### 1AC - Framing

**The meta ethic should be moral pluralism. Prefer-**

#### [1] Empirics- Best studies prove pluralistic tendencies are inevitable

Polzler and Wright 19[Thomas Pölzler and Jennifer Cole Wright- “Empirical research on folk moral objectivism” <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6686698/> NCBI. Published July 5th 2019]

Examining these studies' results more closely, however, makes it less clear whether this interpretation is appropriate (Pölzler, 2018b). Take again Goodwin and Darley's study. In this study, almost 30% of subjects' responses to the disagreement measure and almost 50% of their responses to the truth‐aptness measure fell on the option that the researchers took to be indicative of subjectivism (Goodwin & Darley, 2008, pp. 1347, 1351). Moreover, while some moral statements were dominantly classified as objective (e.g., the above statement about robbery), many others were dominantly classified as nonobjective (e.g., the stem cell research statement). This suggests that subjects in Goodwin and Darley's study may have actually favored what Wright, Grandjean, and McWhite (2013) called “metaethical pluralism,” i.e., they sometimes sided with objectivism and other times with nonobjectivism. More recent studies have by and large confirmed this hypothesis of folk metaethical pluralism. Wright et al. (2013) and Wright, McWhite, and Grandjean (2014), for example, replicated Goodwin and Darley's results, using the exact same measures, but letting subjects classify the presented statements as moral and nonmoral themselves. Objectivity ratings for statements that were dominantly self‐classified as moral varied between as little as 5% and as much as 85%. Research based on different measures yielded high proportions of intrapersonal variation as well (e.g., Beebe, 2014; Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, & Endara, 2015; Beebe & Sackris, 2016; Fisher, Knobe, Strickland, & Keil, 2017; Goodwin & Darley, 2012; Heiphetz & Young, 2017; Wright, 2018; Zijlstra, forthcoming‐a).2

#### Thus, the standard is promoting pragmatic deliberation. Prefer-

#### [1] TJFS- Frameworks should be fair/educational like any other argument. A] Inclusion – Agonism definitionally is a procedural for allowing almost any argumentation in the debate space which controls the internal link to inclusion which is an impact multiplier B] Resource Disparities- Discursive frameworks ensure big squads don’t have a comparative advantage since debates become about quality of arguments rather than quantity and require a higher level of analytic thinking that small schools have.

#### [2] Value Pluralism- Other ethical theories rely on minimalistic criteria as their foundation, our framework resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments LaFollete 2K "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Bracketed for grammer

Employs criteria, but is not criterial The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practiceis primary in philosophy rulesoutthe hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteriaare not discovered by pure reason, and they arenotfixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. Asweobtainnewevidenceabout ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, wefindthat whatwasappropriatefor the old environment maynotbeconduciveto survival in thenew [world]one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. Themoralworldiscomplexandchangeable**.** No set of criteriacouldgiveusunivocalanswersabouthowwe should behave in all circumstances**.** If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and asour environmentschange. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmaticcriteriaare not external rules we apply, but aretoolsweuseinmakinginformedjudgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergentcriteriacanbecomeintegratedinto our habits**,** thereby informingthe waysthat wereactto, think about, and imagine ourworldsand our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Othermoral theoriescan help us isolate(and habitually focus on) morallyrelevantfeaturesof action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. Thepragmatistabsorbstheseinsightsinto her habits, andthereby shapeshowshehabituallyresponds**,** and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way

#### [3] Performativity- Responding to our framework concedes the validity of agonism since that in and of itself is a process of contestation that agonism would say is valuable and necessary for spaces like debate to function.

### 1AC – Offense

#### 1] Reducing IP is a method of global solidarity by manifesting intra-country cooperation.

Jecker and Atuire 7/7 [Nancy S Jecker (professor of bioethics and philosophy at the University of Washington School of Medicine, Department of Bioethics and Humanities) and Caesar A Atuire (PhD in Philosophy from the Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum, Rome, Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy and Classics at the University of Ghana, Legon). “What’s yours is ours: waiving intellectual property protections for COVID-19 vaccines”. Journal of Medical Ethics. July 7 2021. Accessed 7/22/21. <https://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2021/07/06/medethics-2021-107555> //Xu]

We turn next to positive ethical arguments for temporarily waiving IP protections, which appeal to the values of globally solidarity and corporate responsibility. Global solidarity underscores that during the COVID-19 pandemic, each nation’s interests are entwined with the interests of every other.22 Just as it is impossible for any nation standing alone to address the threat to human health climate change raises, it is impossible for any single nation to meet the challenge that COVID-19 and future pandemics present. Instead, humanity must stand together. In the past, nations have failed to do so. The epidemic of HIV/AIDS in Africa illustrates. Shamefully, it took nearly a decade for the first antiretroviral drugs to reach the African continent, even though Africa was the hardest hit region and antiretroviral drugs provided 90% mortality reduction. Although the US government was an early investor in research that produced antiviral drugs for HIV, distribution was controlled by big pharmaceutical companies driven by profit. The USA and other wealthy countries repeated this mistake during the COVID-19 pandemic, supporting vaccine developers without requiring technology transfers and donations to COVAX (the multilateral partnership supplying vaccines to LMICs). Ethically, the task ahead is fixing a problem of human making. A second argument, based on corporate social responsibility, stresses expectations for and benefits of socially responsible behaviour by for-profit companies. Increasingly, companies appreciate the potential impact that socially responsible behaviour has on competitive advantage, reputation, retention of workers and customers, employee morale and relationships with stakeholders.23 IP protections shield pharmaceutical companies from competition, enabling them to monopolise markets and generate above-normal profits. During a pandemic, social responsibility requires temporarily limiting profits and requiring companies to give back, rather than allowing above-normal profits to accrue unchecked. Even Locke, who conceived of our modern notion of property rights, held that fundamental rights like property could be justly overridden under certain conditions, namely, when the goods are perishable and would go to waste or when their extraction may intrude on the common good, in which case they extend only to what leaves enough behind for others.24 Building on this analysis, we submit that displays of social responsibility fall along a continuum. During the COVID-19 pandemic, a high degree of responsibility would be shown by temporarily sharing patents for products aimed at preventing, containing, or treating COVID-19, which is India and South Africa’s proposal; moderate responsibility would be demonstrated by temporarily sharing licenses to manufacture COVID-19 vaccines, as the WTO Director General proposes; and minimal responsibility would be shown by sending vaccines directly to nations in response to pleas for help, which Pfizer did when it pledged up to 40 million doses of its vaccine to COVAX (which represents under 2% of the 2.5 billion doses Pfizer will produce in 2021).25

### 1AC – Fun

#### [1] The role of the ballot is to determine whether the resolution is a true or false statement – anything else moots 6 minutes of the ac - a priori's 1st – even worlds framing requires ethics that begin from a priori principles like reason or pleasure so we control the internal link to functional debates.

#### Here’s how logic works

#### [2] Liar’s Paradox – the resolution is always true

**Camus** [Albert Camus (existentialist). “The Myth of Sisyphus.” Penguin Books. 1975(originally published 1942). Accessed 12/11/19. Pg 22. Copy on hand. Houston Memorial DX]

The mind’s first step is to distinguish what is true from what is false. However, as soon as thought reflects on itself, what it first discovers is a contradiction. Useless to strive to be convincing in this case. Over the centuries no one has furnished a clearer and more elegant demonstration of the business than Aristotle: “The often ridiculed consequence of these opinions is that they destroy themselves. For by asserting that all is true we assert the truth of the contrary assertion and consequently the falsity of our own thesis (for the contrary assertion does not admit that it can be true). And if one says that all is false, that assertion is itself false. If we declare that solely the assertion opposed to ours is false or else that solely ours is not false, we are nevertheless forced to admit an infinite number of true or false judgments. For the one who expresses a true assertion proclaims simultaneously that it is true, and so on ad infinitum.”

#### [3] Overthinking paradox- the 1NC is a form of unnecessary overthinking that prevents decisions to be made so don’t evaluate it

**Wikipedia** [Brackets Original. “Analysis Paralysis”. Wikipedia. No Date. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonini%27s_paradox>]

Analysis paralysis (or paralysis by analysis) describes an individual or group process when overanalyzing or overthinking a situation can cause forward motion or decision-making to become [frozen] "paralyzed", meaning that no solution or course of action is decided upon. A situation may be deemed too complicated and a decision is never made, due to the fear that a potentially larger problem may arise. A person may desire a perfect solution, but may fear making a decision that could result in error, while on the way to a better solution. Equally, a person may hold that a superior solution is a short step away, and stall in its endless pursuit, with no concept of diminishing returns. On the opposite end of the time spectrum is the phrase extinct by instinct, which is making a fatal decision based on hasty judgment or a gut reaction.

#### [4] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.

#### [5] Principle of explosion is true which proves the resolution true.

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of**[**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

1. We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**
2. **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.
3. However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.**

#### [6] Dogmatism Paradox – disregard the 1NC

Sorensen Sorensen, Roy, Professor of Philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis. "Epistemic Paradoxes.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 21 June 2006. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemic-paradoxes/>. PeteZ

Saul Kripke’s ruminations on the surprise test paradox led him to a paradox about dogmatism. He lectured on both paradoxes at Cambridge University to the Moral Sciences Club in 1972. (A descendent of this lecture now appears as Kripke 2011). Gilbert Harman transmitted Kripke’s new paradox as follows: If I know that h is true, I know that any evidence against h is evidence against something that is true; I know that such evidence is misleading. But I should disregard evidence that I know is misleading. So, once I know that h is true, I am in a position to disregard any future evidence that seems to tell against h. (1973, 148)

#### [7] Vote aff because it’s simple – evaluating responses to this is complicated so don’t

Baker 04’ [Baker, Alan, 10-29-2004, "Simplicity (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/simplicity/>]

With respect to question (ii), there is an important distinction to be made between two sorts of simplicity principle. Occam's Razor may be formulated as an epistemic principle: if theory T is simpler than theory T\*, then it is rational (other things being equal) to believe T rather than T\*. Or it may be formulated as a methodological principle: if T is simpler than T\* then it is rational to adopt T as one's working theory for scientific purposes. These two conceptions of Occam's Razor require different sorts of justification in answer to question (iii). In analyzing simplicity, it can be difficult to keep its two facets—elegance and parsimony—apart. Principles such as Occam's Razor are frequently stated in a way which is ambiguous between the two notions, for example, “Don't multiply postulations beyond necessity.” Here it is unclear whether ‘postulation’ refers to the entities being postulated, or the hypotheses which are doing the postulating, or both. The first reading corresponds to parsimony, the second to elegance. Examples of both sorts of simplicity principle can be found in the quotations given earlier in this section.

#### [8] Affirm because either the neg is true meaning its bad for us to clash w/ it because it turns us into Fake News people OR it’s not meaning it’s a lie that you can’t vote on for ethics

#### [9] Decision Making Paradox- in order to judge we need a decision-making procedure to determine it is a good decision. But to chose a decision-making procedure requires another meta level decision making procedure leading to infinite regress so just vote aff to break the paradox.

#### [10] GCB- I am the greatest conceivable being so vote for me because I am infinitely good. To prove this, I will make them contest the aff and say they are not under my control.

#### [11] Negative arguments presuppose the aff being true since they begin with a descriptive premise about the affirmative such as the aff does x, and then justify why x is bad. However, if the aff does not have truth value, that entails the descriptive premise would also not have truth value, which is contradictory.

#### [12] Negating affirms because it assumes that the 1ac is a statement that is worthy of contestation which means are arguments are legitimate.

### 1AC – Underview

#### Treat each theoretical argument as drop the debater – they have the ability to meet them but chose not to and its key to normset

#### [1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, no rvis and the highest layer of the round – 1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off – no RVIs or 2NR theory and paradigm issues– 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### [2] No 2NR “I meet” arguments

#### A] Skews theory ground because they’re each a NIB for me to winning theory which kills my ability to check abuse.

#### B] Skews time, they can make three minutes of blippy I meets that I can’t cover because the 2AR is too short.

#### [3] No new 2n arguments, weighing, and paradigm issues. a) overloads the 2AR with a massive clarification burden b) it becomes impossible to check NC abuse if you can dump on reasons the shell doesn't matter in the 2NR – c) neg has access to bidirectional shells which makes neg shells impossible to meet and impact turns your reading of the shells since I’ll always lose on an interpretation

#### [4] Check all neg interps and K/DA links in CX – 1) avoids infinite regress due to links and interps 2) otherwise reevlaute under the neg’s K 3) norms – you’d do the same with TFW

#### [5] The neg may not read nibs or OCIs (offensive counterinterps) a) you can up-layer for 7 minutes that I have to answer before I even have access to offense b) inf neg abuse since you would just read 7 mins of auto-negate arguments c) OCIs are just shorter theory args they can blow up. This means they must only line by line aff arguments, since otherwise they function as nibs before I access warrants.

#### [6] No neg analytics - I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy arguments in the NC since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win.

#### [7] No neg arguments – skews me to answer those. Answering this triggers a contradiction since it relies on an analytic argument and those affirm since I spoke first and they were your fault for creating.

#### [8] The neg may not read meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the NC and 2N, up-layering my attempt means we never get to the best norm. This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair.

#### [9] Reject out of round violations since a) you can pull up someone saying the f word and reading the k which polarizes argumentation and means someone always loses b) not jurisdictional since the judge can only vote for the better debate, the violation doesn't happen in round.

#### [10] The neg may not read overview answers to aff arguments – they can up-layer all aff arguments for 7 minutes and the 1ar has to shift through it all. I have a computer virus that prevents changing font size and everything’s in an overview.

#### [11] Aff theory first – it’s a much larger strategic loss because 1min is ¼ of the 1AR vs 1/7 of the 1NC which means there’s more abuse if I’m devoting a larger fraction of time. Reject all neg args against the ROB because they assume the ROB is true, and eval theory after the 1ar to prevent a 6 min 2nr docbot.

#### [12] Neg shells may not be bidirectional because they should be aff specific. If they are, drop them for exacerbating time skew which is lexically prior.

#### [13] Refer to me in theory violation as koustubh– anything else justifies misnaming and destroys predictability since I don’t know what they refer to

#### [14] Allow new 2ar responses to nc arguments but not new 2n responses a) reciprocity - the NC has 7 minutes of rebuttal time while I only have 4 minutes, the 2ar makes it 7-7. b) Time skew – the 2n can overload the aff with args and makes the 2a impossible – allows for the neg to auto-win every round

#### [15] Theory or K indicts on spikes is drop the arg a] my theory paradigms are simply presented models for debate b] its key to reciprocity since one line shouldn’t warrant the death penalty

#### [16] All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means you need an rvi to become offensive. You should accept all aff interps and assume I meet neg theory since the aff speaks in the dark and I have to take a stance on something, you can at least react and adapt.

#### [17] I don’t have to take a stance on anything in cross – a) judges don’t flow it b) let’s the 2NR go all in on something I wasn’t prepared for

#### [18] The neg debater must say the words “praise the spaghetti monster” once every speech – anything else causes the spaghetti monster to kill us all which is a reason to reject them

#### [23] Plan – The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines by implementing a one-and-done approach for patent protection.

Feldman 3 Robin Feldman 2-11-2019 "‘One-and-done’ for new drugs could cut patent thickets and boost generic competition" <https://www.statnews.com/2019/02/11/drug-patent-protection-one-done/> (Arthur J. Goldberg Distinguished Professor of Law, Albert Abramson ’54 Distinguished Professor of Law Chair, and Director of the Center for Innovation)//SidK + Elmer

I believe that one period of protection **should be enough**. We should make the legal changes necessary to prevent companies **from building patent walls** and piling up mountains of rights. This could be accomplished **by a “one-and-done” approach** for patent protection. Under it, a drug would receive just one period of exclusivity, and no more. The choice of which “one” could be left entirely in the hands of the pharmaceutical company, with the election made when the FDA approves the drug. Perhaps development of the drug went swiftly and smoothly, so the remaining life of one of the drug’s patents is of greatest value. Perhaps development languished, so designation as an orphan drug or some other benefit would bring greater reward. The choice would be up to the company itself, based on its own calculation of the maximum benefit. The result, however, is that a pharmaceutical company chooses whether its period of exclusivity would be a patent, an orphan drug designation, a period of data exclusivity (in which no generic is allowed to use the original drug’s safety and effectiveness data), or something else — but **not all of the above** and more. Consider Suboxone, a combination of buprenorphine and naloxone for treating opioid addiction. The drug’s maker has extended its protection cliff eight times, including obtaining an orphan drug designation, which is intended for drugs that serve only a small number of patients. The drug’s first period of exclusivity ended in 2005, but with the additions its protection now lasts until 2024. That makes almost two additional decades in which the public has borne the burden of monopoly pricing, and access to the medicine may have been constrained. Implementing a one-and-done approach in conjunction with FDA approval underscores the fact that these problems and solutions are designed for pharmaceuticals, not for all types of technologies. That way, one-and-done could be implemented through **legislative changes to the FDA’s drug approval system**, and would apply to patents granted going forward. One-and-done would apply to both patents and exclusivities. A more limited approach, a baby step if you will, would be to invigorate the existing patent obviousness doctrine as a way to cut back on patent tinkering. Obviousness, one of the five standards for patent eligibility, says that inventions that are obvious to an expert or the general public can’t be patented. Either by congressional clarification or judicial interpretation, many pile-on patents could be eliminated with a ruling that the core concept of the additional patent is nothing more than the original formulation. Anything else is merely an obvious adaptation of the core invention, modified with existing technology. As such, the patent would fail for being perfectly obvious. Even without congressional action, a more vigorous and robust application of the existing obviousness doctrine could significantly improve the problem of piled-up patents and patent walls. Pharmaceutical companies have become adept at maneuvering through the system of patent and non-patent rights to create mountains of rights that can be applied, one after another. This behavior lets drug companies keep competitors out of the market and beat them back when they get there. We shouldn’t be surprised at this. Pharmaceutical companies are profit-making entities, after all, that face pressure from their shareholders to produce ever-better results. If we want to change the system, we must change the incentives driving the system. And right now, the incentives for creating patent walls are just too great.

#### [24] Evergreening keeps Drug Prices high.

Amin 18 Tahir Amin 6-27-2018 "The problem with high drug prices isn't 'foreign freeloading,' it's the patent system" [High drug prices caused by US patent system, not 'foreign freeloaders' (cnbc.com)](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html) <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/25/high-drug-prices-caused-by-us-patent-system.html> (co-founder of nonprofit I-MAK.org)//Elmer

**'Evergreening'** Instead of going to new medicines, the study finds that 74 percent of new patents during the decade went to drugs that already existed. It found that 80 percent of the nearly 100 best-selling drugs extended their exclusivity protections at least once, and 50 percent extended their patents more than once—with the effect of **prolonging** the **time before generics** could reach the market **as drug prices continued to rise**. The strategy is called “evergreening”: drug makers add on new patents to prolong a drug’s exclusivity, even when the additions aren’t fundamentally new, non-obvious, and useful as the law requires. One of the most expensive cancer drugs on the market, **Revlimid**®, is a case in point: **priced at** over $**125,000** per year of treatment, Celgene has sought **105 patents** on Revlimid®, many of which have been granted, extending its monopoly until the end of 2036. That gives the Revlimid® patent portfolio a lifespan of 40 years, which is being used to block or deter generic competitors from entering the market. But a recent I-MAK analysis finds that several of Celgene’s patents are mere add-ons—not fundamentally new to deserve a patent. And because of the thicket of patents around Revlimid®, **payers** are **projected to spend $45 billion** **in excess costs** on that drug alone as compared to what they could be paying if generic competitors were to enter when the first patent expires in 2019. Meanwhile, Celgene is also among the pharmaceuticals that have been recently scolded by the FDA for refusing to share samples with generic makers so they can test their own products against the brands in order to attain FDA approval. **In the absence of** genuine **competition** in the U.S. prescription drug market, **monopolies are yielding reckless pricing schemes and prohibitively expensive drugs** for Americans (and people around the world) who need them. In 2015, for example, U.S. Senators Wyden and Grassley found after an 18-month bipartisan investigation that the notorious $84,000 price tag for the hepatitis C drug made by Gilead was based on “a pricing and marketing strategy designed to maximize revenue with little concern for access or affordability.” Gilead’s subsequent hepatitis C drug Harvoni® was introduced to the market at a still higher cost of $94,500. Who benefits when drugs are priced so high? Not the 85 percent of Americans with hepatitis C who are still not able to afford treatment.

#### [25] That pushes people into poverty – our internal is causal.

Hoban 10 Rose Hoban 9-13-2010 "High Cost of Medicine Pushes More People into Poverty" <https://www.voanews.com/science-health/high-cost-medicine-pushes-more-people-poverty> (spent more than six years as the health reporter for North Carolina Public Radio – WUNC, where she covered health care, state health policy, science and research with a focus on public health issues. She left to start North Carolina Health News after watching many of her professional peers leave or be laid off of their jobs, leaving NC with few people to cover this complicated and important topic. ALSO cites Laurens Niens who is a Health Researcher at Erasmus University Rotterdam)//Elmer

Health economist Laurens Niëns found that drugs needed to treat chronic diseases could be considered unaffordable **for many people in poor countries**. Medicines can be expensive and often make up a large portion of any family's health care budget. And the burden can be even greater for people in poor countries, where the **cost of vital medicines can push them into poverty**. The problem is growing as more people around the world are diagnosed with chronic diseases such as high blood pressure and diabetes. Being diagnosed with a chronic disease usually compells patients to seek treatment for a prolonged period of time. That increases the eventual price tag for health, says health economist Laurens Niëns at Erasmus University in the Netherlands. Niëns examined medication pricing data from the World Health Organization and also looked at data from the World Bank on household income in many countries. Using the data, he calculated how much people need to spend on necessities such as food, housing, education and medicines. "The medicines we looked at are medicines for patients who suffer from asthma, diabetes, hypertension and we looked at an adult respiratory infection," Niëns says. "Three conditions are for chronic diseases, which basically means that people need to procure those medicines each and every day." Niëns focused on the cost of medicine for those conditions. He found the essential drugs could be considered unaffordable for many people in poor countries - so much so that their cost often pushes people into abject poverty. "The proportion of the population that is living below the poverty line, plus the people that are being pushed below the poverty line, can **reach up to 80 percent** in some countries for some medicines," Niëns says. He points out that generic medicines - which are more affordable than brand-name medications - are often **not available in the marketplace**. And, according to Niëns, poor government policies can drive up the cost of medications. "For instance, a lot of governments actually tax medicines when they come into the country," he says. "[They] have no standard for the markups on medicines through the distribution chain. So often, governments think they pay a good price for the medicines when they procure them from the producer. However, before such a medicine reaches a patient, markups are sometimes up to 1,000 percent."

#### [26] Inequality drives diversionary nationalism which sparks international conflict.

Solt 11, Frederick. "Diversionary nationalism: Economic inequality and the formation of national pride." The Journal of Politics 73.3 (2011): 821-830. (Ph.D. in Political Science from University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, currently Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, Assistant Professor, Departments of Political Science and Sociology, Southern Illinois at the time of publication)//Elmer

One of the oldest theories of nationalism is that states instill the nationalist myth in their citizens to divert their attention from great economic inequality and so forestall pervasive unrest. Because the very concept of nationalism obscures the extent of inequality and is a potent tool for delegitimizing calls for redistribution, it is a perfect diversion, and states should be expected to engage in more nationalist mythmaking when inequality increases. The evidence presented by this study supports this theory: across the countries and over time, where economic inequality is greater, nationalist sentiments are substantially more widespread. This result adds considerably to our understanding of nationalism. To date, many scholars have focused on the international environment as the principal source of threats that prompt states to generate nationalism; the importance of the domestic threat posed by economic inequality has been largely overlooked. However, at least in recent years, domestic inequality is a far more important stimulus for the generation of nationalist sentiments than the international context. Given that nuclear weapons—either their own or their allies’—rather than the mass army now serve as the primary defense of many countries against being overrun by their enemies, perhaps this is not surprising: nationalism-inspired mass mobilization is simply no longer as necessary for protection as it once was (see Mearsheimer 1990, 21; Posen 1993, 122–24). Another important implication of the analyses presented above is that growing economic inequality may increase ethnic conflict. States may foment national pride to stem discontent with increasing inequality, but this pride can also lead to more hostility towards immigrants and minorities. Though pride in the nation is distinct from chauvinism and outgroup hostility, it is nevertheless closely related to these phenomena, and recent experimental research has shown that members of majority groups who express high levels of national pride can be nudged into intolerant and xenophobic responses quite easily (Li and Brewer 2004). This finding suggests that, by leading to the creation of more national pride, higher levels of inequality produce environments favorable to those who would inflame ethnic animosities. Another and perhaps even more worrisome implication regards the likelihood of war. Nationalism is frequently suggested as a cause of war, and more national pride has been found to result in a much greater demand for national security even at the expense of civil liberties (Davis and Silver 2004, 36–37) as well as preferences for “a more militaristic foreign affairs posture and a more interventionist role in world politics” (Conover and Feldman 1987, 3). To the extent that these preferences influence policymaking, the growth in economic inequality over the last quarter century should be expected to lead to more aggressive foreign policies and more international conflict. If economic inequality prompts states to generate diversionary nationalism as the results presented above suggest, then rising inequality could make for a more dangerous world. The results of this work also contribute to our still limited knowledge of the relationship between economic inequality and democratic politics. In particular, it helps explain the fact that, contrary to median-voter models of redistribution (e.g., Meltzer and Richard 1981), democracies with higher levels of inequality do not consistently respond with more redistribution (e.g., Bénabou 1996). Rather than allowing redistribution to be decided through the democratic process suggested by such models, this work suggests that states often respond to higher levels of inequality with more nationalism. Nationalism then works to divert attention from inequality, so many citizens neither realize the extent of inequality nor demand redistributive policies. By prompting states to promote nationalism, greater economic inequality removes the issue of redistribution from debate and therefore narrows the scope of democratic politics.