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### Plan

#### Plan: The appropriation of outer space through asteroid mining by private entities should be banned.

#### We’ll defend normal means as the signatories of the OST adding an optional protocol under Article II.

Tronchetti 7[Fabio Tronchetti is a professor at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2007, <https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf>, 12-15-2021 amrita]

ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: A MATTER OF DEBATE The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law. Indeed, several interpretations have been put forward to explain the meaning of its provisions. Article II states that: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. **The text of Article II represents** the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the **free exploration** and use by all States **without the possibility of being appropriated**. By prohibiting the possibility of making territorial claims over outer space or any part thereof based on use or occupation, Article II **makes clear that** the customary procedures of **i**nternational **law allowing** subjects to obtain **sovereignty rights over un-owed lands**, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, **do not apply to** outer **space.** This prohibition was considered by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty the best guarantee for preserving outer space for peaceful activities only and for stimulating the exploration and use of the space environment in the name of all mankind. What has been the object of controversy among legal scholars is the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, **while Article II forbids** expressis verbis the national **appropriation by** claims of **sovereignty**, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, **it does not** make **a**ny explicit **mention** **to** its **private** appropriation. Relying on this consideration, some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed. For instance, in 1968 Gorove wrote: “Thus, at present an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or private association or an international organisation could lawfully appropriate any parts of outer space…”6 . The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit7 . However, it must be said, that nowadays there is a general consensus on the fact that **both national appropriation and private** property rights **are denied** under the Outer Space Treaty. Several way of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8 . **Private entities are allowed to carry out** space **activities but**, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they **must be authorized** to conduct such activities **by the** appropriate **State** of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9 . It has been also suggested that **the prohibition of national** appropriation **implies prohibition of private** appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase. Thus, summing up, we may say that **prohibition of appropriation of outer space** and its parts is a rule which **is valid for both private and public entity**. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, **the need to protect the non-appropriative nature o**f outer **space emerges** in all its relevance.

### Advantage 1 – Space War

#### Countries and their companies are making their own rules through patchwork which creates conflict—an international body is key

Foster 16 – Craig, J.D., University of Illinois College of Law, “EXCUSE ME, YOU’RE MINING MY ASTEROID: SPACE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE U.S. SPACE RESOURCE EXPLORATION AND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2015”, *JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & POLICY*, No. 2, page 428-430, http://illinoisjltp.com/journal/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Foster.pdf

There are many reasons to be excited about the prospect of mining resources from space. Hopes are high that these mining efforts will provide an economic boon by producing jobs and injecting more money into the economy. 214 Additionally, the negative impact of mining natural resources on Earth is widely reported215 and might be mitigated by space mining. If mining precious resources from space can minimize the burden on Earth, then this would lend even greater support for asteroid mining. Finally, little enchants the human mind and propels innovation more than sending people and manmade objects into space. For good reason, there is much enthusiasm about the prospect of space mining. On the other hand, it is troublesome to some that private, commercial entities will be paving the way and making up many of the rules as they go. Might this lead to repeating many of the mistakes humans have made on Earth? Might there be unforeseen problems that could spell trouble if mining efforts are not properly regulated? The answer to these questions is likely “yes” as well. It will be important in the coming years to balance the former excitement against the latter caution. Space might seem limitless and impossible to affect in any significant fashion; but, history must be a major voice for the spacemining industry.216 It must be remembered that humans can make an impact that will be felt for generations to come. Thus, it will be important that lawmakers and the international community be as proactive as possible—both in outlining property rights and protecting the final frontier from being harmed by an industry that might become overzealous if left unchecked. Specifically, it will be vital for countries to enter into some sort of international agreement. One option is to create an agreement similar to UNCLOS, which would regulate how individual states and their citizens interact with resources mined from space.217 Such an agreement should recognize not only the property rights of the extracting commercial entities but also the rights of non-spacefaring countries to benefit from the minerals as well. This might include the creation of an international body, much like the ISA, that will ensure that the interests of all nations are maintained by distributing funds and technology to less wealthy or non-spacefaring nations. The U.S. would do well to help create and ratify such an agreement— something they have failed to do with UNCLOS. If the U.S. and other countries are uneasy about entering into such a restrictive agreement, they might also consider an international regulatory body and scheme much like the one used for satellites. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a United Nations agency that, among other services, provides the international community with uniform satellite orbit oversight and regulatory guidance.218 Currently, 193 countries follow the ITU regulations and utilize their services, which have been likened to domain name registration.219 In the same way, spacefaring countries could form an international body that helps create and maintain a uniform space-mining legal framework.220 Without some sort of international framework as described above, the U.S. and other space-mining countries leave themselves open to great conflict and will be required to patch together a multitude of treaties between themselves as problems inevitably arise.221 V. CONCLUSION The idea of mining resources from celestial bodies is something that has always been relegated to video games and sci-fi movies. But as technology continues to progress at an exponential rate, such mining is starting to come within the realm of possibility. A number of companies are currently creating prospecting technologies that will allow them to determine exactly what an individual asteroid holds. They hope to eventually harvest these resources and sell them for lucrative profits. Fortunately for these companies, the current legal regime governing property rights to space resources is undergoing rapid change at the national level. The U.S. recently passed the Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015, which explicitly entitles U.S. citizens to property rights over any space resources they obtain. This is certain to induce confidence in U.S. investors. The situation at the international level is different. Current international space agreements are vague, lacking in consensus, and provide little precedent for ownership of space resources. This has led the international community to move in the direction of creating a better regulatory framework, but this movement is still in discussion stages and is likely to take a while to come to fruition.

#### Current space treaties have zero authority and lack clarity—which creates ineffective regulations

MacWhorter 16 – Kevin, J.D from William and Mary College and Contributor to the William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, “Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism”, *William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review,* 2016, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1653&context=wmelpr>

Although an academic debate at this point, the legal status of property in space is necessary for any future exploration and exploitation of natural resources in space. Until then, private exploration is severely disincentivized. Further, the technology behind asteroid mining is fast becoming a reality.108 The law must respond. In order to evaluate what the international community needs to accomplish to ensure future exploration, one must explore the international agreements already in place that speak to the issue of property rights. To begin, the United Nations (UN) established the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in 1958 109 to promote international cooperation in space and promote its peaceful use.110 UNOOSA oversees the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and implements its decisions.111 The UN founded COPUOS to avoid international rivalries in space.112 The OST, the Liability Convention,113 and the Moon Agreement114 are all within the jurisdiction of COPUOS. There are five international agreements that lay a framework of space law and, more importantly, ownership of objects and celestial bodies in space: • The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST); 115 • The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space(ARRA); 116 • The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); 117 • TheConvention on RegistrationofObjectsLaunched intoOuterSpace (Registration Convention); 118 and • The Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty). 119 As with all international law, however, the actual authority of these treaties is debatable, because countries often ignore their precepts or disagree on the meaning of their substance.120 International custom, therefore, is the major indication of what international law exactly is.121 The Law of the Sea is an instructive analogy on that point, and as Lyall and Larsen explain, The practice need not be wholly uniform, but must be undertaken in the belief it is binding and required by law as opposed to being merely convenient or mutually beneficial. 122 Further, international law in general was conceived to deal with relations between States, not to deal with private claims of property. 123 International.

#### Disputes and misperceptions create cascading effects towards space weaponization and an arms race—an international framework solves BUT unilateral action causes escalating space wars

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The first concern is establishing clear regulations regarding asteroid mining. With an intent to establish clear regulations with respect to asteroid mining and to legalise material extraction from the moon and other celestial bodies by private companies in the US, the US government legalised space mining in 2015 by introducing the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015.[xxvii] This move was heartily welcomed by the private companies as it provided legitimacy to their planned activities. Subsequently in 2017, Luxembourg followed suit.[xxviii] While the US has been a spacefaring nation for many decades now, Luxembourg aspires to become a global leader in the nascent race to mine resources in outer space. In the 1980s the tiny European nation arose out of almost nowhere to become a leader in the satellite communications industry; today it is looking to the skies again, hoping to be the Silicon Valley of asteroid mining.[xxix] In the backdrop of a thriving steel industry that faced trade recession during the oil crisis of 1973, Luxembourg is trying to capitalise on the potential of space mining. As Prime Minister Xavier Bettel put it, “We realized it wouldn't be forever, the steel, so we decided to do other things.”[xxx] Similarly, looking beyond oil, the UAE is framing its policy approaches to make advances in two key areas: human space exploration, and commercial activities of resource extraction through mining.[xxxi] The two formal pieces of legislation (passed by the US and Luxembourg) provide an answer to the complex question of ownership in outer space; the two-word answer appears to be, “finders, keepers”. The US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, 2015 states: “A US citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained.”[xxxii] This legislation gives US space firms the right to own, keep, use, and sell the spoils of the cosmos as they deem fit. Luxembourg’s legislation is fairly analogous to the US Act, giving mining companies the right to keep their plunder. However, unlike the US law, Luxembourg’s does not require a company’s major stakeholders to be based in the country to enjoy its safeguards; the only requirement is for that company to have an office in the country.[xxxiii] In 2017, Japan entered into a five-year agreement with Luxembourg for mining operations in celestial bodies. Japan today appears a step closer to realising its objective of asteroid mining with two Japanese rovers, Minerva II-1, of JAXA landing on the surface of the asteroid named Ryugu in September 2018.[xxxiv] Earlier, Portugal and the UAE signed similar cooperation agreements with Luxembourg.[xxxv] Meanwhile, a few other countries—which have been critical of the US and Luxembourg, at the forefront of the space mining efforts**—**have also decided to join the field. The increasingly competitive and contested nature of outer space activities is spurring major spacefaring nations to push the boundaries in their space exploration. Asteroid mining could possibly become the next big thing and is already seeing a race among the space powers. The US and Luxembourg are at the forefront in space resource extraction in terms of the policy frameworks and funding.[xxxvi] Even as the US has clarified that the US Space Act 2015 is being misunderstood and that there is no change in the US policy towards national appropriation of space, the reality is that it has already spurred a major debate**.[xxxvii]** China and Russia are among those countries that are following on the path of the US and Luxembourg in undertaking mining missions in space. According to media reports, Ye Peijian, chief commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration programme has stated that China would send the first batch of asteroid exploration spacecraft around 2020.[xxxviii] Speaking to China’s Ministry of Science and Technology-run newspaper, Science and Technology Daily, Ye said that these asteroids have a high concentration of precious metals, which could rationalise the huge cost and risks involved in these activities as their economic value could run into the trillions of US dollars. Therefore, extraction, mining and transporting them back to Earth through robotic equipment will be a significant activity. Chinese scientists are working on missions to “bring back a whole asteroid weighing several hundred tonnes, which could turn asteroids with a potential threat to Earth into usable resources**.**”[xxxix] Ye was also quoted as saying that China has plans of “using an asteroid as the base for a permanent space station.”**[xl]** Helium mining on the moon is also part of China’s goals.[xli] Russia, for its part, is also responding to the space-mining developments of the last decade. For one, it plans to have a permanent lunar base somewhere between 2015 and 2020 for possible extraction of Helium.[xlii] Even as Russia’s official position on asteroid mining is that it is forbidden under the 1967 OST—which states that space is the “province of mankind”—the Russian industry players are of the view that they must follow the lead taken by the US and Luxembourg.[xliii] In early 2018, the director of the Scientific-Educational Center for Innovative Mining Technologies of the Moscow-based National University of Science and Technology MISIS (NUST MISIS), Pavel Ananyev, spoke about the Russian ambitions and proposed activities including space drilling rigs, water extraction on the Moon and 3D printers at space stations.[xliv] Russia’s private space companies including Dauria Aerospace, one of the first Russian private space companies, also hold the opinion that they must go forward in the same direction and call for a larger space to private sector to engage in extracting space resources.[xlv] Moscow may not have yet actively pursued space mining and resource extraction, but it is likely to pick up pace in the coming years alongside global efforts. Moscow clearly has a capacity gap in terms of funding because its earlier plans to have a permanent base in the Moon by 2015 is yet to happen. India, too, has ambitions in extraterrestrial resource extraction. In fact, a year after the US legislation, Prabhat Ranjan, executive director of Technology Information, Forecasting and Assessment Council (TIFAC), a policy organisation within the Department of Science and Technology, made a case for India to push ahead with lunar and asteroid mining. He said, “Moon is already being seen as a mineral wealth and further one can go up to the asteroids and start exploiting this. This can be a big game changer and if India doesn’t do this, we will lag behind.”[xlvi] More recently, Dr. K Sivan, Chairman of the country’s civil space organisation, Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), talked about ISRO’s plans for helium-3 extraction and said, “the countries which have the capacity to bring that source from the moon to Earth will dictate the process. I don’t want to be just a part of them, I want to lead them.”[xlvii] However, gaining proficiency in such missions is not easy – the NASA and ESA (the European Space Agency) have been discussing these possibilities for a longer time, albeit quietly. The ISRO Chairman’s response was characterised by an Indian commentator as “aspirational” and “emotional”, clearly conceding that the country’s technological wherewithal is yet to be adequate.[xlviii] Importantly, it is not clear how the legal and regulatory aspects of space mining operations are being dealt with. There was one instance, though, when Luxembourg and Japan in a joint press statement said, “The exchange of information may cover all the issues of the exploration and commercial utilization of space resources, including legal, regulatory, technological, economic, and other aspects.”[xlix] Whether such legalisation is truly legal is arguable. Space Mining: Legal or Not? The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967, considered the global foundation of the outer space legal regime, along with the other four associated international instruments have provided the fundamental basis for outer space activities by prohibiting certain activities and emphasising aspects such as the “common heritage of mankind”. These agreements have been useful in highlighting the global common nature of outer space. At the same time, however, they have been insufficient and ambiguous in providing clear regulations to newer space activities such as asteroid mining. Based on the premise of ‘res communis’, the magna carta of space law, the OST, illustrates outer space as “the province of all mankind”.[l] Under Article I, States are free to explore and use outer space and to access all celestial bodies “on the basis of equality and in accordance with international law.”[li] Although the OST does not explicitly mention “mining” activities, under Article II, outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies are “not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty” through use, occupation or any other means.[lii] Furthermore, the Moon Agreement, 1979, not only defines outer space as “common heritage of mankind” but also proscribes commercial exploitation of planets and asteroids by States unless an international regime is established to govern such activities for “rational management,” “equitable sharing” and “expansion of opportunities” in the use of these resources.[liii] Slipping conveniently through the loophole in the OST, both the US and Luxembourg have authorised companies to claim exclusive ownership over extracted resources (but not of the asteroid itself). Proponents argue that since no sovereign nation is actually asserting rights over an area of outer space, instead, it is only a private unit claiming rights over singular resources, the treaty norm, “national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”, is not being violated. In the words of renowned space lawyer, Frans von der Dunk, “In terms of the law, yes it’s true that no country can claim any part of outer space as national territory — but that doesn’t mean private industry can’t mine resources.”[liv] Quoting reference from maritime law, Luxembourg regards space resources as appropriable akin to fish and shellfish, but celestial bodies and asteroids are not, just like the high sea. It is noteworthy that out of the only 18 nations that have ratified the Moon Agreement,[lv] none are major spacefaring nations, thereby giving themselves a convenient leeway to not abide by the same. These unilateral initiatives have set off a critical response from the international community. Applying literal interpretation of the OST, there is certainly room to construe that space mining may be legal, compared to the Moon Agreement whose prohibition is absolute. However, taking into consideration the letter and spirit of the OST, strengthened by the Moon Agreement, the argument that “national appropriation” only extends to appropriation of territory and not appropriation of resources is a far reach. That resource extraction is contemplated, albeit implicitly, in the OST, is nothing but logical. Not only have such claims of possessory rights not been recognised in the past, there is also global consensus regarding its illegality.[lvi] It therefore forms a part of customary international law, despite the Moon Agreement not having been widely ratified. In this light, the legalisation of space mining is a sheer violation of the elemental principles of international space law. Yet, there is no clarity on what activity is allowed and what is prohibited in outer space under the existing law.[lvii] There is ambiguity around most issues—from “who would license and regulate asteroid mining operations” to the legality of these activities as per the existing international space law.[lviii] When comparing it to the law of the seas, resource appropriation in the high seas and deep seabed is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and that in Antarctica, as per the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991. While the former is strictly regulated under Part XI of UNCLOS, the latter is completely forbidden but for scientific purposes. The law of the sea argument—“owning the fish, not the sea”—cannot be applied to outer space primarily because fish are living resources that can reproduce and therefore are renewable. Outer space resources, on the other hand, are depletable: once harvested, they cannot be replenished. The analogy with fish and seas, therefore, is not a fair one and its transposition to outer space and celestial bodies would be inaccurate. Perhaps a more comparable regime is the deep seabed, which contemplates property rights over mineral extraction. The utilisation and ownership of the deep seabed’s resources are exclusively structured around the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which is responsible for organising, carrying out and controlling all activities in the seabed.[lix] Not only must State parties seek sanction from the ISA before beginning resource exploitation, but the fiscal benefits from seabed mining must also be shared among all.[lx] Evidently, even the UNCLOS upholds State ownership and fair distribution over individual ownership and self-centred gains.[lxi] By allowing private ownership, the US and Luxembourg are once again in contravention of the very same law they are relying on. The touchstone principle, “province of all mankind” is also being defeated. Therefore, to even reap the limited benefits as under UNCLOS, at least the derivation must be made alike. This argument too falls flat. The Way Ahead Undoubtedly, growing technological adeptness has made space mining inevitable and, therefore, the question is no longer “if” but “when”. Nevertheless, a scenario where companies can, solely based on domestic laws, steadily exploit mineral resources in outer space, would be universally unacceptable. Minus regulations, the realisation of space exploitation will create great disparity between nations and disrupt dynamics of the world economy. Regulations are particularly important in the context of the space debris problem. We definitely do not wish for a future, befittingly described by renowned engineer and inventor Graham Hawkes, thus: “Space exploration promised us alien life, lucrative planetary mining, and fabulous lunar colonies. News flash, ladies and gents: Space is nearly empty. It’s a sterile vacuum, filled mostly with the junk we put up there.”[lxii] Therefore, it is extremely important that resource appropriation is carried out in an ethical manner, without interrupting safe and secure access to outer space, simultaneously allowing all countries a share in the proceeds. Technological advances and financial readiness are pushing both, states and non-state players towards new ventures in outer space. Yet, the rules of engagement especially dealing with the new commercial activities are far from ideal. There is a clear and urgent need to debate and come up with either a new regulation or accommodate the space mining activities within the existing international legal measures. Experts have articulated that these could possibly be addressed under the existing property law principles or old mining law principles.[lxiii] However, given the scale of activities that states and non-state parties will engage in, the ability of the existing regime to address space mining could be highly inadequate. The second option would be to develop a new instrument including an institutional architecture that would set out the parameters for activities related to resource extraction and space mining. Since there are a good number of commercial players playing a formidable role in asteroid mining, there has to be space for commercial players in the new gig, which might be a big departure from the earlier era institutions that saw states being the sole authority in regulating activities in outer space. A clear role for commercial players has been articulated for some time but the global space community has yet to reach a consensus in how they can be incorporated into the global governance debates. The apprehension on the part of a number of states is driven by the fact that private sector participation is still largely a western phenomenon. This trend may be undergoing change in other parts of the world but until there is a sizeable private sector community in other major spacefaring powers, there is a fear that the western bloc of countries may stand to gain from the industry being represented in the global governance debates. A third possible option is to get a larger global endorsement of the Moon Treaty, which highlights the common heritage of mankind. The Moon Treaty is important as it addresses a “loophole” of the OST “by banning any ownership of any extraterrestrial property by any organization or private person, unless that organization is international and governmental.”[lxiv] But the fact that it has been endorsed only by a handful of countries makes it a “failure” from the international law perspective.[lxv] Nevertheless, efforts must be made to strengthen the support base for the Moon Agreement given the potential pitfalls of resource extraction and space mining activities in outer space. Signatories to the Moon Treaty can take the lead within multilateral platforms such as the UN to debate the usefulness of the treaty in the changed context of technological advancements and new geopolitical dynamics, and potentially find compromises where there are disagreements. Pursuing a collective approach is ideal. An example is UNCLOS, which demonstrates that the international society possesses the capability of regulating mining quarters deemed to be the “province of mankind”. However, a sui generis legal framework must be crafted because the difference between the marines and outer space and their resources is wide, and the regulations are too region-specific to permit a superimposition of the oceanic regime to outer space. A sound legal environment will protect both the company performing operations and its beneficiaries, while ensuring even-handed resource allocation. In addition, regulations spelling out safety standards and identifying safety zones around mining operations could be useful in ensuring safe and secure operations in outer space. It would be wrong, however, to say that the international community has not debated over this. In fact, one of the main agenda points of the fifty-seventh session of UNCOPUS Legal Committee held in April 2018, was especially devoted to “general exchange of views on potential legal models for activities in the exploration, exploitation and utilization of space resources.”[lxvi] Upon evaluation, it is clear that countries are not against space mining as such; rather the contentious points are vis-à-vis authorisation, regulation, and where to place responsibility. There also appears to be concurrence regarding the need for international coordination efforts of some sort. Over the last two years, The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group,[lxvii] established with the purpose of “assess[ing] the need for a regulatory framework for space resource activities, has identified 19 “building blocks”,[lxviii] encompassing subject matters that could be included in such a regulatory framework. Although this leaves a lot of hope for the legitimate mining of space resources, its status is still pending. Also, several questions need to be agreed upon by the global space policy community before the establishment of a framework. First, there must be an agreement among all the space powers on the need for a global governance framework for the use of space resources. This must be followed by detailed deliberations on the scope, mandate and objectives of such a framework. Can and should there be safety zones and exclusive rights be recognised under such a framework and how one can ensure equitable sharing of the resources, and lastly, the role of industries and how the interests of the industry as pioneers in this area can be secured. These are all pertinent questions that need to be considered and debated before an international regime for extraction and use of space resources can be established.[lxix] Even legal space mining activity could have serious impacts in two ways. For instance, any technological spinoffs that a country might have could add to the space weaponisation debate. Two, the erosion of norms with regard to space mining could have a cascading effect on other norms in the same issue area such as weaponisation of space. It is imperative for nations to actively combine their efforts to ensure that this activity transpires in the most globally acceptable manner and not one which stirs anarchism. The ancient Roman maxim, ‘Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbatur’ (What touches all must be approved by all) gains due traction in this kind of a scenario. Therefore, a universal activity like space exploration mandates an international guideline; or else, the first haul from mining, instead of earning admiration and exultation, will only be enmeshed in litigation.

#### Space wars go nuclear

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Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame**,** or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24warnedthatit was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employedto achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionalityStates havefairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea,built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction.

Starr ’17 (Steven; director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Associate member of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, expert in the environmental consequences of nuclear war; 1/9/17; “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies”; <https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-studies/>; Federation of American Scientists; accessed 11/24/18; TV) [AV]

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will **instantly ignite fires** over a surface area of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the **blast**, **fire**, and **radiation** from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce **direct fatalities** comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “**counterforce**” **nuclear war** between the superpowers. However, the **long-term environmental effects** of the war **could** significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely **result in** a vast **global famine**. The scientists predicted that **nuclear firestorms** in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of **black carbon smoke** to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in **less than two weeks** and would form **a** global **stratospheric smoke layer** that **would remain for** more than **a decade**. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight, which would **heat the smoke** to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing **ozone losses of** 20 to **50 percent** over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would produce the **coldest** average **surface temperatures** in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global **food production would decrease** by 20 to **40 percent** during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to **two billion** people to perish from **famine**. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern **thermonuclear** weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to **80 times** more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of **100,000 tons of TNT**, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A **war** fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would **ignite immense** **nuclear firestorms** covering land surface areas of many thousands or **tens of thousands** of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to **180 million tons** of black carbon soot and **smoke**, which would form a dense, **global stratospheric smoke layer**. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to **20 years**, and it **would block** as much as **70 percent of sunlight** from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum **temperatures** to **fall below freezing** in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be **too cold and dark** to grow food crops, **which would doom the** majority of the **human population.** NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.”

### Advantage 2 – Collisions

#### Unregulated mining is existential and causes collisions – multiple scenarios

#### Scenario 1 is deflection

#### Unregulated mining causes asteroid deflection and astroterror

Drmola and Mareš 15 - Jakub Drmola is a PhD student and Miroslav Mareš professor, at the Divison of Security and Strategic Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic, "Revisiting the deflection dilemma", *Astronomy & Geophysics*, Volume 56, Issue 5, October 2015, Pages 5.15–5.18, <https://academic.oup.com/astrogeo/article/56/5/5.15/235650>

There are two basic ways to go about moving the resources contained within a given asteroid to the Earth. They can be extracted from the asteroid during its natural orbit and then transported to the Earth, or the entire asteroid might be moved closer to a more convenient location before starting mining. Thus repositioned, it might even be used as a shielded habitat, once hollowed out (Ostro 1999). There are different speculative costs and benefits associated with either option, which would vary with the size, orbit and composition of the asteroid. But, crucially, the second option would entail putting asteroids into orbit around the Earth, the Moon or possibly at one of the Earth’s Lagrangian points. Indeed, NASA has already planned a mission to capture a small asteroid and place it in a high cislunar orbit, where it would serve as a destination for future manned missions and experiments. This “Asteroid Redirect Mission” is to take place in the next decade and is being pitched mainly as a stepping stone towards a future mission to Mars (see box “NASA’s Asteroid Redirect Mission”; Brophy et al. 2012, Burchell 2014, Gates et al. 2015). Programmes to redirect asteroids and, especially, plans to mine asteroids on an industrial scale essentially resurrect the deflection dilemma. But it is no longer a matter of superpowers intentionally misusing technology designed to prevent dangerous impacts. It becomes an issue of proliferation among private entities. Once private mining companies acquire the technical ability to redirect suitable NEOs (Baoyin et al. 2011) in order to extract platinum or water from them, perilous inflections become more likely. The probability of accidents will rise with the number of asteroids whose trajectories we decide to manipulate. Such accidents might be very unlikely, but even a tiny technical or human error in the execution of an inflection meant to place an asteroid into the lunar or geocentric orbit might send it crashing into the Earth with potentially devastating consequences. And while we might find solace in the low probabilities associated with such an accident, even contemporary industries which are considered very safe suffer from unlikely tragedies. Despite being dependable and reliable, airliners do crash; there are a lot of them flying and very improbable accidents do happen if the dice are rolled often enough. Undoubtedly, we will not be steering as many asteroids as we steer planes any time soon, but industries tend to be more accident-prone during their infancy. Furthermore, a single asteroid can do a lot more damage than a single plane. And who is to say how much metal or water we are going to need in space over the course of the 21st century, or the next? The second source of risk is the intentional misuse, similar to the original deflection dilemma. But the entry barrier for asteroid weaponization gets much lower if mining them and moving them around becomes a common industrial activity. This is in stark contrast to the original scenario which envisioned this technology to be used solely for planetary defence and under control of a very small number of the most powerful countries (Morrison 2010). If such a powerful technology becomes widely and commercially available, even rogue states and wellfunded terrorist groups might be tempted to use it for an unexpected and devastating attack. In addition, an active asteroid mining industry would make it more difficult to detect any hostile inflection attempts among the number of legitimate and benign ones. Policy implications Considering these possible future dangers, it seems prudent to consider what to do about them sooner rather than later. The most obvious “solution” would be a blanket ban on the development of any technology that might lead to artificially inflected asteroids crashing into the Earth. However, such a ban would be incompatible with the dream of increased presence of humans in the solar system. It would stymie both scientific exploration and economic development here on Earth, which is increasingly dependent on precious metals and spacebased technologies. Furthermore, this approach would leave us more vulnerable to natural impacts which, in the long view, seems less than desirable. Another approach might be similar to the current regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, aiming to support peaceful civilian use of nuclear power while at the same time prohibiting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The regime mostly works (with caveats, see Wood et al. 2008) because these applications require different infrastructures and fissile materials enriched to different levels of purity. This makes it possible, at least in principle, to tell apart operations meant for the production of electricity and those designed to create weapons. Unfortunately, the difference between legitimate and hostile trajectory modification would lie only in the acceleration imparted on the asteroid and not in the technical means to do it. As the spacecraft launched with the intent to cause impact with the Earth might be identical to those sent off to retrieve resources, telling them apart would be nearly impossible, until it was too late. And this approach makes no difference to the chances of an industrial accident. If monitoring equipment on Earth is unhelpful, the focus changes to space. In other words, all asteroid movement missions should be constantly monitored. For an attacker, it would make most sense to delay the final course adjustment for as long as possible in order to give the least warning and make the timeframe for reaction as short as possible. So an asteroid might head towards a safe orbit fit for resource extraction for most of its altered flight time, but be further accelerated at the last possible moment onto an impact trajectory, perhaps mere days before it hits a major city. Our current programmes cataloguing NEOs (such as CSS or Pan-STARRS), which look for new, previously unknown objects, are not ideally suited for the task of constantly tracking a number of different, already known asteroids. New instruments would be needed to track them in order to immediately detect any hazardous inflection, whether intentional or accidental. Once such a detection is made, emergency measures to evacuate the population or, preferably, to “re-deflect” the incoming object can be executed right away, regardless of the cause. Accidents and hostilities could be treated the same way and countered by the same system (initially, at least). Such a system would be more akin to an air traffic control than a non-proliferation regulation, offering security through vigilance, rather than absence. Additionally, development of a system able to deflect incoming objects at relatively short notice would be beneficial in case of an impending natural impact. Conclusion Perhaps none of these concerns will become relevant. Maybe the idea of asteroid mining will soon fizzle out because we will discover cheaper and more efficient local alternatives. Maybe humanity will lose the will or the capability to explore space any further. Or perhaps manipulating asteroid trajectories will prove impractical or too costly. Certainly, it would not be the first time that a promising and seemingly obvious future does not come about. In the 1960s it seemed almost self-evident that by the second decade of the 21st century we would have flying cars and a base on the Moon. Yet we do not. Asteroid mining might be a similar case of unfulfilled promises and misplaced visions. On the other hand, there are examples of industries that developed surprisingly fast despite being considered unrealistic, not too long ago: air travel, nuclear power generation, or commercial satellites. The spread of the internet and the accompanying digital information revolution is another example; hardly anyone anticipated having virtually the entire repository of human knowledge at our fingertips at all times (except Douglas Adams). Whether the deflection dilemma forever remains an unmaterialized threat or it becomes a palpable problem, it is something to be mindful of now, as the foundations of the prospective asteroid mining industry are being laid. In the end, the purpose of this paper is not to predict the future. Instead it aims to merely update a conscientious warning which called for our diligence more than 20 years ago. While the world has changed somewhat, the basic idea remains valid. Whether the danger comes from warring superpowers, terrorists or negligent corporations, we must be aware of the realistic risks in order to avoid being either stumped by unforeseen catastrophes or paralysed by unwarranted fear. Either extreme would be harmful for our future.●

#### Major collisions cause extinction

Baum ’19 - executive director of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, Ph.D in Geography

Seth Baum, “Risk-Risk Tradeoff Analysis of Nuclear Explosives for Asteroid Deflection,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, May 31, 2019), <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3397559>.

The most severe asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can cause global environmental effects. The core mechanism is the transport of particulate matter into the stratosphere, where it can spread worldwide and remain aloft for years or decades. Large asteroid collisions create large quantities of dust and large fireballs; the fire heats the dust so that some portion of it rises into the stratosphere. The largest collisions, such as the 10km Chicxulub impactor, can also eject debris from the collision site into space; upon reentry into the atmosphere, the debris heats up enough to spark global fires (Toon, Zahnle, Morrison, Turco, & Covey, 1997). The fires are a major impact in their own right and can send additional smoke into the stratosphere. For nuclear explosions, there is also a fireball and smoke, in this case from the burning of cities or other military targets. While in the stratosphere, the particulate matter blocks sunlight and destroys ozone (Toon et al., 2007). The ozone loss increases the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the surface, causing skin cancer and other harms (Mills, Toon, Turco, Kinnison, & Garcia, 2008). The blocked sunlight causes abrupt cooling of Earth’s surface and in turn reduced precipitation due to a weakened hydrological cycle. The cool, dry, and dark conditions reduce plant growth. Recent studies use modern climate and crop models to examine the effects for a hypothetical IndiaPakistan nuclear war scenario with 100 weapons (50 per side) each of 15KT yield. The studies find agriculture declines in the range of approximately 2% to 50% depending on the crop and location.11 Another study compares the crop data to existing poverty and malnourishment and estimates that the crop declines could threaten starvation for two billion people (Helfand, 2013). However, the aforementioned studies do not account for new nuclear explosion fire simulations that find approximately five times less particulate matter reaching the stratosphere, and correspondingly weaker global environmental effects (Reisner et al., 2018). Note also that the 100 weapon scenario used in these studies is not the largest potential scenario. Larger nuclear wars and large asteroid collisions could cause greater harm. The largest asteroid collisions could even reduce sunlight below the minimum needed for vision (Toon et al., 1997). Asteroid risk analyses have proposed that the global environmental disruption from large collisions could cause one billion deaths (NRC, 2010) or the death of 25% of all humans (Chapman, 2004; Chapman & Morrison, 1994; Morrison, 1992), though these figures have not been rigorously justified (Baum, 2018a). The harms from asteroid collisions and nuclear wars can also include important secondary effects. The food shortages from severe global environmental disruption could lead to infectious disease outbreaks as public health conditions deteriorate (Helfand, 2013). Law and order could be lost in at least some locations as people struggle for survival (Maher & Baum, 2013). Today’s complex global political-economic system already shows fragility to shocks such as the 2007- 2008 financial crisis (Centeno, Nag, Patterson, Shaver, & Windawi, 2015); an asteroid collision or nuclear war could be an extremely large shock. The systemic consequences of a nuclear war would be further worsened by the likely loss of major world cities that serve as important hubs in the global economy. Even a single detonation in nuclear terrorism would have ripple effects across the global political-economic system (similar to, but likely larger than, the response prompted by the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001). It is possible for asteroid collisions to cause nuclear war. An asteroid explosion could be misinterpreted as a nuclear attack, prompting nuclear attack that is believed to be retaliation. For example, the 2013 Chelyabinsk event occurred near an important Russian military installation, prompting concerns about the event’s interpretation (Harris et al., 2015). The ultimate severity of an asteroid collision or violent nuclear conflict use would depend on how human society reacts. Would the reaction be disciplined and constructive: bury the dead, heal the sick, feed the hungry, and rebuild all that has fallen? Or would the reaction be disorderly and destructive: leave the rubble in place, fight for scarce resources, and descend into minimalist tribalism or worse? Prior studies have identified some key issues, including the viability of trade (Cantor, Henry, & Rayner, 1989) and the self-sufficiency of local communities (Maher & Baum, 2013). However, the issue has received little research attention and remains poorly understood. This leaves considerable uncertainty in the total human harm from an asteroid collision or nuclear weapons use. Previously published point estimates of the human consequences of asteroid collisions12 and nuclear wars (Helfand, 2013) do not account for this uncertainty and are likely to be inaccurate. Of particular importance are the consequences for future generations, which could vastly outnumber the present generation. If an asteroid collision or nuclear war would cause human extinction, then there would be no future generations. Alternatively, if survivors fail to recover a large population and advanced technological civilization, then future generations would be permanently diminished. The largest long-term factor is whether future generations would colonize space and benefit from its astronomically large amount of resources (Tonn, 1999). However, it is not presently known which asteroid collisions or nuclear wars (if any) would cause the permanent collapse of human civilization and thus the loss of the large future benefits (Baum et al., 2019). Given the enormous stakes, prudent risk management would aim for very low probabilities of permanent collapse (Tonn, 2009). It should be noted that the severity of violent nuclear conflict could depend on more than just the effects of nuclear explosions, because the overall conflict scenario could include non-nuclear violence. Indeed, it is possible for the nuclear explosions to constitute a relatively small portion of the total severity, as was the case in World War II. 4.4 Risk of Violent Non-Nuclear Conflict Finally, it is necessary to discuss the risk of violent non-nuclear conflict. Only a small portion of violent non-nuclear conflicts are applicable, specifically the portion affected by nuclear weapons. More precisely, this section discusses non-nuclear conflicts involving one or more countries that possess nuclear weapons at some point during the lifetime of a nuclear deflection program. Nuclear deterrence theory predicts that nuclear-armed adversaries will not initiate major wars against each other because both sides could be destroyed in a nuclear war. However, the theory does permit limited, small-scale violent conflicts between nuclear-armed countries. These conflicts likely would not involve nuclear weapons. Indeed, nuclear deterrence may even make small violent conflicts more likely, because the countries know that neither side wants to escalate the conflict into major war. This idea is known as the stability-instability paradox: nuclear deterrence brings stability with respect to major wars but instability with respect to minor conflicts. Empirical support for the stability-instability paradox has been found by some research (Rauchhaus, 2009),while other research has found no significant effect of the possession of nuclear weapons on the probability of conflicts of any scale (Bell & Miller, 2015; Gartzke & Jo, 2009). If countries fully disarm their nuclear arsenals, such that they would never have nuclear weapons again, then there would be no nuclear deterrence to prevent the onset of major wars. A simple risk analysis could assume that the risk of major wars would be comparable to the risk prior to the development of nuclear weapons. The two twentieth century World Wars combined for around 100 million deaths in 50 years,13 suggesting an annualized risk of two million deaths. However, two World Wars do not make for a robust dataset. Indeed, the robustness of these two data points is called into question by historical analysis finding that both world wars might not have occurred in the reasonably plausible event that the 1914 assassination of Archduke Ferdinand had failed (Lebow, 2014). Similarly, another historical analysis finds that the U.S. and Soviet Union would probably not have waged major war against each other even in the absence of nuclear deterrence (Mueller, 1988). Furthermore, these past events are not necessarily applicable to the future conditions of a post-nuclear-disarmament world. To the best of the present author’s knowledge, no studies have analyzed the risk of major wars in a post-nucleardisarmament world.

#### Scenario 2 is satellite collisions

#### Mining creates space debris

Boley and Byers 20 (Arron, Department of Physics and Astronomy, University of British Columbia; Michael, Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia) U.S. policy puts the safe development of space at risk, SCIENCE, 9 Oct 2020, Vol 370, Issue 6513, pp. 174-175 <https://www.science.org/doi/full/10.1126/science.abd3402> EE

Mining can generate serious operational concerns. Lunar dust is a known challenge to operations on the Moon. Any surface activity could exacerbate lunar dust migration, including by lofting dust onto trajectories that cross lunar orbits, such as that of NASA's proposed Lunar Gateway (11). Moreover, without cooperation by all actors, the limited number of useful lunar orbits could quickly become filled with space debris.

On asteroids, low escape speeds will make it difficult to prevent the loss of surface material. Even if full enclosures are used, waste material may be purposefully jettisoned. Mining could also lead to uncontrolled outbursts of volatile sublimation after the removal of surface layers. Because the asteroids targeted for mining are likely to be those with small minimum orbit intersection distances, the resulting meteoroid debris streams could threaten lunar operations as well as satellites in Earth's orbit (12). In a worst-case scenario, a trajectory change resulting from mining could eventually lead to an Earth-impact emergency.

Space missions already provide some evidence of these risks. In 2019, during the course of Japan's Hayabusa2 mission, a small impactor was used to make a crater on (162173) Ryugu (13). Some of the resulting anthropogenic meteoroids could begin reaching Earth during the 2033 apparition. In 2022, NASA will test its ability to deflect an asteroid by striking (65803) Didymos B (Dimorphos) with the Double Asteroid Redirection Test spacecraft. This impact will produce anthropogenic meteoroids, with the possibility of immediate delivery to Earth (14). Although these risks are small, they demonstrate how easily human actions can change the near-Earth environment.

#### An increase in space debris and dust from mining collides with key defense satellites

Scoles 15 Sarah Scoles [Freelance science writer, and a contributing writer at WIRED Science, with articles in places like Popular Science, the New York Times, Scientific American, Vice, Outside, and others.], 5-27-2015, "Dust from asteroid mining spells danger for satellites," New Scientist, <https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22630235-100-dust-from-asteroid-mining-spells-danger-for-satellites/> DD AG

IF THE gold mine is too far from home, why not move it nearby? It sounds like a fantasy, but would-be miners are already dreaming up ways to drag resource-rich space rocks closer to home. Trouble is, that could threaten the web of satellites around Earth.

Asteroids are not only stepping stones for cosmic colonisation, but may contain metals like gold, platinum, iron and titanium, plus life-sustaining hydrogen and oxygen, and rocket-fuelling ammonia. Space age forty-niners can either try to work an asteroid where it is, or tug it into a more convenient orbit.

NASA chose the second option for its Asteroid Redirect Mission, which aims to pluck a boulder from an asteroid’s surface and relocate it to a stable orbit around the moon. But an asteroid’s gravity is so weak that it’s not hard for surface particles to escape into space. Now a new model warns that debris shed by such transplanted rocks could intrude where many defence and communication satellites live – in geosynchronous orbit.

According to Casey Handmer of the California Institute of Technology in Pasadena and Javier Roa of the Technical University of Madrid in Spain, 5 per cent of the escaped debris will end up in regions traversed by satellites. Over 10 years, it would cross geosynchronous orbit 63 times on average. A satellite in the wrong spot at the wrong time will suffer a damaging high-speed collision with that dust.

The study also looks at the “catastrophic disruption” of an asteroid 5 metres across or bigger. Its total break-up into a pile of rubble would increase the risk to satellites by more than 30 per cent (arxiv.org/abs/1505.03800).

That may not have immediate consequences. But as Earth orbits get more crowded with spent rocket stages and satellites, we will have to worry about cascades of collisions like the one depicted in the movie Gravity.

#### Collisions with high-value satellites guarantee nuclear escalation.

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“Amid increased tensions, perhaps even an imminent military confrontation between **two nuclear-armed adversaries**, a high-value (for example, early-warning or strategic communication) **satellite stops functioning** or communicating **instantly and inexplicably**. SSA sensors do not pick up any anomalies. **This may be the outcome of** a technical malfunction or a natural phenomenon, such as the impact of a collision with a meteoroid or piece of **space debris small enough to have evaded detection**. Alternatively, the satellite perhaps becomes the victim of a deliberate, undetected attack. Earth-to-space kinetic, electronic, or directed energy attacks would leave behind some trails. A cyberattack, which is harder to detect and attribute, is a strong possibility. So is a stealthy attack by hostile spacecraft. In fact, the adversary is known to have experimented with ominous small spacecraft that could easily conceal or disguise themselves until conducting a final maneuver to neutralize their targets. The victim would also be aware that, especially at distant GEO and HEO altitudes, SSA is not sufficiently comprehensive to detect and give warning of all suspicious or threatening movements as they happen. As suspicions abound, decision makers are faced with hard choices. Could this perhaps be the harbinger of a wider nuclear or nonnuclear **first strike**, along with which the attacker is seeking to eliminate the **possibility of retaliation** by degrading the defender’s capacity to command, control, and communicate with its forces? Should the defender react immediately before the remaining space-enabled NC3 elements are also compromised and its control over nuclear and nonnuclear forces degrades even further? In the absence of a clear-cut picture of what actually has happened, there is a risk that impending decisions will be made on the basis of insufficient and potentially **erroneous information**, and the climate will be ripe for unfounded presumptions and predispositions. The resulting ultimatums, responses, or counteractions could **set off a dangerous cycle of escalation** and tit-for-tat actions, whereby reactions and overreactions between adversaries lead to potentially catastrophic consequences. At a minimum, heightened tension in orbit would **have the outcome of spilling down to Earth** so as to further aggravate an already tense situation.?”

### Framework

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being.

#### 1. Death is bad and outweighs – agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory

#### 2. Intuitions outweigh - since they’re the foundational basis for any argument and theories that contradict our intuitions are most likely false even if we can’t deductively determine why

#### 3. Extinction outweighs -

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

### Disclosure

#### Interpretation: Debaters competing at a TOC bid-distributing tournament must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the NDCA wiki at least 30 minutes before the round.

**1] Non-unique – Prep outs are occurring in the status quo; people know what smaller schools are running—puts them in a double-bind, either A] big schools will know what they’re reading or at least have plenty of prep for it, or B] they’re saying that small schools can only win by the element of surprise—that’s bad because they’ll never actually gain education of in-depth debates then anyway AND it takes out their fairness claims because they wouldn’t be doing the better debating, just the less predictable debate.**

**2] TURN – nondisclosure is more exclusionary and just benefits large teams that have more connections to get intel or more people to watch rounds.**

#### Violation: see screenshots, they haven’t disclosed anything for the other tournaments they’ve attended and their cites are incomplete for this tournament.

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Table

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#### Standards:

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs – it equals the playing field.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access.

**4] predictability (fairness/education)**

#### Voters:

#### Fairness: it’s constitutive of activities with wins and losses

#### Education – it’s the reason school fund debate and host tournaments

#### DTD – a) deter future abuse and set norms b) my strat has already been skewed

#### CI: a) reasonability arbirtrary and causes judge intervention since we don’t know you abuse meter b) creates a race to the top where we set the best norms for debate

#### No RVIS a) illogical – you don’t win for proving you’re fair b) incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to abusive practices