#### 1

#### A: Interp – Debaters must only read a framework that is not maximizing expected well-being.

#### B: Violation – You read util

#### C: Standards –

#### 1. Inclusion – Util is bad for inclusion: A) Bad for small schools since it maximizes the benefit for large program with mass amounts of prep B) Util justifies atrocities since it justifies allowing us to harm some for the benefit of others – even if they spew some pain quantifiability argument that doesn’t solve since there are still instances some get great benefit from others harm C) Util can’t justify intrinsic wrongness – We can’t know whether our action was good until we’ve evaluated the states of affairs they’ve produced since it’s based on the outcome of the action. For Example if asked the question “is rape okay?” a utilitarian would not be able to say yes because there are situations in which it would be morally obligatory to do so if it maximized pleasure D) It’s ableist – certain individuals can’t experience pain and pleasure which justifies their inability to be agents and their manipulation.

#### 2. Resolvability – Util makes debates irresolvable: A) There are infinite end states to each action that I may take meaning we can never know if it is a good or bad action as per util because it could possibly result in many ways: For example, util would tell me to save 2 babies rather than one but there’s a chance that baby turns out to be Hitler in which case util would condemn my actions B) Aggregation is impossible since there’s no way to quantify different amounts of pain and pleasure – how can 2 headaches equal a migraine C) Induction paradox – you only know induction works because it’s worked in the past, but that itself is an induction D) Since it requires evaluating end-states we can’t know whether the action was good until after it was taken which means the judge cannot determine whether the aff is good E) Consequences empirically impossible to predict. Menand 05, Louis Menand (the Anne T. and Robert M. Bass Professor of English at Harvard University) “Everybody’s An Expert” The New Yorker 2005 <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/12/05/everybodys-an-expert//> FSU SS “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. Tetlock is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started asking them to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert. Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, the experts had made 82,361 forecasts. Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, [e.g.] economic growth), or less of something (repression, [e.g.] recession). And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an x per cent chance of happening happen x per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all three outcomes—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world, in other words, are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices.

#### Voters – Fairness is a voter since debate is a competitive activity that requires an equal shot at winning. Inclusion is a voter since it’s a pre-requisite to engagement in the space and the judge has an obligation as an educator to ensure a safe space. Resolvability is a voter since anything else maximizes the probability of judge intervention which minimizes the ballot as a determiner of the better debater which is its constitutive purpose.

#### DD – a) to deter future abuse, b) otherwise they could just kick and go for the positive time tradeoff on theory, c) the round has been skewed so theory is the only fair place to vote, and d) the ballot asks you to vote for the better debater, so if I prove that my interp is better, I have done the better debating and deserve the ballot

#### CI – a) reasonability requires judge intervention because I don’t know where your BS meter is, and b) reasonability creates a race to the bottom since it motivates debaters to use increasingly unfair strategies and get away with them by playing defense on theory.

#### No RVIs – a) It’s illogical to vote for you for being fair, Rounds without theory would be irresolvable b) It incentivizes you to bait theory and win off a scripted CI.

2

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best proves the truth or falsity of the resolution.

#### 1. Logic: Debate is fundamentally a game with rules, which requires the better competitor to win. Every other ROB is just a reason why there are other ways to play the game but are not consistent enough with the purpose of the game to vote on, just like you don’t win a basketball game for shooting the most 3s.

#### 2. Fiat is illusory: Nothing leaves this round other than the result on the ballot which means even if there is a higher purpose, it doesn’t change anything and you should just write whatever is important on the ballot and vote for me. Answering this triggers constitutivism since the win is necessary for your scholarship which means rules inside of the game matter.

#### 3. Isomorphism: ROBs that aren’t phrased as binaries maximize leeway for interpretation as to who is winning offense. Scalar framing mechanisms necessitate that the judge has to intervene to see who is closest at solving a problem. Truth testing solves since it’s solely a question of if something is true or false, there isn’t a closest estimate.

#### 4. Constitutivism: The ballot asks you to either vote aff or neg based on the given resolution a) Five dictionaries[[1]](#footnote-1) define to negate as to deny the truth of and affirm[[2]](#footnote-2) as to prove true which means its intrinsic to the nature of the activity b) the purpose of debate is the acquisition of knowledge in pursuit of truth – a resolutional focus is key to depth of exploration which o/w on specificity. It’s a jurisdictional issue since it questions whether the judge should go outside the scope of the game.

3

#### Permissibility and presumption Negates –

#### [1] Semantics – Ought is defined as expressing obligation[[3]](#footnote-3) which means absent a proactive obligation you vote neg since there’s a trichotomy between prohibition, obligation, and permissibility and proving one disproves the other two. Semantics o/w – a) it’s key to predictability since we prep based on the wording of the res and b) it’s constitutive to the rules of debate since the judge is obligated to vote on the resolutional text.

#### [2] Safety – It’s ethically safer to presume the squo since we know what the squo is but we can’t know whether the aff will be good or not if ethics are incoherent.

#### [3] Logic – Propositions require positive justification before being accepted, otherwise one would be forced to accept the validity of logically contradictory propositions regarding subjects one knows nothing about, i.e if one knew nothing about P one would have to presume that both the “P” and “~P” are true.

#### [4] Shiftiness – Permissibility ground encourages the aff to load up with triggers and the 1ar controls the direction of the round which means they can moot all my offense, I need permissibility in the 2n to compensate.

#### [5] Neg Flex – Aff sets the terms for the round, gets infinite prep, and gets the last word which means they have a substantive advantage on every layer – neg permissibility is key to compensate so I get access to more diverse ground and layering.

#### Skep is true and negates,

#### First is external world skep, We cannot know if anything actually exists because there is a possibility that it does not. Negate on presumption because you cannot know if states even exist.

**Sinnot-Armstrong**

Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter, 6-14-2002, "Moral Skepticism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral/>

Skeptical Hypotheses The final kind of argument derives from René Descartes (1641)**.** I do not seem justified in believing that what I see is a lake if I cannot rule out the possibility that it is a bay or a bayou**.** Generalizing, if there is any contrary hypothesis that I cannot rule out, then I am not justified in believing that what I see is a lake. This is supposed to be a common standard for justified belief. When this principle is applied thoroughly, it leads to skepticism. All a skeptic needs to show is that, for each belief, there is some contrary hypothesis that cannot be ruled out. It need not be the same hypothesis for every belief, but skeptics usually buy wholesale instead of retail, so they seek a single hypothesis that is contrary to all (or many common) beliefs and which cannot be ruled out in any way. The famous Cartesian hypothesis is of a demon who deceives me in all of my beliefs about the external world, while also ensuring that my beliefs are completely coherent. This possibility cannot be ruled out by any experiences or beliefs,because of how the deceiving demon is defined. This hypothesis is also contrary to my beliefs about the lake. So my beliefs about the lake are not justified, according to the above principle. And there is nothing special about my beliefs about the lake. Everything I believe about the external world is incompatible with the deceiving demon hypothesis**.** Skeptics conclude that no such belief is justified.

#### Second is determinism - Actions are predetermined according to the laws of the universe.

**Newell**

Brandi Newell 2009 Indiana Undergraduate Journal of Cognitive Science <http://www.cogs.indiana.edu/icogsci/vol4/Can20Neuroscience20Inform20the20Free20Will20Debate.pdf>

￼For example, by utilizing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),researchers are able to observe which areas of the brain are active as participants engage in experimental tasks. In one study by Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, and Cohen (2004), participants were scanned while making difficult moral decisions**.** Greene and his colleagues found that the neural activation varied systematically depending on whether the dilemma was of a personal or impersonal nature. Additionally, depending on the relative activation of the braincenters associated with “cognitive” and “emotional” processing, one could make relatively accurate predictions as to how the participants would respond to the questions being posed. Another experiment by Huettel, Stowe, Gordon, Warner, and Platt (2006)found that differential levels of activationwithin the lateral prefrontal cortex during a gambling task could predict participants’ preferences for risk takingand general behavioral impulsiveness. Looking at studies like these, it seems evident that theneural activations researchers are detecting have a causal relationship with the behavior being observed**.** It also seems clear thatit is not an immaterial “soul” that is at work during the decision-making processes, but a very material brain. Furthermore, it is hard to imagine a task that would be more under the “soul’s” jurisdiction than solving a moral dilemma. If the brain is at work solving even this most sacred problem, chances are good (and research points to the conclusion) that the brain is, in fact, in charge of all of our cognitive functions. As these and other studies suggest increasingly mechanistic views of the way the brain works, it is becoming harder and harder to deny that it operates according to the same physical laws as the rest of the universe.

**AND util proves determinism since you predict consequences based on prior induction, meaning every action is a result of what came before. But that means we have no free will over since all choices are based in prior circumstance**

#### Third is rule-following, Moral obligations require us to act immediately since waiting in the face of injustice is itself an injustice. However, we need to be fully informed to avoid formulating a rule incorrectly and unjustly, so obligations are internally contradictory.

#### Fourth is paradoxes – a) Meno’s – either any inquiry is known or unknown. If known, then it doesn’t have to be discovered, but if unknown then it’s impossible to know that you have discovered it. Negate on presumption because the quest for knowledge or truth in the aff is fundamentally impossible b) Zeno’s – If you want to move from x to y, you need to move halfway from x to y, and halfway of halfway, and so on infinitely which means that it’s impossible to move from x to y. Proves the aff is impossible and has no solvency, so you negate on presumption

#### Fifth, The problem of the criterion threatens all questions of epistemology – the question of what is true cannot be answered before asking how to tell what is true, but the question of asking how to tell what is true relies on knowing what is true. McCain

Kevin McCain, n/d, <https://www.iep.utm.edu/criterio/>  
Since there are many versions of the Problem of the Criterion, one might worry that it will be nearly impossible to formulate the Problem of the Criterion precisely. Fortunately, this is not the case. Although there are many particular instances of the Problem of the Criterion, they all seem to be questions of epistemic priority. In other words, the various versions of the Problem of the Criterion are focused on trying to answer the question “how is it possible to theorize in epistemology without taking anything epistemic for granted?” (Conee 2004, 17). More generally: how is it possible to theorize at all without making arbitrary assumptions? Hence, perhaps the best way to formulate the Problem of the Criterion in its most general form is with the following pair of questions (Cling (1994) and McCain and Rowley (2014)): (1) Which propositions are true? (2) How can we tell which propositions are true? Plausibly, all the various formulations of particular versions of the Problem of the Criterion can be understood as instances of the problem one faces when trying to answer these general questions. Before moving on it is important to be clear about the nature of (1) and (2). These are not questions about the nature of truth itself. Rather, these are epistemological questions concerning which propositions we should think are true and what the correct criteria are for determining whether a proposition should be accepted as true or false. It is possible that one could have answers to these questions without possessing any particular theory of truth, or even taking a stand at all as to the correct theory of truth. Additionally, it is possible to have a well-developed theory of the nature of truth without having an answer to either (1) or (2). So, the issue at the heart of the Problem of the Criterion is how to start our epistemological theorizing in the correct way, not how to discover a theory of the nature of truth. Most would admit that it is important to start our epistemological theorizing in an appropriate way by not taking anything epistemic for granted, if possible. However, this desire to start theorizing in the right way coupled with the questions of the Problem of the Criterion does not yield a problem—it is merely a desire we have and questions we need to answer. The problem yielded by the Problem of the Criterion arises because one might plausibly think that we cannot answer (1) until we have an answer to (2), but we cannot answer (2) until we have an answer to (1). So, at least initially, consideration of the Problem of the Criterion makes it seem that we cannot get our theorizing started at all. This seems to land us in a pretty extreme form of skepticism—we cannot even begin the project of trying to determine which propositions to accept as true.

Case

**Util collapses to particularism – judgements are contextual to every situation since util can’t categorically condemn any action, as anything may increase pleasure in a particular instance.** Jonathan Dancy, British philosopher, who has written on ethics and epistemology. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at University of Texas at Austin and Research Professor at the University of Reading. He taught previously for many years at the University of Keele. Ethics without principles, 2004 ///AHS PB

There is a question whether we are simply to abandon the less speciﬁc versions of our principles, as Scanlon seems to suggest, or whether they can remain in play in some way. Richard Holton (2002) offers a picture which is broadly similar to Scanlon's but which allows the superseded principles to remain on the scene.17 Holton is pursuing the idea that there is no one set of principles that entails, and hence justiﬁes, each true moral claim. But he takes this to be compatible with holding that each true moral claim is entailed by some true principle (together with appropriate non-moral truths). The thought is that we can ﬁnd a way of adding new principles to the old ones, principles that are in some way built on the old ones, but do not amend or replace them. We have, as it were, a nested set of principles of different layers. There is the principle ‘do not kill’, and there is the principle ‘do not kill except in self-defence’. Where Scanlon would say that the latter principle replaces the former, Holton says that both remain sound, but that the question which one we are to use depends on the circumstances, in the following way. We can perfectly well apply the simple principle ‘do not kill’, in cases where there is no further relevant feature to be borne in mind (such as that one needs to defend oneself). So a moral argument could run like this: 1. It is wrong to kill. 2. This would be a killing. 3. There are no further relevant features. 4. So: it would be wrong to do this. If, however, self-defence is at issue, the third premise is false, and we need a different argument, thus: 1. It is permitted to kill in self-defence. 2. This would be a self-defending killing. 3. There are no further relevant features. 4. So: it is permissible to do this.

**That Negates – The aff is a universal obligation that says X is bad in every circumstance, but that’s impossible under particularism.**

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true* [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)