**UV**

**Don’t vote on presumption/perm**

**Don’t need to explicitly weigh, ev ab jan feb topic**

**1NC—T Gov**

**Interpretation – the affirmative must defend the resolution through governmental implementation**

**The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action: “Resolved” means to enact a policy by law.**

**Words & Phrases ’64**(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “**resolve**,” given by Webster **is “to express** an opinion or **determination by resolution or vote**; as ‘it was resolved **by the legislature**;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

**Government action is necessary to regulate private entities.**

**Blaustein 18** (Blaustein, Richard. “Private-Sector Space Activities Require Government Regulation, Says US Report.” Physics World, IOP Publishing, 4 July 2018, physicsworld.com/a/private-sector-space-activities-require-government-regulation-says-us-report/.)//DebateDrills AY

**The US Congress must introduce legislation to regulate the activities of private companies operating in space.** That is according to a new report by the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, which says **the need for reform has been heightened by the “burgeoning” commercial space sector** in the US. One leader in the booming US private space sector is [Space X](http://www.spacex.com/), which was founded by Tesla head Elon Musk in 2002. The firm, which has had a number of recent high-profile rocket launches, is setting its sights on missions to Mars. Even Jeff Bezos, who founded the online shopping giant Amazon, is getting in on the act with plans for his firm Blue Origin to send a manned mission to the Moon.

**Governments have responsibility over non-government (private) entity actions in outer space.**

**UNOOSA**(UNOOSA. “United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs.” Outer Space Treaty, UNOOSA, [www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html.)//DebateDrills](http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/outerspacetreaty.html.)/DebateDrills)AY

ARTICLE VI **States**Parties to the Treaty **shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space**, including the moon and other celestial bodies,**whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities**, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.**The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.**When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization

**Violation: they only defend the resolution as a general principle. Also see cx**

**Standards:**

**1] predictable limits – anything else means private action is possible. there are more than 10,000 private companies investing in space**

**Keotsier 21**

John Koetsier, [Journalist, analyst, and tech executive. He is a senior contributor for Forbes, hosts the top-50 podcast TechFirst with John Koetsier(among others), and consults with Silicon Valley companies.], 22 May 2021, “Space Inc: 10,000 Companies, $4T Value ... And 52% American”, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoetsier/2021/05/22/space-inc-10000-companies-4t-value--and-52-american/?sh=42d1bb0755ac> // AK

It’s not just SpaceX. Elon Musk’s SpaceX might get all the headlines, but there are now a huge number of companies who are competing to open up an unprecedented level of human access to space. **The U.S. now has 5,582 space-focused companies, almost ten times more than the next country, the UK, which has 615. And there are more than 10,000 total, globally**. Competition between these companies has led the value of space-focused companies to cross the $4 trillion USD mark for the first time ever, and is a key factor in reducing launch to orbit cost by almost two orders of magnitude in the past 20 years.

**That forces the neg to research every company and their specific investments and destroys neg prep bc we can’t predict every single possible combination or company the aff could choose.**

**2] Policymaking – fiating companies into doing specific actions is utopian fiat, which isn’t realistic, only through a policymaking model can students learn how governments set obligations for companies, which is how the resolution would be implemented.**

**D] Voter:**

**Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.**

**Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.**

**Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.**

**No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory**

**Evaluate T before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it**

**FW**

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.**

**Prefer:**

**1] Actor specificity:**

**A] Aggregation – every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action.**

**B] No act-omission distinction – choosing to omit is an act itself – governments decide not to act which means being presented with the aff creates a choice between two actions, neither of which is an omission**

**C] No intent-foresight distinction – If we foresee a consequence, then it becomes part of our deliberation which makes it intrinsic to our action since we intend it to happen**

o/w

**2] Lexical pre-requisite: threats to bodily security preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibits the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose**

**3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first. Intuitions outweigh—they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why.**

**4] Extinction outweighs -**

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters

**DA: Innovation**

#### Space Commercialization drives Tech Innovation in the Status Quo – it provides a unique impetus.

Hampson 17 Joshua Hampson 1-25-2017 “The Future of Space Commercialization” <https://republicans-science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/TheFutureofSpaceCommercializationFinal.pdf> (Security Studies Fellow at the Niskanen Center)//Elmer

The size of the space economy is far larger than many may think. In 2015 alone, the global market amounted to $323 billion. Commercial infrastructure and systems accounted for 76 percent of that 9 total, with satellite television the largest subsection at $95 billion. The global space launch market’s 10 11 share of that total came in at $6 billion dollars. It can be hard to disaggregate how space benefits 12 particular national economies, but in 2009 (the last available report), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) estimated that commercial space transportation and enabled industries generated $208.3 billion in economic activity in the United States alone. Space is not just about 13 satellite television and global transportation; while not commercial, GPS satellites also underpin personal navigation, such as smartphone GPS use, and timing data used for Internet coordination.14 Without that data, there could be problems for a range of Internet and cloud-based services.15 There is also room for growth. The FAA has noted that while the commercial launch sector has not grown dramatically in the last decade, there are indications that there is latent demand. This 16 demand may catalyze an increase in launches and growth of the wider space economy in the next decade. The Satellite Industry Association’s 2015 report highlighted that their section of the space economy outgrew both the American and global economies. The FAA anticipates that growth to 17 continue, with expectations that small payload launch will be a particular industry driver.18 In the future, emerging space industries may contribute even more the American economy. Space tourism and resource recovery—e.g., mining on planets, moons , and asteroids—in particular may become large parts of that industry. Of course, their viability rests on a range of factors, including costs, future regulation, international problems, and assumptions about technological development. However, there is increasing optimism in these areas of economic production. But the space economy is not just about what happens in orbit, or how that alters life on the ground. The growth of this economy can also contribute to new innovations across all walks of life. Technological Innovation Innovation is generally hard to predict; some new technologies seem to come out of nowhere and others only take off when paired with a new application. It is difficult to predict the future, but it is reasonable to expect that a growing space economy would open opportunities for technological and organizational innovation. In terms of technology, the difficult environment of outer space helps incentivize progress along the margins. Because each object launched into orbit costs a significant amount of money—at the moment between $27,000 and $43,000 per pound, though that will likely drop in the future —each 19 reduction in payload size saves money or means more can be launched. At the same time, the ability to fit more capability into a smaller satellite opens outer space to actors that previously were priced out of the market. This is one of the reasons why small, affordable satellites are increasingly pursued by companies or organizations that cannot afford to launch larger traditional satellites. These small 20 satellites also provide non-traditional launchers, such as engineering students or prototypers, the opportunity to learn about satellite production and test new technologies before working on a full-sized satellite. That expansion of developers, experimenters, and testers cannot but help increase innovation opportunities. Technological developments from outer space have been applied to terrestrial life since the earliest days of space exploration. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) maintains a website that lists technologies that have spun off from such research projects. Lightweight 21 nanotubes, useful in protecting astronauts during space exploration, are now being tested for applications in emergency response gear and electrical insulation. The need for certainty about the resiliency of materials used in space led to the development of an analytics tool useful across a range of industries. Temper foam, the material used in memory-foam pillows, was developed for NASA for seat covers. As more companies pursue their own space goals, more innovations will likely come from the commercial sector. Outer space is not just a catalyst for technological development. Satellite constellations and their unique line-of-sight vantage point can provide new perspectives to old industries. Deploying satellites into low-Earth orbit, as Facebook wants to do, can connect large, previously-unreached swathes of 22 humanity to the Internet. Remote sensing technology could change how whole industries operate, such as crop monitoring, herd management, crisis response, and land evaluation, among others. 23 While satellites cannot provide all essential information for some of these industries, they can fill in some useful gaps and work as part of a wider system of tools. Space infrastructure, in helping to change how people connect and perceive Earth, could help spark innovations on the ground as well. These innovations, changes to global networks, and new opportunities could lead to wider economic growth.

#### Strong Innovation solves Extinction.

Matthews 18 Dylan Matthews 10-26-2018 “How to help people millions of years from now” <https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good> (Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University)//Re-cut by Elmer

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the **odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs** we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

**Case**

**FW**

**Going for actor specificity – it comes first since different agents have different ethical standings that change the way they evaluate action – the rez is implemented by a state which is a government actor using util.**

**Governments are limited by scarce resources which means they inevitably have to make decisions about who to serve. For example, the government can’t send one police car to two robberies at once so one gets prioritized which makes it responsible for omitting to rectify the violation—the only non-arbitrary way to make that decision is to value everyone equally and aggregate.**

**States are not culturally homogenous or political communities, so even if communitarianism is correct it does not apply to states**

**Bader, 95**"Citizenship and Exclusion: Radical Democracy, Community, and Justice. Or, What is Wrong with Communitarianism?," Veit Bader [Prof. Dr Veit Bader is Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Professor Emeritus of Social and Political Philosophy], Political Theory, vol. 23, No. 2 (May, 1995); 211-246, http,','vww.jstororg/stabIe/191876, JSTOR

Not all communitarians-and not only communitarians24-conceive of the state as apolitical community Walzer halfheartedly, but no less misleadingly treats the state in analogy with "neighborhoods, clubs and families" (pp. 35-42) Historical states are not such warm, horizontal Vergemein-schaftungen or free and democratic associations, based on consent; but rather cold vertical institutions, based not on free entry but on enforced membership and physical violence. Strictly speaking; they are not "associations" at all, but institutions. Of course, there are differences in this regard between states, and these differences are important. But even "'nation-states" that are culturally fairly homogeneous and rather democratic have been **states in class societies**. To evade the connotations of coldness, vertical hierarchies, bureaucracy, centralism, cultural normalization, and illegitimate domination so commonly associated with states, Walzer misleadingly prefers to speak of "countries" or "political communities:' He may be perfectly right in stating that 'the community is itself a good-conceivably the most important good" (p 29); but this communitarian conviction probably tells less in favor than against the state, or more precisely it could be mobilized in its favor only if and to the degree in which; empirically, states were to resemble the normative ideals in the books of democratic consent-theory. If one recognizes that states are not culturally homogeneous or democratic political communities, the moral and ethical legitimacy of their exclusionary "right to communal self-determination" gets **severely undermined**.

#### [Weinzier and Sarang] Private companies increase collaboration.

Weinzier and Sarang: Weinzier Matt [Professor of Business Administration in the Business, Government, and the International Economy Unit Harvard Business School] Sarang Mehak [ Space Exploration Initiative- MIT] “The Commercial Space Age Is Here Private space travel is just the beginning.” Harvard Business Review, 2021. MB/AC

Finally, the development of the space-for-space economy must not be undermined by earthly geopolitical rivalries, such as that between the United States and China. These conflicts will unavoidably extend into space at least to some extent, and military demand has long been an important source of funding for aerospace companies. But if not kept in check, such rivalries will not only distract attention and resources from borderless commercial pursuits but also create barriers and risks that hamper private investment. On earth, private economic activity has long tied together people whose states are at odds. The growing space-for-space economy offers exceptional potential to be such a force for unity — but it’s the job of the world’s governments [not to get in the way](https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/space-warfare-unregulated/614059/). A collaborative, international approach to establishing — and enforcing — the rule of law in space will be essential to encouraging a healthy space-for-space economy. Visions of a space-for-space economy have been around since the dawn of the Space Age in the 1960s. Thus far, those hopes have gone largely unmet — but this moment is different. For the first time in history, the private sector’s capital, risk tolerance, and profit motive are being channeled into putting people in space. If we seize this opportunity, we will look back on 2020 as the year when we started the truly transformational project of building an economy and a society in space, for space.