# Blake R3

## FW

#### First, ethics are split between the deontic and aretaic. Deontic theories answer what agents should do according to a moral code, while aretaic theories answer what kind of agent people should be to make the right decisions.

**Gryz, 1** (Jarek Gryz, Professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies., 12-15-2010, accessed on 8-21-2021, Springer, "On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic", DOI 10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3)//st

There are two fundamental classes of terms traditionally distinguished within moral vocabulary: the deontic and the aretaic. The terms from the first set serve in the prescriptive function of a moral code. This function consists in providing answers to questions like: What am I (morally) required to do? Answers to such questions usually have the grammatical form of an imperative and are called “prescriptions”, “moral norms”, “rules”, “precepts”, or “commands”. They are expressed by means of such terms as: ‘right’, ‘obligation’, ‘duty’, etc. The second class contains terms used for a moral evaluation of an action (or an actor). Such moral evaluation is not primarily intended to direct actions, although it seems capable of performing this function as well. Terms used for evaluations include: ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘blameworthy’, ‘praiseworthy’, ‘virtuous’, etc. The ‘right’ is the key notion of the normative part of a moral theory; the ‘good’ is used to express moral judgments.

#### To clarify, deontic theories guide ethics by looking at the actions of moral actors, whereas aretaic theories guide ethics by looking at the character of moral actors themselves. By developing good moral character, good actions will naturally follow.

#### Prefer the aretaic:

#### [1] Hijacks – Every action in the deontic can be expressed in the aretaic, but only the aretaic can break free of the right/wrong binary with its richer vocabulary.

**Gryz, 2** (Jarek Gryz, Professor in the department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science at York University, Research Faculty Fellow at Center for Advanced Studies., 12-15-2010, accessed on 8-21-2021, Springer, "On the Relationship Between the Aretaic and the Deontic", DOI 10.1007/s10677-010-9258-3)//st

The way we use words ‘good/bad’ and ‘right/wrong’ seems to support the above claims. Goodness and badness come in degrees, hence we have words like ‘better’ and ‘worse’; we lack similar terms for deontically evaluated actions. The availability of degree terms in the former case seems to indicate the presence of many criteria used in evaluation; an all-or- nothing choice, implied by the use of ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, suggests focusing on only one quantum quality.12 But fine-grainedness is not only a property of particular aretaic terms, the entire aretaic vocabulary is infinitely richer and allows us to draw much finer distinctions in act-evaluations than the deontic vocabulary. For example, by saying that something is praiseworthy we impl[ies] that it deserves approval or favor: we assess it higher when we say that it is admirable, since then it should be also respected and honored. The meaning of the word ‘praiseworthy’ can be quite well conveyed by saying, that it is something that ought to be done, or that it is the right (in Ross’s understanding of ‘right’) thing to do: yet expressing the word ‘admirable’ in deontic vocabulary seems just impossible. From what has been said so far one can derive an encouraging conclusion for the advocates of attractive ethics. Sheer richness and fine-grainedness of aretaic vocabulary seems to be a good reason for believing that all that can be said in deontic terms can be equally well expressed in aretaic terms. This is not to say, however, that we can produce a translation manual which would provide us with a general method of expressing deontic notions in terms of aretaic ones for all possible cases. In particular, it does not seem possible, as we hope to have shown, to substitute ‘good’ for ‘right’ or ‘deplorable’ for ‘wrong’. The relation between the aretaic and the deontic seems to be somewhat similar to the relation between the physical and the mental in the mind-body problem. We can claim that deontic is supervenient on the aretaic without committing ourselves to the idea of complete definitional reduction. In other words, we may allow for token identity (each particular action can have an aretaic description that perfectly matches the deontic one) and deny the possibility of type identity (that there is aretaic sentence true of all and only the actions having some deontic property). If this analogy is correct then the idea of definitional reduction of the deontic to the aretaic, and in particular, Stocker’s identification of rightness and goodness, is doomed. But we can still pursue a more modest goal. If our task is just to substitute every particular deontic evaluation with an aretaic one, there are no logical reasons that would make it impossible (it would not work, of course, in the opposite direction). From that perspective, attractive ethical theories seem to be much better off than the imperative ones.

#### [2] Collapses – A. If agents were conditioned properly, they would independently take the right actions, which hijacks deontic theories. B. Infinite regress – we can always ask why to follow a deontic rule, but the answer will terminate in attempting to achieve some aretaic property.

#### [3] Prerequisite – A. Philosophy must frame who we are as individuals before dictating how we should act; I wouldn’t tell a serial killer to follow the categorical imperative but try to reform their character first, since they don’t have the disposition to follow it. B. The origin of philosophy had to start through an aretaic paradigm since there were no preconceived notions or rules that we needed a guide towards the good; they chose to develop the good out of their own volition; without the aretaic there’d be no reason to do good things unless we wanted to become better people.

#### [4] The deontic fails – A. Moral laws are socially constructed and dependent upon the places and conditions where they will be in use which means they are subjective and fail; moral law can’t account for every single situation, but virtue solves and is more flexible since good agents will do good actions. B. Fails to account for differences in cultures or norms, the aretaic solves by allowing people to determine and weigh between their own virtues.

#### Next, the only ethics consistent with the aretaic is a virtue paradigm. Instead of prescribing normative claims to action, virtue focuses on developing agents to make them virtuous.

**Reader,** (Soran Reader, Soran Reader is Lecturer in Philosophy at Durham University and is editor of The Philosophy of Need (Cambridge University Press, 2006)., December 2000, accessed on 8-22-2021, Springer, "New Directions in Ethics: Naturalism, Reasons, and Virtue.”", http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504153)//st

The centrality of virtue ethics emerges clearly in relation to the themes of the previous two sections. With the first theme, the naturalness of ethics, virtue ethics leads the field in making available a second-natural explicatory account of ethics. A virtue just is a capacity, learnable by beings with our biological nature, which both manifests the flourishing nature of the agent and seeks the flourishing of that to which it responds. With the sec ond theme, of practical reasons, things are less straightforward. It is not obvious that the virtues are our moral reasons for acting, although we cannot explain what the good agent does without reference to their virtues. I explore this question further below. A virtue is a free disposition to act in certain ways under certain conditions. Virtue ethics claims that what is to count[s] as a good action or what is a good outcome is conceptually dependent on claims about the virtue of an agent. How is this dependence supposed to work? Where those after an explanatory account seek a conceptual connection with something like a normative 'in itself, virtue ethicists instead explore the concrete dependence of moral activity on the possibility of learning from already virtuous agents. They hold that the key to moral rationality is found in moral education. Ethics begins with the apprentice moral agent ? the child, or the foreigner, or the damaged person in rehabilitation are all examples. These beginner-agents learn from the experienced, wise moral agent by copying by mimicking in their actions the actions of the virtuous agent. This mimicking, or 'going on in the same way', does not presuppose that the learner agent acquires any representations of how the world is (i.e., beliefs), nor that they acquire the ability to report on or provide justifications for what they do. Virtue is learned by cottoning on to virtuous ways of doing things, going on to do the same, then going on to do the same in new ways, once they have mastered the skill.16 The way virtue and character is supposed to be basic here is simply displayed in the analogy: there is and can be nothing 'behind' the expertise of the phronimos which can explain or justify it (any more than there is anything 'behind' the expertise of the doctor or the navigator, to use Aristotle's examples at NE 1104b7-l 1). Of course, plenty more can be said about it, and shortcuts can be found to aid the learning of those who have already mastered other skills (so competent rule-followers can learn from being given rules, just as competent grammarians can learn a new language from the grammar). But we should not confuse what it is possible to say about the skill of being moral, with what constitutes it. The burden of proof now rests with those who want to resist the idea that ethics is, at bottom, a way of doing things (specifically, living a good human life), and want to find a more fundamental notion than the practi cal skill that the virtuous person has. We approach this problem after Wittgenstein: he argued that 'rules' or 'interpretations' cannot be fundamental in our rationality, but that an actual way of going on comes first.17 McDowell (1979) first applied this insight to moral philosophy; its import has yet fully to be appreciated.

#### The standard is consistency with the cultivation of virtue.

#### Impact Calc –

#### [1] There is a distinction between procedural and substantive actions. Procedural actions allow agents to engage under the framework to practice virtue while substantive offense is an unvirtuous action. Procedural offense comes first since A) Prereq – if it’s impossible to engage in the framework it’s impossible to generate a substantive ethical conclusion from it B) Magnitude – being incapable of generating ethical principles is an intrinsic wrong that infinitely violates all the ethical decisions that you would have made under the framework

#### [2] Not consequentialist – Consequences only evaluate the direct consequences of the action but not the way that it affects someone’s moral character. Virtues aren’t end goods like pain and pleasure – it’s not about how long you live but rather how you live.

#### [3] Consequences fail – A) Induction Fails – You only know induction works because past experiences have told you it has, but that is in itself a form of induction, so you use induction to prove induction – that’s circular B) Butterfly Effect – Every action has an infinite number of consequences that stem from it – me picking up a pen could cause nuclear war a hundred years down – you can’t quantify the infinite amount of pain and pleasure to come C) Aggregation fails – everyone has different feelings of pain and pleasure, so you can’t universalize that and say it’s good – it’s impossible to measure something that’s completely subjective D) Culpability – any consequence can lead to another consequence so it’s impossible to assign obligations since you can’t pinpoint a specific actor that caused a consequence.

#### Prefer additionally:

#### Constitutiveness – moral questions are derived from the life-form of a particular entity, which justifies following our true form. This outweighs – just as I would say a knife is bad if it is blunt, humans would be bad if they do not follow their true form. Any deontic theories are simply a deviation from our form. Foot:

[Foot, Phillipa; “Natural Goodness”; Oxford University (2001)] SHS ZS

Anscombe writes, ‘[G]etting one another to do things without the application of physical force is a necessity for human life, and that far beyond what could be secured by…other means.’ Anscombe is pointing here to what she has elsewhere called **an ‘Aristotelian necessity’**: [is] that which **is necessary because** and in so far as **good hangs on it.** We invoke the same idea when we say that **it is necessary for plants to have water, for birds to build nests, for wolves to hunt in packs, and for lionesses to teach their cubs to kill**. These ‘**Aristotelian necessities’ depend on** what the **particular species of plants and animals** need, **[and] on their natural habitat**, and the ways of making out that there are in their repertoire. **These** things together **determine** **what** it is for members of **a particular species** to be as they **should be,** and to do that which they should do. And for all the enormous differences between [the] life [of] and humans and that of plants or animals, we can see **that human defects and excellences are similarly related to what human beings are and what they do.** We do not need to be able to dive like gannets, nor to see in the dark like owls; but our memory and concentration must be such as to allow us to learn language, and our sight such that we can recognize faces at a glance; while, like lionesses, human parents are defective if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to survive.

## Offense

#### I defend “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.”

#### I’m willing clarify or specify whatever you want me to in CX if it doesn’t force me to abandon my maxim. Check all interps in CX – I could’ve met them before the NC and abuse would’ve been solved. PICs and CPs don’t negate – proving that we can do another virtuous action doesn’t mean we can’t do this one and one exception doesn’t disprove a statement like how penguins don’t disprove that birds fly.

#### To endorse the appropriation of space is to endorse the orientations which make it necessary. If the endorsement of those conditions is morally wrong, then the appropriation of space subsidizes morally wrong attitudes.

Sparrow, 1 (Robert Sparrow, Professor at Monash University; At the highest level of description my research interests are political philosophy and applied ethics; I am interested in philosophical arguments with real-world implications. More specifically, I am working in or have worked in: political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, media ethics; just war theory; and the ethics of science and technology., 1999, accessed on 12-12-2021, Environmental Ethics 21, " Robert Sparrow, The ethics of terraforming - PhilPapers", [https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)[bracketed](https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

The Ethics of Terraforming Robert Sparrow\* I apply an agent-based virtue ethics to issues in environmental philosophy regarding our treatment of complex inorganic systems.l consider the ethics of terraforming: hypothetical planetary engineering on a vast scale which is aimed at producing habitable environments on otherwise "hostile" planets. I argue that the undertak¬ing of such a project demonstrates at least two serious defects of moral character: an aesthetic insensitivity and the sin of hubris. Trying to change whole planets to suit our ends is arrogant vandalism. I maintain that these descriptions of character are coherent and important ethical concepts. Finally, I demonstrate how the argu¬ments developed in opposition to terraforming, a somewhat farfetched example, can be used in cases closer to home to provide arguments against our use of recom¬binant DNA technologies and against the construction of tourist developments in wilderness areas. I. TERRAFORMING What are the ethics of human involvement with nonliving systems such as rivers and mountains and whole continents such as Antarctica? What are the ethics of our interactions with dynamic systems such as climates, ocean currents, and life's genetic code? I want to investigate these issues in isolation from whatever ethical considerations might arise as a result of the effects our actions on these systems might have on living organisms, considered either as individuals or as members of species. My concern is solely with the ethics of our relation to complex inorganic, or nonliving, systems. The example I want to consider in order to highlight these issues is terraforming. Terraforming is the hypothetical climatic and geophysical engineering of other planets on a grand scale with the aim of turning the so-called barren planets in our (or for that matter another) solar system into habitable Earth-like ecosystems.) The sheer scale of such a project allows many issues which arise around other modern technologically oriented environmental projects to be writ large. The most promising planet in our solar systeni as a candidate for terraforming is Mars. A number of ways of doing it have been suggested. Mars possesses polar icecaps and a layer of permafrost beneath the planet's surface, both of which contain water along with other frozen gases. The beginnings of an atmosphere could be created simply by melting these, either with fusion reactors, space-based solar-powered lasers, or collector mirrors or by spreading a thin layer of soot across the icecaps so they absorb the sun's heat, creating an atmosphere of water, carbon dioxide, and other gases. Such an atmosphere would almost certainly initially be extremely poisonous. Other processes which might be used to produce an atmosphere include the introduction of genetically engi¬neered organisms whose life chemistry would free gases existing in common cpmpounds on the planet's surface. Once an atmosphere exists we could modify it using genetically engineered microorganisms designed to convert existing gases and compounds into oxygen, carbon dioxide and water. Over time and with extensive human intervention this program might create seas and eventu-ally an Earth-like and hopefully breathable atmosphere. Throughout this process, we would adjust the planet's surface temperature by intentionally manufactur¬ing a greenhouse effect to heat it up or by placing large sheets of molecular thickness mirroring in orbit around the planet to cool it down. Once conditions were suitable, we would introduce (again genetically modified) plants and animals which could survive in the existing conditions and eventually we would create working ecosystems which in turn could support human life. The whole process is supposed to take a number of centuries, but at the end of that period there would supposedly be a new garden of Eden.2 In this paper, in addition to terraforming, I examine some cases closer to home in which the issues involved are identical, if less dramatic. I use the Mars example first to cast the issues into stark relief. I don' tknow whether terraforming is truly possible, let alone practical: It certainly presupposes a level of technol¬ogy and expertise that we do not have, and perhaps never will. Yet, even though it sounds like an idea from science fiction (where it indeed has appeared), there is today a flourishing scientific literature on the feasibility of terraforming Mars, in which this activity is treated entirely seriously .3 Note that if it could be done, terraforming Mars would presumably create a new home for billions of people for centuries to come. If so, then no matter how high the initial cost of the project, our assessment of the consequences—be it in terms of utility or some other calculation—is likely to turn out to be massively positive once we take into account the benefit for future generations. Neverthe- less, the face of Mars would be totally and irreversibly transformed by this process. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that Mars currently sustains no life and that terraforming Mars will not affect any living thing, will cause no suffering, and will violate no rights that other life forms night possess. I am therefore eliminating rights or utility-based arguments as reasons why the project should not go forward. Despite the absence of any living systems, however, there are still extremely complex inorganic systems on Mars, Mars has a unique geography and complex chemical and physical systems, including an atmosphere and climate. Their operations over the millennia have produced many features of striking natural beauty and vast scale. Among these are a volcano, Olympus Mons, which rises twenty-nine kilometers upward from the planet's surface, spectacular dune systems, and desert canyon systems three times deeper than the Grand Canyon. Although Mars has many features of great beauty, any aesthetic or interest-based accounts of why we should preserve these features—which proceed from the assumption that they have value because of the pleasure they provide to human witnesses—are likely to fail. The vistas of Mars have no such value because, being on Mars, we are unable to appreciate their beauty. There is no chance that more than a few human lives will be enriched or changed by taking a walk in the Martian desert and being awed into ethical reflection. The value of the beauties of Mars in terms of the pleasures or benefits that they provide for human beings are therefore minimal. Furthermore, it is also the case that Mars would probably possess many beautiful and unique features after terraforming, which human beings (future happy Martians) could appreciate as they stroll across the surface of Mars. Of course, these would be completely different from those that exist today and the aesthetic experiences which they might provide would be the result of the destruction of the existing features. To summarize, in terraforming Mars we would be drastically altering the character of a whole planet, a unique environment which includes complex inorganic systems and possesses many features of striking natural beauty. II. AN AGENT-BASED VIRTUE ETHICS To what moral considerations could we turn to give us cause to pause before we embark on this project, given, that we can't use consequentialist or rights based calculations? As I have described the example (and deliberately so), there are no good arguments based on the interests of humans or even other living organisms for not terraforming Mars. The only thing stopping us from radically reshaping Mars—and in doing so destroying the character of a whole planet—is lack of technical knowhow. If true, this example reveals, I believe, a shocking moral bankruptcy at the heart of our attitude toward the environ-ment. It suggests that we have no obligation to approach the world around us with a certain humility or respect: our obligations are only to the organisms which happen to live in it. Are there any ethical considerations then which might give us pause to resist terraforming? I believe that a significant set of reasons regarding projects such as terra—forming can be found in the realm of virtue ethics. Virtue ethics directs our concern to the 'character of agents. It asks us to pay attention to the virtues and vices that we display through our actions.4 The particular virtue ethics that I wish to develop here draws on a distinction made by Michael Slote between two varieties of virtue ethics which he calls "agent-focused" and "agent-based: ethics.75

#### Regardless of the consequences, colonizing space fails to recognize the beauty of space which reveals aesthetic insensitivity.

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Furthermore, an agent-based ethics need not be as human-centered as it first appears. Although it must focus on the character of the human agent, some strong environmental conclusions may follow from an agent-based ethics if it is possible to show that a failure to respond to the environment in certain ways constitutes a vice or that certain sorts of responses are virtuous. These virtues (and vices) need,not serve human ends. Even familiar virtues, such as kindness, which do contribute toward human happiness in an obvious fashion, often require that we respond in certain ways to circumstances around us and in this way may place demands upon us which are independent of human interests. For instance, kindness may require us to be kind to animals as well as people. t3 The anthropocentrism of virtue ethics, therefore, need only consist of the fact that its claims are claims upon human beings. Such anthropocentrism is a feature of any ethics. Using an agent-based virtue ethics, I argue that terraforming reveals in us two serious defects of character. First, it demonstrates that we are suffering from an ethically significant aesthetic insensitivity. We would become cosmic vandals. Second, it involves us in the sin of hubris. We show ourselves to be suffering from an excessive pride which blinds us to our own place in the world. In attempting to shape another planet, to our ends, we are seeking to become gods. I deal with each of these claims in turn. The first vice that terraforming would demonstrate in us is a reprehensible aesthetic insensitivity—on a massive scale. Destroying the unique natural landscape of an entire planet to turn it to our own purposes reveals us to be vandals and brutes. It shows that we lead impoverished lives, being unable to respond appropriately to the beauty which is in the world (and on the worlds) around us.14 The argument that the destruction of natural environments may reveal in us a problematic aesthetic insensitivity has been made before.15 What I wish to emphasize in my account, however, is that the virtue ethics I am applying allows that a vice may be demonstrated simply because of the character it reveals in the agent and regardless of any considerations of the consequences it may have. There are two cases which suggest that an aesthetic insensitivity is a vice that may render the destruction (or neglect) of beauty wrong simply in itself. First, the act of destroying beauty is itself reprehensible independent of any consequences that may flow from it. Even if the beauty destroyed would replace itself, it would still be wrong to destroy it precisely because doing so demonstrates an aesthetic insensitivity. This claim is best illustrated by use of an example. Consider a person who goes hiking in the Snowy Mountains early one morning and discovers, by the edge of a cutting, a stunning array of icicles, a thing of great beauty, formed when the creek which ran over the cutting at that point froze over. Moreolier, the hiker knows that this display is formed anew every night and occasionally disappears completely by the end of the day. [They] also knows that no one else will be hiking that path that day. Yet, isn't it still the case that if the hiker destroys the icicles, [they] will have demonstrated a significant defect of character and lessened him or herself as a person in doing so? The person who casually runs a stick across them, thus destroying them for no reason but a petty act of will, demonstrates an insensitivity to their beauty which is gross and disturbing. The destruction of the icicles suggests that the hiker has not seen them clearly. If the hiker had truly seen and comprehended their beauty, [they] could not have destroyed them. The fact that they were destroyed is not important here, except in that it points to the insensitivity of the vandal. What is significant is the blindness the hiker has displayed to beauty even though no one else may suffer from its loss. This blindness is a failing on the hiker's part. It is a vice. The second way in which one may demonstrate a troubling insensitivity to beauty, although without destroying it, is by using it for one's own purposes in ways that make no reference to its beauty. I illustrate this point by use of another example. Take the case of someone who finds an original Van Gogh—another "Sunflowers" on hardboard—in the musty attic of his or her new house. Although this painting is an object of great—nay, extraordinary—beauty, our hypothetical discoverer merely glances at it, puts it aside, and later turns it upside down and places it on top of a crate in order to make a table on which he or she can store tins of paint. Let us suppose that doing so does not damage the painting in any way and that, because no one knew of the existence of this painting, nobody suffers any loss by virtue of its use in this fashion. Nonetheless, someone who acts in this way demonstrates that [they are] blind to the beauty of the world around him or her. The way in which someone sees the object is not the way he or she should see it. Such a person neglects what any normal person would recognize as the most significant property of the painting—its beauty. This failure to recognize beauty is deplorable. In each of these examples, although the presence (and neglect) of beauty is necessary to demonstrate the existence of the vice, it is not the fact that beauty is destroyed or neglected that is the source of our condemnation. It is not the consequences of the action which are significant. They are, in each case, benign. Instead, it is the character flaw itself which invites our disapproval. It is true that bad consequences may flow from the vice. For instance, we would lead impoverished lives if we could not see the beauty around us. However, this fact is not the reason we should avoid the vice. To be insensitive to beauty is deplorable simply in itself, regardless of the consequences that may follow from it.16 This account of the vice of aesthetic insensitivity would be most powerful if we possessed an objectivist account of beauty. It would then require that we be sensitive even to systems which we do not find in the first instance to be beautiful but which fit some objective description of beauty. Nonetheless, the account would still work with a response-dependent or intersubjective account of beauty, in which case we would merely be required to respond to those systems that normal (or appropriately qualified) observers recognize as beau-tiful.17 In either case, the role played by beauty illustrates my earlier claim that an agent-based ethics need not be as human-centered as one might think. In order to avoid demonstrating a vice, we are required to respond to features of the world around us which are independent of our own interests. If an objectivist account of beauty can be provided, then we are required to respond to facts about the world which make no reference to facts about humans at al1.18

#### Spacecol demonstrates hubris – to take control and appropriate space is to believe that you are above nature itself, which is arrogance.

Sparrow, 3 (Robert Sparrow, Professor at Monash University; At the highest level of description my research interests are political philosophy and applied ethics; I am interested in philosophical arguments with real-world implications. More specifically, I am working in or have worked in: political philosophy, bioethics, environmental ethics, media ethics; just war theory; and the ethics of science and technology., 1999, accessed on 12-12-2021, Environmental Ethics 21, " Robert Sparrow, The ethics of terraforming - PhilPapers", [https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)[bracketed](https://philpapers.org/rec/SPATEO)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

IV. THE SIN OF HUBRIS The other vice which terraforming might involve us in is the sin of hubris. Hubris is a vice, discussed in classical Greek literature and mythology, which is popularly thought to involve excessive pride before the gods.'9 It occurs when humans willfully ignore their limits and seek to become like gods.2° Hubris is traditionally punished by disaster. The excess of pride is the undoing of those who possess it and they are put in their place, usually roughly. The paradigmatic example of hubris can be found in the legend of Icarus, who flew too close to the sun in the attempt to reach heaven and lost his son as a result.21 Planetary engineering strikes me as a good candidate for the sort of project which would demonstrate hubris. We would be playing god. This sentiment is never far from the literature. The rhetoric of terraforming is quite self-consciously a rhetoric of transformation and transcendence. Terraforming is not just another project. It is a project that would make us world makers .22 It would mark the next stage of human destiny and the beginning of the conquest of space. But what about someone who denies that there are any limits on human activity? Someone who holds that there are no gods, no one to challenge, and that human beings can and should forge a glorious destiny? It is obviously unsatisfactory to rely on theistic claims about the proper place of humanity. For the argument to be convincing in modern circumstances, we must be able to give a non-theistic account of hubris. There are two strategies we may pursue to develop such an account. The first and the easiest is to focus on the character and phenomenology of the vice of hubris. To do so, we must provide a description of hubris as an attitude and show that the project of terraforming is both the result of and a source of such attitudes. As noted above, the proponents of terraforming often seem to demon-strate an attitude which is a good prima-facie candidate for hubris. Classically, hubris involves glorying in one's own powers, a false optimism about them, and a haste to put them to the test. A lack of self-knowledge and self-reflection is also characteristic of hubris, as is a dismissive attitude toward both critics and past failures. All of these traits are sometimes evidenced in the discussion of terraforming. The project attracts interest simply because it is so dramatic and because of the proof it could provide of the supremacy of human spirit and engineering skill. This enthusiasm for terraforming looks particularly damning in the light of past technological disasters on Earth. There is little self-reflection going on in the debate about terraforming, which is largely a technical debate about feasibility and methods and which allows little room for questions about why we would want to engage in such a project.23 Thus, the attitudes surrounding and driving terraforming seem to fit the phenom- enology of hubris. But this strategy will not, I suspect, prove effective against an entirely serious (including morally serious) and reflective advocate of terra- forming who denies that any of the above attitudes are involved and who challenges the conservative and parochial consequences of the critique. Although the attitudes described above are all, as a matter of contingent fact, demon- strated by current advocates of terraforming, it remains to be argued that they are always likely to be so. In order to meet objections of this type, we need to try to show that the sin of hubris involves a reference to certain sorts of projects. The above attitudes are all part of the burning desire to transgress our limits. We need to give some account of our limits and to show that terraforming is outside of them. The second strategy is thus to try to formulate a (non-theistic) account of humanity's place in the cosmos and of appropriate limits to human activities, in order to show that projects which transgress these demonstrate hubris.24 It is important to understand that this argument is an attempt to show that seeking to transcend certain limits demonstrates hubris; and is therefore wrong, rather than an attempt to show why seeking to transcend certain limits is wrong, and therefore demonstrates hubris. It is intended to remain within an agent-based framework. We need an account of our limits in order to better show when people are trying to overcome them. Nevertheless, the fact that trying to do so is wrong is solely a function of whether it demonstrates hubris or not, which also depends on any other number of things.25 How do we distinguish these limits? Again it seems to me that there are two ways we might seek some guide to the limits of proper human action. The first moves indirectly toward an account of our limits by fodusing on the nature of our actions and by arguing that certain features are characteristic of projects which seek to transcend our proper limits. There is often a significant relation between our actions and the projects they are part of. In the case of hubris, acts of hubris are usually large, dramatic, and unprecedented acts. They are usually punished by disaster. The pride and the fall go hand in hand. The possibility of disaster, then, of failure which would bring us low, operates as a sign of hubris. Terraforrning certainly involves the possibility of catastrophic failure. Given the scale of the project and the amount of energy involved, failures are likely to be disastrous. Instead of a habitable planet, we may produce .one with a poisonous atmosphere or without water or lashed by continual typhoons. Indeed, given the amount of resources and human effort which would need to be dedicated to terraforming, anything other than complete success would be a disaster. Note that it is the possibility of disaster rather than its probability which is important here. I am not arguing that the risks are too great or that the costs of failure are too high. Instead, the possibility of a catastrophic failure which would reveal our ambitions as arrogant and futile acts as an indication that the project is one which oversteps the limits of our wisdom and abilities. Second, we might attempt more directly to flesh out the idea of our own proper human place. We could try to gain a sense of possible limits to the ambitions which are appropriate to human beings. When considering terraforming, because the limit we are considering here is the physical limit of being confined to a single planet, it seems fair to invoke the metaphor of our proper place in a spatial sense. However, this metaphor can also be understood more generally to pose the question of our proper place in the scheme of things or the limits of the sphere of human activity.26 To say that some location or area is our proper place is not an empty thought. It implies a certain relation of appropriateness in our presence there. A proper place is one in which one can flourish without too much of a struggle. It is one that we can live in and sustain. It is a place in which one fits and does not appear uncomfortable or out of place. It is prima facie implausible'to suggest that Mars is our proper place. The vast amount of effort required for us to sustain a presence there, even to the point of entirely transforming the planet, indicates that it is not a natural environment for us. Our presence there would be analogous to that of a penguin in the Sahara or a rabbit underwater. If we have to wear space suits to visit and to completely remodel it in order to stay, then it's simply not our place. Another way to try to understand our proper place is by relating •it to the idea of a home. It seems natural to say of most creatures, at least as individuals and perhaps as species, that they have a home. This is a place which nurtures them, in which they grow up, reproduce and which offers them some semblance of safety. It is difficult to say of human beings collectively, who have colonized all reaches of the globe, where our homeis. But "Earth" looks like a plausible answer. Planets seem to have a certain status as possible homes for creatures because of their nature as whole systems on which life can evolve. The relation between the idea of a home and the idea of our proper place that I am suggesting is an ethical one. Our proper place is at home until we have shown that we are mature enough to leave it. Whether or not people are ready to leave home depends on how well they live at home and how they look after that home. On this test, the human species does not look well qualified to start moving out to other planets. We must show that we are capable of looking after our current home before we could claim to have any place on another. For the moment, at least, our proper place is on Earth and the desire to colonize other planets is indicative of hubris.

#### Commodifying nature strips value away from our form – the correct way to respond to nature is to conform to it instead of restructuring it to fit us. Space colonization is just a method to conquer more parts of nature.

Lewis (C.S. Lewis, Clive Staples Lewis was a British writer and lay theologian. He held academic positions in English literature at both Oxford University and Cambridge University., 1943, accessed on 12-12-2021, Samizdat.qc, "The Abolition of Man", [http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/cosmos/philo/AbolitionofMan.pdf)[bracketed](http://www.samizdat.qc.ca/cosmos/philo/AbolitionofMan.pdf)%5bbracketed) for gen lang]//phs st

My point may be clearer to some if it is put in a different form. Nature is a word of varying meanings, which can best be understood if we consider its various opposites. The Natural is the opposite of the Artificial, the Civil, the Human, the Spiritual, and the Supernatural. The Artificial does not now concern us. If we take the rest of the list of opposites, however, I think we can get a rough idea of what men have meant by Nature and what it is they oppose to her. Nature seems to be the spatial and temporal, as distinct from what is less fully so or not so at all. She seems to be the world of quantity, as against the world of quality; of objects as against consciousness; of the bound, as against the wholly or partially autonomous; of that which knows no values as against that which both has and perceives value; of efficient causes (or, in some modern systems, of no causality at all) as against final causes. Now I take it that when we understand a thing analytically and then dominate and use it for our own convenience, we reduce it to the level of ‘Nature’ in the sense that we suspend our judgements of value about it, ignore its final cause (if any), and treat it in terms of quantity. This repression of elements in what would otherwise be our total reaction to it is sometimes very noticeable and even painful: something has to be overcome before we can cut up a dead [hu]man or a live animal in a dissecting room. These objects resist the movement of the mind whereby we thrust them into the world of mere Nature. But in other instances too, a similar price is exacted for our analytical knowledge and manipulative power, even if we have ceased to count it. We do not look at trees either as Dryads or as beautiful objects while we cut them into beams: the first man who did so may have felt the price keenly, and the bleeding trees in Virgil and Spenser may be faroff echoes of that primeval sense of impiety. The stars lost their divinity as astronomy developed, and the Dying God has no place in chemical agriculture. To many, no doubt, this process is simply the gradual discovery that the real world is different from what we expected, and the old opposition to Galileo or to ‘body-snatchers’ is simply obscurantism. But that is not the whole story. It is not the greatest of modern scientists who feel most sure that the object, stripped of its qualitative properties and reduced to mere quantity, is wholly real. Little scientists, and little unscientific followers of science, may think so. The great minds know very well that the object, so treated, is an artificial abstraction, that something of its reality has been lost. From this point of view the conquest of Nature appears in a new light. We reduce things to mere Nature in order that we may ‘conquer’ them. We are always conquering Nature, because ‘Nature’ is the name for what we have, to some extent, conquered. The price of conquest is to treat a thing as mere Nature. Every conquest over Nature increases her domain. The stars do not become Nature till we can weigh and measure them: the soul does not become Nature till we can psychoanalyse her. The wresting of powers from Nature is also the surrendering of things to Nature. As long as this process stops short of the final stage we may well hold that the gain outweighs the loss. But as soon as we take the final step of reducing our own species to the level of mere Nature, the whole process is stultified, for this time the being who stood to gain and the being who has been sacrificed are one and the same. This is one of the many instances where to carry a principle to what seems its logical conclusion produces absurdity. It is like the famous Irishman who found that a certain kind of stove reduced his fuel bill by half and thence concluded that two stoves of the same kind would enable him to warm his house with no fuel at all. It is the magician’s bargain: give up our soul, get power in return. But once our souls, that is, ourselves, have been given up, the power thus conferred will not belong to us. We shall in fact be the slaves and puppets of that to which we have given our souls. It is in [hu]Man’s power to treat himself as a mere ‘natural object’ and his own judgements of value as raw material for scientific manipulation to alter at will. The objection to his doing so does not lie in the fact that this point of view (like one’s first day in a dissecting room) is painful and shocking till we grow used to it. The pain and the shock are at most a warning and a symptom. The real objection is that if man chooses to treat himself as raw material, raw material he will be: not raw material to be manipulated, as he fondly imagined, by himself, but by mere appetite, that is, mere Nature, in the person of his de-humanized Conditioners. We have been trying, like Lear, to have it both ways: to lay down our human prerogative and yet at the same time to retain it. It is impossible. Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have no motive but their own ‘natural’ impulses. Only the Tao provides a common human law of action which can over-arch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not slavery.

# Underview

#### [1] 1AR theory – a) AFF gets it because otherwise the neg can engage in infinite abuse, making debate impossible, b) drop the debater – the 1AR is too short for theory and substance so ballot implications are key to check abuse, c) no RVIs – they can stick me with 6min of answers to a short arg and make the 2AR impossible, d) competing interps – 1AR interps aren’t bidirectional and the neg should have to defend their norm since they have more time. e) Fairness because debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education since it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### [2] The role of the ballot is to vote for who best upholds the truth or falsity of the resolution via fair and educational arguments under an ethically justified framework. To clarify, truth testing w/o a prioris

#### [a] Reciprocity – normative frameworks provide a reciprocal burden of justifying an obligation with the ability to turn them – other frameworks are arbitrarily impact exclusive and don’t articulate a 1-1 burden

#### [b] Philosophy – only our role of the ballot incentivizes nuanced discussions over the interactions of different ethical theories. That comes first – [1] constitutivism - 100% unique to ld [2] collapses - the question of why other arguments are good relies on philosophical justification, ie constitutivism

#### [3] new 2ar responses to tricks – 1ar is too timecrunched to answer anything and you can uplayer for 6 min on what I dropped – prevents the debate from becoming who dropped the most spieks

#### [4] The deontic fails to provide a motivating factor to follow the theory and thus fails Cox 12.

[Cox 12 Damian Cox, philosophy prof @ Bond Univ, Judgment, Deliberation, and the Selfeffacement of Moral Theory, The Journal of Value Inquiry, 2012.] SHS ZS

Derek Parﬁt introduced the term ‘‘self-effacement’’ to describe the case in which proponents of a moral theory direct moral agents not to believe the theory.1 The term has since been used in a variety of ways. Glen Pettigrove uses the term to refer to moral theories that ‘‘cannot serve as a person’s motive when she acts.’’2 Joel Martinez applies the term to moral theories whose application requires agents to act from considerations other than the considerations that make an action right.3 Whereas Parﬁt frames self-effacement in terms of the beliefs of moral agents, Pettigrove frames it in terms of motives for action and Martinez in terms of reasons for action. Self-effacement can also be framed in terms of moral deliberation. On this construal, a theory is self-effacing if it entails that it is sometimes wrong to use the theory in moral deliberation. A theory is deliberatively self-effacing if and only if it implies a rejection of any direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. The phenomenon of deliberative self-effacement is pervasive and highly signiﬁcant. For example, utilitarian judgment of deliberation performed in directly utilitarian terms tends to be harsh. Working through expected utility calculations is normally a sub-optimal way of morally deliberating, even for individuals who are good at calculating. By utilitarian lights, this makes it a morally wrong way of deliberating. Utilitarians have long recognized this feature of utilitarian deliberation and the most popular response has been to reject any direct connection between moral deliberation and judgment of right action. This is the position that Bentham takes. Writing about deliberation in terms of the hedonic calculus, Bentham says: ‘‘It is not to be expected that this process should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.’’4 By ‘‘moral judgment,’’ Bentham means moral deliberation, so in this passage he is denying a need to apply his theory of right action directly when deciding how to act. Bentham does not do so, but other utilitarians develop indirect forms of utilitarianism in which utilitarian judgment of rightness is carefully separated from processes of moral deliberation.5 According to indirect utilitarians, deliberation in general ought to proceed on grounds that, given the condition and circumstances of deliberators, produce the best outcomes over the long haul. Direct utilitarian calculation will only occasionally constitute such grounds. Indirect utilitarianism is a deliberatively self-effacing theory and its plausibility depends upon the plausibility of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. Deliberative self-effacement crops up in unexpected places. For example, Bernard Williams argued that reasoning explicit in the works of Kant would lead a person to entertain one thought too many in cases where motives of love ought to predominate.6 Williams thought that this demonstrated the hollowness of the account that Kant advances. One way to interpret his objection to the account advanced by Kant is as a charge of self-effacement. A proper understanding of obligations of love requires that a person not act on them by explicitly consulting them. To do so would be to have one thought too many. The account advanced by Kant, therefore, is self-effacing. Followers of Kant ought to recommend against a direct deployment of an account of right action in moral deliberation along the lines of what Kant proposes. Followers of Kant have a ready response, however, and this is to embrace the possibility of self-effacement. It is at root the same as the response offered by indirect utilitarians. What makes an action right according to Kant ought to be distinguished from his view of how a person ought to deliberate about what to do. Love brings with it obligations, but these are not always obligations to deliberate about the obligations of love and act accordingly. The problem Williams uncovered is not with accounts of moral judgment along the lines of what Kant proposed, anchored as they are in respect for the rational nature of persons, but with the implicit assumption of a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment. If we assume that the terms of moral deliberation must be the terms of moral judgment, we arrive at an implausible account of moral deliberation in contexts of love. The key to solving the problem Williams introduced, therefore, is to ﬁnd a coherent and plausible way of denying a direct connection between moral deliberation and moral judgment.

# 1AR

## Kant

#### In outer space, there is no governing authority and thus cliaming property imposes your will over others.

Stilz, 9 (Anna Stilz, Anna Stilz is Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values. Her research focuses on questions of political membership, authority and political obligation, nationalism and self-determination, rights to land and territory, and collective agency. , 2009, accessed on 12-18-2021, Muse.jhu, "Project MUSE - Liberal Loyalty", https://muse.jhu.edu/book/30179)//phs st

It might seem, then, that Kant, like Simmons, would hold that although our acquired rights are initially indefinite, our private acts of appropria- tion in a state of nature can function to more clearly delimit their contours. Once I appropriate an external object—for example, my piece of land in the state of nature—the boundaries of my right to external freedom might simply be equivalent to those of the things and spaces that I have appropriated. If this were so, then individuals could succeed in more precisely defining property without the help of the state, and simply by coordinating expectations based on their private acts. In order to respect and acknowledge my external freedom, on this view, you would just have to cede me the spot I have rightfully occupied and to refrain from infringing on my choices within that sphere. Yet Kant does not take this position: he argues that the rights made possible by the postulate of practical reason are problematic. Whatever rights our private acts of appropriation outside the state confer upon us can only be understood as provisional rights, that is, they are not conclusive and settled (peremp- torische): indeed, for him, “It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, giving laws publicly, that is, a civil condition” (MM, 6:255). What is the problem with these private methods of defining our rights to property? Why are they so unsatisfactory, from Kant’s perspective? The essential problem with acquiring property rights in a state of nature, for Kant, seems to be that we cannot unilaterally—through private will— impose a new obligation on other persons to respect our property that they would not otherwise have had.30 “By my unilateral choice I cannot bind another to refrain from using a thing, an obligation he would not otherwise have; hence I can do this only through the united choice of all who possess it in common” (MM, 6:261).31 Even claiming to interpret the a priori general will on another person’s behalf, says Kant, is at- tempting to impose a law on them on my own private authority, since every act of appropriation is “the giving of a law that holds for everyone” (MM, 6:253).32 And he worries that this claim to private authority over others is a potential source of injustice: “Now when someone makes ar- rangements about another, it is always possible for him to do the other wrong; but he can never do wrong in what he decides upon with regard to himself (for volenti non fit inuria)” (MM, 6:314). My will to appro- priate, in the belief that my appropriation is justifiable to others, cannot yet serve as a (coercive) law for everyone else, because it cannot put them under an obligation. Kant suggests, in other words, that figuring out how to carve up shares of the external world consistently with everyone’s freedom does not ex- haust the entire problem of justice involved in acquiring rights to prop- erty. We might appeal to criteria of salience or convention to help coordi- nate our expectations on which of the many possible property distributions to choose. But we face an additional difficulty: how do we impose one of these distributions without at the same time arrogating to ourselves the private authority to lay down the law for an equally free being, one who has an innate right not to be constrained by our private will? In coercing someone to respect our view of our property rights, we are also necessarily claiming the right to impose our private will upon that person. If it is to really respect everyone’s freedom, Kant thinks, a property distribution cannot be unilaterally imposed in this way. This additional dimension of the problem of justly acquiring rights— the problem of unilateral imposition—is rooted in each person’s basic “right to do what seems right and good to him and not to be dependent upon another’s opinion about this” (MM, 6:312). This right to do what seems right and good to him derives from the moral equality of persons: no one has an innate right to decide in another person’s behalf. And be- cause each person is an equally authoritative judge, it is therefore impossi- ble—in a state of nature—to put [them] under an obligation of justice that [they] himself does not recognize. The will of all others except for himself, which proposes to put him under obligation to give up a certain possession, is merely unilateral, and hence has as little lawful force in denying him possession as he has in asserting it (since this can be found only in a general will). (MM, 6:257) In conditions of equal authority—such as those that exist in any state of nature—one is obligated only by what one recognizes, by one’s own lights, as an objectively valid requirement of justice. For that reason, no other person’s merely unilateral will can bind one in the face of one’s own disagreement. Kant concludes from this that “no particular will can be legislative for the commonwealth” (TP, 8:295), since no private person’s will can effec- tively claim to impose an obligation on others. Instead, Kant says that “all right,” that is to say all claims that impose binding duties on others, “depends on laws” (TP, 8:294). Law overcomes the problem of unilater- alism inherent in imposing new obligations on others on one’s own au- thority, by substituting an omnilateral will in place of a unilateral one: “Only the concurring and united will of all, insofar as each decides the same thing for all, and all for each, and so only the general united will of the people, can be legislative” (MM, 6:314). But why is law—imposed from a public perspective—consistent with everyone’s freedom in a way that particular wills—based on our private judgments—are not? Fundamentally, Kant argues that defining and enforcing both our rights over our bodies and our rights to external objects through public and nonarbitrary laws is the only way to secure ourselves against the coercive interference of other private persons in our affairs. For Kant, then, the only sort of property distribution to which we could all hypothetically consent must necessarily be one that is defined and enforced by the state, since all privately enforced distributions have the inevitable side-effect of subjecting us to the wills of others. To show this in more detail, Kant points out two different ways that unilateral private enforcement under- mines our right to independence: first, through unilateral interpretation— a particularly pervasive problem in the enforcement of property rights, since these rights are fully conventional in a way our rights over our bod- ies are not; and second, through unilateral coercion, which threatens in- terference by others in all our rights, both our rights over our bodies and our rights over external things.