# NC

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#### Interp: Must defend the entire resolution

#### Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional impacts:

#### Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### Prefer our impact: they’ve skewed the game which necessarily comes first because it makes evaluating the aff impossible. The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise

#### They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

## HIV/AIDS PIC

#### Plan Text: Member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for all pharmaceuticals except for medications critical in HIV/AIDS treatment.

#### Intellectual property protections for AVR treatment are key to help developing countries with HIV/AIDS

**T’Hoen E and Passarelli 13** [Ellen F. M. 't Hoen and Carlos André Facciolla Passarelli, Ellen F. M. 't Hoen is an international medical activist. She is an expert in medicines policy and intellectual property law and has been a consultant to a number of countries and international organizations. Carlos André Facciolla Passarelli has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (2007). He is currently Senior Consultant on Access to Medicines the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, “The role of intellectual property rights in treatment access: challenges and solutions,” <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23201855/>, rpHS-VM]

#### And, regardless of disagreements, the current system is best to meet the needs of people living with HIV/AIDS

**t Hoen E and Passarelli 13** [Ellen F. M. 't Hoen and Carlos André Facciolla Passarelli, Ellen F. M. 't Hoen is an international medical activist. She is an expert in medicines policy and intellectual property law and has been a consultant to a number of countries and international organizations. Carlos André Facciolla Passarelli has a Ph.D. in Clinical Psychology from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (2007). He is currently Senior Consultant on Access to Medicines the United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, “The role of intellectual property rights in treatment access: challenges and solutions,” <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23201855/>, rpHS-VM]

#### Net Benefit: Protecting the lives of 27.5 million people currently receiving ART and prevent mass infection from viral replication

WHO 21 [ World Health Organization, “HIV/AIDS,” <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/hiv-aids>, July 14, 2021, rpHS-VM]

## Case

### Reject

#### Down them for their nuclear war impacts. Just not evaluating the impacts or considering the impact debate zero sum is not enough because of the nature of debate; we all judge through probability\*magnitude=risk, which means the magnitude they’ve chosen overwhelms.

### Nuclear war impacts are bad for debate and discourse for numerous reasons, but I isolate 3:

#### 1. The fear of nuclear war is a tool used to generate fear and actively shapes the citizen psyche; just ask anyone who lived during the Cold War

Masco ‘14 (Joseph, is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago; “The Theater of Operations”; Duke University Press; 45-65)

Has any nation-state invested as profoundly in ruins as Cold War America? Although many societies have experienced mo- ments of self-doubt about the future, perhaps even contemplating the ruins that might be left behind as testament to their exis- tence, it took American ingenuity to transform ruination into a form of nation building. In this regard, the invention of the atomic bomb proved to be utterly transformative for Ameri- can society: it not only provided the inspiration for a new U.S. geopolitical strategy—one that ultimately enveloped the earth in advanced military technology and colonized everyday life with the minute-to-minute possibility of nuclear war—but it also pro- vided officials with a new means of engaging and disciplining citizens in everyday life. For U.S. policy makers, the Cold War arms race transformed the apocalypse not only into a technosci- entific project and a geopolitical paradigm, but also a powerful new domestic political resource. Put differently, a new kind of social contract was formed in the first decade of the nuclear age in the United States, one based not on the protection and improvement of everyday life but rather on the national contemplation of ruins. Known initially as civil defense, the project of building the bomb and commu- nicating its power to the world turned engineering ruins into a form of international theater. Nuclear explosions, matched with large-scale emergency response exercises, became a means of de- veloping the bomb as well as of imagining nuclear warfare (see, for example, Vanderbilt 2002; Glasstone and Dolan 1977; Kahn 1960). This test program would ultimately transform the United States into the most nuclear-bombed country on earth, distributing its environmental, eco- nomic, and health effects to each and every U.S. citizen.1 By the mid-1950s it was no longer a perverse exercise to imagine one’s home and city devas- tated, on fire and in ruins; it had become a formidable public ritual—a core act of governance, technoscientific practice, and democratic participation. Indeed, in early Cold War America it became a civic obligation to collec- tively imagine, and at times theatrically enact, the physical destruction of the nation-state.2 It is this specific nationalization of death that I wish to explore in this chapter, assessing not only the first collective formulations of nuclear fear in the United States but also the residues and legacies of that project for contemporary American society. Today we live in a world populated with newly charred landscapes and a production of ruins that speaks directly to this foundational moment in American national culture (see Stoler with Bond 2006). The notions of danger, preemption, and emergency response that inform the U.S. War on Terror derive meaning from the promises and institutions made by the Cold War security state. Indeed, the logics of nuclear fear informing that multigenerational state- and nation-building enterprise exist now as a largely inchoate, but deeply embedded, set of as- sumptions about power and threat. How Americans have come to under- stand mass death at home and abroad has much to do with the legacies of the Cold War nuclear project, and the peculiar psychosocial consequences of attempting to build the nation through the contemplation of nuclear ruins. What follows is largely a study of visual culture, and specifically the domestic deployment of images of a ruined United States for ideological effect. I argue that key aspects of U.S. security culture have been formed in relation to images of nuclear devastation: the constitution of the mod- ern security state in the aftermath of World War II mobilized the atomic bomb as the basis for American geopolitical power, but it also created a new citizen-state relationship mediated by nuclear fear. This chapter considers the lasting effects of nation building through nuclear fear by tracking the production and ongoing circulation of nuclear ruins from the Cold War’s balance of terror through the current War on Terror. It is not an exercise in viewer response but rather charts the development and circulation of a specific set of ideas and images about ultimate danger. I begin with a discussion of the early Cold War project known as civil defense and track how the specific images created for domestic consumption as part of that campaign continued to circulate as afterimages in the popular films of the 1980s and 1990s.3 I show that the early Cold War state sought explicitly to militarize U.S. citizens through contemplating the end of the nation- state, creating in the process a specific set of ideas and images of collective danger that continues to inform American society in powerful and in- creasingly complex ways. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, the affective coordinates of the Cold War arms race provided specific ideological resources to the state, which once again mobilized the image of a United States in nuclear ruins to enable war. Ultimately, this chapter follows Walter Benjamin’s call to interrogate the aestheticized politics that enable increasing militarization and that allow citizens to experience their own destruction as an “aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (1969, 242).4 Be Afraid but Don’t Panic! The disaster ruins everything, all the while leaving everything intact. . . . To think the disaster (if this is possible, and it is not possible inasmuch as we suspect that the disaster is thought) is to have no longer any future in which to think it. —Maurice Blanchot, The Writing of the Disaster Nuclear ruins are never the end of the story in the United States—they always offer a new beginning. In the early Cold War period, ruins become the markers of a new kind of social intimacy grounded in highly detailed renderings of theatrically rehearsed mass violence. The intent of these public spectacles—nuclear detonations, city evacuations, duck-and-cover drills—was not defense in the classic sense of avoiding violence or destruc- tion but rather a psychological reprogramming of the American public for life in a nuclear age. The central project of the early nuclear state was to link U.S. institutions—military, industrial, legislative, academic—for the pro- duction of the bomb, while calibrating public perceptions of the nuclear danger to enable that project.5 As Blanchot suggests, this effort to think through the ultimate crisis colonized everyday life as well as the future, while fundamentally missing the actual disaster. The scripting of disaster in the imagination has profound social effects: it defines the conditions of insecurity, renders other threats invisible, and articulates the terms of both value and loss. In the United States, civil defense was always a willful act of fabulation, an official fantasy designed to promote an image of nuclear war that would be above all other things politically useful. It also installed an idea of an American community under total, immediate, and unending threat, creating the terms for a new kind of nation building that demanded an unprecedented level of militarism in everyday life as the minimum basis for collective security. After the Soviet Union’s first nuclear detonation in 1949, U.S. policy makers committed themselves to a new geopolitical strategy that would ul- timately dominate American foreign policy for the remainder of the twen- tieth century. The policy of containment, as formalized in a report to the president by the National Security Council, known as nsc 68, proposed as a response to the Soviet bomb a total mobilization of American society based on the experience of World War II.6 nsc 68 articulates the terms of a per- manent wartime posture funded by an ever-expanding domestic economy, transforming consumerism into the engine of a new kind of militarized geopolitics. The report identifies internal dissent as perhaps the greatest threat to the project of the Cold War and calls for a new campaign to disci- pline citizens in preparation for life under the constant shadow of nuclear war. Thus, in the White House, nuclear fear was immediately understood to be not only the basis of American military power, but also a means of in- stalling a new normative reality in the United States, one that could consoli- date political power at the federal level by reaching into the internal lives of citizens. Nuclear danger became a complex new political ideology, both mobilizing the global project of the Cold War (fought increasingly on co- vert terms internationally) and installing a powerful means of controlling domestic political debates about the terms of security. By focusing Ameri- cans on an imminent end of the nation-state, federal authorities mobilized the bomb to create the Cold War consensus of anticommunism, capitalism, and military expansion. Defense intellectuals in the administrations of presidents Harry Tru- man and Dwight Eisenhower, however, worried that nuclear terror could become so profound under the terms of an escalating nuclear arms race that the American public would be unwilling to support the military and geopolitical agenda of the Cold War.7 The immediate challenge, as U.S. nu- clear strategists saw it, was to avoid both an apathetic public (which might just give up when faced with the emerging destructive power of the Soviet nuclear arsenal) and a terrorized public (which would be unable to func- tion cognitively) (Oakes 1994, 34; see also George 2003). For example, a highly influential civil defense study from 1952, Report of the Project East River, argued that civilian response to a nuclear attack would be all-out panic and mob behavior: American society, the report concluded, would not only be at war with the Soviets but also at war with itself as society vio- lently broke down along race and class lines (Associated Universities 1952).

#### 2. Nuclear war is literally an impossible threat to solve for without mass securitization by the UN– our debate about this topic has zero bearing on it

Plame 14 [Valeria Plame, 26 September 2014, TheHill, “Nuclear terrorism: Most immediate and extreme threat to global security”, <https://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/218959-nuclear-terrorism-most-immediate-and-extreme-threat-to-global-security>, 10-21-2020 // jmk]

Achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons is one of the U.N.’s longstanding objectives, one it has failed to prioritize. It’s no surprise that the security discussions this year were overshadowed by the plans of 10 member states to dismantle and defeat the Islamic State group, especially as their assault on radical Sunni resistance and aggression toward U.S. and British journalists continues to grow.

Yet this mounting violence and instability pales in comparison to what could be wrought by nuclear-armed terrorists. We know that the Islamic State group has the means and motive to attain weapons of mass destruction. They have an appetite for shocking demonstrations and indiscriminate killing, and have already seized low-grade nuclear material from a facility in Mosul. They are acquiring the ability to build radioactive dirty bombs that could cause major health and economic damage. With reports of escalating funding and recruitment of citizens from every continent, and ties to radicals in nuclear weapons-states such as Pakistan, it is increasingly conceivable that weapons-grade materials – or even a ready-made nuclear device – could fall into their hands. If that happens, they would not hesitate to use them – possibly at a cost of hundreds of thousands of lives.

There are more than 16,000 nuclear weapons in the world and enough highly-enriched uranium and plutonium to make hundreds of thousands more. We can do our best to prevent isolated incidents in which terrorists buy, build or steal them – but those efforts are stop-gap at best, and we won’t know if we missed something until it’s too late. Nuclear terrorism is all but inevitable unless we work quickly and urgently to secure all nuclear materials and eradicate all nuclear weapons. To eliminate the risk we have to drain the swamp.

#### 3. Worrying about the impact shows America’s spirit of nuclear exceptionalism which is Orientalist and Islamophobic

**Mathur 18** [Rita Mathur, Department of Political Science, University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA), San Antonio, TX, USA, “Techno-Racial dynamics of denial & difference in weapons control,” <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2018.1515640>, September 16, 2018, Accessed on 9/27/21, rpHS-VM]

Nuclear weapons have long been regarded as ‘a new technological deity’ and ‘a divinely offered gift that endorsed American exceptionalism and imbued its creators with God-like power and the mission to restore order and justice in a fallen world.’ (Taylor, 2007, p. 677). Gabrielle Hecht (2012) defines nuclear exceptionalism as ‘insistence on an essential nuclear difference – manifested in political claims, technological systems, cultural forms, institutional infrastructures, and scientific knowledge’ and insists ‘nuclear exceptionalism could be made, unmade, and remade’ as ‘for all efforts at making nuclear things exceptional, there were opposing attempts to render them banal’ (Hecht, pp. 6– 8). It is important to bear this in mind as this pernicious dynamic of difference and exceptionalism becomes even more acute with current US President Donald Trump’s everyday populist declarations. He is on record for stating that the US will be at the ‘top of the pack’ ‘until such time as the world comes to its senses regarding nukes’ (Holland, 2017). In his recent visit to Poland ‘to summon the courage and the will to defend our civilization’ Trump (2017) claims ‘there are dire threats to our security and our way of life’ and argues, ‘the fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive.’ There is little doubt in his mind of the ‘triumph’ of the West (Holland, 2017). It is therefore helpful to pause in this tumultuous ‘history of the present’ and suggest that ‘every identity owes a debt to alterity’ (Naeem & David, 2004, p. 8). Thus it is ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 5 interesting to observe how the existing literature on ‘dynamic of difference’ between Orientalism and Occidentalism has expanded its arsenal with a more complex conceptual apparatus of Strategic Orientalism, Techno Orientalism and Military Orientalism to helps us grasp the everyday practices of techno-racial dynamic of differences that cultivate and nurture techno-racial stereotypes. These stereotypes more often than not dictate modes of behavior that make the Other ‘a monster that must not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed … an enemy who no longer must be compelled to retreat into his borders only’ (Schmitt, 2007). It is this ‘dynamic of difference’ with its persistent desire to annihilate the Other, makes one wonder, whether it is not a complementary sub-text for an increasingly alarming and growing superstructure of a ‘dynamic of denial’ in weapons control? A dynamic of denial so petulant that it casts its shadow in celebrating the recent success of a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty (2017).

#### AI ensures that China will surpass American hegemony soon – the plan is a drop in the bucket

**Shead 21** [Sam Shead, CNBC’s technology correspondent based in London, “U.S. is ‘not prepared to defend or compete in the A.I. era,’ says expert group chaired by Eric Schmidt,” <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/02/us-not-prepared-to-defend-or-compete-in-ai-era-says-eric-schmidt-group.html>, March 2, 2021, Accessed on 3/18/21, DHS-VM]

The U.S. is drastically underprepared for the age of artificial intelligence, according to a group of experts chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt. The National Security Commission on AI warned in a 756-page report on Monday that China could soon replace the U.S. as the world’s “AI superpower” and said there are serious military implications to consider. “America is not prepared to defend or compete in the AI era,” wrote Schmidt and vice chair Bob Work, who was previously deputy U.S. secretary of Defense. “This is the tough reality we must face.”

The commission began its review in March 2019, and this is its final report for the president and Congress. The 15 members of the commission include technologists, national security professionals, business executives and academic leaders. Among them are Amazon’s next CEO, Andy Jassy, Oracle CEO Safra Catz, Microsoft Chief Scientific Officer Eric Horvitz and Google Cloud AI chief Andrew Moore. Schmidt and Work said the report presents a “strategy to defend against AI threats, responsibly employ AI for national security, and win the broader technology competition for the sake of our prosperity, security, and welfare.”

They warn that AI systems will be used in the “pursuit of power” and that “AI will not stay in the domain of superpowers or the realm of science fiction.” The report urges President Joe Biden to reject calls for a global ban on highly controversial AI-powered autonomous weapons, saying that China and Russia are unlikely to keep to any treaty they sign.