# Cal RR R6 Neg vs Strath Haven AM

# 1NC

### 1

#### Interpretation—the aff must disclose the plan text, framework, and advantage areas 30 minutes before the round. To clarify, disclosure can occur on the wiki or over message.

#### Violation—ss

Graphical user interface, text, application, chat or text message

Description automatically generated

#### Vote neg for prep and clash—two internal links—

#### a) neg prep—4 minutes of prep is not enough to put together a coherent 1nc or update generics—30 minutes is necessary to learn a little about the affirmative and piece together what 1nc positions apply and cut and research their applications to the affirmative

#### b) aff quality—plan text disclosure discourages cheap shot affs. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, it should lose—this will answer the 1ar’s claim about innovation—with 30 minutes of prep, there’s still an incentive to find a new strategic, well justified aff, but no incentive to cut a horrible, incoherent aff that the neg can’t check against the broader literature.

#### Competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

### 2

#### The linear predictions upon which the 1ac is based are not benign or accurate – they offer a reductionist view of the world that ignores chaos and complexity

**Saperstein 97.** Alvin M. Saperstein, professor of physics at Wayne State University, “Complexity, Chaos, and National Security Policy: Metaphors or Tools?” Complexity, Politics, and National Security pg. 57, jk

It is clear that successful military and political policy makers have always entertained the potentiality of chaos and have sought the tools of redundancy and flexibility of resources to deal with that possibility. The only new tool to deal with chaos presented here is the engineering tool of attempting to predict crisis instability and then avoid it or be prepared to live with it. Quantitative dynamical models of the system of interest may be useful in making such predictions. If they are inadequate or unavailable, verbal models have a long history, and potentiality, of use.

If the leaders of the pre-WWI European states had recognized that the railroad schedule- dominated mobilization of their troops was a source of great crisis instability (Tuchman 1962, van Creveld 1989), perhaps they would have avoided starting—and being trapped by—the process. But this recognition would have required that the chaos metaphor be more commonly found in the "intellectual air" of turn-of-the-century Europe than was the case in that rapidly industrializing Newtonian-reductionist society.

Given a Newtonian paradigm, the policymaker strives to be efficient in reacting to a given "field of endeavor"; chaos is to be avoided or dealt with by overwhelming force and/or redundant means of force delivery. The present world seems to require a Prigoginean outlook: don’t accept the battlefield or the world system as a fixed given. The complexity, or adaptive self-organizing, metaphor should be very useful for the necessary education, recruitment, planning, and thinking required to deal with and survive our future**.** However, no obvious specific tool—like predicting crisis instability— comes to mind. The metaphor requires that one should always be contemplating the future. And, among these considerations for the future, always include attempts to change the field of endeavor itself.

Hence, it may not be useful for the policymaker to always look for the uniquely "best solution**."** It may be necessary to settle for a local temporary maximum—a good solution, rather than the best. In the elastic fabric of our present and future world, the "perfect" is often the enemy of the "good."

When all is said and done, on a strategic level, the most useful aspect of the chaos and complexity metaphors is to remind us and help us to avoid falling into chaos.26

#### The butterfly effect makes complex systems inherently unstable.

**Rosenau 97.** James N. Rosenau, president of the international studies association, professor of international affairs at GW, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs,” Complexity, Politics, and National Security pg. 37, jk

It follows from the vulnerability of complex adaptive systems to punctuations of their equilibrium and tumultuous phase transitions that small, seemingly minor events can give rise to large outcomes, that systems are sensitive at any moment in time to the conditions prevailing at that moment and can thus initiate processes of change that are substantial and dramatic. Examples of this so-called "butterfly effect" abound. Perhaps the most obvious concerns the way in which an assassination in 1914 triggered the onset of World War I, but numerous other, more recent illustrations can readily be cited. It is not difficult to reason, for instance, that the end of the Cold War began with the election of a Polish Pope more than a decade earlier, just as the release of Nelson Mandela from prison was arguably (and in retrospect) an event that triggered the end of apartheid in South Africa.16

#### The aff’s use of specific scenario planning ignores complexity – generalizing our theories provides a better alternative.

**Mills 09** – (William, PhD political science – University of Michigan, “IV. 2. Constructing Complexity Theory for International Relations,” <http://futuremethods.wordpress.com/complexity/iv-2-constructing-complexity-theory-for-international-relati/>)

Scenario analysis today is used to elicit creative thinking about real-world alternatives that may be hard for people to imagine, such as “Could the Iron Curtain fall peacefully?”; “Could an invasion of Iraq by the U.S. open the door to al Qua’ida?”; “Could Wall St. fall victim to its own scam?”; “Could a victorious Israeli attack on Iran still spell disaster for Israel?” But scenario analysis may have a theoretical value as well.

If complexity theory represents a potentially valuable way of viewing international relations but is a poorly understood theory, scenario analysis might be used not to portray alternative real-world futures but as a “meta-scenario” generator to portray alternative theoretical futures. In other words, the goal would not be to discuss any specific real-world cases but to discuss classes of real-world situations (e.g., post-invasion behavior by a conquered population or victory generating hubris or a greedy financial system undermined by its own greed). The goal of such a meta-scenario analysis would be to generate scenario classes that could be anticipated on the basis of theory rather than actual scenarios based on the reality of a specific case. Since complexity theory’s relevance to international relations remains a work in progress, such meta-scenario development might also prove a useful tool for sharpening our understanding of that now intuitive but yet to be proven relevance.

#### Rethinking linearity is key to tackle existential threats – we need a complete overhaul of military planning and scenario analysis

**Skyttner 05** – (Lars, professor of natural science – University of Gâvle, professor – Royal Swedish Military Academy, “Systems theory and the science of military command and control,” Kybernetes Vol. 34, Issue 7/8, p. 1240-1260)

Military activity has constantly been characterised by the need to design, realize, train and thereafter maintain an organization capable to fight against various kinds of external threats. Such a force has always been used in offensive as well as defensive tasks, e.g. from attacking neighbouring enemies to going together in order to defend oneself from invading forces. To succeed with this, strategical, operational and tactical skill is necessary for the joint effort. Further, a flexible tactical adaptation is necessary when the enemy changes his behaviour or take countermeasure.

The military manoeuvring has always felt the need for some kind of decision support and a management system. The decision support has sometimes manifested itself as good advisors or as today in the shape of advanced high-technological computer-aided expert systems. The management system has always consisted of various communication and control devices. How these systems should be constructed, adapted and developed to challenge new threatening pictures in the constantly changing surrounding world is no simple task.

Today the socio-technical systems of the modern society are increasingly all embracing and tighter integrated. System-relations more and more stand out as untransparent, incomprehensible and unmanageable. Furthermore, the world around is so rapidly changed that circumstantial planning often is a thing of the past.

The uncertainties regarding the nature of future combat therefore bring about great demands of flexibility and adaptability of our command and control systems. That qualities like information-advantage and a realistic surrounding-world apprehension call for increased integration of different sensors, arms and communication systems are nevertheless given. As given is that success in combat always is a function of how command is executed and how danger, stress, obscurity and general confusion which constantly exist will be handled. When the enemy no longer is seen in our binoculars and when we not even know who has released an attack against us, the need for creative thinking is of highest priority. Today an event of war even can lack the attacking component and imply hitherto unknown social phenomena.

As compared with such circumstances, traditional military thinking could not be considered particularly successful. There tactical problems always have been reduced to easily recognizable situations with a well-learned standard response. Quite natural, critical thinking, questioning and creativity have not got a prominent role in this kind of education.

Today the security policy situation of Sweden is radically different from the situation only ten years ago. New, extremely fragmented scenarios of a threat exist. A military threatening picture still exists even if it has deteriorated substantially after the end of the cold war. Russia still has attacking capability via distant and NBC-weapons. A military recovery in this country can result in nonmilitary information operations within a ten-year period. The development is difficult to judge but is coherent with the democratic development and the relations to the West.

Just now the most probable threat comes from terrorism. The last years have signified a development towards an ever increasing extent of terrorist groups with better and better armaments. No doubt, some of these groups have NBC-weapons. Those who not have access to such weapons strive for them. Attacks resulting in thousands of victims among innocent people, today is a reality which has been demonstrated by the assault upon World Trade Centre. It is quite possible that such groups will choose to locate internal controversies to neutral ground like Stockholm with pertinent consequence like taking hostages, etc. When such things happen, the odds are against the anti terrorist forces. The terrorists only need to have success once while the combatting forces must be successful every time.

A third kind of security policy threat are those which are information technology related. States as well as criminal gangs and terrorist organisations already today use IT-related systems as weapons apart from their ordinary use. Attacks can be targeted toward our own IT systems, electricity supply systems, telecommunications and economical systems. In our highly computerized society, a small group can cause damages which early required an army. That the danger of IT-attacks has increased can be related to the simple fact that the more something is exposed, the more the threatening picture is reinforced. A special problem in this context is the difficulty to discover if an attack exists at all. The defence against such information warfare will be a big problem in the foreseeable future for our vulnerable society.

It is also not possible to leave out of account the threats coming from economical warfare. Even if the country today has a reasonably stable economy and is supported by the membership of EU, strongly increased fuel price during a period will destabilize society. Large-scale economical crimes pursued for example by the powerful drug mafia in Colombia can also be a real threat. This organisation has scarcely an interest to capture a geographical area. However, they want to consolidate and expand their economical flows. It is necessary to bear in mind that their financial annual turnover is bigger than most European countries.

Consequently, it is necessary to realise that the old and exact security-policy classification into “war” and “peace” hardly is relevant today. A war-like terror action with disastrous consequence can happen without early warning in a situation which we apprehend to be in deepest peace. The goal can be to crush our basic values – not our geographical area. An enumeration of what the modern societies consider these values to be, can be the following:

territorial integrity in the livingspace;

political sovereignty and democracy;

freedom of thought, religion and speech;

a state governed by law with human rights and minority rights;

free market economy; and

the free university.

In the protection of these values, the extensive invasion and mobilization defence with its mass army no longer has a justification. Not including the frontiers of land, sea and air combat, a new frontier has emerged where the battle is fought with global information systems. There the strategic goals have changed so that destruction has been replaced by manipulation, infiltration and assimilation.

All this taken together is the reason why big-scale problem solving seldom work as before. The traditional way of managing war with a large quantity of troops fighting a well defined and localized enemy is barely no longer possible. The lack of success for traditional methods is visible also on civil frontiers like the war against poverty, the war against drugs, and the attempts to extinct AIDS.

The new, multinational and complex threatening pictures which have replaced the old ones, can only be met with a smaller, more modern and flexible elite-force. The heavy striking-force with small command and intelligence resources will be reduced in favour of a network-defence based on the development within information and communication technology. The designation network will, however, not in the first instance represent the connecting of different technical systems. Instead it will represent a more flexible way of handling a new situation – to combine different entities and components for more complex tasks. One of its main duties will be peace-keeping international contributions. Another task will be to handle attacks realised with nerve-gas or bacteria. High-technological data-virus should also be possible to combat.

The building up of such a defence will demand an entirely new way of thinking regarding decision-making, command and control and use of modern technology. Internationally, this kind of thinking has attracted great interest and got the designation “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA). The term is based on a number of technological breakthroughs which have occurred after the end of the cold war about 1990. In several ways, these have changed the ground for modern warfare. Here the most important achievements have been the information-technological progresses which will permit the use of lots of sensors and the capability to transfer and manage big information-flows. Realistic training with the aid of virtual three-dimensional computer scenarios (“Battlefield Computer Games”), has signified a pronounced increase in the combat-skill of tank-crews.

Some important trends within the RMA-concept is presented below:

Unmanned fighting vehicles and aircrafts. Automated, computerized technology will replace drivers and pilots. Start navigation, interpreting of the surrounding world, target-interpretation, target combatting and possible landing, is handled completely automatic. The opportunity of human handling and target combats remain. No consideration regarding the weight of the pilot, G-forces and life-supporting systems is necessary. The construction can be lighter, stronger, more rapid and cheaper. The instruction time can be shorter.

Data-streams, threat-analyses and military preparedness. Miniaturized networks of cheap sensors deliver data from areas which earlier have not been accessible. Immediate processing creates information which is distributed via coded broadband to all units needing it.

Chemical, bacteriological, radiological detection and protection. Micro sensors integrated in new protective clothes will dramatically increase the ability to move and increase freedom of action in contaminated areas. High sensibility and selectivity will make possible an immediate detection of the threat.

Body-armour for fighting soldiers. Extremely strong and light bullet proof materials increase the survival on the battlefield.

Field-equipment of lightweight type. New, lightweight materials will decrease the total carrying load for the soldier. Hence endurance and strength will increase. This holds well for uniforms, personal weapons, communication equipment and darkness-optics.

New bio-treatment for augmented performance. Without the use of drugs, human staying power can be doubled. Lack of sleep and impaired vigilance now can be compensated for as well as the impact of physical damage.

A science of command and control

Today's military command and control embrace different kinds of affairs from battle conduct to more administrative activities. It takes place on different strata from lower tactical levels to the highest strategical level. In contrast to civil command and control it includes fundamental questions regarding life and death for involved persons. In battlefields the unmasked principle of causality always rules. There the connection between conclusions and orders and their consequences are terrifyingly short.

A simple definition of the aim of command and control could be the coordination of human actions with different resources to get effects. In practise, this is often considered as something diffuse. Difficulties often arise when analysing the content and form of the activity. Problem solutions too often are seen as applied science without either theories or scientific method. Obstacles to attain a comprehensive view with hitherto used frames of reference have been experienced by both commanders and military theorists.

With this background, an attempt to regard command and control as part of “The Art of War” may be understandable. As an art, it can only be developed and reach its fulfilment inside the born leader with his special creativity, intuition capability and the divine vestige, existing in very few persons. However, such a view will have some less successful consequences, especially for the education of higher commanders. The divine vestige is scarcely possible to gauge and the number of born leaders is not in enough supply for the demands of society. At all events it cannot be the foundation for the recruitment of general staff candidates. Here more measurable and tangible properties must be decisive.

A more fruitful attitude therefore has appeared to be an integration of the problems of military management into a general scientific educational frame and denote it a science of command and control. The military competent at once realise that this area has two central questions at issue, on the one hand to make relevant decisions and on the other to carry them out adequately. With a slight reformulation it is possible to say that decision-making is to determine what should be done. The realization, the command, concerns how it should be done. Here the continuous existing aspect of time is present with its deadlines for thinking, planning, decision-making, taking measures, etc. This kind of activity always embraces the old truism of the equal importance of making the right things as doing things right. Regarding civil decision-making and execution, it often differs marginally (in principle) from the military counterpart. Thus, it is possible to speak of a general science of command and control.

In English, the area is denoted by the words command, control, communication and information with the acronym C3I. Command implies goal-oriented conduct and action, executed by people over people who all are living creatures and thereby process information for their survival. The process of life is to adapt the own situation to an ever-changing environment and a relation between information and control. Control comprises the processing of information, programming, decision and communication. Two-way communication between the controller and the controlled feeds back the result of the action for necessary justification and new activity.

In reality, the described control and command process is a very complex phenomenon. The physical and mental status of the decision-maker as well as deeply existing conceptions and preferences influence the procedure. Also organisational structures and technical equipment will influence the result. “Everything is connected to everything else”. Later in the text, it will be evident that the used English keywords can represent subsets of a comprehensive theory. Without this theory the term science in the label “A science of command and control” should be irrelevant.

To synthesize a new subject field like command and control will imply the finding and understanding of the joint factors existing within different kinds of the area. It also demands definitions regarding basic terms and concepts as a starting point for problem-solving and various kinds of reasoning. Below some fundamental concept are presented.

The theory of command and control is founded on a number of related academic areas. The integration of these creates the theoretical basis which allows a commander to understand the function of command and control. That is to master the prerequisite for relevant decisions and their transformation into reality.

The science of command and control is the application of the theory in a real world. It indicates how a system of command and control should be designed and used for decision-making, execution, followup, and government in a mainly unpredictable and chaotic environment (especially the combat).

A system of command and control is an integrated gathering of people, functions, procedures and equipment which together constitute the function of command and control. This system is the tool of the commander and secures that the capacity of the directed unity is utilized in the best manner in order to fulfill the goal.

The research problem of the science of command and control can be formulated as: How should the intentions of the commander be converted into reality as completely as possible?

Something which must be elucidated in the definitions above is the concept of a commander. The presumption that one can count with an unambiguous, conclusive commander as in military units, civil service departments or oil-tankers are not always correct. A committee, a board or some kind of collective often is the equivalent. This must be considered the rule when controversial political problems should be solved.

The concept of a commander implies that somebody (sometimes several) can formulate a criterion for the best problem solution and take the responsibility for a decision. Likewise that this (or these) people finally shoulder the responsibility for execution even if this can be transferred to other instances.

Today a science of command and control is necessary to adapt managing power and exercise of command to new kinds of organisations and new operational principles. The area is transformed at a rapid pace by social changes and new trends like the internationalisation of economies and knowledge production, globalization of media and knowledge mediation and also changed forms of cooperation and conflicts.

Moreover, modern leadership is often executed at a distance which implies both possibilities and risks. Today's communication technology will permit operations (both surgical and military!) to be literally managed and controlled from the other side of the globe. Modern dispersed organisations thus have their specific problems which cannot be neglected. How should social relations be managed when the personal encounter becomes a rare event and directors are dematerialized to a voice in a satellite-mediated phone call?

Regarding military command and control systems, they are today typically multi-component phenomena. The deciding functions are performed by people, simple decision-support systems in computer-based algorithms and advanced expert-systems. The decision-components are geographically dispersed dependent on the appearance of the environment but also for reason of survival. This distributed system gets its character by the quality of the sensors together with velocity and effectiveness of actual weapons.

The need for a comprehensive theory

For the military scientist it is obvious that studies in such a complex area as command and control scarcely are possible without the help of a theory of generalization, a meta-theory. Such a theory must be able to sum up and explain common factors and problems existing in all kinds of command and control. It must also be able to integrate different knowledge and reflections from various subject fields, which apparently do not seem to be related. In addition it must preferably furnish a hierarchy of theories and models where key-variables and their changes are intelligible and measurable. The supply of relevant models to facilitate studies, simulations and calculations defines the limits for both knowledge acquisition and information-dispersal.

A meta-theory likewise must supply general definitions and a common language, joining all subareas which taken together, will constitute a science of command and control. The application must take place in an area which has an ever growing need for rapid decisions and the mastering of very complex processes despite tight margins, ambiguous and disturbed information. As a frame of reference it must also be able to answer the same questions like other scientific areas, namely:

what theories represent the core of the field?

which methods are used?

which sources are used? and

to what extent are these theories, methods and sources universally applicable?

Does such a theory exist? From the viewpoint of the systems-scientist, the answer is affirmative. General Systems Theory (GST) studies patterns which do not relate to a specific area. It examines generalizations, applicable on specific problems, e.g. in command and control. As meta-discipline it can transfer its knowledge-structure to other areas without calling in question their content. It can supplement a great number of areas and integrate phenomena which had not been successfully handled. Above all this theory will support the generalist, who often is found to solve today's problem better than the specialist with his narrow limits.

A popular formulation could be that systems theory creates a knowledge structure which facilitates the providing of fact to the right place and creates possibilities to see a connected whole. A locution is that its main task is to help scientists to elucidate the complexity of the existence, technologists to make use of it and generalists to learn to live with it.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative for their complicity with Newtonian linear regression and predictions. Use the ballot to as a signal of support for complexity theory—such a move is necessary to force academics and policy makers alike to reconsider the basis upon which they make predictions and take action. Only complexity theory allows understanding of events that in turn can produce BETTER responses and predictive models in the long run.

**Rosenau 97.** James N. Rosenau, president of the international studies association, professor of international affairs at GW, “Many Damn Things Simultaneously: Complexity Theory and World Affairs,” Complexity, Politics, and National Security pg. 37, jk

To acknowledge the limits of complexity theory, however, is not to assert that it is of no value for policy makers and academics charged with comprehending world affairs. Far from it: if the search for panaceas is abandoned and replaced with a nuanced approach, it quickly becomes clear that the underlying premises of complexity theory have a great deal to offer as a perspective or world view with which to assess and anticipate the course of events. Perhaps most notably, they challenge prevailing assumptions in both the academic and policy-making communities that political, economic, and social relationships adhere to patterns traced by linear regressions. Complexity theory asserts that it is not the case, as all too many officials and analysts presume, that "we can get a value for the whole by adding up the values of its parts."20 In the words of one analyst,

Look out the nearest window. Is there any straight line out there that wasn’t man-made? I’ve been asking the same question of student and professional groups for several years now, and the most common answer is a grin. Occasionally a philosophical person will comment that even the lines that look like straight lines are not straight lines if we look at them through a microscope. But even if we ignore that level of analysis, we are still stuck with the inevitable observation that natural structures are, at their core, nonlinear. If [this] is true, why do social scientists insist on describing human events as if all the rules that make those events occur are based on straight lines?21 A complexity perspective acknowledges the nonlinearity of both natural and human systems. It posits human systems as constantly learning, reacting, adapting, and changing even as they persist, as sustaining continuity and change simultaneously. It is a perspective that embraces non-equilibrium existence. Stated more generally, it is a mental set, a cast of mind that does not specify particular outcomes or solutions but that offers guidelines and lever points that analysts and policy makers alike can employ to more clearly assess the specific problems they seek to comprehend or resolve. Furthermore, the complexity perspective does not neglect the role of history even though it rejects the notion that a single cause has a single effect. Rather, focusing as it does on initial conditions and the paths that they chart for systems, complexity treats the historical context of situations as crucial to comprehension.

The first obstacle to adopting a complexity perspective is to recognize that inevitably we operate with some kind of theory. It is sheer myth to believe that we need merely observe the circumstances of a situation in order to understand them. Facts do not speak for themselves; observers give them voice by sorting out those that are relevant from those that are irrelevant and, in so doing, they bring a theoretical perspective to bear. Whether it be realism, liberalism, or pragmatism, analysts and policy makers alike must have some theoretical orientation if they are to know anything. Theory provides guidelines; it sensitizes observers to alternative possibilities; it highlights where levers might be pulled and influence wielded; it links ends to means and strategies to resources; and perhaps most of all, it infuses context and pattern into a welter of seemingly disarrayed and unrelated phenomena.

It follows that the inability of complexity theory to make specific predictions is not a serious drawback. Understanding and not prediction is the task of theory. It provides a basis for grasping and anticipating the general patterns within which specific events occur. The weather offers a good example. It cannot be precisely predicted at any moment in time, but there are building blocks—fronts, highs and lows, jet streams, and so on—and our overall understanding of changes in weather has been much advanced by theory based on these building blocks....We understand the larger patterns and (many of) their causes, though the detailed trajectory through the space of weather possibilities is perpetually novel. As a result, we can do far better than the old standby: predict that "tomorrow’s weather will be like today’s" and you stand a 60 percent probability of being correct. A relevant theory for [complex adaptive systems] should do at least as well.22

Given the necessity of proceeding from a theoretical standpoint, it ought not be difficult to adopt a complexity perspective. Indeed, most of us have in subtle ways already done so. Even if political analysts are not—as I am not—tooled up in computer science and mathematics, the premises of complexity theory and the strides in comprehension they have facilitated are not difficult to grasp. Despite our conceptual insufficiencies, we are not helpless in the face of mounting complexity. Indeed, as the consequences of turbulent change have become more pervasive, so have observers of the global scene become increasingly wiser about the ways of the world and, to a large degree, we have become, each of us in our own way, complexity theorists. Not only are we getting accustomed to a fragmegrative world view that accepts contradictions, anomalies, and dialectic processes, but we have also learned that situations are multiply caused, that unintended consequences can accompany those that are intended, that seemingly stable situations can topple under the weight of cumulated grievances, that some situations are ripe for accidents waiting to happen, that expectations can be self-fulfilling, that organizational decisions are driven as much by informal as formal rules, that feedback loops can redirect the course of events, and so on through an extensive list of understandings that appear so commonplace as to obscure their origins in the social sciences only a few decades ago.23 Indeed, we now take for granted that learning occurs in social systems, that systems in crisis are vulnerable to sharp turns of directions precipitated by seemingly trivial incidents, that the difference between times one and two in any situation can often be ascribed to adaptive processes, that the surface appearance of societal tranquillity can mask underlying problems, and that "other things being equal" can be a treacherous phrase if it encourages us to ignore glaring exceptions. In short, we now know that history is not one damn thing after another so much as it is many damn things simultaneously.

And if we ever slip in our understanding of these subtle lessons, if we ever unknowingly revert to simplistic formulations, complexity theory serves to remind us there are no panaceas. It tells us that there are limits to how much we can comprehend of the complexity that pervades world affairs, that we have to learn to become comfortable living and acting under conditions of uncertainty.

The relevance of this accumulated wisdom—this implicit complexity perspective—can be readily illustrated. It enables us to grasp how an accidental drowning in Hong Kong intensified demonstrations against China, how the opening of a tunnel in Jerusalem could give rise to a major conflagration, how the death of four young girls can foster a "dark and brooding" mood in Brussels, how an "October surprise" might impact strongly on an American presidential election, or how social security funds will be exhausted early in the next century unless corrective policies are adopted—to cite three recent events and two long-standing maxims.24 We know, too that while the social security example is different from the others—in that it is founded on a linear projection of demographic change while the other examples involve nonlinear feedback loops—the world is comprised of linear as well as nonlinear dynamics and that this distinction is central to the kind of analysis we undertake.

In other words, while it is understandable that we are vulnerable to the appeal of panaceas, this need not be the case. Our analytic capacities and concepts are not so far removed from complexity theorists that we need be in awe of their accomplishments or be ready to emulate their methods. Few of us have the skills or resources to undertake sophisticated computer simulations—and that may even be an advantage, as greater technical skills might lead us to dismiss complexity theory as inapplicable—but as a philosophical perspective complexity theory is not out of our reach. None of its premises and concepts are alien to our analytic habits. They sum to a perspective that is consistent with our own and with the transformations that appear to be taking the world into unfamiliar realms. Hence, through its explication, the complexity perspective can serve as a guide both to comprehending a fragmegrated world and theorizing within its limits.

#### If the perm has a net benefit, it links – predetermining the outcome causes cooptation.

Osinga **0**5 – (Frans, PhD, colonel – Royal Netherlands Air Force, “Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd,” Eburon Academic Publishers)

Already in 1990 James Rosenau had noted that the international system was in a state of turbulence because the fundamental parameters of the system were marked by extensive variability and complexity. This necessitated a novel conceptualization. He noted it was ‘not enough to sense that deep changes are at work, rather one has to develop an overall perspective on the essential nature of world politics through which to transform the perception of a disorderly world into sensitivities for the sources and consequences of the dynamics of change’. And he found such a perspective in the language of chaos and complexity theory as developed by Gleick and Prigogine126. This provides a ‘mental set that does not specify particular outcomes or solutions but one that offers guidelines and lever points that analysts and policy makers can employ to more clearly assess the specific problems they seek to comprehend or resolve’127. The awareness of fundamental unpredictability of complex systems caused four leading scholars to exasperate that ‘God gave physics the easy problems’. And they subsequently suggest that ‘evolutionary biology is a more productive analogy for social science’128.

## Case

### Adv 1

#### Use it or lose it requires a higher degree of certainty - analytic

#### Lack of attribution means no retal

Schwarzer et al ’19 [Daniela, Eva-Marie McCormack, and Torben Schutz; Director, Editor, and Associate Fellow in the Security, Defense, and Armaments Program at the German Council of Foreign Relations; Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, “Technology and Strategy: The Changing Security Environment in Space Demands New Diplomatic and Military Answers,” [https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology\_and\_Strategy\_the\_Changing.pdf](https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/63288/ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2019-schutz-Technology_and_Strategy_the_Changing.pdf);]

However, even a (misinterpreted) threat to space assets could start a chain reaction and quickly escalate an incident in space to a wider war. Successful deterrence, therefore, requires situational awareness, attribution capabilities and resilient assets. Especially the latter two are notoriously difficult to achieve in space. While it might be easy to attribute a kinetic attack executed with a missile, the same is not true for ASAT attacks by other satellites, and, especially, not for cyberattacks and electronic warfare measures. Without clear attribution, however, it is difficult to deter any adversary, since he could speculate that an attack cannot be traced back to him – making deterrence and retaliation more difficult. Although cross-domain deterrence, i.e. threatening an actor through potential retaliation attacks on or by other-than-space assets, is always possible, it also amplifies the problems involved in traditional deterrence: A response has to be timely and proportionate, and it should not further expand of the conflict.

#### No space war miscalc

Bragg et al, July 2018 - \*Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois, NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU \*\*Dr. Robert Elder, PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor \*\*\*Dr. Belinda Bragg, principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M.;“Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Everyone needs space

While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

### Adv 2

#### Chinese leadership solves extinction.

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### A rules based order persists with east Asian institutions and prevents transition wars

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The maintenance of world order depends on regional orders. As Henry Kissinger argues, “The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.”[22](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-22) Yet developing such inclusive, open regional orders is a critical challenge. This would require creating new regional mechanisms and supporting those that already exist but are constrained by a lack of resources. While some liberal thinkers see regionalism (not including the European Union) as a threat to world order, there are many regional initiatives that, if recognized and strengthened, could actually support world order. For example, ASEAN+3’s Chiang Mai initiative on finance has allowed those countries to better cope with short-term liquidity problems, supplementing the existing capacity of the International Monetary Fund.[23](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-23) As another example, though the Obama administration feared the Chinese-inspired AIIB would be a competitor to the World Bank, its structure and rules mimic those of established multilateral institutions, and its management includes persons from Western countries. Thus, it is more likely to complement rather than compete with the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. In a fragmented and pluralistic world, exploring local and regional initiatives in diverse issue areas that complement older but fragmenting global institutions could be one of the most promising ways to build world order in the twenty-first century.

A multiplex world will not be free from disorder, but it is also not necessarily doomed to be what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini call a G-Zero World—“one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda”[24](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-24)—simply because of the loss of a predominant U.S. leadership role. Leadership-sharing between the Western powers and the emerging powers is more attainable than (hard) power-sharing. A world less dependent on U.S. leadership—but without a complete U.S. retreat into isolationism—will still find ways to cooperate. It will still come together in crisis, as happened at the G-20 summit after the 2008 global financial crisis, or to combat common perils, as happened with the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.[25](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-25) The latter was made possible not because of proactive U.S. leadership but because of common understanding among the Western nations, the emerging powers (led by China), and civil society groups. Importantly, the agreement avoided the traditional Western legalistic sanction-based approach in favor of a softer, voluntaristic approach that is characteristic of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them.

#### Decline has popularized restraint – a bipartisan coalition formed to avoid the failures of liberal hegemony – even if china expands, the US won’t go down fighting

Ashford 21 Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September/October 2021, "Strategies of Restraint," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint> mvp

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus: that as the world’s “indispensable nation” and with no competitor, the United States had little choice but to pursue a transformational agenda on the world stage. Over the last few years, however, that consensus has collapsed. A growing chorus of voices are advocating a strategy of restraint—a less activist approach that focuses on diplomatic and economic engagement over military intervention. And they have found a receptive audience.

In that, they have undoubtedly been helped by circumstance: the United States’ failed “war on terror,” the rise of China, and growing partisan polarization at home have all made it clear that U.S. foreign policy cannot simply remain on autopilot. Even those who continue to argue for an interventionist approach to the world typically acknowledge that their strategy must be shorn of its worst excesses. Where restraint was once excluded from the halls of power and confined largely to academic journals, now some of its positions have become official policy.

Although President Donald Trump’s record was defined by dysfunction more than any coherent strategy, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, raise doubts about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and question the wisdom of military intervention and democracy promotion. President Joe Biden, for his part, has begun withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has initiated a review of the United States’ global military posture, and has taken steps to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship. In 2019, Jake Sullivan, now Biden’s national security adviser, wrote, “The U.S. must get better at seeing both the possibilities and the limits of American power.” That this sentiment is now openly embraced at the highest levels of government is nothing short of a win for those who have long called for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Yet victory also raises a question: Where do restrainers go from here? With Washington having dialed down the war on terrorism, the most politically popular of their demands has been achieved. Now, they are liable to face an uphill battle over the rest of U.S. foreign policy, such as how to treat allies or what to do about China—issues that have little public salience or on which the restrainers are divided. Although often bundled together by Washington’s foreign policy elites and derided as isolationists, the members of the restraint community include a diversity of voices, running the gamut from left-wing antiwar activists to hard-nosed conservative realists. It should not be surprising that they disagree on much.

If the restraint camp focuses on what divides them rather than what unites them, then it will find itself consumed with internecine battles and excluded from decision-making at the very moment its influence could be at its height. But there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts. This more pragmatic strategy, which would entail the gradual lessening of U.S. military commitments, would not achieve the most ambitious of the restrainers’ goals. But it has the best chance of moving U.S. foreign policy in a more secure and more popular direction.

A DEBATE REBORN

The idea that the United States is uniquely qualified to reshape the world has manifested itself in different ways in the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a bipolar world. Humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and counterterrorism—all were attempts to mold the world according to American preferences. Yet the unipolar moment has largely failed to live up to expectations. Today, democracy is in decline, there are more state-level conflicts than at any time since 1990, the war on terrorism has largely failed, and China’s rise has given the lie to the notion that the United States can prevent the emergence of peer competitors. Washington’s foreign policy community now appears to accept the need for a course correction, although it remains divided on the specifics.

#### Fear of lost credibility incentivizes US entrapment – it’s fueling aggression towards China which risks great power war in East Asia – direct negotiation or offshore balancing solves conflict

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Since its 2010- 2011 announcement, the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in the South and East China Seas. Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface around some of these locales, neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in ownership of contested areas. Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies for what they suggest about China's territorial ambitions. They are therefore important to the United States for the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its allies in their disputes with the PRC by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor, clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and - above all - has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the "status quo" in contravention of China's own interests (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015;Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016).Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle: the more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct US- Chinese confron\*tation. In other words, treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China.

This is entrapment of the purest sort. The United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia, maintain Asia's political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian maritime disputes. To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners is in the United States' interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.3

#### A persistent US led order leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

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In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### US unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.