#### Their attempt to ascribe a unified essence to the subject – that individuals are classified as complete and homogenous – fails to acknowledge the different creative contexts that truly merit our philosophic inquiries. The particular can never follow from the universal as it is built upon the exclusion of difference – only a focus on the complex process of subject production can we open up new possibilities

Arnott [Stephen J. Arnott, Canberra, ACT, Australia. “Liminal Subjectivity and the Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm of Félix Guattari”] AA

Before we begin this task in earnest, it will be necessary to say something about the concept of subjectivity as it is developed throughout Chaosmosis. **The emphasis is always on the production of subjectivity, a thesis** which opposes itself **to any** theory or **philosophical inquiry** **which conceives subjectivity as** given, either **wholly or partially**, **which**, in other words, **insists** **on its a priori or transcendental status**. This at once distances Guattari's approach from that of Turner, who while conceding that social and political structures are produced for the most part due to organizational requirements, presupposes a unity of the individual which to some extent remains immune to the effects of structure and stratification. Turner's individualism, however, is in no way a necessary requirement of his thesis, and in fact often seems to be at odds with it. For the moment we must emphasize that Guattari admits no such essential unity, for **one because we have no grounds, empirical or otherwise, for maintaining this presupposition, and** for another **because treating subjectivity in the light of the complex processes of production by means of which it is constituted in all its** heterogeneity or **diversity opens up ever new possibilities for its future production and also permits an optimism which might be denied to proponents of essential qualities of human individuation.**¶The term **'production' gives rise to images of production-lines, of highly** **mechanized techniques for producing objects according to preconceived design specifications** and economic viability. **The processes of production constitutive of subjectivity take on an altogether different character**, **but will include mechanized production in their midst.** Guattari opposes mechanism to 'machinism', and employs the latter to characterize production as it relates to subjectivity. Machinic production is invoked to access the extreme complexity of contributing factors and the enormous variety and variability of connectivity. **Factors contributing to the production of subjectivity will not be limited to biological arrangements**, **familial circumstances and social milieu,** **although all these will be included**. **Technology, media, art, institutions, machinic encounters of all kinds must be seen to have an active role in the production of subjectivity**. **Machines of extreme diversity,** **not simply scientific** or technological **machines**, **but desiring-machines**, aesthetic or literary machines, organic and inorganic, corporeal and incorporeal, all contributing, **all making their effects felt in varying degrees of intensity** - on the basis of this machinic background subjectivities are produced. By means of this machinic ontology, this machination of ontological textures, we are able "to decentre the question of the subject onto the question of subjectivity" (C p. 22). We no longer need recourse to a universal or transcendent subject, **but instead diagnose processes of subjectivation operating on biological, psychic, resource etc. materials in diverse and ever-changing ways**.¶ In **seeking to identify** and understand the effects of **factors implicated in the** **production of subjectivity within** **both historical and present cultural and social contexts**, **we can hope to highlight those factors** whose contribution appears to be detrimental, **which** in other words **steer both individual and collective subjectivity down paths of self-destruction and at the same time pinpoint potentially creative or positive factors which have been blocked in** one way or another **and thus been unable** **to be realized** in any effective capacity. This is not to say that we can foresee in advance what effects certain kinds of tendency or paradigm are going to have, although we can hazard an educated guess, though not without risks. This conveys something of the force of Guattari's call for the reappropriation of the production of subjectivity: **initially to try to be aware of or at least have a story about factors and processes which play an active part in the production of subjectivity**, **and then to be ready to experiment with new factors**, **as they present themselves** or are created, **without**, however, **having any clear ideas about the results** of such experiments. **For example, within an ethical perspective, we might identify the prevalence of** **transcendent principles licensed by religion** **or other kinds of moral dogma** **in the production** **of subjectivity in certain social contexts or historical periods.** **While we can recognize** manifest positive effects of such moralities such as the institution of **fairly stable communities** **of like-minded subjects**, **we can also see** all-too-plainly **the** insularity and **prejudices of such subjects** and communities. Perhaps **we** can find a way to preserve or enhance the positive effects by other means while at the same time lessening the negative ones. Guattari suggests that this might be achieved by **the** **introduction of a** certain **'narrative element'** of tolerance based on a conception of 'constellations of Universes of value' which **would facilitate a respect** **amongst proponents of** **belief systems of different** or even opposing **types**. **Such considerations might seem distant** **from the multicultural societies** which many of us now occupy, **in which the recognition of** **the diversity of value** and systems of belief **is** supposedly **acknowledged**. It is still the case, however, that political decisions are often made on the presupposition of shared community values which in actuality amount to little more than the propagation of values that are dominant rather than shared. For example, the current perceived need to introduce mechanisms of government instituted and controlled censorship of the Internet presupposes shared moral standards which demand the restriction of certain kinds of information being disseminated. Little regard is given, however, to the far-reaching effects that such censorship would illicit - for example, electronic or hypertext versions of Anti-Oedipus­ would be censored by mechanisms currently under consideration due to its use of profanity and words such as incest, masochism and so on.¶ **If there is no general prescription as to how we might steer the production of subjectivity along positive and creative paths**, **Guattari** nonetheless **argues that we might** **attempt to ensure increased diversity**, **creativity and experimentation**, **without at the same** **time contributing to antagonistic tendencies**, **through the institution of a broadly aesthetic** **paradigm**, **which would achieve primacy** **over scientific,** **moral, religious or other paradigms**. With the intention of clarifying and elaborating this ethico-aesthetic paradigm, I want now to introduce two important concepts developed by Victor Turner in the context of an analysis of the sociological effect of ritual practices in various preindustrial societies. The first of these is 'communitas', which describes a state of community which is in patent opposition to the mode of hierarchical community engendered by 'normal' social organization and stratification and which is effected on specific and relatively infrequent occasions within structured society by means of rituals of various kinds. The second is 'liminality', which derives from limen, meaning threshold but also implying margin or outskirts. Communitas and liminality for Turner constitute one half of a dialectical relation defined as 'anti-structure' which maintains an antithetical position with regard to the other half of the dialectic, that

#### They recreate the oppression they try to fight – in attempting to eliminate difference through a politics of inclusion, they in turn target individuals who represent deviancy.

Evans 10 [Brad Evans, 2010 “Foucault’s Legacy: Security, War, and Violence in the 21st Century,” Security Dialogue vol.41, no. 4, August 2010, pg. 422-424.]

Imposing **liberalism has often come at a price. That price has tended to be a continuous recourse to war.** While the militarism associated with liberal internationalization has already received scholarly attention (Howard, 2008), Foucault was concerned more with the continuation of war once peace has been declared.4 Denouncing the illusion that ‘we are living in a world in which order and peace have been restored’ (Foucault, 2003: 53), he set out to disrupt the neat distinctions between times of war/military exceptionalism and times of peace/civic normality. War accordingly now appears to condition the type of peace that follows. None have been more ambitious in map-­ ping out this war–peace continuum than Michael Dillon & Julian Reid (2009). Their ‘liberal war’ thesis provides a provocative insight into the lethality of making live. Liberalism today, they argue, is underwritten by the unreserved righteousness of its mission. Hence, while there may still be populations that exist beyond the liberal pale, it is now taken that they should be included. **With ‘liberal peace’ therefore predicated on the pacification/elimination of all forms of political difference in order that liberalism might meet its own moral and political objectives, the more peace is commanded, the more war is declared in order to achieve it:** ‘In proclaiming peace . . . liberals are nonetheless committed also to making war.’ This is the ‘martial face of liberal power’ that, contrary to the familiar narrative, is ‘directly fuelled by the universal and pacific ambitions for which liberalism is to be admired’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 2). Liberalism thus stands accused here of universalizing war in its pursuit of peace: However much liberalism abjures war, indeed finds the instrumental use of war, especially, a scandal, war has always been as instrumental to liberal as to geopolitical thinkers. In that very attempt to instrumentalize, indeed universalize, war in the pursuit of its own global project of emancipation, the practice of **liberal rule itself becomes profoundly shaped by war**. However much it may proclaim liberal peace and freedom, its own allied commitment to war subverts the very peace and freedoms it proclaims (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 7). While Dillon & Reid’s thesis only makes veiled reference to the onto-­ theological dimension, they are fully aware that its rule depends upon a certain religiosity in the sense that war has now been turned into a veritable human crusade with only two possible outcomes: ‘endless war or the transformation of other societies and cultures into liberal societies and cul-­ tures’ (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 5). Endless war is underwritten here by a new set of problems. Unlike Clausewitzean confrontations, which at least provided the strategic comforts of clear demarcations (them/us, war/peace, citizen/soldier, and so on), these wars no longer benefit from the possibility of scoring outright victory, retreating, or achieving a lasting negotiated peace by means of political compromise. Indeed, deprived of the prospect of defining enmity in advance, war itself becomes just as complex, dynamic, adaptive and radically interconnected as the world of which it is part. That is why ‘any such war to end war becomes a war without end. . . . **The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and unending process’** (Dillon & Reid, 2009: 32). Duffield, building on from these concerns, takes this unending scenario a stage further to suggest that since wars for humanity are inextricably bound to the global life-­chance divide, it is now possible to write of a ‘Global Civil War’ into which all life is openly recruited: Each crisis of global circulation . . . marks out a terrain of global civil war, or rather a tableau of wars, which is **fought on and between the modalities of life itself. . . .** What is at stake in this war is the West’s ability to contain and manage international poverty while maintaining the ability of mass society to live and consume beyond its means (Duffield, 2008: 162). Setting out civil war in these terms inevitably marks an important depar-­ ture. Not only does it illustrate how **liberalism gains its mastery by posing** fundamental questions of life and death – that is, who is to live and who can be killed – disrupting the narrative that ordinarily takes sovereignty to be the point of theoretical departure, civil war now appears to be driven by **a globally ambitious biopolitical imperative** (see below). Liberals have continuously made reference to humanity in order to justify their use of military force (Ignatieff, 2003). War, if there is to be one, must be **for the unification of the species**. This humanitarian caveat is by no means out of favour. More recently it underwrites the strategic rethink in contemporary zones of occupation, which has become biopolitical (‘hearts and minds’) in everything but name (Kilcullen, 2009; Smith, 2006). While criticisms of these strategies have tended to focus on the naive dangers associated with liberal idealism (see Gray, 2008), insufficient attention has been paid to the contested nature of all the tactics deployed in the will to govern illiberal populations. Foucault returns here with renewed vigour. He understood **that forms of war have always been aligned with forms of life.** Liberal wars are no exception. Fought in the name of endangered humanity, humanity itself finds its most meaningful expression through the battles waged in its name: At this point we can invert Clausewitz’s proposition and say **that politics is the continuation of war by other means**. . . . While it is true that political power puts an end to war and establishes or attempts to establish the reign of peace in civil society, it certainly does not do so in order to suspend the effects of power or to neutralize the disequilibrium revealed in the last battle of war (Foucault, 2003: 15). What in other words occurs beneath the semblance of peace is far from politically settled: political struggles, these clashes over and with power, these modifications of relations of force – the shifting balances, the reversals – in a political system, all these things must be interpreted as a continuation of war. And they are interpreted as so many episodes, fragmentations, and displacements of the war itself. We are always writing the history of the same war, even when we are writing the history of peace and its institutions (Foucault, 2003: 15). David Miliband (2009), without perhaps knowing the full political and philo-­ sophical implications, appears to subscribe to the value of this approach, albeit for an altogether more committed deployment: NATO was born in the shadow of the Cold War, but we have all had to change our thinking as our troops confront insurgents rather than military machines like our own. The mental models of 20th century mass warfare are not fit for 21st century counterinsurgency. That is why my argument today has been about the centrality of politics. People like quoting Clausewitz that warfare is the continuation of politics by other means. . . . We need politics to become the continuation of warfare by other means. Miliband’s ‘Foucauldian moment’ should not escape us. Inverting Clausewitz on a planetary scale – hence promoting the collapse of all meaningful distinctions that once held together the fixed terms of Newtonian space (i.e. inside/outside, friend/enemy, citizen/soldier, war/peace, and so forth), he firmly locates the conflict among the world of peoples. With global war there-­ fore appearing to be an internal state of affairs, vanquishing enemies can no longer be sanctioned for the mere defence of things. A new moment has arrived, in which **the destiny of humanity as a whole is being wagered on the success of humanity’s own political strategies**. No coincidence, then, that authors like David Kilcullen – a key architect in the formulation of counterinsurgency strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan, argue for a global insurgency paradigm without too much controversy. **Viewed from the perspective of power, global insurgency is after all nothing more than the advent of a global civil war fought for the biopolitical spoils of life.** Giving primacy to counter-­ insurgency, it foregrounds the problem of populations so that questions of security governance (i.e. population regulation) become central to the war effort (RAND, 2008). Placing the managed recovery of maladjusted life into the heart of military strategies, it insists upon a joined-­up response in which sovereign/militaristic forms of ordering are matched by biopolitical/devel-­ opmental forms of progress (Bell & Evans, forthcoming). Demanding in other words a planetary outlook, it collapses the local into the global so that life’s radical interconnectivity implies that absolutely nothing can be left to chance. While liberals have therefore been at pains to offer a more humane recovery to the overt failures of military excess in current theatres of operation, warfare has not in any way been removed from the species. Instead, humanized in the name of local sensitivities, doing what is necessary out of global species necessity now implies that war effectively takes place by every means. Our understanding of civil war is invariably recast. Sovereignty has been the traditional starting point for any discussion of civil war. While this is a well-established Eurocentric narrative, colonized peoples have never fully accepted the inevitability of the transfixed utopian prolificacy upon which sovereign power increasingly became dependent. Neither have they been completely passive when confronted by colonialism’s own brand of warfare by other means. Foucault was well aware of this his-­ tory. While Foucauldian scholars can therefore rightly argue that alternative histories of the subjugated alone permit us to challenge the monopolization of political terms – not least ‘civil war’ – for Foucault in particular there was something altogether more important at stake: there is no obligation whatsoever to ensure that reality matches some canonical theory. Despite what some scholars may insist, politically speaking there is nothing that is necessarily proper to the sovereign method. It holds no distinct privilege. Our task is to use theory to help make sense of reality, not vice versa. While there is not the space here to engage fully with the implications of our global civil war paradigm, it should be pointed out that since its biopolitical imperative removes the inevitability of epiphenomenal tensions, nothing and nobody is necessarily dangerous simply because location dictates. With enmity instead depending upon the complex, adaptive, dynamic account of life itself, **what becomes dangerous emerges from within the liberal imaginary of threat. Violence accordingly can only be sanctioned against those newly appointed enemies of humanity** – a phrase that, immeasurably greater than any juridical category, necessarily affords enmity an internal quality inherent to the species complete, for the sake of planetary survival. Vital in other words to all human existence, **doing what is necessary out of global species necessity requires a new moral assay of life that, pitting the universal against the particular, willingly commits violence against any ontological commitment to political difference**, even though universality itself is a shallow disguise for the practice of destroying political adversaries through the contingency of particular encounters. Necessary Violence Having established that the principal task set for biopolitical practitioners is to sort and adjudicate between the species, modern societies reveal a distinct biopolitical aporia (an irresolvable political dilemma) in the sense that making life live – selecting out those ways of life that are fittest by design – inevitably writes into that very script those lives that are retarded, backward, degenerate, wasteful and ultimately dangerous to the social order (Bauman, 1991). Racism thus appears here to be a thoroughly modern phenomenon (Deleuze & Guattari, 2002). This takes us to the heart of our concern with biopolitical rationalities. When ‘life itself’ becomes the principal referent for political struggles, power necessarily concerns itself with those biological threats to human existence (Palladino, 2008). That is to say, since life becomes the author of its own (un)making, the **biopolitical assay of life necessarily portrays a commitment to the supremacy of certain species types: ‘a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm**, against those who pose a threat to the biological heritage’ (Foucault, 2003: 61). Evidently, what is at stake here is no mere sovereign affair. Epiphenomenal tensions aside, racial problems occupy a ‘permanent presence’ within the political order (Foucault, 2003: 62). Biopolitically speaking, then, since it is precisely through the internalization of threat – the constitution of the threat that is now from **the dangerous ‘Others’ that exist within** – that societies reproduce at the level of life the ontological commitment to secure the subject, since everybody is now possibly dangerous and nobody can be exempt, for political modernity to function one always has to be capable of killing in order to go on living: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire **populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter** in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . The principle underlying the tactics of battle – that one has to become capable of killing in order to go on living – has become the principle that defines the strategy of states (Foucault, 1990: 137). When Foucault refers to ‘killing’, he is not simply referring to the vicious act of taking another life: ‘When I say “killing”, I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection and so on’ (Foucault, 2003: 256). Racism makes this process of elimination possible, for it is only **through the discourse and practice of racial (dis)qualification that one is capable of introducing ‘a break in the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die’** (Foucault, 2003: 255). While kill- ing does not need to be physically murderous, that is not to suggest that we should lose sight of the very real forms of political violence that do take place in the name of species improvement. As Deleuze (1999: 76) duly noted, when notions of security are invoked in order to preserve the destiny of a species, when the defence of society gives sanction to very real acts of violence that are justified in terms of species necessity, that is when the capacity to legitimate murderous **political actions in all our names and for all our sakes becomes altogether more rational, calculated, utilitarian**, hence altogether more frightening: When a diagram of power abandons the model of sovereignty in favour of a disciplinary model, when it becomes the ‘bio-­power’ or ‘bio-­politics’ of populations, controlling and administering life, it is indeed life that emerges as the new object of power. At that point law increasingly renounces that symbol of sovereign privilege, the right to put someone to death, but allows itself to produce all the more hecatombs and genocides: not by returning to the old law of killing, but on the contrary in the name of race, precious space, conditions of life and the survival of a population that believes itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’. Auschwitz arguably represents the most grotesque, shameful and hence meaningful example of necessary killing – the violence that is sanctioned in the name of species necessity (see Agamben, 1995, 2005). Indeed, for Agamben, since one of the most ‘essential characteristics’ of modern biopolitics is **to constantly ‘redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside’, it is within those sites that ‘eliminate radically the people that are excluded’ that the biopolitical racial imperative is exposed in its most brutal form** (Agamben, 1995: 171). The camp can therefore be seen to be the defining paradigm of the modern insomuch as it is a ‘space in which power confronts nothing other than pure biological life without any media-­ tion’ (Agamben, 1995: 179). While lacking Agamben’s intellectual sophistry, such a Schmittean-­inspired approach to violence – that is, sovereignty as the ability to declare a state of juridical exception – has certainly gained wide-­ spread academic currency in recent times. The field of international relations, for instance, has been awash with works that have tried to theorize the ‘exceptional times’ in which we live (see, in particular, Devetak, 2007; Kaldor, 2007). While some of the tactics deployed in the ‘Global War on Terror’ have undoubtedly lent credibility to these approaches, in terms of understanding violence they are limited. Violence is only rendered problematic here when it is associated with some act of unmitigated geopolitical excess (e.g. the invasion of Iraq, Guantánamo Bay, use of torture, and so forth). This is unfortunate. Precluding any critical evaluation of the contemporary forms of violence that take place within the remit of humanitarian discourses and practices, **there is a categorical failure to address how necessary violence continues to be an essential feature of the liberal encounter**. Hence, with post-interventionary forms of violence no longer appearing to be any cause for concern, the nature of the racial imperative that underwrites the violence of contemporary liberal occupations is removed from the analytical arena.

#### Vote neg to embrace actuality ecology. Rather than focusing on victimhood, this minoritarian strategy embraces a collective becoming towards deviancy. Understanding the world through affect enables a coming-together that moves past human subjecthood in favor of an ecological connection together. This molecular strategy connects the abstract subjectivity and material progress into a synthesis which can affect the material world.

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Benhabib’s formulation of a context-specific ethics – interactive not legislative (Benhabib, 1992, p. 6) – encourages an application of Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of becoming and its focus on specificity, intensity and unique intersections, within an ethical and ‘real-life’, social context or ecology. Mediation is a constant consideration of concrete specificities as they intersect, not economically but in terms of quality and movement. Deleuze recognises meditative ecology: ‘Not becoming unearthly. But becoming all the more earthly by inventing laws of liquids and gases on which the earth depends.’3 Deleuze points to the application of theories of becoming and mediation as directly affective of real bodies and real situations in movement – finite existential territories and machinic phyla – not philosophical or reflective conceptual versions of becoming. This actuality ecology encompasses what Braidotti emphasises: ‘Here the focus is more on the experience and the potential becoming of real women in all of their diverse ways of understanding and inhabiting the position “woman”’ (Braidotti, 1994, p. 115). Actuality ecology involves the slowing of time, of tactics which are modest and thus possible to concretise, and of the mobilisation of pack assemblages, devolved animal-humans, rather than the ‘so individual it is no longer completely there as human’ post-human. Feminism, queer, animal rights and other mobilisations of reified maps are pack deterritorialisations of existential territories – inextricably actual and theoretical, politically, aesthetically, activist, creatively (and actually risky for being so). While one may argue that the philosopher activates change because thought is material and thinking is inextricable from action, the body able to be hurt, deprived or die is the point at which the real of hermeneutic subjectivity both haunts and is irrefutably maintained in all philosophies. To activate material vitalistic philosophy the vitalism of the assemblage must colonise that irresistible point of self-maintenance located primarily in the flesh – all we are and all we need to live. Corporeal philosophy introduces the hitherto ignored, repressed and overcome. Autonomy defined through legally owning our own bodies is precisely what we must refuse in order to negotiate ethically being a self as not others. We must become molecular and one molecule in a political assemblage, a molecule in a pack such as the pack of feminism, of anti-racism, of animal rights, of queer-rights. Real flesh has been the site of prejudice, isomorphic annexation and suffering. It is purely because of the flesh – its use and its minoritarian status visually and conceptually – that suffering and death has been experienced. The animal slaughtered or experimented on, the woman impregnated, raped or beaten, the racial other starved or murdered, the queer denied human rights have all been made to suffer corporeally and cease to exist through the maintenance of majoritarian ideology. This ideology is a material philosophy. We should not focus on the victim, becomings are not victimhoods but tactical entry points (although the prevention of the making dead of the victims is nonetheless an inherent quality of becomings). Majoritarian systems need to be the focus of change, not just the immediate rights for preserving potential victims within those systems. We must take care not to martyr ourselves. Claiming we shall sacrifice our ‘oneness’ simply makes the value of that oneness consistent. If it is not sustained it cannot be part of the assemblage and while not wanting to overvalue the one that is us, we should not underestimate the more-than-one-less-than-one, which is our ability to act as part of assemblages. We are sustained in our becomings not in our beings. Activism changes paradigms but also attempts to preserve the life of other individuals at local and micro levels. Ethics demands that we seek to decentre molar systems of majoritarianism which oppress ‘women’, ‘animals’ and so forth as groups but also actively affect single instances of suffering and life. The sustaining self encourages these new assemblages which in turn sustain themselves and that with which they subsequently make connections. Sustainability forms both local and overarching assemblages. Sustainability raises ‘the challenge here of how to think in terms of processes, not of entities or single substances, at both the social and symbolic levels’ (Braidotti, 2006, p. 206, cites Becker and Jahn).

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater that best interrogates the oppressive politics of recognition, education grounded in majoritarian thought leads to real-world regulation. Carlin and Wallin 14

(Jason Wallin, Professor of Media and Youth Culture in Curriculum in the Faculty of Education at the University of Alberta, 2014, “Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education: For a People-Yet-to-Come”, 122-124, Bloomsbury Academic)

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’ (p. 6). Where education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its modes of production have taken as their teleological goal the production of a ‘majoritarian people’, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where education aspires to invest desire in the production of a ‘majoritarian’ or ‘molar’ public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed, not only through the paucity of enunciatory forms and images available for thinking education in the first place, but further, through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the singular, the ‘majoritarian’ and standardizing impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production the reification of common sense, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’, common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracted.

### Case

#### First, Defense

#### AT Foster – 1] This flows Negative – it says that ambiguity over space property causes conflict – the Plan doesn’t clarify a new way to interpret property, it just gets rid of any property claims which doesn’t resolve patchwork disputes since it’s purely a negative action and 2] Doesn’t conclude that we should ban mining – it just needs “uniform satellite oversight and regulatory guidance”.

#### AT MacWhorter – Multiple alt causes to OST vagueness – questions of “appropriation” means that the Plan can’t spill-over to making the entire OST credible.

Pershing 19, Abigail D. "Interpreting the Outer Space Treaty's Non-Appropriation Principle: Customary International Law from 1967 to Today." Yale J. Int'l L. 44 (2019): 149. (Robina Fellow at European Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights Yale Law School)//Elmer

Though the Outer Space Treaty flatly prohibits national appropriation of space,150 it leaves unanswered many questions as to what actually counts as appropriation. As far back as 1969, scholars wondered about the implications of this article.151 While it is clear that a nation may not claim ownership of the moon, other questions are not so clear. Does the prohibition extend to collecting scientific samples?152 Does creating space debris count as appropriation by occupation? While the answers to these questions are most likely no, simply because of the difficulties that would be caused otherwise, there are some questions that are more difficult to answer, and more pressing. As commercial space flight becomes more and more prevalent,153 the question of whether private entities can appropriate property in space becomes very important. Whereas once it took a nation to get into space, it will soon take only a corporation, and scholars have pondered whether these entities will be able to claim property in space.154 Though this seems allowable, since the treaty only prohibits “national appropriation,”155 allowing such appropriation would lead to an absurd result. This is because the only value that lies in recognition of a claim is the ability to have that claim enforced.156 If a nation recognized and enforced such a claim, this enforcement would constitute state action.157 It would serve to exclude members of other nations and would thus serve as a form of national appropriation, even though the nation never attempted to directly appropriate the property.158 Furthermore, the Outer Space Treaty also requires that non-governmental entities must be authorized and monitored by the entities’ home countries to operate in space.159 Since a nation cannot authorize its citizens to act in contradiction to international law, a nation would not be allowed to license a private entity to appropriate property in space.160 While this nonappropriation principle is great for allowing free access to space, thereby encouraging research and development in the field, it makes it difficult to create or police a solution to the space debris problem. A viable solution will have to work without becoming an appropriation. There is, however, very little substantive law on what actually counts as appropriation in the context of space.161 So, the best way to see what is and is not allowed is to look both at the general international law regarding appropriations and to look at the past actions of space actors to see what has been allowed (or at least tolerated) and what has been prohibited or rejected.

#### AT Mallick and Rajagopalan – this is power-tagged – they make an internal link to space weaponization but not “escalating space wars” – they also haven’t read a U/Q argument about how companies want to weaponize mining w/ WMD’s – it’s just about how it could happen.

#### Second, Offense

#### Concede the last line from Jamasmie about how Mining pushes China and Russia to closer cooperation in Space. Space is key to broader Alliance ties.

Ridgwell 21 Henry Ridgwell 12-17-2021 "China-Russia Collaboration in Space Poses Challenge for West" <https://www.voanews.com/a/china-russia-collaboration-in-space-poses-challenge-for-west/6358568.html> (Henry Ridgwell reports for VOA from London.)//Elmer

LONDON — China and Russia have begun collaborating on technology to rival the United States' GPS and European Galileo satellite navigation systems, as the two countries pursue closer military and strategic ties. Earlier this year, China agreed to host ground monitoring stations for Russia’s GLONASS positioning system on its soil, which improves global range and accuracy but can pose a security risk. In turn, Russia agreed to host ground stations for China’s BeiDou system. The reciprocal agreement indicates a growing level of trust and cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, says analyst Alexander Gabuev, senior fellow and chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific Program at the Carnegie Moscow Center. “Russia’s schism with the West and deepening confrontation and competition between China and the U.S. as two superpowers is definitely contributing to rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. There is a natural economic complementarity where Russia has (an) abundance of natural resources, and China has capital and technology to develop those resources. And finally, both are authoritarian states, so they don’t have this allergy when talking domestic political setup, or the poisoning of (Russian opposition leader) Alexi Navalny, or issues like Hong Kong or human rights in Xinjiang,” Gabuev told VOA. It will take some time for the collaboration on satellite navigation systems to be felt on the ground. “So far, we have yet to see important results, because in Russia, Russia still relies increasingly on GLONASS but also on GPS. We don’t have major BeiDou-linked projects,” Gabuev added. Satellites Satellites are seen as a crucial component of 21st century military power. Last month, Russia tested a missile against one of its own satellites. The U.S. said the resulting debris threatened astronauts on the International Space Station. “What's most troubling about that is the danger that it creates for the international community. It undermines strategic stability,” U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters Nov. 17. Russia, China and the U.S. are among several nations developing hypersonic missiles, which travel through the upper atmosphere at up to five times the speed of sound. Space treaty Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the U.S. had failed to engage on a joint Russian-Chinese space treaty. “They have ignored for many years the initiative of Russia and China to prepare a treaty to prevent an arms race in space. They simply ignore it, insisting instead on developing some sort of universal rules,” Lavrov said. In an interview June 11 with U.S. broadcaster NBC, Russian President Vladimir Putin said cooperation with Beijing was deepening. “We have been working and will continue to work with China, which applies to all kinds of programs, including exploring deep space. And I think there is nothing but positive information here. Frankly, I don't see any contradictions here,” Putin said. There are limits to Russian and Chinese cooperation, Gabuev said. “Both Russia and China are religious about their strategic autonomy. There is deep-seated nationalism, there is some level of mistrust and some level of competition in many of those areas where there is seeming complementarity, like space programs. I think that these advances in military technology is happening mostly in parallel, but not jointly.”

#### China-Russia coop solves nuclear war

Artyom Lukin 20 {Artyom Lukin is Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University. He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. 6-13-2020. “The Russia–China entente and its future.” https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7}//JM

China and Russia are the two largest—and neighboring—powers of continental Eurasia. Can two tigers share the same mountain, especially when one great power is rapidly gaining strength and the other is in relative decline? And there seems to be a pattern in the history of international relations that two ambitious major powers that share a land border are less likely to make an alliance, while they are more likely to engage in territorial disputes with one another as well as rivalry over primacy in their common neighborhood. There are at least three major parts of Eurasia—East Asia, the post-Soviet space (mainly Central Asia), and the Arctic—where China’s and Russia’s geopolitical interests intersect, creating potential for competition and conflict. But, on the other hand, if managed wisely, overlapping interests and stakes can also generate opportunities for collaboration. The following sections examine how Russia and China are managing to keep their differences in key Eurasian zones under control while displaying a significant degree of mutual cooperation.

East Asia This is China’s ‘home region’, but also one where Russia, by virtue of possessing the Far Eastern territories, is a resident power. Moscow, which has traditionally been concerned with keeping sovereignty over its vulnerable Far East