# 1NC

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#### Their ontology and identity-based focus fails – we aren’t stable beings but rather defined by difference in itself. This takes out their ontology claims – ontology is defined by difference, not identity. The only ontologically valid orientation is that which recognizes a constitutive instability. May 05

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While Foucault and Derrida seek to unravel the pretensions of ontology as a study of what there is, Deleuze revels in ontological creation and analysis. While Foucault and Derrida find ontology to be a threat to asking how one might live, Deleuze finds ontology to be the very route one must take in order to ask about it adequately. While Foucault and Derrida offer alternatives to the traditional philosophical project of ontology, Deleuze drives that project to its limit, a limit at which he finds the question of how one might live to be raised afresh and ready to offer surprising answers. By embracing ontology as the study of what there is Deleuze does not only go against the anti-ontological trend of much of twentieth century philosophy. His work also cuts against the grain of those who have approached the question of how one might live. For Deleuze’s predecessors and contemporaries, breathing life into that question requires abandoning what had been considered ontologically necessary, eliminating the search for entities that constrain us to asking questions less radical than that of how one might live. For Nietzsche the question of how one might live is opened up by the death of God, that is, the loss of any constraining ontological transcendence. For Sartre existentialism involves a recognition that nothing makes us be what we are, that we are free to create ourselves without an essential ontological nature that dictates the inescapable course of our lives. For Foucault the identities offered to us by our history must be recognized as contingent rather than necessary, as passing phenomena rather than ontological requirements. Only then will we be able to ask the question of how one might live without already constricting the answer to the conformity that forms the ether of our world. Finally, for Derrida the rigid ontologies of traditional philosophy veil the fluidity of their terms, a fluidity that undercuts the very project of saying what there is and what there is not. That fluidity must be unveiled if we are to reopen the question of how one might live. It would seem that if one hopes to address the question of how one might live in a way that does not reinforce a tired conformity, then ontology – at least inasmuch as it is the study of what there is – is the problem rather than the solution. Is this the inescapable fate of ontology? Must it disappear from the field of philosophical reflection if our task is to ask the question of how one might live without falling back either into concerns about how one should act or how one ought to live or into an unquestioning conformism? Deleuze denies this in his work. He denies it by creating an ontology, or rather a series of ontologies, that challenge two assumptions underlying the rejection of an ontological approach to the question. The first assumption is that ontology involves discovery rather than creation. What other thinkers who have been grasped by the question of how one might live have assumed is that ontology is an attempt to discover the nature of the universe’s fundamental entities. Why must one see ontology as a matter of discovery, however, as opposed to creation? It is true that philosophers who engage in ontology almost universally see themselves as attempting to glean the essential character of what there is. They assume that the study of what there is consists of accounting in the most adequate fashion for the nature of what exists. And it is precisely this assumption that has worried those who ask the question of how one might live. Such accounting seems always to be a reduction of possibilities, a narrowing of perspective that ends up impoverishing the universe. A universe composed solely of physical entities in more or less predictable relationships with one another, a humanity characterized by narrow norms of behavior, a realm of entities rigidly demarcated from one another: these are worlds that constrict rather than widen the question of how one might live. Is this how ontology must be done? Are we excluded from approaching ontology another way? Suppose we were to see the study of what there is as a creation rather than a discovery, or, better, as a project where the distinction between creation and discovery is no longer relevant. Suppose that ontology were not a project of seeking to grasp what there is in the most accurate way. Suppose instead ontology were to construct frameworks that, while not simply matters of fiction, were not simply matters of explanation either. Is it not possible to invert the traditional relationship, so that the question of how one might live is no longer based upon the question of what there is but vice versa? In other words, could one not create an ontology whose purpose is to open the question of how one might live to new vistas? Nietzsche, Sartre, Foucault, and Derrida have shown the constrictions that arise when the question of how one might live must answer to ontology. Deleuze suggests that it is possible to move in the opposite direction, to create an ontology that answers to the question of how one might live rather than dictating its limits. Such an ontology would not only invert the traditional relationship between creation and discovery. It would also invert the traditional relationship between identity and difference. This is the second assumption about ontology that Deleuze challenges. It is intertwined with the first one. If ontology is a project solely of discovery, its point is to articulate the nature or essence of what is. It is to offer us the identity of what is. An identity requires conceptual stability. In order for something to have an identity, it must have characteristics that can be identified over time. Those characteristics do not need to be stable. The stability needs to be possessed only by the concepts that identify them. Certain kinds of instabilities might be identified, and might be part of the identity of what is. If Freud is correct in his view of human development, tensions between one’s present relationships and one’s earlier parental relationships are of the nature of human being. No particular way of resolving these tensions is essential to human unfolding; the identity of human beings, however, is caught in the web of those tensions and the instabilities that emerge from them. And the character of the tensions themselves can be identified. That character can be captured in words that possess conceptual stability, words like Oedipus complex and transfer. Without conceptual stability there can be no discovery of the kind ontology has always sought. Unless we can articulate what there is in words that actually identify it, our discoveries slip through our conceptual grasp. We are left with chaos, with a realm that defies our understanding, that resists our attempt to say what there is and to say what it is like. There is no identity here, because what there is cannot be identified in a way that allows us to engage in ontology. In their different ways, Nietzsche and Sartre and Foucault and Derrida argue that there are no ontological identities to be discovered, because what looks like a stable identity is not. Particular identities have become sedimented in our philosophical views not because they reflect the ways things really are but because our history or our fears or our language has placed them there. Ontology, far from being an engagement with what is, denies the shifting character of reality or the porous quality of our language. Since it is a project of discovery, ontology requires identity; because it does so it is a philosophical failure. According to Deleuze, the failure of ontology to discover identifiable entities does not spell the end of ontology, the “death of philosophy” as some writers would have it. This failure is, in fact, the beginning of ontology. We can engage in ontology, the only kind of ontology worth doing – ontology that responds to the question of how one might live – when we cease to see it as a project of identity. We begin ontology when we abandon the search for conceptual stability and begin to see what there is in terms of difference rather than identity: “difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing.”7 To see being as difference is at once to refuse to philosophize in terms of identities and to jettison the project of ontology as discovery. It is not, however, to resort to fiction. The abandonment of discovery is not an announcement that philosophy has given the field over to novel writing. We need not posit two stable concepts – discovery and creation – and conclude that since philosophy is not solely the first then it is nothing more than the second. Just as fiction writers are constrained by the characters they create, by the situations those characters find themselves in, and by the flow of the narrative itself, philosophy is constrained, but in different ways. What is philosophy? It is “the art of forming, inventing, and fabricating concepts.”8 A concept is not a fiction, but neither is it a discovery. A concept is a way of addressing the difference that lies beneath the identities we experience. It is a way of articulating the hidden virtual reality out of which the actually experienced reality emerges. In Deleuze’s hands, philosophy does not seek to offer a coherent framework from within which we can see ourselves and our world whole. It does not put everything in its place. It does not tell us who we are or what we ought to do. Philosophy does not settle things. It disturbs them. Philosophy disturbs by moving beneath the stable world of identities to a world of difference that at once produces those identities and shows them to be little more than the froth of what there is. And it does this by creating concepts. Concepts reach beneath the identities our world presents to us in order to touch upon the world of difference that both constitutes and disrupts those identities. A concept does not stand alone. It links up with other concepts, coexists with them on a “plane of immanence” that allows different concepts to resonate together in a multitude of ways. “It is the plane that secures conceptual linkages with ever increasing connections, and it is concepts that secure the populating of the plane on an always renewed and variable curve.”9 Together, concepts and the plane of immanence give voice to the difference that is behind everything and behind which there is nothing. How is this possible? How can a concept capture something that is not an identity but instead lies beneath it and within it? Although we have yet only begun to approach the difference Deleuze speaks of, we can already recognize that it cannot be given an identity. Difference is not identified. What is the relationship between a concept or a philosophical perspective consisting in concepts on a plane and the difference it articulates? In traditional ontology, concepts identify what there is. What can a concept do with that which cannot be identified? Concepts do not identify difference, they palpate it. When doctors seek to understand a lesion they cannot see, they palpate the body. They create a zone of touch where the sense of the lesion can emerge without its being directly experienced. They use their fingers to create an understanding where direct identification is impossible. This sense or understanding is not an emotional one. It is not an effect. (For Deleuze, art is the realm of effects; philosophy is the realm of concepts.) We might say that palpation “gives voice” to the lesion. It allows the lesion to speak: not in its own words, for it has none, but in a voice that will at least not be confused with something it is not. Palpation is not a traditional philosophical activity. It does not seek to comprehend, if by comprehension we mean bringing within our intellectual control. Traditional ontology would like to match its concepts to what there is, to map what there is by means of concepts that are adequate to it. Adequacy requires truth, conceptual stability, and in the end identity. But if it is difference rather than identity we seek, and the interesting and remarkable rather than the true, then it is palpation rather than comprehension we require. If a doctor palpates something that cannot be directly perceived, philosophy palpates something that cannot be directly comprehended. It palpates something that eludes our theoretical grasp, something that – as we will see in a moment – eludes our knowledge. Concepts palpate difference, and by doing so they give voice to it. It is a strange voice, eerie and perturbing. It is not the voice of the pop singer or the news anchor. Nor is it the voice of the legislator or the professor. The voice of difference arises from a place that is at once distant and intimate, that is both of us and not of us. And the creation of concepts, which in Deleuze’s view is the only significant endeavor in which philosophy can engage, seeks to palpate and give voice to this difference that disrupts all projects of identification. Philosophy is ontology; it speaks of what there is. But what there is cannot be identified. Or better, what can be identified is only a single manifestation, a single actualization, of what there is. What there is is difference: a difference that is not simply the distinction between two identities (which would subordinate difference to identity) or the negation of one of them (which would think of difference only negatively). What there is is a difference in itself, a pure difference that forms the soil for all identities, all distinctions, and all negations. The task of philosophy is to create concepts for difference.

#### The human overrepresents itself and assimilates difference to signify the face, excluding deviancy – this is the faciality machine and turns case. MDC 20

M.D.C (ok I couldn’t find a citation anywhere but cmon do you really need author creds here just interact w the warrants), xx-xx-2020, "Establishing an immanent counterhumanism for the un-foreclosure of the future," Anarchist Library, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/m-d-c-establishing-an-immanent-counterhumanism-for-the-un-foreclosure-of-the-future>, //hzheng, brackets in original

1.8 The nonhuman turn One of the scholarly and philosophical movements at the moment could be called the ‘nonhuman turn’ (Roffe & Stark, 2015). This position is at least a heavy criticism of the idea that the category ‘human’ is what we should aspire to in political struggle. Instead, together with nonnormative critique, it understands the human as a category of exclusion, like man, or white, and just as women need not aspire to be men, those excluded from the category of human need not aspire to that category. The human, for a Deleuzian, is “the site of a capture and diminution of life” [27] (p. 8), stratifying and limiting all of human social life through prescriptions and impositions constituted with mutually-reinforcing sets of material relations, social-political-economic, which make up systemic inequality and the world’s political violence. Following sections will be dealing directly with how transcendence in relation to humanness is central to these problems. It is useful now to introduce the topic by relating the human to another axis of stratification: gender. Thinking about the human in Deleuze studies has been taken up by many significant feminist scholars today (of which Claire Colebrook and Rosi Braidotti are perhaps the most well-known); for them, implicit in the universal human through the processes of normativity, is masculinity – (like it is for Wynter) the universal human is ‘man’: “If reason is that characteristic that marks the human, then women have been understood as unreasonable, irrational, unruly; if language defines the human, then ‘great writing’ is that undertaken by men; if political (or religious) community defines the human, then women are relegated to the tasks of handmaiden and server. To the extent that the human is regarded as an accomplishment, it is denied to women, mothers, girls and all those associated with their denigrated or less-than-adequate characteristics.” (p. 19-20) Here we can see quite quickly that the human norm has done a similar kind of work to create hierarchy of gender as it has of race. We find also same distinction in approach between what Stark (p. 20) calls “Egalitarian Feminism” – one which aims to create a more (or fully) inclusive concept of the human, and “so-called difference feminism” which is interested instead in what goes beyond the human and the masculine so as to free us from the constraints of the human. This same kind of tension can be found in relation to any axis of stratification within society, like race, gender, and class – where the human consitututes and is put in service of those relations. Both counterhumanist and nonhumanist engagements with the human seek to fundamentally challenge the dominant form of the human such that those stratifications are unmade, and in so doing are trying to radically restructure the entire world. In Part III, once we have resolved the tension between these two positions in Part II in arriving at Mbembe’s geographical conception of the human in terms of an Open World, we will build that world that the solution makes up, as an inherent part of addressing the solution. By now, I hope that I have made clear the distinction between the counterhumanist and nonhumanist approaches. Counterhumanists believe that a new, ecumenical, all-inclusive human can be made, while nonhumanism as portrayed here uses immanent critique to undercut the idea that any concept can be all-inclusive, and argues that any particular concept tends to conserve itself, literally prejudiced in favour of the current dominant epistemological and social order, because any new information must first be understood in terms of that concept in order to be recognised as acceptable information, and also makes a genealogical argument for the use of ‘human’ through history to show how despite appearances and intentions, the category remains stratified along the lines of rulers-ruled-excluded. Abstracted out, the conflict here is around whether something like a transcendent universal model approach to ontology or an immanent and pragmatic approach to ontology is preferable. The solution I propose, coming from Mbembe, is to bring nonnormative critique to bear on counterhumanism and to create an immanent counterhumanism which carries the strengths of both positions, providing a framework from which to build a world without harmful political hierarchies. 1.9 Faciality and nonnormative ethics In my first reading of Achille Mbembe’s Critique of Black Reason, I was not sure how to understand his use of both the counterhumanist and nonnormative approaches, and set out to try to undermine the conflict that I saw in his work. Instead, I came to see how his work opened the way for a non-normative, or immanent, counterhumanism, a particular antiracist and decolonial form of posthumanism that avoids the problem of transcendence and creates a framework to address political hierarchies other than race as they pertain to humanness. But before moving onto that I should cover Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of the human as well as some of the consequences of nonnormative view, some further elements of its ethical positive and negative critique, so that we may be best able to recognise them when they appear in our analysis of Mbembe’s work. 1.9.1 The human face One of the consequences of the kind of Deleuzoguattarian critique we’ve engaged is that we can no longer understand humans in terms of a “universal or transcendental subject, which could function as the bearer of universal human rights,” and instead the what is human is “only variable and historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation’” (Smith, 2012, p. 346). Deleuze’s treatment of the human is broadly as follows: locating the concept as a product of historical processes, critiquing that concept, placing the human within his univocal ontology, and in so doing, affirming the multiple nonhuman contexts that relate to the human and set it into creative movement. (Roffe & Stark, 2015, p. 6) ‘Faciality’ is the name of the concept developed by Deleuze and Guattari that expresses how the dogmatic image of thought works for the human – it is an idea, conveying “that language functions as a disciplinary ordering device operating at the nexus of the signifier and the subject” (Bignall, in Saldanha and Adams, 2013, p. 72). Faciality is an abstract machine – a pre-actualised potential designating matter and function [28] comprised of a black hole and white wall system - it is the machine that delimits human experience. For our purposes, making up the face we can understand the white wall of the signifier as that information making up all of the forms of information that constitute the present image of the human, and the black holes of subjectification are those spaces in which difference is consumed and assimilated into the register of the white face. Together, these effect the operation of representational thinking as explained in the critique of the dogmatic image of thought: difference is judged “in terms of it recognised resemblance to a given or established representative form; this privileging of similitude and resemblance categorises inassimilable difference as ‘unruly’ or ‘outcast’ and reproduces an expanding principle of identity or sameness in the process of signification” (p. 79). Faciality then is that which “provides the coordinates and contours that allow the signifying subject to emerge.” As such it is bound up deeply in the economy and the organization of power. “It organises a field of possibilities, [and] determines, at least to a certain extent, what we are capable of seeing, doing and being.” (O’Sullivan, 2006, p. 311) Humankind developed its ‘face’ on its non-human (nonsignifying, nonsubjective, essentially collective, polyvocal and corporeal) head. Deleuze and Guattari express how the faciality machine is what abstracts the human from the world (here they say “the body”) – “The face is produced only when the head ceases to be a part of the body, when it ceases to be coded by the body, when it ceases to have a multidimensional, polyvocal corporeal code – when the body, head included, has been decoded and has to be overcoded by something we shall call the Face” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 170, emphasis in the original). In simple terms, this means that over time, a particular image of humanness (the face) becomes abstract, dominant over and policing of what were once a plurality of human being, effected at the levels of meaning-making (signifiance) and subject-making (subjectification). This abstraction is ‘overcoded’ – in the same way Wynter’s ‘Man’ overrepresents the whole of humanity – in the sense that it doubles the virtual space, the body/world, it is imposing on. This understanding is utilised in multiple ways by Deleuze and Guattari – I will focus on what is most relevant to the discussion at hand. The white wall/black hole system of the face becomes a site of transcendental illusion: from within the face everything seems to confirm to the logic of the face: “When the established political regime of the face is erroneously taken as the cause of signifiance, it operates as a ‘site of transcendental illusion’ which suggests the apparent inevitability of that regime of signs” (p. 81). It becomes easy to say that it is in human nature to be greedy, for example, when a an overwhelmingly singular image of what it is to be human becomes globally pervasive, as we have today; when in fact this is a result of historical processes and reflective of our current social assemblages (e.g. global neoliberalism), and, importantly, could be otherwise. It is worthwhile here to reiterate an outline of some of Wynter’s ideas around the development of the human in relation to faciality. For Wynter, humans evolved language, becoming language-using animals, who use it to develop origin stories, mythoi, about themselves. Mythoi structure the subjective reality of each individual human and make up an inherent always-already existing element of humanity’s hybrid existence as both bios and mythos. Because our always-already existing mythoi structure our subjective experience, they are preconscious and internal to us, and so, in some sense opaque to us – its logics are the conditions of our experience as humans, and though constituted together with experience, also prior to them. This hybrid form exists in co-constituting relationship with the material world, and as such the stratifications of each ethnohumanism are reflected in the cosmogonies and the societies over which they are imposed. Some parallels exist, then, between Wynter’s account and Deleuze’s account of the emergency of humanness. Both are centred around the importance of language and subject-making, the mutually-created nature of these structures with the material world and the reflection of their stratifications across both. The opacity of the ways our own mythoi always-already structure our own experience also has some parallel with Deleuze’s understanding that from the face everything appears to conform to the logic of the face – that is, as a transcendent form, the face conditions our experience so as to be invisible in it, normal. Again, the nonnormative project is not nonnormative in the sense that it does not value. It simply is aware of how certain modes of valuing – those that allow for transcendence, are radically harmful. As humans, understanding ourselves in non-transcendent ways, ie. immanently, is perhaps our most fundamental ethical task. I engage this in the section that follows.

#### There is no universal queer. Queerness is a specific resistance to modern actualization of “biological sex,” a difference that the structures of modernity can’t capture, which implies it can be destroyed. What we need to do is say “fuck biology, fuck the sexed body,” a project their advocacy can’t do. Saewol 18 (they’re queer)

Saewol (a journal of queer becomings), 11-9-2018, "Against Biology, Against the Sexed Body," Anarchist Library, <https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/saewol-a-journal-of-queer-becomings-against-biology-against-the-sexed-body>, //hzheng

The specter of biology is near omnipresent. This omnipresence is nowhere more evident than in the way in which sex, and thus consequentially Gender, is understood. The left has long forwarded the understanding of systems of power as that which constitutes political, and thus social, life. That said, what is surprising is that this semiotic imperialism of biology over the field of sex has planted itself within ‘radical spaces’ as well, and in most cases, expresses itself in ways that would seem contradictory to the held beliefs of those expressing them. For example, how can one resolve that biologization is a primary force of Western colonialism, but also forward an article that ascribes penises and sperm as “Male reproductive physiology” and vagina’s and eggs as “female reproductive system(s)” as “one of my favorite articles” (Martin 10–11; Spira)? It would seem that the praising of such a blatantly transphobic, and thus biologizing, article as positive merely reproduces the same colonial force of Western biologization, thus formulating these two positions as necessarily mutually exclusive. That said, the very fact that these two positions are mutually exclusive and thus contradictory to hold at the same time reveals the way in which biology has penetrated the molecular realm to such a degree that we have been circuited to desire a folding of all life (specifically understandings of sex and gender) under the taxonomy of biology; even when it seems inherently contradictory to other ideologically held beliefs. Following Oyèrónke Oyewùmi, we ought not understand biology as an independent vector of violence, but rather as one that is necessarily situated within the production of Western modernity; anti-blackness, settler colonialism, and by consequence compulsory heterosexuality (9). In that sense, I hope to indicate that the taxonomization of molecular life under the signifier of biology necessarily sexes the body, and in doing so, deploys the structures for which compulsory heterosexuality is able to gain coherence. This essay will hopefully not only impel the necessity of gender abolitionism in revolutionary struggles against compulsory heterosexuality, but also a re-articulation of life that “instead of denoting a possible reality” understands life as fundamentally virtual (Parisi 14). Despite what biology would lead you to believe life is not determinate, i.e. life is not transcendentally knowable or “determined genetically, predominantly by parts of the genes called chromosomes” but rather fundamentally indeterminate; always already in flux (Stryker 8). The reason for which this is the case is due to the fact that the very quantum materiality’s that make up like, for example protons and electrons, exist within a constant state of flux (Barad 394). As briefly mentioned earlier, one of the primary ways in which the biologization of life operates is through the creation of a singular meaning for which life can express itself. For example, there is a unitary classification system that is imparted onto particular species to such a degree that all of the difference that exists between those that might be considered a species is reduced down to a singular set of unifying traits. In this sense an ontology is created, attached, and reproduced as the de-facto way in which life should be understood; as having a constitutive being. It could be said that this ontologization of life is the raison d’etre for Western science in that “difference is expressed as degeneration” and thus must be smoothed over through the signification of an ontology, or being (Oyewùmi 3). Biology serves as one of the fundamental vectors of this collapsing of difference because of its ability to justify its logics as determinate of how the world operates, which through its omnipresence at the heart of any scientific development, has spilled out onto an understanding of quantum physics as well (Oyewùmi 9). As an instance of this, traditional quantum physics has generally explained quantum properties (waves, particles, etc) as necessarily determinate, and thus because of that developed the determinate principle as the overarching structure for which life expresses itself (Sheldon 4). This generally takes the form of constructing waves and participles as having universal principles that always already determine their expression, and because of that, have a definite expression (Sheldon 4). There is a multitude of reasons as to why this understanding of life is problematic, but first and foremost it just misunderstands the basis for which it justifies its claim to determinacy; particles and waves. Rather than having determinate characteristics that a-priori dictate the way in which particles and waves express themselves, they are rather indeterminate in the sense that the way in which they express themselves is always dependent on the realities for which they are expressed within; they are virtual. Virtual in the sense that their trajectory is not teleological but rather open to the infinite possibilities made possible by particular material realities, or in other words, “the virtual is reality in terms of strength or potential that tends towards actualization or emergence” (Parisi 14). To elaborate, the classic way in which particles and waves are recorded is through shooting them through an apparatus that is comprised of a screen or, “slit,” that once passed through records the pattern for which the particles/waves were composed (Sheldon 4). Traditional quantum physics would say that particles passing through a double slit would produce a scattershot pattern due to the fact that once a stream of particles bounces off of the first slit it should radiate out like buckshot. That said, when particles do pass through such an apparatus they do not actually express themselves as theorized, instead they tend to represent the formation of what a wave is typically understood to be; an interference pattern (Sheldon 4). Compounded with this, if a detector is added after the fact to determine which of the two slits the particles actually passed through their formation reverts back to a scattershot (Sheldon 5). This indicates that the foundational principle for the very building blocks of life is not determinacy, but rather indeterminacy, virtual particles that are constantly opening themselves towards the possibilities constituted by the material relations they both create and are situated within (Barad 395–396). In this sense, life should not be understood as a stabilized biologic force, but rather an interplay between molecular relations that constantly produce mutations within all fields at which life is able to express itself (Parisi 53–54). To reiterate the old Deleuzoguattarian adage, life is about becoming and not being; any attempt to compress becoming into being (as biology does) is a reactive force of violence (Deleuze and Guattari 106). Biology engages in this sort of violence in that it seeks to create a determinate principle, or being, for which life is organized. An example of this being the way in which biology categorizes bodies as constitutive wholes, or organisms, instead of machines that necessarily interplay and are contaminated by their ecologies. Summarizing Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler articulates that one of the primary ways in which biology engages in this process is through not only the invention of the body as a naturalized product, but specifically the sexed body (463). I want to stress the importance of this argument, Butler’s claim is not merely that taxonomies of biology create a specific conception of the body that is sexed, but rather the structuring logic for which the body catalyzes into existence through a biologic frame is one that is necessarily sexed. To be clear, this is not to say that the impact for which these conceptions of the body are not ‘real’ in their impact/violence, because they certainly are, but rather serves to indicate that the claim to naturalism that they deploy is part in parcel to that violence, and in many cases is the operational logic for said violence (Butler 464). This specific biological project, the compression of the body to be strictly organized around sex, is a process of collapsing the virtual potentialities of the molecular to an ontology and thus a violent attack on life itself. Describing this process, Luciana Parisi brilliantly says this “model of representation does not entail the exact reflection of reality or truth, but is more crucially used to refer to a system of organization of signs where structures of meaning arrange … through the hierarchies of the signifier. The model of representation reduces all differences … to the universal order of linguistic signification constituted by binary oppositions where on term negates the existence of the other” (9). In this sense, it’s clear that the process for which biology embarks upon, the inducing of the body into the semiotic realm vis a vis a sexing, is one that is fundamentally violent, the question then becomes what this conception of sex looks like.

#### Your dialectical conception of identity is wrong – faciality explains better. Hardt No Date

Michael Hardt (this card was Hardt to cut. I need to stop making puns in these), xx-xx-xxxx, "Deleuze & Guattari," Duke University, https://people.duke.edu/~hardt/Deleuze&Guattari.html, //hzheng

1. Faciality Faciality is not an easily concept to grasp. I think a good place to start is by contrasting it to a dialectical conception of identity and identity formation. In other words, I would propose as a backdrop to D&G faciality, Sartre's and Fanon's conceptions of race and racial identity as dialectical. The Sartre/Fanon dialectic runs like this. First the dominant subject (the white European) creates the dominated subject as a coherent identity. As Sartre says, it's the anti-semite who creates the Jew. Or in Fanon, it is the European colonizer who creates the African "native" as a fixed identity. And Said's work on Orientalism proceeds roughly along the same line: the "oriental" is created in European scholarship, European art, travel logs, etc. None of this is to claim that the subalterns in question (Jew, Africans, Orientals) did not exist before their creation by the dominant European imaginary; the claim is rather that this identity, which overdetermines the existing subjectivities, was created and imposed by the colonial power. Jews existed but the anti-semite created "the jew"; Africans existed but the colonizing power created "the native" as it did "the oriental." The colonizer and racist created these negative identities, and pushed alterity to its extreme, inventing the Other, posing a rigid boundary of exclusion through the middle of the world. As Fanon says, the colonial city is a world cut in two, between European Self and Native Other. The dialectical conception doesn't stop, however, with this first act of creation -- and this is the brilliance, I think, of Sartre and Fanon. The White European Self does not actually exist before this creative encounter, this invention of the Other. The European Self is rather the final result of the process. The White European Self is only arrived at through its opposition to the Other, its difference from the Jew, the Native, the Oriental. After the creation of the negative identity, the Other, the Self arises as a negation of that negation, and hence the dialectical structure. The White European Self depends on its negative Other because only through negation of that Other can it invent and maintain its own identity. Now, I think this dialectical theory of identity is a good starting point for understanding D&G's notion of faciality because it is first of all decidedly nondialectical. In other words, faciality is a theory of racism (among other things), but it is not a theory of racial Others. "If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category. They are also inscribed on the wall, distributed by the hole. the white man's claim has never operated by exclusion, or by the designation of someone as Other (...). Racism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to the White-Man face, which endeavors to integrate nonconforming traits into increasingly eccentric and backward waves (...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside" (p. 178). So, in this nondialectical conception of racism, there are no Others, no one on the outside. In other words, racial difference or alterity is not configured in terms of the Other, of polar difference, but rather in terms of degrees of deviance from the standard of White-Man face. Really there is no exclusion properly speaking. On the contrary, European racism functions precisely by including everyone on the white screen and in the black holes -- including them and arranging them in a hierarchy defined by degrees of deviance from the dominant standard. That's the first thing to understand about faciality, then, that it is based not on a negative dialectic of identities but degrees of deviance, and that although it does not function through exclusion it nonetheless establishes a hierarchy of types. (Does faciality have to do with identity? Is a face an identity?) What, then, is faciality? So far we have only that it is a nondialectical machine of hierarchy or domination. "This machine is called the faciality machine because it is the social production of face, because it performs the facialization of the entire body and all its surroundings and objects, and the landscapification of all worlds and milieus" (p. 181). The machine imposes a face on a body or a landscape on a world. One might assume at first that a face or a landscape is an identity that is stamped onto the body or the world, and that notion of facialization as an identity-producing machine might end up being pretty accurate, but D&G take a different tack. The face that is created by this machine is a combination of a white wall or screen with black holes. The white screen is the surface on which meanings appear; it is a system of signification. The black holes, on the other hand, are the points of passion and subjectification. One should remember at this point that a few chapters back, On Several Regimes of Signs, D&G described four regimes that all centered around signification: the primitive pre-signifying regime, the counter-signifying, the signifying, and the post-signifying regime, which is also the subjective and passional regime. A face, then, is a coordinated arrangement of these last two regimes, signification and subjectification. Specifically, they told back in that chapter that faciality is the substance of expression. It is the material locus for signification and subjectification. "Faciality reigns materially over that whole constellation of signifiances and interpretations (psychologists have written extensively on the baby's relations to the mother's face, and sociologists on the role of the face in mass media and advertising). The despot-god has never hidden his face, far from it; he makes himself one or even several" (115). The face is thus a field or a milieu on which signification or subjectification can take place, but it is not a neutral field or milieu. It is constructed so as to make certain meanings and subjectivities appear. The baby's relation to the mother's face is an interesting example, and maybe gives us a reason for calling this face. But clearly this doesn't just have to do with what we normally call faces. This face in general is a constructed field or milieu that determines the possible signification and subjectification. We might be better off, then, understand the face as close to what Debord called a spectacle. Like the spectacle the face determines what can appear, what meanings and what subjectivities. And like the spectacle, the face corresponds to or determines a form of rule. "The face is a politics" (181). The despotic facial machine gives priority to the white wall and signification; while the authoritarian facial machine gives priority to the black holes and subjectification. The two, of course, mix and function together. Every face is a mixture of a despotic regime and an authoritarian regime, signification and subjectification. The revolutionary politics to counter or contest this, then, is not to return to any primitive, pre-facial regime -- nor is it to create any identity (which I assume would be to create a new face). The course D&G propose instead is to unmake the face. "If the face is a politics, dismantling the face is also a politics involving real becomings, an entire becoming-clandestine. Dismantling the face is the same as breaking through the wall of the signifier and getting out of the black hole of subjectivity. Here, the program, the slogan, of schizoanalysis is: Find your black holes and white walls, know them, know your faces; it is the only way you will be able to dismantle them and draw your lines of flight" (188). Here I think the difference between the face and the spectacle becomes more clear. Spectacles in Debord are always something external on us, projected for us, maybe at the limit on us. The faces, on the other hand, are us. They constitute us, our black holes and white walls. Dismantling our faces will be to a large extent dismantling ourselves. We have no choice but to start out from our faces on our lines of flight.

#### The alternative is becoming-minority, a refusal to categorize, to destroy any notion of identity and stability, to embrace difference in itself. Prabakaran 15

Madhu Prabakaran (IUU, Ph.D), 04-xx-2015, "Becoming Minority," ResearchGate, <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301554146_Becoming_Minority>, //hzheng

What is it to ‘become minority’? Idea of ‘becoming minority’ provokes sense of becoming, beyond an entity that has become. The act of becoming minority is counter to remaining majority. It implies becoming and unbecoming are acts and formations. It indicates ethical dimension of becoming minority. Stated with no subtitles it has universal implication. What is it to become? Being is becoming. In other words, becoming is perceived as being. Becoming is becoming a manifold. It is ongoing convergence or irreducible multiplicities. It is an ongoing ensemblage. Its ongoingness both presupposes and constitutes time. Precisely, being is becoming in time. Time implies becoming as co-happening. Time of becoming is ethological formation. It is ethological because it happens to the ecology of networked relations in action. Locale of time is its habitat. It is ‘being there’. Time has no relevance sans habitat or sans becoming. Likewise, being is being timed, being multiple and being habituated. Being makes no sense bereft of its mobility, multiplicity and situation. Without its transition, manifoldness and location being cannot be grappled with. Any attempt otherwise falls short of understanding. Falling short is falling into traps of fixed identities. Identities are always conceived freezing networks, mobility and enseblages that trigger being. There is no being that is homo-clausus, exclusively somatic, atomized, ahistorical, or fixed. It is majoritarian to assume signs, memories, minds, consciousness and unconsciousness are embodied exclusively within the somatic fixities. They are spread and transcend throughout the networks of relations. Spread, flow, transitions and transcendence of the network of relations make habitats and keep them live and mediating. Habitat habituates being to become within its adaptive conditioning. Majoritarians are misguided by fixations of homo-clausus (Elias, 1978) and soma-clauses (Clark, 2008; Wilson, 2004). Beings become or unbecome. Becoming as habitual happening, is often conceptualized as non-evental. However, pure non-eventals exist not. Non-eventals are eventals uncounted. Hence, becoming is always unbecoming. Unbecoming is rupturing into unknown pathways; hence, evental. Unbecoming is minoritarian. It is minoritarian to count ruptures. It is a rupture from state of being construed as a self-identical entity. Conversely, it is majoritarian to uncount ruptures. Being fascist is uncounting ruptures. It is to presuppose unity, timelessness and atomic fixity as against the truth of multiplicity, transition and flow. Becoming is unbecoming unnoticeable or unnoticed. Being is becoming unaccounted. A habitat uncounted of its being becoming or unbecoming appears structured. Structuralists seek for rigid structures provoked by their explanatory agenda hence, take live habitats of beings becomings or unbecomings to be explainable concrete structures. Explanations are hardly understandings; or understandings hardly correspond to things as they are. Things as they are are activities and co-becomings than entities or their identities. Being is becoming. Becoming is unbecoming. Becoming is adaptive burgeoning. It is contingent co-functioning within habitats of heterogeneous multiplicities. Being and becoming happens through individuations. However, individuations within habitats are haecceitas in formation. Haecceities are modes of individuations, different from persons constituted as subjects and identities. Haecceities are in formation, heterogeneously assembling the ebbs and flows of life-politics. Haecceities are always becoming in-between- neither one or two, nor the relation of the two (Deleuze & Guatttari 2004: 293). Their alterity, in-between-ness and heterogeneous origins if uncounted they appear whole persons with identity fixations. With uncounting inbetweenness, ruptures, mobility, or transitions ‘scholars’ fall into the slippery slope of majoritarian logic. Becoming is movement. It is an anti-thesis of and negation of stationeries. Being is becoming, becoming is unbecoming. Becoming minority is unbecoming majority. Becoming is unbecoming the self-same. It is othering. In this regard Deleuze & Guatari aptly announce, “there is no becoming – majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is minoritarian” (Deleuze & Guatttari 2004: 106). Being majoritarian is non-becoming. Becoming a minority is an event that occurs at the disruption of axiomatic majoritarian subjection. Majoritarian subjections are discursively sustained from its potential rupture. In degrees and varieties our subjection to the networked discursive terrains of truth- games makes us both majoritarian and minoritarian accordingly. The degree and variety of freedom from the terrains of discursive truth-games is becoming minoritarian accordingly. Becoming minority is being freed from majoritarion ideology of molar identities. Molar identities are socialized mimicries, sustained by delusive consents and seductions. The idea of majority is little understood by quantities because counting always involves uncounting the invisibles and multiplicities. Counting involves separation, individuation, identification, aggregation, categorization and classification. It involves a series of violence that simultaneously uncounts the unnamed stripping them off from heterogeneous multiplicity in action. Counting uncounts becoming different because without uncounting differences and becomings, unity cannot be arrived. The act of counting forces sameness. History, sociology, art and politics of counting are majoritarian to the degree it counts to uncount. Far removed from what is discussed here, minorities and majorities are counted in India and by many other nation states in terms of taken for granted religious affiliations. First they were counted ahistorically and anachronistically and then they were head-counted by demographers. All counting involves uncounting. The premise of counting all by religious affiliation comes from the stereotyped bias that all humans are essentially born in religions and so be categorized by religious affiliation (Abeysekara, 2011). It also assumes each one is necessarily a member of one religion and one religion only. The other choice is to be counted off of all religions. First, they were counted into religions and latter head-counted demographically and given their respective identities, all within the irreflexive truth-games of majoritarian ‘scholarship’. It is obvious that counting uncounts heterogeneity, multiplicity, differences, becomings, unbecomings and even the absurdity of accounting all within folds of religious identities. Categorizing all into fixed faiths was indeed part of majoritarian colonial expediency of taxonomic territorialization that still zombies actively misrecognizing demography for the governmental objectives. State counts its subjects territorializing them into categories. Hence, it is called statistics. Statistics counts by uncounting differences. Becoming minority is an intimate act of politics. It is the act of suspending taken for granted consents. It is claiming freedom. It is the act of being sensitive to differences and being mindful of ongoing ethological affective enssemblages of heterogeneous that rebels against the forced unities. It is a politics against majoritarian molds. It is politics of becoming aware of haecceities and formations that dissolves claims of self and identity. Becoming minority is unbecoming majority. One is a majoritarian mostly by ideological claims of pride and prestige of race, religion, of gender, caste, race, class, age or productivity. To be minoritarian is to torpedo the majoritarian claims on every walks of life. To become minority is not merely to belonging to a group of minorities, but to crack away from majoritarian ideology. None belongs to a fixed category of minority; one becomes minority. If one doesn’t become, irrespective of their of race, religion, of gender, caste, race, class, age,.. one is still a majoritarian. Minoritization happens. Becoming minority is an event that happens with the break from majoritarian habituation. None can be excluded from becoming minority ; certainly not the ‘majority’.

### ROB

#### The Role of the Ballot is to vote for the team that did the better debating – theirs is self serving and arbitrary:

#### [a] Obviously the judge is an individual, but they should default to comparing competing policy options. Voting on identity claims causes judge intervention and creates a violent model of debate in which judges use their ballot to issue referendums on someone’s personal performance of their identity. Especially violent when two minorities debate, like Davis and myself.

#### [b] Discourse doesn’t shape reality – proven by the fact they read Kant. This proves that their epistemological claims are inevitably overdetermined by their concern for competitive success.

#### [c] Our model doesn’t necessitate plan focus in terms of the off case arguments read, but FW proves that a stable advocacy is necessary to generate clash and pre-round research. If you assume the worst version of our model, there should be a reciprocal burden in which you assume the worst version of their model in which debaters are forced to negate one’s subject position, increasing racist arguments and turns their psychological violence impacts.

#### [d] Fiat is answered by numbers 1 and 3 – abandoning the resolution causes debaters to weaponize their own identities for ballots and causes judge intervention. Our model also doesn’t necessitate fiat since USFG ISNT IN THE RESOLUTION. You just have to defend limitations on state power which solves your offense.

#### [e] Focusing only on debate is too narrow minded and disavows the structural dispossession of people outside of our activity that your UQ claims rely on. If you’re correct about your claims of enslavement and inability to access policy institutions, then focusing only on Debate doesn’t resolve these issues.