# LC 1NC v Immaculate Heart BC Round 1

## 1

#### Interp – the Aff may not specify a “just” government.

#### Governments is a generic bare plural.

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### Violation – they spec []

#### Upward Entailment test fails – democracy was the subject of SeptOct that year the same way governments are the subject of NovDec because “A just government ought to recognize the rights of workers– therefore, only [] ought to recognize the rights of all workers” is illogical.

#### 1] Limits – there’s so many just governments they could specify, coupled with various types of workers. Kills neg burdens – it’s impossible for me to research every possible just government AND different permutations of those governments.

#### 2] TVA – read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff. We aren’t stopping them from reading new frameworks, mechanisms, or advantages. PICs don’t solve – it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff making it impossible for me to win.

DTD

CI

No RVI’s

## 2

#### The right to strike is a dangerous fantasy antithetical to any effective deployment of labor power

White 18 – Ahmed White (Nicholas Rosenbaum Professor of Law, University of Colorado-Boulder), Its Own Dubious Battle: The Impossible Defense of an Effective Right to Strike, 2018, 2018 Wis. L. Rev. 1065 https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles WJ

One of the most important statutes ever enacted, the National Labor Relations Act envisaged the right to strike as the centerpiece of a system of labor law whose central aims included dramatically diminishing the pervasive exploitation and steep inequality that are endemic to modern capitalism. These goals have never been more relevant. But they have proved difficult to realize via the labor law, in large part because an effective right to strike has long been elusive, undermined by courts, Congress, the NLRB, and powerful elements of the business community. Recognizing this, labor scholars have made the restoration of the right to strike a cornerstone of labor law scholarship. Authorities in the field have developed an impressive literature that stresses the importance of strikes and strongly criticizes the arguments that judges, legislators, and others have used to justify their degradation of the right to strike. But this literature has developed without its authors ever answering a fundamental question, which is whether an effective right to strike is a viable aspiration in the first place. This Article takes up this question. It documents the crucial role that strikes have played in building the labor movement, legitimating the labor law itself, and indeed validating the New Deal and, with this, the modern administrative state; and it confirms the integral role that strikes play in contesting the corrosive power capitalism accords employers over the workplace and the spoils of production. But this Article also shows how the strikes that were effective in these crucial ways were not conventional strikes, limited to the simple withholding of labor and the advertisement of workers’ grievances. Instead, they inevitably embraced disorderly, coercive tactics like mass picketing and sit-down strikes to a degree that suggests that tactics such as these are indeed essential if strikes are to be effective. Yet strikes that have featured these tactics have never enjoyed any legitimacy beyond the ranks of labor, radical activists, and academic sympathizers. Their inherent affronts to property and public order place them well beyond the purview of what could ever constitute a viable legal right in liberal society; and they have been treated accordingly by courts, Congress, and other elite authorities. From this vantage, it becomes clear that an effective right to strike is not only an impossible distraction but a dangerous fantasy that prevents labor’s champions from confronting the broader, sobering truths that this country’s legal and political system are, at root, anathema to a truly viable system of labor rights and that labor’s salvation must be sought elsewhere.

#### Their approach results in elitist and top-down unionism -- it legitimizes the judicial state and crushes movements

Walchuk 11 -- Brad Walchuk (York University, Canada), Union Democracy and Labour Rights: A Cautionary Tale, Global Labour Journal Vol. 2 No. 2: May 2011, https://mulpress.mcmaster.ca/globallabour/article/view/1099 WJ

Despite a wealth of literature that is critical of constructing labour rights as human rights and the accompanying judicialized strategy required to achieve this, the discussion of the effects of such a strategy on the capacity building and mobilization of the labour movement’s grassroots, rank-and- file members has been downplayed. Consequently, this essay seeks to fill the void and analyze in considerable detail the long-term effects of rights-based strategy on rank-and-file activism. Although some discussion of the effects of rights-based strategy on rank-and-file democracy has occurred, it has been done largely in passing and with evidence that is non-existent or, at best, anecdotal. For example, Joseph McCartin, in contrasting the rise of pre-war unionism based on industrial democracy and contemporary unionism based on rights-discourse, maintains that ‘...the [pre-war] demand for industrial democracy helped counter the tendency of unions to follow the “iron law of oligarchy...”’ adding that ‘it is [now] difficult to imagine how rights talk can foster this democratic spirit’ (McCartin 2005: 64). Viewed in this light, a union renewal strategy based upon constructing labour rights as human rights privileges a bureaucratic form of unionism, thus shifting the emphasis from democratic rank-and-file activism to top-down leader-driven unionism. As a result, it is suggested that unions will succumb to the iron law of oligarchy by relying too heavily on rights- based strategy.1 Similarly, in a cautioning account of the effects of the rise of rights discourse within the labour movement, Nelson Lichtenstein argues that ‘the spread of employee rights has suffered through its necessary dependence upon professional, governmental expertise’ (Lichtenstein 2003: 71). For labour rights to be actualized, rank-and-file workers are forced to rely on union bureaucrats – especially labour lawyers – as opposed to their own active participation. ‘Rights consciousness’, he continues, ‘...transfers authority into the hands of another body...to sort out the various claims and strike the approximate balance’ (Lichtenstein 2003: 71). While rights-discourse may lead to meaningful ends for rank-and-file workers, the means used to achieve those ends do little to foster a sense of activism amongst workers or to facilitate their capacity building. Lichtenstein aptly concludes that ‘justice is served, but not always democratic participation’ (2003: 71).

While McCartin and Lichenstein draw important conclusions regarding the effects of constructing labour rights as human rights on democratic rank-and-file participation, they do so only in passing as part of a broader normative argument regarding the limitations associated with rights discourse. Furthermore, they cite no evidence of labour rights campaigns adversely affecting rank-and-file activism and instead present broad generalizations of what they expect to happen under such a construction. While there is considerable merit to their conclusions, they are weakened by sole presence of normative assertions and the absence of empirical evidence. However, the use of both a typology of trade unionism and a concrete case study of a labour-backed, rights-based campaign will strengthen the claim that constructing labour rights as human rights prevents the development of a form a more radical, grassroots, rank-and-file led social movement unionism and instead facilitates the proliferation of more hierarchical, elite dominated forms of trade unionism.

#### Their work is failed legal scholarship – the right to strike has always failed. Legal approaches result in public apathy and counterbalancing

Horwitz et al 17 [Morton J. Horwitz is Charles Warren Professor at Harvard Law School, where he teaches Torts and American Legal History. Abram Chayes, William Fisher, Morton Horwitz, Frank Michelman, Martha Minow, Charles Nesson, Todd Rakoff Critical Perspectives on Rights. The Bridge. 7/2/17 <https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/rights.htm>] 7/29/17

In "The Critique of Rights," 47 SMU Law Review, Mark Tushnet emphasizes the first theme in arguing that progressive lawyers overestimate the importance of their work because of an inflated and erroneous view of the role of the Supreme Court in advancing progressive goals in the 1960s. That period of judicial leadership was aberrational in American history and also more reactive and pro-active, depending on mass social movements rather than lawyers’ arguments. Legal victories also are often not enforced; judicial victories do not obviate the need for ongoing political mobilization. Legal victories may have ideological value even where they lack material effects; a court victory can mark the entry of previously excluded groups into the discourse of rights which holds ideological importance inside the nation. Nonetheless, legal and political cultures inside the United States can also produce large consequences from judicial losses for relatively powerless groups. Losing a case based on a claim of rights may in some cases lead the public to think that the claims have no merit and need not be given weight in policy debates. Robert Gordon similarly argues that even noted legal victories for blacks, for labor, for the poor, and for women did not succeed in fundamentally altering the social power structure. "The labor movement secured the vitally important legal right to organize and strike, at the cost of fitting into a framework of legal regulation that certified the legitimacy of management’s making most of the important decisions about the conditions of work." Robert Gordon, "Some Critical Theories of law and Their Critics," in The Politics of Law 647 (David Kairys ed., third edition, Basic Books: New York, 1998). Moreover, rights are double-edged, as demonstrated in the content of civil rights. "Floor entitlements can be turned into ceilings (you’ve got your rights, but that’s all you’ll get). Formal rights without practical enforceable content are easily substituted for real benefits. Anyway, the powerful can always assert counterrights (to vested property, to differential treatment according to "merit," to association with one’s own kind) to the rights of the disadvantaged. "Rights" conflict—and the conflict cannot be resolved by appeal to rights." Id., at 657-68.

The content of contemporary American rights in particular must be understood as failing to advance progressive causes. Current constitutional doctrine, for example, heavily favors so-called negative liberties (entitlements to be free of government interference) over positive liberties (entitlements to government protection or aid) and thus reinforces the pernicious "public/private" distinction. That distinction implies that neither government nor society as a whole are responsible for providing persons with the resources they need to exercise their liberties, and indeed, any governmental action risks violating private liberties. Current freedom of speech doctrine accords protection to commercial speech and pornography, limits governmental regulation of private contributions to political campaigns, and forbids sanctions for hate speech. Such rules operate in the often-stirring language of individual freedom, but their effect is more likely to be regressive than progressive.

#### The alternative refuses rights discourse in favor of militant political power – only our approach can harness the forces behind 20th century unionism and ensure democratic protection

McCartin 11 -- Joseph A. McCartin (Georgetown University), Probing the Limits of Rights Discourse in the Obama Era: A Crossroads for Labor and Liberalism, International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 80 (Fall 2011), pp. 148-160, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41307197?seq=1 WJ

I have argued elsewhere that the struggle for industrial democracy played a more salutary role in organizing progressive forces to address the labor question in the early twentieth century than a rights-based formulation of the labor problem would have been able to do. By privileging the ideal of majority rule rather than workers' rights, the concept of industrial democracy provided a powerful counterweight to the individualism which was so deeply rooted in both the culture and the judicial system; by helping reformers articulate the linkages between the workplace and the state, it helped them make the case for the necessity of reform in both arenas of power; and by positing the enhancement of democracy as a central goal of labor relations, it lent encouragement to workers who sought to make their unions more democratic. Industrial democracy was, moreover, a malleable concept, open to appropriation by radicals, reformers, and pure-and-simple trade unionists alike. That framework was not without its own flaws: The majoritarian biases of the industrial democracy ideal proved unsuitable to the task of rooting out systemic discrimination against women and racial minorities. However, despite these limitations the ideal of industrial democracy functioned extraordinarily well during its heyday as a concept around which liberals and labor could pull in harness to their mutual advantage.35 If the liberals and labor activists of the early twentieth century did not depend upon rights-based arguments, there is no reason why their present-day heirs must depend so heavily upon them. Human rights appeals can and should continue to play an important role in the struggle for workers' empowerment, especially in international or transnational contexts.36 But both labor and today's progressives have much to gain by developing a framework that reaches beyond rights to articulate a vision that references to rights alone cannot evoke. What that vision is and how best to articulate it is not yet clear. Nor will we find it in the past. While industrial democracy worked well in its time, it was a product of distinctive circumstances and of a unique historical moment that is long gone: We cannot simply resurrect that dated ideal. But what we can do is learn from it and look for our own ways of articulating democratic aspirations, just as the demand for industrial democracy once did. We can also seek ways to link those aspirations with the growing desires for transparency, accountability, and sustainability that are making themselves felt across the political landscape in inchoate and sometimes contradictory ways, and with the abiding hunger for solidarity and community that acquisitive individualism has yet to extinguish - a hunger that rights-based appeals have never fully satisfied. To be sure, this moment marks a nadir, a time for crisis for both organized labor and its progressive allies. But it is also a moment of opportunity, a time to discard or revise timeworn frameworks and strategies, a time to begin anew. There is no guarantee that organized labor can find a way to surmount the obstacles it faces. But it would be folly to continue to employ strategies that are not working. The time has come to move beyond our over-reliance on the rights-based framework in search of a new vision whose full dimensions are still only dimly visible, but whose broad outlines our recent experience has begun to illuminate.

## 3

#### CP Text- A just government ought to provide an unconditional right to strike except for Ambulance and Paramedic workers

#### Ambulance strikes in countries lead to increased mortality rates and massively delayed response time.

The Times ,3-27-2012, "Pensioner’s death linked to ambulance strike," No Publication, <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/pensioners-death-linked-to-ambulance-strike-m89w3tkcx3t> | DD JH

An elderly patient died in London while waiting for a delayed ambulance during autumn’s mass strike, in which more than half of the capital’s ambulance workers walked out. An official NHS report will today claim the death could be linked to the industrial action on November 30, revealing how it led to major delays in the 999 emergency service. Some patients in “life-threatened” situations were forced to wait for more than two hours for a response, while many others were left in “distress and pain”, it finds. The study, seen by The Times, claims that the death - at 4.35pm - was “potentially linked to a delayed response”. A further investigation is expected to confirm that the patient was waiting too long for the ambulance but cannot conclusively blame that for the patient’s death. The NHS London report says the death occurred over three hours after the London Ambulance Service declared an “Internal Major Incident” and called on the unions to repudiate the strike. Services were so clogged up by then that dozens of emergency cases were being held with many patients forced to wait an hour or longer for a response. However, the strike continued and very few members of staff returned to work, the study says. Hundreds of people who needed urgent medical attention received delays in their care. Some 875 patients in “potential immediately life-threatened” situations - classified as category A - were forced to wait longer than the eight-minute target for an urgent response. Of those, 318 waited longer than 19 minutes. By the evening some patients whose lives were at the highest level of risk classified had to wait more than two hours. The NHS London report concludes that the action had a “significant effect” on the operational capability of the ambulance service. It fears that “timely, consistent, effective and safe clinical care” was not delivered. “Undoubtedly some patients waited too long for an ambulance, in particular those patients with non life-threatening conditions and it is recognised that these patients were often in distress and pain,” it concludes. The report finds that the majority of patients had to wait longer than nationally mandated standards. The expectation was that 30 per cent of staff would walk out but over half actually did and the service was not able to handle it. In some parts of the capital staffing levels fell to just 10 per cent. ADVERTISEMENT The report reveals how 117 calls were being held by 1pm, with over 50 waiting more than an hour. By 4pm four category A patients were being held for more than an hour. By the evening dozens of emergency cases were not responded to for between one or two hours. The ambulance service has a target of responding to three quarters of category A calls within 8 minutes. On November 30, that fell to below one quarter. It insists that future strikes must be better dealt with.

#### Paramedic strikes are happening during COVID in the US as well, endangering people’s health

Steven Tavares, 10-1-2020, Steven Tavares is a large reporter for the East bay express, "A paramedic strike during a pandemic? Alameda County EMTs picket as labor dispute intensifies," East Bay Express | Oakland, Berkeley & Alameda, https://eastbayexpress.com/a-paramedic-strike-during-a-pandemic-alameda-county-emts-picket-as-labor-dispute-intensifies-1/

Alameda County paramedics picketed Wednesday in downtown Oakland following months of fruitless labor negotiations with Falck, the county’s 911 ambulance provider. Both parties seem far apart on the union’s demand for wages on par with neighboring counties. Union members—represented by the National Association of Government Employees (NAGE) Local 510—also picketed Tuesday night at the Falck’s offices in Hayward following 19 bargaining sessions with the Denmark-based company since last February. The union’s contract expired Aug. 31. Paramedics in Alameda County earn between 15-20 percent less pay than those doing similar work in Santa Clara and Contra Costa counties, said Dary Sardad, a national representative for NAGE Local 510. “The cost-of-living is the same,” he said. “So, how is it that we’re so far behind?” Ongoing labor negotiations between Falck and its paramedics highlight the continuing stress health care providers and their workers are facing during the pandemic. Labor negotiations between nurses and Alameda Health System, the health care provider that operates Highland Hospital in Oakland, San Leandro Hospital, and Alameda Hospital, have been acrimonious for months. “We’re not asking for the moon,” Sardad said. “We don’t want to endanger anyone on the street. We want to provide 911 service. On the other hand, we can’t be held hostage to not doing further work actions by the argument that we’re abandoning the patient. That’s in Falck’s lap, not ours.” On Wednesday, Falck offered annual wage increases and cost-of-living adjustments worth between 2-6.7 percent, according to a statement by the company. “At a time when the pandemic and recession have challenged the well-being of our county, state and nation, we want to ensure that our first responders are compensated fairly,” said Carolina Snypes, director and chief of Falck’s Alameda County operation. Falck officials said the average pay of EMTs and paramedics in Alameda County is about $100,000 a year. Sardad scoffed at the assertion. “Yeah, that’s working 96 hours a week,” he said. “That’s a lot of overtime. You’re never going home.” Although Falck has not furloughed any employees during the pandemic, even as calls for service dropped significantly last spring due to the shelter-in-place orders, the health care provider had previously threatened job cuts in April. The union contends Falck’s finances are sound, noting that the entire company earned $2 billion in profits last year, along with $500 million during the first quarter of 2020, despite a downturn in service. Union officials described labor negotiations as “barely moving,” although they acknowledge some movement was recently achieved. “They’ve come a little closer on personal time-off,” Sardad said, “but that was really the only step they made. They put a little more money into it, but we are still not anywhere close to where we need to be.” With such a large gap between the two parties, the possibility remains the union may be heading toward a work-stoppage at some point. “I can say this much, we’re not leaving any options off the table,” Sardad said. Jennifer Cowell, a paramedic for 26 years, said union members feel betrayed after they advocated strongly last year for Falck to win the county’s 911 ambulance contract. “We are in a dangerous position at our jobs on the best day, and right now, we have an invisible virus that can potentially make us very sick or kill us,” she said. “We’re doing our best to protect ourselves and give our patients the best care we can, and then we’ve got an employer that is trying to make cuts at every corner.” On Monday, the Service Employees International Union Local 1021, the California Nurses Association and International Longshoremen and Warehouse Workers Local 6 announced a five-day strike starting Oct. 7. NAGE Local 510 union members plan to picket in solidarity, Sardad said.

## Case

#### **Unions are essentially labor cartels, which have a worse effect on the economy AND the worker.**

Sherk 2009 [James (Research Fellow, Labor Economics at the Heritage Foundation), 21 May 2009, “What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the Economy”, The Heritage Foundation, <https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy>] //DebateDrills LC

Unions function as labor cartels. A labor cartel restricts the number of workers in a company or industry to drive up the remaining workers' wages, just as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) attempts to cut the supply of oil to raise its price. Companies pass on those higher wages to consumers through higher prices, and often they also earn lower profits. Economic research finds that unions benefit their members but hurt consumers generally, and especially workers who are denied job opportunities.

The average union member earns more than the average non-union worker. However, that does not mean that expanding union membership will raise wages: Few workers who join a union today get a pay raise. What explains these apparently contradictory findings? The economy has become more competitive over the past generation. Companies have less power to pass price increases on to consumers without going out of business. Consequently, unions do not negotiate higher wages for many newly organized workers. These days, unions win higher wages for employees only at companies with competitive advantages that allow them to pay higher wages, such as successful research and development (R&D) projects or capital investments.

Unions effectively tax these investments by negotiating higher wages for their members, thus lowering profits. Unionized companies respond to this union tax by reducing investment. Less investment makes unionized companies less competitive.

This, along with the fact that unions function as labor cartels that seek to reduce job opportunities, causes unionized companies to lose jobs. Economists consistently find that unions decrease the number of jobs available in the economy. The vast majority of manufacturing jobs lost over the past three decades have been among union members--non-union manufacturing employment has risen. Research also shows that widespread unionization delays recovery from economic downturns.

Some unions win higher wages for their members, though many do not. But with these higher wages, unions bring less investment, fewer jobs, higher prices, and smaller 401(k) plans for everyone else. On balance, labor cartels harm the economy, and enacting policies designed to force workers into unions will only prolong the recession.

**Turn: Strikes create a stigmatization effect on labor that devastates the economy and worsens inequality.**

**Tenza 20**, [Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal)]

When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of violent strikes that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have shattered-down the aspirations of a better South Africa. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which cost the country about R6.1 billion according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These strikes are not only violent but take long to resolve. Generally, a lengthy strike has a negative effect on employment, reduces business confidence and increases the risk of economic stagflation. In addition, such strikes have a major setback on the growth of the economy and investment opportunities. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as investors would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment may not materialise if the labour environment is not fertile for such investments as a result of, for example, unstable labour relations. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that the right to strike is exercised for purposes not intended by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action affects not only the strikers or picketers, the employer and his or her business but it also affects innocent members of the public, non-striking employees, the environment and the economy at large. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26 These examples from case law show that South Africa is facing a problem that is affecting not only the industrial relations’ sector but also the economy at large. For example, in 2012, during a strike by workers employed by Lonmin in Marikana, the then-new union Association of Mine & Construction Workers Union (AMCU) wanted to exert its presence after it appeared that many workers were not happy with the way the majority union, National Union of Mine Workers (NUM), handled negotiations with the employer (Lonmin Mine). AMCU went on an unprotected strike which was violent and resulted in the loss of lives, damage to property and negative economic consequences including a weakened currency, reduced global investment, declining productivity, and increase unemployment in the affected sectors.27 Further, the unreasonably long time it takes for strikes to get resolved in the Republic has a negative effect on the business of the employer, the economy and employment. 3 1 Effects of violent and long strikes on the economy Generally, South Africa’s economy is on a downward scale. First, it fails to create employment opportunities for its people. The recent statistics on unemployment levels indicate that unemployment has increased from 26.5% to 27.2%. 28 The most prominent strike which nearly brought the platinum industries to its knees was the strike convened by AMCU in 2014. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 24 June 2014. It affected the three big platinum producers in the Republic, which are the Anglo American Platinum, Lonmin Plc and Impala Platinum. It was the longest strike since the dawn of democracy in 1994. As a result of this strike, the platinum industries lost billions of rands.29 According to the report by Economic Research Southern Africa, the platinum group metals industry is South Africa’s second-largest export earner behind gold and contributes just over 2% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).30 The overall metal ores in the mining industry which include platinum sells about 70% of its output to the export market while sales to local manufacturers of basic metals, fabricated metal products and various other metal equipment and machinery make up to 20%. 31 The research indicates that the overall impact of the strike in 2014 was driven by a reduction in productive capital in the mining sector, accompanied by a decrease in labour available to the economy. This resulted in a sharp increase in the price of the output by 5.8% with a GDP declined by 0.72 and 0.78%.32

**Frequent strikes turn violent.**

**Grant 91** [Don Sherman; Wallace, Michael (1991). 3/99. Why Do Strikes Turn Violent?. American Journal of Sociology, 96(5), 1117–1150. doi:10.1086/229651]//DD AS

We suspect that **strike frequency**, like union organization, **may have a curvilinear (U-shaped) association with strike violence.** If strike frequency taps the power resources of workers, violence may be most likely in low- or high-strike industries. When strikes occur in low-strike industries, workers may lack the resources, experience, or discipline to counter employer strategies and thus be susceptible to violence. Likewise, when strikes are frequent, strikes may turn violent because of the workers' power advantage. The curvilinear hypothesis suggests that violence will be unlikely in contexts with medium levels of strike frequency in which the power resources of workers and employers are roughly equal.

#### Warming doesn't cause extinction

Bjørn Lomborg, an adjunct professor at the Copenhagen Business School, founded and directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center, Project Syndicate, February 14, 2014, "The Davos Apocalypse", http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bj-rn-lomborg-criticizes-global-leaders-for-creating-an-atmosphere-of-panic-about-climate-change

The apocalyptic bombast is even more disturbing. According to Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD, “our planet is warming dangerously,” and we need to act now “to avoid catastrophe”; the United Nations climate chief, Christiana Figueres, maintains that global warming means that “the world economy is at risk.”

Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan takes the prize for the **most extreme rhetoric**, claiming that not curbing global warming is “a terrible gamble with the future of the planet and with life itself.”

Yet, the rhetoric is unconvincing. Yes, global warming is real and man-made. But creating panic and proposing unrealistic policies **will not help in tackling the problem.**

Both Annan and Gurría cited Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines last November as evidence of increased climate-change-related damage. Never mind that the latest report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) found that “current datasets indicate no significant observed trends in global tropical cyclone frequency over the past century” and reported “low confidence” that any changes in hurricanes in recent (or future) decades had anything to do with global warming.

Annan and Gurría also neglected to note that global Accumulated Cyclone Energy, an index for total hurricane activity, is hovering at the lowest values seen since the 1970’s. Indeed, the trend for strong hurricanes around the Philippines has declined since 1951.

Similarly, Gurría tells us that Hurricane Sandy, which slammed into New York City in 2012, is an example of inaction on climate change, costing the United States “the equivalent of 0.5% of its GDP” each year. In fact, the US currently is experiencing the longest absence of intense landfall hurricanes **since records began** in 1900, while the adjusted damage cost for the US during this period, including Hurricane Sandy, has fallen slightly.

Figueres claims “that current annual losses worldwide due to extreme weather and disasters could be a staggering 12% of annual global GDP.” But the study she cites shows only a possible loss of 1-12% of GDP in the future, and this is estimated not globally but within just eight carefully selected, climate-vulnerable regions or cities. By contrast, according to the IPCC, “long-term trends in economic disaster losses adjusted for wealth and population increases **have not been attributed to climate change**.”

On the contrary, the bulk of peer-reviewed economic evidence indicates that, up to around 2050-2070, the net global economic impact of rising temperatures is likely to be positive. Although global warming will create costs stemming from more heat-related deaths and water stress, they will be **outweighed by the benefits** from many fewer cold-related deaths and higher agricultural productivity from higher levels of CO2.

Global warming is a long-term problem. Most models indicate that the cost toward the end of the century will be 1-5% of world GDP. This is not a trivial loss; but nor does it put “the world economy at risk.” For comparison, the IPCC expects that by the end of the century, the average person in the developing world will be 1,400-1,800% richer than today.

Such incorrect statements by leading officials reinforce **wasteful policies** based on **wishful thinking**. Figueres sees “momentum growing toward” climate policies as countries like China “reduce coal use.” In the real world, China accounts for almost 60% of the global increase in coal consumption from 2012 to 2014, according to the International Energy Agency. While Figueres lauds China for dramatically increasing its solar-power capacity in 2013, the increase in China’s reliance on coal power was 27 times greater.

Figueres’s weak grasp on the facts has led her not only to conclude that China is “doing it right” on climate change, but also to speculate that China has succeeded because its “political system avoids some of the legislative hurdles seen in countries including the US.” In other words, the UN’s top climate official seems to be suggesting that an authoritarian political system is better for the planet.

The fact remains that global wind and solar power usage in 2012 cut, at most, 275 million tons of CO2, while soaking up $60 billion in subsidies. With the electricity worth possibly $10 billion, the average cost of cutting a ton of CO2 is about $180. The biggest peer-reviewed estimate of the damage cost of CO2 is about $5 per ton. This means that solar and wind power avoid about $0.03 of climate damage for every dollar spent.

Compare this to smarter technological solutions. In the short run, the US shale-energy revolution has replaced high-polluting coal with cheaper, cleaner natural gas. This has cut about 300 million tons of US emissions – more than all the world’s solar and wind power combined – and at the same time has profited Americans by saving them $100 billion in energy costs.

In the long run, current investment in green research and development will help drive the price of future renewable energy below that of fossil fuels, enabling a choice that is both environmentally and economically sound. In the meantime, even dramatic cuts in CO2 emissions will have very little impact on hurricanes 50-100 years from now. Lifting billions of people out of poverty, however, would not only be intrinsically good; it would also make societies much more resilient in the face of extreme weather, whether caused by global warming or not.

#### Turn-Strikes hurt workers disproportionately

**Orechwa 19**

[Jennifer Orechwa. , 2019 "How Unions Hurt Workers: The 2019 GM Strike," UnionProof, <https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/how-unions-hurt-workers-the-gm-strike-continues/>]

It’s a fact that the number of union strikes have been increasing the last couple of years – especially among hourly workers like hotel, hospital workers and convenience store employees. We’ve also seen work stoppages involving teachers and various manufacturing workers. The United Automobile Workers (UAW) strike against GM is one example of how unions hurt workers. Because of General Motors participation in the 2008 federal bailout plan, there are some unique – and fascinating twists. What happened during the Recession is key to understanding what is going on now. However long the UAW strike against GM lasts, it’s a good reminder for employers that strikes still take place in the public and private sectors, and their negative impacts are felt inside and outside the business. The GM strike is an opportunity to [educate your managers and supervisors](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/coach-my-leaders/) on the importance of staying union free and the ramifications of a strike on employees and the communities of operation, as well as the company. The reality is that a strike hurts the workers the most. They don’t hurt the union. In fact, union leaders see a strike as a chance to get some nationwide publicity as an organization helping the “little guys” take on the big bad abusive employer. Strikes don’t hurt permanently hurt the company because a large company like GM has a contingency plan and is prepared to keep operating without the striking workers by taking steps like temporarily shutting down some plants and consolidating operations. It’s the workers that are hurt, encouraged by the unions and some politicians to subject themselves to loss of income and job stability. Instead of encouraged, it should read that workers are “used” by the unions and [political parties](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/16/2020-election-democrats-cheer-uaw-strike-against-gm-criticize-trump.html) to push their agenda. Unions thrive on making employers look bad, and politicians that believe America’s big businesses take advantage of employees use the strikes as proof. The general line is that, “If employees are willing to suffer a loss of income, benefit and job stability, the workplace policies must be abusive.” The negotiations for a new 4-year collective bargaining agreement started July 16, 2019, and two months later the strike began after negotiations reached an [impasse](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/collective-bargaining-good-faith-impasse/). On September 16, 2019, more than 48,000 union members at 55 plants in the Midwest and South GM factories went on strike. One of the most glaring twists to this story is the fact General Motors would likely be out of business if not for the $49.5 billion taxpayer bailout during the recession. The company was in serious financial trouble before the recession, but it didn’t declare bankruptcy until 2009. After the company paid back the bailout money it agreed to pay, taxpayers ended up covering $10.6 billion (or $11.2 billion by some estimates). The union did make concessions during the recession, but there were twists to their seeming generosity. One is that it was either make concessions or be unemployed and lose their pensions. The other is that many people believed that weak GM management had negotiated too generous collective bargaining agreements with the UAW. Union workers were overpaid and had too generous benefits, and that contributed to GM’s financial problems and being unable to survive a recession without government assistance. The union storyline today is that union members bore a “significant portion of the pain” required to restore GM’s financial health. A New York Times headline read, “G.M. Workers Say They Sacrificed, and Now They Want Their Due.” This is the foundation of the strike today. Union members have bought into the union stance that they suffered to help GM in 2009, and now GM is taking advantage of them. The opposing viewpoint is that unions did make concessions, but the uncompetitive wages were largely responsible for GM’s financial instability. The UAW was given preferential treatment during the bankruptcy proceedings. Usually a bankruptcy leads to wages being dropped to a competitive level, but in this case union wages were not cut. GM was in trouble before the recession because of the exorbitant compensation paid to union employees and competition. Now the [union says](https://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-are-united-auto-workers-on-strike-against-gm/) this about the current strike, “We are standing up for fair wages. We are standing up for affordable quality healthcare.” They continue, “We are standing up for our share of the profits. We are standing up for job security for our members.” So, what exactly does all of this mean in the real world? In 2007 and 2008, GM lost $70 billion. At the time, the labor costs were approximately 45 percent higher than the labor costs of competitors. The level of compensation was untenable and likely would have eventually driven GM into bankruptcy even without the recession. Was the union standing up for the little guy by helping the company go broke? For example, production workers were paid 95 percent of their salaries when temporarily laid off. Union workers back then made approximately $31 per hour plus bonuses and had full benefits that included a lifelong pension. One of the concessions made before the recession was that permanent people hired after 2007 could start at $17 per hour and work eight years to reach $29 per hour. Another concession is that union workers have 401(K) retirement plans instead of pensions. The union agreed to forgo cost of living wage increases and a four-year wage freeze. Workers also had to start paying a 3 percent health care cost-sharing amount. All workers get a nice health care package, with the only difference being the temporary workers don’t have vision and dental benefits. GM’s temporary workers earn approximately $15 an hour. Since 2010, GM has paid out $80,500 each to permanent hourly workers as bonuses. The union’s complaints cover a range of items. One is that they don’t like GM’s [planned change](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/communicating-change-in-house-communications-team/) to use more temporary workers which currently account for 7 percent of the workforce. The union wants a cap on the number of temporary workers. Minimum pay for temp workers is at $15. They don’t like the fact there are two very different pay levels in the workforce so want the pay leveled out between the pre- and post-2007 workers hired. They want entry-level workers to reach $30 an hour within 3-4 years. Top production wages are at $33 per hour. Unions don’t like the fact GM plans to close four plants, will build the Chevy Blazer in Mexico, and already laid off 2,800 employees with plans for more layoffs. The unions don’t like GM’s request for union members to contribute 15 percent of health insurance costs. All of these [company changes](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/company-change-and-how-it-leads-to-union-organizing/) the union doesn’t like are used to justify the strike. Here is the reality. GM is facing intense competition from foreign vehicle manufacturers. Earnings are falling. The company cannot afford to pay everyone on an equal basis and needs to cut, not increase, labor costs in order to stay competitive. GM needs to increase the number of lower-cost temporary workers so there is more scheduling flexibility. The union points to a 2018 GM profit of $12 billion, but revenues were only 1 percent higher compared to 2017, an indication of coming financial problems. However, GM announced a restructuring last November and needs the profits to pay for the restructuring and protect itself against a future economic downturn and the competition causing further revenue declines. Here is what GM offered during the contract negotiations. The company said it planned on investing $7 billion in eight plants in the U.S. GM said it would adding 5,400 jobs and an $8,000 signing bonus after contract signing. The company offered a new profit sharing formula that increases the amount permanent workers would get, and workers are already averaging $10,000 each on an annual basis. However, the new offer did not include temporary workers in the profit sharing. GM also said it would build batteries and electric pickups in Detroit-Hamtramck and manufacture battery cells in Lordstown, two of the plants targeted for closure. There are two cities where GM plants were closed. This strike has many elements reflecting a [clash of the past with the present.](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/employees-need-union-history/) Unions want to continue to do business the old way. They want companies to hire mostly full-time permanent workers, guarantee schedules, not plan plant closures as a strategy for company survival and increase the total compensation package, including profit sharing. One striking worker said the [union told us](https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2019/09/21/gm-uaw-strike-one-week-in-strikers-worried-determined/2402195001/), “We’re fighting for, honestly, a thing of the past, where health care is provided by the employer.” GM wants to do what it takes to secure a strong company future so that people have good employment for decades. As GM earns profits, the unions believe compensation and benefits should increase, even if those profits are used to build or modernize facilities and equipment and establish a contingency fund to carry the company through the next recessions. The union wants GM to agree to a permanent path for temporary workers to reach permanent status. This defeats the whole purpose of hiring temporary workers, a trend occurring across industries. Unions are never satisfied. GM offered to retain all healthcare benefits and add new coverage for allergy testing, autism, and therapy care. As mentioned, GM workers currently pay 3 percent of costs, and GM has offered to come down from the 15 percent requested. However, 3 percent is significantly less than what most employed people play. Currently, the national average for employee cost-sharing of health benefits is 28 percent. GM offered two percent raises in alternating years and 2 percent lump sum payments, also in alternating years. The union says it is not enough. GM offered to keep or retain the 5,400 jobs with half of them new ones. The union doesn’t think this is good enough because, of course, they want to increase their membership. You may think a company suffers as much as or more than workers during a strike. That is the message unions give workers. If union members didn’t believe that, there would be no reason to go on strike. The whole purpose of a strike is to hurt the business so the employer caves in to union demands. Of course, strikes are a powerful example in which unions hurt workers. However, consider the fact it’s the employees walking picket signs in all kinds of weather. It’s not the employer. As the strike starts its second week, it’s the employees who will have to live on $250 per week strike pay after the eighth day of the strike. It’s the workers who toss-and-turn at night while wondering how they will support their families pay their bills. During the first week of the strike, GM chose to [shift the cost of healthcare payments](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-autos-labor/gm-switches-health-insurance-costs-to-union-for-striking-workers-talks-continue-idUSKBN1W21TW) for striking employees to the union, in order to help make up for likely stalled vehicle production and to demonstrate the costs the company carries (over $900 million each year) to provide excellent benefits to its workers. The unions will have to pay the money for health insurance out of their strike fund, including for COBRA payments for hourly employees. The strike fund does not cover vision, dental, and hearing, so all workers are penalized again for striking. Unions are also using the GM workers for a larger strategy. If the unions can get concessions from GM, the plan is to do the same during talks with other auto companies like Ford. Politicians are also using the workers. Not long ago, [AFL-CIO President Richard Trumka](https://www.foxnews.com/politics/labor-union-afl-cio-richard-trumka-2020-democratic-presidential-candidates-lets-be-nore-honest-about-the-democratic-partys-record) sent a public warning that Democrats shouldn’t take the support of union workers for granted because they aren’t doing enough in terms of influencing [labor laws](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/category/labor-law/) to favor employees and are supporting the Green New Deal which will cost unions members their jobs. It’s not surprising people like Presidential candidates [Elizabeth Warren and Joe Biden](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/22/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-uaw-strike.html) are publicly aligning themselves with the striking employees. They need union votes to win an election. Unions always have an agenda that begins with protecting its own organization. A strike is where unions hurt workers the most. Strikes lead to worker financial hardship and cause harm in community relations with their employer. There are ripple effects too. For example, 4,500 Unifor union employees have been [laid off in Canada](https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/20/thousands-more-workers-furloughed-as-gm-and-suppliers-idle-plants-in-uaw-strike.html) due to the U.S. strike, [GM suppliers](https://www.wxyz.com/money/auto-news/general-motors-suppliers-feeling-the-pinch-in-day-5-of-uaw-strike) are already feeling the loss of business and facing layoffs, and communities are experiencing negative economic impacts. When union members strike, they cause harm to many more people than themselves. The unions don’t talk about these kinds of issues because it would damage their efforts. [Unions use words](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof/the-language-of-unionization/) like “sacrifice” and “taken advantage of” to appeal to people’s emotions. They don’t talk about local businesses hurt by the strikes. They don’t make mortgage payments for their members. Additionally, they don’t offer to increase strike pay to put food on people’s tables. Ultimately, they don’t recognize or address the ways unions hurt workers. All of this is a good reminder that keeping a business union free remains an important strategy for long-term business sustainability. [Educate your leaders and employees on unions](https://projectionsinc.com/) by taking advantage of communication tools like [video, web and eLearning](https://projectionsinc.com/unionproof), engage your employees and be transparent about changes needed to remain competitive. It’s the path to becoming an employer of choice with a workforce that has no need for unions.

#### Econ Collapse doesn’t cause war

Clary 15

Christopher Clary, PhD in political science from MIT, MA in national security affairs, postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries”, 4/25/15, <http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=719105092024097121124100018083011118038069081083039091121092126090087109098065027066123029119022059121027020065094083094082064017078060077029075100073095001126072113085042032004073009085104092002020027086072104017023079122098123108013079003000082124078&EXT=pdf>, MIT political science department

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 1950, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all

of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice. Economic Crisis Leads to Austerity Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost invariably assumes growth rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are felt most acutely in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is especially the case when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are very reluctant to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes tangible losses on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7 Austerity Leads to Cutbacks in Defense Spending At a minimum, the political costs of pursuing austerity through cutbacks in social and economic expenditures alone make such a path unappealing. In practice, this can spur policymakers to curtail national security spending as a way to balance budgets during periods of economic turmoil. There is often more discretion over defense spending than over other areas in the budget, and it is frequently distantly connected to the welfare of the mass public. Many militaries need foreign arms and foreign ammunition for their militaries, so defense expenditures are doubly costly since they both take up valuable defense budget space while also sending hard currency overseas, rather than constituencies at home. Pursuing defense cuts may also conform to the preferences of the financial sector, which shows a strong aversion to military conflict even if that means policies of appeasement and conciliation.8 During periods of economic expansion, the opportunity costs associated with defense expenditure—the requirement for higher taxes or foregone spending in other areas—are real but acceptable. Economic contraction heightens the opportunity costs by forcing a choice between different types of spending. There is a constituency for defense spending in the armed services, intelligence agencies, and arms industries, but even in militarized economies this constituency tends to be numerically much smaller than those that favor social and economic expenditures over military ones. Defense Cutbacks Encourage Rapprochement An interest in defense cutbacks can lead to conciliatory behavior through two paths. First, the cutbacks themselves serve as a concrete signal to adversaries that the military threat posed by the economically distressed state is declining. This permits the other state to halt that portion of defense spending dedicated to keeping up, breaking the back of ongoing arms races through reciprocated, but non-negotiated moves. Unilateral conventional force reductions were a major element of Gorbachev’s foreign policy in the late 1980s, alongside negotiated strategic arms control, and diplomatic efforts to achieve political understandings with the United States.9 Gorbachev similarly used force reductions in Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Soviet Far East to signal to China in 1987 that he was serious about political negotiations.10 Elsewhere, non-negotiated, tit-for-tat military redeployments facilitated Argentina-Brazil rapprochement.11 Second, leaders may believe cutbacks are necessary, but would be dangerous in the absence of negotiated improvements with traditional foes. Economic downturns can serve as motivation to pursue arms control or political settlement. During periods of normalcy, such outcomes would be positives, but are viewed as “too hard” by political leaders that move from one urgent problem to the next. During periods of economic crisis, however, arms control or political improvements might allow for much needed cuts in defense spending, and are pursued with greater vigor. The Johnson administration attempted both unilateral and negotiated arms limitations because of budgetary concerns as President Johnson and Secretary McNamara struggled to pay for the “Great Society” domestic programs and the increasingly costly Vietnam War. They first attempted unilateral “caps” on costly nuclear forces and anti-ballistic missile defenses and when this failed to lead to a reciprocal Soviet response they engaged in formal arms control talks. Détente continued in the Nixon administration, accelerating in 1971 and 1972, simultaneous with rising budget deficits and inflation so serious that Nixon instituted price controls. Nixon’s decision to sharply limit anti-ballistic missile defenses to enable arms control talks was contrary to his strategic views, but necessitated by a difficult budgetary environment that made paying for more missile defense emplacements unrealistic.12 As Nixon told his national security advisor Kissinger in an April 1972 discussion of ballistic missile and anti-ballistic missile developments: “You know we've got a hell of a budget problem. We've got to cut it down, we've got to cut 5 billion dollars off next year's defense budget. So, I don't want to [inaudible: do it?] unless we've got some settlement with the Russians.”13 In practice, unilateral defense cuts and force reductions are frequently combined with negotiated political agreements in a sequential, iterative fashion, where a unilateral reduction will signal seriousness that opens the way for political agreement, which in turn permits even deeper reductions. Defense cuts and force reductions are not only a means to achieve rivalry termination, but also a goal in and of themselves that rivalry termination helps secure. Leaders are seeking resources from defense they can use elsewhere. Thus when Argentine leader Raul Alfonsín campaigned for the need for drastic budgetary austerity, his specific “platform was the reduction of military spending to use it for the other ministries, connected with the concept of eliminating the hypothesis of conflict” with Argentinian rivals, according to Adalberto Rodríguez Giavarini, who served in Alfonsín’s ministry of defense (and later was Argentina’s foreign minister).14 Similarly, Gorbachev was motivated to reduce arms in the late 1980s because he determined it was necessary to cut Soviet defense spending and defense production, and repurpose part of the defense industry to make consumer and civilian capital goods, according to contemporary U.S. Central Intelligence Agency classified assessments.15 Thus the “main reason” why strategic arms control breakthroughs occurred from 1986 to 1988 and the Soviet Afghan intervention concluded in 1989 was a realization within the Politburo of “excessively high expenditures on defense,” according to Nikolai Ryzhkov, Gorbachev’s prime minister.16 Economic Downturns Provoke Strategic Reassessment: Threat Deflation and Prioritization Economic downturns encourage leaders to seek new ideas to use to frame their policy problems. During periods of economic difficulty, elites can come to realize that their problems are not amenable to old solutions, and search for new ideas.17 During an economic crisis, politics and policy are “more fluid,” as old answers seem stale and insufficient.18 An ideational entrepreneur that can link economic lemons to foreign policy lemonade can find a patron when leaders are casting about for ways to reframe the world in acceptable ways to their peers and publics. The behavior of an old foe is often ambiguous, and can be viewed as either injurious to one’s interests or neutral toward them. During periods of normalcy, the motivation of defense establishments is tilted toward threat and danger. During periods of economic crisis, national leaders have a counteracting motivation to downplay such dangers, so that the threats faced by a nation are manageable through available resources. Economic difficulties provide a motivation for leaders to view equivocal signals from the international system in a way that is benign. To the extent that rivalries are perpetuated because of threat inflation, economic downturns provide incentives to deflate the threat, potentially disrupting cycles of competition and enmity. South Korean president Kim Dae-jong came to power in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian economic crisis, pursued a “sunshine policy” toward the North, cut South Korean defense spending in nominal and real terms, and pursued a policy toward North Korea that political scientist Dong Sun Lee called “threat deflation” despite the growing North Korean nuclear weapons threat.19 Economic crises can also spur strategic reassessment through another channel. If leaders view economic problems as structural, rather than a temporary gale, they may come to question whether available national resources are sufficient to confront all of the national threats identified in the past. This creates incentives to economize threats, seeking political settlements where possible in order to focus remaining resources on competitions that can be won. A concrete example: in 1904, the chancellor to the Exchequer wrote his cabinet colleagues: “[W]e must frankly admit that the financial resources of the United Kingdom are inadequate to do all that we should desire in the matter of Imperial defense.”20 The result was a British decision to minimize political disagreement with the United States and focus on other defense challenges. While such a decision is in line with realist advice, it occurred not when the power trajectories were evident to British decisionmakers but when the budget situation had reached a crisis that could no longer be ignored. Economic Downturns Increase Incentives for International Economic Cooperation Economic downturns not only create incentives to cut spending, they encourage vigorous pursuit of opportunities for economic cooperation. This, too, can engender conciliatory behavior. Economic downturns can increase motives to pursue trade and investment. Rivalries with old foes often directly impinge on trade and investment with the adversary and may indirectly impinge on trade and investment with third parties, especially if the rivalry is viewed as being likely to generate disruptive military conflict. Additionally, economic aid is sometimes used as an inducement for adversaries to set aside a political dispute. This aid can either serve as a side payment from one rival to another, or it can be offered by a third party to one or both rivals as an incentive to set aside lingering disputes. Such aid is more attractive during periods of economic turmoil than during periods of comparative normalcy. In South Asia, India and Pakistan struggled from 1947 to 1960 with how to manage water resources in the Indus Rivers basin, inheriting a canal system meant to service pre-partitioned India. Pakistan, suffering an economic downturn, and India, reliant on foreign aid to avert economic crisis, agreed to an Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 to resolve the lingering dispute, made possible in substantial part because of World Bank financing that was especially attractive to the struggling economies. In the Middle East, Egypt and Israel made the hard choices necessary for the Camp David accord in 1979 precisely because the Sadat and Begin governments faced difficult economic situations at home that made the U.S. aid guarantee in exchange for a peace agreement especially attractive.21 In 1982, the Yemen’s People’s Republic agreed to stop its attempts to destabilize Oman, because otherwise Yemen would not receive economic assistance from Arab oil producing states that it desperately needed.22 In the late 1990s, El Niño-induced flooding devastated Ecuador and Peru, spurring reconciliation as leaders sought to increase trade, secure investment, and slash military expenditures so they could be used at home.23 As one Western diplomat assessed at the time, Ecuador and Peru “have decided it's better to see reason…. They see foreign companies eager to invest in South America, and if Peru and Ecuador are in conflict, it makes them less attractive than, say, Argentina or Brazil or Chile for investment purposes. That's the last thing either country wants.”24 Economic Downturns Can Cause Meaningful Leadership Change The above mechanisms have identified how economic difficulties can alter the preferences of an incumbent leader. Additionally, economic crises can lead to leadership turnover and, during periods of difficulty, the selection process that determines new leadership can loosen ideological strictures that relate to extant rivalries. Leaders may be selected based on judgments about their ability to cope with economic problems, with greater elite acceptance of ideological heterogeneity in foreign policy beliefs than in periods of normalcy.25 In Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth’s words, “If everything is going well or is stable, then why select leaders who might subvert the triedand-true identity? But if that identity is leading to increased material difficulties, pressure for change will likely mount. In these circumstances, those who are willing to alter or adjust the hallowed precepts of the existing identity and its associated practices are more likely to assume power.”26 Economic crisis, then, can spur incumbent leaders to either abandon the “baggage” of rivalry or facilitate the selection of new leaders that do not carry such baggage. The most well-known example of an incumbent selectorate looking for a reformer, even one without much foreign policy experience, involves Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascension to the Soviet premiership

#### For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities. No extinction from disease – global dispersion, countermeasures, and evolution

Farquhar 17

Sebastian Farquhar is the director of the Global Priorities Project, Masters degree in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford, Project Manager at FHI, John Halstead, DPhil in political Philosophy from St Anne’s College, Oxford, Global Priorities Project, 2017, “Existential Risk Diplomacy and Governance”, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39