## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative may not specify which government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “government” in the res- this means that you have to prove the resolution true in a VACCUM, not for one specific country.

CCC "Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers," Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether.A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Precision outweighs

#### 1] Predictability – people base prep off the rez – no stasis point for arguments.

#### 2] Jurisdiction – judge is contracted to vote inside the rez.

#### Violation: They specify the US

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Limits – any permutation of 193 different governments each with different political climates. Explodes aff ground – you cherry-pick affs with no neg ground. I must prep all affs while they prep one – forces uplayering and shallow debates. Pigeonholes me to generics that you’ll prep out with aff leverage so I lose on specificity.

#### 2] TVA – read this aff as an advantage – we still get discussion on it – non-uniques any reason why their aff is uniquely good.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness – Debate is a competitive activity and the better debater must win. Education – it’s the only portable skill we take out of round.

#### Drop the debater – 1] a loss deters future abuse 2] dropping the arg severs from your original advocacy which creates a 7-6 timeskew when you read new offense.

#### Competing interps – 1] Your brightline is arbitrary and based on what you did rather than the best one. 2] leads to a race to the top since we figure out the best possible norm

#### No RVI on T – 1] logic – you shouldn’t win for being topical – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for arguments. 2] they encourage you to read an abusive aff and prep out T. 3] enables us to return to substance and get that education rather than debating T the whole time.

**3**

## 2

### Link

#### The usage of state to overcode subject’s desires replicates machinic enslavement which arises when the desires of subjects are directed towards the elevated signifier of striking at an attempt at uniformity. The state encodes life in a way that forces individuals to gain recognition under a model built to exclude them, suppressing deviance. This turns case but also explains why the methodology and orientation of using the state as a starting point produces violence.

Robinson 10 [Andrew. Andrew Robinson is a political theorist and activist based in the UK. His book Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies (co-authored with Athina Karatzogianni) was published in Sep 2009 by Routledge. “In Theory Why Deleuze (still) matters: States, war-machines and radical transformation”. Ceasefire. September 10th] RL

In this article, I have chosen to concentrate on **the conceptual pairing of states and war-machines as a way of understanding the differences between autonomous social networks and hierarchical**, repressive **formations**. **Deleuze and Guattari view the ‘state’ as a particular** kind of institutional **regime derived** **from a set of social relations** **which can be** traced to **a way of seeing** focused on **the construction** of **fixities** and representation. There is thus a basic form of the state (a “state-form”) in spite of the differences among specific states. Since Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is primarily relational and processual, **the state exists** primarily **as a process rather than a thing**. The state-form is defined by the processes or practices of ‘overcoding’, ‘despotic signification’ and ‘machinic enslavement’. These attributes can be explained one at a time. The concept of despotic signification, derived from Lacan’s idea of the master-signifier, suggests that, in statist thought, a particular signifier is elevated to the status of standing for the whole, and the other of this signifier (remembering that signification is necessarily differential) is defined as radically excluded. ‘**Overcoding’ consists in the imposition of the regime of meanings arising from this fixing of representations on the** **various processes** **through which** **social life** **and desire operate**. In contrast to the deep penetration which occurs in capitalism, states often do this fairly lightly, but with brutality around the edges. Hence for instance, in historical despotic states, the inclusion of peripheral areas only required their symbolic subordination, and not any real impact on everyday life in these areas. **Overcoding** **also**, however, e**ntails the destruction of anything which cannot be represented or encoded.¶ ‘Machinic enslavement’ occurs when assembled groups of social relations and desires, known in Deleuzian theory as ‘machines’, are rendered subordinate to the regulatory function of the despotic signifier and hence incorporated in an overarching totality.** This process identifies Deleuze and Guattari’s view of the state-form with Mumford’s idea of the megamachine, with the state operating as a kind of absorbing and enclosing totality, a bit like the Borg in Star Trek, eating up and assimilating the social networks with which it comes into contact. Crucially, while these relations it absorbs often start out as horizontal, or as hierarchical only at a local level, their absorption rearranges them as vertical and hierarchical aggregates. **It tends to destroy** or reduce **the intensity of horizontal connections, instead increasing the intensity of vertical subordination**. Take, **for instance, the formation of the colonial state** **in Africa: loose social identities were rigidly reclassified as exclusive ethnicities**, **and these ethnicities were arranged in hierarchies** (for instance, **Tutsi as superior to Hutu**) in ways **which created rigid** **boundaries** **and oppressive relations** culminating in today’s conflicts.¶ According to this theory of the state-form, states are at once ‘isomorphic’, sharing a basic structure and function, and heterogeneous, differing in how they express this structure. In particular, states vary in terms of the relative balance between ‘adding’ and ‘subtracting axioms’ (capitalism is also seen as performing these two operations). An axiom here refers to the inclusion of a particular group or social logic or set of desires as something recognised by a state: examples of addition of axioms would be the recognition of minority rights (e.g. gay rights), the recognition and systematic inclusion of minority groups in formal multiculturalism (e.g. Indian ‘scheduled castes’), the creation of niche markets for particular groups (e.g. ‘ethnic food’ sections in supermarkets), and the provision of inclusive services (e.g. support for independent living for people with disabilities). It is most marked in social-democratic kinds of states. The subtraction of axioms consists in the encoding of differences as problems to be suppressed, for example in the classification of differences as crimes, the institutionalisation of unwanted minorities (e.g. ‘sectioning’ people who are psychologically different), or the restriction of services to members of an in-group (excluding ‘disruptive’ children, denying council housing to migrants). This process reaches its culmination in totalitarian states. It is important to realise that in both cases, the state is expressing the logic of the state-form, finding ways to encode and represent differences; but that the effects of the two strategies on the freedom and social power of marginalised groups are very different.¶ **The state** **is** also **viewed** as a force of ‘antiproduction’. This term is defined **against** the ‘productive’ or creative power Deleuze and Guattari believe resides in processes of **desiring-production** (the process through which desires are formed and connected to objects or others) and social production (the process of constructing social ‘assemblages’ or networks). **Desiring-production** tends to **proliferate** **differences**, **because desire operates through fluxes and breaks**, **overflowing particular boundaries**. **The** **state** as machine of antiproduction **operates to restrict**, prevent or channel **these flows of creative** **energy so as to preserve fixed social** **forms and restrict the extent** of **difference which is able to exist**, or the connections it is able to form. Hence, **states try to restrict** and break down **the coming-together of** **social networks by prohibiting** or making difficult **the formation of** hierarchical **assemblages**; it operates to block ‘subject-formation’ in terms of social groups, or the emergence of subjectivities which are not already encoded in dominant terms. Take for instance the laws on ‘dispersal’, in which the British state allows police to break up groups (often of young people) congregating in public spaces. Absurdly, the state defines the social act of coming-together as anti-social, because it creates a space in which different kinds of social relations can be formed. **The state wishes to have a monopoly on how people interrelate, and so acts to prevent people from associating horizontally**. Another example of antiproduction is the way that participation in imposed activities such as the requirement to work and the unpaid reproductive labour involved in families, leaves little time for other kinds of relationships – people don’t have time to form other assemblages either with other people or with other objects of desire. Hakim Bey has argued that this pressure to restrict connections is so strong that simply finding time and space for other forms of belonging – regardless of the goal of these other connections – is already a victory against the system.

### Impact

#### They force the subject to be graded against a majoritarian worldview that always leaves it empty --- any degree of deviancy leads the subject incomplete, causing it to desire its own oppression. DELEUZE AND GUATTARI:

[Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari. “Anti-Oedipus.” Pg. 26-29. 1977. LHP MK]

In point of fact**, if desire is the lack of the real object, its very nature as a real entity depends upon an "essence of lack" that produces the fantasized object. Desire thus conceived of as** production, though merely the **production of fantasies, has been explained perfectly by psychoanalysis.** On the very lowest level of interpretation, **this means that the real object that desire lacks is related to an extrinsic natural or social production**, whereas desire intrinsically produces an imaginary object that functions as a double of reality, as though there were a "dreamed-of object behind every real object," or a mental production behind all real productions. This conception does not necessarily compel psychoanalysis to engage in a study of gadgets and markets, in the form of an utterly dreary and dull psychoanalysis of the object: psychoanalytic studies of packages of noodles, cars, or "thingumajigs**." But even when the fantasy is interpreted in depth, not simply as an object, but as a specific machine that brings desire itself front and center, this machine is merely theatrical, and the complementarity of what it sets apart still remains: it is now need that is defined in terms of a relative lack and determined by its own object, whereas desire is regarded as what produces the fantasy and produces itself by detaching itself from the object, though at the same time it intensifies the lack by making it absolute: an "incurable insufficiency of being," an "inability-to-be that is life itself."** Hence the presentation of desire as something supported by needs, while these needs, and their relationship to the object as something that is lacking or missing, continue to be the basis of the productivity of desire (theory of an underlying support). In a word, when the theoretician reduces desiring-production to a production of fantasy, he is content to exploit to the fullest the idealist principle that defines desire as a lack, rather than a process of production, of "industrial" production. Clement Rosset puts it very well: **every time the emphasis is put on a lack that desire supposedly suffers from as a way of defining its object, "the world acquires as its double some other sort of world, in accordance with the following line of argument: there is an object that desire feels the lack of; hence the world does not contain each and every object that exists; there is at least one object missing, the one that desire feels the lack of; hence there exists some other place that contains the key to desire** (missing in this world)."29 If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can be productive only in the real world and can produce only reality. Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production. The real is the end product, the result of the passive syntheses of desire as autoproduction of the unconscious. Desire does not lack anything; it does not lack its object. **It is, rather, the subject that is missing in desire,** or desire that lacks a fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is **repression**. Desire and its object are one and the same thing: the machine, as a machine of a machine. Desire is a machine, and the object of desire is another machine connected to it. Hence the product is something removed or deducted from the process of producing: between the act of producing and the product, something becomes detached, thus giving the vagabond, nomad subject a residuum. The objective being of desire is the Real in and of itself.\* There is no particular form of existence that can be labeled "psychic reality." As Marx notes, what exists in fact is not lack, but passion, as a "natural and sensuous object." **Desire is not bolstered by needs, but rather the contrary; needs are derived from desire: they are counter-products within the real that desire produces. Lack is a counter-effect of desire; it is deposited, distributed, vacuolized within a real that is natural and social. Desire always remains in close touch with the conditions of objective existence; it embraces them and follows them, shifts when they shift, and does not outlive them.** For that reason it so often becomes the desire to die, whereas need is a measure of the withdrawal of a subject that has lost its desire at the same time that it loses the passive syntheses of these conditions. This is precisely the significance of need as a search in a void: hunting about, trying to capture or become a parasite of passive syntheses in whatever vague world they may happen to exist in. It is no use saying: We are not green plants; we have long since been unable to synthesize chlorophyll, so it's necessary to eat. . .. Desire then becomes this abject fear of lacking something. But it should be noted that this is not a phrase uttered by the poor or the dispossessed. On the contrary, such people know that they are close to grass, almost akin to it, and that desire "needs" very few things-not those leftovers that chance to come their way, but the very things that are continually taken from them-and that what is missing is not things a subject feels the lack of somewhere deep down inside himself, but rather the objectivity of man, the objective being of man, for whom to desire is to produce, to produce within the realm of the real. The real is not impossible; on the contrary, within the real everything is possible, everything becomes possible. Desire does not express a molar lack within the subject; rather, the molar organization deprives desire of its objective being. Revolutionaries, artists, and seers are content to be objective, merely objective: they know that desire clasps life in its powerfully productive embrace, and reproduces it in a way that is all the more intense because it has few needs. And never mind those who believe that this is very easy to say, or that it is the sort of idea to be found in books. "From the little reading I had done I had observed that the men who were most in life, who were moulding life, who were life itself, ate little, slept little, owned little or nothing. They had no illusions about duty, or the perpetuation of their kith and kin, or the preservation of the State.... The phantasmal world is the world which has never been fully conquered over. It is the world of the past, never of the future. To move forward clinging to the past is like dragging a ball and chain."30 The true visionary is a Spinoza in the garb of a Neapolitan revolutionary. We know very well where lack-and its subjective correlative-come from. **Lack (manque)\* is created, planned, and organized in and through social production. It is counterproduced as a result of the pressure of antiproduction;** the latter falls back on (se rabat sur) the forces of production and appropriates them. It is never primary; production is never organized on the basis of a pre-existing need or lack (manque). **It is lack that infiltrates itself, creates empty spaces or vacuoles, and propagates itself in accordance with the organization of an already existing organization of production. The deliberate creation of lack as a function of market economy is the art of a dominant class. This involves deliberately organizing wants and needs (**manque**) amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and fall victim to the great** fear of not having one's needs satisfied; and making the object dependent upon a real production that is supposedly exterior to desire (the demands of rationality), while at the same time the production of desire is categorized as fantasy and nothing but fantasy. There is no such thing as the social production of reality on the one hand, and a desiring-production that is mere fantasy on the other. The only connections that could be established between these two productions would be secondary ones of introjection and projection, as though all social practices had their precise counterpart in introjected or internal mental practices, or as though mental practices were projected upon social systems, without either of the two sets of practices ever having any real or concrete effect upon the other. As long as we are content to establish a perfect parallel between money, gold, capital, and the capitalist triangle on the one hand, and the libido, the anus, the phallus, and the family triangle on the other, we are engaging in an enjoyable pastime, but the mechanisms of money remain totally unaffected by the anal projections of those who manipulate money. The Marx-Freud parallelism between the two remains utterly sterile and insignificant as long as it is expressed in terms that make them introjections or projections of each other without ceasing to be utterly alien to each other, as in the famous equation money = shit. The truth of the matter is that social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions. We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product **of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production.** There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. **Even the most repressive and the most deadly forms of social reproduction are produced by desire within the organization that is the consequence of such production under various conditions that we must analyze. That is why the fundamental problem of political philosophy is still precisely the one that Spinoza saw so clearly, and that Wilhelm Reich rediscovered: "Why do men [people] fight for their servitude as stubbornly as though it were their salvation?" How can people possibly reach the point of shouting: "More taxes! Less bread!"? As Reich remarks, the astonishing thing is not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? Reich is at his profoundest as a thinker when he refuses to accept ignorance or illusion on the part of the masses as an explanation of fascism, and demands an explanation that will take their desires into account, an explanation formulated in terms of desire: no, the masses** were not innocent dupes; at a certain point, under a certain set of conditions, they **wanted fascism, and it is this perversion of the desire of the masses that needs to be accounted for.**

#### The alternative is to proliferate our active desires – promoting the social relations the state seeks to suppress allows us to envision a truly revolutionary praxis, where difference is promoted and desire is no longer misdirected towards fascism.

K&R 13 [Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson. “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Neitzschean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks.” *From the Selected Works of Athina Karatzogianni.* July 2013. Works.bepress.com/athina\_karatzogianni/19] RL

**The impulse to condemn deviance, resistance and insurrection is disturbingly strong in academia**, and doubtless strengthened by revulsion against network terror. Yet **this networked rebellion of the excluded is the key to hopes for a better world**. In the spiral of terror between states and movements, it is important to recognise that **the source is the state and the weak point is in the movements**. In today’s social war, the Other is not even accorded the honour of being an enemy in a fair fight. As long as social conflicts are seen through a statist frame, social war is doomed to continue, because discursive exclusion produces social war as its underside, and renders resistance both necessary and justified. **The cycle of terror starts with the state: its terror at an existential level of losing control and fixity.** This terrified state produces state terror and thereby creates the conditions for movement terror. It is naive to look for a way out from this side of the equation. **State terror can end only when the state, both accepts the proliferation of networks beyond its control, and adopts a more humble role for itself, or when it collapses or is destroyed**. On the other side, **we should find hope in the proliferation of resistance among the excluded. We need to see in movements of the excluded the radical potential and not only the reactive distortions**. To take Tupac Shakur’s metaphor, we need to see the rose that grows from concrete, not merely the thorns. The problem is, rather, that **many of the movements on the network side of the equation are still thinking, seeing and feeling like states. Such movements are potential bearers of the Other of the state-form, of networks as alternatives to states, a**ffinity against hegemony, abundance against scarcity. The question thus becomes how they can learn to valorise what they are -- autonomous affinity-networks -- rather than internalising majoritarian norms. For instance, in terms of the impact of technosocial transformations on agency, the negotiation of ideology, order of dissent in relation to capitalism as a social code, remains hostage to labor processes and to thick identities of local/regional or national interests, which fail to move contemporary movements to an active affinity to a common humanity and a pragmatic solution for an ethical, non exploitative form of production (Karatzogianni and Schandorf, 2012). Here the exception may like in the global justice movements and Occupy, although still here the discourse remains often in reactive mode, due to state crackdowns experienced by the movements. **There is a great need to find ways to energise hope against fear. Hope as an active force can be counterposed to the reactive power of fear.** **People are not in fact powerless, but are made to feel powerless by the pervasiveness of the dominant social fantasy and of separation. This yields a temptation to fall back on the power of ‘the powerful’, those who gain a kind of distorted agency through alienation**. **But powerlessness and constituted power are both effects of alienation, which can be broken down by creating affinity-network forms of life. An emotional shift can thus be enough to revolutionise subjectivities.** Hence, as Vaneigem argues, ‘[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection’ (Vaneigem 1967: 50-1). It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a continuum, expressing ‘aspects of affective ambivalence’ connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus 2005). **The type of hope needed is active and immanent, brought into the present as a propulsive force rather than deferred to the future**. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ for this possibility. In his work on conflict transformation, John Paul Lederach emphasises the need to turn negative energies into creative energies and mobilising hope against fear (Lederach and Maiese, n.d.: 2-3; Lederach, 2005). How is this change in vital energies to be accomplished? Deleuze and Guattari invoke a figure of the shaman as a way to overcome reactive energies (1983: 167-8). **They call for a type of revolutionary social movement ‘that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’**, countering reactive energies (ibid. 277). In looking at how **this might operate in practice**, let us examine briefly **[like] the Colombian feminist anti-militarist group La Ruta Pacifica de las Mujere**s. In particular, **the aspects of social weaving and collective mourning prominent in their methodology are crucial forms of creative shamanism, which turns fear into hope.** **Their approach involves ‘the deconstruction of the pervasive symbolism of violence and war and the substitution of a new visual and textual language and creative rituals’** (Cockburn, 2005: 14; Brouwer, 2008: 62). **Weaving as a metaphor refers to social recomposition, the reconstruction of affinity**; being ‘bound’ through social weaving is believed to control fear. It is taken as a way to counter everyday violence on the frontlines of the ‘war on terror’. **Rituals of mourning and weaving are believed by participants to disarm the armed and create invisible connections among participants** (Colorado, 2003). La Ruta seek to create new combinations of cognitive and emotional elements strong enough to disrupt dominant monologues (Cockburn, 2005: 14). Weaving reconstructs social connections and life-cycles, and thereby enhances wellbeing (ibid. 15). **Participants recount inner strength and physical recovery as effects of such rituals** (Brouwer, 2008: 85). Hence, **it is in open spaces, safe spaces, and spaces of dialogue that hope can be found to counter the spiral of terror. This opening of space, this creation of autonomous zones, should be viewed as a break with the majoritarian logics of social control.** The coming ‘other worlds’ counterposed to the spaces of terror are not an integrated ‘new order’, but rather, a proliferation of smooth spaces in a horizontality without borders. These ‘other worlds’ are being built unconsciously, wherever networks, affinity and hope counterpose themselves to state terror and the desire for fixed identity be it national, ethnic, religious or cultural. It is in the incommensurable antagonism between the autonomous zones of these ‘other worlds’ and the terror state’s demands for controlled spaces to serve capital, that the nexus of the conflicts of the present and near-future lies. And interestingly, there is also a certain active/reactive difference between state responses in the Turkey and Brazil protests of June 2013.

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better debate that best interrogates the politics of desire, education grounded in majoritarian thought leads to real-world regulation. CARLIN AND WALLIN:

[Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121. LHP MK]

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘**the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’** (p. 6). Where **education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its** modes of production have taken as their teleological **goal** the **production of a ‘majoritarian people’**, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where **education aspires to invest desire in the** production of a ‘**majoritarian’** or ‘molar’ **public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed**, not only through the paucity of enunciatory **forms and images available for thinking education** in the first place, but further, **through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection**, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, **the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the** singular, the ‘**majoritarian’** **and standardizing** **impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production** **the reification of common sense**, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). **Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’,** common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, **where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited** and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: **common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression**. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, **while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking** – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

## On case

### Democracy -- Pandemics

#### Autocracies solve emerging pandemics – studies prove democratic failure

Kavanagh & Singh 20 – (Matthew M. Kavanagh, assistant professor of global health and visiting professor of law at Georgetown University, where he directs the Global Health Policy & Politics Initiative at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Renu Singh, fellow at the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University Law Center, “Democracy, Capacity, and Coercion in Pandemic Response—COVID 19 in Comparative Political Perspective,” 5-28-2020, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, Duke University Press, <https://read.dukeupress.edu/jhppl/article/doi/10.1215/03616878-8641530/165294/Democracy-Capacity-and-Coercion-in-Pandemic>)

Is Democracy Good or Bad for Health in a Pandemic? In general, social scientists have tended to agree, albeit with caveats, that democracy is beneficial for public health. COVID-19 is raising important questions about this contention as high-profile cases show authoritarian countries winning praise for their response while leading democracies have struggled to respond. This complicates, perhaps in helpful ways, the exploration of health and of democracy. A wide literature has long debated the value of democracy for health. Electoral pressures and political freedoms of democratic regimes, it is argued, contribute to improved health and longer lives (Ruger 2005; Sen 1999). These claims have empirical support in political science (Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012; McGuire 2010; Przeworski et al. 2000; Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley 2017), economics (Kudamatsu 2012), and public health (Bollyky et al. 2019)—though not without challenge, as some have shown weak or no connection (Ross 2006). A range of mechanisms have been proposed and tested for how democracy improves health including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and a norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information both flows to the public about health and from the public to government about how to calibrate policy; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail; and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. The narrative of Chinese success and U.S. failure has led to concern that COVID-19 represents bad news about the value, and future, of democratic governance (Diamond 2020). Initial studies have already been conducted showing a correlation between democracy and worse outbreaks as well as less effective policy responses (Cepaluni, Dorsch, and Branyiczki 2020). Pandemic response is different from much of population health—with effective responses requiring the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance. With the exception of HIV (e.g., Lieberman 2009), disease outbreaks and political institutions have been under-studied in comparative politics—with much of the literature focused on infant mortality or life expectancy, long-running trends that have far different mechanisms from a pandemic. Here, the accountability mechanisms that help democracies perform better may not be as beneficial. Political leaders with short time horizons may have relatively weak incentives to invest in pandemic preparedness and response (Dionne 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009). And some of the benefits of associational networks and civil society can be shut down in the face of an emergency—facing, for example, stay-at-home orders. Democracies also have the added challenge of managing competing political factions and institutions, some of whom may have political incentives to undermine response. Once the outbreak broke into the public and Beijing was moved to act, China was able to quickly shut down the Wuhan market, shut down the movement of tens of millions of people, screen and isolate the sick, and even build two hospitals in a matter of days. Singapore is another autocracy that has gained praise for its quick response. The U.S., on the other hand, has struggled to respond. The Trump administration focused on travel bans to keep the “foreign” virus out rather than on mobilizing public health capacities to detect and respond—a message that aligns with the Trump administration’s election-year antiimmigrant and anti-China political frame. The President’s incentive structure has been clear, as his administration has tried to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan Virus,” continuing a trade war with China, the largest producer of medical goods needed by the U.S. Perhaps these incentives were clearest in early March when Trump resisted allowing a cruise ship with COVID-19 cases to dock because “I don’t need to have the numbers double because of one ship” (The White House 2020).

#### Pandemics risk extinction

Yaneer Bar-Yam 16, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI (July 3, 2016), http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable

### Democracy -- Drones

#### Democracy causes drone warfare.

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But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare. Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way. In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn. Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value. And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options. But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night. So why? Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

#### Drolif means every hotspot goes nuclear.

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The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.

### Democracy – War

#### Democratization is even more dangerous than authoritarian backsliding – robust statistical evidence proves it causes war.

Doorenspleet, PhD, ‘19 (Renske, **ProfComparativePtx@UWarwick, PhDPoliSci@LeidenU**, “Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective,” p. 94-96, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick) BW

Is it a good idea to democratize a country in order to give peace more of a change? No, probably not. It is not only a bad idea because of the three caveats as described above, but also because the democratizing itself could be a very dangerous process during which conflicts are more likely. Countries that are in the process of making a transition to democracy are likely to be involved in wars between countries. As Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995a, b, 2002a, b, 2005) convincingly argued, countries become more aggressive and war-prone in the transitional phase of democratization. Such countries are likely to fight wars with not just dictatorships but also democracies. Democratizing countries are most likely to be involved in an interstate war, even more compared to political systems which are in transition towards dictatorship. The distinction between democratic and democratizing political systems is crucial. Systems can be considered to be democratizing if they change from a less democratic type of system to a democracy during a given period of time. Conversely, systems are autocratizing if they change from democracy to a less democratic type of system (Mansfeld and Snyder 1995a, b).37 Democratic peace scholars tended to work with a crude binary political system variable (so a country is either democratic or not), while this might hide a negative aspect of the process of democratization. However, by taking into account change and transitions and levels of democracy, Mansfeld and Snyder found that democratizing states were more likely to fight wars than were states that had undergone no regime change. Based on the strong empirical evidence for the negative effects of democratization, they recommended to always including the factor of democratization as one of the independent variables in the analyses, as it appears that democratic transitions are actually quite dangerous periods of instability. Transitioning democracies are generally more likely to fight wars than either consolidated dictatorships or consolidated democracies. Some studies did not find a relationship between democratization and conflict (Thompson and Tucker 1997; Oneal and Russett 1997), and some studies (Braumoeller 2004) showed that the link between democratization and war only holds for those democratizing countries where the executive lacks sufficient power, independence and institutional strength. At the same time, many studies found evidence that transition processes can be very dangerous (Ward and Gleditsch 1998; Gleditsch and Ward 2000; Mansfeld and Snyder 1995a, b, 2002a, b, 2005). Some excellent studies have distinguished between political systems which went through a complete process of autocratization (a full change, all the way to a dictatorial system) or democratization (all the way to a democratic system, regardless of starting point) on the one hand, and an incomplete change on the other hand (e.g. a change into a hybrid political system). Based on such distinctions, it can be concluded that the only change that has an effect is incomplete democratization: such a change is very risky and dangerous. Complete democratization has generally peaceful effects, although this effect is not significant (see, e.g., Mansfeld and Snyder 2002a, b, 2005).38 Rocky or especially rapid transitions or reversals increase the risk of being involved in warfare (Ward and Gleditsch 1998), and large swings back and forth between democracy and dictatorship can increase war proneness as well (Gleditsch and Ward 2000). Moreover, a regional context plagued by conflict greatly magnifies the risk of war (Gleditsch and Ward 2000) while the regional context of undemocratic neighbouring countries also increases the risk of war in democratizing countries (see Ray 2003). Not only democratizing a country can be risky, but there is also evidence that semi-democracies are inherently unstable (Baliga et al. 2011; Knutsen and Nygard 2015). For the period 1816–2000, the study by Sandeep Baliga et al. (2011) found that semi-democracies (or ‘hybrid systems’) are more aggressive than other types of political systems, including dictatorships; this is the case in general, so not only during periods when the political system is changing. Hybrid systems are particularly unstable political systems, and there is robust statistical evidence that hybrid systems are inherently less durable than both democracies and dictatorships (Knutsen and Nygard 2015). The General Lesson from the Results in a Nutshell (Caveat 4) Transition processes can be risky and lead to war, particularly when the changes are rapid or large. Some studies did not find a relationship between democratization and conflict, but most studies did, so it is not to be recommended to democratize a country in order to prevent war and to give the people a more peaceful life; to the contrary, a growing number of statistical studies show that transitions (both towards democracy and towards dictatorship) can easily lead to conflict and war (Table 3.4).

#### Presumption and permissibility negates – a) more often false than true since I can prove something false in infinite ways b) real world policies require positive justification before being adopted c) the aff has to prove an obligation which means lack of that obligation negates d) resolved in the resolution indicates they proactively did something, to negate that means that they aren’t resolved e) winning the nc proves since otherwise we’d be blindly deceived when skeptical f) to negate[[1]](#footnote-1) means to deny the truth of which means if the aff is false you vote neg g) permissibility can’t affirm since then anything would be ok which would justify racism – we should be safe and do nothing.

#### 1] No 1ar theory: [a] I only have one speech to respond which outweighs on infinite abuse because they can read any number of shells [b] aff frames the round means they pick neg ground and if the 1ar is hard, they should just write a better aff [c] 1ar restart, 4-6-3 tim skew, inifinite abuse.

#### 2] Use reasonability on 1ar theory – **[a] Competing interps moots 7 mins of NC offense which outweighs minimal neg abuse. [b] Offense-defense disincentivizes substantive education by shifting the round from substance to a norm so their model prioritizes diminishing marginal skews over substance. That outweighs – the end goal of theory is better substantive debates.** Reject aff overviews – allows them to homogenize my arguments and kills in depth line by line work, which is key to clash. **[c] kills recourse – would incentivize infinite 1ar shells so the neg needs reasonability to protect their core ground.**

#### 3] neg theory highest layer of the round a) framing of the round b) if the aff was abusive the neg is justifiecdi n being abusive

#### 4] Accept neg paradigm issues – otherwise they can put infinite spin on 1nc contextualization which means we never have good theory debates if we are disagreeing on the rules of the game. Leads to infinite theory debates, which kills the point of theory.

1. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)