# Shell

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose the aff at least 30 minutes before the round – to clarify, this can be informal disclosure Violation was before round – they said the aff was new

#### standards 1 - forces us to rely on generics rather than strategies tailored to the affirmative— kills nuanced clash and turns their education arguments since every debate is the same.

#### 2- they get infinite time to frontline their aff, while I come into the round guessing – kills fairness 3 - discourages cheap shot aff’s. If the aff isn’t inherent or easily defeated by 20 minutes of research, the case should lose- surprise factor affs are bad- incentivizes cases that are as fringe as possible instead of well-researched realistic affirmatives- incentivizes useless education

#### Voters

#### fairness -we can’t determine truth of arguments if they’re not tested fairly

#### education -only reason why schools fund debate

#### Ci offense isn't competitive because you can still read new affs- just disclose them. critical thinking is non-unique because people would still have to come up with answers to the aff before the round.

#### Drop the debater on new affs- the theory is on the entire aff so dta means they lose

#### Competing interps, reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention

#### NO RVI A. incentives good theory debaters to bait abuse b- chills debaters from running theory on good teams even if they deserve it

# T

#### Interpretation – the aff may not defend that a just government ought to recognize the right to strike for a subset of workers

#### 1. Workers is a generic bare plural

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 August 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a definite singular since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with bare singulars (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to this topic – a] workers is an existential bare plural bc it has no determiner b] The sentence “A just government ought to recognize the right of workers to strike” does not imply “a just government ought to recognize the right of people to strike”

#### 2. The aff makes the right to strike conditional on worker type which is the opposite of unconditional

Cambridge Dictionary No Date, (Cambridge Dictionary, “Unconditional”), https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/unconditional // MNHS NL

complete and not limited in any way: the unconditional love that parents feel for their children

unconditional surrender

We demand the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners.

#### Violation – they spec \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Standards

#### 1] Limits – they can spec infinite different workers like agricultural workers, nurses etc - that’s supercharged by the ability to spec combinations of types of strikes. This takes out functional limits – it’s impossible for me to research every possible combination of workers, strikes and governments

#### 2] TVA solves – just read your aff as an advantage to a whole rez aff – we don’t stop them from reading new FWs, mechanisms or advantages. PICs aren’t aff offense – a] it’s ridiculous to say that neg potential abuse justifies the aff being non-T b] There’s only a small number of pics on this topic c] PICs incentivize them to write better affs that can generate solvency deficits to PICs

# hobbes

## NC

#### Permissibility negates:

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[1]](#footnote-1) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics outweighs – A. it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res B. It’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### [3] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### The metaethic is perspectivism – truth is not absolute but rather created by individuals based on their own individual perspective. Prefer it

#### [1] Opacity – we can never access another person’s perspective because we can never fully understand who someone else is or what they think. Every truth I create cannot be universalized because I can’t guarantee that they will create the same truth because they do what they want.

#### [2] Linguistics – Truth is constructed by language, which is completely arbitrary. Nothing tells me that a chair is a chair; I only assign it that name arbitrarily because I want to. Meaning can’t be contained within language if we make it up ourselves, and truth doesn’t exist absent language.

#### But, the state of nature leads to infinite violence – competing truth claims means conflicts cannot be resolved. Two warrants:

#### [1] Ambiguity – everyone can assert their own claims to be true and refuse contestation – this means we always fight over who is correct. This is irresolvable because there is no mediator to adjudicate the dispute and tell who is correct – we just fight forever

#### [2] Self-Interest – everyone wants their truth claims to be true because it benefits them – this leads to conflict because we can’t divide limited resources and must compete with each other – terminates in death because neither of us want to concede to the other

#### This state of nature is brutish and has no conception of morality because we don’t have any unified truth to guide us, and thus outweighs on magnitude. The solution is the creation of the sovereign to mediate what is true and enforce the law; they are the ultimate ruler and arbitrator. It must eliminate all conflicts to bring peace to our violent natures. Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign. Prefer it because it outweighs on bindingness: Only the sovereign can get everyone to follow their rule and enforce the law, it creates motivations for any moral rules we create. Otherwise, the framework collapses and truth becomes impossible.

## Offense

#### Negate –

#### [1] The sovereign has absolute authority; strikes contest the rule of the authority of the sovereign which leads to infinite regress and freezes action.

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Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic grounds for preferring monarchy to other forms of government, his main concern was to argue that **effective government—whatever its form—must have absolute authority.** Its powers must be neither divided nor limited. **The powers of legislation, adjudication, enforcement, taxation, war-making (and the less familiar right of control of normative doctrine) are connected in such a way that a loss of one may thwart effective exercise of the rest;** for example, **legislation without interpretation and enforcement will not serve to regulate conduct. Only a government that possesses all of what Hobbes terms the “essential rights of sovereignty” can be reliably effective**, since **where partial sets of these rights are held by different bodies that disagree** in their judgments as to what is to be done, **paralysis of effective government, or degeneration into a civil war to settle their dispute, may occur.** Similarly, **to impose limitation on the authority of the government is to invite irresoluble disputes over whether it has overstepped those limits. If each person is to decide for herself whether the government should be obeyed**, factional disagreement—**and war to settle the issue, or at least paralysis of effective government—are [is] quite possible**. **To refer resolution of the question to some further authority, itself also limited and so open to challenge for overstepping its bounds, would be to initiate an infinite regress of non-authoritative ‘authorities’** (where the buck never stops). To refer it to a further authority itself unlimited, would be just to relocate the seat of absolute sovereignty, a position entirely consistent with Hobbes’s insistence on absolutism. **To avoid the horrible prospect of governmental collapse and return to the state of nature, people should treat their sovereign as having absolute authority.**

#### [2] The sovereign hasn’t granted the unconditional right to strike in the squo - proves that it doesn’t want it. Passing the res blocks the sovereign’s will.

1. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)