# 1

#### **The self-fulfilling prophecy dictates that the aff causes the very impacts they claim to avoid inevitable, holding us hostage to the threat of nuclear annihilation and perpetuating colonial domination and brutalizing the national security apparatus that feeds off endless suffering.**

#### Specifically when their Hamann 09 card says “The work of the WTO cannot be overstated in a nuclear-armed world”; roblin 21 and mead 13 cards all talk of “nuclear war” scenarios

Masco 14 [Joseph Masco, Professor of Anthropology and Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. 2008 Rachel Carson Prize from the Society for the Social Studies of Science and the 2006 Robert K. Merton Prize from the Section on Science, Knowledge and Technology of the American Sociology Association. His work has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Wenner-Gren Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. “The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror.” Pg. epilogue]

Reclaiming the emotional history of the atomic bomb is crucial today, as nuclear terror has been amplified to enable a variety of political projects at precisely the moment when American memory of the bomb has become impossibly blurred. In the United States, nuclear fear has recently been used to justify preemptive war and unlimited domestic surveillance, a worldwide system of secret prisons; and the practices of rendition, torture, and assassination. But what do Americans today actually know or remember of the bomb? We live not in the ruins produced by Soviet ICBM’s, but rather in the emotional ruins of the Cold War as an intellectual, imaginative, and social project. The half- century- long project to install and articulate the nation through contemplating its violent end has colonized the present. The suicide- hijacker attacks on New York City and Washington in 2001 may have produced an immediate political consensus that the Cold War “was over” and a formal declaration of a counterterror project.24 But American reactions to those attacks were structured by a multigenerational state project to harness the fear of mass death to divergent political and military industrial agendas. By evoking the image of the mushroom cloud to enable the invasion of Iraq, President Bush appealed directly to citizens’ nuclear fear, a cultural product of the very Cold War nuclear standoff he formally disavowed in inaugurating the new counterterror state. The mushroom cloud imagery, as well as the totalizing immediacy of the threat in his presentation, worked to redeploy a cultural memory of apocalyptic nuclear threat (established during the four de cades of the Soviet- American nuclear arms race) as part of the new War on Terror. Th e new color- coded terrorist warning system (based on a similar system proposed in Project East River [Associated Universities 1952] to deal with nuclear-armed Soviet bombers), as well as the more recent transformation of shampoo bottles on planes into an imminent threat by the Department of Homeland Security, are official efforts to install and regulate fear in everyday life through a public theater of insecurity.25 In this regard, the War on Terror has been conducted largely as a campaign of emotional management within the United States, using the tropes and logics developed during the early Cold War to enable a new kind of American geopolitical project. Th e war redirects but also reiterates the American assumptions about mass violence, technology, and democracy I have explored in this chapter.

If the September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington felt strangely familiar to many U.S. citizens, it was because American society has been imaginatively rehearsing the destruction of these cities for more than three generations: in the civil defense campaigns of the early and late Cold War, as well as in the Hollywood blockbusters of the 1990s, which destroyed these cities each summer with increasing nuance and detail. Th e genealogy of this form of entertainment is traumatic, dating back to the specific way in which the United States entered the nuclear age as the perpetrator of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and to the specific propaganda campaigns informing nuclear threat throughout the four decades of Cold War. Indeed, the ease with which the suicide- hijacker attacks were nationalized as part of a nuclear discourse by the new counterterror state has much to do with this legacy (see Dower 2010; Kaplan 2003). Not coincidentally, the two graphic measures of nuclear blast damage most frequently used during the Cold War involved the Pentagon and the New York City skyline (see Eden 2004; Galison 2001). Figures 1.10 and 1.11, for example, are taken from the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s campaign to document the size of the first U.S. hydrogen bomb test in 1952. Fourteen true- to- scale versions of the Pentagon (identified by the AEC as the largest building in the world) were placed inside the blast crater (the former Elugelab Island) to document its size, while the New York skyline is used to demonstrate the vast horizontal and vertical scope of the detonation. The attacks of September 2001 were easily nationalized and transformed into a nuclear discourse precisely because the U.S. security culture has imagined and rehearsed attacks on Washington and New York for generations, and because the specific symbols in the attacks (the Pentagon and the tallest building in the New York skyline) were also used by the nuclear state for three generations as part of its strategy of emotional management. In other words, the Bush administration mobilized a well- established logic of nuclear attack to pursue its policy objectives in Iraq, translating discrete, nonnuclear threats into the emotional equivalent of a global nuclear crisis.

Since the United States constructs itself via discourses of ruination, it should not be a surprise to see a corollary U.S. exportation of ruins on a global scale. As Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf clearly understood, the “with us or against us” stance of the Bush administration in 2001 left no ambiguity about the cost to Pakistan if it did not align itself with the sole remaining global superpower at the start of its War on Terror (2006, 201). Th e threat to reduce Pakistan to a “Stone Age” ruin is an alternative, international deployment of nuclear fear, constituting a U.S. promise to reduce that country to a prenational, pretechnological state. Th is threat of annihilation has its roots in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and is a recurring Cold War form, also expressed by U.S. officials in the mass bombing campaigns in Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia. Thus, the United States enters the twenty- first century as a nation both fascinated by and traumatized by nuclear ruins. It transforms real and imagined mass death into a nationalized space and supports a political culture that believes bombing campaigns can produce democracy. It simultaneously is terrorized by nuclear weapons and threatens to use them. The U.S. military both wages preemptive war over nascent WMD programs and is committed to maintaining state- of- the- art nuclear weapons for all future contingencies.26 American society(‘s) is today neither “atomic bomb– proof” nor capable of engaging nuclear technologies as a global problem of governance. Instead, U.S. citizens live today in the emotional residues of the Cold War nuclear arms race, which can address those citizens only as fearful and docile bodies. Th us, even in the twenty- first century, Americans remain caught between terror and fear, trapped in the psychosocial space defined by the once and future promise of nuclear ruins.

#### **The need to produce increasingly apocalyptic visions perpetuates atmospheres of violence** and ensures that every grasp at security will only ever produce more insecurity. The aff wears the mask of rationality while actually planting the seeds of collective suicide by playing with the language of extermination, reproducing the same failed logic of nuclear security and then blackmailing us with the precarity of a situation they themselves have created.

Masco 12 [Joseph Masco, Professor of Anthropology and Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. 2008 Rachel Carson Prize from the Society for the Social Studies of Science and the 2006 Robert K. Merton Prize from the Section on Science, Knowledge and Technology of the American Sociology Association. His work has been supported by the American Council of Learned Societies, The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, The Wenner-Gren Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities. “The End of Ends.” Jstor, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 85 No. 4 (Fall 2012), Pg. 1117-1122]

US military systems became both the most direct application of technical rationality and the location of deep fantasies about national immortality and systems of total control. In the first decade of the Cold War, for example, the lack of detailed intelligence about the Soviet Union enabled an American national security project that was both technologically Utopian and driven by increasingly apocalyptic visions of an omnipotent other. A top-secret, blue-ribbon panel studying the possibility of nuclear civil defense in 1957, known as the Gaither Committee, not only recommended a nationwide commitment to building underground bunkers and training citizens to think calmly about experiencing nuclear war, its members also concluded that a "missile gap" with the Soviet Union left the US increasingly vulnerable to a devastating "first strike" (Security Resources Panel of the Science Advisory Committee 1 957). Reinforced by the hysteria over Sputnik later in 1957- the first artificial satellite in space- US national security debates, by the end of the 1950s, were structured by visions of a Soviet sneak attack that would destroy urban America in an instant. The Gaither Committee leaked to the press their conclusion that by 1959 the Soviets would have a decisive advantage in ICBMs (see Roman 1995, Snead 1999) provoking huge nuclear arms expenditures in the US. The domestic politics informing the "missile gap" narrative were part of the battle between military branches for nuclear resources and soon key to John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign strategy of positioning his Republican rivals (Eisenhower and then Nixon) as weak on national security. Thus, a threat projection with multiple political uses became codified as a kind of truth in US national security policy, leading to massive increases in defense spending at the end of the Eisenhower administration and then again at the start of the Kennedy administration. The nuclear triad- of bombers, ICBMs, and submarines- is built at this moment, providing multiple redundant systems for waging nuclear war and giving each branch of the military a nuclear capability.

Today we can see that in addition to the new weapons systems built at the end of the 1950s, there was also an important political discovery crucial to the evolving Cold War: namely, the universal utility of threat proliferation in US security culture. The raw political value of existential threat as a motivating narrative became a well-worn domestic strategy in the US, one linking the "missile gap" of the 1950s to the "window of vulnerability" of the 1970s, to the "strategic defense initiative" of the 1980s to the "space based Pearl Harbor" narratives of the 1990s to the terrorist "WMD" discourses of the 2000s as illustrations of a nuclear culture. In each of these cases, we can see how the bomb (as a consolidated form of existential threat) has been good for Americans to think with, becoming the basis for building a nuclear state and a global military system but also for transforming raw military ambition into a necessary form of "defense." But if the bomb has been crucial to constituting US "superpower" status, it has also produced a complex new domestic affective political domain, allowing images of, and appeals to, existential threat to become a central means of establishing and expanding a militarized national security culture.

By 1961, US war planners sought to rationalize a vast set of military logics and capabilities into a comprehensive war plan- known as the Single Integrated Operating Plan or SIOP. The first plan, known as SIOP- 62, promised to reduce contingency and error, and to coordinate a US war machine that included bombers, submarines, and missiles deployed glob- ally, as well as a vast array of front line nuclear technologies, from nuclear cannons, to backpack bombs, to atomic land mines (see Sagan 1987, Ball and Toth 1990, and Burr 2004). The first SIOP had two options each involving a total assault on the communist block- preemptive war and retaliation. What is crucial to acknowledge today is that SIOP-62 was not a war plan in any traditional sense, rather it articulated in technologically feasible terms a total ending (see Keeney 2002, Burr 2005, Rosenberg and Moore 1981/1982). The preemptive option could be triggered by "signs" of an imminent Soviet attack. What constituted a definitive "sign" of such an attack however was left unstated, creating potential slippages between different organizations- the Strategic Air Command, the Navy, and the White House, for example- which might interpret Soviet actions differently. American Cold War state and nation-building was also increasingly devoted to rehearsing a surprise attack on the US and to applying the worst-case scenario thinking as normative (Masco 2008).

The preemptive option in SIOP-62 committed the full US arsenal in a simultaneous global nuclear strike, involving 3,200 nuclear weapons delivered to 1,060 targets around the world. In short, it was a plan to eliminate "communism" from planet Earth within a few hours of nuclear war. It involved targets not only in the Soviet Union, but also China (not yet a nuclear power), and all of their allied states. In a few hours of nuclear war, hundreds of cities, and more than 500 million people would be destroyed, followed by millions more from radiation injuries. Not included in this calculation were nuclear counterstrikes or the environmental or climatic con- sequences of nuclear war, which would have magnified and spread these effects to all corners of the globe.

The scale of destruction detailed in SIOP-62 is a distinctive moment in human history and is, in Kant's strict technical sense of the term, sublime. It is beyond comprehension, which raises a crucial issue about how the nuclear state resolves such terror/complexity. In national security planning, the compensation for this experience of cognitive overload was a fixation on command and control, as well as the articulation of specific war calculations, marking degrees of violence for different nuclear war scenarios (see Kahn 1960, Eden 2004). What would likely be an unknown chaos of missiles and bombs launched for the first time from a vast range of technologies, located all over the planet under deeply varied conditions, appears on paper as a rational program of cause and effect, threat and preemption, attack and counter-attack. This was an apocalyptic vision presented simply as math. From 1 962 until today, the SIOP nuclear war plan has been continually revised and rationalized for different global political contexts but never truly abandoned (McKinzie, Cochran, Norris, and Arkin 2001). The US maintains the ability to destroy all major population centers outside the continental US within a few minutes of nuclear conflict. It is important to recognize that this technical capacity to deliver overwhelming violence to any part of the world in mere minutes has relied on structures of the imagination as well as on machines, threat projections, and fantasies, as well as physics and engineering.

US policymakers have experienced many moments of rupture in their global vision, shocks that might have recalibrated how threat, security, fears, and technology were organized. After U-2 pilot Gary Powers was shot down over the Soviet Union in 1 960, covert spy flights over the USSR were stopped, leaving policy makers in the US with no definitive intelligence on Soviet military activities. It is difficult today to imagine a period more fraught, more susceptible to paranoid fantasy and projection, and more primed for nuclear conflict. US policymakers lacked basic information about Soviet society and military capabilities, creating a huge information gap that invited speculation and fantasy, as well as paranoia. In a national security culture rehearsing surprise attack, and negotiating increasing confrontations in Europe, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, what could provoke a de-escalation in this nuclear system, which by the early 1960s was already primed for nuclear war on a minute-to-minute basis? The Corona system offered a radically new perspective on Cold War realities, but its role has been historically and culturally limited to revealing the objective facts of Soviet nuclear capabilities, not the American fantasies that generated the "missile gap" in the first place.

The Corona system was both cutting edge technology and a new form of expressive culture, an early planetary technology mobilized to com- bat official panic. The missed opportunity provided by the first Corona photographs was to evaluate the fantasies and paranoia of an American military system that had so thoroughly misjudged the scale of the Soviet technological capabilities that preemptive nuclear war was under consideration. Instead, the "missile gap" narrative was never publicly retracted, and the satellite photographs that proved this major discourse of the Cold War to be false were classified top secret until 1995. Classification protected the technology, but also the self-critique that Corona photographs might have generated of official US projections. Thus, an opportunity for a public discussion of how national fears are constituted out of a lack of information, fantasy, and political demonology was lost. Instead, a new effort to normalize nuclear crisis was pursued. The US nuclear stockpile grew to over 30,000 weapons by the end of the 1 960s, and space became an increasingly militarized domain. The SIOP target list would continue to grow through the 1980s, eventually including tens of thousands of global targets and constituting a nuclear war system so complex that it is very likely that no single human being understood its internal logics or likely effects. American ideologies of nuclear fear constantly threaten to overwhelm the material evidence of danger and have become a core part of a now multigenerational commitment to militarism for its own sake. By 201 1 , the result is that the US spends as much as the rest of the world combined on military matters but has not yet achieved anything like "security."

The Corona system offers us, in Benjamin's terms, an important opportunity to "brush history against the grain" as it was both a technological marvel- a demonstration of the power of instrumental rationality- and a stark reality check on US national security culture itself, offering a new optics on the psychopolitics of Cold War (Orr 2006). The first photographic survey of the Soviet Union from outer space showed that US policymakers took the world to the brink of nuclear war in response to their fantasies of Soviet power, not the reality of Soviet capabilities. This well documented insight might have produced a fundamental rethinking of how threat, security, and nuclear power were organized in the US, establishing a cautionary tale at the very least. But instead the Corona photographs remained a highly classified set of facts through the Cold War. This secrecy enabled a system of nuclear normalization to be reinforced rather than interrogated, securing the project of Cold War for the next 30 years. In the end, the new optics offered by Corona (on both Soviet machines and American fantasies) were reduced simply to a push for new space technology- higher resolution photographs, better real time transition of data, and so on. In other words, the structure of the security state did not change even when confronted with evidence of its own fantasy projections and error. The "success" of Corona ultimately produced an American Cold War project even more focused on technological innovation and the projection of nu- clear power rather than one capable of re-thinking its own cultural terms, expert logics, or institutional practices.

The constant slippages between crisis, expertise, and failure are now well established in an American political culture. The cultural history of Cold War nuclear crisis helps us understand why. Derrida (1984), working with the long running theoretical discourse on the sublimity of death (which links Kant, Freud, and Benjamin), describes the problem of the nuclear age as the impossibility of contemplating the truly "remainderless event" or the "total end of the archive." For him, nuclear war is "fabulously textual" because until it occurs all you can do is tell stories about it, and because to write about it is to politically engage in a form of future making that assumes a reader, thus performing a kind of counter-militarization and anti-nuclear practice. In the early 1960s, the US nuclear war policy was officially known as "overkill," referencing the redundant use of hydrogen bombs to destroy targets (Rosenberg 1983). This "overkill" installs a new kind of biopower, which fuses an obliteration of the other with collective suicide. The means to an end here constitutes an actual and total end, making the most immediate problem of the nuclear age the problem of differentiating comprehension from compensation in the minute-to-minute assessment of crisis.

This seems to be a fundamental problem in US national security culture-an inability to differentiate the capacity for war with the act itself, or alternatively to evaluate the logics of war from inside war. Today, space is filled with satellites offering near perfect resolution on the surface of the earth and able to transmit that data with great speed and precision to computers and cell phones, as well as early warning systems, missiles, and drones. What we cannot seem to do is find an exterior viewpoint on war itself- a perspective that would allow an assessment not only of the reality of conflict but also of the motivations, fantasies, and desires that sup- port and enable it. Indeed expert systems of all sorts- military, economic, political, and industrial- all seem unable to learn from failure and instead in the face of crisis simply retrench and remobilize longstanding and obviously failed logics. War, for example, is not the exception but the norm in the US today- which makes peace "extreme." So what would it take for Americans to consider not only the means to an end- that is, the tactics, the surges, the preemptions, and surgical strikes- but also to reevaluate war itself? What would it take to consider an actual end to such ends?

#### **Reject the aff and endorse our critical interrogation of the rhetoric of security and insecurity. Your ballot represents a break with the nuclear mindset and the possibility of constructing a new and more human sense of meaning.**

Elliot 12 [Emory Elliot is a Distinguished Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside. “Terror, Theory, and the Humanities in the Public Sphere.” https://quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/10815548.0001.001/1:3.5/--terror-theory-and-the-humanities?rgn=div2;view=fulltext]

In a 1991 interview for the New York Times Magazine, Don DeLillo expressed his views on the place of literature in our times in a statement that he has echoed many times since and developed most fully in his novel Mao II:

In a repressive society, a writer can be deeply influential, but in a society that’s ﬁlled with glut and endless consumption, the act of terror may be the only meaningful act. People who are in power make their arrangements in secret, largely as a way of maintaining and furthering that power. People who are powerless make an open theater of violence. True terror is a language and a vision. There is a deep narrative structure to terrorist acts, and they infiltrate and alter consciousness in ways that writers used to aspire to. (qtd. in DePietro 84)

The implications of DeLillo’s statement are that we are all engaged in national, international, transnational, and global conflicts in which acts of representation, including those of terrorism and spectacular physical violence as well as those of language, performance, and art compete for the attention of audiences and for influence in the public sphere.

In the early days of the Iraq War, the United States used the power of images, such as those of the “mother of all bombs” and a wide array of weapons, as well as aesthetic techniques to influence and shape the consciousness of millions and to generate strong support for the war. The shock, fear, and nationalism aroused in those days after 9/11 have enabled the Bush administration to pursue a military agenda that it had planned before 9/11. Since then, the extraordinary death and destruc- tion, scandals and illegalities, and domestic and international demon- strations and criticisms have been unable to alter the direction of this agenda. Those of us in the humanities who are trained as critical readers of political and social texts, as well as of complex artistically constructed texts, are needed now more urgently than ever to analyze the relationships between political power and the wide range of rhetorical methods being employed by politicians and others to further their destructive effects in the world.

If humanities scholars can create conscious awareness of how such aesthetic devices such as we see in those photos achieve their affective appeal, citizens may begin to understand how they are being manipulated and motivated by emotion rather than by reason and logic. In spite of our ability to expose some of these verbal and visual constructions as devices of propaganda that function to enflame passions and stifle reasonable dis- cussion, we humanities scholars find ourselves marginalized and on the defensive in our institutions of higher learning where our numbers have been diminished and where we are frequently being asked to justify the significance of our research and teaching. While we know the basic truth that the most serious threats to our societies today are more likely to result from cultural differences and failures of communication than from inadequate scientific information or technological inadequacies, we have been given no voice in this debate. With the strong tendency toward polarized thinking and opinion and the evangelical and fundamentalist re- ligious positions in the US today and in other parts of the world, leaders continue to abandon diplomacy and resort to military actions. Most government leaders find the cultural and social explanations of the problems we face to be vague, and they are frustrated by complex human issues. That is not reason enough, however, for us to abandon our efforts to influence and perhaps even alter the current course of events. In spite of the discouragements that we as scholars of the humanities are experiencing in these times, it seems to me that we have no option but to continue to pursue our research and our teaching and hope to influence others to question the meaning and motives of what they see and hear.

# 2

#### Removing patents for just covid undermines incentives to innovate

NC Bioscience Organization, “Vaccine patent waiver breaks faith with American companies, stifles innovation” https://www.ncbioscience.net/2021/05/13/55544/

NCBIO is extremely disappointed that the Biden administration has chosen to support waiving critical intellectual property protections for U.S. COVID-19 vaccines. This decision, known as a TRIPS waiver, breaks faith with American innovators, punishes the ingenuity of our life sciences industry and will delay the equitable delivery of COVID vaccines to people around the globe. Giving countries in need a recipe for making a vaccine is not the same as providing them with vaccine. Production facilities, ingredients, safeguards, a trained workforce and a distribution system must all be in place before a single patient is injected. All of this can take months or years. Other world leaders know this IP waiver is a bad idea. German Chancellor Angela Merkel opposes IP waivers for vaccines, saying they would create “severe complications” for production. “The limiting factor for the production of vaccines are manufacturing capacities and high quality standards, not the patents,” [she told Bloomberg](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-06/wto-enters-covid-19-vaccine-standoff-with-a-compromise-proposal). “The protection of intellectual property is a source of innovation and this has to remain so in the future.” The president should follow through on his pledge to make the United States the world’s “[arsenal of vaccines](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/28/remarks-as-prepared-for-delivery-by-president-biden-address-to-a-joint-session-of-congress/).” This policy leads in the opposite direction. A better alternative would be the COVID [Global Strategy for Harnessing Access Reaching Everyone Program](https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Letter%20to%20President%20Joseph%20Biden%20-%20May%203%202021_0.pdf) proposed by the Biotechnology Innovation Organization. The SHARE program would ensure sufficient global supply of and access to vaccines and strengthen and support health care systems in low-and middle-income countries in addressing COVID. It would accomplish these goals without compromising protections for intellectual property or further stretching limited global vaccine expertise to the breaking point. We agree with Sen. Richard Burr and [Sen. Thom Tillis](https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2021/5/tillis-and-cotton-statement-on-president-biden-s-disastrous-decision-to-support-the-trips-waiver) who oppose the TRIPS waiver. Burr said in a [statement](https://www.burr.senate.gov/press/releases/burr-statement-on-intellectual-property-protections-for-covid-19-vaccines), “The partnerships developing and manufacturing the COVID-19 vaccines have been one of the biggest scientific success stories in generations – one that’s already impacting other areas of medical research. Intellectual property protections are part of the reason we have these life-saving products; stripping these protections only ensures we won’t have the vaccines or treatments we need when the next pandemic occurs.” These hits to the innovation behind vaccines could easily extend to all areas of the U.S. innovation economy. Intellectual property protections are the lifeblood of the life science industry and the same could be said for other technologies where U.S. innovation is key. North Carolina, home to many innovative early stage and biopharmaceutical manufacturing companies could see a particularly severe impact. We urge the president to protect American companies from the coerced transfer of technology by foreign governments, avoid any precedents that would work to undermine incentives to develop vaccines and treatments in future pandemics and avoid setting a precedent that undermines the entire US innovation economy.

#### Turn—innovation is k2 resolving covid in the future

Da Silva 7-21

[Renan Gonçalves Leonel da Silva](javascript:;), [Roger Chammas](https://health-policy-systems.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12961-021-00760-8#auth-Roger-Chammas) & [Hillegonda Maria Dutilh Novaes](https://health-policy-systems.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12961-021-00760-8#auth-Hillegonda_Maria_Dutilh-Novaes)  7-21-2021, "Rethinking approaches of science, technology, and innovation in healthcare during the COVID-19 pandemic: the challenge of translating knowledge infrastructures to public needs," Health Research Policy and Systems, https://health-policy-systems.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12961-021-00760-8

According to Jasanoff and colleagues (2021), during the novel coronavirus outbreak, decisions that were made in the past positioned some countries better than others in terms of their capability to respond to the crisis. It has been a particular way to approach the development of knowledge infrastructures in health in the field of science and technology studies (STS), and researchers in this field have been paying attention to the evolution of the pandemic responses from an international comparative perspective, taking into account the role of the political and knowledge platforms to respond to the rise in infections [[9](https://health-policy-systems.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12961-021-00760-8#ref-CR9)]. Countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have become leaders in health innovation over the past few decades, producing new technologies and devices, but have also experienced a positive movement of policy-making directed at facilitating and fostering research and technological development regionally [[10](https://health-policy-systems.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12961-021-00760-8#ref-CR10)]. Governments from countries such as the United States and United Kingdom mobilized their national systems of innovation to produce new diagnostics, devices, and technologies, but delayed in adequately producing and delivering molecular diagnostics. These countries have a sophisticated health innovation infrastructure and should have been capable of large-scale production of molecular tests in order to monitor the escalation of the pandemic and propose adequate public policies.

#### Innovation necessary for booster shots against future variants

Jared S. Hopkins, 4-15-2021, "Annual Covid-19 Vaccine Booster Shots Likely Needed, Pfizer CEO Says," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/annual-covid-19-vaccine-booster-shots-likely-needed-pfizer-ceo-says-11618520527

[Pfizer](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/PFE) Inc. [PFE -1.65%](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/PFE?mod=chiclets) Chief Executive Albert Bourla said it is likely that people who receive Covid-19 vaccines will need booster shots within a year afterward, and then annual vaccinations, to maintain protection against the virus as it evolves. “The variants will play a key role. It is extremely important to suppress the pool of people that can be susceptible to the virus,” Mr. Bourla said during a virtual event hosted by [CVS Health](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/CVS) Corp. that aired Thursday but was recorded April 1. “There are vaccines like polio where one dose is enough,” Mr. Bourla said. “And there are vaccines like flu that you need every year. The Covid virus looks more like the influenza virus than the polio virus.” More research is required to confirm the need for annual booster shots, he said. But he added that the need appeared likely given research so far. The chief executive’s comments come as the U.S. and other countries race to vaccinate as many people as possible and [try to stay ahead of any variants](https://www.wsj.com/articles/variants-fuel-covid-19-surge-but-scientists-voice-optimism-for-vaccines-11618479003?mod=article_inline) that could evade the shots. Researchers still don’t know how long protection lasts from any of the Covid-19 vaccines, although they are studying the issue. New shots or boosters might be necessary, vaccine experts say, if the virus mutates significantly enough. In the rush to introduce vaccines for the new virus, companies and other vaccine researchers didn’t have time to determine how long shots would provide protection, or whether booster shots would be needed to ensure protection. Pfizer and its partner, [BioNTech SE](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/BNTX), [BNTX -3.11%](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/BNTX?mod=chiclets) said recently that the shot [remains highly effective six months after its second dose](https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-biontech-covid-19-vaccine-protects-for-six-months-companies-say-11617273901?mod=article_inline), and they hope to provide more information on protection beyond six months in the coming weeks. Health regulators began authorizing use of Pfizer-BioNTech’s shot in December and the vaccine has been rolled out in dozens of countries. Mr. Bourla and other Pfizer executives have said since last year that annual or seasonal shots were likely. In February, Pfizer and BioNTech began a study testing in people [whether a third dose of the companies’ inoculation](https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-and-biontech-studying-third-covid-19-vaccine-dose-to-fight-new-strains-11614253507?mod=article_inline) can protect against emerging variant strains. [Moderna](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/MRNA) Inc. [MRNA -4.52%](https://www.wsj.com/market-data/quotes/MRNA?mod=chiclets) executives have also said they expect boosters to be needed to ensure protection lasts in vaccinated people. The company recently started studying whether a [booster shot of its two-dose vaccine](https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-variant-vaccine-from-moderna-begins-human-testing-11615417407?mod=article_inline) is effective against a variant of the virus. Countries with high vaccination rates will be ready to shift their focus to boosters possibly at the end of this year, Moderna said during a company vaccine event this week. Moderna President Stephen Hoge said it is safe to assume boosters would be needed “annually, probably seasonally, even though the pandemic is raging in a nonseasonal way.” The Moderna and Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines are based on a new gene-based technology called messenger RNA. The likelihood that periodic Covid-19 shots will be needed is one reason Pfizer executives have said the company plans [to expand its vaccine business](https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-goes-it-alone-to-expand-vaccine-business-beyond-covid-19-pandemic-11616491800?mod=article_inline) by becoming a leader in mRNA.

#### New strains are more infectious delta proves—that o/w’s on scope

Ashley Hagen 7-30-2021, "How Dangerous Is the Delta Variant (B.1.617.2)?," ASM.org, https://asm.org/Articles/2021/July/How-Dangerous-is-the-Delta-Variant-B-1-617-2

Data indicate that Delta is [40-60% more transmissible than Alpha](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/993321/S1267_SPI-M-O_Consensus_Statement.pdf) and almost twice as transmissible as the original Wuhan strain of SARS-CoV-2. Furthermore, significantly more viral particles have been found in the airways of patients infected with the Delta variant. A Chinese study reported that [viral loads in Delta infections were ~1,000 times higher](https://virological.org/t/viral-infection-and-transmission-in-a-large-well-traced-outbreak-caused-by-the-delta-sars-cov-2-variant/724) than those in infections caused by other variants. In response this information, the World Health Organization (WHO) regards Delta as “[the fastest and fittest](https://www.yalemedicine.org/news/5-things-to-know-delta-variant-covid)” variant so far. 2. Is the Delta variant more dangerous than other variants of concern? According to surveys conducted in the U.K., where Delta accounts for ~90% of current COVID-19 cases, symptoms of Delta tend to be a little different than other strains, but that does not necessarily mean the associated symptoms are more severe. Fever, headache, sore throat and runny nose are common, while cough and loss of smell are not. Other reports [link Delta to more serious symptoms](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-07/gangrene-hearing-loss-point-to-delta-variant-being-more-severe), including hearing impairment, severe gastrointestinal issues and blood clots leading to tissue death and gangrene. Research is ongoing to determine if Delta infection is associated with increased hospitalization and death. One early study assessing the risk of hospital admission in Scotland reported that [hospitalization is twice as likely in unvaccinated individuals with Delta](https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(21)01358-1/fulltext) than in unvaccinated individuals with Alpha. [Case numbers and hospitalizations](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/covidview/index.html) are once again on the rise in the U.S., especially in [states where vaccination percentages are low](https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/07/17/us/delta-variant-us-growth.html) and the Delta variant is surging. On July 16, 2021, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported a 7-day average increase in new COVID-19 cases of 69.3% and a 35% increase in hospitalizations. Still, it is difficult to determine whether Delta is actually making people sicker than previous forms of the virus or if it is simply circulating amongst more vulnerable populations where case numbers are high, vaccination rates are low and increased stress on hospital systems is impacting patient care and disease outcomes. What is clear is that the majority of hospitalizations and COVID-19-associated deaths in the U.S. [are occurring in unvaccinated people](https://healthfeedback.org/claimreview/unvaccinated-individuals-now-account-for-the-vast-majority-of-covid-19-hospitalizations-and-deaths-in-the-u-s-according-to-available-data/), leading to a chilling warning from CDC director Dr. Rochelle Walensky that “this is becoming a pandemic of the unvaccinated.” 3. Will vaccines remain protective against the Delta variant? Studies show that 2 doses of [vaccines are effective at preventing hospitalization](https://khub.net/documents/135939561/479607266/Effectiveness+of+COVID-19+vaccines+against+hospital+admission+with+the+Delta+(B.1.617.2)+variant.pdf/1c213463-3997-ed16-2a6f-14e5deb0b997?t=1623689315431) and death, but neutralization levels of vaccinated sera are lower against the Delta variant compared to the original strain. A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine [tested neutralization activity of sera](http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMc2107799) from individuals who had recovered from natural SARS-CoV-2 infection and sera from individuals who had been fully vaccinated with Moderna or Pfizer vaccines against infectious B.1.617.2 virus. Data from the study indicated that, on average, the Delta variant was 2.9 times less susceptible to neutralization than the Wuhan strain, but most convalescent serum samples and all vaccination serum samples showed detectable neutralization activity. As a result, researchers concluded that immunity conferred by mRNA vaccines is likely to be retained against the Delta variant. These results were supported by research, published in Nature, that [evaluated the sensitivity of infectious Delta virus](https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-021-03777-9_reference.pdf) against monoclonal antibodies, convalescent sera and sera developed after vaccination. The study found that some antibodies targeting the N-terminal domain and receptor binding domain of the spike protein (S protein) showed impaired binding and neutralization of the Delta variant. Additionally, convalescent sera, collected up to 12 months post symptoms from individuals who had recovered from natural SAR-CoV-2 infection, were 4-fold less effective at neutralizing Delta than Alpha. Sera from individuals who were partially vaccinated (had received 1 dose of Pfizer or AstraZeneca vaccine) showed little to no neutralizing activity against Delta. Sera from 95% of those who received 2 doses of either vaccine generated a neutralizing response that was 3-5-fold less potent against Delta than Alpha. Another study published in the New England Journal of Medicine used a test-negative, case-control design to estimate vaccine effectiveness against symptomatic disease caused by the Delta variant, compared to Alpha. The study, which was conducted in the U.K., reported an [88% efficacy against Delta](https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2108891?query=TOC&cid=NEJM%20eToc,%20July%2022,%202021%20A%20DM162198_NEJM_Non_Subscriber&bid=560372554%22%20\) after 2 doses of mRNA vaccine, but only 30.7% efficacy after 1 dose, which is below the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)’s 50% efficacy threshold for COVID-19 vaccines. Initial reports indicated that the [J&J vaccine was also effective against Delta](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/01/health/coronavirus-johnson-vaccine-delta.html), however a new study, not yet peer reviewed, indicated that sera from a significant fraction of J&J vaccinated individuals showed a [5-7 fold decrease in neutralizing titers](https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.07.19.452771v2.full), which, according to the study’s mathematical modeling, could result in decreased protection from infection. Taken together, these data support the importance of full dose vaccination against SARS-CoV-2, but reports of reduced vaccine efficacy against Delta warrant further investigation into breakthrough infections and the possibility of vaccine booster shots. Genomic analysis of isolates from 63 vaccine breakthrough infections in India (not yet peer reviewed) revealed that B.1.617.2 was the predominant lineage in groups who were partially and fully vaccinated with either AstraZeneca or [Covaxin](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covaxin) (an inactivated virus-based vaccine developed by Bharat Biotech in collaboration with the Indian Council of Medical Research). In late July, 2021, the [CDC published a report evaluating outbreaks of SARS-CoV-2](https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7031e2.htm?s_cid=mm7031e2_w) that were associated with large public gatherings in Barnstable County, Massachusetts. Out of the 469 identified cases of COVID-19, 346 or 74% of them were breakthrough infections that occurred in people who were fully vaccinated with 2 doses of Pfizer or Moderna, or 1 dose of the J&J vaccine. Genomic analysis revealed that Delta was responsible for 90% of the 133 sequenced breakthrough infections. This information prompted the CDC to recommend the use of [masks in indoor public spaces, regardless of vaccination status](https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/vaccines/fully-vaccinated-guidance.html), in areas where COVID-19 transmission is high. Further research into [breakthrough infections](https://asm.org/Videos/COVID-19-Vaccine-Breakthrough-Infections-Microbial) that occur after COVID-19 vaccination is needed. Meanwhile, companies are already developing booster doses to improve efficacy against circulating variants. Pfizer plans to seek [FDA authorization for its booster dose](https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/pfizer-ask-fda-authorize-booster-dose-covid-vaccine-delta-variant-spreads-2021-07-08/), which is expected to elicit [stronger neutralization against the Delta variant](https://cdn.pfizer.com/pfizercom/2021-07/Delta_Variant_Study_Press_Statement_Final_7.8.21.pdf?IPpR1xZjlwvaUMQ9sRn2FkePcBiRPGqw). However, antibodies alone do not give the whole picture of immune protection. How other vaccine-elicited immune components, such as T cells and B cells, respond when challenged by the Delta variant is still relatively unclear, and conversation about whether booster doses are needed yet are ongoing. To learn more about the effectiveness of vaccines against Delta and dive deepter into data from the studies mentioned here, tune in to Microbial Minutes, ASM's monthly video series of trending topics in the microbial sciences.

# 3

#### Counterplan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines by facilitating the technology transfer and licensing of manufacturing to other manufacturers to produce vaccines.

#### Backed by the WTO Director-General and been proven to be effective.

https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2021-03-24/international-wto-considers-waiving-certain-intellectual-property-protections-for-the-prevention-containment-and-treatment-of-covid-19/

Alternatively, prior to her start as the new WTO Director-General, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala argued for a “third way”—not establishing a TRIPS Agreement waiver and not relying on article 31 bis compulsory licenses to increase access to vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics. She points to the possibility of increasing access to vaccines and other products through facilitating (1) technology transfer and (2) the licensing of manufacturing to other manufacturers to produce vaccines and other products, while still making sure that IP issues are taken care of (which has already occurred in the case of AstraZeneca licensing manufacturing to the Serum Institute of India).

# 4

#### Counterplan: The World Trade Organization ought to

#### -Increase covax support

#### -prioritize trade facilitation

#### -commit to aid for LDC’s

#### -invest in pandemic preparedness

[Violeta Gonzalez](https://www.devex.com/news/authors/1581504) 8-1-2021, "Opinion: 4 ways to promote vaccine equity through trade," Devex, https://www.devex.com/news/opinion-4-ways-to-promote-vaccine-equity-through-trade-100457

As of Monday, only [1.1 % of people in low-income countries](https://ourworldindata.org/covid-vaccinations) had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose. This is making it harder to battle a third wave of infections, as the highly transmissible [delta variant](https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/07/1095152) spreads across many nations. In the [World Health Organization](https://www.devex.com/organizations/world-health-organization-who-30562)’s Africa region — where a [high number](https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/com/2021/E2100045-English-CoM21-Progress-in-the-implementation-of-the-priority-areas-of-the-Programme-of-Action-for-the-Least-Developed-Countries-for-the-Decade-2011-2020_Istanbul-Programme-of-Action.pdf) of LDCs are located — COVID-19 fatalities [surged 44.2%](https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/342715/OEW28-0511072021.pdf) over one week in July. The coronavirus is [devastating](https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/2021/major-study-on-covid-19-impact-on-ldcs-released/) many LDCs’ already fragile economies and causing poverty and inequality to rise. Without equitable access to vaccines, [global economic recovery cannot be sustained](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/gc_05may21_e.htm) and progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals will be derailed. While trade alone cannot eradicate vaccine unequity or its negative consequences for the [economy](https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/05/1091732) and [vulnerable groups](https://observatoryihr.org/news/covid-19-vaccine-distribution-highlights-social-inequality/), it has a powerful contribution to make. Here are four actions that would make an impact: 1. Increase COVAX support Vaccine equity can only be achieved if the global community eschews vaccine nationalism. High-resource countries should [ramp up donations](https://www.devex.com/news/wto-chief-to-g-20-donate-2-3b-more-covid-19-vaccine-doses-100306) through the vaccine-sharing initiative COVAX and commit to securing a swift, workable resolution to ongoing debates around [technology transfers and intellectual property waivers](https://www.devex.com/news/wto-council-offers-hope-for-trips-vaccine-proposal-100125). While countries in the G-7 group of nations have [pledged to increase their support](https://www.who.int/news/item/13-06-2021-g7-announces-pledges-of-870-million-covid-19-vaccine-doses-of-which-at-least-half-to-be-delivered-by-the-end-of-2021) for COVAX, the initiative has faced hurdles in the form of [supply bottlenecks](https://www.devex.com/news/india-crisis-puts-covax-150-million-doses-behind-schedule-99860), [export restrictions](https://unctad.org/news/export-restrictions-do-not-help-fight-covid-19), and [logistical weaknesses](https://www.devex.com/news/the-cold-chain-storage-challenge-99869). Many currently available COVID-19 vaccines have short shelf lives and must be stored at low temperatures. LDCs can only benefit from donated doses if they have fast and efficient processing at their borders, modern transportation systems, and access to cold chain infrastructure. 2. Prioritize trade facilitation Accelerating implementation of the [World Trade Organization](https://www.devex.com/organizations/world-trade-organization-wto-44694)’s 2017 [Trade Facilitation Agreement](https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm) is critical for helping LDCs overcome these challenges. A total of [154 WTO members](https://www.tfafacility.org/ratifications) now support the agreement, which pledges investment in the simplification and modernization of the movement, release, and customs clearance of goods globally. It also aims to help low-income countries overcome these same barriers through technical assistance and capacity building. The [Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation](https://www.devex.com/organizations/global-alliance-for-trade-facilitation-102992) has made good progress in identifying barriers to vaccine equity and introducing solutions. In [Mozambique](https://www.tradefacilitation.org/article/two-new-mozambique-projects-aim-to-ease-access-to-vaccines-medical-products/), for example, the alliance is working to digitalize pre-shipment authorization for vaccine imports — a process that can take as long as two weeks, during which vaccine doses must be kept in storage. This digitalization should help Mozambique decrease wait times, improve shipment traceability, and reduce storage and inventory management costs. Yet more work remains to help governments overcome [challenges associated with implementing](https://www.wto-ilibrary.org/trade-facilitation-and-customs-valuation/world-trade-report-2015_f2985d96-en) the Trade Facilitation Agreement, such as changing domestic legislation and involving the private sector. Lower-income countries and LDCs have flagged a need around human resources and training, legal assistance, and the acquisition of information and communication technologies. 3. Commit to Aid for Trade For LDCs to participate fairly in global vaccine supply chains — as importers or exporters of inputs and finished products — they need financial and technical assistance to strengthen their [productive capacity](https://www.devex.com/news/cepi-ceo-concerted-effort-needed-to-build-lmic-vaccine-manufacturing-100013), streamline their cross-border standards and processes, and improve their logistics infrastructure and [technological know-how](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/dgno_21may21_e.htm). The Aid for Trade initiative exists to provide that support — but can only deliver if donor countries maintain or increase their official development assistance, or ODA. Preliminary figures from the [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development](https://www.devex.com/organizations/organisation-for-economic-co-operation-and-development-oecd-29872) show that [Development Assistance Committee](https://www.devex.com/organizations/development-assistance-committee-dac-100607) members [expanded their ODA by $10 billion](https://www.devex.com/news/what-to-make-of-the-2020-dac-stats-99641) between 2019 and 2020, mostly as part of their COVID-19 response. However, with several government donors having reprogrammed their aid budgets to focus on immediate health priorities, [fears are growing](https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/01/helping-small-businesses-build-resilience/) that their overall ODA may also be slashed — and, with this, their support for Aid for Trade. The generosity of some countries provides hope. Norway, for example, recently stepped up to help plug such gaps with [45 million Norwegian kroner](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news21_e/if_22jun21_e.htm) of additional funding for the WTO-backed [Enhanced Integrated Framework](https://www.devex.com/organizations/enhanced-integrated-framework-eif-78046), a global Aid for Trade program that aims to reduce poverty. 4. Invest in preparedness In 2019, only [$374 million](http://www.healthdata.org/sites/default/files/files/policy_report/FGH/2020/FGH_2019_Interior_Final_Online_2020.09.18.pdf) — or less than 1% — of the world’s total development assistance for health was spent on pandemic preparedness. Within months, the consequences of that underinvestment became clear. Integrating lower-income countries and LDCs into global and regional [pharmaceutical value chains](https://unctad.org/news/unctad-report-says-least-developed-countries-position-improve-access-medicines-through-local-0) is vital for ensuring the world is better prepared next time. Directing increased aid to help these countries become [producers and exporters](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-26/africa-must-build-vaccine-production-capacity-wto-chief-says) of medical equipment and vaccines has never been more needed. LDCs would not only receive more of the [vaccines and therapeutics they need now](https://trade4devnews.enhancedif.org/en/op-ed/access-denied-ensuring-vaccines-worlds-poorest-countries) but could actively contribute to the global response when the next pandemic inevitably hits.

# 5

#### Counterplan: The member nations of the World Trade Organization should mandate that pharmaceutical companies join and support the C-TAP in support of IP sharing of COVID vaccines.

https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/coronavirus-covid-19-vaccines-for-developing-countries-an-equal-shot-at-recovery-6b0771e6/

Ensure that key decision makers in global fora (e.g. UN, G20, and G7) have the evidence they need for joined up leader-level commitments on crisis response and improved resilience for the future. This includes:

* Providing latest costings for additional development finance required for the ACT Accelerator;
* Ensuring that flows to collaborative initiatives and vertical health funds reinforce and complement capacity and infrastructure for healthcare delivery at the national level;
* Encouraging efforts to minimise IP barriers to the production of COVID-19 vaccines, including through recording pledges of commitment made under the Solidarity Call to Action to voluntarily share COVID-19 health technology-related knowledge, intellectual property and data through the WHO COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP) and/or mechanisms for licensing of intellectual property as provided by the Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and the TRIPS flexibilities (see footnote 6);
* Supporting initiatives to co-pilot innovative solutions such as Advance Market Commitments and Product Development Partnerships.

#### Pushing for more C-TAP support is the most important solution to COVID vaccine distribution now.

https://healthpolicy-watch.news/progress-on-covid-19-technology-pool-inches-along-as-sister-initiative-to-pool-vaccine-procurement-accelerates/

While the COVAX Facility, a global initiative to pool procurement of a safe and effective COVID-19 vaccine, has been gaining momentum, another global initiative to pool intellectual property rights for tools to combat the pandemic has been moving at a much slower pace. Only three more countries have signed on to support the COVID-19 Technology Access Pool (CTAP), an initiative to pool COVID-19-related intellectual property IP, including patent rights, since the pool was first launched in 29 May. That makes 40 countries now supporting the initiative, according to WHO Access to Medicines, Biologics, and Vaccines Director Mariangela Simão, speaking at a [UNGA side event](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SQBzFtv0VnI&feature=emb_logo) hosted by Costa Rica’s President Carlos Alvarado Quesada on Friday. The high-level event also included WHO Director General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus and UN AIDS executive director Winnie Byanyima. Byanyima expressed concern about the lack of support the IP pool had received so far from countries as well as industry. “A vaccine is our greatest hope of rising up from this crisis. But the only place where a COVID-19 vaccine is a global public good is in rhetoric, not reality,” Byanyima said. “We congratulate the hard work of scientists, and yes, of pharma corporations too. And yet despite that – all the knowledge and technology to make them remains a secret. It is the private property of companies. They are deciding how many vaccines get made. They are deciding what price is charged. They are deciding who gets them. “The implications are clear. Oxfam’s research shows that rich countries representing 13% of the world’s population have secured half the vaccine supplies belonging to the major candidates…Do I need to remind us of the 10 million lives needlessly lost to HIV and AIDS? That’s what happened the last time we relied on the good will of pharmaceutical corporations in a crisis…. “Together we believe that there must be safe and effective vaccines for everyone. Vaccines that are fairly and speedily distributed across the world – free of charge – according to need and not ability to pay. We need a people’s vaccine not a profit vaccine. To do this all pharma corporations must openly share their know-how and technology for producing their vaccines free of patent and monopoly. This know-how and technology can then be shared with as many producers as possible. Once we have more producers, we have more doses, and there will be no need for this self-defeating vaccine bidding war in which the most at-risk populations will always loose. “To achieve this, we must push harder on CTAP. This is the most important multilateral solution we have on the table to unlock supply. The World Health Organization have shown us how access pools work, for example with the Medicines Patent Pool. We welcome COVAX, but we need its spirit of solidarity to extend to sharing technology and intellectual property for the global public good.

# 6

#### Interp: The aff on the 2021 Septermber/October LD topic must defend a reduction and not an elimination of intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Reduce does not mean to eliminate

Marcus Perrin Knowlton, Late Chief Justice Of The Supreme Judicial Court Of Massachusetts, Opinion in Dora Green v. Abraham Sklar, June 20, 1905, Lexis Academic

The first question is whether, in applying the statute, the judge may consider the costs of the different cases together as one aggregate, and reduce them to an amount "not less than the [\*364] ordinary witness fees and other costs recoverable in one of the cases"; or, whether he is to consider the costs of each case by itself, and make the reduction in each case separately. If he is limited to the latter mode, he cannot extinguish or disallow the costs altogether in any case, for the word "reduce," in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower or bring to an inferior state. We think HN2Go to this Headnote in the case.the words above quoted indicate that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced. This makes it possible for the judge, in his discretion, to reduce them in such a way as to leave nothing in some of the cases, providing he leaves in the aggregate an amount not [\*\*\*3] less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases.

#### Violation: They eliminate cx checks

#### 1] Limits, the aff gets to venture outside of the limits of the resolution—that gives them infinite ground because they can arbitrarily change words in the res.

#### Jurisdiction, judges can only vote on affs that affirm the resolution a] norms, we came to round prepared to debate the topic anything else is arbitrary is a waste of time b] the aff burden is to affirm the resolution—anything else means you negate

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1] Fairness first—debate is a game if its not fair people wont play

#### 2] T is DTD a] the plan represents the whole aff b] DTD sets norms

#### 3] Competing interps a] reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention b] competing interps is a race to the top

#### 4] no RVI a] incentives theory baiting which is justified abuse b] illogical—you don’t get a cookie for being fair

#### 5] T before theory a] they have 4 years to set their norm we have 2 months b] any NC abuse was necessary to check 1AC abuse

# Case

#### Covid strengthening Quebec nationalism - we’re on the brink now

Girard 20. Louis Girard, 7-31-2020, "Quebec Solidaire joins with the hard-right in promoting economic nationalism", International Committee of the Fourth International, https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/07/31/qsca-j31.html //SW

The World Socialist Web Site recently exposed how Quebec Solidaire (QS)—a pseudo-left party that holds ten seats in the 125-member Quebec National Assembly—has supported Canadian authorities’ disastrous handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and facilitated their efforts to compel a premature return to work that puts corporate profits before human lives. (See: Quebec Solidaire backs Canadian elite’s disastrous handling of COVID-19 pandemic)  The coronavirus crisis has also provided QS with an opportunity to join forces with the province’s right-wing populist, “Quebec First” CAQ (Coalition Avenir Québec) government in promoting a reactionary economic nationalist agenda.  Quebec Solidaire enthusiastically applauded the CAQ government's “Blue basket” initiative, a website promoting “Quebec made” products. The “Blue basket” is based on the principle, spelled out by Quebec Premier Francois Legault, that “we should be self-sufficient for goods that are essential.” QS, for its part, calls on the CAQ government “to set an example by investing in our local businesses,” and advocates that it “replace 40 percent” of the purchases Quebec departments and agencies make from out-of-province firms “with local purchases within four years.”  Quebec Solidaire has also responded positively to the CAQ’s proposal that Quebec become self-sufficient in medical equipment. QS advocates Quebec take “control of our medical supply” and create a new Quebec government agency, Pharma-Québec. This it claims would allow for a coronavirus vaccine to “be produced here in Quebec as soon as it is ready, with the sole objective of making it quickly accessible to the Quebec population.”  At a time when the COVID-19 pandemic is threatening millions of lives around the world, demonstrating the need for a science-based, internationally-coordinated response, Quebec Solidaire is trumpeting its nationalist egoism and parochialism.  Its reactionary utopia of “buying locally” and “developing a Quebec vaccine” exclusively for Quebeckers is part of pronounced shift by ruling elites in Canada, the United States and the world over towards national protectionism, intensified strategic competition, and virulent chauvinism.  This includes all sections of the political establishment—from Trump and the ultra-right to pseudo-left parties such as Quebec Solidaire and the German Left Party, as well as the traditional parties of government, liberal, conservative, and social-democratic.  These forces are exploiting the health and socio-economic catastrophe triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic to promote protectionism, including local production of “strategic resources,” and the strengthening of the state—based on the spurious claim that dependence on the import of N95 masks and other medical supplies has been a major factor in the pandemic’s deadly impact.

#### Nationalism causes Quebec secession – causes great power war AND global secessionism.

Daniel **Matthews 14**. Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer for III MEF. 2014. “THE QUEBEC WARS”<http://cimsec.org/quebec-wars/11757> http://cimsec.org/quebec-wars/11757

Thought of Canada being the region where the **sparks for World War III will be struck** may not seem likely, but there is one area where a foreign **foe could surprise the West: Quebec**. If Quebec were to secede from Canada, two unsettling possibilities could occur. The first is that **Canada could go to war with its wayward province**. The second is that **some power like China or Russia could build an alliance with Quebec**. While such possibilities are unlikely, there are means of defense. The Canadian Civil War If Quebec were to secede from Canada, there are several points that could **spark a civil war between the two**. The least likely would be national pride. There are several **economic reasons that could provide the tinder for war.** Quebec controls the mouth of the St. Lawrence River, and Quebec could use that control to wage economic war with Western Canada. In addition, Quebec possesses significant reserves of natural resources that currently contribute to the North American economy on a free basis. An independent Quebec would change that. Finally, Canada proper would become a split country, with a third of Canadian provinces being geographically separated from the Capital. In light of the fact that no state wants to be divided, and Canada already has several fluttering independence movements, the urge to prevent further dissolution will be strong. While it is true that Canada does not have a large military, and Quebec has none, it is not impossible for war to break out. The Quebec separatists have used violence before, most notably with the murder of Quebec Labour Minister Pierre Laporte, and it would be easy for a semi-independent Quebec to buy arms on the international market. If Canada did get involved in civil war with Quebec, there are several options open to both sides if the war drags on. Canada could invoke Article 5 of the NATO treaty, which could split NATO as France has traditionally expressed support for Francophone Quebec. It is unlikely Britain would be unconcerned with a core Commonwealth state being embroiled in civil war; especially depending on how the vote for Scottish independence goes this year. The United States would be committed, as they are deeply intertwined with Canada at every level. States like Russia, China, or Iran could use the **distraction** of a civil war in the very center of the Anglosphere to **press their boundaries with the Western Alliance**. Furthermore, they could start supporting the Quebec rebels, either directly or through third party means. If the war was presaged by an internationally recognized referendum, then Russia or China could take the position that they are upholding international norms, and paint the Western states in a negative light. Attempts at arming the rebels or openly supporting them would directly **threaten the fundamental security of the United States,** as it would **provide a foothold on the continent from which hostile states could threaten the United States**. The Bear and the Dragon in Quebec While the first scenario of a successful Quebec independence movement immediately descending into world war is unlikely, the far more dangerous one of an independent Quebec making allies with states hostile to the West is possible. An independent Quebec would have the full ability to make alliances with foreign powers, and it is unlikely they would be readily welcomed into NATO, NAFTA, or other treaties with the Western powers. Canada would put pressure on any attempts to allow Quebec a seat at the table, and European countries would be wary of admitting Quebec, **as it could fuel separatist movements within their own countries.**   In addition, the United States would not want the possibility of Canada dissolving, even if most of the providences would likely join the United States. This method of amalgamation would be undesirable, if for no other reason than there is no guarantee that each section of Canada would join the US, and a unified Canada is better for the US than a series of states on its northern border. The dissolution of Canada could also embolden separatist movements in the United States.   Given the internal danger to Western countries an independent Quebec would present, it is likely that Quebec would be forced to look for friends elsewhere. Russia and China are the most likely candidates. Both countries would be interested in the natural resources of Quebec. China and Russia would also both enjoy the prospects of helping to develop Quebec’s Arctic resources. In addition, the possibility of a military alliance with Quebec would present an opportunity not present since Alaska became part of the United States**; a land connection to the United States.**   Right now the Anglosphere is protected by its island status, with no major hostile powers sharing a land border with any member. An independent Quebec would be courted by hostile powers to allow such a chance thought. Russia would view it as retaliation for NATO expanding into the Baltics, Poland, and developing close relations with Ukraine and Georgia. China would view it as a chance to have a mirror for the US alliances in China’s First Island Chain, with the added bonus of a large land connection to the American heartland, as opposed to the slender one that the US has against China on the Korean peninsula. The presence of a near-peer competitor with **bases on** the **North America**n heartland would greatly reduce the flexibility of Western countries as they exert their influence on the world. Such a situation would be more bothersome to the United States and its allies than the Zimmerman telegram of a century ago, or the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba half a century ago. It would have the same effect as **Germany’s race to rival Britain** on the high seas **before World War I**.

## Contetnion 2: WTO credibility

Evenett baldwin 20 card says nothing about how covid reform is the only way. There are alt causes on talks of trade reform in general.

Double bind – either multinational trade is low now and

Or the impact was never gonna happen in the first place

No terminal impact on sneario 2 of contention 3

No solvency. Alt causes.