# 1nc

## 1NC – OFF

#### Interp – The aff should only defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution.

#### Outer space means anything above Earth’s Karman line

Dunnett 21 (Oliver Tristan, lecturer in geography at Queen’s University Belfast). Earth, Cosmos and Culture: Geographies of Outer Space in Britain, 1900–2020 (1st ed.). Routledge. 2021. <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780815356301> EE

In such ways, this book argues that Britain became a home to rich discourses of outer space, both feeding from and contributing to iconic achievements in space exploration, while also embracing the cosmos in imaginative and philosophical ways.2 INSERT FOOTNOTE 2 2 This book primarily uses the term ‘outer space’ to describe the realm beyond the Earth’s atmosphere, conventionally accepted as beginning at the Kármán line of 100km above sea level. Other terms such as ‘interplanetary space’, ‘interstellar space’, ‘cosmos’, and ‘the heavens’ are used in specific contexts. END FOOTNOTE 2 Cognisant of this spatial context, a central aim is to demonstrate how contemporary geographical enquiry can provide specific and valuable perspectives from which to understand outer space. This is an argument that was initiated by Denis Cosgrove, and his critique of Alexander von Humboldt’s seminal work Cosmos helped to demonstrate geography’s special relevance to thinking about outer space.3 The key thematic areas which provide the interface for this book’s research, therefore, are the cultural, political and scientific understandings of outer space; the context of the United Kingdom since the start of the last century; and the geographical underpinnings of their relationship.

#### “Appropriation” means to take as property.

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

#### Private entity is a major nonstate.

Warners 20 (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline.

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almostas comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### Violation – cx

#### Standards:

#### [1] Competitive equity – 3 warrants:

#### [A] Limits – their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff is a commitment even large squads can’t handle, let alone small schools like us. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### [B] Causality – debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negatable – that independently decks clash cuz there’s no way for me to engage with the affirmative.

#### [2] Switch-side debate –

#### [A] Clash – topics are chosen so that both sides have enough lit but since you can choose whatever topic you want there won’t be any specific lit against your aff. Debate has a unique education value in that it can challenge your ideas but since I have no pre round prep you never get that challenge.

#### [B] TVA solves – they can still have all their advantages and say that private appropriation masks a western desire to take over muslim culture

#### [3] Skills – forcing them to defend the resolution makes them have to cut new positions every two months and forces them to explore the depths of the literature as opposed to just recycling the same set of non T affs over and over that lead repetitive and stale debates – they reject argument innovation and force every non t debate into either k vs t or k v k.

#### Vote negative –

#### [1] It’s a procedural – it determines whether your model is good

#### [2] I don’t have the power to impose a norm – only to convince you my side is better. Theory doesn’t ban you from the activity – the whole point is that norms should be contestable – I just say make a better arg next time.

#### [3] It’s not the same thing as violence – you aren’t going to get arrested if you lose the round, theory is just a test of norms we can set in the debate round.

#### [4] Norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms

#### Fairness is an impact –

#### [1] It’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### [2] Probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews

#### [3] Internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### [4] Comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it.

#### Education is an impact – it’s the only reason schools fund debate

## 1NC - OFF

Cap K

#### The reliance upon the politics of personal identity ignores the *material bases of oppression* --- in order to change the existing political order, our critique must preface class.

Moufawad-Paul 13. Josh Moufawad-Paul, 4/23/13, Professor of Philosophy @ York University, Toronto. “10 Theses on Identity Politics,” Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Reflections, http://moufawad-paul.blogspot.com/2013/04/10-theses-on-identity-politics.html.

1) By basing a definition of oppression on sites of identity wrenched from a materialist basis, there emerges a concept of oppression that lacks any revolutionary praxis. There can be no solidarity in a theory that divides along multiple moments of identity and elevates these molecularities above the molar basis that actually divides a given mode of production into ruling and ruled classes. While it may be unfashionable in certain academic circles to make this claim, the only basis of revolutionary unity is still the basis of social class since a given mode of production, as well as the momentum of history, is determined, in the last instance, by class struggle. 2) While it is correct to reject the class essentialism of a crude marxism that in itself produces its own form of identity politics (where the proletariat is automatically and erroneously overcoded according to a white, male, hetero, able-bodied, and cis-gendered identity), it is incorrect to substitute a post-modern politics of difference––which concretely means identity politics––in its place. To argue that the proletariat’s composition is defined by these sites of oppression is not the same as clinging to a politics that speaks only of these sites, wrenched from the material basis of social class and treated in an abstract and intersecting manner, rather than the material fact of class division. Class might be determined by these moments of oppression, but it also and simultaneously determines these moments of oppression. Again: in the final instance we have to recognize social/economic class as the basis of revolutionary struggle. 3) The theory of intersectionality, a term flouted about by those committed to an identitarian approach, is ultimately banal. While it is indeed a fact that class, race, sex, gender, nationality, etc. intersect, recognizing this fact is about as useful as recognizing that the clouds are grey when it is close to raining. No theory of intersectionality proposed by proponents of post-modern and identitarian approaches has done anything more significant than inform us of the obvious fact that oppression intersects and overlaps; they generally fail to explain why and how they overlap, and more importantly they fail to provide a praxis of revolutionary unity. Here the statements of intersectionality mean only the recognition of disparate trajectories that happen to intersect, just because they do, rather than provide a precise epistemology of intersection. 4) Revolutionary communists have known, for a long time, that disparate oppressions intersect in the moment of class which is the final instance rather than a separate identitarian trajectory. By pretending that social class is something that is only a moment of intersection, rather than the material basis that makes sense of intersection, identity politics cannot challenge capitalism in a scientific manner. Instead, all it can do is offer moralizations. 5) Those who champion the enshrined practices of identity politics––anti-oppression training, “safe spaces”, rarified theories of privilege, abstract movementism––are generally petty-bourgeois academics. The irony is that while many of these people possess a significant level of intellectual privilege (and note that the post-modern theories behind this politics are currently accessible mainly to students and intellectuals) they do not grasp the privilege generated by their social class as the primary moment of privilege, or even recognize that they are economically privileged, when they speak of privilege, oppression, intersectionality, etc. Hence the failure to produce a material analysis of oppression: under capitalism those who possess the most “privilege” are those who possess the most economic autonomy, i.e. the bourgeosie, and those who possess the intellectual autonomy to flourish in the spaces opened by identity politics also possess, in some very significant ways and regardless of their specific identities (oppressed or otherwise), the very privilege they imagine they lack. None of this is to say that these practices were not at one point of time necessary, or at least the logical result of the class essentialism of a crude marxism, but just that they can be nothing more than a petty-bourgeois activism that produces neo-reformism. 6) Although there have been numerous marxist attempts to reject identity politics without falling back into class essentialism, most have ended up reifying the content of identity politics. (Hence the recent bad faith appropriation of proletarian feminism where the same identitarian notion of “privilege” is presupposed and revolutionary theorists such as Anuradha Gandhy are poached by bourgeois feminists who replace exploitation with an idealist concept of oppression.) Generally speaking, in our attempt to supersede a class essentialism while learning from the politics of identity, some of us tend to err more on the side of the latter in an attempt to overcome the problems of the former. This error makes sense in light of the history of crude marxism and yet is still an error… for if we claim we are marxists, then we need to offer something more and beyond the simplest and idealist rejections of a marxism that belongs in the dustbin of history.

#### Capitalism causes war, violence, environmental destruction, [racism], and extinction.

Robinson 14 (William I., Prof. of Sociology, Global and International Studies, and Latin American Studies, @ UC-Santa Barbara, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism” The World Financial Review)

Cyclical, Structural, and Systemic Crises Most commentators on the contemporary crisis refer to the “Great Recession” of 2008 and its aftermath. Yet the causal origins of global crisis are to be found in over-accumulation and also in contradictions of state power, or in what Marxists call the internal contradictions of the capitalist system. Moreover, because the system is now global, crisis in any one place tends to represent crisis for the system as a whole. The system cannot expand because the marginalisation of a significant portion of humanity from direct productive participation, the downward pressure on wages and popular consumption worldwide, and the polarisation of income, has reduced the ability of the world market to absorb world output. At the same time, given the particular configuration of social and class forces and the correlation of these forces worldwide, national states are hard-pressed to regulate transnational circuits of accumulation and offset the explosive contradictions built into the system. Is this crisis cyclical, structural, or systemic? Cyclical crises are recurrent to capitalism about once every 10 years and involve recessions that act as self-correcting mechanisms without any major restructuring of the system. The recessions of the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and of 2001 were cyclical crises. In contrast, the 2008 crisis signaled the slide into a structural crisis*. Structural crises* reflect deeper contra- dictions that can only be resolved by a major restructuring of the system. The structural crisis of the 1970s was resolved through capitalist globalisation. Prior to that, the structural crisis of the 1930s was resolved through the creation of a new model of redistributive capitalism, and prior to that the struc- tural crisis of the 1870s resulted in the development of corpo- rate capitalism. A systemic crisis involves the replacement of a system by an entirely new system or by an outright collapse. A structural crisis opens up the possibility for a systemic crisis. But if it actually snowballs into a systemic crisis – in this case, if it gives way either to capitalism being superseded or to a breakdown of global civilisation – is not predetermined and depends entirely on the response of social and political forces to the crisis and on historical contingencies that are not easy to forecast. This is an historic moment of extreme uncertainty, in which collective responses from distinct social and class forces to the crisis are in great flux. Hence my concept of global crisis is broader than financial. There are multiple and mutually constitutive dimensions – economic, social, political, cultural, ideological and ecological, not to mention the existential crisis of our consciousness, values and very being. There is a crisis of social polarisation, that is, of *social reproduction.* The system cannot meet the needs or assure the survival of millions of people, perhaps a majority of humanity. There are crises of state legitimacy and political authority, or of *hegemony* and *domination.* National states face spiraling crises of legitimacy as they fail to meet the social grievances of local working and popular classes experiencing downward mobility, unemployment, heightened insecurity and greater hardships. The legitimacy of the system has increasingly been called into question by millions, perhaps even billions, of people around the world, and is facing expanded counter-hegemonic challenges. Global elites have been unable counter this erosion of the system’s authority in the face of worldwide pressures for a global moral economy. And a canopy that envelops all these dimensions is a crisis of sustainability rooted in an ecological holocaust that has already begun, expressed in climate change and the impending collapse of centralised agricultural systems in several regions of the world, among other indicators. By a crisis of humanityI mean a crisis that is approaching systemic proportions, threatening the ability of billions of people to survive, and raising the specter of a collapse of world civilisation and degeneration into a new “Dark Ages.”2 This crisis of humanity shares a number of aspects with earlier structural crises but there are also several features unique to the present: 1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries. 2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; *1984 has arrived;* 3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, de-ruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that *intensive* expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand? 4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison-industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on; 5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction. Global Police State How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute. One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical re- sponses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges. Yet another response is that I term *21st century fascism*.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent

force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

#### The role of the ballot should endorse the best political tactics for organizing against material oppression and the alternative is to theorize through communism --- the best method is the one that most effectively catalyzes political organization against capitalism.

Walker 14 (Gavin, Assistant Professor of History and East Asian Studies at McGill University, “The Reinvention of Communism: Politics, History, Globality,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 113:4, Fall 2014)

Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the term communism has returned to the theoretical and historical agenda with a striking force and a surprising novelty. 1 In a wide range of fields of knowledge, the questions of the actuality and the history of the world communist movement, the theoretical tendencies of communist thought, and the current political possibilities of new developments of communism have been revisited and addressed anew. In the social movements that have sprung up in nations around the world—from Spain to Greece to Quebec, throughout Latin America, Asia, Africa, and beyond—-the word communism has again acquired a critical force, not a force of nostalgia or simple retrospection, but a new and creative force. We can only be struck by the degree to which it now seems that communism, far from the dead end of the twentieth century it was long assumed to be, may be something profoundly of the twenty-first century, an idea and field of concepts whose time has come. When Antonio Negri emphasizes that the communists today are “alone and potent,” he alerts us to a crucial point that I want to highlight, from two divergent directions, in the following essay. Rather than see the contemporary communist moment simply as a “return,” implying a transposition of the same forces, forms, and contents, this moment indicates instead an open field for the reinvention of communism. The earlier modality of twentieth-century communism, linked above all to the existence and continuity established by the Soviet Union, no longer exists. No longer is there a national form or federated space that would serve as a “bulwark” of the communist project. In this sense, the communists today are alone. Yet Negri insists that the communists are alone and potent. This potency is derived, not as in the previous arrangement, from a site of institutional force that could be treated as a model of explanation, but from this fact of being alone, untethered, unguaranteed, not beholden to a specific historical telos. In this sense, the communists today are potent because they are alone. What does this new political solitude mean for the concepts and contents of communism in our contemporary moment? Two distinct trends emerge in this development of communism in our global present. One is the great historic movement that has transferred the center of gravity of a reinvented communist politics to the exterior of the West, taken in the broadest sense. This globality of communism is in essence a fulfillment of a promise rather than a historical accident, the fulfillment of a politics that from the outset sought a new theoretical and political destiny beyond the horizon of the national and local. The second is the striking link between this return—and reinvention—of communism and its site of return, one of which is without doubt the field of “critical theory.” What makes this site peculiar is that it too, like the political potential of communism itself, has been in a long retreat since the 1980s in the fields of knowledge production around the world. Theory’s originary impulse toward the politicization of knowledge, the immanent critique of the university, and its globality, the fact that theory has long provided a common language beyond the regime of national language, has been the target of an intense revanchist attack by institutional neoliberalism, conservative politics, and positivist knowledge work. But new experiences have emerged in recent years to produce a situation in which these two developments—one linked to the practical social movements and reinventions of political organization and the other linked to the crystallization of a new trend in theory—are experiencing complex and volatile articulations and points of contact. What we are seeing today is perhaps the first emergence of a new direction and politicization of theory itself, the first stirrings of a communist critical theory. P o litics: P e rs is te n c e a n d S cissio n One distinguishing feature of the current discussions of the “communist hypothesis” (Badiou), the “actuality of communism” (Bosteels), and “the communist horizon” (Dean) is a renewal of an insistence on the primacy of politics over the mere presupposition of a politics derived from the structural analysis of global capitalism’s current tendencies, level of technical composition, and scale of development of the productive forces. These thinkers maintain a conception of politics that upholds its rarity, its intermittent or hazardous quality. Rather than accept the given character of politics, in which it would become a figure of ubiquity or immanence (the banal argument that “everything is political”), the rethinking of the question of communism has also insisted on a divergent genealogy of what is and what is not political. Rather than a constantly presupposed undercurrent, this figure of politics would instead be, for instance, in Alain Badiou (2001), the rare event that grounds a political sequence and convokes a subject through a fidelity, or in Jacques Ranciere’s (1999) terms, the egalitarian proposal that suspends the representations possible in the dominant order (“the police”).2 This concept of politics is, above all, linked to new attempts to think the place of the subject of politics, and it is this point that provides an entry into the critical dimensions of this “communist hypothesis” within the theoretical field. The rethinking of communism today has distinguished itself as a trend in insisting on antagonism, contradiction, the subject, politics, and organization; it refuses gestures of diffusion, multiplicity as such, focusing on the dialectical conditions of the possible rather than the immanent conditions of the impossible. There is here a reaction to the monopoly held by a very specific register—the Derridean register of defeat and withdrawal, the Deleuzian register of immanence and multiplicity—within the broadly left trends of thought and knowledge production. Metapolitically speaking, we can observe within the works associated with this “communist hypothesis” a rebirth of simple, seemingly “obvious” concepts: truth, justice, fidelity, struggle, honor, courage, and so forth, concepts largely derided in the postdeconstruction trends of thought and relegated to the realm of the “popular,” avoided as vulgarities too “earnest” for the field of so-called theory. Instead, detachment, irony, withdrawal, defeat, finitude, the impossibility of presence, the impossibility of naming, the impossibility of an affirmative creation, and the impossibility of an interventionist politics proper often constitute the typical terms of theoretical work. There is thus in the recent communist current a refusal to accept this by-now rigid division of labor, one that has decisive consequences for both politics and critical theory itself. What lies behind this new vocabulary and new set of gestures? Above all, it is the insistence on a link between the internal dynamics of theory and the external situation, in particular, on the question of organization. Let us consider a few short texts that might be taken as a “pre-history” of this notion, a polemical period of Badiou’s work that expresses the essence of the overall problem: how to develop and conceptualize a theory of politics that is not simply a reflection or proof of a structural or given feature of the situation in which we find ourselves, a theory of politics that is not beholden to concepts of historical necessity. Behind this thesis lies a resistance to the notion that politics is involved in a flattening of phenomena, a fear of antagonism, the preference for holism over division, the emphasis on consensus, on “friendship,” against contestation. In 1977 Badiou launched a frontal attack against Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s work for its implied political pitfalls. This attack on their “fascism of the potato” is excessive, dogmatic, beyond the demands of the political conjuncture (going so far as to identify them as “prefascist ideologues”). But it also contains an extremely important point for the paradox of organization within politics, perhaps the key kernel of the new trend inaugurated in theoretical work by the hypothesis of communism. In this text, Badiou (2012:199-200) reacts against Deleuze and Guattari’s celebration of multiplicity, appeals to escape, to flight, to becoming-multiple, becomingschizophrenic, becoming-minor, and so forth,3 by intersecting this theoretical work with the concrete terms of the political situation: We have seen this in May ’68: If you have the mass revolt, but not the proletarian antagonism, you obtain the victory of the bourgeois antagonism (of bourgeois politics). If you have ideas that are just, but not Marxism, you obtain the return to power of the bourgeois reformists of the Parti Socialiste. If you have the objective forces, but neither the programme nor the party, you obtain the revenge of Pompidou’s parliamentarianism, you obtain the return to the scene of the PCF and the unions. Badiou argues that Deleuze and Guattari fail to carry through the very ideas that found their major theoretical concepts. They support the mass revolt, but lack the antagonism between “friends” and “enemies” of the people; they have “just ideas”—freedom, the overturning of injustice, the defense of the workers, the poor, the targets of a vicious imperialism in and out of the metropole—but no structural features link the situation of domination with an affirmative politics of inversion; they include the objective forces of the masses in social motion, but lack direction, a concrete framework within which the mass movement can orient itself. Badiou argues that these elements finally invert into their opposites: the victory of bourgeois politics, reformism, parliamentarism, and so forth. But what is behind this charge, this accusation? Two elements subtend this polemic whose compositional elements are returning today to the theoretical scene through the return to the communist hypothesis, namely, persistence and scission. Badiou charges Deleuze and Guattari with the production of a theoretical system that is itself in a constant process of diverting, redirecting, and moving sideways to avoid “capture.” Such a politics cannot sustain the forces it unleashes; it can initiate moments of dissensus within the dominant order, but it cannot persist in a full overturning of their foundations or proceed from this moment of dissensus to a new hegemony over the situation. Such a mode of thought poses questions, identifies structural injustices, and marks points of rupture, but it nevertheless chooses, at the final moment, to refuse to uphold a strong division, a strong break, an insistence on one side over another, one line over another. Badiou (2012:199-200) puts this point in a dense and powerful formulation: “To think the multiple outside the two, outside scission, amounts to practicing in exteriority the dictatorship of the One.” If you think the multiple, you can expose the One to its internal disunity, the false impression of substantiality. But merely pointing to the multiple character of a social and political situation is not in itself a bridge to a politics. Remarking on the multivocal character of what appears as a unity is in no way a critique, much less an intervention, within this situation. Instead, the multivocal reality of the unitary image can always be recuperated precisely in the service of the One. In a circumstance of social struggle, it is never enough to point to the heterogeneous composition of all positions—“the police are also drawn from the lower stratum of society,” “their pensions are also being cut back by the state,” “within the ranks of the workers are some with terrible ideas,” “the activists are not as upstanding as they say they are,” and so on—and thereby to end in the original abstentionist position: “It’s all so complicated, it’s not just one thing and another.” This type of analysis, which always underscores the hybridity and mutual complicity of political scenarios, itself participates in the naive fantasy of imagining that exposing this multiplicity allows one out of the practice of partisanship. In such an optic, you can go on multiplying the options, always finding yet another option, always finding a “third way,” always insisting on escape from the binary, escape from the pressure of limited choices, always demanding an evacuation of responsibility, of having to uphold the consequences of a choice. To force a cut in the situation is to assert that the One is forever split, that there is a two-line struggle in every social and political scenario, that politics proper consists in this scission itself: the formation of an antagonism where previously there was only a semblance of unity. This is why Badiou emphasizes the Two—when you choose to say, “I don’t want either side, they’re all bad, we don’t have to make a choice, we don’t have to have just one thing,” what is installed in theory and in practice is not a splitting or splintering of the One into its infinitely heterogeneous elements (the thesis of multiplicity) but a withdrawal that allows the One to remain intact. This is precisely what Badiou calls, in the above formulation, “practicing in exteriority the dictatorship of the One.” By choosing flight or escape, the status quo (i.e., the One) reasserts itself, this time stronger than before, bolstered by the experience of finding in its own image of multiplicity a renewed unity. What remains a true politics is the courage to choose, to insist on the Two, to not fear division, separation, scission. To accept the responsibility of the choice, to accept that there is no way to opt out—that the act of a supposed withdrawal is in fact a refusal to countenance real movement, real overturning of the situation, a break that has to be sustained—is to accept the responsibility to uphold the choice despite the fact that there is no going back. What does this argument contain for the current rethinking of communism? Above all, it holds that politics is contained not in overturning the system of social binaries, or in finding a “third way,” or in escapism, defeatism, or abstention. A common thread today, in all the thinkers reinventing the term communism, is a long and arduous struggle for hegemony in the world of thought, a world devoted to concepts of the “death of the subject,” the refusal of binaries, the emphasis on incessant multiplicity, and so forth. This struggle for a new politics recognizes the dead end of these “philosophies of defeat,” in Bruno Bosteels’s terms. It recognizes that a new communist development will come, not from the endless work of withdrawal and negation as such, but from the affirmative and interventionist declaration that politics is possible and the status quo can be permanently fractured. And this fracture produces the need for a persistence, the ability to carry through the full consequences of the initial break.

## 1NC - OFF

#### CP Text: I endorse the entirety of the 1AC minus their use of the word Sufism.

Dehlvi 16 [Sadia Dehlvi in TOI Edit Page, Edit Page, India, TOI. “Islam Is Non-Violence: Unfortunately Sufis, Islam’s original mystics, are succumbing to sectarianism too.”April 21, 2016. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/islam-is-non-violence-unfortunately-sufis-islams-original-mystics-are-succumbing-to-sectarianism-too/]

Sufism is the modern word for Tasawwuf, Islam’s mystic path. Sufis never called themselves Sufis but faqirs, indicating their state of humility before God. Datta Ganj Baksh of Lahore wrote of Sufis in the 8th century saying, ‘Tasawwuf, once a reality without a name, is today a name without a reality’. The ‘ism’ remains problematic for it turns an internal spiritual quest into externalised religiosity and bubblegum spirituality. The ‘ism’ is commercialised, pickled and sold as Sufi Disco, Sufi Kathak, Sufi Nights at bar clubs, and as the ‘Antidote to Terror’. Historically, Sufis played key roles in providing educative, philosophical and spiritual nourishment, enabling openings of both mind and heart. Sufism gained strength in the 8th century as a reaction to the Islamic Caliphate’s obsession with conquests and wealth; forgetting the egalitarianism and simplicity of the Prophetic message. Early mystics raised voices against stifling religious freedoms, ensuring Islam not be confined to legalistic codes. Today, frequent Deoband fatwas and Sufi advisories constrict the inherent flexibility of Islam. Barring some mandatory rules, Quranic wisdom lies in its silence on trivial issues; offering layers of multiple interpretations. Sufis like Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, Baba Farid and Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya brought new dimensions to Islamic understanding; enabling it to blossom organically with the colours of the Indian soil; not requiring local citizenry to commit cultural apostasies. This provided nourishment to the synthesis of Muslim and Hindu mystics that produced the Bhakti movement, when people across faiths came together against religious orthodoxies and social divisions. At the World Sufi Forum in Delhi, as expected, enlightened Islamic narratives came from Sufis and scholars in Syria, Egypt, Indonesia, America, Africa, Europe, and Canada. Contemporary Muslim rhetoric in the subcontinent remains intellectually lethargic, failing to rejuvenate the pluralistic traditions of Islam. Perhaps the slogan ‘Islam is peace’ should change to, ‘Islam is non-violence and non-coercion’. Some individuals and states find peace through wars, suicide bombings, retribution, death penalties and other ways of blood letting. Peace in the Quran flowers from the absence of ‘khauf’, fear, and ‘huzn’, grief; achieved through denial of violence, coercion, sectarianism, oppression, injustice and poverty. Prophets were not sent to establish peace, but to alleviate suffering, establish law and preach the Oneness of God. Violence is an aberration of the human heart that naturally inclines towards calm. Muslims requiring fatwas against terrorism reveal the vulnerability, despair and defeat of Muslim communities. Until issues such as heresy, blasphemy, apostasy, exclusion and gender justice are addressed; the words ‘love, harmony and world peace’ remain candy floss. Be they Salafis, Sufis, Deobandis, Barielvys, Shias or other, Muslim thinkers must engage critically and creatively with canonised medieval laws; enabling Muslims to negotiate today’s realities. Otherwise, violence in the name of Islam will long continue.

## 1NC - OFF

Narratives PIC

#### Counterplan text: we endorse the entirety of the aff minus their use of narratives. To clarify, using personal narratives is bad.

#### We endorse the content of thehir message but we rejec ttheir uses of narratives as a means to express it.

#### Narratives are violent – they force the judge to compare between different people’s experiences and stories, which requires the judge to quantify lived experiences and suffering which causes oppression olympics and violence when osmeone is told that their narratives are not good enough

## 1NC – OFF

#### CP Text: Vote negative to inject the affirmative advocacy with a radical loss.

**Genosko 16** - Gary Genosko, University of Ontario, Lo Sguardo, 8/29/16 “How to Lose to a Chess Playing Computer According to Jean Baudrillard” [<http://www.losguardo.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/2017-23-Genosko.pdf>] Accessed 9/14/20 SAO

Readers of Baudrillard know that he thought about competition in sport and games in terms of failure and frailty. In For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign, exchange value and symbolic ambivalence are mutually exclusive domains; in the latter, desire is not satisfied through phantasmic completion, and this entails that desire may ride failure to an ignominious counter-victory. Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those whso are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard’s speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM’s Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard’s theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even ‘non-thought’. Considering the malevolent and fictional computer system HAL, as well as Deep Blue and subsequent programs, right up to IBM’s Jeopardy-playing computer ‘Watson’, this paper looks at ways to defeat programming power by critically regaining the counter-technical and (dys)functional skills of the loser.

#### The Affirmative critique is assimilated to justify the moral superstructure they criticize. It’s try or die for the CP under their role of the ballot.

**Robinson 12** - Andrew Robinson, Ceasefire, August 24th, 2012 “An A to Z of Theory | Jean Baudrillard: From Revolution to Implosion” [<https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-10/>] Accessed 3/9/20 SAO

Baudrillard and resistance Last week, this column explored Baudrillard’s account of the collapse or implosion of capitalism. What does all of this mean for political resistance? For one thing, it means that the dominant system must continue to be opposed. For Baudrillard, there is always something missing from the code. It is always incomplete, leaving a radical remainder. The system is based on a split. The code is differentiated from reality. It has to be, to avoid symbolic exchange. It cannot achieve the complete inclusion which comes about with generalised reversibility. Yet the code tends to take over all of social space. Its “other” disappears or becomes invisible. It tries to be a complete system, a total reality. It largely succeeds in sucking intensity from social life. Yet it also remains vulnerable, because of the exclusion on which it is based. Baudrillard theorises resistance in terms of the irruption of the symbolic in the realms controlled by the code. It is something like what Hakim Bey terms the ‘return of the primitive’. We really need the dimension of the ‘secret’. Its forced revelation is destructive and impossible. The return of the symbolic is discussed in various ways in different texts. Resistance arises when subjects come to see their own programmed death in the accumulation, production and conservation of their subjectivity. They become fiercely opposed to their reduction to the regime of work-buy-consume-die. Resistance becomes increasingly nihilistic, in response to the programming of the universe. It becomes resistance to the code as meaning, and at the same time as lack of intensity. In seeking to restore intensity, it resorts to the modalities of symbolic exchange. The impossibility of “revolution” It is important to differentiate Baudrillard’s view from standard accounts of revolution. To be sure, this is the position from which Baudrillard emerges. In the early work, The Political Economy of the Sign, Baudrillard argued that the regime of the code could only be destroyed by a total revolution. ‘Even signs must burn’. Baudrillard’s early work can be read as a call for a Situationist-style overthrow of capitalism through a revolution in the everyday, which breaks the power of the code and of signs. In more recent works, Baudrillard rethinks this view. He claims that revolution is now impossible. Baudrillard makes this claim because of the end of production. Revolution was historically seen as the liberation of the productive energy of humanity from the confines of capitalism. But if production no longer exists, this kind of vision has no hold. Labour has become another sign. There is no tendency for it to liberate itself by moving beyond capitalism. Baudrillard is deeply critical of standard leftist responses to neoliberalism. He criticises revolutionaries of his day for seeking a return to the “real”. He sees this as nostalgia for the previous, Fordist period of capitalism. People seek to get rid of the code, and go back to the earlier kind of simulation. Or they seek to identify something which is not yet signified in the system and which ought to be – for instance, excluded groups who should be included. This actually ties people to the prior forms of the dominant system. For Baudrillard, the weapons of the previous period are already neutralised in the order of the code. Revolution is a casualty of the end of the period of system-expansion. Explosions and revolutions are effects of an expanding order. This expanding order is an effect of the regime of production. But simulation is instead an inward-looking order. It is ‘saturated’ – it cannot expand any further. As a result, explosion will never again happen. It has been replaced by the ‘cold’ energy of the simulacrum. Instead, there is constant implosion. The world is saturated. The system has reached its limits. It is socially constructed as dense and irreversible, as beyond the ‘liberating explosion’. Baudrillard believes that we are past a point of no return: the system can’t be slowed down or redirected to a new end. We are in a ‘pure event’, beyond causality and without consequence, and every effort to exorcise hyperreality simply reinforces it. These are little fractal events and gradual processes of collapse which no longer create massive collapses, but exist horizontally. Events no longer resonate across spheres. It is as if the forces carrying the meaning of an event beyond itself have slowed to a standstill. The London ‘riots’ or the student fees protests, for example, do not turn into generalised rebellions in Britain as perhaps they still might in Egypt or Greece. We are in an era of ‘anomalies without consequences’. But the system will nevertheless come to an end, by other means. Even if people can’t revolt, a reaction is certain. Explosive violence is replaced by implosive violence, arising from a saturated, retracting, involuting system. The system has lost its triumphal imaginary because of its saturation. It is now in a phase of mourning, passing towards catastrophe. Things don’t get transcended anymore, but they expand to excess. Baudrillard sees this as the culmination of a kind of negative evolution. Systems pass through stages: a loose state produces liberty or personal responsibility; a denser state produces security; an even denser state produces terror, generalised responsibility, and saturation. Beyond saturation there is only implosion. Anti-consumerism is another target of critique. Criticising consumer society for doing what it claims to do – for supplanting ‘higher’ virtues with everyday pleasures – is a false critique which reinforces the core myth of consumerism. Consumer society functions as it does, precisely because it does not provide everyday pleasures. Rather, it simulates them through the code. Baudrillard also criticises moral critique and scandal, such as Watergate. He argues that the system requires a moral superstructure to operate, and the revival of such a superstructure sustains the system. What is really scandalous is that capital is fundamentally immoral or amoral. Moral panics serve to avoid awareness of this repressed fact. Similarly, critiques of ideology risk reaffirming the system’s maintenance of the illusion of truth. This helps cover up the fact that truth no longer exists in the world of the code. Since there is no reality beneath the simulacrum, such analyses are flawed. It is now the left (or the Third Way) that tries to re-inject moral order and justice into a failing system, thereby protecting it from its own collapse. Baudrillard implicitly criticises theories such as Laclau’s, which seek to re-inject meaning and intensity into politics. For Baudrillard, this task is both impossible and reactionary. Baudrillard sees the system as creating the illusion of its continued power by drawing on or simulating antagonisms and critique. There is thus a danger that critique actually sustains the system, by giving it a power it doesn’t have. Trying to confront and destroy the system thus inadvertently revives it, giving it back a little bit of symbolic power. He also sees conspiracy theories and current forms of Marxism as attempts to stave off awareness of the reality of a systematic code. In any case, the energy of the social is simply a distorted, impoverished version of the energy of “diabolical” forces (i.e. of symbolic exchange). Baudrillard thinks that societies actually come into being, not for the management of interests, but coalesce around rituals of expenditure, luxury and sacrifice. Politics itself was a pure game until the modern period, when it was called upon to represent the social. Now politics is dead, because it no longer has a referent in reality. This is because it lacks symbolic exchange. The absence of symbolic exchange leads also to an absence of possibility of redistribution, either North to South or elite to masses. Fascism also resists the death of the real, in a similar way. It tries to restore in an excessive way the phenomena of death, intensity and definite references, in order to ward off the collapse of the real. Fascist and authoritarian tendencies revive what Baudrillard terms ‘the violence necessary to life’ – they keep up some kind of symbolic power. (Baudrillard’s Lacanian heritage is clearly shown in this idea of a necessary violence). Baudrillard has a certain sympathy for the desire to escape hyperreality in this way, but also sees it as futile. People doing this – both left and right – are trying to resuscitate causes and consequences, realities and referents, and recreate an imaginary. But the system deters such efforts from succeeding. Le Pen for instance is ultimately absorbed, as the mainstream integrates and repeats his racist ideas. This analysis could also be applied to various “fundamentalisms” and ethno-nationalist movements today. This kind of resistance is ultimately reactionary, seeking to restore the declining regime of signs. But it can only be understood if its basis in energies of resistance to simulation is recognised. It is because it channels such resistance that it is able to mobilise affective forces. Baudrillard’s analysis is here similar to Agamben’s view that the sovereign gesture is now exercised everywhere because of the rise of indistinction and indeterminacy. The paradox is that the performance of fundamentalism often leads back towards the world of simulation and deterrence. Such movements map symbolic exchange onto the state, restoring some of its reality, but ultimately contributing to the persistence of simulation. Resistance from inside the regime of power is impossible because of deterrence. Baudrillard suggests that it’s now impossible to imagine a power exercised inside the enclosure created by deterrence – except for an implosive power which abolishes the energies preventing other possibilities emerging. He also suggests that the loss of the real is irreversible. Only the total collapse of the terrain of simulation will end it, not a test of reality. A truly effective revolution would have to abolish all the separations – including the separation from death. It cannot involve equality in what is separated – in survival, in social status and so on. The strategy for change is now exacberation, towards a catastrophic end of the system. Baudrillard believes that the resultant death of the social will paradoxically bring about socialism.

# Case

## Framing

#### Vote for the better debater. Only evaluating the consequences of the plan allows us to determine the practical impacts of politics and preserves the predictability that fosters engagement. Rigorous contestation and third and fourth-line testing are key to generate the self-reflexivity that creates ethical subjects.

#### Prefer –

#### 1. Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### 2. Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this shit on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### 3. Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

4. out of round forums can sovle their offense but it can’t sovle mine

5. curel optimsim - -The 1AC assumes a universal value to participatory democracy in debate. The idea that being inclusve is a universal good is just a model for the NSDA to slap images of students on diversity campaigns while those Islamaphobic tropes become solidified in the collective unconscious. Even certain words in this 1AC concede it especially in that Zakat part.

6. narratives are a voting issue – force you to compare between ppls experince dtdf

## Presumption

### 1NC - AT: Plan

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A. No spill over – there’s no connection between the ballot and changing people’s attitudes --- especially when it’s delaying the TOC --- the 1AC concedes that we can’t do this, but doesn’t have a warrant for how voting AFF spills up to rectify Islamaphobia writ large

#### B. No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective --- CX proves “spreading this AFF in debate creates a movement”

#### C. Don’t let them weigh the sum total of their impact—they only get to weigh the unique amount solved by the affirmative. Filter the debate through scope of solvency—there’s no impact to root cause if they don’t solve Islamophobia writ large

#### Sufi mysticism fails --- it’s coopted by politics and reifies sectarian divisions, causing real world violence

Dehlvi 16 [Sadia Dehlvi in TOI Edit Page, Edit Page, India, TOI. “Islam Is Non-Violence: Unfortunately Sufis, Islam’s original mystics, are succumbing to sectarianism too.”April 21, 2016. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/islam-is-non-violence-unfortunately-sufis-islams-original-mystics-are-succumbing-to-sectarianism-too/]

The malaise creeping into Sufi communities manifests in the recent violence and siege of Islamabad that glorifies Mumtaz Qadri’s death. In 2011, he assassinated Punjab Governor Salman Taseer for talking about reforming blasphemy laws that victimise minorities. Mumtaz Qadri was aligned to the Qadri Sufi order, which once produced the great Mian Mir who laid the foundation of the Golden Temple at Amritsar. Pakistan’s bold step in hanging Mumtaz Qadri has set the cat amongst the doves. Many Sufi leaders are competing to claim his political legacy, lauding the ‘ghazi’ or ‘warrior of Islam.’ Extremism feeds on selective retrieval of sacred texts and history, creating irrational fears that require urgent remedial measures. Terrorists employ this methodology to evoke rage, Salafi Wahhabi groups to promise a return to some imagined historic ideals as the only route to paradise. Many Sufi leaders in the subcontinent are turning political, extreme and as exclusionary as the groups they condemn for the same reasons. At the culminating public rally of the recent Sufi event in Delhi Sufis from India and Pakistan, with authoritative titles such as Pir Saqib Shami, Shaykh ul Alam Alauddin Siddiqui and Shyakh ul Islam Tahir ul Qadri were present. Most stressed on ‘ahle sunnat wal jamaat’, the aqeedah, creed, describing Sunnis following Sufi traditions. Distancing from Shias and other Muslim groups, they reinforce the sectarianism they pledged to fight. Sectarianism is fuelling bloodbaths in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Pakistan. Somewhere the strife is Shia-Sunni; elsewhere it is Sunnis against other kinds of Sunnis! Tahir ul Qadri and Saqib Shami are religious figures from Pakistan with cult-like followings. While appreciating Qadri’s fatwa against terrorism, Shami challenged him publicly to issue a fatwa prohibiting Muslims from praying behind terror supporting Salafi Imams, even in Mecca. In earlier videos Siddiqui takes similar positions, calling Salafis kafirs for pronouncing other Muslims kafirs. Shami is the new icon for the Bareilly Sufi Centre that has long proclaimed Shias as kafirs, non-Muslims; recently closing their mosques to Wahhabi Muslims. This contradicts Prophet Muhammad’s action of facilitating the prayers of a Christian delegation at his mosque in Medina. Tahir ul Qadri’s scholarship, efforts in interfaith and Shia-Sunni unity and unequivocal condemnation of Mumtaz Qadri are commendable. However, his political methodologies and positions on blasphemy are questionable. On Pakistani television, Qadri says that blasphemers require to be killed, claiming credit for helping General Zia creating the blasphemy laws in 1985. On foreign shores, Qadri tactfully denies this by blurring the issue with legal jargon. Pir Shami held special prayer services honouring Mumtaz Qadri’s martyrdom with thousands in attendance. Talk of combating terrorism while legitimising violence for blasphemy is ridiculous.