# 1NC

### 1st off

#### Permissibility and presumption negate.

#### a] the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation

#### b] Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### Equality via rationality and self-ownership implies autonomy, thus, the standard is consistency with a system of self-ownership. Feser ND

Edward Feser (Pasadena City College), xx-xx-xxxx, "Nozick, Robert," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/nozick/>, //hzheng

Nozick takes his position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant and enshrined in Kant’s second formulation of his famous Categorical Imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” The idea here is that a human being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot properly be treated as a mere thing, or used against his will as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also describes individual human beings as self-owners (though it isn’t clear whether he regards this as a restatement of Kant’s principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor. They have all the prerogatives with respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining why slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy, for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But if individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves (as Kant describes them) and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they have certain rights, in particular (and here again following Locke) rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all, just is to have a right to it, or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights – rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it, etc. – that constitute ownership; and thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements that make up one’s self. These rights function, Nozick says, as side-constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person. So, for example, since you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you (since this would involve destroying or damaging your property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also constrained not to force you against your will to work for another’s purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self-owned body and its powers, e.g. either to work or to refrain from working.

#### Prefer: performativity – debating my framework presumes that you own yourself to argue which concedes the validity of my framework, also means it’s inescapable because escaping it entails contradiction

#### Negate – this implies justice justifies acquisition of outer space because it doesn’t interfere with anyone. Murray ND

* Justice is built on autonomy – if people are not coerced, they can do whatever they want
* Murray contextualizes this to property acquisition (which can be applied to space) – going to space and acquiring property there is okay so long as it does not involve theft, coercion, or fraud

Dale Murray (University of Wisconsin), xx-xx-xxxx, "Nozick, Robert: Political Philosophy," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://iep.utm.edu/noz-poli/>, //hzheng

The Three Principles of Justice Nozick argued that there are three principles of just distribution. These principles make up the basic framework of his entitlement theory. The first is the principle of just acquisition. Under this principle, individuals may acquire any property they wish just so long as it is previously unowned and is not taken by theft, coercion or fraud. The second is the principle of just transfer whereby property may be exchanged just so long as the transfer is not executed (again) by theft, force or fraud. These two principles constitute the legitimate means of acquiring and transferring goods. All valid transactions come from repeated actions on these two principles. While Nozick did not explicitly define what is now known as his third principle, he described its function. This third principle – just rectification – works, as the name suggests, to rectify violations of the first two principles. What actions on these three principles reflect is what Nozick calls a “historical” theory of justice. He thought there was no way, simply by looking at the patterns of distribution that we could tell whether or not these distributions of goods are just. Nozick emphasized that we have to know exactly how the distribution came about. If somewhere in the chain of transactions theft, coercion or fraud occurred, then we could safely say that the property involved is unjustly held. The three principles of just distribution thereby regulate proper property acquisition and exchange.

### 2nd Off

#### Our world operates on the color line, which controls our subjectivity in relation to the figure of Man. Weheliye 14

Alexander Weheliye, 08-xx-2014, "Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human," Duke University Press, <https://necrocenenecrolandscaping.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/weheliye_habeas-viscus.pdf>, //SLC West HZ, brackets in original

Viewing Wynter's colossal project, with which Butler does not engage in any sustained way, both of critiquing the current western instantiation of the human as coterminous with the white liberal subject and of crafting a new humanism should not be reduced to observing the historicity of this concept with the aim of showing how women of color and other groups are excluded from its purview. Or to put it in Butlerian terms: Wynter is interested in human trouble rather than “merely” woman-of color trouble, even while she deploys the liminal perspective of women of color to imagine humanity otherwise. 15 In response to Butler and western feminism more generally, Wynter has stated on several occasions that her object of knowledge is not gender but genre—genres of the human: “Our struggle as Black women has to do with the destruction of the genre; with the displacement of the genre of the human of ‘Man.’” 16 For Wynter, destroying only western bourgeois conceptions of gender leaves intact the genre of the human to which it is attached, and thus cannot serve as a harbinger of true emancipation, which requires abolishing Man once and for all. It seems as if we have yet to countermand the “unrecognized contradiction” which, as Gayatri Spivak so fittingly diagnosed in 1988, “valorizes the concrete experience of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about [how] the historical role of the intellectual is maintained by a verbal slippage.” 17 Rather than contending with Wynter's thinking as an intellectual project in the same manner as she does with Althusser, Hegel, or Irigaray, Butler privileges her concrete experience as a woman of color. 18 In addition to rejecting gender as a category independent of other axes of subjugation, Wynter states that in her writings “ ‘race’ is really a code-word for ‘genre.’ Our issue is not the issue of ‘race.’ Our issue is the issue of the genre of ‘Man.’ It is this issue of the ‘genre’ of ‘Man’ that causes all the ‘-isms.’…Now when I speak at a feminist gathering and I come up with ‘genre’ and say ‘gender’ is a function of ‘genre,’ they don't want to hear that.” 19 Thus, Wynter does not privilege race over gender as much as she insists that the master's tools (a universal notion of gender) cannot dismantle the master's house (Man), in Audre Lorde's formulation. Rather, Wynter's is a feminism typified by a critique of race and coloniality that focuses on the liberation of humans from all “-isms” versus only one specific form of subjection such as sexism, and it does not contradict the majority of women-of color feminisms, which have not taken gender as an isolatable—or even primary—category of analysis but have instead highlighted the complex relationality between different forms of oppression. 20 Mainstream feminism in contrast sees itself “as an autonomized particularity, rather than as a particularity constitutive of a new non-middle class mode of universality.” 21 For Wynter, a feminism that does not aspire to create a different code for what it means to be human merely sketches a different map of Man's territorializing assemblages; however, in order to abolish these assemblages feminism's insurrection must sabotage “its own prescribed role in the empirical articulation of its representations in effect by coming out of the closet, moving out of our assigned categories.” 22 Hortense Spillers makes a similar point when she maintains, “we are less interested in joining the ranks of gendered femaleness than gaining the insurgent ground as female social subject.” 23 In this context, “gendered femaleness” denotes gender as a “purely natural” and sovereign modality of difference while the revolt of a “female social subject” articulates gender as an integral component in the abolition of the human as Man. As phrased by one of the defining texts in the recent history of black feminism: “If Black women were free, it would mean that everyone else would have to be free since our freedom would necessitate the destruction of all the systems of oppression.” 24 Moving away from discourses of inclusion and recognition, the Combahee River Collective dwells on the specific positions of black women within western modernity to launch global critiques, expansive theories, poetic tactics, and relational political projects that spurn the ethnographic encampment of Man's racializing assemblages. 25 Neither Wynter nor Spillers asks us to choose between race and gender but, instead, their thinking demands vigilance about how different forms of domination create both the conditions of possibility and the “semiosis of procedure” necessary to hierarchically distinguish full humans from not-quite humans and nonhumans. 26 Spillers's and Wynter's ideas have been essential to formulating my arguments, because they represent systems of thought—both individually and taken together—that tackle notions of the human as it interfaces with gender, coloniality, slavery, racialization, and political violence without mapping these questions onto a mutually exclusive struggle between either the free-flowing terra nullius of the universally applicable or the terra cognitus of the ethnographically detained. Wynter's large-scale intellectual project, which she has been pursuing in one form or another for the last thirty years, disentangles Man from the human in order to use the space of subjects placed beyond the grasp of this domain as a vital point from which to invent hitherto unavailable genres of the human. 27 According to this scheme in western modernity the religious conception of the self gave way to two modes of secularized being: first, the Cartesian “Rational Man,” or homo politicus, and then beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, “Man as a selected being and natural organism…as the universal human, ‘man as man.’” 28 The move from a supernatural conception of world and the self's place within this cosmos, however, does not signal the supersession of a primitive axiomatic with an enlightened and rarefied type of the human. Rather, one genre of the human (JudeoChristian, religious) yields to another, just as provincial, version of the human, and, although both claim universality, neither genre fully represents the multiplicity of human life forms. In the context of the secular human, black subjects, along with indigenous populations, the colonized, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human. 29 Thus, race, rather than representing accessory, comes to define the very essence of the modern human as “the code through which one not simply knows what human being is, but experiences being.” 30 Accordingly, race makes its mark in the dominion of the ideological and physiological, or rather race scripts the elision of the former with the latter in the flesh. In her latest writings, Wynter identifies homo politicus's successor in the long road from “theodicy” to “biodicy” as the liberal “bio-economic man.” 31 The idea of “bio-economic man” marks the assumed naturalness that positions economic inequities, white supremacy, genocide, economic exploitation, gendered subjugation, colonialism, “natural selection,” and concepts such as the free market not in the realm of divine design, as in previous religious orders of things, but beyond the reach of human intervention all the same. In both cases, this ensures that a particular humanly devised model of humanity remains isomorphic with the Homo sapiens species. Wynter's approach differs markedly from arguments that seek to include the oppressed within the already existing strictures of liberal humanism or, conversely, abolish humanism because of its racio-colonial baggage; instead Wynter views black studies and minority discourse as liminal spaces, simultaneously ensconced in and outside the world of Man, from which to construct new objects of knowledge and launch the reinvention of the human at the juncture of the culture and biology feedback loop. Even though the genre of the human we currently inhabit in the west is intimately tied to the somatic order of things, for Wynter, the human cannot be understood in purely biological terms, whether this applies to the history of an individual organism (ontogenesis) or the development at the level of a species (phylogeny). This is where Fanon's important concept of sociogeny comes into play, offering Wynter an approach of thinking of the human— the “science in the social text,” to echo Spillers's phrase—where culture and biology are not only not opposed to each other but in which their chemistry discharges mutually beneficial insights. 32 In this scenario, a symbolic register, consisting of discourse, language, culture, and so on (sociogeny) always already accompanies the genetic dimension of human action (ontogeny), and it is only in the imbrication of these two registers that we can understand the full scope of our being-in-the-world. Fanon's concept of sociogeny, arising from the inadequacy of traditional psychoanalytic models in the analysis of racialized colonialism, builds on Freud's appropriation of recapitulation theory. 33 Thus, according to Fanon, Freud breaks with the strict codes of Darwinism and social Darwinism (phylogenetic theory) in order to analyze the psyche of the modern individualized subject from an ontogenetic vantage point. While the ontogenetic technique yields, depending on your general sympathy for the now very antiquated protocols of Freudian psychoanalysis, abundant results when evaluating white subjects ensconced in the liberal nuclear family, it encounters a roadblock when transplanted to the colonial settlement, which is why “the alienation of the black man is not an individual question. Alongside phylogeny and ontogeny, there is also sociogeny…. Society, unlike biochemical processes, does not escape human influence. Man is what brings society into being.” 34 Why does the colonial situation specifically necessitate a reformulation of Freud's and Darwinism's procedural frame of reference? Since colonial policies and discourse are frequently grounded in racial distinctions, the colonized subject cannot experience her or his nonbeing outside the particular ideology of western Man as synonymous with human, or, as Fanon writes, “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man.” 35 The colonial encounter determines not just the black colonial subject's familial structure or social and physical mobility and such, but colors his or her very being as he-or-she-which-is-not-quite-human, as always already tardy in the rigged match of the survival of the fittest. Conversely, in this ontological face-off, the white colonial subject encounters herself or himself as the “fullness and genericity of being human.” However, he or she only does so in relation to the deficiency of the black subject and indigenous (Wynter, 40). To be precise, Fanon and Wynter locate racializing assemblages in the domain of being rather than the realm of epiphenomena, showing how humans create race for the benefit of some and the detriment of other humans. Yet because race is thought to rest in biology, it necessitates different analytic protocols than bare life and biopolitics, namely ones that draw on both ontogeny and sociogeny. Whereas Fanon's mobilization of ontogeny remains rooted in the Freudian paradigm as pertaining to the individual subject, Wynter summons the explanatory apparatus of neurobiology to elucidate how racialization, despite its origins in sociogeny, is converted to the stuff of ontogenesis; this is what Wynter refers to as “sociogenetic.” 36 Although human life has a biochemical core defined by a species-specific adaptive reward and punishment mechanism (poison = bad and food = good) that “determines the way in which each organism will perceive, classify, and categorize the world,” it is “only through the mediation of the organism's experience of what feels good to the organism and what feels bad to it, and thereby of what it feels like to be that organism” that a repertoire of behaviors, which ensure the continued existence of the species, develops (Wynter, 50). For the human species, because it is defined by both organic and symbolic registers, this is complicated by the way culturally specific sociogenic principles such as what is good or bad work to trigger neurochemical reward and punishment processes, in the process “institut[ing] the human subject as a culture-specific and thereby verbally defined, if physiologically implemented, mode of being and sense of self. One, therefore, whose phenomenology…is as objectively, constructed as its physiology” (Wynter, 54). 37 Phenomenological perception must consequently don the extravagant drag of physiology in order to “turn theory into flesh,…[into] codings in the nervous system,” so as to signal the extrahuman instantiation of humanity. 38 Wynter's description of the autopoiesis of the human stretches Fanon's concept of sociogeny by grounding it in an, albeit false or artificial, physiological reality. In other words, Wynter summons neurobiology not in order to take refuge in a prelapsarian field anterior to the registers of culture and ideology, but to provide a transdisciplinary global approach to the study of human life that explains how sociogenic phenomena, particularly race, become anchored in the ontogenic flesh. Also, in contrast to treatments of racialization more squarely articulated from the disciplinary perspective of sociobiology, Wynter does not focus on the origins and adaptive evolution of race itself but rather on how sociogenic principles are anchored in the human neurochemical system, thus counteracting sociobiological explanations of race, which retrospectively project racial categories onto an evolutionary screen. 39 That is to say, Wynter interrogates the ontogenic functioning of race—the ways it serves as a physiologically resonant nominal and conceptual pseudonym for the specific genre of the human: Man—and not its role in human phylogeny. Consequently, racialization figures as a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man, because its law-like operations are yoked to species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line—instituted by cultural laws so as to register in human neural networks—that clearly distinguishes the good/life/fully-human from the bad/death/not-quite-human. This, in turn, authorizes the conflation of racialization with mere biological life, which, on the one hand, enables white subjects to “see” themselves as transcending racialization due to their full embodiment of this particular genre of the human while responding anti-pathetically to nonwhite subjects as bearers of ontological cum biological lack, and, on the other hand, in those subjects on the other side of the color line, it creates sociogenically instituted physiological reactions against their own existence and reality. 40 Since the being of nonwhite subjects has been coded by the cultural laws in the world of Man as pure negativity, their subjectivity impresses punishment on the neurochemical reward system of all humans, or in the words of Frantz Fanon: “My body was returned to me spread-eagled, disjointed, redone, draped in mourning on this white winter's day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is wicked, the Negro is ugly.” 41 Political violence plays a crucial part in the baroque techniques of modern humanity, since it simultaneously serves to create not-quite-humans in specific acts of violence and supplies the symbolic source material for racialization.

#### Fuck humanism. Man recognized itself by the irrational other which it subjected upon minorities – this justified atrocities and disproves progress – progress is only seen through the framework of the liberal human. Osterweil 20

Vicky Osterweil (Author of the book In Defense of Looting, Bold Type Press, August 2020. Vicky is a writer, editor, and agitator based in Philadelphia), 08-xx-2020, "In Defense of Looting," Anarchist Library, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/vicky-osterweil-in-defense-of-looting>, //SLC West HZ

The contradiction between racial power and the liberal concept of inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property is visible throughout American history. One striking example occurred one hundred years before the Revolution, in the racialized conception of freedom visible in Bacon’s Rebellion. In the infamous 1676 Virginia uprising, enslaved and servant, Black and white fought side by side, and some historians therefore celebrate this rebellion as a proto-democratic and revolutionary uprising. Much like the Civil War was about slavery, but with neither side originally fighting for emancipation, so was Bacon’s Rebellion originally about “Indian policy,” with a disagreement about how quickly genocide of the Indigenous people should be carried out. And, as in the Civil War, slaves joined the fight, changing the meaning of the struggle in their attempt to win emancipation. The conflict was sparked by Nathaniel Bacon, a backcountry planter and settler living on the border of “Indian territory.” He wanted to seize more land, and to do so advocated a more aggressive and immediate genocidal policy than that of the colony: total war on the natives. Berkeley, the English governor of the colony, disagreed. He recognized the strategic imperative to maintain provisional and relative peace — until, of course, the next time the colony needed to expand westward — rather than risk an all-out war they would almost certainly lose. Bacon ignored Berkeley, and in the first act of the rebellion, in May 1676, gathered a militia to attack a group of Indigenous Americans. Not even attacking a “hostile” nation, Bacon’s militia massacred a village of the British-allied Occaneechi. Governor Berkeley declared Bacon’s mustering of the militia illegal. In response, armed supporters of Bacon stormed the capital and forced Berkeley to change his ruling and approve Bacon’s commission as militia leader. This indicated the functional end of Berkeley’s power, and Berkeley and his governmental assembly would eventually flee the capital. Bacon’s Assembly, the first and only formal government of the rebellion, was held in June 1676. It passed a number of new acts into colonial law, the most famous removing property restrictions on suffrage and giving democratic electoral control over parish priests to all free men of the colony, regardless of race. Bacon’s sudden death in October 1676, followed by a series of military defeats — ending in a famous last stand made by a mix of Black and white servant-rebels — concluded the uprising, and the acts of Bacon’s Assembly were repealed. Still, some historians hold up their expansion of voting rights and popular control as examples of early democratic policy in America. Bacon’s Rebellion is thus seen as an antecedent of the America Revolution. And, indeed, it is, though not in the way its defenders usually intend but because the first three acts of Bacon’s Assembly all focused on pursuing total war against Indigenous Americans and confiscating Indigenous lands theoretically protected by British treaty.[46] European and Black servants fought together in the rebellion, which points to the fact that whiteness had not fully developed by then, but we can see in the first three acts of Bacon’s Assembly that racialized structures of freedom-for-some were already well established. This contradiction, between legal and social structures of racial oppression and democratic liberty, is the central epistemological framework of the modern European worldview. As philosopher Sylvia Wynter demonstrates, it is the constitutive principle of Rational Man; for Wynter, the key transition from feudal thought to enlightened reason centers around the replacement of God versus Man as the structuring dichotomy of society with that of reason versus lack of reason. Because, under feudalism, all people were subservient to the law of God, everything in “nature” served to verify the glory, power, and existence of God: nobles and kings were divinely ordained, the sun rotated around God’s earth, and so forth. But once nature was no longer needed to perform this affirmation of the divine, another mode of nature, human nature, would now be installed in its place. The representation of a naturally ordered distribution of degrees of reason between different human groups enable what might be called a homo-ontological principle of Sameness/Difference, figured as a by/nature difference of superiority/inferiority between groups, and could now function tautologically as the verifying proof of a ... naturally caused status-organizing principle, a principle based on differential endowment of Reason (rather than of noble Blood) and verified dynamically in the empirical reality of the order.[47] The emergence of reason and the subsequent reification of reason as the fundamental attribute of human nature is therefore completely premised on the creation of hierarchies of reasonable and unreasonable people. The enlightened, reasoned man can only exist in distinction to the (African, Indigenous, nonmale) person who lacks reason; the idea of universal humanity is premised on human difference from and opposition to the less- or nonhuman person, a racialized and racializing difference. In practice, this means that anything is justified in introducing reason to those who lack it, because, lacking it, that person is cast outside what Wynter calls the “sanctified universe of obligation”; in other words, they are not entitled to those same protections colloquially referred to as basic human decency. This principle, “verified dynamically in the empirical reality of the order,” is the ideology of progress: domination, colonialism, and the expansion of capitalism become justice, the end of poverty, and the spread of culture, science, and truth. As Wynter shows, in the colonial period this humanist structure was used to justify genocide of Indigenous Americans. Spanish colonists encountering what they understood as senseless human sacrifice (as opposed to rational, sensible wars of religion or conquest) used it as proof that the Indigenous societies they confronted lacked reason. In the name of God, yes, but as He is now the God of reason and un-reason’s innocent victims, Spanish colonists claimed they not only could but also were morally obligated to conquer this society. This is the same logic that allows Bacon’s Rebellion to expand the franchise while advocating wiping out the “primitive” Indians. The concepts of the individual and the human that constitute the basis for all rights, for all law, for “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” were already and always built on a racial definition. But the phrase is an adaptation of a John Locke quotation that did not mention happiness: it was “life, liberty, and the pursuit of estate.” This inalienable right to “estate,” to property, would be the marker of the kind of subject recognized by this new government. But this also works in the other direction: to be able to own property is to be human, so those who cannot own property — be they enslaved, Indigenous, or even the children and wives of settlers — need not be recognized as fully human by the state. In the early decades of the colonial era, it was illegal to enslave Christians in perpetuity. But as the theological explanation of the world gave way to reason, the justification for enslaving people also transformed: only barbaric, uncivilized, and “reason-lacking” people can be enslaved. And, as Wynter shows us, because this is a tautological structure that verifies itself through what has already come to pass, Africans, who were by the turn of the seventeenth century “easier” to enslave than Europeans, became just such a “reason-lacking” people. Africans came to stand for lack of reason itself. Because people lacking reason were not human, they were only capable of being property, not owning it. Although the more liberal-minded settlers believed that with education and uplift some select Black people might become capable of humanity, they did not challenge the basic framework by which most Africans were deemed inhuman. Black people became, legally, socially, and ideologically, property.

#### Biology’s a link. Queerness is a specific resistance to modern actualization of “biological sex,” a difference that the structures of modernity can’t capture. What we need to do is say “fuck biology, fuck the sexed body,” a project their advocacy can’t do. Saewol 18 (they’re queer)

Saewol (a journal of queer becomings), 11-9-2018, "Against Biology, Against the Sexed Body," Anarchist Library, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saewol-a-journal-of-queer-becomings-against-biology-against-the-sexed-body>, //hzheng

The specter of biology is near omnipresent. This omnipresence is nowhere more evident than in the way in which sex, and thus consequentially Gender, is understood. The left has long forwarded the understanding of systems of power as that which constitutes political, and thus social, life. That said, what is surprising is that this semiotic imperialism of biology over the field of sex has planted itself within ‘radical spaces’ as well, and in most cases, expresses itself in ways that would seem contradictory to the held beliefs of those expressing them. For example, how can one resolve that biologization is a primary force of Western colonialism, but also forward an article that ascribes penises and sperm as “Male reproductive physiology” and vagina’s and eggs as “female reproductive system(s)” as “one of my favorite articles” (Martin 10–11; Spira)? It would seem that the praising of such a blatantly transphobic, and thus biologizing, article as positive merely reproduces the same colonial force of Western biologization, thus formulating these two positions as necessarily mutually exclusive. That said, the very fact that these two positions are mutually exclusive and thus contradictory to hold at the same time reveals the way in which biology has penetrated the molecular realm to such a degree that we have been circuited to desire a folding of all life (specifically understandings of sex and gender) under the taxonomy of biology; even when it seems inherently contradictory to other ideologically held beliefs. Following Oyèrónke Oyewùmi, we ought not understand biology as an independent vector of violence, but rather as one that is necessarily situated within the production of Western modernity; anti-blackness, settler colonialism, and by consequence compulsory heterosexuality (9). In that sense, I hope to indicate that the taxonomization of molecular life under the signifier of biology necessarily sexes the body, and in doing so, deploys the structures for which compulsory heterosexuality is able to gain coherence. This essay will hopefully not only impel the necessity of gender abolitionism in revolutionary struggles against compulsory heterosexuality, but also a re-articulation of life that “instead of denoting a possible reality” understands life as fundamentally virtual (Parisi 14). Despite what biology would lead you to believe life is not determinate, i.e. life is not transcendentally knowable or “determined genetically, predominantly by parts of the genes called chromosomes” but rather fundamentally indeterminate; always already in flux (Stryker 8). The reason for which this is the case is due to the fact that the very quantum materiality’s that make up like, for example protons and electrons, exist within a constant state of flux (Barad 394). As briefly mentioned earlier, one of the primary ways in which the biologization of life operates is through the creation of a singular meaning for which life can express itself. For example, there is a unitary classification system that is imparted onto particular species to such a degree that all of the difference that exists between those that might be considered a species is reduced down to a singular set of unifying traits. In this sense an ontology is created, attached, and reproduced as the de-facto way in which life should be understood; as having a constitutive being. It could be said that this ontologization of life is the raison d’etre for Western science in that “difference is expressed as degeneration” and thus must be smoothed over through the signification of an ontology, or being (Oyewùmi 3). Biology serves as one of the fundamental vectors of this collapsing of difference because of its ability to justify its logics as determinate of how the world operates, which through its omnipresence at the heart of any scientific development, has spilled out onto an understanding of quantum physics as well (Oyewùmi 9). As an instance of this, traditional quantum physics has generally explained quantum properties (waves, particles, etc) as necessarily determinate, and thus because of that developed the determinate principle as the overarching structure for which life expresses itself (Sheldon 4). This generally takes the form of constructing waves and participles as having universal principles that always already determine their expression, and because of that, have a definite expression (Sheldon 4). There is a multitude of reasons as to why this understanding of life is problematic, but first and foremost it just misunderstands the basis for which it justifies its claim to determinacy; particles and waves. Rather than having determinate characteristics that a-priori dictate the way in which particles and waves express themselves, they are rather indeterminate in the sense that the way in which they express themselves is always dependent on the realities for which they are expressed within; they are virtual. Virtual in the sense that their trajectory is not teleological but rather open to the infinite possibilities made possible by particular material realities, or in other words, “the virtual is reality in terms of strength or potential that tends towards actualization or emergence” (Parisi 14). To elaborate, the classic way in which particles and waves are recorded is through shooting them through an apparatus that is comprised of a screen or, “slit,” that once passed through records the pattern for which the particles/waves were composed (Sheldon 4). Traditional quantum physics would say that particles passing through a double slit would produce a scattershot pattern due to the fact that once a stream of particles bounces off of the first slit it should radiate out like buckshot. That said, when particles do pass through such an apparatus they do not actually express themselves as theorized, instead they tend to represent the formation of what a wave is typically understood to be; an interference pattern (Sheldon 4). Compounded with this, if a detector is added after the fact to determine which of the two slits the particles actually passed through their formation reverts back to a scattershot (Sheldon 5). This indicates that the foundational principle for the very building blocks of life is not determinacy, but rather indeterminacy, virtual particles that are constantly opening themselves towards the possibilities constituted by the material relations they both create and are situated within (Barad 395–396). In this sense, life should not be understood as a stabilized biologic force, but rather an interplay between molecular relations that constantly produce mutations within all fields at which life is able to express itself (Parisi 53–54). To reiterate the old Deleuzoguattarian adage, life is about becoming and not being; any attempt to compress becoming into being (as biology does) is a reactive force of violence (Deleuze and Guattari 106). Biology engages in this sort of violence in that it seeks to create a determinate principle, or being, for which life is organized. An example of this being the way in which biology categorizes bodies as constitutive wholes, or organisms, instead of machines that necessarily interplay and are contaminated by their ecologies. Summarizing Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler articulates that one of the primary ways in which biology engages in this process is through not only the invention of the body as a naturalized product, but specifically the sexed body (463). I want to stress the importance of this argument, Butler’s claim is not merely that taxonomies of biology create a specific conception of the body that is sexed, but rather the structuring logic for which the body catalyzes into existence through a biologic frame is one that is necessarily sexed. To be clear, this is not to say that the impact for which these conceptions of the body are not ‘real’ in their impact/violence, because they certainly are, but rather serves to indicate that the claim to naturalism that they deploy is part in parcel to that violence, and in many cases is the operational logic for said violence (Butler 464). This specific biological project, the compression of the body to be strictly organized around sex, is a process of collapsing the virtual potentialities of the molecular to an ontology and thus a violent attack on life itself. Describing this process, Luciana Parisi brilliantly says this “model of representation does not entail the exact reflection of reality or truth, but is more crucially used to refer to a system of organization of signs where structures of meaning arrange … through the hierarchies of the signifier. The model of representation reduces all differences … to the universal order of linguistic signification constituted by binary oppositions where on term negates the existence of the other” (9). In this sense, it’s clear that the process for which biology embarks upon, the inducing of the body into the semiotic realm vis a vis a sexing, is one that is fundamentally violent, the question then becomes what this conception of sex looks like.

#### The Color Line is the root cause of climate change via “civilizing.” Wynter and McKittrick 15

Sylvia Wynter and Katherine McKittrick (a professor in Gender Studies at Queen's University. She is an academic and writer whose work focuses on black studies, cultural geography, anti-colonial and diaspora studies, with an emphasis on the ways in which liberation emerges in black creative texts (music, fiction, poetry, visual art)), xx-xx-2015, "On Being Human as Praxis," Duke University Press, <http://joshualubinlevy.com/uploads/3/5/3/6/35367669/katherine-mckittrick-sylvia-wynter-on-being-human-as-praxis.pdf>, //SLC West HZ

This is an episteme that functions, with respect to the knowledge of our contemporary world and its systemic reality, according to the same cognitively closed descriptive statement and its sociogenically encoded truth of solidarity as that of the theo-Scholastic knowledge system of the medieval order of Latin-Christian Europe. So this is what gives me the urgency, do you see what I mean? For we cannot allow ourselves to continue thinking in this way. This way of thinking is linked to the same ethno-class mode of behavior-regulatory and cognitively closed order of knowledge that has led to our now major collectively human predicament: the ongoing process of global warming, climate instability, and ecosystemic catastrophe. Regarding the above, a 2007 report in Time magazine on global warming tells us two things: first, that global warming is a result of human activities; and, second, that this problem began in about 1750 but accelerated from about 1950 onward.29 Now, the date 1750 points to the Industrial Revolution. But the article, which builds on the expertise of a U.N. climate panel, fails to explain why global warming accelerated in 1950. What happened by 1950? What began to happen? The majority of the world’s peoples who had been colonial subjects of a then overtly imperial West had now become politically independent. At that time, we who, after our respective anticolonial uprisings, were almost all now subjects of postcolonial nations, nevertheless fell into the mimetic trap of what Jean Price-Mars calls, in the earlier nineteenth- century case of Haiti, “collective Bovaryism”30—because the West is now going to reincorporate us neocolonially, and thereby mimetically, by telling us that the problem with us wasn’t that we’d been imperially subordinated, wasn’t that we’d been both socioculturally dominated and economically exploited, but that we were underdeveloped. 31 The West said: “Oh, well, no longer be a native but come and be Man like us! Become homo oeconomicus!” While the only way we could, they further told us, become un-underdeveloped, was by following the plans of both their and our economists. The catch was that our economists, like the distinguished Caribbean economist Sir Arthur Lewis, had been educated in British imperial universities, like many of us. This is the same kind of model as in the Roman Empire: all the elites of the imperially subordinated populations were educated in Roman imperial schools! And so these mimetically educated elites, proud to be incorporated as Roman citizens, had helped to keep the Roman Empire going; and then when the Roman Empire was going to break down, among such elites you had a scholar like Augustine, who before his conversion to Christianity had been a professor of rhetoric and of the imperial Roman theory of high and low styles. After his conversion he had then taken all of that knowledge, then shifted the above rhetorical strategies to reinforce the revolutionary sermo humilis of the then new “gaze from below,” postpagan, postclassical monotheistic religion of Christianity—this latter as one whose projected promise of eternal salvation in the City of God will far outstrip the glories of the cities of Man, including that of Rome itself. This is what I call an Augustinian turn, the taking and revising of an existing system of knowledge, in order to create that which is imperatively emancipatorily new.32 There is one profound difference here, however. Rome’s empire was Roman. Instead, as studies of contemporary neocolonialism as well as of its predecessors colonialism and postcolonialism reveal, the West, over the last five hundred years, has brought the whole human species into its hegemonic, now purely secular (post- monotheistic, post- civic monohumanist, therefore, itself also transumptively liberal monohumanist) model of being human. This is the version in whose terms the human has now been redefined, since the nineteenth century, on the natural scientific model of a natural organism. This is a model that supposedly preexists—rather than coexists with—all the models of other human societies and their religions / cultures. That is, all human societies have their ostensibly natural scientific organic basis, with their religions / cultures being merely superstructural. All the peoples of the world, whatever their religions / cultures, are drawn into the homogenizing global structures that are based on the-model-of-a-natural-organism world-systemic order. This is the enacting of a uniquely secular liberal monohumanist conception of the human—Man- as- homo oeconomicus—as well as of its rhetorical overrepresenting of that member-class conception of being human (as if it is the class of classes of being human itself).

#### Warming is a threat multiplier and controls the internal link – means it comes first. Torres 16

Phil Torres (Affiliate Scholar at the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies, and founder of the X-Risks Institute), 7/22/16, “Op-ed: Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk,” Future of Life, <https://futureoflife.org/2016/07/22/climate-change-is-the-most-urgent-existential-risk/>, //recut SLC West HZ

Climate change and biodiversity loss may pose the most immediate and important threat to human survival given their indirect effects on other risk scenarios. Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges this century. Threats to our collective survival stem from asteroids and comets, supervolcanoes, global pandemics, climate change, biodiversity loss, nuclear weapons, biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.\* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely climate change and biodiversity loss, should take priority right now over every other known threat. Why? Because these ongoing catastrophes in slow-motion will frame our existential predicament on Earth not just for the rest of this century, but for literally thousands of years to come. As such, they have the capacity to raise or lower the probability of other risks scenarios unfolding. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: are wars more or less likely in a world marked by extreme weather events, megadroughts, food supply disruptions, and sea-level rise? Are terrorist attacks more or less likely in a world beset by the collapse of global ecosystems, agricultural failures, economic uncertainty, and political instability? Both government officials and scientists agree that the answer is “more likely.” For example, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennan, recently identified “the impact of climate change” as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has described climate change as a “threat multiplier” with “the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 drought in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which fueled the 2011 Syrian civil war. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history.

#### Vote neg to disenchant humanism – reject fucked up colonial narratives of “this is human, this is good, we should reject the human Other.” Wynter 87

Sylvia Wynter, Autumn 1987, "On Disenchanting Discourse: "Minority" Literary Criticism and Beyond," JSTOR, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1354156>, //SLC West HZ

To disenchant discourse will therefore be to desacralize our "cultures" and their systems of rationality by setting upon our literary and cultural heritages and their orders of discourse rather than by continuing to adapt to their generating premises and non-conscious systems of inference as we do now. The "setting upon" process of disenchantment – parallel to Heidegger's definition of "technology" as expressive of the human's new setting upon physical nature rather than adapting to it – into being through the collective behaviors of the systemic subjects which the order of discourse unconsciously orients and regulates. This proposal redefines the dynamics of desire as a new meta-biological object of knowledge constituted by discourse, as the acquired rhetorical motivation systems which are the uniquely human parallel of the species-specific motivation systems characteristic of all mammalian forms of life up to and including the different species of the prehuman hominid. These systems regulate all facets of species- specific behavior, cognitive and actional, in non-human mammals and linguistically speciated, i.e., group-specific, behaviors in human. It is these acquired/rhetorically coded, rather than innate/genetically coded, motivation systems that constitute the psychic unity of the human species. Like Mendel's new object of knowledge, hereditary trails, which functioned as an object irreducible to the species and to the "sex transmitting them," rhetorical motivation systems whose function is to bring differing modalities of "human being" into being, by means of enculturating discourses generated from the grounding premise of an environmentally "fit" conception of life/death, must also necessarily decenter the human subjects whose behaviors enable the stable replication of their own autopoiesis as systems. That is to say, their own intentionality and autonomy as autopoietic systems, once put into discursive play, whilst largely compatible with, are not reducible to that of their individual subjects. The discursive system of each human order functions as the enculturating machinery by and through which the motivational system which dictates the behaviors needed if a specific mode of the human is to be brought into dynamic being and stably replicated (even if and where these behaviors are contradictory to the self-realization of human individuals or groups: cf. Black Skins/White Masks, minority skins, majority masks). Thus orders of discourse must function so as to "enchant" their human subjects into desiring in the mode of desiring needed, into acquiescing to the effecting of the intentionality of the R.M.S. in question, even at the cost of not affirming their own. Hence the great moments of Girardian conversion, from Don Quixote to The Invisible Man, arise where the novelistic hero wakes up, rejecting the non-conscious "mimetic" quality of his former inculcated mode of motivation/desire. It is in the disenchanting of the discourses which brings into being an existential reality experienced as if it were objectively outside our human control that Minority Discourse will both find and go beyond its own paradoxical rationale. For if, as Derrida argues, the "very idea of reason as dominant . . . in human nature is also a fiction" since consciousness or reason are "effects, traces, the detritus of will" and "man lacks the capacity-to know without motive," it is only through the "disenchanting" of our true discourses that we will come to know the grounding premise that determines this ostensibly autonomous "will" or "motive" and to determine then consciously what now determines us, determining how we know and act upon the world: to disenchant the human, then, enabling her/his Girardian "waking up" to a consciously chosen intentionality. With this emerges the possibility of a science of human behavior, and of what Gellner calls the extra-territoriality, at last, of human cognition.