# 1NC vs Immac SS

## 1NC – OFF

#### CP Text: The United States federal government should lift the Wolf Amendment. States ought to ban anti-satellite weapons.

#### Solves the AFF --- creates global international norms for space and checks back against separate spheres of influence

Ronci 19 [Rob Ronci, exec director of CAELUS. “Dividing Heaven - Effects of the Wolf amendment on the developing system of global space governance.” October 2019. *International Astronautical Conference.* https://swfound.org/media/206870/ronci\_1\_iac2019\_paper.pdf]

This paper investigates how the U.S. policy limiting NASA’s bilateral cooperation with China, colloquially known as the “Wolf amendment”, is influencing the developing system of global space governance. As technological advancements improve access to outer space, policymakers around the world are crafting institutions that will regulate humanity’s access, participation, and activities in the final frontier. However, the rapid pace of technological advance is creating policy challenges faster than policymakers can address them. While international space policymaking continues to trend toward voluntary norm building and emphasis on national laws rather than firm international treaties, the policies of perceived leaders will remain key drivers of norm and infrastructure development. As the current dominant space actor (the United States) and an increasingly influential space power (China) are effectively barred from working together in major space projects, the challenge international policymakers face becomes greater. While the Wolf amendment is already an oft debated subject, its true effects on international collaboration remain poorly understood. The Wolf amendment is only a small piece of the overall U.S. – China space relationship, yet it exerts significant influence on the patterns of interaction between the two space programs with implications for the greater system of global space governance. This presents key findings from a research project that analyzed congressional hearing transcripts, legal documents, personal letters, research reports, and public statements utilizing a qualitative complex systems approach to identify how the Wolf amendment exerts influence upon the political systems within which the amendment is embedded. Matching this analysis to current trends and patterns occurring in these systems enables an understanding of how the Wolf amendment is influencing the evolutionary trajectory of global space governance. The findings of this study reveal that the persistence of the Wolf amendment’s influence forces the U.S. - China relationship to remain primarily competitive, rather than cooperative, in space exploration activities. With U.S. policymakers preventing participation in major joint activities with China, the creation of multiple spheres of influence in the development of space-based infrastructure becomes inevitable. Given current patterns of development, such a division of influence will likely lead to a persistently fragmented and competitive environment in outer space. These outcomes will exacerbate challenges for international policymakers working to secure the sustainable usage of outer space, but may also create opportunities for a wider range of space actors.

#### The 1AC is a self-fulfilling prophecy, but lifting Wolf reverse-causally solves competition, while boosting US heg

Ronci 19 [Rob Ronci, exec director of CAELUS. “Dividing Heaven - Effects of the Wolf amendment on the developing system of global space governance.” October 2019. *International Astronautical Conference.* https://swfound.org/media/206870/ronci\_1\_iac2019\_paper.pdf]

Within this context, the Wolf amendment’s persistence creates a strong possibility that cooperative space projects will fragment into at least two different blocks of political influence. In an environment where new international treaties are becoming non-operative, the U.S.-China divide in space projects may indicate a persistent, bi-polar order in global space governance. In the context of these evolving systemic trends, the Wolf amendment remains only a driver, rather than a root cause. But by applying basic principles of complex systems thinking to the Wolf amendment, it is possible to recognize how the amendment exerts influence upon these systems. As U.S. policymakers feared losing their leadership and dominance in space, the Wolf amendment emerged as a tool to help maintain a sense of security against a rising China. This created a positively reinforcing feedback loop: not allowing China to become a cooperative or collaborative partner with the U.S., thereby pushing China to create its own competing projects, which in turn perpetuates the fear of a rising opponent, and thus the cycle as a whole. The increasing resilience of these patterns has created the possibility of a long-term division in the spheres of influence in major space projects. In such a scenario, U.S. policymakers will have legitimized an external sphere of influence where it has little to no authority, thus risking the very leadership those policymakers fear losing. 6. Conclusions This paper has presented the manner in which the Wolf amendment exerts influence, and the implications of this influence by briefly discussing the conditions in which that influence exists. Primarily, the Wolf amendment prevents Chinese participation in major U.S. civil space projects. By doing so, it does not prevent most cooperation in space between the two countries, but rather it perpetuates an effective perception that the two nations do not, and should not, work together. This lack of potential cooperation in major space activities perpetuates the perception of China as an opponent to the U.S. in space, and encourages the discourse that the U.S. should fear losing its outer space dominance. This self-reinforcing divide between the U.S. and China in space activities is particularly significant given current trends in global space governance. As international space policy trends towards decentralized and voluntary norm-building rather than firm laws, the roles and actions of perceived leaders will become more influential. As major space exploration projects develop without the U.S. and China participating in joint endeavors, it is increasingly likely that a divide in major government funded space projects will occur. As these projects are likely to be particularly influential in both soft-power norm-building and space infrastructure development, this divide will likely have significant influence on the future development of space governance.

#### International space legal regime are needed to solve space war --- norm-setting in space becomes CIL

Hart 21 [Amalyah Hart, Amalyah Hart is a science journalist based in Melbourne, 11-19-2021, "Do we need new space law to prevent space war", Cosmos Magazine, https://cosmosmagazine.com/people/society/space-law-to-prevent-space-war/] simha

The week before last, a UN panel approved the creation of a working group to discuss next-generation laws to prevent the militarisation of space. The move comes as space 2.0 seems to be going into hyper-drive, with countries and corporations racing to claim their stake in the final frontier. It’s timely, as the potential for friction is gathering by the day, with China, India, Russia and the US testing anti-satellite missiles on their own satellites and creating worrisome clouds of debris. This week’s destruction by Russia of its “dead” satellite, Cosmos 1408, underlined the issue. Meanwhile, the orbital space around Earth is becoming jammed with machinery; currently, there are 3,372 active satellites whizzing around Earth, but in one or two decades that number is set to leap to potentially 100,000 or more. And that’s ignoring the space stations, telescopes and spyware already in orbit as countries flex their aerospace muscles. It’s a cosmic fracas. And contested territory is prime fodder for international disputes, as we know. It’s these kinds of disputes the group of UK diplomats who proposed the UN motion want to prevent, by coming to an agreed-upon set of norms for behaviour in space. Space law: what are the issues at stake? The current international framework for law in space is the UN’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which sets governing principles for the exploration of space, including that space should be free for use by all nations, that celestial bodies like the Moon should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that outer space should not be subject to national appropriation. Under international law, any and all objects being launched into space must be registered to avoid collisions. On top of these global laws, each nation-state has its own legal framework around the registering and launching of objects into space. But as technology evolves and new opportunities arise, are these old laws equipped to govern new problems? The UN’s 1967 Outer Space Treaty sets governing principles for the exploration of space, including that space should be free for use by all nations. “There exists an incredible amount of applicable law already, and it has served us really well,” says space law expert Steven Freeland, an emeritus professor at Western Sydney University and professorial fellow at Bond University. Freeland is vice-chair of a UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) working group that is developing laws around the exploitation of resources in space. “There’s a lot of law at the multilateral level that then filters down to other layers of bilateral or ‘minilateral’ agreements and national laws. But clearly things move so quickly with technology, we’re doing so many more things in space that were beyond the contemplation of the drafters of the original treaties. Ideally we need more.” Freeland says there are myriad complex, interconnected issues in space that need tighter laws. These include the increasing militarisation of space; the proliferation of satellites, which can lead to overcrowding of “popular” orbits and increased demand for radio-wave spectra; ethical issues around human spaceflight; and the possible extraction of resources on celestial bodies like the Moon. Resource exploitation It might sound like science fiction, but mining in outer space is looking increasingly likely in the not-too-distant future. In September 2020, NASA announced that it would award contracts to private companies for the extraction and purchase of lunar regolith (rock matter) from the surface of the Moon, which could be mined and then studied in situ by the company, before the data and rights are transferred to the space agency. The move heralds what our space-based future might look like, with private companies mining celestial bodies for their precious resources. In our solar system, composed of millions of celestial bodies both large and small, the opportunities for cashing in look potentially endless – provided technology advances to the level of practical spaceflight. “Most wars on Earth have historically been fought over a quest for resources,” says Freeland, “so it’s incredibly important [to have appropriate space laws].” Just last month, scientists announced the discovery of two extraordinarily metal-rich near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), comprised of roughly 85% metals like iron, nickel and cobalt, which are thought to exceed Earth’s entire known metallic reserves. These three highly valuable metals, often known as the “iron triad”, are particularly critical for the energy supply chain and a renewable energy future; they’re used to build lithium-ion batteries, electrochemical capacitators for storing energy, and nano-catalysts for use in the energy sector. Under the OST, outer-space resources cannot be appropriated by nations, but the law and principle around the commercial use of space resources is less clear. The 1979 Moon Treaty holds that any celestial body is under the jurisdiction of the international community and therefore subject to international law. The treaty outlaws the military use of any celestial body as well as providing a legal framing for the “responsible” exploitation of celestial resources. But, to date, no space-capable nation has ratified the treaty. Militarisation That brings us to the militarisation of space. As technology advances, the potential avenues for weapons that cross the border from terrestrial to cosmic continue to proliferate. So, what laws protect us from a space war? “The issues about security in space have historically been dealt with by the CD, the Conference of Disarmament, but more recently the UK has led discussions at the United Nations that effectively seek to change the diplomatic language and thinking about space security,” says Freeland. Currently, the principles for governing space under the OST forbid the military use of space, but space is already used for military purposes such as surveillance, and some missiles carve a path through outer space on their journeys to their targets. As it currently stands, the only weapons found in space are the TP-82 Cosmonaut survival pistols that Russian astronauts regularly take on board the Soyuz spacecraft, intended to protect them from a potential wild animal attack if they are forced to emergency land in “off-the-map” territory. But as technology proliferates, the opportunities for space-based militarisation also grow. The existing laws were drafted long before many of these technologies were even dreamed up. The most worrisome technologies currently being trialled are anti-satellite missiles. “We have this strategic competition going on amongst the major powers,” says Gilles Doucet, a space security consultant based in Canada who worked for 35 years with the Canadian Department of National Defence. Doucet is both an engineer and an expert in space law. “They all wish to be dominant and make sure that their national security is secured by controlling, or at least not having other people control, outer space.” But what kinds of defence technologies are being developed in space? Doucet says the most worrisome technologies currently being trialled are anti-satellite missiles of the sort that Russia deployed earlier this week. Known as direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles (DA-ASAT), they can destroy satellites in low Earth orbit. “This essentially looks a lot like ballistic missile defence, but it’s happening in outer space against satellites,” he says. In fact, DA-ASAT technology is dependent on the same technology used for midcourse ballistic missile defence – the technology that the US, for example, deploys to defend itself from potential ballistic missile attacks on North America. These missiles fly at altitudes of around 3,000 to 4,000 kilometres, well within the low-Earth orbit many satellites operate in. This technology is being developed and tested by the US, China, India and Russia. “Destroying another country’s satellites would only occur in an armed conflict scenario,” Doucet says. “It would be because the other country’s satellite is providing an important military role – for example, a GPS satellite for directing munitions or an imagery satellite for locating your forces.” Other military applications in space, Doucet says, include the jamming of satellite communications and navigation, as well as interference with some GNSS signals, of which GPS – the satellite navigation system we all use for things like Google Maps – is one. Satellite jamming can have major disruptive potential. “You might be conducting an operation in a conflict – let’s say you wish to target a certain facility. Your missile system or your drone-launching missiles rely on GPS to guide them,” Doucet says. “So if you’re on the other end of it wanting to protect yourself, then you’ll send out jamming signals.” But while these signals can help defend a military target, Doucet says many satellites provide services for military and civilian companies and organisations at once. In this case, jamming a satellite’s signal may also interfere with civilian services it provides, including aircraft and ship navigation, car mapping, even timing signals for financial transactions. This means satellite jamming has major disruptive potential. And there are other areas where satellite technology could have duplicitous or combative potential. “Close proximity operations seem to get countries a bit upset,” says Doucet. Close proximity operations, as the name suggests, involve satellites moving close to other satellites. “One reason might be intelligence or inspection, just to take close images to understand how it’s built. But you may be getting close to intercept signals or to interfere with signals. “So that is a concern, because it’s one thing to get close for passively collecting information, but if you’re close you may also be in a position to interfere.” What might new space law systems look like? “We have a lot of space systems that are dual use, that have the potential to do harm,” Doucet says. “I’d like to see some transparency on the mission, on what you’re doing, to help alleviate concerns. “That might sound like a small step, but to militaries it’s actually a really big step to provide transparency.” Doucet says he’d also like to see clarification of the existing principles for space law already set out in the OST and other treaties. In fact, he’s currently working on the MILAMOS Project, developing a Manual on International Law Applicable to Military Uses of Outer Space at Canada’s McGill University. “I would like to see the existing legal regime being given a bit of life,” he says. “We’ve got tremendously good outer space principles, but over several decades countries have kind of refused to give them life because it’s too controversial. “The third thing I’d like to see is the major space powers sit down and talk. They’re all potentially losers if this keeps going down this path. I don’t think there’s a winner in a space war.” For all these complex problems, Doucet is cautiously optimistic about our chances of avoiding a space war. “I don’t think the issue about space security is as unique as people think,” he says. “Yes, it’s a very unique domain, but the actors are all the same, the interests are all the same. It’s the same people that have struggled over ballistic missile proliferation, nuclear weapons proliferation, treaties about the high seas, about aviation and all kinds of things. “So, we shouldn’t think this is an unsolvable problem. We may take lessons from how we’ve managed to agree to disagree in other areas beyond national jurisdiction.” Freeland agrees that even if international tensions may simmer at home, it’s in the best interest of major global powers to come to agreements about laws in space. “When it comes to these really big issues, particularly issues that have the propensity to go horribly wrong if we follow an irresponsible path, in the end it’s in [governments’] common interest to agree to the rules of the road,” he says. “The important element is that they have had the opportunity to buy in on the framing of those rules.“I think we need to be optimistic. With a great deal of caution, cool heads will prevail.”

## Militarization

#### This Curio ev is really bad

#### 1] it cites alt causes like russia buying products which the plan doesn’t stop since it’s a question of reducing supply

#### 2] lunar bases are non-uq since it’s state based

#### The Bowman ev:

#### 1] Concedes that it’s a question of a Russian and Chinese weapon militarization not a bond over commercial goods which the aff prohibits – the 1ar is going to say that it stops private selling to companies but it doesn’t since that isn’t direct appropriation, but rather selling of parts/things that can appropriate

#### 2] Their card literally says they’ve already militarized it so they don’t need alliances (which is what the impact ev is ABOUT, not alliances)

1AC Bowman and Thompson 3/31 [(Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/] BC

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons.

To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring.

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.

On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space?

The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.”

## ASAT Prolif

#### No invasion. China gets crushed by geography alone.

**Easton 21** (Ian Easton serves as a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, a Virginia-based think tank where he conducts research on defense and security issues involving the U.S., China, Japan, and Taiwan. During the summer of 2013 he also was a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo. Previously Ian worked as a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia for two years. Ian holds an M.A. in China Studies from National Chengchi University in Taiwan and a B.A. in International Studies from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. “Why a Taiwan Invasion Would Look Nothing Like D-Day”. May 26, 2021)

Now think of **a** very **different battlefield**. Taiwan is a rugged, heavily urbanized nation of 23.6 million people. The country of **Taiwan** (also known as the Republic of China) **is made up of over 100 islands, most too tiny to see on the map.** Many of **Taiwan’s outer islands bristle with missiles, rockets, and artillery guns.** Their granite hills have been **honeycombed with tunnels and bunker systems.** The main island of Taiwan is 394 kilometers long and 144 kilometers across at its widest point. It has 258 peaks over 3,000 meters in elevation. The tallest, Yushan, or “Jade Mountain,” is just under 4,000 meters high. Unlike Normandy, **the** coastal **terrain** here **is a defender’s dream come true. Taiwan has only 14 small invasion beaches,** and they are **bordered by cliffs and urban jungles**. Linkou Beach near Taipei provides an illustrative example. Towering directly over the beach is Guanyin Mountain (615 meters). On its right flank is the Linkou Plateau (250 meters), and to its left is Yangming Mountain (1,094 meters). Structures made of steel-reinforced concrete blanket the surrounding valleys. **Taiwan gets hits by typhoons and earthquakes all the time, so each building and bridge is designed to withstand severe buffeting. This extreme geography is** densely **garrisoned by armed defenders.** In wartime, **Taiwan could mobilize** a counter-invasion force of **at least 450,000 troops, and probably far more**. While Taiwan’s standing military is only around 190,000 strong, it has a large reserve force comprised primarily of recent conscripts with basic training. In 2020, Taiwan’s then defense minister estimated that 260,000 reservists could be mobilized in a worst-case scenario to augment active-duty personnel. **This appears to be a conservative estimate.**

#### No Taiwan war. The US will never defend.

**Brunnstrom 21** (David Brunnstrom, Correspondent, U.S. Asia Policy, at Thomson Reuters U.S. position on Taiwan unchanged despite Biden comment – official”. August 20, 2021.)

A senior Biden administration official said **U.S. “policy with regard to Taiwan has not changed”** and analysts said it appeared that Biden had misspoken. China’s embassy in Washington did not immediately respond to requests for comment. In Taipei, Presidential Office spokesman Xavier Chang said they had “noted” Biden’s comments, and thanked his administration for “continuing to take practical actions” to show the rock solid U.S. commitment to Taiwan, like arms sales. While **Washington** is required by law to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, it **has long followed a policy of “strategic ambiguity**” on whether it would intervene militarily to protect Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Article 5 is a NATO agreement that states that an attack on one member of the alliance is viewed as an attack on all. South Korea is also a U.S. treaty ally with a mutual defense agreement, but **U.S. relations with Chinese-claimed Taiwan have been unofficial since** Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing in **1979**. Some prominent U.S. academics and others have argued Washington should **give Taiwan a** more explicit **security guarantee** in light of increasing military pressure from Beijing, but **Biden’s** Indo-Pacific **policy coordinator**, Kurt Campbell, has **appeared to reject this**, saying in May there were “significant downsides” to such an approach. Bonnie Glaser, a Taiwan expert at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, called Biden’s apparent mischaracterization “unfortunate.” “**The U.S. had an Article 5 commitment to Taiwan from 1954 to 1979.** **The Biden administration isn’t considering returning to that commitment**, as indicated by public statements by Kurt Campbell.”

#### No Taiwan war. Laundry list.

Kassam ’20 [Natasha; January 7; Research Fellow in the Diplomacy and Public Opinion Program at the Lowy Institute, Bachelor of Laws (Hons I) and a Bachelor of International Studies from the University of Sydney, and Richard McGregor, Senior Fellow at the Lowy Institute, Former Fellow at the Wilson Center and Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center at George Washington University; Lowy Institute Report, “Taiwan’s 2020 Elections,” <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/taiwan-s-2020-elections>]

In Taiwan, political leaders worry that Xi wants to cement his legacy with a breakthrough on Taiwan. Once shy about revealing its strengths, Beijing under Xi has adopted a different approach, flaunting its wealth and power and strengthening the People’s Liberation Army to deter any challengers.

Regionally, the conventional balance of military power is tipping towards China. The People’s Liberation Army has long equipped itself and planned for a cross-straits conflict. However, a full-frontal Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains unlikely in the near term. There are numerous factors that would deter such an invasion, including Taiwan’s unwelcoming geography and climate, the difficulties of staging an amphibious landing, the unknown appetite in the United States for intervention and Japan’s interests in the Taiwan Strait. Other military options which would be less risky, and potentially less disruptive to trade, include a targeted naval blockade.[36]

Even if Beijing were to take over Taiwan militarily, Hong Kong has illustrated how difficult it would be to occupy the island in the face of near certain local resistance. The resulting political and security crisis for China and the broader region would be unprecedented since World War II. Taiwanese resistance, both on the island and by a mobilised Taiwanese diaspora, would be a test for national politics around the world, including in Australia. The People’s Liberation Army is untested, both in battle and in the business of occupation, and China’s institutions and military resources would be stretched by such a war.[37] It is unsurprising then that Beijing is pursuing its current strategy of multi-front hybrid warfare against the island to force an opening of talks, rather than military action.

#### No link to the rajapolan ASAT prolif

#### 1] this is about chinese government space which the plan doesn’t stop – HOLD THE LINE ON WORDPLAY – the link ev is about chinese space control via the private sector but that doesn’t have to do with ASATs, etc..

#### 2] Chronological, not casual – this indicates that china does commercial space and it breaks norms which have no relationship

1AC Rajagopalan 5/12 [(Dr Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Dr Rajagopalan was the Technical Advisor to the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) (July 2018-July 2019). She was also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre from April-December 2020. As a senior Asia defence writer for The Diplomat, she writes a weekly column on Asian strategic issues. Dr Rajagopalan joined ORF after a five-year stint at the National Security Council Secretariat (2003-2007), Government of India, where she was an Assistant Director. Prior to joining the NSCS, she was Research Officer at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She was also a Visiting Professor at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, National Chung Hsing University, Taiwan in 2012. Dr Rajagopalan has authored or edited nine books including Global Nuclear Security: Moving Beyond the NSS (2018), Space Policy 2.0 (2017), Nuclear Security in India (2015), Clashing Titans: Military Strategy and Insecurity among Asian Great Powers (2012), The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Its Implications for Asia (2009). She has published research essays in edited volumes, and in peer reviewed journals such as India Review, Strategic Studies Quarterly, Air and Space Power Journal, International Journal of Nuclear Law and Strategic Analysis. She has also contributed essays to newspapers such as The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Times of India, and The Economic Times. She has been invited to speak at international fora including the United Nations Disarmament Forum (New York), the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) (Vienna), Conference on Disarmament (Geneva), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the European Union.) “China’s irresponsible behaviour: A threat to space security” Observer Research Foundation, 5/12/2021. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/chinas-irresponsible-behaviour-a-threat-to-space-security/] BC

With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space.

Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either.

Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s \*possible\* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).”

Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point.

Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either.

What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries.

The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently oppose[d] anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”.

While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult.

#### 3] Concedes already happens when they did an ASAT test so non-uq

#### Conflict isn’t inevitable – if china believes that they need ASATS then they will develop them which takes out the link arg since its contingent on them winning its going to happen

## Heg

#### Chinese leadership solves extinction.

Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC, http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491

As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment, the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance. Second, the global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically, which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance” to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of “diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily. All of these have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive “circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the developed and developing countries against the background of globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit, re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc. China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition to “regulate” China’s development orientation. Today, China has become a source of stability in an international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third, the Chinese solution is more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation, as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and “sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to “exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative. The Chinese solution composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind, seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms. Thus, in leading the transformation of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities, but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the global governance system. On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing, resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas, opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus participated in by all countries concerned. China has also proposed international public security views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order, calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM, CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened. As the biggest developing country and fast growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice, including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies; financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.

#### A rules based order persists with east Asian institutions and prevents transition wars

Acharya 17 Amitav Acharya, Amitav Acharya is Distinguished Professor of international relations at American University, Washington, D.C. He has taught at York University, the University of Bristol, and Nanyang Technological University, and held visiting appointments at Rhodes University, University of Oxford, and Harvard University. His books include Agency and Change in World Politics: Constructing Global Order (forthcoming); Rethinking Power, Institutions and Ideas in World Politics (2014); The End of American World Order(2014); and Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism(2009). He is also editor of Why Govern? Rethinking Demand and Progress in Global Governance (2016). His articles have appeared in International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, World Politics, and The National Interest, and he frequently writes op-eds for the Washington Post (Monkey Cage), the Financial Times, and Foreign Affairs Today. “[After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/).” Ethics & International Affairs. September 8, 2017. https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/

The maintenance of world order depends on regional orders. As Henry Kissinger argues, “The contemporary quest for world order will require a coherent strategy to establish a concept of order within the various regions and to relate these regional orders to one another.”[22](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-22) Yet developing such inclusive, open regional orders is a critical challenge. This would require creating new regional mechanisms and supporting those that already exist but are constrained by a lack of resources. While some liberal thinkers see regionalism (not including the European Union) as a threat to world order, there are many regional initiatives that, if recognized and strengthened, could actually support world order. For example, ASEAN+3’s Chiang Mai initiative on finance has allowed those countries to better cope with short-term liquidity problems, supplementing the existing capacity of the International Monetary Fund.[23](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-23) As another example, though the Obama administration feared the Chinese-inspired AIIB would be a competitor to the World Bank, its structure and rules mimic those of established multilateral institutions, and its management includes persons from Western countries. Thus, it is more likely to complement rather than compete with the World Bank or Asian Development Bank. In a fragmented and pluralistic world, exploring local and regional initiatives in diverse issue areas that complement older but fragmenting global institutions could be one of the most promising ways to build world order in the twenty-first century.

A multiplex world will not be free from disorder, but it is also not necessarily doomed to be what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini call a G-Zero World—“one in which no single country or bloc of countries has the political and economic leverage—or the will—to drive a truly international agenda”[24](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-24)—simply because of the loss of a predominant U.S. leadership role. Leadership-sharing between the Western powers and the emerging powers is more attainable than (hard) power-sharing. A world less dependent on U.S. leadership—but without a complete U.S. retreat into isolationism—will still find ways to cooperate. It will still come together in crisis, as happened at the G-20 summit after the 2008 global financial crisis, or to combat common perils, as happened with the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change.[25](https://www.ethicsandinternationalaffairs.org/2017/multiplex-world-order/#fn-12859-25) The latter was made possible not because of proactive U.S. leadership but because of common understanding among the Western nations, the emerging powers (led by China), and civil society groups. Importantly, the agreement avoided the traditional Western legalistic sanction-based approach in favor of a softer, voluntaristic approach that is characteristic of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

A multiplex world is a G-Plus world, featuring established and emerging powers, global and regional institutions and actors, states, social movements, corporations, private foundations, and various kinds of partnerships among them.

#### Decline has popularized restraint – a bipartisan coalition formed to avoid the failures of liberal hegemony – even if china expands, the US won’t go down fighting

Ashford 21 Emma Ashford is a Senior Fellow at the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, September/October 2021, "Strategies of Restraint," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-24/strategies-restraint> mvp

For nearly three decades after the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was characterized by a bipartisan consensus: that as the world’s “indispensable nation” and with no competitor, the United States had little choice but to pursue a transformational agenda on the world stage. Over the last few years, however, that consensus has collapsed. A growing chorus of voices are advocating a strategy of restraint—a less activist approach that focuses on diplomatic and economic engagement over military intervention. And they have found a receptive audience.

In that, they have undoubtedly been helped by circumstance: the United States’ failed “war on terror,” the rise of China, and growing partisan polarization at home have all made it clear that U.S. foreign policy cannot simply remain on autopilot. Even those who continue to argue for an interventionist approach to the world typically acknowledge that their strategy must be shorn of its worst excesses. Where restraint was once excluded from the halls of power and confined largely to academic journals, now some of its positions have become official policy.

Although President Donald Trump’s record was defined by dysfunction more than any coherent strategy, he did wind down the war in Afghanistan, raise doubts about the value of U.S. alliances in Europe and Asia, and question the wisdom of military intervention and democracy promotion. President Joe Biden, for his part, has begun withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, has initiated a review of the United States’ global military posture, and has taken steps to stabilize the U.S.-Russian relationship. In 2019, Jake Sullivan, now Biden’s national security adviser, wrote, “The U.S. must get better at seeing both the possibilities and the limits of American power.” That this sentiment is now openly embraced at the highest levels of government is nothing short of a win for those who have long called for a more restrained U.S. foreign policy.

Yet victory also raises a question: Where do restrainers go from here? With Washington having dialed down the war on terrorism, the most politically popular of their demands has been achieved. Now, they are liable to face an uphill battle over the rest of U.S. foreign policy, such as how to treat allies or what to do about China—issues that have little public salience or on which the restrainers are divided. Although often bundled together by Washington’s foreign policy elites and derided as isolationists, the members of the restraint community include a diversity of voices, running the gamut from left-wing antiwar activists to hard-nosed conservative realists. It should not be surprising that they disagree on much.

If the restraint camp focuses on what divides them rather than what unites them, then it will find itself consumed with internecine battles and excluded from decision-making at the very moment its influence could be at its height. But there is a viable consensus, a path forward for restraint that can achieve the most important goals, alienate the fewest members of the coalition, and win new converts. This more pragmatic strategy, which would entail the gradual lessening of U.S. military commitments, would not achieve the most ambitious of the restrainers’ goals. But it has the best chance of moving U.S. foreign policy in a more secure and more popular direction.

A DEBATE REBORN

The idea that the United States is uniquely qualified to reshape the world has manifested itself in different ways in the 30 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of a bipolar world. Humanitarian intervention, democracy promotion, and counterterrorism—all were attempts to mold the world according to American preferences. Yet the unipolar moment has largely failed to live up to expectations. Today, democracy is in decline, there are more state-level conflicts than at any time since 1990, the war on terrorism has largely failed, and China’s rise has given the lie to the notion that the United States can prevent the emergence of peer competitors. Washington’s foreign policy community now appears to accept the need for a course correction, although it remains divided on the specifics.

#### US hegemony is dead – there’s no coming back

* COVID, economic downturns, nationalistic politics, security internationally
* Rise in other great powers to rival
* Weaker states can seek alternatives to US support
* Rise in right-wing networks vs liberal policies

Cooley and Nexon 6/9 (Alexander Cooley is the Claire Tow Professor of Political Science at Barnard College and Director of Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, Daniel H. Nexon is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 6/9/2020, Foreign Affairs, “How Hegemony Ends”, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/how-hegemony-ends>) //EG

Multiple signs point to a crisis in global order. The uncoordinated international response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the resulting economic downturns, the resurgence of nationalist politics, and the hardening of state borders all seem to herald the emergence of a less cooperative and more fragile international system. According to many observers, these developments underscore the dangers of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “America first” policies and his retreat from global leadership.

Even before the pandemic, Trump routinely criticized the value of alliances and institutions such as NATO, supported the breakup of the European Union, withdrew from a host of international agreements and organizations, and pandered to autocrats such as Russian President Vladimir Putin and the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. He has questioned the merits of placing liberal values such as democracy and human rights at the heart of foreign policy. Trump’s clear preference for zero-sum, transactional politics further supports the notion that the United States is abandoning its commitment to promoting a liberal international order.

Some analysts believe that the United States can still turn this around, by restoring the strategies by which it, from the end of World War II to the aftermath of the Cold War, built and sustained a successful international order. If a post-Trump United States could reclaim the responsibilities of global power, then this era—including the pandemic that will define it—could stand as a temporary aberration rather than a step on the way to permanent disarray.

After all, predictions of American decline and a shift in international order are far from new—and they have been consistently wrong. In the middle of the 1980s, many analysts believed that U.S. leadership was on the way out. The Bretton Woods system had collapsed in the 1970s; the United States faced increasing competition from European and East Asian economies, notably West Germany and Japan; and the Soviet Union looked like an enduring feature of world politics. By the end of 1991, however, the Soviet Union had formally dissolved, Japan was entering its “lost decade” of economic stagnation, and the expensive task of integration consumed a reunified Germany. The United States experienced a decade of booming technological innovation and unexpectedly high economic growth. The result was what many hailed as a “unipolar moment” of American hegemony.

But this time really is different. The very forces that made U.S. hegemony so durable before are today driving its dissolution. Three developments enabled the post–Cold War U.S.-led order. First, with the defeat of communism, the United States faced no major global ideological project that could rival its own. Second, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its accompanying infrastructure of institutions and partnerships, weaker states lacked significant alternatives to the United States and its Western allies when it came to securing military, economic, and political support. And third, transnational activists and movements were spreading liberal values and norms that bolstered the liberal order.

Today, those same dynamics have turned against the United States: a vicious cycle that erodes U.S. power has replaced the virtuous cycles that once reinforced it. With the rise of great powers such as China and Russia, autocratic and illiberal projects rival the U.S.-led liberal international system. Developing countries—and even many developed ones—can seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support. And illiberal, often right-wing transnational networks are pressing against the norms and pieties of the liberal international order that once seemed so implacable. In short, U.S. global leadership is not simply in retreat; it is unraveling. And the decline is not cyclical but permanent.

#### That means trying to fight back ensures counterbalancing and war

Adams 18 Gordon Adams, Gordon Adams is emeritus faculty from American University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center. He oversaw national security budgets in the Clinton White House from 1993-97. “Beyond Hegemony And A Liberal International Order.” May 17, 2018. https://lobelog.com/beyond-hegemony-and-a-liberal-international-order/

America’s place in the world is experiencing an historic turning point. All the mumbo-jumbo about being the “exceptional” and “indispensable” nation, the natural “leader” of something called the “West,” the guarantor of some kind of international system of “rules” is finally being cast into the dustbin of history.

This moment is not just about leaving the Iran nuclear agreement, or even the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris climate agreement. It is not simply attributable to the unpredictable, childish impulses of the current president. Nor is it the result of Obama’s failure to enforce a red line in Syria, or “leading from behind” in Libya. It is not even about Bush’s invasion of Iraq with the goal of regime change, setting in motion the destruction of what little political stability existed in the Middle East.

Of course, it is about all these decisions. But in every case, those decisions, and even the critics of those decisions, have failed to realize how they have played into, helped cause, and now accelerate a fundamental shift in global realities—the centrifugal redistribution of power and influence in the international system that has brought to an end the “American century.” The United States has become just another power in a system for which it no longer sets or enforces the rules, if it ever really did.

Both political parties fail to cope with this reality. Democrats and liberals insist that Trump’s foreign-policy decisions threaten the “rules-based” international order America built and dominated. A simple change in leadership, they believe, can restore order and America’s primacy. Republicans [demand](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/03/24/john-bolton-wants-regime-change-in-iran-and-so-does-the-cult-that-paid-him/?utm_term=.68aa7b4e3cce) bellicose American assertiveness, believing that force and military strength guarantee that the world will behave. Columnists bewail America’s declining status, [arguing](https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/trump-has-put-america-in-the-worst-of-all-possible-worlds/2018/05/11/ff68940c-5553-11e8-9c91-7dab596e8252_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.76f57dea9018) that greater iinvestment in allies and diplomacy, combined with military engagement might reverse the tide. Think tanks scurry to [define](https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit) new national security and military policies that can put America back on top.

This debate is a circular firing squad. Both liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans are struggling to recreate a myth: that the US dominates the world by dint of power, values, wisdom, even God’s decisions. America, and only America, can bring order and security to the world. Any other option spells chaos.

Power Shifts

The latest foreign policy whim—withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran—is the most recent nail in the coffin lid in which the myth is buried. Rather than restore leadership, withdrawing from the agreement simply accelerates the global rebalancing already underway, a tectonic shift that began with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The signs are everywhere.

In the Middle East, the power shift is palpable. The United States has treated Iran as a pariah since 1979, trying to stuff the ayatollahs back into some imaginary bottle, hoping that they will go away or be overthrown. This approach has failed, and the withdrawal from the nuclear deal will only make that failure more evident. Iran is a regional power, defending its interests, engaging other powers and movements inside and outside the region, such as Russia. US regime change in Iraq not only destabilized the region but helped usher the Iranians into this active regional role. The other influential countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, will have to deal with this reality.

In addition to these three countries, Russia is also key to regional stability and instability. There’s no way of pushing the Russians out, short of direct conflict. Nor can Turkey be forced to comply with American policy. It is clearly asserting its own interests and influence in three directions at the same time: Central Asia and Russia, Europe, and the Middle East. The invasion of Iraq may have helped open this Pandora’s box. The US is rapidly becoming a marginal player in the chaotic security environment of the Middle East. In Asia, decades of US condemnation and containment of China have failed. How dare China rise? How dare China steal intellectual property, stifle democracy, arm its artificial islands in the South China Sea, develop a powerful military, mess in Africa (complete with a military base in Djibouti), and intrude into Latin America? And yet, to paraphrase Galileo, “they move.” There is a new, global, competitive player in the system, a reality the United States can not contain or reverse. That player is disrupting that lovely system of rules, acting without U.S. permission or approval. It is even creating new international institutions—an infrastructure development bank and a global trading infrastructure programs (the Belt and Road initiative) to which the US is not even a party. The balance has changed, permanently, and the rules are being rewritten, whether the United States likes it or not.

At the end of the Cold War, American power surrounded Russia, coopting its former satellites, provoking a Russian reaction. Today, the Russian government is, poisoning its citizens overseas, arming Assad, intruding on elections globally, stifling dissent and killing dissenters, and rebuilding its military. Confront Russia, condemn Putin, pretend that they are isolated, treat them with contempt and moral judgment, but Putin does not go away. He is asserting his view of Russia’s interests and Russia’s role in the world, like any great power is likely to do. No amount of US pressure, sanctions, or policy is likely to change that reality. Russia is consciously and actively rebalancing the United States, with some success.

American bullying and presidential rhetoric may have played a role in the apparent, but uncertain, willingness of the North Korean regime to put its nuclear program on the table. But if that program disappears, the putative Nobel Peace Prize may actually belong to President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and even Kim Jong Un, for seizing an opportunity. Even that regional balance and the key players are shifting.

Reckoning with the Shift

America has not been able to use its dominant military to prevent this evolution or restore order. Where it has been deployed in large numbers—Iraq and Afghanistan—U.S. military force has failed. War grinds on in Afghanistan with no light suddenly appearing at the end of the tunnel, despite the promises of generations of officers. Rousting the Islamic State from Iraq has not solved the internal problems of that unhappy country, which is still recovering from a US occupation. Special Operations forces in dozens of countries whack at terrorist moles only to find others arising in their place, stimulated by the confrontation. Order is not restored; the American rules are not being obeyed.

If the US fails to read global rebalancing accurately and tries either to bully the rest of the world or to “restore” the liberal international order, the entire world will find itself at an even more dangerous moment. Bullying will only accelerate the centrifugal trend. Asserting the superiority of an American “order” and American “rules” will no longer persuade other rising powers.

The rules will change with the rebalancing. Eliminating the Trump presidency will not restore the previous order. His actions are not an aberration, but an accelerant, spreading the fires that were already under way.

The challenge is to completely redesign US foreign and national security policy to fit with a world where America is just another power, competing and cooperating for influence. The United States must learn to play well with others in the global sandbox.

#### Fear of lost credibility incentivizes US entrapment – it’s fueling aggression towards China which risks great power war in East Asia – direct negotiation or offshore balancing solves conflict

Edelstein & Shifrinson 18 [David M. Edelstein - Associate Professor of International Affairs in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Center for Security Studies, and Department of Government at Georgetown University; Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson - BA Brandeis University, PhD Massachusetts Institute of Technology, He has special expertise in great power politics since 1945 and U.S. engagement in Europe and Asia; *U.S. Grand Strategy in the 21st Century: The Case for Restraint*; “Chapter 2: It’s a Trap”; pg. 34-35; Published by *Routledge* // Brower]

Since its 2010- 2011 announcement, the pivot has inserted the United States into a host of Asian political and military disputes with China involving ownership of contested maritime space and islands in the South and East China Seas. Though there may be economic resources beneath the surface around some of these locales, neither the United States nor its allies have an intrinsic interest in ownership of contested areas. Instead, the contested maritime domains are worrisome to US allies for what they suggest about China's territorial ambitions. They are therefore important to the United States for the signal American actions send to allies over American credibility. Thus, the United States has moved to back its allies in their disputes with the PRC by rhetorically portraying China as the principal aggressor, clarifying that US commitments to the allies would cover the maritime areas under dispute, and - above all - has dispatched its own military forces to enforce what the US and its allies define as the "status quo" in contravention of China's own interests (Russell 2014; White House 2014; US Pacific Command 2015;Valencia 2016; LaGrone 2015; Panda 2016).Whatever the legitimacy of these actions, their effect is to create a self-perpetuating cycle: the more the United States stands by its allies in opposing potential Chinese ambitions, the nominally more credible the American resolve to defend its allies, the more the allies are inclined to act aggressively toward China, and the greater the likelihood of a direct US- Chinese confron\*tation. In other words, treating American support for its allies as a litmus test of the alliances themselves requires the United States to take steps on behalf of its allies that risk conflict with China.

This is entrapment of the purest sort. The United States could readily provide security to its friends in East Asia, maintain Asia's political status quo, or more generally limit the rise of China without involving itself in Asian maritime disputes. To the extent that the United States simply wants to preserve East Asian stability, it could negotiate directly with the P.R.C. to settle conflicts of interest on a bilateral basis. To the extent that the United States wants to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon or engaging in military action beyond its borders, it could simply surge forces to the region as crises develop or build up the military forces of its clients (Itzkowitz Shifrinson and Lalwani 2014; Glaser 2015; Mirski 2013). That these options are treated as insufficient suggests entrapment at play. Even if protecting Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners is in the United States' interest, only entrapment explains the timing and form of the American response.3

#### A persistent US led order leads to Sino-Russia alliance and is unsustainable.

Porter, DPhil, 19

(Patrick, ModernHistory@Oxford, ProfInternationalSecurityAndStrategy@Birmingham, Advice for a Dark Age: Managing Great Power Competition, The Washington Quarterly, 42:1, 7-25)

Even the United States cannot prudently take on every adversary on multiple fronts. The costs of military campaigns against these adversaries in their backyards, whether in the Baltic States or Taiwan, would outstrip the losses that the U.S. military has sustained in decades. Short of all-out conflict, to mobilize for dominance and risk escalation on multiple such fronts would court several dangers. It would overstretch the country. The U.S. defense budget now approaches $800 billion annually, not including deficit-financed military operations. This is a time of ballooning deficits, where the Congressional Budget Office warns that “the prospect of large and growing debt poses substantial risks for the nation.”27 If in such conditions, current expenditure is not enough to buy unchallengeable military preponderance—and it may not be—then the failure lies not in the failure to spend even more. Neither is the answer to sacrifice the quality of civic life at home to service the cause of preponderance abroad. The old “two war standard,” a planning construct whereby the United States configures its forces to conduct two regional conflicts at once, would be unsustainably demanding against more than one peer competitor, or potentially with a roster of major and minor adversaries all at once.28 After all, the purpose of American military power is ultimately to secure a way of life as a constitutional republic. To impose ever-greater debts on civil society and strip back collective provision at home, on the basis that the quality of life is expendable for the cause of hegemony, is perversely to set up power-projection abroad as the end, when it should be the means. The problem lies, rather, in the inflexible pursuit of hegemony itself, and the failure to balance commitments with scarce resources. To attempt to suppress every adversary simultaneously would drive adversaries together, creating hostile coalitions. It also may not succeed. Counterproliferation in North Korea is difficult enough, for instance, but the task becomes more difficult still if U.S. enmity with China drives Beijing to refuse cooperation over enforcing sanctions on Pyongyang. Concurrent competitions would also split American resources, attention and time. Exacerbating the strain on scarce resources between defense, consumption and investment raises the polarizing question of whether preponderance is even worth it, which then undermines the domestic consensus needed to support it. At the same time, reduced investment in infrastructure and education would damage the economic foundations for conducting competition abroad in the first place. Taken together, indiscriminate competition risks creating the thing most feared in traditional U.S. grand strategy: a hostile Eurasian alliance leading to continuous U.S. mobilization against hostile coalitions, turning the U.S. republic into an illiberal garrison state. If the prospect for the United States as a great power faces a problem, it is not the size of the defense budget, or the material weight of resources at the U.S. disposal, or popular reluctance to exercise leadership. Rather, the problem lies in the scope of the policy that those capabilities are designed to serve. To make the problem smaller, Washington should take steps to make the pool of adversaries smaller.

#### A strong Sino-Russian alliance combined with expanded US military presence ensures joint retaliation — that escalates to the use of nuclear force

Klare 18 – Professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College. (Michael T., “The Pentagon Is Planning a Three-Front ‘Long War’ Against China and Russia,” April 4, 2018, https://fpif.org/the-pentagon-is-planning-a-three-front-long-war-against-china-and-russia/)//sy

In relatively swift fashion, American military leaders have followed up their claim that the U.S. is in a new long war by sketching the outlines of a containment line that would stretch from the Korean Peninsula around Asia across the Middle East into parts of the former Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and finally to the Scandinavian countries. Under their plan, American military forces — reinforced by the armies of trusted allies — should garrison every segment of this line, a grandiose scheme to block hypothetical advances of Chinese and Russian influence that, in its global reach, should stagger the imagination. Much of future history could be shaped by such an outsized effort. Questions for the future include whether this is either a sound strategic policy or truly sustainable. Attempting to contain China and Russia in such a manner will undoubtedly provoke countermoves, some undoubtedly difficult to resist, including cyber attacks and various kinds of economic warfare. And if you imagined that a war on terror across huge swaths of the planet represented a significant global overreach for a single power, just wait. Maintaining large and heavily-equipped forces on three extended fronts will also prove exceedingly costly and will certainly conflict with domestic spending priorities and possibly provoke a divisive debate over the reinstatement of the draft. However, the real question — unasked in Washington at the moment — is: Why pursue such a policy in the first place? Are there not other ways to manage the rise of China and Russia’s provocative behavior? What appears particularly worrisome about this three-front strategy is its immense capacity for confrontation, miscalculation, escalation, and finally actual war rather than simply grandiose war planning. At multiple points along this globe-spanning line — the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Syria, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, to name just a few — forces from the U.S. and China or Russia are already in significant contact, often jostling for position in a potentially hostile manner. At any moment, one of these encounters could provoke a firefight leading to unintended escalation and, in the end, possibly all-out combat. From there, almost anything could happen, even the use of nuclear weapons. Clearly, officials in Washington should be thinking hard before committing Americans to a strategy that will make this increasingly likely and could turn what is still long-war planning into an actual long war with deadly consequences.

#### US unipolarity is specifically responsible for the globalization of extremism.

Ibrahimi 18 (2/19/18; S. Yaqub Ibrahimi, [researcher and instructor of political science. PhD @ Carleton University] “Unipolar politics and global peace: a structural explanation of the globalizing jihad”; taylor and francis <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/17467586.2018.1428763?needAccess=true)>

* JSG = Jihadi-Salafi Groups

Three conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the peacefulness of the contemporary unipolar system could be discussed beyond the interstate conflict and the likelihood of great powers competition debate. The new forms of asymmetric warfare, particularly the emergence of JSGs and their violent activities at different levels of the global order, could be assessed as another variable in debates on the peacefulness of the system. These actors DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT 59 emerged and operate under the unipolarity conditions. Unipolarity, in this sense, has generated conflict-producing mechanisms and nonstate actors that drove sovereign states in lengthy wars against JSGs. This argument makes a significant contribution to the unipolarity-peace puzzle, which is conventionally addressed from the interstate conflict perspective. Second, unipolarity transformed Islamist-oriented terrorism from domestic to global. In addition to other conflict-generating conditions produced under unipolarity, the United States’ unipolar policies in Muslim regions transformed the traditional near-enemy-centric narrative of jihad into a far-enemy-centric ideology. As a result of the transformation of this doctrine, new forms of JSGs emerged that posed a threat to peace and security at all levels. Finally, because of the unipolarity of the system, global peace depends largely on the sole great power’s foreign and military policies. The US interventionism, due to the absence of a challenging great power, might not generate interstate conflict. However, it would engage the US in asymmetric warfare with nonstate actors that would emerge independently or on behalf of states to disrupt the US hegemony through insurgency, terrorism, and other forms of violence at different levels. These all might not challenge the durability of unipolarity, drastically, but they would disrupt peace and security at all domestic, regional, and global levels.

#### Terrorists get and detonate nuclear weapons – they have means, motive, and opportunity – most recent and predictive evidence that takes into account technological advances

Bunn et al 19 – Matthew Bunn is a Professor of Practice at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and the faculty leader of the Project on Managing the Atom. Nickolas Roth is a Research Associate at the Belfer Center’s Project on Managing the Atom. William H. Tobey is a Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. (“Revitalizing Nuclear Security in an Era of Uncertainty”, Harvard Belfer Center for International Affairs, Jan 2019, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/matthew\_bunn/files/bunn\_revitalizing\_nuclear\_security\_in\_an\_era\_of\_uncertainty\_2019.pdf)

The risk that terrorists could get and use a nuclear bomb—turning the heart of a modern city into a smoldering radioactive ruin—remains very real. Sabotage of major nuclear facilities or dispersal of radioactive material in a disruptive “dirty bomb” also remain real risks.

Motive. Apocalyptic visions or global ambitions drove groups such as al Qaeda and the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo to seek nuclear weapons. From the 9/11 attackers to Chechen rebels, who killed hundreds of children and their parents at a school in Beslan, Russia, to the Islamic State, which regularly televised its atrocities, it is clear that some terrorist groups seek to inflict as many casualties as possible, as cruelly as possible.

Means. There have been repeated cases of seizure of stolen HEU or plutonium. While there have been no such seizures since 2011, security assessments and tests continue to reveal important vulnerabilities, in the United States and elsewhere. Moreover, non-nuclear criminal thefts and terrorist attacks continue to occur that use tactics and capabilities that the security systems at many nuclear facilities would be hard-pressed to defend against—ranging from substantial teams of heavily armed, well-trained attackers, to insider conspiracies, to the use of vehicles such as helicopters to get past multiple layers of site security systems.

Opportunity. Government studies in multiple countries have concluded that sophisticated terrorist groups could plausibly make a crude nuclear device. Stopping such a device from being brought into a country and detonated remains a very challenging task, given the huge length of national borders, the immensity of normal traffic across them, and the small size and weak radiation of the materials needed for a nuclear bomb.

Since our last report in 2016:

• Al Qaeda and particularly the Islamic State have suffered numerous defeats which must necessarily make it more difficult for them to mount the organized effort necessary to perpetrate nuclear terrorism, although their intent to inflict massive damage abides;

• Rapid and clandestine radicalization of insiders has continued to present a threat that most personnel reliability programs have been unable to address successfully;

• The pace of seizures of fissile material outside of authorized control appears to have slowed, although what is known publicly about earlier cases offers little confidence that the leaks have been plugged;

• New technologies such as drones and cyber, expanded deployments of small, mobile nuclear weapons, and construction of bulk processing facilities will offer new opportunities for terrorists to strike and present new challenges for those attempting to defend against them.

On balance, the combination of nuclear terrorist means, motives, and opportunities presents somewhat less of a threat than it did two years ago. But as past experience makes clear, the future is highly uncertain; the world has likely not seen the last of powerful terrorist groups bent on mass destruction. And as adversaries make increasingly sophisticated use of technologies such as cyber and drones in the future, the threat to nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities could increase. To minimize risk in