources for national use

Stockwell 20 (Sam Stockwell is a research assistant at RAND Europe working in the area of defence, security and infrastructure. His research interests include terrorism and counter-terrorism, cybersecurity, emerging technologies in conflict environments, and space security. Prior to RAND, Stockwell was a research assistant at The Henry Jackson Society, a security think tank, where he studied the impact of coronavirus on online extremist content. He has also worked with lecturers at the University of East Anglia on Brexit-related projects. Stockwell achieved a Distinction at King's College London in conflict, security and development studies, specialising in far-right terrorism and cyber security. He holds a First Class B.A. (Hons) degree in politics from the University of East Anglia, where he also received The Thomas Paine Prize in Politics for achieving consistently high marks on assignments throughout his course.), “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”, E-International Relations, July 20th, 2020, <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> NT

Envisaging appropriation concerns that might arise from the future extraction of space assets by spacefaring nations, Article II of the UN OST declared that: “Outer space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means” (UN, 1967). **The emphasis on claims of national sovereignty were intimately tied to the Cold War context at the time, where space activities were under the exclusive monopoly of governmental agencies and initiated for goals of military dominance or national prestige** (Sachdeva, 2017: 210). However, the privatisation of the space industry that has occurred since the 1980s has meant that the legislation leaves an **enormous amount of legal ambiguity and interpretation** regarding the regulation of private resource mining in space. As Shaer (2016) demonstrates, the Article II provision fails to address either the exploitation of space for financial gain or the property claims of commercial enterprises (Shaer, 2016: 47). Nevertheless, Article VI of the UN OST asserts that: “States shall be responsible for national space activities whether carried out by governmental or non-governmental entities” (UN, 1967; own emphasis). Some scholars have suggested that this clause significantly restrains the activities of private space corporations by incentivising states to regulate their domestic organisations for fear of liability concerns (Abeyratne, 1998: 168). However, the US government recently enacted a piece of legislation which exploited this clause, in order to circumvent its own restrictions and strengthen US economic influence in space. The passage of the 2015 SPACE Act enabled US citizens to privately “possess, own, transport, use, and sell the resources” they obtain in outer space, whilst making careful consideration to deny national sovereign claims over such materials (Leon, 2018: 500). Yet, regardless of whether it is an American private company or public venture, **the US is still satisfying its geopolitical interests; by exclusively siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources for American gain, the nation’s soft power is thereby extended at the expense of spacefaring adversaries** such as China (Basu & Kurlekar, 2016: 65). Indeed NewSpace actors cleverly played on these strategic concerns prior to the bill’s passage, with billionaire space entrepreneur Robert Bigelow asserting that the biggest danger wasn’t private enterprises on the Moon, but that “America is asleep and does nothing, while China comes along… surveying and laying claim [to the Moon]” (Klinger, 2017: 222). **The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments** (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. **In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources.** **By constructing their endeavours in ways that appeal to the common good, NewSpace actors are therefore concealing the reality of how commercial resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at the expense of the vast majority of the global population.** Private Space Corporations and Orbital Surveillance: Dual-Use Satellite Technology Starting in 2013, the leaking of classified information by former US National Security Agency employee Edward Snowden revealed the extent to which American intelligence agencies were collaborating with the private sector in mass surveillance operations (Bauman et al., 2014). In what has been described as the ‘securitisation’ of society, contemporary states have shifted from “politics to policing and from governing to managing” the public, which has often occurred without the consent or knowledge of their citizens (Petit, 2020: 31). While such practices have conventionally been Earth-bound in nature, the space domain provides an entirely radical and strategically beneficial perspective for conducting surveillance through satellites. **Although many commercial US satellites provide an array of environmental and internet capabilities on Earth, they are also absolutely essential from a national security perspective of maintaining US space superiority** (Chatters IV & Crothers, 2009: 257). This is known as the “dual-use” nature of satellites, where civilian and military purposes are blurred into a single observational system and can be adapted for different functions when necessary (Lubojemski, 2019: 128-129). Dual-use satellite technology has been vital for the US military in offering a tactical edge on the battlefield, with 80% of its satellite communications needs being derived from commercial satellites (Hampson, 2017: 7). The reliance on these networks forms a component of the broader US military doctrine of ‘space control’, part of which aims to secure the transmission of commercial satellite data that will prevent the exposure of sensitive military tactics (Peña & Hudgins, 2002). Whilst the OST does not contain any clauses specifying the rules or regulations of data monitoring in space, any form of malicious or illegal surveillance can be seen to violate Article XI, which requires states to: “Inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations as well as to the public and international scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practical, of the nature, conduct, locations and results of [space] activities” (UN, 1967). Yet, legal scholars have claimed that this clause is significantly weak, since states can withhold vital information about their space activities on the basis that the dissemination of such information is neither ‘feasible’ nor ‘practical’ (Chatterjee, 2014: 31-32). The absence of any clear UN guidelines has also meant that American satellite corporations are increasingly capable of refusing to state their intentions, or who their customers are – with the US government being one of these elusive clients. The 1994 Presidential Decision Decree-23 authorised the US government to require firms to either limit or stop sales of certain satellite images through a process known as ‘shutter control’. It is controversial because it designates the US executive branch the ability to limit publicly accessible information in certain circumstances, possibly violating First Amendment rights (Livingston & Robinson, 2003: 12). During the 2001 War in Afghanistan, the US government bought the rights to all orbital images taken over the theatre of operations by GeoEye’s Ikonos satellite on the grounds of ‘national security’ (The Guardian, 2001). However, media groups accused the government deal of preventing them from informing the public about matters of critical importance that in no way implicated national security, including the independent verification of government claims concerning damage to civilian structures and possible casualties (Livingston & Robinson, 2003: 12). These measures therefore undermined the OST’s Article XI clause by concealing important information to the public when it was feasibly possible, through the guise of national security discourse. At the same time, it allowed the US government to manipulate media coverage of areas it deems to be essential for conditioning public war support in Afghanistan, whilst simultaneously strengthening its space control doctrine. In many ways this strategy can also be seen as facilitating a ‘global panoptical’ intelligence network (Backer, 2008). **By extending the private-public hybrid structure of surveillance into outer space, businesses and governments have the opportunity to observe millions of global citizens unknowingly at any one point – and with it – immense amounts of data.** Given that GeoEye received nearly two million dollars in contract-related fees from the US government for its Ikonos pictures (The New York Times, 2001), this could incentivise the commercial satellite industry to continue to restrict data that might serve the interests of citizens globally. As such, satellite imaging may turn into a form of orbital data-siphoning where companies conducting observations in space could sell off their data to the highest bidder, with a concerning disregard for privacy rights. Indeed, the revelations surrounding Cambridge Analytica and Facebook have underscored the extent to which private entities are monetising off the sensitive information of their consumers unknowingly (Balkin, 2018: 2050-2051).

#### Amending space iLAW is an opportunity to reframe traditional IR discussions about sustainable use and security concerns

Sutch and Roberts 19 (Peter Sutch Department of Politics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK and Department of Politics, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, and Peri Roberts Department of Politics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK), “Outer space and neo-colonial injustice: Distributive justice and the continuous scramble for dominium”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol 46, Issue 11, August 23rd, 2019, <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/IJSE-03-2019-0152/full/html> NT

The global commons: a brief sketch At their heart, the remarkable early debates about global commons exploitation and management explored the ways in which we might order the regimes governing the deep sea bed and outer space to the benefit of all humankind, with special provision for the needs of less developed states, and with a view to avoiding the conflict and suffering associated with colonialism and war. While the negotiations of what we now know as common heritage regimes really got going in the late 1950s, as previously unavailable natural resource pools became a subject of international interest, it is worth setting the scene by thinking about the nature of property rights in general. This helps us understand the unique way in which the conventional commons sought to govern these resources. Property is a legal construct. There are a variety of ways in which property rights can be assigned but the developed global commons solution was distinctive. Christopher Joyner’s exploration of the legal implications of the common heritage regime that was to govern property rights in the global commons begins (as do many accounts) with the traditional roman law distinction between res nullius and res communis. These terms apply to property or to space that is not owned by anyone. If that space is res nullius then it is open to “appropriation and exploitation by anyone who is capable of carrying out those acts” ( Joyner, 1986, p. 194). Sovereignty is gained, and exclusive property rights established, by demonstrating control over that space by settling it or exercising jurisdiction over it. **On the other hand, if the area is considered res communis it is land owned by no one, open for use by all but not available for appropriation and so not available to become the exclusive property of any one person or any one nation** ( Joyner, 1986, p. 194). Here agents have free access but never gain exclusive title to the resources in question. International or global spaces, such as the sea and the resources therein, were traditionally thought of in res communis terms as, for example, “free seas”. However, when advances in scientific knowledge made it clear that the assumptions of inexhaustibility, the thought that resources were renewable and sustainable enough to provide for all indefinitely, that partly underpins the concept of free seas are problematic this (in addition to several other concerns about the consequences of establishing a res communis regime in the high seas) invited a different approach to at least some questions of property (Schrijver and Prislan, 2009). Under emerging and innovative global commons rules spaces designated as such could not be appropriated and access to the resources of that space had to be carefully managed to ensure sustainability of access for all, at present and in the future. The conception of unowned resources and property in a global commons regime is therefore distinct from res nullius regimes because it denies the right of appropriation and it is distinct from res communis regimes because it denies unfettered access, replacing it with some form of regulated access. The questions of what spaces or resource should be thought of in these terms, what the term implied (about distributive or intergenerational justice, for example), how the space and resources at stake were to be managed and administered, and what obligations the administrators had to humankind as a whole all formed part of the elaborate and often painstaking negotiations regarding property rights and benefit sharing underpinning the international conventions that emerged, and they continue to be hotbeds of legal, political and normative contention. The strongest or most redistributive approach to global commons governance is the notion that the resources at stake were to be treated as the “common heritage of mankind”. The central feature here is that these areas, and the resources therein, need to be managed for the common good. Common features of such regimes include pacific use, sustainable exploitation or conservation, shared scientific advancement, intergenerational justice and distributive justice, albeit to differing degrees across the range of regimes. **Important to the development of such regimes was the thought that the international community needed both to respond to the inequalities associated with colonialism and avoid the consequences for both security and justice of a scramble for dominium over these spaces that was explicitly likened to the colonial “scramble for Africa”** (Pardo, 1967). These were widely understood to be important, but not uncontentious, drivers in these debates. We should understand that the key parties often had differing aspirations for ad interpretations of the idea of the “common heritage of mankind”. The states advocating a NIEO in the aftermath of post-war decolonisation had a distinctive take on the commons ideal, very different from that of many of the more developed states. Socialist states took a different view to the liberal-capitalist states. Key states (perhaps most tellingly the USA) even took such contrasting views at different points in the debates over the period from the 1950s to the present day that it prompts at least one scholar to ask whether the USA’s initial, powerful support for the common heritage ideal is sufficient to make a case from the principle of estoppel that the more laissez faire or neo-liberal approach adopted in the later period is unlawful (Blaser, 1990, p. 87). Several alternative statements of the broad ideals have also been advanced and agreed, such as the idea that such resources might be considered the “common interest of mankind” (The Antarctic Treaty, 1959) or the “common province of all mankind” (Outer Space Treaty, 1967) and related but more general terms such as “the common concern of humanity” (Shelton, 2009). **Changing debates about how we ought to govern the commons have been primarily prompted by advances in science and technology that had important international ramifications for the potential exploitation of resources** rather than by the rise of a philosophical or conceptual notion of the commons. However, early interventions – direct in the case of Arvid Pardo’s (1967) speech to the UN General Assembly and indirect in the form of Garrett Hardin’s (1968) influential paper “The Tragedy of the Commons” in Science – led to some of the most fascinating debates in global politics. These debates about the commons of the sea, outer space and, in a slightly different fashion, the Antarctic all have their roots in the period after the Second World War. Whilst the prospect of immense mineral wealth on the ocean floor had been apparent from as early as 1873, with the “Challenger” voyage which had found polymetallic nodules on the sea bed (Deacon et al., 2001 in Schrijver and Prislan, 2009, p. 177), it was not until the 1960s and the 1970s, when further wealth in the form of polymetallic sulphides and ferromanganese crusts were discovered, that the estimated wealth from these rich mineral deposits became the subject of international concern and debate. Also, in 1957 the launch of “Sputnik I” galvanised the international community and the academic community to think seriously about the challenges and possibilities of space exploration. Finally, in 1958, disputed territorial claims, as well as concerns over sustainable whaling and access to other marine resource and associated security claims, led to the negotiation of the Antarctic regime (Buck, 1998, chapter 3). The designation and acceptance of each of these as “commons” was to be the subject of separate negotiations, but the shared political and historical context of scientific development, post-colonialism, and an emphasis on peace informed by the tragedy of two global conflicts meant that there was much cross-fertilisation between these negotiations. They also shared key drivers of debate in the prospect of incredible wealth that is not yet owned by anyone and in the security implications of these newly accessible spaces. **These were debates in which the values of security, economic exploitation and distributive justice were inextricably intertwined**. This is, perhaps, most straightforwardly illustrated with a closer look at the evolution of conventions and laws governing outer space. Global commons debates, outer space and the deep sea bed Prior to the 1957 launch of “Sputnik I” by the USSR there had been some growing interest among scholars in the prospect of space exploration and its implication for the global legal order. However, it was the success of the Soviet launch that placed the issues firmly on the agenda of the international community and pushed the USA to what President Eisenhower termed the “Sputnik crisis” triggering the “space race” between the two superpowers (Devine, 1993). The USA entered the race in 1958 with the launch of “Vanguard I” and, while the initial driver of the competition was security concerns (the possibility of Soviet missiles in orbit), the launch of commercial communications satellites and later the prospect of the commercial exploitation of extra-terrestrial resources has driven both the politics and conceptualisation of outer space in equally significant ways (Vogler, 2000, p. 95; Tronchetti, 2009). As early as 1952 Oscar Schachter, then Director of the United Nations Legal Department, referred to space as “common property of mankind over which no nation would be permitted to exercise its domination” (Blaser, 1990, pp. 80-81, see also Tronchetti, 2009, p. 91). Scholarly debates revisited the distinction between res nullius and res communis and, argues Tronchetti, “use the term res communis omnium to point out the fact that no state’s sovereignty can be exercised in outer space, because it represents an area of common interest of all mankind” (Tronchetti, 2009, p. 12). This idea, that property rights in outer space ought to be managed as res communis because space was an area of common interest to all mankind, was to have a very significant impact on the later evolution of space law. In 1958 the United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 1348 (XIII) on the peaceful uses of outer space. The resolution established an ad hoc committee which one year later, under UNGA resolution 1472 (XIV), became the permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). That resolution, and subsequent ones, retained the references to “the common interest of mankind” and when in 1963 the “Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space” was adopted by the General Assembly (UNGA res 1962 (XIII)) the phrase became a fixture in the debates (Tronchetti, 2009, p. 16). In fact, the declaration prefigured what is often referred to as the Magna Carta of space law, the Outer Space Treaty (OST – Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies 1967). The first four articles of the OST set the general tenor of all future debates: ARTICLE I The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of all mankind. Outer space […] shall be free for exploration and use by all States […] on a basis of equality […] and there shall be free access to all areas of celestial bodies. ARTICLE II Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty […] 1295 Outer space and neo-colonial injustice ARTICLE III States […] shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space […] in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. ARTICLE IV […] The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. (www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html, accessed 24 October 2018) The language is striking and focussed on both pacific use and shared benefits. The treaty establishes three rights ( free access, exploration and use) all of which are to be carried out for the benefit and interest of all countries. As Tronchetti notes: In general terms this provision means that the exploration and use of outer space, being the “province of all mankind”, is not aimed at serving only the interests of those states that have the technological capability to explore and utilize outer space, **but those of all states, no matter what their degree of economic and scientific development is**. Only mankind acting collectively, by way of international cooperation, has the right to enjoy the benefits derived from space activities and to establish how to share them among all nations. (Tronchetti, 2009, pp. 23-4) Much scholarly effort has been expended on the fascinating project of working through potential differences between the “common province of mankind” and the several related notions found in other treaties and conventions developed to deal with commons, such as the “common heritage of mankind”, “common interest of mankind” and “common concern of mankind”. However, the normative key may lie in trying to understand what follows from the idea that such spaces are common to mankind, regardless of the precise phraseology. Indeed, whilst this variety in concepts could be regarded as a weakness (Blaser, 1990, p. 80) it can also be seen as a strength because it becomes clear that a radical set of ideas have developed and been cemented into the past, current and potentially future discourses. **It demonstrates that each time the International Community has encountered a new resource pool becoming available for development, for which questions of sustainable and equitable exploitation emerge alongside security concerns about military use, their debates have circled in on the set of potentially radical notions and values that we find in diverse commons regimes.** It is worth emphasising that each iteration of the diplomatic, scholarly and institutional conversation has had to return again to the core questions of what the fact that the commons are “common to mankind” means in moral and practical terms and, importantly, it has not seemed fully appropriate to just set these values aside. Facing the contemporary challenge posed by US policy is no different and our debates must, once again, return to these questions.

#### Doesn’t violate our interp – resolved denotes a policy

Merriam Webster '18 (Merriam Webster; 2018 Edition; Online dictionary and legal resource; Merriam Webster, "resolve," <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resolve;> RP)

: a legal or official determination especially: a legislative declaration

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

## Case

### Framing

#### The role of the ballot is to determine if the aff’s a good idea—anything else is self-serving, arbitrary and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### Focus on large scale catastrophes is good and they outweigh – appeals to social costs, moral rules, and securitization play into cognitive biases and flawed risk calculus – 2020 is living proof

Weber 20 (ELKE U. WEBER is Gerhard R. Andlinger Professor in Energy and the Environment and Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at Princeton University.), November-December 2020 Issue, "Heads in the Sand," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2020-10-13/heads-sand> mvp

We are living in a time of crisis. From the immediate challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic to the looming existential threat of climate change, the world is grappling with massive global dangers—to say nothing of countless problems within countries, such as inequality, cyberattacks, unemployment, systemic racism, and obesity. In any given crisis, the right response is often clear. Wear a mask and keep away from other people. Burn less fossil fuel. Redistribute income. Protect digital infrastructure. The answers are out there. What’s lacking are governments that can translate them into actual policy. As a result, the crises continue. The death toll from the pandemic skyrockets, and the world makes dangerously slow progress on climate change, and so on.

It’s no secret how governments should react in times of crisis. First, they need to be nimble. Nimble means moving quickly, because problems often grow at exponential rates: a contagious virus, for example, or greenhouse gas emissions. That makes early action crucial and procrastination disastrous. Nimble also means adaptive. Policymakers need to continuously adjust their responses to crises as they learn from their own experience and from the work of scientists. Second, governments need to act wisely. That means incorporating the full range of scientific knowledge available about the problem at hand. It means embracing uncertainty, rather than willfully ignoring it. And it means thinking in terms of a long time horizon, rather than merely until the next election. But so often, policymakers are anything but nimble and wise. They are slow, inflexible, uninformed, overconfident, and myopic.

Why is everyone doing so badly? Part of the explanation lies in the inherent qualities of crises. Crises typically require navigating between risks. In the COVID-19 pandemic, policymakers want to save lives and jobs. With climate change, they seek a balance between avoiding extreme weather and allowing economic growth. Such tradeoffs are hard as it is, and they are further complicated by the fact that costs and benefits are not evenly distributed among stakeholders, making conflict a seemingly unavoidable part of any policy choice. Vested interests attempt to forestall needed action, using their money to influence decision-makers and the media. To make matters worse, policymakers must pay sustained attention to multiple issues and multiple constituencies over time. They must accept large amounts of uncertainty. Often, then, the easiest response is to stick with the status quo. But that can be a singularly dangerous response to many new hazards. After all, with the pandemic, business as usual would mean no social distancing. With climate change, it would mean continuing to burn fossil fuels.

But the explanation for humanity’s woeful response to crises goes beyond politics and incentives. To truly understand the failure to act, one must turn to human psychology. It is there that one can grasp the full impediments to proper decision-making—the cognitive biases, emotional reactions, and suboptimal shortcuts that hold policymakers back—and the tools to overcome them.

AVOIDING THE UNCOMFORTABLE

People are singularly bad at predicting and preparing for catastrophes. Many of these events are “black swans,” rare and unpredictable occurrences that most people find difficult to imagine, seemingly falling into the realm of science fiction. Others are “gray rhinos,” large and not uncommon threats that are still neglected until they stare you in the face (such as a coronavirus outbreak). Then there are “invisible gorillas,” threats in full view that should be noticed but aren’t—so named for a psychological experiment in which subjects watching a clip of a basketball game were so fixated on the players that they missed a person in a gorilla costume walking through the frame. Even professional forecasters, including security analysts, have a poor track record when it comes to accurately anticipating events. The COVID-19 crisis, in which a dystopic science-fiction narrative came to life and took everyone by surprise, serves as a cautionary tale about humans’ inability to foresee important events.

Not only do humans fail to anticipate crises; they also fail to respond rationally to them. At best, people display “bounded rationality,” the idea that instead of carefully considering their options and making perfectly rational decisions that optimize their preferences, humans in the real world act quickly and imperfectly, limited as they are by time and cognitive capacity. Add in the stress generated by crises, and their performance gets even worse.

Because humans don’t have enough time, information, or processing power to deliberate rationally, they have evolved easier ways of making decisions. They rely on their emotions, which serve as an early warning system of sorts: alerting people that they are in a positive context that can be explored and exploited or in a negative context where fight or flight is the appropriate response. They also rely on rules. To simplify decision-making, they might follow standard operating procedures or abide by some sort of moral code. They might decide to imitate the action taken by other people whom they trust or admire. They might follow what they perceive to be widespread norms. Out of habit, they might continue to do what they have been doing unless there is overwhelming evidence against it.

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Humans evolved these shortcuts because they require little effort and work well in a broad range of situations. Without access to a real-time map of prey in different hunting grounds, for example, a prehistoric hunter might have resorted to a simple rule of thumb: look for animals where his fellow tribesmen found them yesterday. But in times of crisis, emotions and rules are not always helpful drivers of decision-making. High stakes, uncertainty, tradeoffs, and conflict—all elicit negative emotions, which can impede wise responses. Uncertainty is scary, as it signals an inability to predict what will happen, and what cannot be predicted might be deadly. The vast majority of people are already risk averse under normal circumstances. Under stress, they become even more so, and they retreat to the familiar comfort of the status quo. From gun laws to fossil fuel subsidies, once a piece of legislation is in place, it is hard to dislodge it, even when cost-benefit analysis argues for change.

#### Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures – they contest the implausibility of inequitable structures producing catastrophe and generate imagination of futures of social justice outside of current narratives

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue>

* Squo power structures (i.e. what the K criticizes) paint themselves as stable/inevitable to project their power and maintain dominance
* Questioning that stability thru extinction narratives questions squo world orders bc it calls into ques the idea of squo world stability which allows us to envision alternative worlds/future i.e. one where it fails and causes extinction
* Justifies extinction focus and preventing extinction in the name of changing those squo structures

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the statusquo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

### Presumption

#### Presumption:

#### A – Systems – the 1AC argues that material events and institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions

#### B – Spillover – the aff assumes that its advocacy of a certain affect is sufficient to result in the liberation of the flesh BUT they are missing a robust internal link to solving oppression inside OR outside the round

#### C – Academia – the 1AC is a regurgitation of knowledge that already exists within academia which proves they aren’t a departure from the status quo and voting aff is not intrinsic to affirming

#### D – Competition – debate is not the forum for social change or revolutionary movements – its competitive nature swallows aff movements since teams ally themselves with people who vote for them and read their arguments, but alienate those who are forced to debate them – this proves their model forwards exclusion and their movements fail due to creating allies based on competition rather than those who genuinely support your project

### Structuralism

#### 1] It’s wrong – structuralism can’t explain why methods of reform and assimilation change over time – even if they win a structural antagonism or logic of elimination, that relationship can only be realized in harmful ways if external structures allow it – proves settler violence is contingent.

#### 2] Prefer historical analysis – just bc things are bad doesn’t mean they haven’t gotten better – linear reform like the initially flawed American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 that was then amended twice in 1984 to close loopholes that criminalized substance use, McGirt v Oklahoma, or Deb Haaland’s appointment as secretary of the interior all prove that reforms aren’t one and done actions of token sympathy but instead lay the groundwork for an optimistic historical arc.

#### 3] Reject the aff’s Sophie’s Choice for Natives—leaving multiple options for survival on the table is necessary for indigenous people to effectively resist colonization

Grande 07

(Sandy Grande, Connecticut College education associate professor], Critical Pedagogy: Where are we now? By Peter McLaren, “Red Lake Woebegone: Pedagogy, Decolonization, and the Critical Project” p330, http://books.google.com/books?id=M97YKJdkJbcCandq=sandy+grande#v=onepageandq=grammar20of20empireandf=false, p.330, accessed 3-17-14)

Audre Lorde’s essay, The Master’s Tools Will Not Dismantle the Master’s House, is one of the most quoted essays in academic history and, I would also venture to say, one that needs rethinking. While it is self-evident that indigenous knowledge is essential to the process of decolonization, I would also argue that the Master’s tools are necessary. Otherwise, to take Audre Lorde seriously means to create a dichotomy between the tools of the colonizer and those of the colonized. Such a dichotomy leaves the indigenous scholar to grapple with a kind of “Sophie’s Choice” moment where one feels compelled to choose between retaining their integrity (identity) as a Naitve scholar by employing only indigenous knowledge or to “sell out” and employ the frames of Western knowledge. Does it signify a final submission to the siren’s son, seducing us into the colonialist abyss with promises of empowerment? Or is it the necessary first step in reclaiming and decolonizing an intellectual space – an inquiry rom – of our own? Such questions provoke beyond the bounds of academic exercise, suggesting instead the need for an academic exorcism. The demon to be purged is the specter of colonialism. As indigenous scholars, we live within, against, and outside of its constant company, witnessing its various manifestations as it shape-shifts its way into everything from research and public policy to textbooks and classrooms. Thus, the colonial tax of Native scholars not only requires a renegotiation of personal identity but also an analysis of how whole nations get trans- or (dis)figured when articulated through Western frames of knowing. As Edward Said observes, “institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles” all support to the “Western discourse” (Said, 1985, p. 2). In other words, is it possible to engage the grammar of empire without replicating its effects? At the same time indigenous scholars entertain these ruminations, Native communities continue to be impacted and transformed by the forces of colonization, rendering the “choice” of whether to employ Western knowledge in the process of defining indigenous pedagogies essentially moot. In other words, by virtue of living in this world and having to negotiate the forces of colonization, indigenous scholars are given no choice but to know, understand, and acquire the grammar of empire as well as develop the skills to contest it. The relationship between the two is not some liberal dream of multicultural harmony but rather the critical and dialogical tension between competing moral visions.

#### 4] The structuralism of their method is a fatalist mentality that makes colonialism inevitable

Macoun and Strakosch, 13

(Alissa Macoun, Indigenous Studies Research Network, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. Elizabeth Strakosch, Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney, Sydney, Australia. “The Ethical Demands of Settler Colonial Theory” https://www.academia.edu/3641917/The\_Ethical\_Demands\_of\_Settler\_Colonial\_Theory) Henge

Firstly, by disturbing settler colonialism’s narratives of progress, SCT attributes a peculiar suspended temporality to the settler project. This can portray settler colonialism as an inevitable structure likely to exist across time – the fact that the past persists in the present implies that this past will also persist in the future. Foundational scholar Patrick Wolfe has been labelled ‘very much a structuralist stuck in a poststructuralist world’.63 As we have outlined, this structuralism is particularly useful in identifying the operation of political hierarchies. However, it can also excuse us from human political action in the present by presenting this action as futile or already determined.64 The role of political activists is to wait for the structurally determined future, and at most to prepare others for its arrival. The particular challenge of SCT’s analysis is that it does not give an account of such a transformed future, or of the conditions for settler colonialism’s demise. This can lead to a theoretical and political impasse and result in a kind of colonial fatalism. Such fatalism can be deployed to imply a moral equivalence between different forms of settler political interaction with Indigenous people, and, at its worst, to deny the legitimacy of Indigenous resistances. Structuralist narratives are able to posit radical change, but only if this change is built into the structures they describe – for example because these structures are subject to internal contradictions or are inherently unstable. Settler colonial structures, however, appear as highly stable and ‘relatively impervious to regime change’.65 Therefore, at the same moment settler scholars finally see the depth and reach of settler colonialism in the present they feel unable to find ‘postsettler colonial passages’.66 This tendency is reinforced by SCT’s capacity to identify significant commonalities in the objectives of conservative and progressive policy approaches, as discussed above. It shows that traditional ‘decolonizing’ pathways such as treaty making, reconciliation and formal apologies may also serve colonial ends by absorbing and extinguishing Aboriginal political difference without disturbing the foundational structures of settler dominance. As Australian anthropologist Deborah Bird Rose notes, this makes it ‘difficult to offer a critique of the colonizing features without calling into question the whole decolonizing project’.67 If every settler action is framed as always already colonizing, then individuals are excused from anti-colonial action

in the present and Indigenous people are destined to be victims of an unstoppable colonizing state.68 As bell hooks argues in relation to US race relations, this is useful to those in a position of dominance: ‘so many White people are eager to believe racism cannot be changed because internalizing that assumption downplays the issue of accountability. No responsibility need be taken for not changing something if it is perceived as immutable.’69 Is it possible that settlers are particularly attracted to SCT precisely because it gives us a sense of being intellectually committed to the end of colonialism while simultaneously unable to act against our own privilege? As a recent article concluded about the prospects for decolonization: I can only assess this with a degree of gloom. I am yet to be convinced that we can prevent indigenous disadvantage remaining structurally embedded in society and through the state even after any kind of ‘transition’ or ‘transformation’. At the same time, I fear decolonization. I am myself a settler, like several of my ancestors before me, and I have nowhere else to belong.70 SCT’s structuralism may serve these conflicted interests, in allowing us to feel we have done all we can while facing the ‘reality’ of an inevitable settler colonial future. This structuralism gives many within settler colonial studies a particular orientation towards Indigenous resistance and scholarship. Australian scholar Tim Rowse argues that critical settler perspectives on colonialism can ‘reproduce that sorrowing form of attention in which defeat and marginality are highlighted at the expense of understanding the nature and limits of the Indigenous agency that circumstances afforded’.71 He and others suggest that this sort of analysis caricatures Indigenous responses, presenting a false binary between resistance/sovereignty and co-optation in the colonizing process.72 This, they suggest, leads scholars to position one sort of Indigenous response as more valid and authentic than others, re-performing the authority settlers have always claimed over definitions of Indigenous reality. Joanne Barker identifies a ‘troubled focus within settler colonial studies on structure to the erasure of Indigenous experiences and perspectives about colonialism even within analyses of the “logic of elimination” that fuels colonial processes of social formation.’73 SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences.74 Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency.75 Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.

### Double Turns

#### 1] Equating settler expansion into the solar system as settler colonialism is a move to innocence – asteroids and ice shards aren’t Indigenous people and labeling that appropriation as clearing or genocide is colonial equivocation that homogenizes all violence and imperial activity into a narrow frame of decolonial frameworks, which decreases the potency and accuracy of those frameworks

#### 2] Abstract decolonization is a form of affective catharsis which is settler innocence— “we decolonize but won’t even consider what that looks like” in debate locks in settlerism by erasing indigenous life.

Hawari et al. 19 - Yara Hawari (Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter), Sharri Plonski (School of Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary, University of London) & Elian Weizman (Department of Politics and International Studies, SOAS, University of London), 2019, “Seeing Israel through Palestine: knowledge production as anti-colonial praxis”, Settler Colonial Studies, 9:1, 155-175, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2018.1487129 WJ

Since the settler colonial drive is anchored in the complete takeover of territory and erasure of the native’s presence – an evolving process of normalising and affixing the settler’s presence on the land and with it, the hierarchies, structures and constructions of the colonial relationship33 – the struggle to decolonise is bound up with negating this very process. It is about de-normalising and rejecting the production of settler knowledge; and at the same time constructing alternative knowledge that can support and sustain a decolonised future. Accordingly, this work should be understood as part of the larger counter-hegemonic project, one that rejects existing representations and denies the normalisation of existing power relations. Yet, it is, as Gramsci argues, something that happens gradually, evolving through the production of subjects and supporters, and incorporated into the institutions and ideologies that constitute state and society. Thus, we would argue that the struggle for liberation from oppression, for the decolonisation of life and land in settler states, calls for a ‘war of position’, fought in the trenches of civil society, of state institutions, in daily life.34 In Rita Dhamoon’s work on the expansive nature of settler colonial hegemony, she explains that while settler colonialism is a ‘structure’, at the same time, it is not a ‘meta structure’. On the contrary,

It is composed of a series of structures and processes, and also part of a series of structures of domination or a matrix of domination. In other words, settler colonialism is both generative of and generated by intersecting and interactive forces of power.35

The implication of this is significant for a praxis of decolonisation, as it opens up the space for resistance and for change. It foments the possibility of creating alliances and collective action, in order to disrupt and expose as well as confront multiple dimensions of the matrix of domination. Simultaneously, the possibility opens for developing new frames, new ways of knowing, and new ways of thinking.

Anti-colonial theory ‘cogently speaks to the imperial present from, with, through and against the colonial past’, and forms an alternative body of knowledge that is instilled through local knowledge.36 Drawing inspiration from anti-colonial thinkers, the praxis of both anti-colonial and decolonial knowledge production must, therefore, include several facets. First and foremost, it must be part of a liberatory movement, committed to challenging and dismantling colonial imposition, and all relations of domination. In parallel, it must engage in the empirical and theoretical study of the nature and extent of particular and general relations of domination and the multiple sites of power. This work should be grounded in the understanding that decolonial knowledge is ‘an epistemology of the colonized, anchored in the Indigenous sense of collective and common colonial consciousness’.37 This does not simply demand a reoriented lens, but a practice that shifts how we think and do research, with the potential towards transformation.

Thinking through the role and function of contemporary Israel Studies in this light, reveals the need to confront and unravel its premises and its modes of operation; to contest it by advancing, rather than dismissing, understanding of Israeli state and society. It is our contention that redrawing the parameters around which Israel is studied, and thus encountering Israel in its raw and problematic form as part of how Palestine is studied and engaged with, is key to challenging and dismantling the new hegemony of Israel Studies; and to reconnecting the intellectual examination of Israel with the movement to liberate Palestine. We argue that what is needed are precise analyses of the material history of Israel’s settler colonial project, as well as the assemblage of educational practices used to bolster it, in order to carve out a vision for how to challenge and transform it, and ultimately de-colonise it. To do so, it will be necessary to shift the voices and lenses through which this develops: to begin by emphasising, as Zu’bi, Mbembe and Linda Tuhiwai Smith do, the colonising effects of settler knowledge production, which sees indigenous peoples as objects of research as opposed to subjects; and thus to work, as Timothy Mitchell argues regarding the colonisation of Egypt, through the lens of colonised peoples to analyse the coloniser, and thus the indigenous experience of colonisation. And then, with this knowledge as a guide, we need to develop an educational practice in which the agents and subjects of knowledge and research are turned on their head.38

However, we argue that in order to recalibrate how we approach the study of Israel we must first take into account the shifting terrain within Palestine Studies, particularly in its engagements with critical paradigms. In particular, we must consider the call by Shihade and others for the decolonisation of Palestine Studies through the framework of Indigenous (and anti-colonial) knowledge; a demand that is more than a call to look at Israel through a settler colonial lens, but to understand how studies of and in the Middle East have been shaped by settler colonial and neoliberal hegemony, and thus must be challenged and transformed.39

Finding new terrain in critical studies of Palestine and Israel

In 2013, the guest editors of the special issue of Settler Colonial Studies entitled ‘Past is Present: Settler Colonialism in Palestine’ called for a new praxis for the study of Palestine, in which decolonisation and liberation are reclaimed as part of our analytical reading of the case.40 The essence of their argument focused on the severed link between liberation methodologies and analytical rigour in the study of Palestine and the resulting lost engagement/relationship between ‘movement’ and ‘scholarship’ that once shaped the core of the field.41 They argued that the shift was informed by new politics and priorities since the inauguration of ‘the Oslo Process’ that concentrated Palestine into a confined territorial space whilst at the same time failing to address its past and present. The effect of this has been to erase the ongoing colonial legacy of Zionism (inside and outside academia) and to normalise settler colonial relations in Palestine. The call was an attempt to realign the fractured and flattened analysis of racialised violence, dispossession and elimination in Palestine, with both old and new frameworks for conceptualising these as part of the global project of settler colonial and capitalist relations. The practicalities of this require engagement in comparative, intersectional analysis that situates Zionist settler colonialism as part of, as Lorenzo Veracini labels it, the ‘settler colonial present’,42 and treats, Salamanca et al. have argued, the anti-colonial struggle in Palestine as ‘embedded within, and empowered by, broader struggles – all anti-imperial, all antiracist, and all struggling to make another world possible’.43 Moreover, crucially, the new trajectory of scholarship, they argued, must reiterate the fact that ‘Palestinians are an indigenous people, and (there must be) an alignment of Palestine scholarship with indigenous and native studies.’44

One should see the 2012 special issue as part (rather than the initiator) of this shift in both the field of critical Palestine Studies and the disciplinary conversation around settler colonialism; a zeitgeist once again mirroring politics on the ground. In parallel with the failings of Oslo,45 a floodgate of new research had been opened that has re-rendered Palestine through the lens of ‘settler colonialism’; at the same time, Settler Colonial Studies increasingly became centred on Palestine, re-writing its structural features through analyses of this case.46 This range of work has succeeded in revealing the violence of Israel as a settler state in high-profile journals, academic conferences, university classrooms and disciplinary associations, and thus in achieving its goals of re-configuring the conversation around Israel in critical academic circles. Yet, these successes, which are still partial and often marginalised within academic institutional spaces, emphasise both the ways in which critical research contributes to counter-hegemonic practices, and how hegemonic knowledge is reasserted and reproduced, as it contends with the new turn in Settler Colonial Studies.

This is evident if we consider that while the new research agenda in critical Palestine Studies is clearly anchored in the scholarly legacy of Palestine liberation research (initially outlined in 1965 by the PLO Research Centre), it also seems decidedly distant from it – to such a degree that, as Barakat has noted, it is barely ever referenced.47 Researchers from this earlier period found their inspiration and comparative landscape from post-colonial African states that had fought and won their liberation struggles, with Fanon as their theoretical mouthpiece and Algeria as their signpost (and ultimately, renewing this connection was at the heart of the special issue’s call for analytical resurgence).48 Conversely, current scholarship increasingly places Palestine alongside those states whose settler projects have remained resilient by embedding themselves in liberal and neoliberal state structures such as in the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This has connected the trajectory of this research with the paradigm developed by Patrick Wolfe (and later Veracini), in which settler colonialism is a ‘structure not an event’, and elimination – which is both a ‘logic’ and a ‘practice’ – operates at multiple levels and in multiple ways to efface indigenous systems of life and territoriality. As part of this process, settlers rewrite the legal, geographic and social matrix of their new homes, enabling them to hide (and even forget) their character, becoming natives, through normalising their privileges and modes of violence.

49

The issue highlighted here is not the shift in comparative case studies, nor the new depth with which Wolfe and Veracini understood the distinctiveness of settler colonialism vis-a-vis other colonial projects. Both the Algerian and the American context are relevant and enrich analyses of settler colonial relations in Palestine and vice versa. However, as Algeria and other post-colonial states have disappeared from the cutting edge of settler colonial analytics (in Palestine and elsewhere),50 research priorities have shifted from how settler colonialism ends, to how it continues. The subtlety of this change makes discussion of anti-colonial resistance, indigenous futurity, and decolonisation less concrete; and thus settler colonial relations has become an increasingly comfortable terrain for interrogation in spaces and among scholars that are disconnected from political movements on the ground. This is not to say that settler colonialism is not still a trigger to those seeking to control the discourse around Israel, given the problematic questions it poses around Israel’s ‘normal’ status in the world (as the Berkeley example cited above clearly demonstrates). Yet, as it is increasingly folded into academic arenas, and given legitimacy within hegemonic institutions, settler colonialism becomes another debated, intellectual framework: a way of understanding a system of power, divorced from practices actually seeking to transform it. To the point where such paradigms feel comfortable and ordinary in spaces and systems they are meant to disrupt.51

Thus, in navigating sites of hegemonic knowledge production, it will not be enough to simply study Israel (or any settler colonial state) through ‘the Settler Colonial paradigm’, as it is often labelled. It will require turning the framework on its head, to look at Israel through the lens of Palestine; to look at settler colonialism through the lens of those who want to end it and link it to the goal of decolonisation.52 Following the lead offered by many Indigenous scholars and scholars of Indigenous Studies, it is our contention that lessons for how and from where to start will come from working within the frame offered by ‘Indigenous Studies’ – a body of scholarship and community of scholars that link an analytical process to its material goals, and treat knowledge production as both a theory and a praxis, upon which collective organising is based. Yet, the large-scale embrace of settler colonial studies by Palestinian scholars and scholars of Palestine Studies has also been accompanied with some apprehension on locating scholarship on Palestine within Indigenous Studies. This has also been reflected in the Palestinian national political project, as perhaps best exemplified by the statement made by Yasser Arafat during the siege of his compound in 2004 by the Israeli army, in which he stated ‘We are not Red Indians.’53 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to address Indigeneity as it is understood within the Palestinian national project, this statement by Arafat reveals an important and common assumption about Indigenous peoples that is also present amongst those scholars working in the field: that the settler colonial project has been successful in North America and that the ‘Red Indians’ have been wiped out. Indeed, Nadim Rouhana, drawing upon (albeit misrepresenting) Mahmoud Mamdani’s explorations of settler colonial typologies, explains that unlike North America, where settler colonialism has triumphed, the Zionist settler colonial project is ongoing and ‘its outcome is still undetermined’.54 Rouhana goes on to describe the exceptionality of the Israeli settler colonial case ‘because its main goal is still actively challenged and resisted by a nation that Zionism has defeated but failed to reduce to the status of indigenous populations in “triumphed” settler-colonial cases’.55 As exemplified in the work of Audra Simpson, Coulthard, Tuhiwai Smith and others – not to mention ongoing and powerful movements for Indigenous sovereignty throughout the continent – this dismissal of Indigenous peoples and Indigenous struggles in North America ultimately relegates the settler colonial structure (in Palestine, as much as anywhere else) to an event, fixed and limited to a particular space and time.56

These undertones of defeat, fragility and extinction that are evoked with discussion of indigeneity, are reflected among some of those working within the academic field of Palestine Studies, and have become a key facet of the hegemonic approaches we are seeking to disrupt. This notion of extinction has serious temporal implications as it relegates Indigenous peoples to history, with settler colonialism as something that happened to them rather than something that continues to happen to them. It moreover problematically situates Israel in ahistorical terms – an exception that leads to a lack of comparative analysis between Palestinians and other indigenous peoples, despite the paradoxical use of settler colonial analytics as a way of understanding the state’s logics and actions. Brenna Bhandar and Rafeef Ziadah highlight this problem and make the case for a comparative approach within settler colonial scholarship and political organising circles that ‘must attend to the political-economic and juridical formations that subtend colonization as a process’.57 Steven Salaita similarly argues that Indigeneity must be conceptualised as a global political category and as such, decolonisation in Palestine must be part and parcel of a global process.58 The term Indigenous peoples is thus one that connotes and connects people’s experiences and struggles in the face of ongoing colonisation; an idea we believe is central to the unsettling of knowledge of settler relations in Palestine.59

The growing discord between Settler Colonial and Indigenous Studies further highlights the tensions between separating the discipline from the movement, and the need to reconnect them in critical studies of Palestine. These tensions become clear in an emerging critique of the settler colonial paradigm, articulated by Alissa Macoun and Elizabeth Strakosch, as ‘a largely White attempt to think through contemporary colonial relationships’.60 Indeed whilst Indigenous Studies is largely a scholarly endeavour dominated by Indigenous scholars, Settler Colonial Studies is conversely dominated by nonIndigenous scholars. While this has not been the case for scholarship on Palestine, where many Palestinian academics have contributed to and advanced the framework (as discussed above), we note a new palatability to the paradigm within Israeli institutions and centres of knowledge.61

This seems to follow from the field’s focus on, and centring of, the dominating power structure. As Jodi Byrd writes;

One of the challenges facing Indigenous Studies in conversation with Settler Colonial Studies and frontier histories is to resist the continual prioritizing of an effect for a cause, of requiring the settler and the frontier rather than the indigenous as the structuring analytic through which to assess the consequences of colonialism.62

Byrd highlights the possible epistemic trap of focusing the narrative on the settler structure and therefore replicating the silencing of Indigenous voices. The disruption of these colonising epistemologies in academia must thus be positioned as the driving impetus behind white scholars who consider themselves as allies to non-white and indigenous peoples. Recognising this dynamic, Wolfe had previously discussed the problematic position of white settlers dominating knowledge production within Indigenous studies:

I set up the teaching of Koori history – that’s indigenous southeast Australian history – at the University of Melbourne ... I gave it up after a few years because I am a Gubbah – a white guy – and it seemed wrong to me that a white guy should be teaching Aboriginal history when there weren’t any Aboriginal people also teaching it. Wolfe crucially points out the troubling power structure involved when a white settler is the sole producer of knowledge on Indigenous peoples within an institution; one that is uncomfortably reiterated in the proliferation of Israel Studies’ programmes (as opposed to ‘Palestine Studies’ programmes) and their narrations of Palestinian history. This reinforces those colonising epistemologies that converge in academic spaces, to write indigenous peoples out of history and reduce their ways of knowing and understanding as inferior to Western scholarship. Recognising that Western epistemologies and methodologies have been a key component of the colonising violence inflicted upon Indigenous and native peoples is an important facet of Indigenous Studies. The purpose of which, as Martin Nakata explains

... is not just to decolonise through revival of Indigenous Knowledge but also to defend them by reinstating Indigenous ontologies and epistemologies through the development of new frameworks to redress the submergence of Indigenous people’s knowledge as it occurred through colonial regimes.64

Considering these tensions and critiques, Rana Barakat makes an excellent case for refining the use of settler colonialism as a ‘method of analysis within the larger project of indigenous studies’, rather than carving it out as its own field.65 Barakat, reiterating Byrd’s argument, emphasises that the focus on settler triumph and native defeat in settler colonial scholarship is problematic and results in replicating a narrative that marginalises Indigenous people; whereas Indigenous Studies attempts to keep the focus on Indigenous understandings of invasion, rupture and transformation. Barakat’s point, mentioned earlier, that Palestinian early work on settler colonialism is barely referenced, is a product of this problematic approach to settler colonial relations; one that seems to have led to the increasing marginalisation of knowledge developed by indigenous communities in Palestine, and the particular language they use to describe the structure of invasion (in large part because it does not accord with the lexicon that has accompanied the institutional paradigm articulated by Wolfe and Veracini). Alternatively, an Indigenous Studies framework highlights the fact that Palestinians call the cyclical and continuous process of Zionist invasion and erasure al Nakba al mustimirrah (the continuous Nakba); and emphasises that this understanding of the settler colonial condition underpins the writings and discourse of Palestinian scholars, activists and ordinary people.

### Offense

#### Colonization’s coming within the century

Reedy 17 [Christiana Reedy, Futurism editor. When Will the First Human Space Colony Be Established? August 17, 2017. https://futurism.com/when-will-the-first-human-space-colony-be-established]

Will humanity be ready to colonize space before doomsday? We asked Futurism readers when they thought humans will colonize off-planet, and the results revealed quite a consensus. More than 70 percent of people who took the poll thought a colony will be established during the first half of the 21st century, and the decade with the most votes — a whopping 36 percent of participants — was the 2030s. Satish Varma, a software engineer, explained why he voted for this decade. Varma wrote in his response that our technological advances in spacecraft design, artificial intelligence (AI), and bionics will be the driving forces that finally propel us into space long term. “Currently there are some promising advances in space exploration and artificial intelligence by companies like SpaceX, Google, and Tesla in a short time frame,” Varma wrote. Varma’s observations are right on — both SpaceX and Blue Origin have recently reached significant milestones in developing reusable rockets, which will be key in making space travel economically viable. Google has recently developed an AI that can learn almost as fast as we can, making the technology much more promising for real-world applications, like flying spaceships. What The Experts Have To Say The technologies have enticed governments and companies around the world to take the idea of space colonization seriously. The two most popular targets for human occupation are currently Mars and the Moon. The Moon gets a little less attention these days, but scientists have estimated that we could build a colony there over the pan of six years and for as little as $10 billion. The Chinese and European space agencies are carefully examining the possibility of a Moon base, as such a resource would greatly reduce the cost of traveling to other planets — including Mars. On the Mars front, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has announced its intention to establish a settlement on the Red Planet by 2117. Other nations are likely to beat the UAE in reaching this goal, however, as the U.S. government has tasked NASA with getting humans on Mars by 2033, and China has set an even more ambitions goal: by the end of the decade. These government efforts align with readers’ predictions. But SpaceX CEO Elon Musk hopes to prove just how much more efficient private companies are than government bureaucracies. His plan, too, is to send humans to Mars by 2020, but that isn’t his only goal. He wants to make travel to the Red Planet affordable, setting the price cap at $200,000 in his new plan that focuses on establishing a self-sustaining space civilization rather than a simple exploratory expedition. Such an establishment will be paramount to the future of the human species, Musk said. “History suggests there will be some doomsday event, and I would hope you would agree that becoming a multi-planetary species would be the right way to go,” Musk said at a press conference last year. “I want to make Mars seem possible… like something that we can do in our lifetimes.” With all these efforts to get humans off world over the course of the next few decades, it seems like a good bet a Martian colony is not only something this generation could see, but something it will.

#### Space colonization solves climate change

Youn and Theodorou 19, 5/9, "Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos unveils plans for space colonization," ABC News, https://abcnews.go.com/Business/blue-origin-jeff-bezos-unveils-lunar-lander-mission/story?id=62941981 TDI  
His inspiration? American physicist Gerard O'Neill, who became interested in the idea of space colonization in 1969.

Bezos extolled his belief in the idea that humans could live in environments that were ideal and create colonies where heavy industry can be carried out without subjecting the earth to atmospheric pollution. He also did refer to coming back to Earth.

“Earth is the best planet. It is not even close. Don’t even get me started on Venus," Bezos said.

The Amazon founder identified two initial goals that Blue Origin would focus on: a radical reduction in launch costs and establishing resources for space. Like Elon Musk's SpaceX, Blue Origin has focused on reusable rockets.

Blue Origin would begin by sending humans into space in 2019 on New Shepard -- a suborbital vehicle designed for space tourism -- which uses liquid hydrogen, an incredibly efficient fuel source.