
### 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose affirmative frameworks, advocacy texts, and advantage areas thirty minutes before round if they haven’t read the affirmative before

#### Violation: They didn’t



#### Standards:

#### 1] Clash- Not disclosing incentivizes surprise tactics and poorly refined positions that rely on artificial and vague negative engagement to win debates. Their interpretation discourages third- and fourth-line testing by limiting the amount of time we have to prepare and forcing us to enter the debate with zero idea of what the affirmative is. Negatives are forced to rely on generics instead of smart contextual strategies destroying nuanced argumentation.

#### 2] Reciprocity – They get an infinite amount of time to frontline their aff to write the most efficient and effective answers to anything we could say against it while we get only four minutes in round. This gives them a tremendous advantage over us that makes it impossible to win substance.

#### 3] Shiftiness- Not knowing enough about the affirmative coming into round incentivizes 1ar shiftiness about what the aff is and what their framework/advocacy entails. That means even if we could read generics or find prep, they’d just find ways to recontextualize their obscure advocacy in the 1ar.

#### Fairness and education are voters – its how judges evaluate rounds and why schools fund debate

#### Neg theory is DTD - 1ARs control the direction of the debate because it determines what the 2NR has to go for – DTD allows us some leeway in the round by having some control in the direction

#### Competing interps – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation – it also collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### No RVIs – A – Going all in on theory kills substance education which outweighs on timeframe B - Discourages checking real abuse which outweighs on norm-setting C – Encourages theory baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly D – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments E - Kills norm setting since debaters can never admit they’re wrong – outweighs since norm setting is the constitutive purpose of theory

#### NC theory first - 1] Abuse was self-inflicted- They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] Norming- We have more speeches to norm over whether it’s a good idea 3] eval after nc reciprocity

#### Neg abuse outweighs Aff abuse – 1] Infinite prep time before round to frontline 2] 2AR judge psychology and 1st and last speech 3] Infinite perms and uplayering in the 1AR.

### 2

#### The standard is act hedonistic util. Prefer –

#### 1 – Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### 2 – No intent-foresight distinction – if I foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of my deliberation since its intrinsic to my action

#### No intent foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the death of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 3 – Actor spec – governments lack wills or intentions and inevitably deals with tradeoffs – outweighs because agents have differing obligations.

#### 4 – No act omission distinction – choosing not to act is an action in of itself since you had to make an active decision to omit. Walking past a drowning baby and choosing not to save it is a cognitive decision you were faced with and you actively decided to keep walking b) warranting a distinction gives agents the permissible choice of omitting from any ethical action since omissions lack culpability.

#### No calc indicts – a) no philosophy actually says that consequences don’t matter at all since otherwise it would indict every theory since they use causal events to understand how their ethics have worked in the past and through the justification of premises b) we don’t need consequences – winning hedonism proves we’re the only one with impacts to it which means risk of offense framing is sufficient c) they’re blippy nibs that set the aff at an unfair advantage since they only have to win one while we have to beat them all – voting issue for fairness

#### Extinction first –

#### 1 – Forecloses future improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible which proves moral uncertainty

#### 2 – Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### 3 – Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

### 3

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than the appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy in the 1AC. *(To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)*

#### B. Violation: They didn’t

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Fairness – This is a litmus test to determining whether your aff is fair –

#### a) Limits – there are infinite things you could defend outside the exact text of the resolution which pushes you to the limits of contestable arguments, even if your interp of the topic is better, the only way to verify if it’s substantively fair is proof of counter-arguments. Nobody knows your aff better than you, so if you can’t find an answer, I can’t be expected to. Our interp narrows out trivially true advocacies since counter-solvency advocates ensure equal division of ground for both sides.

#### b) Shiftiness-Having a counter-solvency advocate helps us conceptualize what their advocacy is and how it’s implemented. Intentionally ambiguous affirmatives we don’t know much about can’t spike out of DA’s and CP’s if they have an advocate that delineates these things.

#### 2. Research – Forces the aff to go to the other side of the library and contest their own view points, as well as encouraging in depth-research about their own position. Having one also encourages more in-depth answers since I can find responses. Key to education since we definitionally learn more about positions when we contest our own.

### Case

#### The Role of the Ballot and Judge is to vote for the better debater – any artificial constraint or goal arbitrarily brackets out different potentialities of what debate could be turning the Judge into a gatekeeper of ideologies and foreclose radical new ways of engaging the world.

#### They say cap is bad- we’re impact turning that.

#### It’s sustainable---robust environmental progress and increasing resource reserves prove---BUT, they can’t save the environment either.

Andrew McAfee 20, principal research scientist at MIT, codirector of the MIT Initiative on the Digital Economy at the MIT Sloan School of Management, Doctorate from Harvard Business School, two Master of Science and two Bachelor of Science degrees from MIT, "Don't Misunderstand Earth Day's Successes," Wired, 4-22-2020, https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-dont-misunderstand-earth-days-successes/

We should all be intensely grateful to the people who took to the streets exactly 50 years ago on the first Earth Day. The modern environmental movement that crystallized then has given us a cleaner, better planet. The pressure applied to governments and businesses on April 22, 1970, has not let up since, and it has yielded two huge victories.

The first is massive reductions in the amount of pollution we and our ecosystems have to endure. In the world’s richest countries, which are the ones where environmentalism has most taken hold, the air, land, and water are all much cleaner than they were 50 years ago. This is not because these countries have simply offshored degradation to poor nations. Germany, for example, has the world’s largest trade surplus, yet has seen steady reductions in air pollution in recent decades.

If globalization is not the reason rich countries are much cleaner now than they were half a century ago, then what is? Effective regulation. The United States established the EPA and greatly strengthened the Clean Air Act in 1970, added the Clean Water Act in 1972, and kept taking steps over the years to bring down all kinds of pollution.

Some of the most innovative and helpful of these steps are cap-and-trade systems that create markets for pollution. Companies can trade with each other for the right to pollute, but the overall total is set by the government and declines over time. Over the past 30 years cap-and-trade has proved to be both relatively cheap and highly effective; a triumph of smart environmentalism.

The other great triumph is the improved health of species and ecosystems that we had pushed to the brink. Throughout the 20th century, relentless hunting almost wiped out whales. A nearly global moratorium was finally passed 1982, thanks in part to the “Save the Whales” movement that started in the mid-1970s (no doubt helped by folk superstar Judy Collins’ 1970 hit “Farewell to Tarwathie,” which introduced many people to whales’ haunting songs).Many other species, including wolves, bears, beavers, and deer, have also come back after being near extinction in America. They rebounded in large part because we limited when, where, and how they could be hunted, and we limited trade in wild animal products. It’s generally illegal, for example, to sell hunted meat in the US. For the past 50 years, the environmental movement has carried on the laudable traditions of conservationism, which got its start early in the 20th century as Americans reacted in shock and horror to the extinction of the passenger pigeon and near elimination of the bison and other iconic animals.

Paradoxically, the great victories over pollution and extinction highlight environmentalism’s greatest weakness: a continued hostility to economic growth. The “degrowth” movement, which started in the early 1970s, stressed that human populations and economies simply couldn’t continue to grow as they had in the decades leading up to Earth Day. As philosopher André Gorz put it in 1975, “Even at zero growth, the continued consumption of scarce resources will inevitably result in exhausting them completely. The point is not to refrain from consuming more and more, but to consume less and less—there is no other way of conserving the available reserves for future generations.”

This seemed like an obvious truth to many in the 1970s, especially when they saw that the use of many natural resources—fossil fuels, metals and minerals, fertilizer, and so on—had been increasing in lockstep with the size of the overall economy. Since these resources were finite, and since their consumption went hand-in-hand with growth, growth apparently had to stop.

Yet around the world, it didn’t. The pace has slowed down a bit since the inaugural Earth Day, but this is mainly because the years between 1945 and 1970 saw exceptionally fast growth as we rebuilt our societies after two world wars. Except for that 25-year stretch, economic growth since 1970 is the fastest the world has ever seen.

So how are natural resource stocks doing? Oil is a great indicator of the overall story (its recent pandemic-induced demand free fall notwithstanding). At present we have about 50 years of oil left, given projected consumption and known reserves. That sounds dire, until you realize that 40 years ago, we only had 30 years of oil left. How can this be? It’s certainly not because we’ve cut way back on oil demand; we consume almost 40 percent more oil now than we did in 1980.

It’s because we kept finding more supplies. The same is true for every other economically important natural resource. Proven reserves—the amount of the resource we know we can access—have increased as we keep developing better technologies for finding and accessing them. And because the supply-demand balance keeps getting more favorable, resource affordability increases. The world’s average worker can, with an hour of their labor, purchase a greater quantity of every important resource than was the case just a few decades ago.

We live on a finite planet, but an incredibly abundant one. It contains enough of everything we need for as long as we’ll be around. Especially since, in the decades and centuries to come, we clever humans will almost certainly figure out nuclear fusion or some other technology that gives us limitless clean energy and lets us ignore fossil fuels. In short, there’s no need to slam the brakes on our growth. This happy fact is deeply counterintuitive, and it trips a lot of people up. But the evidence is clear: Degrowth is unnecessary.

In fact, it’s a terrible idea. Recall that the countries that have cleaned up their environments the most since Earth Day are the richest ones. This is not a coincidence, as Indira Gandhi knew in 1972. In a speech given in Stockholm, she said “Are not poverty and need the greatest polluters?... The environment cannot be improved in conditions of poverty.” Prosperous people and societies can afford, in every sense of the word, to care about the state of the planet we all live on, and to improve it.

Economic growth does not irreversibly degrade and deplete the planet. Instead, economic growth yields more prosperous people, who demand to live in a better world—a world with less pollution and more healthy ecosystems. The 50 years since Earth Day have largely shown that they get what they want.

The Covid-19 recession has given us much cleaner air in cities around the world, but at a terrible cost. We don’t need to endure such hardship to reduce emissions from car traffic. If we just made pollution more expensive and energy and transport innovation cheaper (via subsidies or research funding), we’d get the same clean skies without any economic devastation at all.

We face no shortage of environmental challenges over the next 50 years. We continue to overhunt, overfish, and raze ecosystems in many parts of the world. More extinctions loom. And of course we have to reduce the greenhouse gas pollution that’s causing global warming. The good news is that, in the decades since Earth Day, we’ve put together an effective playbook for meeting these challenges. I hope the environmentalists of the coming half-century will study this playbook, and realize that it shuns degrowth rather than advocating it.

#### No transition---centuries of history prove societies can’t and won’t shift fast enough.

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Gómez-Baggethun is right to suspect that the modern myth of progress has theological origins. In fact, it is largely a product of the Christian conception of human history as an inherently meaningful story that has salvation as its end point. Without the belief that there is a teleological coherence to the history of humanity, and that salvation (whether the Christian version of the Kingdom of God on Earth, or the humanist faith in an emancipated and harmonious future) is an earthly event that lies ahead of the present, the idea of progress is groundless. In cultures that are not historically steeped in Western monotheism, the belief that humanity is inexorably marching toward a better state of affairs is largely absent (Gray, 2007, pp. 29–39). Where Gómez-Baggethun's reading of progress misses the mark is in limiting its scope to technology. The central tenet of modern belief in progress is that ethics and politics advance in line with the growth of knowledge, so that as scientific and technological understandings accrue, so too do humans increasingly learn to arrange their societies in rational and ethical ways (Gray, 2002).

Contrary to Gómez-Baggethun's assertions, technological progress is a fact. Throughout their history, humans have increasingly learnt to manipulate the environment around them to serve their interests. The reason for this is that scientific knowledge grows cumulatively: past discoveries are not necessarily lost with the advent of new knowledge, but rather can be built upon or thrown into question by these new understandings. In contrast, any historical ‘gains’ in politics and ethics (placed between inverted commas to reflect that such evaluations will depend on the particular values of each generation) are easily undone by regime and cultural changes. It is progress in ethics and politics, not in technology, that is a myth.

Viewed in this light, Gómez-Baggethun's assertion that utopias are concrete and plausible if they are scientifically informed, while saying nothing about how assumed radical social change may come about, begs the question of why scientific plausibility is given categorical priority over social and political feasibility. Gómez-Baggethun's analysis fits within a broader tradition; the belief that humans can radically remake the world at will commonly presents itself as having the authority of science (Gray, 2007, p. 20). An historically and politically informed view may well reveal degrowth to be utopian, in the true sense of being a projection into the future of an unrealisable society (Gray, 2007, pp. 20–29).

There are no historical examples of humans showing the intelligence or will to voluntarily restructure their societies in the measure that would be required for a global shift to degrowth, let alone at the speed required to avert the climatic changes and ecological collapses predicted for this century. Further complicating things for advocates of degrowth, no contemporary democratic state has been able to survive without sustaining economic growth over the medium and long terms (Gray, 1992, p. 83). Recently, Gray (2019) has written,

The trouble is that Green proposals involve a drop in material living standards for large numbers of people, and any such fall will be unsustainable in political terms. Macron's tax on petrol fuelled the rise of the gilets jaunes in France, while the principal beneficiary of Hilary Clinton's election pledge to shut down the coal industry has been Donald Trump. When Green policies impose heavy costs on the poor and the working majority – as they often do – the result is a popular blowback.

Gómez-Baggethun's mistake here is to think that degrowth is feasible simply because it is desirable. In political terms, the evidence suggests that it is unfeasible. To resist these facts and to consider degrowth to be the only realistic imaginary reflects a pseudo-religious faith in humans' willingness and ability to convert to an ecological worldview and to radically adjust their institutions accordingly.

#### We’re past tipping points---only tech solves---the Aff causes dictatorship.

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Today’s best-case ecological scenario was a horror story just three decades ago. In 1993, Bill Clinton declared that global warming presented such a profound threat to civilization that the U.S. would have to bring its “emissions of greenhouse gases to their 1990 levels by the year 2000.” Instead, we waited until 2020 to do so; in the interim, humanity burned more carbon than it had since the advent of agriculture. Now, it will take a historically unprecedented, worldwide economic transformation to freeze warming at “only” 2 degrees — a level of temperature rise that will turn “once in a century” storms into annual events, drown entire island nations, and render major cities in the Middle East uninhabitable in summertime (at least for those whose lifestyles involve “walking outdoors without dying of heatstroke”). This is what passes for a utopian vision in 2021. If we confine ourselves to mere optimism — and assume that every Paris Agreement signatory meets its current pledged target for decarbonization — then warming will hit 2.4 degrees by century’s end.

The reality of our ecological predicament invites denial of our political one. Put simply, it is hard to reconcile the scale of the climate crisis with the limits of contemporary American politics. Delusions rush in to fill the gap. Among these is the fantasy of national autonomy; the notion that the United States can save the planet or destroy it, depending on the precise timeline of its domestic decarbonization. A rapid energy transition in the U.S. is a vital cause, not least for its potential to expedite similar transformations abroad. But the battle for a sustainable planet will be won or lost in the developing world. Although American consumption played a central role in the history of the climate crisis, it is peripheral to the planet’s future: Over the coming century, U.S. emissions are expected to account for only 5 percent of the global total.

There is also the delusion of “de-growth’s” viability. The fact that there is no plausible path for global economic expansion that won’t entail climate-induced death and displacement has led some environmentalists to insist on global stagnation. Yet there is neither a mass constituency for this project, nor any reason to believe that there will be any time soon. Freeze the status-quo economy in amber, and you’ll condemn nearly half of humanity to permanent poverty. Divide existing GDP into perfectly even slices, and every person on the planet will live on about $5,500 a year. American voters may express a generalized concern about the climate in surveys, but they don’t seem willing to accept even a modest rise in gas prices — let alone a total collapse in living standards — to address the issue. Meanwhile, any Chinese or Indian leader who attempted to stymy income growth in the name of sustainability would be ousted in short order. It’s conceivable that one could radically reorder advanced economies in a manner that enabled living standards to rise even as GDP fell; Americans might well find themselves happier and more secure in an ultra-low-carbon communal economy in which individual car ownership is heavily restricted, and housing, healthcare, and myriad low-carbon leisure activities are social rights. But nothing short of an absolute dictatorship could affect such a transformation at the necessary speed. And the specter of eco-Bolshevism does not haunt the Global North. Humanity is going to find a way to get rich sustainably, or die trying.

Thus, the chasm between the ecologically necessary and the politically possible can only be bridged by technological advance. And on that front, the U.S. actually has the resources to make a decisive contribution to global decarbonization — and some political will to leverage those resources. Unfortunately, due to some combination of fiscal superstitions and misplaced priorities, the Biden administration’s proposed investments in green innovation remain paltry. An American Jobs Plan with much higher funding for green R&D is both imminently winnable and environmentally imperative. U.S. climate hawks should make securing such legislation a top priority.

The choice before us is techno-optimism or barbarism.

If governments are forced to choose between increasing income growth in the present, and mitigating temperature rise in the future, they are going to pick the former. We’ll get cheap, lab-grown Kobe beef before we get a U.S. Senate willing to tax meat, and steel plants powered by “green hydrogen” before we get anarcho-primitivism with Chinese characteristics.

The question is whether we’ll get such breakthroughs before it’s too late.

Techno-optimism has its hazards, but the progress we’ve made toward decarbonization has come largely through technological innovation. When India canceled plans to construct 14 gigawatts of new coal-fired power stations in 2019, it did not do so in deference to international pressure or domestic environmental movements, but rather to the cost-competitiveness of solar energy. The same story holds across Asia’s developing countries: Thanks to a ninefold reduction in the cost of solar energy over the past decade, the number of new coal plants slated for construction in the region has fallen by 80 percent. Meanwhile, the road to an electric-car revolution was cleared by a collapse in the cost of lithium batteries, the challenge of powering cities with solar energy on cloudy days was eased by a 70 percent drop in the price of utility-scale batteries, and wind power grew 40 percent cheaper. Our species remains lackluster at solidarity and self-government, but we’ve got a real knack for building cool shit.

The technological progress of the past decade was not sufficient to compensate for tepid climate policy. But real techno-utopianism has never been tried: As of 2019, global spending on clean energy R&D totaled $22 billion a year, or 3 percent of the Pentagon’s annual budget. Increasing spending on such research — while expediting cost-reductions in existing technologies by deploying them en masse — should be twin priorities of American climate policy.

The preconditions for green industrialization can be made in America.

The United States has more fiscal capacity and better-financed research universities than any nation on the planet. And, for all the pathologies of our politics, public investment in green tech inspires far weaker opposition than many less-indispensable climate policies. In fact, late last year, with Republicans controlling the Senate and Donald Trump in the White House, the U.S. increased funding for zero-emission technology R&D by $35 billion. America does not have sovereignty over enough humans to save the planet by slashing our domestic emissions. But we just might have the resources and political economy necessary to help the developing world save us all.

#### Regulated cap solves everything better.

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However, things are more complicated than the arguments above would suggest, and the benefits of capitalism, especially for the world's poorest and most vulnerable people, are in fact myriad and significant. In addition, as we will see in this section, many experts argue that capitalism is not the fundamental cause of the previously described problems but rather an essential component of the best solutions to them and of the best methods for promoting our goals of health, well-being, and justice.

To see where the defenders of capitalism are coming from, consider an analogy involving a response to a pandemic: if a country administered a rushed and untested vaccine to its population that ended up killing people, we would not say that vaccines were the problem. Instead, the problem would be the flawed and sloppy policies of vaccine implementation. Vaccines might easily remain absolutely essential to the correct response to such a pandemic and could also be essential to promoting health and flourishing, more generally.

The argument is similar with capitalism according to the leading mainstream arguments in favor of it: Capitalism is an essential part of the best society we could have, just like vaccines are an essential part of the best response to a pandemic such as COVID-19. But of course both capitalism and vaccines can be implemented poorly, and can even do harm, especially when combined with other incorrect policy decisions. But that does not mean that we should turn against them—quite the opposite. Instead, we should embrace them as essential to the best and most just outcomes for society, and educate ourselves and others on their importance and on how they must be properly designed and implemented with other policies in order to best help us all. In fact, the argument in favor of capitalism is even more dramatic because it claims that much more is at stake than even what is at stake in response to a global pandemic—what is at stake with capitalism is nothing less than whether the world's poorest and most vulnerable billion people will remain in conditions of poverty and oppression, or if they will instead finally gain access to what is minimally necessary for basic health and wellbeing and become increasingly affluent and empowered. The argument in favor of capitalism proceeds as follows:

Premise 1. Development and the past. Over the course of recorded human history, the majority of historical increases in health, wellbeing, and justice have occurred in the last two centuries, largely as a result of societies adopting or moving toward capitalism. Capitalism is a relevant cause of these improvements, in the sense that they could not have happened to such a degree if it were not for capitalism and would not have happened to the same degree under any alternative noncapitalist approach to structuring society. The argument in support of this premise relies on observed relationships across societies and centuries between indicators of degree of capitalism, wealth, investments in public goods, and outcomes for health, wellbeing, and justice, together with econometric analysis in support of the conclusion that the best explanation of these correlations and the underlying mechanism is that large increases in health, wellbeing, and justice are largely driven by increasing investments in public goods. The scale of increased wealth necessary to maximize these investments requires capitalism. Thus, as capitalist societies have become dramatically wealthier over the past hundred years (and wealthier than societies with alternative systems), this has allowed larger investments in public goods, which simply has not been possible in a sustained way in societies without the greater wealth that capitalism makes possible. Important investments in public goods include investments in basic medical knowledge, in health and nutrition programs, and in the institutional capacity and know-how to regulate society and capitalism itself. As a result, capitalism is a primary driver of positive outcomes in health and wellbeing (such as increased life expectancy, lowered child and maternal mortality, adequate calories per day, minimized infectious disease rates, a lower percentage and number of people in poverty, and more reported happiness);5 and in justice (such as reduced deaths from war and homicide; higher rankings in human rights indices; the reduced prevalence of racist, sexist, homophobic opinions in surveys; and higher literacy rates).6 These quantifiable positive consequences of global capitalism dramatically outweigh the negative consequences (such as deaths from pollution in the course of development), with the result that the net benefits from capitalism in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice have been greater than they would have been under any known noncapitalist approach to structuring society.7

Premise 2. Economics, ethics, and policy. Although capitalism has often been ill-regulated and therefore failed to maximize net benefits for health, wellbeing, and justice, it can become well-regulated so that it maximizes these societal goals, by including mechanisms identified by economists and other policy experts that do the following:

* optimally8 regulate negative effects such as pollution and monopoly power, and invest in public goods such as education, basic healthcare, and fundamental research including biomedical knowledge (more generally, policies that correct the failures of free markets that economists have long recognized will arise from “externalities” in the absence of regulation);9
* ensure equity and distributive justice (for example, via wealth redistribution);10
* ensure basic rights, justice, and the rule of law independent of the market (for example, by an independent judiciary, bill of rights, property rights, and redistribution and other legislation to correct historical injustices due to colonialism, racism, and correct current and historical distortions that have prevented markets from being fair);11 and
* ensure that there is no alternative way of structuring society that is more efficient or better promotes the equity, justice, and fairness goals outlined above (by allowing free exchange given the regulations mentioned).12

To summarize the implication of the first two premises, well-regulated capitalism is essential to best achieving our ethical goals—which is true even though capitalism has certainly not always been well regulated historically. Society can still do much better and remove the large deficits in terms of health, wellbeing, and justice that exist under the current inferior and imperfect versions of capitalism.

Premise 3. Development and the future. If the global spread of capitalism is allowed to continue, desperate poverty can be essentially eliminated in our lifetimes. Furthermore, this can be accomplished faster and in a more just way via well-regulated global capitalism than by any alternatives. If we instead opt for less capitalism, less growth, and less globalization, then desperate poverty will continue to exist for a significant portion of the world's population into the further future, and the world will be a worse and less equitable place than it would have been with more capitalism. For example, in a world with less capitalism, there would be more overpopulation, food insecurity, air pollution, ill health, injustice, and other problems. In part, this is because of the factors identified by premise 1, which connect a turn away from capitalism with a turn away from continuing improvements in health, wellbeing, and justice, especially for the developing world. In addition, fertility declines are also a consequence of increased wealth, and the size of the population is a primary determinant of food demand and other environmental stressors.13 Finally, as discussed at length in the next section of the essay, capitalism can be naturally combined with optimal environmental regulations.14 Even bracketing anything like optimal regulation, it remains true that sufficiently wealthy nations reduce environmental degradation as they become wealthier, whereas developing nations that are nearing peak degradation will remain stuck at the worst levels of degradation if we stall growth, rather than allowing them to transition to less and less degradation in the future via capitalism and economic growth.15 In contrast, well-regulated capitalism is a key part of the best way of coping with these problems, as well as a key part of dealing with climate change, global food production, and other specific challenges, as argued at length in the next section. Here it is important to stress that we should favor well-regulated capitalism that includes correct investments in public goods over other capitalist systems such as the neoliberalism of the recent past that promoted inadequately regulated capitalism with inadequate concern for externalities, equity, and background distortions and injustices.16

Conclusion. Therefore, we should be in favor of capitalism over noncapitalism, and we should especially favor well-regulated capitalism, which is the ethically optimal economic system and is essential to any just basic structure for society.

This argument is impressive because, as stated earlier in the essay, it is based on evidence that is so striking that it leads a bipartisan range of open-minded thinkers and activists to endorse well-regulated capitalism, including many of those who were not initially attracted to the view because of a reasonable concern for the societal ills with which we began. To better understand why such a range of thinkers could agree that well-regulated capitalism is best, it may help to clarify some things that are not assumed or implied by the argument for it, which could be invoked by other bad arguments for capitalism.

One thing the argument above does not assume is that health, wellbeing, or justice are the same thing as wealth, because, in fact, they are not. Instead, the argument above relies on well-accepted, measurable indicators of health and wellbeing, such as increased lifespan; decreased early childhood mortality; adequate nutrition; and other empirically measurable leading indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice.17 Similarly, the argument that capitalism promotes justice, peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance relies on empirical metrics for each of these.18

Furthermore, the argument does not assume that because these indicators of health, wellbeing, and justice are highly correlated with high degrees of capitalism, that therefore capitalism is the direct cause of these good outcomes. Rather, the analyses suggest instead that something other than capitalism is the direct cause of societal improvements (such as improvements in knowledge and technology, public infrastructure, and good governance), and that capitalism is simply a necessary condition for these improvements to happen.19 In other words, the richer a society is, the more it is able to invest in all of these and other things that are the direct causes of health, wellbeing, and justice. But, to maximize investment in these things societies need well-regulated capitalism.

As part of these analyses, it is often stressed that current forms of capitalism around the world are highly defective and must be reformed in the direction of well-regulated capitalism because they lack investments in public goods, such as basic knowledge, healthcare, nutrition, other safety nets, and good governance.20 In this way, an argument for a particular kind of progressive reformism is an essential part of the analyses that lead many to endorse the more general argument for well-regulated capitalism.

Although these analyses are nuanced, and appropriately so, it remains the case that the things that directly lead to health, wellbeing, and justice require resources, and the best path toward generating those resources is well-regulated capitalism. And on the flip side, according to the analyses behind premise 1 described above, an anti-capitalist system would not produce the resources that are needed, and would thus be a disaster, especially for the poorest billion people who are most desperately in need of the resources that capitalism can create and direct, to escape from extreme poverty.21

#### No endless war impact---their analysis is a reductive critique of a complex list of factors that influence US foreign policy.

---restraint literature essentializes complex IR.

---history of interventions faced heavy controversy as opposed to immediate consensus.

---military doctrines err away from interventions.

---primary motivators of interventions are security.

---military presence, spending, and nuclear arsenals all dramatically decreased to levels restraint advocates would’ve called for in the peak of US hegemony.

---no active, forced liberal order promotion.

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US Foreign Policy: Caricature versus Reality

In the eyes of proponents of restraint, the reigning concepts that guide America’s role in the world embody a limitless drive for supremacy and power that has produced an infatuation with militarism and a litany of interventions and wars. “There is one dominant grand strategy in US politics,” two advocates for restraint contend, “which is primacy, also known as liberal hegemony.” 4 “The vast majority of US foreign policy makers are devotees of primacy,” concludes another recent essay. 5 The historian Stephen Wertheim refers to a post-Cold War US approach that “gave pride of place to military threats and methods” and that “spares no expense for military hegemony.” 6 The scholar Barry Posen, in one of the defining works of the restraint literature, points to an overriding implication: “the United States has grown incapable of moderating its ambitions in international politics.” 7

Immediately, this portrait of militarized liberal hegemony in search of primacy simplifies a more complex reality: the concepts of primacy and liberal interventionism overlap on some issues but diverge starkly on others. More importantly, much of the literature on restraint blends these various concepts in order to fuel what quickly becomes an essentialist critique of US foreign and security policy. Proponents argue that US policy is not merely imperfect at the margins—its basic assumptions and impulses are fundamentally unsound, and it must be not merely pruned but substantially uprooted. Yet, by depicting the guiding concepts of US policy with such extreme and unconditional language, these diagnoses tend to deal in caricatures and straw people rather than realities.

This polemical approach emerges in restraint proponents’ treatment of the basic US foreign policy record. It has had its share of excesses, but the record betrays far more limits, hesitation, and, in fact, restraint than the labels of primacy and liberal hegemony would suggest—something apparent in the repeated tendency to avoid interventions, major post-Cold War cuts in defense spending and global posture, and the constraints on liberal value promotion.

The Frequent Impulse to Moderation

The restraint literature downplays the often-powerful reluctance with which successive US administrations have grappled with most decisions to intervene. US action in cases like the Balkan wars and even Libya only came with great hesitancy and after fierce internal debates.8 The United States has shunned many opportunities for large-scale interventions in the last generation alone—in Somalia, Rwanda, Syria, and elsewhere.9 US administrations did not act in crises in the Great Lakes region of Africa and two major examples of Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine.10 An infamous case of non-intervention was the Darfur tragedy in the Sudan, when credible accusations of genocide did not prompt US action.11 The United States would never have invaded either Afghanistan or Iraq had it not been for 9/11; indeed, then-NSC official Richard Clarke and others begged two administrations to strike al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan for months beforehand, to no avail.12 In regard to humanitarian intervention broadly speaking, the selectivity of US action, rather than a general impulse to intervene, is the dominant lesson.13

Even with regard to Vietnam, two US presidents (Kennedy and Eisenhower) struggled to avoid an open-ended US commitment; when the United States did engage, it was because Lyndon Johnson felt a need to stand up to communist aggression and protect his personal reputation, but he was hardly enthusiastic about the prospect. He was painfully conflicted about the war and deeply regretted having to fight it.14 In other words, when US interventionism has occurred, it has often been reactive and halfhearted rather than aggressively ambitious.

In fact, the alleged epicenter of US global military power—the Department of Defense and the military services—have forcefully opposed many interventions in places like the Balkans, Somalia, and Libya, believing they should [conserve] ~~husband~~ their power for major wars. The two leading modern conceptual articulations of criteria for going to war—the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines—came from senior defense officials, and both represented efforts to constrain, not liberate, the use of force.15 Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told a graduating class at West Point that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it,” 16 reflecting a widely held view at Defense—one far afield from the ideas of unrestrained primacy. A similar impulse for limits has emerged in major diplomatic initiatives. In a recent essay outlining a restraint agenda, Stephen Wertheim suggests that the United States should “seek to normalize relations with North Korea” in part with a nuclear deal, and that it should “end its grudge match” with Iran.17 In fact, the United States at one time embraced both these ideas in the form of the Agreed Framework with North Korea and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran. The later US desertion of these accords was prompted by hawkish factions in two Republican administrations, not an indiscriminate national hegemonic inclination.18

Nor can US involvement in foreign wars and interventions usually be traced to a hegemonic desire to spread liberal values. A missionary attitude in foreign policy and liberal value promotion agenda may help lay the groundwork or justify the public case for unnecessary commitments and may be responsible for a few of them. But the largest interventions—Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, the Balkan wars, Afghanistan, and Iraq—were all primarily motivated by security considerations.19 Some of these actions may have been excessive to begin with or become so over time, and the security concerns that drove them may have been based on bad information or inflated fears. But they were not fueled by the boundless commitment to primacy and liberal value promotion described by many advocates of restraint. Limits to Ambition: By the Numbers Broadly speaking, then, the default setting of US foreign policy is hardly one of fervent interventionism. In terms of actual military posture and spending, if the United States had truly embraced hegemonic policies, there would be a trajectory of continually rising commitments, military spending, and interventions since 1945. Yet the actual record is starkly different. Table 1 tells an interesting story about one key focus of the restraint proponents—global military presence. Between the late 1980s and roughly 2018, US troop levels declined slightly in Japan, more than 40 percent in Korea, and 80 percent in Europe. The result was that, as the Pew Research Center put it, by 2016 the “U.S. military overseas presence [was] at a 60-year low,” falling well below 200,000 after having reached a peak of 1.2 million in the late 1960s and remaining at over 600,000 as recently as 1990. In 2016, only 15 percent of active-duty US military troops were deployed overseas—the lowest proportion since 1957.21 One partial exception to this trend, of course, is the Middle East, where after a history of “extremely light force presence” 22 before 1990, US regional deployments expanded across the region in the wake of the Gulf War and ramped up dramatically during the Iraq War. Various factors—including the flow of units into and out of the region, the use of private contractors to fulfill some functions, and limits on public information—make it impossible to put a precise figure on US deployments; the Congressional Research Service has estimated that as of 2019, there were 60,000 to 80,000 US troops in the Central Command

Table

Description automatically generated

(CENTCOM) area of responsibility.23 Yet even here, these numbers are well down from the recent peak: the Obama administration’s withdrawal of most US combat forces from Iraq meant that numbers there plummeted from over 160,000 in 2006– 07 to residual levels by 2012.24

The story of US defense spending from 1988 to 9/11 is also one of gradual decline. All told, “inflation-adjusted military spending fell by one-third in the 1990s.” 25 The defense budget shows a similar pattern over a longer time period—a downward slope from about 16 percent of GDP in the early 1950s to less than 3 percent by the end of the 1990s, and then, after a bump from 9/11 and the war on terror, back down to 3.1 percent in 2018.26 (Even before the current pandemic, the Congressional Budget Office had projected a further decline to 2.8 percent of GDP by 2029.27) The United States also took advantage of the end of the Cold War to slash its nuclear arsenal from a peak of 31,255 weapons to fewer than 5,000.28 Therefore, had an advocate of restraint called in 1989 for a one-third cut in defense spending, an 80 percent reduction in troops in Europe, and an 85 percent cut in the US nuclear arsenal, they would have gotten everything they asked for. Restraint proponents would doubtless suggest that spending remains too high and that US global posture—with hundreds of bases and deployments across dozens of countries—remains too elaborate. Both may be true, and further cuts may be called for. But the record of US foreign policy does not reflect a one-way trajectory of defense posture and spending in service of primacy and liberal hegemony.

An Inconsistent Urge to Transform the World

In his most recent book, eminent realist John Mearsheimer defines US hegemonic aspirations in especially absolute terms, specifically regarding the promotion of liberal values. The focus of Mearsheimer’s ire is liberal hegemony, which he defines as “an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions” through “an active policy of regime change.” Liberal hegemony thus inevitably becomes a “highly interventionist foreign policy that involves fighting wars,” “doing significant social engineering in countries throughout the world,” and “toppling autocracies” which, according to Mearsheimer, results in an “abysmal record of failure.” 29 Stephen Walt joins Mearsheimer in condemning the pursuit of such liberal hegemony as a “costly failure.” 30

It is not clear at what country this critique is aimed, but it certainly is not the United States. During the Cold War, of course, many criticized US foreign policy specifically for embracing many dictatorships—from Pinochet’s Chile to the Shah’s Iran to authoritarian governments in Guatemala. Since the Cold War’s end, the United States has had active regime change policies aimed at only a handful of states. Even with regard to some of these, the record is full of swerves: the United States infamously toyed with engaging Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s before gradually sliding toward an unofficial regime change policy by the late 1990s. (Even after fighting Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the Gulf War, the Bush administration famously decided not to overthrow him, a decision that reflected a remarkable degree of restraint.31) US regime change ambitions with both Iran and Cuba were effectively shelved by the Obama administration (even if revived, at least with Iran, by the Trump administration).

The United States has persistently encouraged the gradual advance of liberal values through more patient means such as broad-based engagement, support for human rights activists, and investments in civil society organizations. But these indirect, long-term approaches are a far cry from the vision of a militarized liberal hegemony.

As an example of the gap between this caricature and actual US policy, consider the US approach to the roster of autocratic states in 1990. Many of these were clustered in Africa; the United States called for improved human rights policies on the continent but had no real, active regime change policies toward any of these governments. Globally, Washington counted many regimes then defined as illiberal—including Saudi Arabia, Oman, Indonesia, Egypt, and Morocco—as friends. It was busily embracing a policy of engaging China, the world’s biggest autocratic regime, and would soon be on the road to mending ties and eventually initiating a strategic partnership with Vietnam. The direct clashes that did exist with autocratic states (largely Cuba, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea) were the product of specific histories or aggressive behavior on the part of these regimes, not any generalized crusade against illiberalism.

To be sure, dreams of liberal value promotion have always inspired US goals and have ornamented some US policies since 1945. The rise of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and related interventionist doctrines in the 2000s did help produce what may be the single example of an intervention prompted largely by such considerations—the European and US action in Libya in 2011. Even here, that outcome followed a US effort to embrace the regime: when Washington secured Libyan promises of nonproliferation in 2003, it was happy to remove sanctions on Muammar Qaddafi’s government and move toward rapprochement without much attention to human rights. Washington presumably hoped that such engagement would produce reform and change, but this slow, steady, peaceful approach to value promotion is presumably just the sort of alternative to militarized hegemony that restraint advocates would want. Beyond Libya, the allegedly belligerent approach to liberal hegemony has been evident in remarkably few cases.

To some degree, Mearsheimer is actually making an argument about a momentary period of surplus power, not more perennial motives behind US strategy. He claims that it is not merely a liberal hegemonic impulse that has produced US interventionism, but the fact that “the United States was so powerful in the aftermath of the Cold War that it could adopt a profoundly liberal foreign policy.” 32 If America’s relative power ebbs, he predicts, so will its liberal ambitions.

It is certainly true that, after 1989, America’s preeminent position allowed it to expand its ambitions to an unhealthy degree. But this temptation has been fading for years; the existence of surplus power, for example, cannot solely explain US interventions in Afghanistan or Iraq, neither of which would have occurred absent 9/11.33 Any great power enjoying unrivaled predominance will be tempted to widen its ambitions. That US foreign policy did not run even more amok during these years, given its massive surplus power and the lack of any real countervailing force, is perhaps the greater wonder.

In sum, the record of US foreign policy, both during and after the Cold War, does not look like anything close to an unalloyed embrace of primacy and liberal hegemony. It is the story of potent but also constrained ambitions, repeated efforts to meddle in other societies, and many refusals to do so. It is a complex history of partial global engagement marred by a handful of truly excessive tragedies (dominated by a single case—Iraq—which as of 2012 accounted for 67 percent of casualties and 64 percent of costs of all post-1990 US interventions34)—shaped at every turn by kaleidoscopic mixtures of political impulses and constraints, military realities, personality conflicts, ambitions tempered by risk, and many other influences. It is not a record that looks anything like the portrait of hegemony found in much of the restraint literature.

#### *Even if* revolutionary movements are successful, the utter chaos of the transition causes mass violence and repression that repeats the pitfalls of capitalism.

Wright 17, \*Erik Olin Wright, Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. Director of A. E. Havens Center for Social Justice, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (2017, “How to be an Anti-capitalist for the 21st Century”, https://www.redalyc.org/journal/124/12452111002/html/)

Smashing

This is the classic strategic logic of revolutionaries. The rationale goes something like this:

The system is rotten. All efforts to make life tolerable within capitalism will eventually fail. From time to time small reforms that improve the lives of people may be possible when popular forces are strong, but such improvements will always be fragile, vulnerable to attack and reversible. Ultimately it is an illusion that capitalism can be rendered a benign social order in which ordinary people can live flourishing, meaningful lives. At its core, capitalism is unreformable. The only hope is to destroy it, sweep away the rubble and then build an alternative. As the closing words of the early twentieth century song Solidarity Forever proclaim, “We can bring to birth a new world from the ashes of the old.” The full realization of the emancipatory alternative may be gradual, but the necessary condition for such a gradual transition is a ruptural break in the existing system of power.

But how to do this? How is it possible for anti-capitalist forces to amass sufficient power to destroy capitalism and replace it with a better alternative? This is indeed a daunting task, for the power of dominant classes that makes reform an illusion also blocks the revolutionary goal of a rupture in the system. Anti-capitalist revolutionary theory, informed by the writings of Marx and extended by Lenin, Gramsci and others, offered an attractive argument about how this could take place:

While it is true that much of the time capitalism seems unassailable, it is also a deeply contradictory system, prone to disruptions and crises. Sometimes those crises reach an intensity which makes the system as a whole fragile, vulnerable to challenge. In the strongest versions of the theory, there are even underlying tendencies in the “laws of motion” of capitalism for the intensity of such system-weakening crises to increase over time, so that in the long-term capitalism becomes unsustainable; it destroys its own conditions of existence. But even if there is no systematic tendency for crises to become ever-worse, what can be predicted is that periodically there will be intense capitalist economic crises in which the system becomes vulnerable and ruptures become possible. The problem for a revolutionary party, therefore, is to be in a position to take advantage of the opportunity created by such system-level crises to lead a mass mobilization to seize state power, either through elections or through an insurrectionary overthrow of the existing regime. Once in control of the state, the first task is to rapidly refashion the state itself to make it a suitable weapon of ruptural transformation, and then use that power to repress the opposition of the dominant classes and their allies, dismantle the pivotal power structures of capitalism, and build the necessary institutions for the long-term development of an alternative economic system.

In the 20th century, various versions of this general line of reasoning animated the imagination of revolutionaries around the world. Revolutionary Marxism infused struggles with hope and optimism, for it not only provided a potent indictment of the world as it existed, but also provided a plausible scenario for how an emancipatory alternative could be realized. This gave people courage, sustaining the belief that they were on the side of history and that the enormous commitment and sacrifices they were called on to make in their struggles against capitalism had real prospects of eventually succeeding. And sometimes, if rarely, such struggles did culminate in the revolutionary seizure of state power.

The results of such revolutionary seizures of power, however, were never the creation of a democratic, egalitarian, emancipatory alternative to capitalism. While revolutions in the name of socialism and communism did demonstrate that it was possible “to build a new world from the ashes of the old,” and in certain specific ways they may have improved the material conditions of life of most people for a period of time, the evidence of the heroic attempts at rupture in the 20th century is that they do not produce the kind of new world envisioned in revolutionary ideology. It is one thing to burn down old institutions and social structures; it is quite another to build emancipatory new institutions from the ashes.

Why the revolutions of the 20th century never resulted in robust, sustainable human emancipation is, of course, a hotly debated matter. Some people argue that this was just because of the historically specific, unfavorable circumstances of the attempts at system-wide ruptures. Revolutions occurred in economically backward societies, surrounded by powerful enemies. Some argue it was because of strategic errors of the leadership of those revolutions. Others indict the motives of leadership: the leaders that triumphed in the course of these revolutions were motivated by desires for status and power rather than the empowerment and wellbeing of the masses. And still others argue that failure is intrinsic to any attempt at radical rupture in a social system. There are too many moving parts, too much complexity and too many unintended consequences. As a result, attempts at system-rupture will inevitably tend to unravel into such chaos that revolutionary elites, regardless of their motives, will be compelled to resort to pervasive violence and repression to sustain social order. Such violence, in turn, destroys the possibility for a genuinely democratic, participatory process of building a new society.

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.