# Scarsdale Octas

# Shell

#### Interpretation – the aff may not defend that a just government ought to recognize the right to strike for a subset of workers

#### 1. Workers is a generic bare plural

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to this topic – a] workers is an existential bare plural bc it has no determiner b] The sentence “A just government ought to recognize the right of workers to strike” does not imply “a just government ought to recognize the right of people to strike”

#### 2. The aff makes the right to strike conditional on worker type which is the opposite of unconditional

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Unconditional”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unconditional // MNHS NL

complete and not limited in any way: the unconditional love that parents feel for their children

unconditional surrender

We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.

#### Violation – they spec prioner

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different workers like agricultural workers, nurses etc - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of strikes. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of workers, strikes and governments

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

Dtd – it’s their whoel advocacy no rvis – just read a deifnition to prove ur topical and makes it a positive time tradeoff for you, t is a test of competition ci – cant be responabilty topical

Fiarness and education – debate’s a game and we sdo it to elarn real life skills

# Cp

#### Cp: A just government should recognize the unconditional right to strike for prisoners except in the case when strikes directly demand violence and discrimiantion.

Sovlency advcoated is the supereme court enfocement of hate crime

Net benefit is their solvency – their HLR 3 ev says that only peaceful stirkes can sovle for this, but he unconditona lright tos triek allows prisoners to be vioelnct, which turn the public opinion against them because they’ll be viewed as less than human. Their hlr 5 evidence says t hat vioelnt prison strikes are bad because they are viewed badly and hurt the priosners, often cauasing the state to crack down on them when they try to control the state

Calling of rvioelnce and discrimination still trigger these impacts

Hodl them to their plan text- fi they don’t want to have violent strikes then they should’ve put that in their plan text

Anything else caues sinfinite shifitness because you can say that your palntext escludes any disad linskt hat I could ever run

Suff framing any 1% irsk it hapeps is bad

# K

#### Legitimizing the right to strike enables the state to have a monopoly on violence shutting down any possibility of change.

Crépon, 19 (Marc Crépon, Marc Crépon (born 30 March 1962) is a French philosopher and academic who writes on the subject of languages and communities in the French and German philosophies and contemporary political and moral philosophy.[1] He has also translated works by philosophers such as Nietzsche, Franz Rosenzweig and Leibniz., August 2019, accessed on 6-28-2021, Google Docs, "The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's "Toward the Critique of Violence"", DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331)//st

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is important to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most important reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis-à-vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that **violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.**”1 In other words, **nothing would endanger the law more than** the possibility of **its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control**. The function of **the law would therefore** be, first and foremost, to **contain violence within its own boundaries.** It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within **class struggle.** To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle **implies certain forms of violence. The strike** could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework **is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law** in France in 1864. What **this recognition engages is**, in fact, **the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike.** Thus, **the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best,** if not the only, **way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles.** We might consider this to be the perfect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benjamin dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (**the proletarian general strike**) to **exceed the limits of the right to strike**— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which **the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against** the possible violence of **class struggles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law.** The difference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that **the right to strike** is granted and guaranteed unconditionally. Rather, it **is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers,** on the one hand, **and of the state** on the other. **From the** point of view of the **state, the partial strike cannot** under any circumstance **be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting** (and verifiable) **violence: that of the employer.** In this sense, **the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action**, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: **the state legislated the right to strike in order to contain class struggles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason”** to strike. However, **it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with** (and accomplice to) **employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will** therefore **be seen as abusing a right** granted by the state, and in so doing **transforming it into a violent means.** On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of **governments confronted with a strike** (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, **deny that the arguments constitute suf­fi­cient reason for a strike** **that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny,** in other words, **that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that justifies the strike.** Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) left once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insuf­fi­cient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of suf­fi­cient rationale, allowing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### Unions are limited to defending against the system instead of overthrowing it, reinforcing capitalism by making it easier for workers to be productive.

Eidlin, 20 (Barry Eidlin, Barry Eidlin is an assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada., 1-6-2020, accessed on 6-28-2021, Jacobinmag, "Why Unions Are Good — But Not Good Enough", <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing)//st>

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. **Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them** almost by definition **reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it.** Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. First, **to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle,** or actively shape those relations? Second, **if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it?** Third, **how do unions shape class identities,** and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, **what is the relation between unions and politics?** This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This departed from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im­ ply the recognition of the fact that **the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves**; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the **Unions** direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “**[compel] the admission that something more is needed than** Trades Unions and **strikes to break the power of the ruling class.”** Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, **unions** are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power. Second, they **are an insufficient vehicle for creating and mobilizing that collective actor.** Marx and Engels understood that unions are essential to working-class formation because, under capitalism, the system of “free labor,” where individual workers sell their labor power to an employer for a wage, fragments relations between workers and makes them compete with each other. As described in the Communist Manifesto, the bourgeoisie “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment,’” leaving workers “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.” While workers organized based on other collective identities, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, only unions could unite them as workers against the source of their exploitation — the bourgeoisie. Unions serve “as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule.” But just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons. First, **unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they limited themselves “to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it.”** Thus, **even militant trade unions found themselves struggling** for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” **without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power**, particularly the wage labor system. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. Second, **unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles.** This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic.

#### Capitalism’s successes necessitate human extinction and destroy the value to life – it’s try or die for alternative organizing

Duzgun 20 Eren Duzgun (teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands), 4-5-2020, "Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction," Socialist Project, https://socialistproject.ca/2020/04/capitalism-coronavirus-and-road-to-extinction/, SJBE

**Covid-19, by contrast, has begun its journey and taken its biggest toll thus far in the most advanced and affluent parts of the world**. This is to say, the contagion is no longer limited to the persistently undernourished, underdeveloped, and war-torn parts of the world; its impact is no longer restricted to a distant wet market or a third world country alone. **Instead, it has emerged and expanded in the very heart of the capitalist world order at a time when capitalism has not only been already firmly established across the globe but has been testing the eco-biological limits of the entire planet. Should things remain the same, Covid-19 and its future cousins are likely to claim the lives of not just ‘some’ people as they did in the past, but of humanity as a whole. In this sense, perhaps for the first time in modern history, the biological blitzkrieg activated by the coronavirus has thrown into sharp relief the immediately existential and undeniably global contradictions and consequences generated by capitalism.** Contradictions on a Global Scale Critical biologists and epidemiologists have put the blame on industrial agriculture as the root cause of the emergence of new pathogens since the 1990s. [According to Rob Wallace](https://climateandcapitalism.com/2020/03/11/capitalist-agriculture-and-covid-19-a-deadly-combination/), giant agribusiness and resource extraction firms have now reached the last virgin forests and smallholder-held farmlands in the world, subordinating them to the logic of capitalist markets. **The loss of the ecological diversity and complexity of these huge tracts of land has increasingly forced wild food operators to hunt in previously untouched parts of the jungle, which, in turn, has increased “the interaction with, and spillover of, previously boxed-in pathogens, including Covid-19.”** Likewise, global warming has forced or allowed pathogens to escape their natural habitat. As a result, new viruses against which we have no immunity “are being sprung free, threatening the whole world.” In short, [as John Vidal writes](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/mar/18/tip-of-the-iceberg-is-our-destruction-of-nature-responsible-for-covid-19-aoe), “we disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.” **That some agribusiness firms have been blatantly risking lives for profit would not come as a surprise to the critical reader**. Even [Bill Gates has been sounding the alarm](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Af6b_wyiwI) about the potentially deadly consequences of irresponsible business practices and new viruses. **Yet, what tends to remain underemphasized in these debates is that the blame belongs neither solely to ‘greedy’ firms that have driven viruses out of their natural habitat, nor to ‘short-sighted’ politicians who have not invested enough in vaccine technology or national health systems. Instead, the problem is rooted in the very structure and rationality of the system as a whole. That is, we may go extinct as a result of the ‘successes’ of the very system ‘we’ created in the first place, i.e., capitalism. How did we end up losing control of an ‘economic’ system of our own making?** This is indeed an anomaly in human history. The conception of the ‘economy’ as an autonomous sphere dictating its own rules over society did not exist in non-capitalist societies. As the economic anthropologist [Karl Polanyi](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Polanyi#Works) put it, “neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there… a separate economic system in society.” The economy either “remained nameless” or had “no obvious meaning,” for the economic process and prices were instituted through non-market means, such as kinship, marriage, age-groups, status, political patronage, etc. Even “where markets were most highly developed, as under the mercantile system,” the economic system, as a rule, “[was absorbed in the social system](https://books.google.ca/books?id=SgHuxQEACAAJ)” and showed “no tendency to expand at the expense of the rest.” In this sense, the market with a distinctive logic, autonomy, and dynamic of its own was completely unknown to our ancestors, and indeed, the emergence of the idea of ‘self-regulating’ markets represented a complete reversal of the way in which past economies functioned. **In order for ‘self-regulating’ markets to ‘self-regulate’, a variety of political and institutional arrangements had to be initiated to progressively eliminate the non-market survival strategies that humans previously relied upon.** Most notably, the age-old communal systems of social and moral regulation needed to be eradicated, a process that systematically subordinated the ‘natural and human substance of society’, i.e., land and labour, to market relations for the first time in history. Rise of Capitalism **At the heart of the rise of capitalism, therefore, rested a ‘political’, legal, and violent process that led to the historically unprecedented characterization of land and labour as commodities. Without commodifying land and labour, i.e., without treating the planet’s living substance as commodities, it would have been impossible to view the ‘economy’ as an institutionally and motivationally self-regulating sphere of life, an almost robotic creature functioning at the expense of human lives and livelihoods. Capitalism presupposed from the very beginning a radical transformation in the human use of nature as well as in the provision of life’s essential requirements. In this sense, the danger of global extinction which we have been going through is not a temporary hiccup in an otherwise smoothly operating capitalist ecosystem but has always been a possibility built into the very structure of market society.** On the one hand, by treating land and labour as commodities, by subjecting people’s utilization of land and enjoyment of life to their ability to continuously increase market competitiveness and productivity, capitalism has enabled massive technological advancements in all spheres of life. This, in turn, has generated, above all, an unprecedented potential to feed, clothe, and accommodate an ever-increasing world population. **On the other hand, however,** [**as Ellen Wood argues**](https://monthlyreview.org/1998/07/01/the-agrarian-origins-of-capitalism/)**, by subordinating all other considerations to the imperatives of market competition, capitalism has also created poverty, homelessness, environmental destruction and pandemics**. Billions of people who could be fed and housed are subjected to immense doses of insecurity, living their lives under the constant threat of joblessness, homelessness, loss of status and starvation. **In a similar fashion, the environment that could be protected is systematically destroyed for profit, and killer viruses that could be contained are unleashed.** Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has become the archetypal example that lays bare “the destructive impulses of a system in which the very fundamentals of existence are subjected to the requirements of profit.” **Can the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outcomes of capitalism be somewhat reconciled? Indeed, for a brief period in the Global North, it seemed they could be**. During the so-called [Golden Age of Capitalism](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-golden-age-of-capitalism-9780198287414) (1945-70), massive productivity increases (alongside working-class struggles) allowed for steady increases in wages, job security, expansion of welfare state, improvements in the living conditions of the majority of the labouring masses as well as the expansion of civil and political liberties. **Yet, this brief period of generalized prosperity and stability also facilitated the incorporation of the western working classes into the dominant capitalist ideology, causing them to turn a blind eye to the economically destabilizing, environmentally destructive, and socially degrading impact of global capitalism in the Global South.** The main ‘problem’ with the Global South has been, by and large, a question of ‘timing’. **Once capitalism was established and consolidated in the Global North, it has not only led to the birth of new and more effective forms of imperialist control and neocolonial expansion but has also irrevocably undermined the potentially positive outcomes of capitalist development elsewhere.** For example, the [MIT political economist Alice Amsden](https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-rise-of-the-rest-9780195170597), a large chunk of whose work in the 1970s and 1980s sought to explain the success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, more recently concluded that the massive technological and infrastructural gap between the North and the South has literally made impossible capitalist ‘development’ of any sort in the vast majority of southern economies since the 1990s. The economic situation in the Global North has gotten progressively worse too. Under the conditions of increased global economic competition wages have been stagnating or declining since the 1970s, while decades of fiscal austerity wiping out most of the economic and social gains of the earlier period. The new reality of high unemployment, stagnant wages, long work hours and precarious jobs has been masked for a while by a debt-driven growth, the unsustainability of which has been bitterly testified by millions of people since the 2008 financial crisis. All in all, market imperatives have been regulating social reproduction almost worldwide for a long time but with no prospect of capitalist ‘development’ for an overwhelming majority of the world’s population in the South and the North alike. **Furthermore, the ecologically disastrous and socially inhumane consequences of capitalism have long outweighed the prospects of material gain in the Global South.** In this respect, what is being painfully realized in the current conjuncture is that the North is no longer able to externalize the worst consequences of such an unsustainable mode of life. The North isn’t and won’t be spared the existential threats posed by global capitalism. **The implication is that any meaningful attempt at solving the present, and future crises needs to take the bull by the horn**. There is literally no choice to be made between ‘capitalism’ and ‘capitalism with a human face’. **As long as the underlying dynamics of our lives remain the same, as long as we keep treating nature and human beings as commodities, no** [**cosmetic surgery**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/12/why-growth-cant-be-green/) **will do. To the contrary, historical experience suggests that such minimal interventions will sooner or later backfire, re-legitimizing capitalism pure and simple. The only way to ‘re-embed’ our economies and save our lives from ecological collapse is by intervening in the very heart of the beast: land and human beings need to be taken out of the market. The beast is not tameable; it needs to be**[**killed**](https://monthlyreview.org/product/what_every_environmentalist_needs_to_know_about_capitalism/)**.**

#### Vote neg for dual power organizing – only by refusing the 1ac’s opportunistic politics can we produce actual change.

Escalante 18 Alyson Escalante (Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist), 8-24-2018, "Against Electoralism, For Dual Power!," Forge News, https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/, pat recut sjbe

If we, as socialists, truly fight for a classless world, we must smash the mechanisms which ensure class domination. **We must smash the bourgeois state. This realization led the Bolsheviks to reject the opportunism of the Socialist Revolutionaries and Menshiviks in the Soviets and they chose to overthrow the provisional government themselves. Shockingly, their revolution was successful**. After months of compromise, the workers had grown tired of the opportunist bourgeois socialists. They had seen that the dual power of the soviets and the provisional government was not tenable. One side had to take unitary power. Most importantly, the workers saw that the bourgeois government had done nothing for them: it had smashed their printing presses, it had crushed their demonstrations, it had broken their strikes. Of course, it could do nothing else, the bourgeois state is designed to do precisely this. The events of October, 1917 ought to have concretely proven that the strategy of infiltrating the bourgeois government is untenable. **Lenin and the Bolsheviks proved that the workers are willing to throw the bourgeois state away in favor of a dictatorship of the proletariat. And yet, here we are 111 years later and large factions of the largest socialist organization in the United States echo the cowardly and worthless drivelings of the Menshiviks and Socialist Revolutionaries.** Dual Power Today **I am sure that at this point, the opportunists reading this have already begun to type out their typical objection: the world is different than it was in 1917, and the conditions of the United States in no way echo the conditions which enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve revolutionary success. To this tried and true objection, there is one simple answer: you are entirely correct, and that is why we need to abandon electoralism and working within the bourgeois state. What were the conditions which allowed the Bolsheviks to successfully revolt? The conditions were that of Dual Power. Alongside the capitalist state, there existed a whole set of institutions and councils which met the needs of the workers.** The soviets, a parallel socialist government made up of individual councils, successfully took over many governmental responsibilities in some parts of Petrograd. In the radical Viborg district, the Bolshevik controlled soviets provided government services like mail, alongside programs that could meet the needs of workers. **When a far right coup was attempted against the provisional government, it was troops loyal to the Bolshevik factions within the soviet who repelled the coup plotters, proving concretely to the workers of Petrograd that the socialists could not only provide for their needs, but also for their defense. In short: the Bolsheviks recognized that instead of integrating into the bourgeois state, they could operate outside of it to build dual power. They could establish programs of elected representatives who would serve the workers**. They would not bolster the capitalist state in the name of socialism, they would offer an alternative to it. **And so, when the time came for revolt, the masses were already to loyal to the Bolsheviks. The only party who had never compromised, who had denounced the unpopular imperialist wars, who had rejected the provisional government entirely, was the party who successfully gained the support of the workers.** And so, many of us on the more radical fringes of the socialist movement wonder why it is the the DSA and other socialist opportunists seem to think that we can win by bolstering the capitalist state? **We wonder, given this powerful historical precedent, why they devote their energy to getting more Ocasios elected; what good does one more left democrat who will abandon the workers do for us?** The answer we receive in return is always the same: we want to win small changes that will make life for the workers easier; we want to protect food stamps and healthcare. And do this, we reply: what makes you think reformism is the only way to do this. **When the bourgeois state in California was happy to let black children go to school unfed, the Black Panthers didn’t rally around democratic candidates, they became militant and fed the children themselves. In the 40s and 50s, socialists in New York saw people going without healthcare and instead of rallying behind democratic candidates, they built the IWO to provide healthcare directly. Both these groups took up our pressing revolutionary task: building dual power.** Imagine if all those hours the DSA poured into electing Ocasio were instead used to feed the people of New York, to provide them with medical care, to ensure their needs were met. **Imagine the masses seeing socialism not as a pipe dream we might achieve through electing more imperialists, but as a concrete movement which is currently meeting their needs?** The fact is, we are not nearly ready for revolution. Socialists in the United States have failed to meet the needs of the people, and as long as their only concrete interaction with the masses is handing them a voter registration form, they will continue to fail the people. **Our task now is not to elect representatives to advocate for the people; it is much more gruelingly laborious than that. Our task is to serve the people. Our task is to build dual power.** **The movement to do this is underway**. **Members of the DSA refoundation caucus have begun to move the left of the DSA in this direct, socialist groups like Philly Socialists have begun to build dual power through GED programs and tenants unions, many branches of the Party For Socialism and Liberation have begun to feed the people and provide for their concrete needs, and Red Guard collectives in Los Angeles have built serve the people programs and taken on a stance of militant resistance to gentrification**. The movement is growing, its time is coming, and dual power is achievable within our life time. The opportunists are, in a sense, correct. We are not where we were in 1917, but we can begin to move in that direction and dual power can take us there. **In order to achieve dual power we have to recognize that Lenin was right: there will be no socialist gains by working within state institutions designed to crush socialism. Furthermore, we must recognize that the strategies of the electoral opportunists trade off with dual power. Electing candidates drains resources, time, and energy away from actually serving the people.** **And so, we should commit to undertake the difficult and dangerous task of building dual power**. We must reject opportunism, we must name the democratic party as our enemy, we must rally around power directly in the hands of the socialist movement. **We do not have a parallel system of soviets in the United States. We can change that**. Someday the cry “all power to the soviets” will be heard again. Lets make it happen.

#### Framing – neoliberalism infects our education – you should prioritize epistemologically challenging it

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**Within Ramya Venkataraman’s writing and presentations, there is the deployment and reiteration of a particular discursive ensemble, a set of tightly interrelated and interdependent concepts, ideas, and arguments addressed to educational reform (see Table 3). The ensemble joins up a set of arguments, assertions, and assumptions, in relation to the state and its alternative, that serve as a rationale for the processes of reform of education.** The elements of this ensemble are both local and specific as well as generic and global. **They are reiterated at almost all of the nodes in the global policy network—almost every website or network event rehearses and deploys them**. Although they are articulated and recombined in different ways and given different degrees of emphasis, they have a coherence which underpins network membership. As Marsh and Smith (2000, p. 6) put it, “networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular forms of behaviour.” **These are made up not simply of pragmatic relations, but also constitute moral and epistemic communities.** The ensemble takes as its starting point the failures of the state, and a state of crisis in education (A)—the assertion that the government schools are ineffective and unfair. This starting point is the basis for a set of linked arguments: the replacement of bureaucracy by enterprise, through PPPs (I) and/or forms of private provision (H/G); and the need for assessment (as a way of measuring and managing the system) (B); the deployment of IT, that is, assessment software and big databases (C); at the institutional level the strategic role of leadership skills and sensibilities in driving change and raising quality (D) and to leverage for change from outside agencies, in particular from strategic philanthropy (E). The private sector is given a privileged role in all of this as agents of change and of innovation (F) through direct forms of private provision (H). Leadership, partnerships and assessment are offered as practices that “work”—for which there is evidence or stories of success in other places (J). **The state then reappears in a different form (K) as a competition state (Jessop, 2002), which facilitates, contracts, sets targets, and monitors—that makes and regulates markets. Embedded and represented in these arguments is a version of neoliberal rationality and its “state phobia” as Foucault (2010) calls it, in relation to the “old” state.** Over and against this, the competition state is imagined as lean and frugal. **Bureaucracy is displaced, innovation and creativity are “released” through the participation of business and civil society actors, and interrelated opportunities are created for reform and for profit and for “worldmaking.” The elements of a new policy ecosystem are outlined here—practices, organizations, infrastructure, and incentives that enable a market in state work. All of this is a reworking, or perhaps even an erasure, of the boundaries of state, economy, and civil society**. This rationality and its mobilization and advocacy are also realized and demonstrated in socio-material practices, which are enacted in and through network relationships. Public–private partnerships are excellent examples because they are a kind of assemblage of actors, organizations, and techniques that create and activate relationships. Ramya Venkataraman and McKinsey (India) have been active participants and partners in a variety of PPP initiatives. For example, they have participated in both the Mumbai School Excellence Programme (with Akanksha, MSDF, UNICEF, and the Mumbai Corporation) and in the South Delhi School Excellence Programme (with ARK, Bharti, Centre for Civil Society, Central Square Foundation, The Tech Mahindra Foundation, South Delhi Municipal Corporation). Both of these PPPs involve nonstate actors who take over state schools, loosely modeled on and directly informed by the U.S. charter school and English Academies programs. The work that ARK is doing in the UK is very similar to what we want to do down the road…. We now have 18 academies, with 24 en route; it’ll be 50 by 2015. And the concept of privately running— education that is publicly funded is something that ARK believes it can deliver [inaudible] it’s looking to India, we’re also seeking a similar model in South Africa and Uganda. (Amitav Virmani, Head of ARK [India] now CEO, The Education Alliance) In Mumbai we’ve been involved from end to end in the implementation. There are also other cities and states, which we are currently in discussion with for similar programs …. the state government has taken our help to craft the program …. (Ramya Venkataraman) Although these practices and the forms, stories, and ideas that underpin them are instantiated in a particular way in India in these examples, it is also possible to trace their movement through the global education policy community beyond India. One can follow them through a set of relations clustered around other reform efforts, using the same ingredients in the United States and in England. DISCUSSION This paper focuses on some of the network and discursive labor of one “traveling technocat.” Ramya Venkataraman travels across and beyond India as well as across the business, state, and third sectors, and between local, national, and international institutions. She carries with her a story made up of ideas, practices, and sensibilities that address the reform of Indian education and the Indian state, and articulates new opportunities for business and philanthropy as agents and beneficiaries of reform. **She is embedded in an apparatus of relations, finance, practices, and discourse (plots and stories), “comprising variously entangled scaled agents (of different geographical reaches)” (Cook & Ward, 2012, p. 7), which moves, changes, and develops but which coheres around a neoliberal project of reform and of creative destruction.** We are able to glimpse through these relations some of the work of assembling political rationalities, spatial imaginaries, calculative practices, and subjectivities that are “both the cause and the effect of wider transformative processes” (Cook & Ward, 2012, p. 140). Artifacts, schemes, propositions, and “programmatic” ideas move through these network relations, gaining credibility, support, and funding as they do so. These global forms are phenomena that are distinguished by their “capacity for decontextualization and recontextualization, abstractability and movement, across diverse social and cultural situations and spheres of life” (Ong & Collier, 2005, p. 7). Ramya Venkataraman’s engagements in the reform movement are diffuse, tangled, and contingent, she is a speaker at many sites and events that contribute to a reform assemblage that brings together various “things” and bodies, utterances, modes of expression, and regimes of signs. Such assemblages “stand in a dependent but contingent relationship to the grander problematizations …. They are a distinctive type of experimental matrix of heterogeneous elements, techniques and concepts” (Rabinow, 2003, p. 17). **Here the grand problematization is neoliberalism**. What is evident in Ramya’s activities is the labor involved in animating the assemblage, the efforts of articulation, persuasion, exemplification, legitimation, and problematization. Concomitantly, there is the emergence of an infrastructure of organizations, a sort of shadow state (Wolch, 1990), that can incubate, disseminate, and exchange ideas—teacher certification and training, school leadership, assessment, managing and running schools—over and against the language of more traditional forms of government and support, facilitate and legitimate the activities of non-state actors. **The mix of state, business, and third-sector actors and organizations within policy and governance is changed, not once and for all, but as part of a slow and steady movement from government to governance**. At the same time, new kinds of careers, identities, and mobilities are forged within the processes of reform and the work of networks.

Capitalism is the only way to center this pedagoical audacity – only by looking at learger sturcutresbehidn the prison state can we see hwo to dismantle it

# NC

#### The metaethic is practical reason. Prefer:

#### First, inescapability – the exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards it as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.

Wood [Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]//rct st

Kant holds that the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end (G 4:437). To set an end is, analytically, to subject yourself to the hypothetical imperative that you should take the necessary means to the end you have set (G 4:417). This is the claim that you rationally ought to do something whether or not you are at the moment inclined to do it. It represents the action of applying that means as good (G 4:414) – in the sense of “good” that Kant explicates as: what is required by reason independently of inclination (G 4:413). Kant correctly infers that any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it. The act of setting an end, therefore, must be taken as committing you to represent some other act (the act of applying the means) as good. In doing all this, however, the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good in general. For it treats these capacities as capable of determining which ends are good, and at the same time as grounding the goodness of the means taken toward those good ends. But to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities. It is to esteem oneself – and also to esteem the correct exercise of one’s rational capacities in determining what is good both as an end and as a means to it. One’s other capacities, such as those needed to perform the action that is good as a means, are also regarded as good as means. But that capacity through which we can represent the very idea of something as good both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself. To find this value in oneself is not at all the same as thinking of oneself as a good person. Even those who misuse their rational capacities are committed to esteeming themselves as possessing rational nature. It also does not imply that a more intelligent person (in that sense, more “rational”) is “better” than a less intelligent one. The self-esteem involved in setting an end applies to any being capable of setting an end at all, irrespective of the cleverness or even the morality of the end setting. Kant’s argument supports the conclusion, to which he adheres with admirable consistency throughout his writings, that all rational beings, clever or stupid, even good or evil, have equal (absolute) worth as ends in themselves. For Kantian ethics the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.

#### Second, practical reason – ethical principles must be derived from the structure of reason:

#### [1] Regress – we can always ask why we should follow a theory, so they aren’t binding because they don’t have a starting point. Practical reason solves – When we ask why we should follow reason, we demand a reason, which concedes to the authority of reason itself, so it’s the only thing we can follow

#### [2] Action Theory – every action can be broken down to infinite amounts of movements, i.e. me moving my arm can be broken down to the infinite moments of every state my arm is in. Only reason can unify these movements because we use practical reason to achieve our goals, means all actions collapse to reason

#### Third, epistemology – ethics must begin a priori, meaning they can’t be derived from our experience.

#### [1] Representations of space – we can only access our experiences if we can interpret the space around us, but that requires the a priori. Thinking of the absence of space is impossible – we can think of empty space but never the lack of space itself. Imagining space through a priori thoughts is the only way we can even begin to have a conception of interpreting experience; we need to be able to construct space through our minds.

#### [2] Separateness – if space is based on experience, it must be formed from objects separate to us outside of our reasoning abilities. But to represent objects as separate from us, we would already need to assume space exists in the first place to have a concept of “separateness,” so to represent space as something separate from us would be incoherent.

#### [3] Uncertainty – every person has different experiences so we can’t have a unified perspective on what is good if we each have different conceptions of it – even if we can roughly aggregate it’s not enough because there’ll always be a case when it fails so the framework o/w on probability.

#### Practical reason means we all have a unified perspective: What can be justified to me can be justified to everyone who is a practical reasoner. If I can conclude that 2+2 is 4, then I understand not only that I know 2+2 is 4, but that everyone around me can arrive at the same conclusion. These things are temporally consistent: I know that me adding two numbers now and taking that sum will not result in me adding the same two numbers in the future and getting a different sum. Our unified perspective does not change but rather stays consistent.

#### But, willing an action that violates the freedom of others is a contradiction: If I decide to kill someone, that action is not universalizable because that would justify other people killing me too. If I die, I cannot exercise my freedom to kill someone else. This is a contradiction: I both justify extending my freedom to kill others and limiting my own freedom.

#### Thus, the standard is respecting freedom.

#### 1] Strikes violate individual autonomy by exercising coercion.

Gourevitch 18 [Alex; Brown University; “The Right to Strike: A Radical View,” American Political Science Review; 2018; [https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321]](https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/s0003055418000321%5d//SJWen) Justin

\*\*Edited for ableist language

Every liberal democracy recognizes that workers have a right to strike. That right is protected in law, sometimes in the constitution itself. Yet strikes pose serious problems for liberal societies. They involve violence and coercion, they often violate some basic liberal liberties, they appear to involve group rights having priority over individual ones, and they can threaten public order itself. Strikes are also one of the most common forms of disruptive collective protest in modern history. Even given the dramatic decline in strike activity since its peak in the 1970s, they can play significant roles in our lives. For instance, just over the past few years in the United States, large illegal strikes by teachers ~~paralyzed~~ froze major school districts in Chicago and Seattle, as well as statewide in West Virginia, Oklahoma, Arizona, and Colorado; a strike by taxi drivers played a major role in debates and court decisions regarding immigration; and strikes by retail and foodservice workers were instrumental in getting new minimum wage and other legislation passed in states like California, New York, and North Carolina. Yet, despite their significance, there is almost no political philosophy written about strikes.1 This despite the enormous literature on neighboring forms of protest like nonviolence, civil disobedience, conscientious refusal, and social movements.

The right to strike raises far more issues than a single essay can handle. In what follows, I address a particularly significant problem regarding the right to strike and its relation to coercive strike tactics. I argue that strikes present a dilemma for liberal societies because for most workers to have a reasonable chance of success they need to use some coercive strike tactics. But these coercive strike tactics both violate the law and infringe upon what are widely held to be basic liberal rights. To resolve this dilemma, we have to know why workers have the right to strike in the first place. I argue that the best way of understanding the right to strike is as a right to resist the oppression that workers face in the standard liberal capitalist economy. This way of understanding the right explains why the use of coercive strike tactics is not morally constrained by the requirement to respect the basic liberties nor the related laws that strikers violate when using certain coercive tactics.

#### 2] Means to an end: employees ignore their duty to help their patients in favor of higher wages which treats them as a means to an end.