#### 1

#### Interp: The affirmative must defend the resolution: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike

#### Violation: they spec sex workers

#### Standards

#### Limits – the resolution is the only thing that defines our prep burdens. Their interp incentivizes affirmatives to be as far from the resolution as possible to minimize the negative’s ability to engage and spec hyperspecific affs – outweighs since that controls the internal link to clash since you could moot all my pre-round prep, which puts me at a structural disadvantage going into the round. All other limits are arbitrary and would favor the aff in terms of literature bases leading to a structural skew. That means we should presume all of your arguments false since I couldn’t have been expected to have the prep to contest it, so it hasn’t been subject to any scrutiny – also means they can’t weigh case.

#### Switch side debate – if your stance doesn’t affirm, you can read it on the negative which solves all your offense. A limited topic forces us to contest our beliefs from different angles which controls the internal link to advocacy skills since it forces you to scrutinize your own beliefs, which spills over and makes real world change. Undermining switch-side debate forces me to argue for terrible norms since you could affirm “racism is bad” and I would have to argue against it, which is an independent reason to drop them since it creates psychological violence for minority debaters and invites violent arguments in the debate space.

#### TVA – read the aff as whole res, you can still talk about sex work but that way we can engage more effectively

#### Fairness is a voter and outweighs: a. it’s constitutive of any activity with wins and losses b. it’s the only solvable impact within the round

#### Education is a voter – it’s the reason schools fund debate and host tournaments

#### Use competing interps – a. topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify b. reasonability results in a race to the bottom since debaters will try to be as abusive as possible within reason

#### Drop the debater: a. deters future abuse c. dropping the arg on T is nonsensical since we indict your whole advocacy

#### No rvis: a. illogical, you shouldn’t win for proving your fair b. chilling effect – infinite abuse goes unchecked since debaters are too scared to read theory against better theory debaters

2

#### The subject is structured by affect: we are constantly affected by the world around us, and are instable due to the ever changing nature of our affective relations through time. I am not the same person I was a year ago. The only feature of the subject that is constitutive is fluidity.

#### The affs view of politics is based on recognition, where the state has to recognize individuals rights for them to be legitimate, appealing to habeas corpus. But legal personhood fails—the state was built to include only able-bodied, cishet white men. Defining persons through state recognition results in exclusion, and attempts within the state to include minority groups only serve to deny rights to others and perpetuate hierarchy

#### Weheliye 14 Alexander G. Weheliye, “Habeas Viscus.” Duke University Press, 2014

The judge's comparison underscores the dangers of ceding definitions of personhood to the law and of comparing different forms of political subjugation, since hypothetical Indian personhood in the law rests on attaining whiteness and the violent denial of said status to black subjects. Additionally, while the court conceded limited capabilities of personhood to indigenous subjects if they chose to convert to whiteness, it did not prevent the U.S. government from instituting various genocidal measures to ensure that American Indians would become white and therefore no longer exist as Indians. In other words, the legal conception of personhood comes with a steep price, as in this instance where being seemingly granted rights laid the groundwork for the U.S. government's genocidal policies against Native Americans, since the “racialization of indigenous peoples, especially through the use of blood quantum classification, in particular follows…‘genocidal logic,’ rather than simply a logic of subordination or discrimination,” and as a result “whiteness constitutes a project of disappearance for Native peoples rather than signifying privilege.” 11 Beginning in the nineteenth century the U.S. government instituted a program in which Native American children were forcibly removed from their families and placed in Christian day and boarding schools, and which sought to civilize children by “killing the Indian to save the man,” representing one of the most significant examples of the violent and legal enforced assimilation of Native Americans into U.S. whiteness. 12 Though there is no clear causal relationship between Taney's arguments in the Scott decision and the boarding school initiative, both establish that legal personhood is available to indigenous subjects only if the Indian can be killed—either literally or figuratively—in order to save the world of Man (in this case settler colonialism and white supremacy). Furthermore, the denial of personhood qua whiteness to African American subjects does not stand in opposition to the genocidal wages of whiteness bequeathed to indigenous subjects but rather represents different properties of the same racializing juridical assemblage that differentially produces both black and native subjects as aberrations from Man and thus not-quite-human. The writ of habeas corpus—and the law more generally—anoints those individualized subjects who are deemed deserving with bodies even while this assemblage continually enlists new and/or different groups to exclude, banish, or exterminate from the world of Man. In the end, the law, whether bound by national borders or spanning the globe, establishes an international division of humanity, which grants previously excluded subjects limited access to personhood as property at the same time as it fortifies the supremacy of Man. 13 The cruel irony of this fact is nowhere more pronounced than in the case of Henrietta Lacks, who died destitute after enduring great pain, but whose cervical cancer provided one of the first immortal cell lines to be successfully cultivated outside the biological jurisdiction of the human body. As such, even though they were not patented, the HeLa cells have served as the basis for not only scientific progress but also financial gain. The scientific and economic immortality of the HeLa cells, as they are known, stands in stark contrast to Henrietta Lacks's susceptibility to premature death at the age of thirty-one in 1951 and her family's continued poverty. 14 If Henrietta Lacks's story and the ongoing narrative of the eternal life of the HeLa cells prove anything, it is that the hieroglyphics of the flesh subsists even in death, and that it has now been transposed from the outwardly detectable to the microscopic interior of the human, since it “can be invaded at any given and arbitrary moment by the property relations” (Spillers, “Mama's Baby,” 218). It would seem that persistence of the twin phantoms of racialization and property relations unsettle the promise of a subepidermal and cellular humanity as an absolute biological substance. 15 More recently, as a result of his treatment for hairy cell leukemia at the UCLA Medical Center, John Moore's cancer cells were grown into a highly profitable immortal cell line (MO) patented by the University of California in 1984 without his knowledge. Subsequently, Moore sued the UC Regents, and in 1990 the California Supreme Court ruled that the law could not grant proprietorship over biological matter, at least not to those individuals from whom this zoe is expropriated. Though Moore was not granted even partial proprietary ownership of the patented cell line derived from his spleen, the court did rule “that the case was one of a breach of fiduciary duty and a lack of informed consent,” since the doctors who patented the cell line had not informed Moore of their maneuvers. 16 The court was faced with determining whether the cell line belonged to the jurisdiction of Moore's body and, thus, “related to his rights of self-possession” or whether it represented “something different and artificial, belonging to its scientific makers. The court chose the latter, clearly influenced by the after-the-fact nature of the quandary.” 17 Rather than outlawing the proprietary ownership of cell lines derived from humans outright, however, the opinion of one judge in this ruling absolves the court of responsibility: “Whether…cells should be treated as property susceptible to conversion is not, in my view, ours to decide.” 18 Though the law has no problem adjudicating who can possess a body, and therefore full humanity, the highest legal authority in the United States cedes the field to corporate interests when confronted with “choices…that define our essence.” 19 Paradoxically, the particular biological material in question remains the property, at least nominally, of all humanity and is not proper to Moore the individual person: “Lymphokines, unlike a name or a face, have the same molecular structure in every human being and the same, important functions in every human being's immune system. Moreover, the particular genetic material which is responsible for the natural production of lymphokines, and which defendants use to manufacture lymphokines in the laboratory, is also the same in every person; it is no more unique to Moore than the number of vertebrae in the spine or the chemical formula of hemoglobin.” 20 So, while the court grants personhood to human subjects in an individualized fashion that is based on comparatively distinguishing between different humans, when biological material clashes with the interests of capital, the court appeals to the indivisible biological sameness of the Homo sapiens species. Since the court's ruling does not place this slice of human flesh in the commons for all humans to share, it tacitly grants corporations the capability of legally possessing this material with the express aim of generating monetary profit. Considering that corporations enjoy the benefits of limited personhood and the ability to live forever under U.S. law, corporate entities are entrusted with securing the immortal life of biological matter, while human persons are denied ownership of their supposed essence. 21 My interest here lies not in claiming inalienable ownership rights for cells derived from human bodies such as Lacks's and Moore's but to draw attention to how thoroughly the very core of pure biological matter is framed by neoliberal market logics and by liberal ideas of personhood as property. We are in dire need of alternatives to the legal conception of personhood that dominates our world, and, in addition, to not lose sight of what remains outside the law, what the law cannot capture, what it cannot magically transform into the fantastic form of property ownership. Writing about the connections between transgender politics and other forms of identity-based activism that respond to structural inequalities, legal scholar Dean Spade shows how the focus on inclusion, recognition, and equality based on a narrow legal framework (especially as it pertains to antidiscrimination and hate crime laws) not only hinders the eradication of violence against trans people and other vulnerable populations but actually creates the condition of possibility for the continued unequal “distribution of life chances.” 22 If demanding recognition and inclusion remains at the center of minority politics, it will lead only to a delimited notion of personhood as property that zeroes in comparatively on only one form of subjugation at the expense of others, thus allowing for the continued existence of hierarchical differences between full humans, not-quite-humans, and nonhumans. This can be gleaned from the “successes” of the mainstream feminist, civil rights, and lesbian-gay rights movements, which facilitate the incorporation of a privileged minority into the ethnoclass of Man at the cost of the still and/or newly criminalized and disposable populations (women of color, the black poor, trans people, the incarcerated, etc.). 23 To make claims for inclusion and humanity via the U.S. juridical assemblage removes from view that the law itself has been thoroughly violent in its endorsement of racial slavery, indigenous genocide, Jim Crow, the prison-industrial complex, domestic and international warfare, and so on, and that it continues to be one of the chief instruments in creating and maintaining the racializing assemblages in the world of Man. Instead of appealing to legal recognition, Julia Oparah suggests counteracting the “racialized (trans)gender entrapment” within the prison-industrial complex and beyond with practices of “maroon abolition” (in reference to the long history of escaped slave contraband settlements in the Americas) to “foreground the ways in which often overlooked African diasporic cultural and political legacies inform and undergird anti-prison work,” while also providing strategies and life worlds not exclusively centered on reforming the law.

#### In turning for the state for legal recognition, minorities are forced to make a spectacle of their suffering and compete over who deserves rights more. This exhausts psychic energy and creates infighting

Weheliye 2 Alexander G. Weheliye, “Habeas Viscus.” Duke University Press, 2014

**Suffering, especially when caused by political violence, has long functioned as the hallmark of both humane sentience and of inhuman brutality. Frequently,** suffering becomes the defining feature of those **subjects** excluded from the law, the national community, humanity, and so on due to the political violence inflicted upon them even as it, paradoxically, grants them access to inclusion and equality. In western human rights discourse, for instance, the physical and psychic residues of political violence enable victims to be recognized as belonging to the “brotherhood of Man.” Too often, this tendency not only leaves intact hegemonic ideas of humanity as indistinguishable from western Man but demands comparing different forms of subjugation in order to adjudicate who warrants recognition and belonging. As W. E. B. Du Bois asked in 1944, if the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not offer provisions for ending world colonialism or legal segregation in the United States, “Why then call it the Declaration of Human Rights?”2 Wendy Brown maintains, “politicized identity” operates “only by **entrenching, restating,** dramatizing, and inscribing its pain in politics; it can hold out no future…that triumphs over this pain.”3 Brown suggests replacing the identitarian declaration “I am,” which merely confirms and solidifies what already exists, with the desiring proclamation “I want,” which offers a Nietzschean politics of overcoming pain instead of clinging to suffering as an immutable feature of identity politics. While I recognize Brown's effort to formulate a form of minority politics not beholden to the aura of wounded attachments and fixated almost fetishistically on the state as the site of change, we do well to recall that many of the political agendas based on identity (the suffragette movement, the movement for the equality of same-sex marriages, or the various movements for the full civil rights of racialized minority subjects, for instance) are less concerned with claiming their suffering per se (I am) than they are with using wounding as a stepping stone in the quest (I want) for rights equal to those of full citizens. **Liberal** governing bodies, whether in the form of nation-states or supranational entities such as the United Nations or the International Criminal Court make particular forms of wounding the precondition for entry into **the hallowed halls of full** personhood, only acknowledging certain types of physical violence. For instance, while the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees passed a resolution in 2008 that includes rape and other forms of sexual violence in the category of war crimes, there are many forms of sexual violence that do not fall into this purview, and thus bar victims from claiming legal injury and/or personhood. 4

#### The color line defines the conception of the human, not-quite-human, and non-human in relation to the Western Man. Bodies become defined by how close they are to this ideal in order to access humanity.

Wynter Sylvia Wynter 2003; “Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation--An Argument,” CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 3, Number 3,257-337  
**The Argument proposes that** the **new master code of the bourgeoisie and of its ethnoclass** conception of the human - that is, the code of selected by Evolution/dysselected by Evolution- was now to be mapped and anchored on the only available "objective set of facts" that remained. **This was the set of environmentally, climatically determined** phenotypical differences between human hereditary variations as these had developed in the wake of the human diaspora both across and out of the continent of Africa; that is, as a set of (so to speak) totemic differences, which were now harnessed to the task of projecting the Color Line drawn **institutionally and discursively** between whites/nonwhites **- and at its most extreme between the Caucasoid physiognomy (as symbolic life, the name of what is good, the idea that some humans can be selected by Evolution) and the Negroid phys- iognomy (as symbolic death, the "name of what is evil," the idea that some humans can be dysselected by Evolution)- as the new extrahuman line, or projection of genetic nonhomogeneity that would now be made to function, analogically, as the status-ordering principle based upon ostensibly differ- ential degrees of evolutionary selectedness/eugenicity and/or dysselected- ness/dysgenicity.** Differential degrees, as between the classes (middle and lower and, by extrapolation, between capital and labor) as well as between men and women, and between the heterosexual and homosexual erotic preference - and, even more centrally, as between Breadwinner (job- holding middle and working classes) and the jobless and criminalized Poor, with this rearticulated at the global level as between Sartre's "Men" and Natives (see his guide-quote), before the end of politico-military colonial- ism, then postcolonially as between the "developed" **First World, on the one hand**, and the "underdeveloped" Third and Fourth Worlds on the other**. The Color Line** was **now** projected as the new **"space of Otherness**" principle of nonhomogeneity, **made to reoccupy the earlier places of the motion-filled heavens/non-moving Earth, rational humans/irrational animal lines, and** to recode in new terms **their ostensible extrahumanly determined** differences of ontological substance. While, if the earlier two had been indispen- sable to the production and reproduction of their respective genres of being human, of their descriptive statements (i.e., as Christian and as Mam), and of the overall order in whose field of interrelationships, social hierarchies, system of role allocations, and divisions of labors each such genre of the human could alone realize itself- and with each such descriptive state- ment therefore being rigorously conserved by the "learning system" and order of knowledge as articulated in the institutional structure of each order - this was to be no less the case with respect to the projected "space of Otherness" of the Color Line. With respect, that is, to its indispensability to the production and reproduction of our present genre of the human Mam, together with the overall global/national bourgeois order of things and its specific mode of economic production, alone able to provide the material conditions of existence for the production and reproduction of the ethnoclass or Western-bourgeois answer that we now give to the question of the who and what we are.

#### Those who do not conform to the standard set by Man inhabit a permanent state of exception. The alternative is habeas viscus, which defines the flesh outside of state recognition to shift focus to our affective bonds. This is the only way we can deconstruct the influence of the Man and mobilize collective action against systems of oppression.

#### Weheliye 3 Alexander G. Weheliye, “Habeas Viscus.” Duke University Press, 2014

Because black cultures have frequently not had access to Man's language, world, future, or humanity, black studies has developed a set of assemblages through which to perceive and understand a world in which subjection is but one path to humanity, neither its exception nor its idealized sole feature. Yet black studies, if it is to remain critical and oppositional, cannot fall prey to juridical humanity and its concomitant pitfalls, since this only affects change in the domain of the map but not the territory. In order to do so, the hieroglyphics of the flesh should not be conceptualized as just exceptional or radically particular, since this habitually leads to the comparative tabulation of different systems of oppression that then serve as the basis for defining personhood as possession. As Frantz Fanon states: “All forms of exploitation are identical, since they apply to the same ‘object': man.”28 Accordingly, humans are exploited as part of the Homo sapiens species for the benefit of other humans, which at the same time yields a surplus version of the human: Man. Man represents the western configuration of the human as synonymous with the heteromasculine, white, propertied, and liberal subject that renders all those who do not conform to these characteristics as exploitable nonhumans, literal legal no-bodies. If we are to affect significant systemic changes, then we must locate at least some of the struggles for justice in the region of humanity as a relational ontological totality (an object of knowledge) that cannot be reduced to either the universal or particular. According to Wynter, this process requires us to recognize the “emancipation from the psychic dictates of our present...genre of being human and therefore from ‘the unbearable wrongness of being,’ of desetre, which it imposes upon...all non-white peoples, as an imperative function of its enactment as such a mode of being[;] this emancipation had been effected at the level of the map rather than at the level of the territory.”29 The level of the map encompasses the nominal inclusion of nonwhite subjects in the false universality of western humanity in the wake of radical movements of the 1960s, while the territory Wynter invokes in this context, and in all of her work, is the figure of Man as a racializing assemblage. Wielding this very particular and historically malleable classification is not an uncritical reiteration of the humanist episteme or an insistence on the exceptional particularity of black humanity. Rather, Afro-diasporic cultures provide singular, mutable, and contingent figurations of the human, and thus do not represent mere bids for inclusion in or critiques of the shortcomings of western liberal humanism. The problematic of humanity, however, needs to be highlighted as one of the prime objects of knowledge of black studies, since not doing so will sustain the structures, discourses, and institutions that detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity so as to facilitate the violent conflation of Man and the human. Otherwise, the general theory of how humanity has been lived, conceptualized, shrieked, hungered into being, and imagined by those subjects violently barred from this domain and touched by the hieroglyphics of the flesh will sink back into the deafening ocean of prelinguistic particularity. This, in turn, will also render apparent that black studies, especially as it is imagined by thinkers such as Spillers and Wynter, is engaged in engendering forms of the human vital to understanding not only black cultures but past, present, and future humanities. As a demonic island, black studies lifts the fog that shrouds the laws of comparison, particularity, and exception to reveal an aquatic outlook “far away from the continent of man.”**30** The poetics and politics that I have been discussing under the heading of habeas viscus or the flesh are concerned not with inclusion in reigning precincts of the status quo but, in Cedric Robinson's apt phrasing, “the continuing development of a collective consciousness informed by the historical struggles for liberation and motivated by the shared sense of obligation to preserve [and I would add also to reimagine] the collective being, the ontological totality**.**”31 Though the laws of Man place the flesh outside the ferocious and ravenous perimeters of the legal body, habeas viscus defies domestication both on the basis of particularized personhood as a result of suffering, as in human rights discourse, and on the grounds of the universalized version of western Man. Rather, habeas viscus points to the terrain of humanity as a relational assemblage exterior to the jurisdiction of law given that the law can bequeath or rescind ownership of the body so that it becomes the property of proper persons but does not possess the authority to nullify the politics and poetics of the flesh found in the traditions of the oppressed. As a way of conceptualizing politics, then, habeas viscus diverges from the discourses and institutions that yoke the flesh to political violence in the modus of deviance. Instead, it translates the hieroglyphics of the flesh into a potentiality in any and all things, an originating leap in the imagining of future anterior freedoms and new genres of humanity. To envisage habeas viscus as a forceful assemblage of humanity entails leaving behind the world of Man and some of its attendant humanist pieties. As opposed to depositing the flesh outside politics, the normal, the human, and so on, we need a better understanding of its varied workings in order to disrobe the cloak of Man, which gives the human a long-overdue extreme makeover; or, in the words of Sylvia Wynter, “the struggle of our new millennium will be one between the ongoing imperative of securing the well-being of our present ethnoclass (i.e. western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself, and that of securing the well-being, and therefore the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species itself/ourselves.”32 Claiming and dwelling in the monstrosity of the flesh present some of the weapons in the guerrilla warfare to “secure the full cognitive and behavioral autonomy of the human species,” since these liberate from captivity assemblages of life, thought, and politics from the tradition of the oppressed and, as a result, disfigure the centrality of Man as the sign for the human. As an assemblage of humanity, habeas viscus animates the elsewheres of Man and emancipates the true potentiality that rests in those subjects who live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception: freedom; assemblages of freedom that sway to the temporality of new syncopated beginnings for the human beyond the world and continent of Man