## Util

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### ] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework-threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

#### ] Actor specificity: util is the best for governments, which is the actor in the rez – multiple warrants:

#### [a] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.

#### [d] Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Takes out util calc indicts since they’re empirically denied and link turns them because the alt would be no action.

#### 4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. That impacts to weighing meaning rounds are only resolvable under our interp

#### To distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary interference requires some higher normative metric making republicanism question-begging. Larmore 1:

Charles Larmore, [University of Chicago] “A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism” RE

Pettit's answer is that the basis for possible interference is not arbitrary if it leads to interference aimed at "tracking" or pursuing the interests, or at least the relevant interests, of the individual who is its object (Pettit 1997, p. 55). For instance (this is Pettit's example), it is in my interest that each citizen pays his taxes, so that even if I do not want to pay my own, the coercion that the government may then employ to force my payment does not constitute an arbitrary interference. Yet how should the interests of the individual be ascertained? Is it a matter of the interests which the individual herself avows? And if so, what is the nature of the circumstances in which her own declarations count as authoritative? Or is it a matter instead of her "real" interests, of which she may or may not have any grasp? Pettit contends that determining the interests which state power can pursue on a non-arbitrary basis is a question which only the political deliberation of the citizens themselves can ultimately decide (Pettit 1997, pp. 56, 63). This position is no doubt attractive. But it gives rise in turn to a further question, namely, that of the principles which ought to govern this collective deliberation. In the absence of both institutional and normative structures that are already in place, debate will lead to no result, or the outcome will have no claim to being fair and just.

#### B) The problem of intervening actors. If someone cheats on their spouse and the spouse kills them in response, the cheater is not responsible for their own death. Likewise, the NC can’t garner offense from causing other actors to minimize domination.

### FW – Util

#### 1 – Their arbitrary power standard lacks a definition – that means it’s impossible to enforce the standard which is a takeout to its ethical desirability

#### 2 – The standard is just an instantiation of rule util according to Pettit - Rule util must collapse to act util because we constantly adjust our rules to maximize goodness on balance, like avoiding extinction – that means that the only rule that maximizes goodness is act util

#### 3 – Judgements about freedom/domination depend on the consequences of our lives – that devolves to util because if we value good consequences it follows we should maximize them

#### 5 – They don’t have a reason why we shouldn’t weigh domination against other goods – that devolves to util because it necessitates maximizing good consequences

#### 6 – There’s no intrinsic value in freedom without a positive obligation to protect wellbeing – collapses to util. Chappell 05

Richard Chappell, PhD, Princeton University. Libertarian vs. Utilitarian Justice, Philosophy. June 2005. JC

Libertarians hold that each person owns themselves, and others may not make use of their property (i.e. them) without their consent.[28] Just as others have no right to shelter a homeless man in my house, so they have no right to tax the products of my labour and redistribute to the needy. But the free market requires ownership rights over both self and external resources,[29] and we have seen that the latter is problematic. Moreover, self-ownership is a merely ‘formal’ notion that does not guarantee substantive freedom or power over one’s own life. For suppose that natural resources are initially owned by everyone rather than no-one. On this view, a self-owning individual may not make use of the material world without others’ consent. But, as Kymlicka asks, “how can I be said to own myself if I may do nothing without the permission of others?”[30] Such merely formal freedom has no worth. Yet this is the position of the poor and disadvantaged within a libertarian capitalist society. Once we recognize the importance of substantive rather than merely formal freedom, our aim becomes to enable people to live the lives they want to live. This commits us to ensuring access to education, healthcare, and basic human needs like food and shelter, since all of these are essential prerequisites to any form of freedom worth having. If provision of these goods requires us to compromise self-ownership, so be it. The latter has no value in the absence of the former in any case. We are thus led back in the direction of utilitarianism.

#### 7 – Their notion of independence doesn't make sense – domination is possible via certain acts that you can always exercise like force, which means it's hard to know what it means to have power over someone – means their notion of freedom is indeterminate, so we need classical freedom which devolves to util as shown above

#### \*\*8 – Even if ethical life occupies other norms, we always react in cases of known preventable harms – we’re virtually obligated to be consequentialist, even under a model of non-domination – YOUR AUTHOR

Pettit 95 [Philip Pettit (Irish Philosopher. Civic republicanism dude.) “The Virtual Reality of ‘Homo Economicus.’” The Monist Vol. 78 No. 3. July 1995.] MK

But the focal-peripheral interpretation of the claim that people are implicitly self-regarding does not make the claim seem particularly compelling. **We all admit that people profess standards from which they often slip** and that their slipping does usually relate to an awareness, perhaps a deeply suppressed awareness, of the costs of complying with the standards. We all admit, in other words, **that weakness of will and self deception are pretty commonplace phenomena**. But what the focal peripheral model would suggest is that the whole of human life is shot through with this sort of failure: that what we take to be a more or less occasional, more or less localised, sort of pathology actually represents the normal, healthy state of the human organism. That is a fairly outrageous claim. Most economists would probably be shocked to hear that the view of the human subject which they systematically deploy is about as novel, and about as implausible, as the picture projected in classical Freudian ism. But if we reject the focal-peripheral way of reconciling the economic and the common mind, are we forced to choose between the two pictures of the human subject? Are we forced to choose between economic science and common sense? Happily, I think not. There is a second, less familiar model of the implicit-explicit distinction that is available in the literature and it promises a different, more attractive mode of reconciliation.5 I call this the virtual-actual model. One area where it is sometimes deployed?though not in so many words?is in explaining the sense in which I may implicitly believe that 2 times 101 is 202, even when I have never given a thought to that particular multiplication; or, to take another example, the sense in which I may implicitly believe that Europe has more than ten million inhabitants, when I have only ever thought about the population of individual countries. I implicitly believe these things in the sense that I am so disposed?specifically, I am so familiar with elemen tary arithmetic or with the population figures for European coun tries?that even the most casual reflection is sufficient to trigger the recognition that indeed 2 times 101 is 202, indeed the population of Europe is more than ten million. I virtually believe the propositions in question?virtually, not actually?but the virtuality or potentiality in question is so close to realisation that ordinary usage scarcely marks the shortfall.6 I propose that **if we are to follow the** familiar conciliationist **route of describing people as economically** minded, but not always in an explicit fashion, **we should try to spell out this claim by reference to the virtual actual model,** not the peripheral-focal one. I think that **it is not implausible that people are virtually self-regarding in most contexts of choice, even if they are not actually so**. It is generally agreed that actual self-regard plays a great part in market and related behaviour but that it does not have the same sort of presence?if it has a presence at all?in other contexts: for example, in contexts of ordinary family or friendly interaction, in contexts of political decision, or in contexts of group behaviour. What I suggest is that **in** such **non-market contexts self-regard may still have an important presence: it may be virtually if not actually there; it may be waiting in the wings, even if it is not actually on stage.**Here is how **self-regard might have a virtual presence** in such contexts. **Suppose**, first of all, that **people are generally content in non market contexts we can restrict our attention to these to let their actions be dictated by what we might call the cultural framing of the situation in which they find themselves. A friend asks for a routine level of help and, in the absence of urgent business, the agent naturally complies with the request; it would be unthinkable for someone who understands what friendship means to do anything else.** There is an election in progress and, the humdrum of everyday life being what it is, the agent spontaneously makes time for going to the polls; that is manifestly the thing to do, under ordinary canons of understanding, and the thing to do without thinking about it. Someone has left a telephone message asking for a return call about some matter and the agent doesn't hesitate to ring back; even if aware that there is nothing useful they can tell the original caller, they shrink from the impoliteness, in their culture, of ignoring the call. In the pedestrian patterns of day-to-day life, the cultural framing of any situation will be absolutely salient to the ordinary agent and the ordinary agent will more or less routinely respond. Or so at least I am prepared to assume. But that is only the first part of my supposition. **Suppose, in the second place, that despite the hegemony of cultural framing in people's everyday deliberations and decisions, there are certain alarm bells that make them take thought to their own interests. People may proceed under more or less automatic, cultural pilot in most cases but at any point where a decision is liable to cost them dearly in self-regarding terms, the alarm bells ring and prompt them to consider personal advantage**; and heeding considerations of personal advantage leads people, generally if not invari ably, to act so as to secure that advantage: they are disposed to do the rel atively more self-regarding thing. **Under these suppositions, self-regard will normally have no actual presence in dictating what people do; it will not be present in deliberation and will make no impact on decision. But it will always be virtually present in deliberation**, for there are alarms which are ready to ring at any point where the agent's interests get to be possibly compromised and those alarms will call up self-regard and give it a more or less controlling deliberative presence. The agent will run under cultural pilot, provided that pilot does not carry them into terrain that is too dangerous from a self interested point of view. Let such terrain come into view, and the agent will quickly return to manual; they will quickly begin to count the more personal losses and benefits that are at stake in the decision at hand. This reflection may not invariably lead to self-regarding action?there is such a thing as self-sacrifice, after all?but the assumption is that it will do so fairly reliably. **If the suppositions I have described were realised, then it would be fair to say that people are implicitly self-regarding: that they implicitly conform to the image of the economic mind**. The reason is that under the model of virtual self-regard, no action is performed without self-regarding consideration unless it fails to ring certain alarms: that is, unless it promises to do suitably well in self-regard terms. What it is to do suitably well may vary from individual to individual, of course, depending on their expectations as to what is feasible and depending on their self-regarding aspirations: depending on how much they want for themselves, and with what intensity. But the point is that regardless of such variations, the model of virtual self-regarding control does privilege self-regard in a manner that conforms to the image of the economic mind. Another way of putting this point is to say that under the model described, **an agent will generally be moved by certain considerations only if they satisfy a certain negative, self-regarding condition: only if they do not tend to lead the agent towards a certain level of self-sacrifice.** Let the considerations push the agent below the relevant self-regarding level of aspiration and the alarm bells will ring, causing the agent to rethink and probably reshape the project at hand. The position which self-regard is given under the model of virtual self-regarding control is rather like that which it enjoys under Herbert imon's (1978) model of satisficing as distinct from maximising behaviour. People do pretty well in self-regarding terms, even if they do not do as well as possible. And it may even be that virtual self-regarding control enables them to do as well as possible in egocentric terms, for the absence of self-regarding calculation in most decisions represents a saving in time and trouble?these are virtues emphasised by Simon?and it may also secure other benefits: it may earn a greater degree of acceptance and affection, for example, than would a pattern of relentless calculation. But is the model of virtual self-regarding control, in particular the scenario of the alarm bells, a plausible one? The question divides in two. First, is there any arrangement under which we can imagine that such alarms are put in place? And second, if there is, can we plausibly maintain that those alarms will reliably serve to usher self-regarding deliberation into a controlling position in the generation of behaviour? The alarms required will have to be informational; they will have to be signals that this is the sort of situation where the agent's advantage may be compromised, if cultural framing is given its head. So are there signals available in ordinary contexts that might serve to communicate this message? Clearly, there are. **Consider the fact that a decision situation is non-routine; or that it is of a kind in which the agent's fingers were already burned**; or that it is a situation in which the agent's peers?others who might be expected to fare about as well?do generally better than the agent; or that some conventional or other assurances as to the responses of others are lacking. Any **such facts can serve as signals that the agent's personal advantage may be in especial danger**. Indeed it is hard to imagine a situation in which the agent's interests were likely to be compromised in significant measure by culturally framed demands compromised in a measure that the agent would not generally tolerate without such signals being present. **Certainly it is reasonable to assume that generally there will be signals available in such situations that the agent should take care**: signals to the effect that this is a situation where that framing is liable to serve the agent less well than it ordinarily does. The other question is whether it is plausible, given the availability of signals of this kind, to postulate that the signals will generally tip agents into a self-regarding sort of deliberation: a sort of deliberation that is normally sidelined in favour of fidelity to the cultural frame. This issue is wholly an empirical matter but it is an issue on which the weight of received opinion speaks unambiguously. **It has been common wisdom for at least two thousand years of thinking about politics that few are proof against temptation and few, therefore, are likely to ignore signals that their self-interest may be endangered. Human beings may be capable of reaching for the stars but, expect for some romantic strands of thought, all the streams in the Western tradition of thinking suggest that if there is opportunity for individuals to further their own interests, then they can generally be relied upon, sooner or later, to exploit that opportunity: all power corrupts**. The main theme of the tradition is summed up in the lesson that no one can be entrusted with the ring of Gyges that Plato discusses: the ring that renders a person invisible and that makes it possible for him to serve his own interests with impunity, at whatever cost to the interests of others. These lines of thought give support, therefore, to the picture described above. They suggest that it is very plausible to think that even when people pay no actual attention to relatively self-regarding consider ations, still those considerations have a certain presence and relevance to how people behave. They are virtually present, in the sense that if the behaviour rings the alarm bells of self-interest?and there will be plenty such bells to ring?the agent will give heed and will tend to let self regarding considerations play a role in shaping what is done.7 **Under the emerging picture, then, there is a sense in which people are always at least implicitly of the self-regarding cast of mind projected by economists**; if they are not actually self-regarding in their mode of delib eration, they are virtually so: if **self-regard** does not actually occupy the pilot's seat, it **is always there in the co-pilot's, ready to assume control**. The picture is a rather non-idealistic representation of human beings but it is not unnecessarily bleak. It emphasises that in the normal run, people are not calculating or self-concerned: they articulate their lives and rela tionships in the currency of received values and they generally conform to the requirements of those values. Where it goes non-idealistic, it does so only in the spirit of what we might call the Gyges axiom: the principle that virtue?fidelity to the demands of the cultural frame?is fragile and generally survives only under conditions in which it is not manifestly against the interests of the agent, only under conditions in which the alarm bells do not ring. There are two further points to put to those who worry about the alleged non-idealism of our picture. First, the picture leaves open the pos sibility that in many cases some individuals will not heed the alarms and will stick to what the culturally framed situation requires, by criteria of common values, through the thick and the thin of self-sacrifice. And, second, the picture leaves room for the Aristotelian principle that people become virtuous, become lovers of virtuous ways, through habituation in those ways. It leaves room, not just for the possibility that some people will be relatively heedless of the alarms described, but for the possibility that such heedlessness may be facilitated in increasing measure by a regime in which the alarms only rarely ring: a regime in which things are well designed and people are free, in the silence of self-regard, to develop an attachment to doing that which by the common values of the culture is what the situation requires.

## Econ DA

**The economic costs of labor strikes outweigh the intended benefits – even small actions can cause a ripple-effect in international trade**

**CM ’18:** Media statement from Creamer Media’s Engineering News. “Strikes and their economic consequences”. October 1st, 2018. <https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/strikes-and-their-economic-consequences-2018-10-01>. FD.

After conducting intensive research\* into the topic of strikes and labour unrest, the Mandela Initiative came to several conclusions. One of these was that the right to strike is made up of a delicate balance between the [power](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/power) of firms and the rights of employees, and is considered a sign of a healthy democracy. “Whilst there are potential benefits from strikes (e.g. better work morale, lower absenteeism, or improved labour productivity), strike action also brings about numerous direct and indirect **economic costs** that can be high, depending on duration, number of workers involved and divisions affected,” the Initiative confirmed. According to labour expert Suleyman Alley, there are seven key causes of labour unrest: [health](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/health) hazards in the workplace; excessive working hours; low wages; demand for leave with pay; discrimination; inadequate working tools; and aggressive behaviour of managers towards employees. While several activities can be taken in an effort to prevent strikes from occurring or escalating, in the South African context, the tendency towards violent outbursts seems to outweigh reasonable action. “Strikes and labour unrest have **marked negative impacts** on the employees themselves, the employers and their stakeholders, the government, consumers, and the economy,” advises Jacki Condon, Managing Director of Apache [Security](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/security) [Services](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/services). “The negative effects on **international trade** include the hinderance of economic development, creating great economic uncertainty – especially as the global media continues to share details, images and videos of violence, damage to property and ferocious clashes between strikers and [security](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/security).” Strike action results in less productivity, which in turn means less profits. Labour Law expert, Ivan Israelstam confirms that; “The employer is likely to lose money due to delayed [service](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/service) to clients or to lost production time. The employees will lose their pay due to the no work, no pay principle. If the strikers are dismissed they will lose their livelihoods altogether.” This year alone, Eskom, Prasa, various [manufacturing](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/manufacturing)plants, Sasol and the Post Office have faced crippling strikes – to name but a few. Condon argues that there are more immediate consequences to consider than loss of income. “As the socio-economic issues continue to affect South Africans across the board, tensions are constantly rising,” states Condon. “Businesses must protect themselves, their assets, [business](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/business) property, and their non-striking employees from violence and intimidation.” Condon believes that this requires the deft hand of well-trained and highly qualified close protection operatives. These operatives provide not only protection, but video evidence as well, ensuring those responsible for damage can be held to account. “The key is to create a strategic partnership with a reliable [security](https://www.engineeringnews.co.za/topic/security) provider. Plans must be put into place to protect businesses against vandalism, physical assault, property invasion and intimidation during labour unrest,” concludes Condon.

#### Economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that triggers hotspots around the globe – co-opts all other causes of war

Harris and Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions**.** It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

# Case

#### [1] Strikes treat people as mere means to an end

Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers" <https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html> (Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG

A further formula of the Categorical Imperative is "so, act as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of any other context, never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself' (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. Participating in a labor-strike demonstration/action is **a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society **is used to duly and unduly influence the bargaining process for better working conditions**. In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of clients and society **is not seen as crucial** **and as an 'end'**, but rather used to demonstrate the undeniable need for the skills and expertise of social workers. Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

#### [2] Strikes in essential services hurt the patient but not the employer which reduces the patient to a mere means to an end.

Loewy 2K, Erich H. "Of healthcare professionals, ethics, and strikes." Cambridge Q. Healthcare Ethics 9 (2000): 513. (Erich H. Loewy M.D., F.A.C.P., was born in Vienna, Austria in 1927 and was able to escape first to England and then to the U.S. in late 1938. He was initially trained as a cardiologist. He taught at Case Western Reserve and practiced in Cleveland, Ohio. After 14 years he devoted himself fully to Bioethics and taught at the University of Illinois for 12 years. In 1996 he was selected as the first endowed Alumni Association Chair of Bioethics at the University of California Davis School of Medicine and has taught there since.) JG

“Essential” Work and Strikes Healthcare professionals, garbage collectors, and other “essential” workers have a responsibility that is considered to be different from, say, the responsibilities of workers in a supermarket chain. There are almost certainly other supermarkets, but there is generally only one municipal garbage collection service**, one police force, and one fire department; and in general, only one healthcare system available to us. In the medical setting, furthermore, workers are much more apt to deal with identified lives**: they know their patients and often have known them for some time. Striking against their employer (even if it is done in part to benefit the patient) is **denying meaningful and often essential services to some of these identified lives**. We tend to relate differently with those lives we know and therefore call “identified” from those whom we consider “unidentified” or statistical lives, in part, because we have obligations as a result of relationships; in part because we fail to recognize that these so-called unidentified lives are not in fact unidentified but are merely not identified by us.4 When strikes are called by healthcare professionals, both types of lives are apt to be injured or, at least, severely inconvenienced. Except in the pocketbook, strikes in the healthcare setting generally do not directly hurt the employer. The employer **is hurt through the** **patient**. The patient thus becomes a **means toward the employees’ ends**, a football being kicked between two contending parties—**even if one of the employees’ goals is to serve the good of patients in general.** Theoretically, patients will then bring pressure on the employer (be it the government or a managed care organization), thus, quite frankly, using the patient as a means toward the ends of the health professionals.5 The dilemma, of course, is that without significantly inconveniencing or even endangering patients, no pressure is likely to be brought and, therefore, no amelioration of working conditions is effected. To be effective, a strike of healthcare professionals has to “hurt” patients and often patients known to the healthcare professionals.

#### [3] Freedom to strike cannot come at the expense of others AND they might not have ethical motivations.

Muñoz 14, Cristian Pérez. "Essential Services, Workers’ Freedom, and Distributive Justice." Social Theory and Practice 40.4 (2014): 649-672. (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida) JG

The second objection suggests that the freedom to strike is a fundamental value for a liberal society. Restrictions or prohibitions on this par ticular freedom are equivalent to interfering with basic freedoms such as the freedom of speech and association. This objection presupposes, of course, that preserving individual freedom **possesses a value of high priority.** But it is difficult to defend this idea when the respect for this freedom **potentially causes harm to the recipient populations of essential services**. The only way to defend this position is to show that the benefits of protecting the freedom to strike (for the specific workers under question) are comparatively larger than the harm (for the recipient populations) it might potentially cause. For example, it should be shown that the objectives of a strike among physicians are in the best interest of the patients they service. The idea is that this bargaining instrument might aid physicians in obtaining the resources they require to improve the services they provide to their patients. However, **that is not always the case**. The motivation behind strikes may **not be directly associated** with the objective of improving the quality of the service that physicians provide.

Permissibility and presumption negates –

1. Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation  which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two.

2. Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

3. Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

4. A statement has more ways to be wrong then right. I can prove my pen to be white in 1 way, but not white in an infinite amount of ways ie. I can prove it to be red or black or green.

### Turn – Ineffective

**Strikes are ineffective– they can’t overcome the power imbalance and have a net negative impact on workers**

**Waldersee ’17:** Victoria Waldersee. “We asked economists whether strikes really work”. Our Economy. Thursday September 7th, 2017. <https://www.ecnmy.org/engage/we-asked-economists-whether-strikes-really-work/>. FD

“Strikes are always the last resort. Everyone from unions to HR managers pretty much agrees on that,” says Simms. “You only do it if you’ve tried everything to get the other side to understand, and they either can’t, or they just won’t. Obviously there’s an imbalance of power, so unions are always in a weaker position, and individual employees even more so.” Often, strikers just feel they’re being expected to do more than they’re being paid for. But recently, says Professor Crossman, it’s been about more than that – people’s pay isn’t rising, but inflation is, and executive salaries are going up too. So people end up feeling like they’re being unfairly treated, and the money they’re earning is buying them less because prices are going up. Another big issue is flexible working. It’s good for some, but others feel like it’s been imposed on them by big companies making it the norm. Not knowing how many hours work you’ll have means your income stream is unpredictable, and that’s a real problem for people. “Most of us have regular bills – we know what the outflows of cash from our account are looking like,” Crossman points out. “We want to make sure the inflows match.” “The basic ‘economics’ idea is that we have the right to decide how we use our labour,” says Simms. “If we didn’t, we’d be slaves, literally. But if we’re freely making the choice to exchange our work for pay, and other benefits, then in principle we have the right to withdraw it, too.”It depends on a few things: One, how much it’s going to affect the employer’s business in the short term; two, how replaceable the workers are; and three, to what extent the strikers have the public and the government on their side. “I work at a university,” says Simms. “If I decide not to work today, not much happens to my employer’s business. But if I were a train driver, and I decided not to do my job, it would obviously have an immediate effect.” If workers can easily be replaced by other workers, their ‘bargaining power’ is pretty low. If there is what economists call ‘surplus labour’ – i.e., people available and willing to do the job in the current conditions – then companies can just fire unhappy staff and call on a bank of new workers. When public sector workers go on strike, there are often private companies happy to do the work instead. And then there’s technology What's this?. “Advances in technology are really reducing the power of workers to fight their corner,” says Crossman. In low-wage, manufacturing jobs, people can just be replaced by obedient robots, and that’s the end of that. If the government and the public take a stand against the way workers are being treated – regardless of whether they could be replaced by other workers, or by robots – all this changes. Customers could simply boycott a product or service, and governments could launch official inquiries as to whether people’s rights are being breached. That puts companies in a vulnerable place, which workers can’t do. “ “Trade unions would say customers are secondary,” says Simms. “The workers have decided it’s necessary, because someone isn’t listening to them.” According to Crossman, it’s a matter of opinion. “If you look at the train strike [in the UK], **customers were angry** about the fact they couldn’t get to work, but they knew the service was bad before. So they tend to blame government and management, not unions. But there’s only so much they’ll take before they start turning on staff.”Governments have got to try and help the parties reach an agreement – a bit like a marriage counselor,” says Simms. Whether they’ve got an obligation to get involved varies country to country – in the UK, it’s optional, bu in other places, it’s mandatory. The other option is setting rules to avoid the things that cause strikes to kick off in the first place from happening. But, as Crossman points out, companies tend to find a way around them.”When companies were supposed to regulate how much they could increase executive pay in the 1970s, they just started handing out company cars. It’s like a computer virus: the virus comes after the computer has been created, so you’re always playing catch up.” Governments can do the opposite, too: make it harder for unions to go on strike, by doing things like requiring a minimum vote among union members to allow industrial action. You can also make votes secret, to avoid any kind of peer pressure. How else could workers express their dissatisfaction with the way they’re being treated? Simms suggests some simple things: “Pull a sickie! It’s definitely not legal for your union to ask you to do that, but..” Another simple act of protest, especially in hospitality, is just getting really grumpy. “There was a smile strike at Disneyland about 20 years ago,” says Simms. “Which at Disneyland is obviously a seriously huge thing” You can also only agree to do things strictly outlined in your contract - that’s called a Work To Rule, and is often really annoying for employers. Plus, as Crossman pointed out, you still get paid. But there’s not much you can do. “It feels like these days, the power is just really imbalanced,” says Crossman. “Because no-one in their right mind is going to put their house in jeopardy, or not be able to pay rent, so they’ll ultimately go back, because they need to, economically. Employers suffer financial damage, but evidence suggests it doesn’t take too long to recoup the losses. But **once an employee has lost their wage, they can’t get that back** without working overtime.”