### 1

#### Our Interpretation is the affirmative should instrumentally defend the resolution – hold the line, CX and the 1AC prove there’s no I-meet – anything new in the 1AR is either extra-T since it includes the non-topical parts of the Aff or effects-T since it’s a future result of the advocacy which both link to our offense.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### [4] Standards to Prefer:

#### First - Fairness – radically re-contextualizing the resolution lets them defend any method tangentially related to the topic exploding Limits, which erases neg ground via perms and renders research burdens untenable by eviscerating predictable limits. Procedural questions come first – debate is a game and it makes no sense to skew a competitive activity as it requires effective negation which incentivizes argument refinement, but skewed burdens deck pedagogical engagement.

#### [Optional] Fairness turns the Aff – 1] Solutions to status quo unfairness should not be to remove them for all but work to ensure that fairness in every instance is remedied and 2] An unlimited topic hurts low-income and minority debaters by allowing big schools infinite capacity to break non-T Affs – for people who can’t afford to work on debate full-time due to income concerns, their interp says unless you prep out every possible Aff, you will always lose.

#### Second - Clash – picking any grounds for debate precludes the only common point of engagement, which obviates preround research and incentivizes retreat from controversy by eliminating any effective clash. Only the process of negation distinguishes debate and discussion by necessitating iterative testing and effective engagement, but an absence of constant refinement dooms revolutionary potential.

#### Third – SSD – their model that allows them to side-step the topic on both the Aff and Neg hurts debate as a site of role experimentation – choosing to individually engage both sides solves argument refinement and self-reflexivity breeding constantly evolving methodology which is key to activist resistance BUT side-stepping it ingrains ideological dogmatism by imposing artificial lines in the sand for what not to experiment replicating imperial ideologies about exclusion.

#### TVA – Read an aff that advocates for Asian Heg

#### TVA is terminal defense – proves our models aren’t mutually exclusive - any response to the substance of the TVA is offense for us because it proves our model allows for clear contestation. Form over Content doesn’t take it out since we don’t restrict Form, just the substantive burden of the Aff.

#### Prefer Competing Interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom. This means reject Aff Impact Turns predicated on their theory since we weren’t able to adequately prepare for it.

### 2

#### PIC: We endorse the aff besides reading it against another Asian debater in debate

#### Solves all of your offense—allows you to engage in modes of transpacifism against other debaters besides Asians

#### DAs:

#### 1] Negation---if your aff is true, you force us to negate our own identity by defending the model minority as good or that there is no impact etc which is psychologically violent. Two impacts:

#### A] That fractures collectivity for your movement and destroys coalitions by pitting Asians against each other which is a tool of the white man.

#### B] Causes psychological violence for Asian debaters which outweighs by making the debate space non-inclusive

### 3

#### Capitalism causes massive violence and inevitable extinction – the fundamental task is developing tools for organization and tactics to bring about revolution.

Escalante ‘19

[Alyson, revolutionary Marxist (duh), philosophy at U of Oregon. 09/08/2019. “Truth and Practice: The Marxist Theory of Knowledge”. <https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/09/08/truth-and-practic-the-marxist-theory-of-knowledge/>] Pat

The world we live in today is in a dire state. Climate destruction continues at a fast pace, and every with every passing day, capitalism proves itself to be incapable of addressing this. Capitalist production and its endless drive for resources to match artificial market demands has created a climate crisis that leaves us on the brink of potential extinction.

Governments around the world are turning to far right and fascist leaders to assuage their fears of an uncertain future, and the most marginalized and oppressed suffer because of it. Fascism is on the rise, and history tells us very clearly what that can result in without opposition.

The decaying US empire continues to lash out in violence across the globe in a desperate attempt to re-assert its power and hegemony. Whole countries are destroyed in its desperate bids for more fossil fuels. The world burns from America’s white phosphorus weaponry.

The need for a revolutionary movement capable of replacing capitalism with something better has never been so clear. The choice between socialism or barbarism has never been so stark. More and more people are starting to realize that reform cannot save us, that capitalism and imperialism themselves are the problem, and that we must unite and band together to fight for a better world.

The question then is: how will we know what strategies, what tactics, and what ideas to unite around? If the skeptics and postmodernists are correct that knowledge is always relative and localized, then we cannot built a global and universal strategy to unite around. If they are correct then we are doomed to small acts of localized or individual resistance in the face of apocalypse. To embrace such a vision of the world (with its accompanying epistemological skepticism) is to embrace defeat.

The masses do not want to embrace defeat, they want to know how to fight back. Marxism can provide the tools necessary to engage in that fight.

Marxism, with its self criticism and its insistence on incorporating the valuable ideas of its critics has created a means for unifying workers across the globe with anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. The Marxist belief in the possibility of true ideas, tested and verified in practice, creates the possibility for unity on a global scale. The scientific status of Marxism means that as our climate changes, as our world looks more and more grim, Marxism will adapt through struggle and practice; it will provide us with the ideas and tools we need to fight and win.

There will be no victory for the workers of the world without the ability to wield a revolutionary science. What is at stake in questions of Marxist epistemology is the very possibility of creating a philosophical and scientific basis for revolution. We must defend this possibility. We must defend the scientific status of Marxism, and must insist on the possibility of victory.

#### Labor competition was the foundation of Asian exploitation – their language games are meaningless and cede the question to neoliberal ends.

San Juan Jr. ‘91

(E, PhD. “Beyond Identity Politics: The Predicament of the Asian American Writer in Late Capitalism”. American Literary History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 542-565) rc/Pat

With the presumed collapse of the transcendental grounds for universal standards of norms and values, proponents of the postmodern “revolution” in cultural studies in Europe and North America have celebrated differance, marginality, nomadic and decentered identities, indeterminacy, simulacra and the sublime, undecidability, ironic dissemination, textuality, and so forth. A multiplicity of power plays and language games supposedly abounds. The intertextuality of power, desire, and interest begets strategies of positionalities. So take your pick. Instead of the totalizing master narratives of Enlightenment progress, postmodern thinkers valorize the local, the heterogeneous, the contingent and conjunctural. Is it still meaningful to speak of truth? Are we still permitted to address issues of class, gender, and race? What are the implications of this postmodern “transvaluation” of paradigms for literary studies in general and minority/ ethnic writing in particular? One salutary repercussion has been the questioning of the Eurocentric canonical archive by feminists, peoples of color, dissenters inside and outside. The poststructuralist critique of the self-identical Subject (by convention white, bourgeois, patriarchal) has inspired a perspectivalist revision of various disciplinary approaches in history, comparative aesthetics, and others. To cite three inaugural examples: Houston Baker’s text-specific inventory of the black vernacular “blues” tradition presented in Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature (1984), Arnold Krupat’s foregrounding of oral tribal allegory in American Indian autobiographies enabled by a “materially situated historicism” in The Voice in the Margin (1989), and Ramon Saldivar’s dialectical assessment of Chicano narrative as an “oppositional articulation” of the gaps and silences in American literary history, a thesis vigorously argued in Chicano Narrative (1990). Premised on the notion that everything is socio-discursively constructed, these initiatives so far have not been paralleled by Asian American intellectuals. Who indeed will speak for this composite group? One would suspect that the rubric “Asian American,” itself an artificial hypostasis of unstable elements, would preemptively vitiate any unilateral program of systematization. In addition, Asian Americans’ being judged by media and government as a “model minority,” some allegedly whiter than whites (see Themstrom 252; Lee), makes their marginality quite problematic. Perhaps more than other peoples of color, Asian Americans find themselves trapped in a classic postmodern predicament: essentialized by the official pluralism as formerly the “Yellow Peril” and now the “Superminority,” they nevertheless seek to reaffirm their complex internal differences in projects of hybrid and syncretic genealogy. Objectified by state-ordained juridical exclusions (Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos share this historically unique commonality), they pursue particularistic agendas for economic and cultural autonomy. Given these antinomic forces at work, can Asian American writers collectively pursue a “molecular micropolitics” of marginality? What is at stake if a well-known authority on ethnic affairs like Ronald Takaki (whose recent book affords a point of departure for my metacommentary) tries to articulate the identity-in-difference of this fragmented and dispersed ensemble of ethnoP. (see Grigulevich and Kozlov 17-44). How does a postmodern politics of identity refract the innovative yet tradition-bound performances of the Chinese American Maxine Hong Kingston and the Filipino American Carlos Bulosan? Given the crisis of the postmodern politics of identity, can we legitimately propose an oppositional “emergency” strategy of writing whose historic agency is still on trial or, as it were, on reprieve? My inquiry begins with remarks on Asian American history’s textuality as prelude to its possible aesthetic inscription. In composing Strangers from a Different Shore in a period when the planet is beginning to be homogenized by a new pax EuroAmericana, a “New World Order” spawning (as I write) from the Persian Gulf, Takaki has performed for us the unprecedented task of unifying the rich, protean, intractable diversity of Asian lives in the US without erasing the specificities, the ramifying genealogies, the incommensurable repertoire of idiosyncrasies of each constituent group—a postmodern feat of reconciling incommensurables, to say the least. There are of course many discrete chronicles of each Asian community, mostly written by sympathetic Euro-American scholars before Takaki’s work. But what distinguishes Takaki’s account, aside from his empathy with his subject and documentary trustworthiness, is its claim to represent the truth based on the prima facie experiences of individuals. At once we are confronted with the crucial problem plaguing such claims to veracity or authenticity: Can these subalterns represent themselves (to paraphrase Gayatri Spivak) as self-conscious members of a collectivity for-itself? Or has Takaki mediated the immediacy of naive experience with a theory of representation that privileges the homo economicus as the founding subject of his discourse? No one should underestimate Takaki’s achievement here in challenging the tenability of the received dogma (espoused by Nathan Glazer and other neoconservative pundits) that the European immigrant model of successful assimilation applies to peoples of color in the US (see Takaki, “Reflections”). Europe’s Others, hitherto excluded from the canonical tradition, are beginning to speak and present themselves so as to rectify the mystifying re-presentation of themselves. In this light, Takaki is to be credited above all for giving Asian Americans a synoptic view of their deracinated lives by making them (as protagonists who discover their roles and destinies in the process) perform the drama of their diverse singularities. This is stage-managed within the framework of a chronological history of their ordeals in struggling to survive, adapt, and multiply in a hostile habitat, with their accompanying rage and grief and laughter. By a montage of personal testimony—anecdotes, letters, songs, telegrams, eyewitness reports, confessions, album photographs, quotidian fragments, cliches and banalities of everyday life—juxtaposed with statistics, official documents, reprise of punctual events, Takaki skillfully renders a complex drama of Asians enacting and living their own history. We can perhaps find our own lives already anticipated, pantomimed, rounded off, and judged in one of his varied “talk stories”—a case of life imitating the art of history. Granted the book’s “truth-effects,” I enter a caveat. For all its massive accumulation of raw data and plausible images of numerous protagonists and actions spanning more than a century of wars and revolutions, Takaki’s narrative leaves us wondering whether the collective life-trajectory of Asian Americans imitates the European immigrant success story, spiced with quaint “Oriental” twists—which he clearly implies at the end. If so, it is just one thread of the national fabric, no more tormented nor pacified than any other. If not, then this history is unique in some way that escapes the traditional emplotment of previous annals deriving from the master narrative of hu mankind’s continuous material improvement, self-emancipation, and techno-administrative mastery conceived by the philosophes of the European Enlightenment. Either way, there is no reason for Asian Americans to feel excluded from the grand March of Progress. Our puzzlement, however, is not clarified by the book’s concluding chapter, which exposes the myth of the “model minority” in an eloquent argument, assuring us that Asian Americans did not “let the course of their lives be determined completely by the ‘necessity’ of race and class” (473). In the same breath Takaki warns of a resurgent tide of racially motivated attacks against Asian Americans manifested in the media, in campus harassments, in the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin mistaken for a Japanese by unemployed Detroit autoworkers (and, I might add here, in the January 1989 massacre of Vietnamese and Cambodian schoolchildren in Stockton, California, by a man obsessed with hatred for Southeast Asian refugees). During this same period, in contrast, the judicial victory of the Japanese concentration camp internees’ demand for redress and reparations as well as the growing visibility of Asian American artists furnishes convincing proof that what David Harvey calls the post-Fordist post-Keynesian system (173-78) still allows dreams to come true, that is, allows Asian Americans the opportunity in particular “to help America accept and appreciate its diversity.” Calculating the losses and gains, Takaki prudentially opts for a meliorative closure. In retrospect, the telos of Strangers from a Different Shore can be thematized as the Asian immigrants’ almost miraculous struggle for survival and recognition of their desperately won middle-class status. What is sought is the redemption of individual sacrifices by way of conformity to the utilitarian, competitive ethos of a business society. Reversing the dismaying prospect for Asian Americans forecast in an earlier survey, American Racism (1970) by Roger Daniels and Harry Kitano, Takaki offers a balance sheet for general consumption: Asian Americans are no longer victimized by legislation denying them naturalized citizenship and landownership. They have begun to exercise their political voices and have representatives in both houses of Congress as well as in state legislatures and on city councils. They enjoy much of the protection of civil rights laws that outlaw racial discrimination in employment as well as housing and that provide for affirmative action for racial minorities. They have greater freedom than did the earlier immigrants to embrace their own “diversity”—their own cultures as well as their own distinctive physical characteristics, such as their complexion and the shape of their eyes. (473-74) It now becomes clear that despite its encyclopedic scope and archival competence, Takaki’s somewhat premature synthesis is a learned endeavor to deploy a strategy of containment. His rhetoric activates a mode of comic emplotment where all problems are finally resolved through hard work and individual effort, inspired by past memories of clan solidarity and intuitive faith in a gradually improving future. What is this if not a refurbished version of the liberal ideology of a market-centered, pluralist society where all disparities in values and beliefs—nay, even the sharpest contradictions implicating race, class, and gender—can be harmonized within the prevailing structure of power relations? This is not to say that such attempts to empower disenfranchised nationalities are futile or deceptive. But what needs a more than gestural critique is the extent to which such reforms do not eliminate the rationale for the hierarchical, invidious categorizing of people by race (as well as by gender and class) and their subsequent deprivation. Lacking such self-reflection, unable to problematize his theoretical organon, Takaki has superbly accomplished the articulation of the **hegemonic doctrine of acquisitive/possessive liberalism** as the informing principle of Asian American lives. Whether this is an effect of postmodern tropology or a symptom of “bad faith” investing the logic of elite populism, I am not quite sure. My reservations are shared by other Asian American observers who detect an apologetic agenda in such **liberal historiography.** At best, Takaki’s text operates an ironic, if not duplicitous, strategy: to counter hegemonic Eurocentrism, which erases the Asian American presence, a positivist-empiricist valorization of “lived experience” is carried out within the master narrative of evolutionary, gradualist progress. The American “Dream of Success” is thereby ultimately vindicated. This is not to suggest that historians like Takaki have suddenly been afflicted with amnesia, forgetting that it is the totalizing state practice of this ideology of market liberalism that underlies, for one, the violent colonial domination of peoples of color and the rape of the land of such decolonizing territories as the Philippines (my country of origin) and Puerto Rico in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War. It is the social practice of an expansive political economy which converts humans to exchangeable commodities (African chattel slavery in the South) and commodified labor power, thus requiring for its industrial take-off a huge supply of free labor—hence the need for European immigrants, especially after the Civil War, and the genocidal suppression of the American Indians. It is the expansion of this social formation that recruited Chinese coolies for railroad construction (the “fathers” poignantly described in Kingston’s China Men) and Japanese and Filipino labor (and Mexican braceros later) for agribusiness in Hawaii and California and for the canneries in Alaska. It is this same hegemonic worldview of free monopoly enterprise, also known as the “civilizing mission” of Eurocentric humanism, that forced the opening of the China market in the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century and the numerous military interventions in China and Indochina up to the Vietnam War and the coming of the “boat people.” Of course it is also the power/knowledge episteme of the modernization process in Kenya, South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Grenada, and all the neocolonial or peripheral dependencies of the world-system named by Immanuel Wallerstein as “historical capitalism” (13-43; see Amin). It is now generally acknowledged that we cannot understand the situation of Asian Americans in the US today or in the past without a thorough comprehension of the global relations of power, the capitalist world-system that “pushed” populations from the colonies and dependencies and “pulled” them to terrain where a supply of cheap labor was needed. These relations of power broke up families, separating husbands from wives and parents from children; at present they motivate the “warm body export” of cheap labor from Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere. They legitimate the unregulated market for brides and hospitality girls, the free trade zones, and other postmodern schemes of capital accumulation in Third World countries. The discourse of the liberal free market underpins these power relations, constructing fluid georacial boundaries to guarantee the supply of cheap labor. Race acquires salience in this world-system when, according to John Rex, “the language of racial difference. . . becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. . . . The exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to Capitalism.. . . Ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation” (406-07). The colonization and industrialization of the North American continent epitomize the asymmetrical power relations characteristic of this world-system. The sociocultural formation of global apartheid has been long in the making. Studies like Eric Wolf’s Europe and the People Without History (1982) or Richard Bamet and Ronald Muller’s Global Reach (1974), to mention only the elementary texts, show that the migration of peoples around the world, the displacement of refugees, or the forced expulsion and exile of individuals and whole groups (the Palestinian diaspora is the most flagrant) have occurred not by choice or accident but by the complex interaction of political, economic, and social forces from the period of mercantile capitalism to colonialism, from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, continuing into the imperialism of the twentieth century. This genealogy of domination, the self-reproduction of its mechanisms and the sedimentation of its effects, is what is occluded in Takaki’s narrative (see Nakanishi).

#### Their attempt to stage a semiotic break is an act that conflates “materialism” with “materiality” – violence is not some amalgamation of signs but is instead about flesh and bone – their project fuels capitalist pedagogy.

McLaren 10 [Peter, UC-Los Angeles and Nathalia E. Jaramillo, Purdue University, “Not Neo-Marxist, Not Post-Marxist, Not Marxian, Not Autonomist Marxism: Reflections on a Revolutionary (Marxist) Critical Pedagogy” Cultural Studies <=> Critical Methodologies 2010 10: 251]

Ebert (2009; Ebert & Zavarzadeh, 2008) makes an important distinction between corporeality/materiality and matter/materialism. Materiality is related to objective idealism and refers to the acceptance of an idea in the mind as something real, something that escapes class interests. In this way, avant-garde scholars will deconstruct materialism as merely the effects of tropes and representations. It attempts to create a prefigurative origin for what is essentially an ontology. However, Ebert (2009) argues that this constitutes transforming materialism into materiality, into a contemplative corporeality of difference, purging materialism of its conceptuality and determinate meanings. Matter is turned into signs or the effect of signs or sign power. This has led to the recent interest in the politics of performativity—performing identities, performing pedagogy, performing class, and so on. However, Ebert argues that matter is not synonymous with physical objects; matter exists outside the consciousness of the subject, and it cannot be separated from its production and contradictions in history. Matter is objective reality in history. Ebert and Zavarzadeh (2008) characterize materialism as the objective (transformative) productive activities of humans involving them in social relations; these social relations occur under definite historical conditions that are independent of their will and are shaped by class struggle over the surplus produced by social labor. A materialism that excludes historical processes and operates as a medium of cultural practices is not materialism; it is materiality or what Ebert (2009) refers to as “matterism.” Avant-garde critics who would replace materialism with materiality (through the tropes of supplementarity, spectrality, undecidability, and difference) severely undercut the claim for the objectivity of class interests and ultimately replace class struggle with the struggle over the sign. Like Ebert, David McNally (2001) in his classic Marxist text, Bodies of Meaning, describes the deconstructive efforts of post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida as a form of linguistic idealism. In his critique of anti-fetishistic thought (like that of Marx), that palpates the farthest reach of linguistic meaning, Derrida devalues dialectical critique as useless by disavowing embodied human activity, by ignoring laboring human bodies and rejecting them as metaphysical illusions. When Derrida deals with issues of the economy, he is interested only in capital that begets capital—that is, in credit or fictitious capital. Likewise, in his critique of Saussure, he critiques the notion of a transcendental signified, a universal equivalent or what McNally refers to as meaning’s gold standard (something positive that can exist outside of an endless reference of commodities to other commodities). There is nothing extralinguistic for Derrida, since language suspends all reference to something outside of it. Similarly, for Derrida, money lacks a referent. It is driven by credit and speculation and lacks any material foundations. Derrida deals with fictitious or dematerialized money, money that can be produced without labor, that is, money as an expression of hyperreality. Capital in this view is nothing more than a self-engendering dance on a solipsistic path of self-fecundation. The real is folded into the representation. Derrida (and Baudrillard and others) assimilate the economy (the same one that is throwing people out of their homes and into the streets at present) into their poststructuralist model of language. Contrary to Derrida, Ebert and McNally maintain that value is not a sign freed from its referent; rather, value expresses itself in material form. It must pass through laboring bodies and their history of struggle, through toiling subjects and practical human activity that takes place in an organic social universe of skin, hair, blood, and bone. And capitalism abstracts from these bodies, and commodifies them. The work of McNally and Ebert implodes the limitations of post-structuralist thought in dealing with capitalist exploitation. According to Ebert (2009), revolutionary agents of social transformation act ethically when they attempt to resolve the contradictions of their objective location in relations of exploitation. Capitalist violence often doubles as cultural discourses, and Ebert views popular culture, especially, as a narcosis of violence, predicated on distracting subjects from the central antagonism of capitalist society—the struggles over the surplus labor of the other––thereby producing subjects who cannot grasp the totality of the system. In Ebert’s view, the pedagogical practices developed by the poststructuralist avant-garde theorize experience in relation to trauma, desire, and affective relations in general as if these relations were antiseptically cleaved from relations of class, thereby replacing a conceptual analysis of the social totality with liberating pedagogical narratives grounded in local affective strategies—strategies that serve unwittingly as epistemological covers for economic conditions that help the subject cope with the objective material conditions of capitalist exploitation. This leads ultimately to a de-historicization of social life and draws attention away from the way in which all human beings who populate capitalist societies are implicated in some manner in international class struggles and the social division of labor (see also Zavarzadeh, 2003). Ebert and Zavarzadeh describe this process as a “pedagogy of affect.” They write that The pedagogy of affect piles up details and warns students against attempting to relate them structurally because any structural analysis will be a causal explanation, and all causal explanations, students are told, are reductive. Teaching thus becomes a pursuit of floating details—a version of games in popular culture. Students seem to know but have no knowledge. This is exactly the kind of education capital requires for its new workforce: workers who are educated but nonthinking; skilled at detailed jobs but unable to grasp the totality of the system—energetic localists, ignorant globalists. This pedagogy provides instruction not in knowledge but in savviness—a knowing that knows what it knows is an illusion but is undeluded about that illusion; it integrates the illusion, thereby making itself immune to critique. Savviness is enlightened false consciousness: a consciousness that knows it is false, but its “falseness is already reflexively buffered.” (2008, pp. 107-108)

#### Vote negative for communist organizing – that requires collective struggle and the establishment of centralized organization to inform both theory and practice.

Kuhn ‘18

[Gabriel, Austrian-born writer and translator living in Sweden. Among his book publications is “All Power to the Councils! A Documentary History of the German Revolution of 1918-1919”. March 2018. “Don't Mourn, Organize! Is Communism a Pipe Dream—or a Viable Future?” <https://brooklynrail.org/2018/03/field-notes/Dont-Morn-Organize-Is-Communism-a-Pipe-Dreamor-a-Viable-Future>] Pat

The forms of organization this requires must go further than the affinity group but stop short of the vanguard party. Affinity groups do not answer the demand for mass organizing that mass societies require. But neither do vanguard parties. They attempt to lead the masses, not organize them, and that’s a big difference. The party model might in general be insufficient for mass organizing today. The networks that movementism gave way to are perhaps more appropriate, but only if they can overcome the assumption that the looser the connections are, the better. This assumption is wrong. Loose connections might suit the needs of an ever more flexible market economy, but not of effective political organizing. To “have contacts” is not enough; you need to do something with them. And you need to stay committed to the projects you initiate. I will try to flesh this out by listing the aspects I consider most important in organizing today.

1. We need to leave sectarianism behind. The left is weak and each additional division weakens it further. In a 2011 article titled “Movement, Cadre, and the Dual Power,” Joel Olson made a simple, yet very important observation: “We believe that the old arguments between communists and anarchists are largely irrelevant today.” This must be our point of departure.

2. We need theory that is adapted to our times. It must overcome the false contradiction between “class struggle” and “cultural struggle.” There is a fruitful debate about a “new class politics” in the German-speaking world. Sebastian Friedrich, one of its main proponents, drew these conclusions in an article published by Counterpunch:

A new class politics does not relegate gender, race, and imperial legacy to issues that are supplementary to class relations. These issues, and the struggles they imply, are an integral part of class relations. In fact, feminist, anti-racist, and anti-colonial struggles are the base on which effective unified class struggles must be launched.… A new class politics must clarify where and how the specific experiences of workers based on gender, race, citizenship, and other factors converge. It must reveal the overlapping interests of workers as members of the class. This makes common struggles possible.

3. We must not rely on the “objective forces” identified by historical materialism. Subjective forces are important for change. It is easy to underestimate how much neoliberalism shapes the lives even of people opposed to it. In the Global North, political activism has become a leisure activity that people engage in or not, depending on their mood, the identity they are trying to create for themselves, or the road of “self-improvement” they have chosen. In almost all cases, it is secondary to professional careers and personal comforts. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to get anything done. There is nothing wrong with being “voluntaristic.” Radical change is dependent on people wanting radical change, no matter how much Marxists still insist on economic realities determining individual consciousness and, therefore, individuals’ capacity for political action. An organization’s efficiency relies on the individual qualities of its members, that is, responsibility, reliability, and accountability.

Making Things Concrete

If we want communism to be more than a pipe dream, we have to be willing to face reality, even if it confuses, challenges, or even frightens us. We cannot ignore struggles that refer to communist ideals, simply because they aren’t the struggles we’d like to see. If our enthusiasm for communism remains limited to lecture halls and conference rooms, it won’t be anything the powerful will lose sleep over.

The struggle that currently receives most attention among communists of all stripes in the Global North is the one in Kurdistan. In Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan), forces affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, have established a direct-democratic council system, based on the “democratic confederalism” conceived by the imprisoned PKK leader Abduallah Öcalan. Öcalan describes democratic confederalism as “a non-state political administration or a democracy without a state,” and cites Murray Bookchin’s “libertarian municipalism” as a major influence. There are people who celebrate this as a form of anarchism. But as an observant friend of mine noted, an anarchism that is imposed by a leader is a strange kind of anarchism. Besides, there are reports from the ground that challenge the libertarian narrative. The editors of Lower Class Magazine, an online project dedicated to “low budget underground journalism,” travel regularly to Kurdistan and have the following to say:

The Western left sees Rojava as the realization of a democracy “from below”: communes, councils, a confederation; no hierarchies, no party, a spontaneous mass project. Anarchists and “libertarian” communists wax lyrically about the dawn of a direct-democratic Shangri-La. […] Yes, the change in Rojava comes “from below. It is based on the power of the people, no doubt. Communes and councils are at the heart of decision-making, that is true. But as essential is the following: None of this would be happening if it wasn’t for a vanguard leading the way. The revolution in Rojava proves that Leninist vanguardism is correct, not false.

Another European journalist visiting the region noted that the cadres of the People’s Protection Units, YPG, relate to the councils of Rojava in the same way the Bolshevists related to the councils of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, there are troubling pragmatic alliances, which have included collaboration with the U.S. military. Yet the people behind Rojava Solidarity NYC sum up the situation well:

Rojava, an autonomous region in Northern Syrian, the largest revolutionary territory of the 21st century, has projected anarchist and communist ideas to the forefront of political discourse and into the pragmatic and messy reality of everyday life. … From communal relationships to the councils and self-defense units, we can assess numerous potential routes by which we can create liberated communities at home, while learning from their possibilities and pitfalls.

Rojava won’t be the answer to our problems. No single struggle ever is. But the developments in Rojava challenge us to discuss real-life strategies for radical change. It is easy to focus on shortcomings, but if this is all we ever do, where will it get us?

Councils are essential for communist projects. Their power, which is based on the direct involvement and active participation of the masses, is curtailed as soon as political interest groups, such as parties, assume control over them. This conviction separated historical council communism, represented by figures such as Otto Rühle and Anton Pannekoek, from the Bolsheviks. Pannekoek wrote:

The councils are no government; not even the most central councils bear a governmental character. For they have no means to impose their will upon the masses; they have no organs of power. All social power is vested in the hands of the workers themselves.

Unless we want the transition to communism to entail enormous human suffering (which would be utterly absurd), we need to consider the fact that billions of people will need to be fed, sheltered, nursed, provided with access to clean water, and so forth. To produce according to the needs of the people rather than the needs of profit requires enormous efforts in planning, especially if current living standards are to be upheld. (Living standards don’t equal standards of consumption—the standards of consumption in the Global North cannot and should not be upheld, since they are unsustainable.) Furthermore, we must collectively dispose of industrial and nuclear waste, weapons of mass destruction, and ticking environmental bombs. None of this is possible without a level of centralization, no matter how visceral the reactions are that the word might provoke in some circles.

Only a council system can combine the centralization required by the complexity of modern societies with participative democracy. Centralization requires formal structures. Participative democracy requires these structures to be transparent. They need to be bottom-up rather than top-down, and delegates must be directly responsible to their constituencies. The council system is the only administrative framework to provide that.

Romanticizing particular struggles rarely does any good, no matter how council-based they are—or claim to be. If radicals in the Global North fail to address concerns with respect to struggles in the Global South, it is not respectful but condescending. To escape into the intellectual poverty of cultural relativism doesn’t help. We can only evolve from critical engagement. But real-life struggles are our starting point. It makes little sense to demand struggles for communism if we shy away from engaging with the ones that exist. Arundhati Roy put it simply after spending time with Maoist Naxalites in the forests of central India, an experience she chronicled in the book Walking with the Comrades. She said: “I went in because I wanted to tell the story of who these people are.” This informs revolutionary theory and, in turn, improves revolutionary practice. Most importantly, it is crucial for saving communist struggles from betraying their own principles. Everyone can watch failure unfold. The challenge lies in helping to prevent it.

### Case

#### Interp: Debaters may not gain offense off of performative methods. To clarify, you can read it, you just cant gain offense off of it. Violation – the ROB says you vote off of performance. Prefer 1] Resolvability 2] Psychic Violence – a) judges b) debaters proper 3] Limits

#### ROB is to vote for the better debater- anything else is self serving and arbitrary.

#### Vote neg on presumption –

#### A) Nothing spills over – there’s no connection between the ballot and chancing people’s attitudes. You encourage more teams to read framework which turns your offense and prevents the alteration of mindsets.

#### B) No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

#### C) Debate – none of their evidence is specific to it – sets a high threshold for solvency and ignores how communicative norms operate.

#### D) Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### That moots the value of their performance –

#### A) Impact calc – only weigh impacts they can draw a causal connection to with solvency – systems of power aren’t offense against framework because they don’t have an internal-link to how the aff solves that

#### Embedding hope for liberation to an object like a ballot enacts cruel optimism that the 1AC’s rhetoric sustains.

Berlant 06 Lauren, professor of Literature at the University of Chicago. “Cruel Optimism” in Differences, 17.3. 2006.

When we talk about an object of desire, we are really talking about a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us. This cluster of promises could be embedded in a person, a thing, an institution, a text, a norm, a bunch of cells, smells, a good idea—whatever. To phrase “the object of desire” as a cluster of promises is to allow us to encounter what is incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality, but as an explanation for our sense of our endurance in the object, insofar as prox- imity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us while others not so much. In other words, all attachments are optimistic. That does not mean that they all feel optimistic: one might dread, for example, returning to a scene of hunger or longing or the slapstick reiteration of a lover or parent’s typi- cal misrecognition. But the surrender to the return to the scene where the object hovers in its potentialities is the operation of optimism as an affective form (see Ghent). “Cruel optimism” names a relation of attachment to compromised conditions of possibility. What is cruel about these attachments, and not merely inconvenient or tragic, is that the subjects who have x in their lives might not well endure the loss of their object or scene of desire, even though its presence threatens their well-being, because whatever the content of the attachment, the continuity of the form of it provides something of the continuity of the subject’s sense of what it means to keep on living on and to look forward to being in the world. This phrase points to a condition different than that of melancholia, which is enacted in the subject’s desire to temporize an experience of the loss of an object/scene with which she has identified her ego continuity. Cruel optimism is the condition of maintaining an attachment to a problematic object in advance of its loss.¶ One might point out that all objects/scenes of desire are prob- lematic, in that investments in them and projections onto them are less about them than about the cluster of desires and affects we manage to keep magnetized to them. I have indeed wondered whether all optimism is cruel, because the experience of loss of the conditions of its reproduction can be so breathtakingly bad. But some scenes of optimism are crueler than others: where cruel optimism operates, the very vitalizing or ani- mating potency of an object/scene of desire contributes to the attrition of the very thriving that is supposed to be made possible in the work of attachment in the first place. This might point to something as banal as a scouring love, but it also opens out to obsessive appetites, patriotism, a career, all kinds of things. One makes affective bargains about the costliness of one’s attachments, usually unconscious ones, most of which keep one in proximity to the scene of desire/attrition.¶ To understand cruel optimism as an aesthetic of attachment requires embarking on an analysis of the modes of rhetorical indirection that manage the strange activity of projection into an enabling object that is also disabling. I learned how to do this from reading Barbara Johnson’s work on apostrophe and free indirect discourse. In her poetics of indi- rection, each of these rhetorical modes is shaped by the ways a writing subjectivity conjures other ones so that, in a performance of phantasmatic intersubjectivity, the writer gains superhuman observational authority, enabling a performance of being made possible by the proximity of the object. Because the dynamics of this scene are something like what I am describing in the optimism of attachment, I will describe the shape of my transference with her thought