### Part 1 is Instability

#### The subject is unstable – there’s no set of irreducible categories that describe it – two warrants

#### [1] Subjectivity is a matter of constantly changing affects and effects that allow us to be a constantly changing desire machine. There isn’t a static view of identity – rather, identity is constantly changing.

#### Semetsky 06

[Semetsky. Semetsky, Inna. “Deleuze, Education, and Becoming.2006 ”]

Unconscious formations are to be brought into play both because an individual is a desiring machine and the “family drama depends ... on the unconscious social investments that come out in *delire*” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 20), that is, in a pre- rational, differential and excessive, triadic logic of floating images and disparate meanings inhabiting the Alice’s paradoxical Wonderland. **Desire is not a single drive – it is an assembly line of affects and effects;** machine is not a mechanical law utilized in the production of some predetermined end imposed by a transcendental subject – **instead subjects and objects are themselves differentiated and produced as the outcomes of desiring machines. The unconscious enfolded in subjectivity entails the insufficiency for subjectivity to be interpreted just in terms of the stable identity of the rational and intentional subject, or some ideal authentic self.** There is no transcendental subject for Deleuze, it vanishes like the infamous ghost into the unconscious machine, it is nowhere to be found. **The unconscious, as yet a-conceptual part of the plane of immanence is always productive and constructive, making subjectivity changing and transient** as though forcing it into becoming-other. According to Deleuze, “the intentionality of being is surpassed by the fold of Being, Being as fold” (Deleuze, 1988a, p. 110). In this respect, the unconscious perceptions are implicated as minute, or microperceptions; as such – and *le pli*, the root of the *im*-*pli-cated*, means in French *the fold* – they are part of the cartographic microanalysis of establishing “an unconscious psychic mechanism that engenders the perceived in consciousness” (Deleuze, 1993, p. 95). **The notion of being as fold points toward a subjectivity understood as a process irreducible to universal notions such as totality, unity or any *a priori* fixed self- identity**. As a mode of intensity, **subjectivity is capable of express[es]ing itself in its present actuality neither by means of progressive climbing toward the ultimate truth or the higher moral ideal**, nor by “looking for origins, even lost or deleted 19 CHAPTER 1 ones, but setting out to catch things where they were at work, in the middle: breaking things open, breaking words open” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 86). The **complexity of subjectivation is related to the complexity of language: there cannot be a single meaning derived from the classical signifier-signified based model, because such description would failto acknowledge the Deleuzean plural and pragmatic subject’s mode of existence as qualitative multiplicity. Subjectivity is always derivative to the expression of thought**, and being true to thought is pre- eminent to the production of subjectivity. **The fundamental Deleuzean concept of fold contributes to the blurring of boundaries between epistemology, ethics, and psychology: subjectivity expresses itself [and] through emergence of a new form of content**: it **becomes other by way of interaction**, or the double transformation – as in the aforementioned and oft-cited example of wasp and orchid.

#### [2] Thinking only affects a subject as a being in time and so is not a transcendent feature. Transcendent subject hood fails because differentiation through time causes instability.

Deleuze 68

[Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repitition. Translated by Paul Patton. 1968.]

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though **Descartes's Cogito** **operated** **with** two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. **The** **determination (I think) implies an undetermined** **existence** (**I am,** because 'in order to think one must exist') - **and** **determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject**: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. **The** entire **Kantian** **critique [is]** amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. **The determination ('I think')** obviously **implies** something undetermined **('I am'), but** **nothing so far tells us how it is that** **this undetermined is determinable** **by the 'I think'**: 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 **Kant** therefore **adds** a third logical value: **the determinable**, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but **in the form of a transcendental** **Difference** between the Determination as such and what it determines; **no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates**, **but in the form of an** **internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation** between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: **my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a** **phenomenon**, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, **the spontaneity of which I am** **conscious in the 'I think' cannot** **be understood as the** **attribute of a substantial** and spontaneous **being**, **but only as the affection** **of a passive self** **which experiences its own thought** - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. **The activity of thought applies** to a receptive being, **to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it**, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. **To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the** **self** - **that is, the passive position** (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, **namely** **time**. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the **I were fractured** from one end to the other: fractured **by** the pure and empty form of **time**. **In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time.** **Time signifies a** fault or a **fracture in the I and a passivity in the self**, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. **Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant** and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?

### Part 2 is Affect

#### Our instability means that we’re temporally bound and connected by affect – Our encounters with the world change the way we form relations with everything else. Hardt 14

The Power to be Affected Michael Hardt Published online: 12 December 2014 # Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 Int J Polit Cult Soc (2015) 28:215–222 DOI 10.1007/s10767-014-9191-x Scarsdale CC

By focusing on the causes of the affects, however, Spinoza points toward a practical project. **All affects can be either active (that is, caused internally) or passive (caused externally). Indeed one advantage of using “affect” instead of the more colloquial “emotion” or “feeling” to translate Spinoza’s Latin term “affectus” is that it highlights the causes and effects of actions by and upon us.** Once the causes are revealed, the project becomes to shift from passive to active affections, from external to internal causes. The reason to prefer active over passive does not reside in the experience of the affect, which does not change depending on cause or source. **A passive affection, Deleuze explains, “does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the external body: rather, it indicates the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which our power to be affected is filled at that moment”** (1992, pp. 219–220, translation modified). Just like passive affections, active affections too indicate the present constitution of our body. The crucial difference is really a temporal one and regards duration and repetition. **We need the ability to select, as Nietzsche would say, in order to extend and repeat those encounters and affects that are beneficial and prevent those that are detrimental. The repetition of passive affections is completely out of our control. Some random encounters, of course, do bring us joy, but that passes quickly if we cannot make them last or repeat them. And most random encounters, unfortunately, result in sadness. If we leave this to hazard, we will stay stuck with no way forward. “As long as you don’t know what is the power to be affected of a body, as long as you understand it like that, in chance encounters, you will not have a wise life, you will not have wisdom”** (1978 “L’affect et l’idée”). **The great advantage of the active over the passive affection is that it is no longer dependent on the vagaries of external forces. Since the body causes itself to be affected, chance is removed and it is able to control the duration and repetition of encounters. The issue, then, is not only understanding and expanding your power to be affected but also augmenting proportion of that power that is filled with active rather than passive affections**. This notion of active affection could appear obscure or, worse, moralistic if not linked to Spinoza’s definition of bodies (and, ultimately, subjects). From his perspective, there is no basic or default unitary body. “A body,” Spinoza explains, “is constituted by the relation among its parts” (1985 Ethics, IV P39 dem), and the number and constitution of those parts is changeable. We need to shift perspective so as no longer to consider a body as an entity (or even a cluster of entities) but instead as a relation. **When a new relation is added, a larger body is composed, and when a relation is broken, the body diminishes or decomposes. All this simply means that the border between the inside and outside of bodies, and hence between internal and external causes, is fluid and subject to our efforts. In order for a passive affection to become an active one, then, it is not necessary for the body that previously experienced the effect of an external body somehow to cut off that relationship and learn to become itself the cause. The body instead can, under certain conditions, envelop the cause—this is the term Deleuze uses—by creating a relation with it or, really, by expanding the relation that constitutes the body. You only gain the knowledge of when these conditions exist through encounters with others: every encounter reveals the extent to which the relations that constitute your body agree with or are “composable” with those of another**. And a joyful encounter always indicates that there is something in common to discover. “We must, then,” Deleuze explains, “by the aid of joyful passions, form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own” (1992, p. 283). Once we recognize those common relations, we can compose a new, greater body, which contains the cause of our joy. The cause, then, does not really change. It simply becomes internal—annexed, as it were, by the affected body. The real change is the border between inside and outside and hence the composition of the body. **Once the cause is internal and the affection is active, then you are no longer subject to chance: the affect can be prolonged and repeated as long as it brings you joy.**8 The practical project to transform passive into active affections thus ultimately involves a strategy of bonds and relations to maintain or transform the constitution of the body. The advice, if Spinoza were your therapist, could be as simple as this: first, discover your body’s power to be affected and the affects that compose it, and, then, if an encounter with someone or something results in joy, form a relationship with it, make it part of you, and transform the passive affection into an active one so that you can repeat the encounter or make it last until the joy no longer results. **You have to recognize that you are not a fixed entity but a bundle of relations and your task is to compose new joyful relations and decompose sad ones. Increasing the proportion of active affections does not primarily mean becoming the cause, at least not in a direct way. The bad therapist is the one who simply berates you to take control of your life as if it were an act of sovereign will. Instead you must discover joyful encounters and then make the passive affection into an active one by forming a consistent relation with the cause, thereby enveloping the cause with a new relation that constitutes us as a new body**. Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s technical vocabularies might make this process sound obscure when it is really a very practical project. Consider, for example, your power to think together with others. In many intellectual discussions and encounters, you find yourself more confused and less able to think. Occasionally, though, you encounter a person or a group with whom you are able to think more clearly and more powerfully than you could before. Suddenly, you understand things that previously seemed completely incomprehensible. This is a joy as pure as Spinoza can imagine. Well, the practical thing to do is not to leave such joyful encounters to chance and the fluctuations of external causes. Compose a stable relation with the source of intellectual joy; make the encounters repeat and last. Maybe form a discussion group or write a book together. This will change you, of course, since you are defined by relations, but it will change you for the better.

#### Affect is divided into two groups – Active and reactive. Active affect embraces the constitution of difference and fluidity, while reactive affect operates in accordance to majoritarianism

#### The state is a neutral tool but can be used as a destructive force of reactive desire as it can codify and regulate all social interactions as well as destroy those deemed deviant.

#### Robinson 09

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In this article, I have chosen to concentrate on the conceptual pairing of states and war-machines as a way of understanding the differences between autonomous social networks and hierarchical, repressive formations. **Deleuze and Guattari view the ‘state’ as a** particular kind of **institutional regime derived from a set of social relations** which can be **traced to a way of** seeing **focus**ed **on** the construction of **fixities and representation.** There is thus a basic form of the state (a “state-form”) in spite of the differences among specific states. Since Deleuze and Guattari’s theory is primarily relational and processual, the state exists primarily as a process rather than a thing. **The state-form is defined by the processes or practices of ‘overcoding’, ‘despotic signification’ and ‘machinic enslavement’.** These attributes can be explained one at a time. The concept of **despotic signification**, derived from Lacan’s idea of the master-signifier, **suggests that**, in statist thought, **a particular signifier is elevated to the status of standing for the whole, and the other of this signifier** (remembering that signification is necessarily differential) **is defined as radically excluded.** ‘**Overcoding**’ **consists in the imposition of** the regime of **meanings arising from this fixing of representations on the various processes through which social life and desire operate.** In contrast to the deep penetration which occurs in capitalism, states often do this fairly lightly, but with brutality around the edges. Hence for instance, **in historical despotic states, the inclusion of peripheral areas only required their symbolic subordination, and not any real impact on everyday life in these areas. Overcoding** also, however, **entails the destruction of anything which cannot be represented** or encoded. ‘**Machinic enslavement**’ **occurs when** assembled groups of social relations and desires, known in Deleuzian theory as **‘machines’, are rendered subordinate to the regulatory function of the despotic signifier and hence incorporated in an overarching totality.** **This** process **identifies Deleuze** and Guattari’s view of the state-form **with Mumford’s idea of the megamachine, with the state operating as a kind of absorbing and enclosing totality**, a bit like the Borg in Star Trek, **eating up** and assimilating **the social networks with which it comes into contact**. Crucially, while these relations it absorbs often start out as horizontal, or as hierarchical only at a local level, their absorption rearranges them as vertical and hierarchical aggregates. **It tends to destroy or reduce the intensity of horizontal connections, instead increasing the intensity of vertical subordination.** Take, for instance, the formation of the colonial state in Africa: loose social identities were rigidly reclassified as exclusive ethnicities, and these ethnicities were arranged in hierarchies (for instance, Tutsi as superior to Hutu) in ways which created rigid boundaries and oppressive relations culminating in today’s conflicts. According to this theory of the state-form, **states are** at once **‘isomorphic’, sharing a basic structure and function**, and heterogeneous, **differing** in how they express this structure. In particular, states vary **in terms of** the relative balance between **‘adding’ and ‘subtracting axioms’** (capitalism is also seen as performing these two operations). **An axiom** here **refers to** the **inclusion of a particular group** or social logic or set of desires as something **recognised by a state: examples** of addition of axioms **would be the recognition of minority rights** (e.g. gay rights), the recognition and systematic inclusion of minority groups in formal multiculturalism (e.g. Indian ‘scheduled castes’), the creation of niche markets for particular groups (e.g. ‘ethnic food’ sections in supermarkets), **and the provision of inclusive services (e.g. support for independent living for people with disabilities**). It is most marked in social-democratic kinds of states. **The subtraction** of axioms **consists in the encoding of differences as problems to be suppressed,** for example in the classification of differences as crimes, **the institutionalisation of unwanted minorities** (e.g. ‘sectioning’ people who are psychologically different), or the restriction of services to members of an in-group (excluding ‘disruptive’ children, denying council housing to migrants). This process reaches its culmination in totalitarian states. It is important to realise that **in both cases, the state is expressing the logic of the state-form, finding ways to encode and represent differences; but that the effects of the two strategies on the freedom and social power of marginalised groups are very different.** **The state is also** viewed as **a force of ‘antiproduction’**. This term is defined **against** the ‘productive’ or creative power Deleuze and Guattari believe resides in processes of **desiring**-production (the process through which desires are formed and connected to objects or others) **and social production** (the process of constructing social ‘assemblages’ or networks). **Desiring-production** tends to **proliferate differences**, **because desire operates through fluxes and breaks**, overflowing particular boundaries. The state as machine of **antiproduction operates to restrict**, prevent or channel these **flows of creative energy** so as **to preserve fixed social forms and restrict** the extent of **difference** which is able to exist, **or** the **connections** it is able to form. Hence, **states try to restrict** and break down the **coming-together of social networks by** prohibiting or **making difficult the formation of hierarchical assemblages**; it operates to block ‘subject-formation’ in terms of social groups, or the emergence of subjectivities which are not already encoded in dominant terms. **Take** for instance the laws on **‘dispersal’,** in which the **British** state **allows police to break up groups** (often of young people) **congregating in public spaces.** Absurdly, **the state defines** the social act of **coming-together as anti-social, because it creates a space in which different kinds of social relations can be formed. The state wishes** to have **a monopoly on how people interrelate**, and so acts to prevent people from associating horizontally. Another example of antiproduction is the way that participation in imposed activities

#### Embracing a politics of active desire – one that is immanent and based in the present rather than the future – is key to break free of reactive desire. This resists logics of majoritarian control and becomes the space for potential resistance.

#### K&R 16

Karatzogianni, Athina and Robinson, Andy. “Schizorevolutions vs. Microfascisms: A Deleuzo-Nietzchean Perspective on State, Security, and Active/Reactive Networks.” University of Leicester, . 2013. Scarsdale CC

The impulse to condemn deviance, resistance and insurrection is disturbingly strong in academia, and doubtless strengthened by revulsion against network terror. Yet this networked rebellion of the excluded is the key to hopes for a better world. In the spiral of terror between states and movements, it is important to recognise that the source is the state and the weak point is in the movements. In today’s social war, the Other is not even accorded the honour of being an enemy in a fair fight. As long as social conflicts are seen through a statist frame, social war is doomed to continue, because discursive exclusion produces social war as its underside, and renders resistance both necessary and justified. The cycle of terror starts with the state: its terror at an existential level of losing control and fixity. This terrified state produces state terror and thereby creates the conditions for movement terror. It is naive to look for a way out from this side of the equation. State terror can end only when the state, both accepts the proliferation of networks beyond its control, and adopts a more humble role for itself, or when it collapses or is destroyed. On the other side, **we should find hope in the proliferation of resistance among the excluded. We need to see in movements of the excluded the radical potential and not only the reactive distortions**. To take Tupac Shakur’s metaphor, we need to see the rose that grows from concrete, not merely the thorns. The problem is, rather, that many of the movements on the network side of the equation are still thinking, seeing and feeling like states. **Such movements are potential bearers of the Other of the state-form, of networks as alternatives to states, affinity against hegemony, abundance against scarcity. The question thus becomes how they can learn to valorise what they are -- autonomous affinity-networks -- rather than internalising majoritarian norms.** For instance, in terms of the impact of technosocial transformations on agency, the negotiation of ideology, order of dissent in relation to capitalism as a social code, remains hostage to labor processes and to thick identities of local/regional or national interests, which fail to move contemporary movements to an active affinity to a common humanity and a pragmatic solution for an ethical, non exploitative form of production (Karatzogianni and Schandorf, 2012). Here the exception may like in the global justice movements and Occupy, although still here the discourse remains often in reactive mode, due to state crackdowns experienced by the movements. There is a great need to find ways to energise hope against fear. **Hope as an active force can be counterposed to the reactive power of fear. People are not in fact powerless, but are made to feel powerless by the pervasiveness of the dominant social fantasy and of separation. This yields a temptation to fall back on the power of ‘the powerful’, those who gain a kind of distorted agency through alienation.** But powerlessness and constituted power are both effects of alienation, which can be broken down by creating affinity-network forms of life. An emotional shift can thus be enough to revolutionise subjectivities. Hence, as Vaneigem argues, ‘[t]o work for delight and authentic festivity is barely distinguishable from preparing for a general insurrection’ (Vaneigem 1967: 50-1). It has been argued in utopian studies that fear and hope form part of a coxntinuum, expressing ‘aspects of affective ambivalence’ connected to the indeterminacy of the future (McManus 2005). **The type of hope needed is active and immanent, brought into the present as a propulsive force rather than deferred to the future. Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘absolute deterritorialisation’ for this possibility.** In his work on conflict transformation, John Paul Lederach emphasises the need to turn negative energies into creative energies and mobilising hope against fear (Lederach and Maiese, n.d.: 2-3; Lederach, 2005). **How is this change in vital energies to be accomplished? Deleuze and Guattari invoke a figure of the shaman as a way to overcome reactive energies** (1983: 167-8). **They call for a type of revolutionary social movement ‘that follows the lines of escape of desire; breaches the wall and causes flows to move; assembles its machines and its groups-in-fusion in the enclaves or at the periphery’, countering reactive energies** (ibid. 277). In looking at how this might operate in practice, let us examine briefly the Colombian feminist anti-militarist group La Ruta Pacifica de las Mujeres. In particular, the aspects of social weaving and collective mourning prominent in their methodology are crucial forms of creative shamanism, which turns fear into hope. Their approach involves ‘the deconstruction of the pervasive symbolism of violence and war and the substitution of a new visual and textual language and creative rituals’ (Cockburn, 2005: 14; Brouwer, 2008: 62). Weaving as a metaphor refers to social recomposition, the reconstruction of affinity; being ‘bound’ through social weaving is believed to control fear. It is taken as a way to counter everyday violence on the frontlines of the ‘war on terror’. Rituals of mourning and weaving are believed by participants to disarm the armed and create invisible connections among participants (Colorado, 2003). La Ruta seek to create new combinations of cognitive and emotional elements strong enough to disrupt dominant monologues (Cockburn, 2005: 14). Weaving reconstructs social connections and life-cycles, and thereby enhances wellbeing (ibid. 15). Participants recount inner strength and physical recovery as effects of such rituals (Brouwer, 2008: 85). **Hence, it is in open spaces, safe spaces, and spaces of dialogue that hope can be found to counter the spiral of terror. This opening of space, this creation of autonomous zones, should be viewed as a break with the majoritarian logics of social control. The coming ‘other worlds’ counterposed to the spaces of terror are not an integrated ‘new order’, but rather, a proliferation of smooth spaces in a horizontality without borders. These ‘other worlds’ are being built unconsciously, wherever networks, affinity and hope counterpose themselves to state terror and the desire for fixed identity be it national, ethnic, religious or cultural.** It is in the incommensurable antagonism between the autonomous zones of these ‘other worlds’ and the terror state’s demands for controlled spaces to serve capital, that the nexus of the conflicts of the present and near-future lies. And interestingly, there is also a certain active/reactive difference between state responses in the Turkey and Brazil protests of June 2013.

#### Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace active desire. To clarify, we reject things that attempt to reinforce stability or the majoritarian subject. Modern education is structured by majoritarian thought that reproduces dominant hierarchies – the school is made to capture difference and make it measurable, killing possibilities for resistance.

#### Carlin and Wallin 14

[Carlin, Matthew. Wallin, Jason. “Deleuze & Guattari, Politics and Education.” Bloomsbury. 2014. Pg. 119-121] MK

As a social machine through which ‘labour power and the socius as a whole is manufactured’, schooling figures in the production of social territories that already anticipate a certain kind of people (Guattari, 2009, p. 47). And what kind of people does orthodox schooling seek to produce but a ‘molar public’, or, rather, a public regulated in the abstract image of segmentary social categories (age, gender, ethnicity, class, rank, achievement) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987)? Such an aspiration is intimately wed to the territorializing powers of the State, for as Deleuze and Guattari argue (1983), State power first requires a ‘representational subject’ as both an abstract and unconscious model in relation to which one is taught to desire. As Massumi (2002) writes, ‘**the subject is made to be in conformity with the systems that produces it, such that the subject reproduces the system’** (p. 6). Where **education has historically functioned to regulate institutional life according to such segmentary molar codes, its** modes of production have taken as their teleological **goal** the **production of a ‘majoritarian people’**, or, more accurately, a people circuited to their representational self-similarity according to State thought. This is, in part, the threat that Aoki (2005) identifies in the planned curriculum and its projection of an abstract essentialism upon a diversity of concrete educational assemblages (a school, a class, a curriculum, etc.). Apropos Deleuze, Aoki argues that the standardization of education has effectively reduced difference to a matter of difference in degree. That is, in reference to the stratifying power of the planned curriculum, Aoki avers that difference is always-already linked to an abstract image to which pedagogy ought to aspire and in conformity to which its operations become recognizable as ‘education’ per se. Against political action then, orthodox educational thought conceptualizes social life alongside the ‘categories of the Negative’, eschewing difference for conformity, flows for unities, mobile arrangements for totalizing systems (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). Twisting Deleuze, might we claim that the people are missing in education? That is, where **education aspires to invest desire in the** production of a ‘**majoritarian’** or ‘molar’ **public, the prospect of thinking singularities are stayed**, not only through the paucity of enunciatory **forms and images available for thinking education** in the first place, but further, **through the organization of the school’s enunciatory machines into vehicles of representation that repeat in molarizing forms of self-reflection**, ‘majoritarian’ perspective, and dominant circuits of desiring-investment. Herein, **the impulse of standardization obliterates alternative subject formations and the modes of counter-signifying enunciation that might palpate them. Repelling the** singular, the ‘**majoritarian’** **and standardizing** **impulse of education takes as its ‘fundamental’ mode of production** **the reification of common sense**, or, rather, the territorialization of thought according to that which is given (that which everyone already knows). **Figuring in a mode ‘of identification that brings diversity in general to bear upon the form of the Same’,** common sense functions to stabilize patterns of social production by tethering them to molar orders of meaning and dominant regimes of social signification (Deleuze, 1990, p. 78). As Daignault argues, in so far as it repels the anomalous by reterritorializing it within prior systems of representation, common sense constitutes a significant and lingering problem in contemporary education (Hwu, 2004). Its function, Daignault alludes apropos Serres, is oriented to the annihilation of difference. Hence, **where the conceptualization of ‘public’ education is founded in common sense, potentials for political action through tactics of proliferation, disjunction, and singularization are radically delimited** and captured within prior territorialities of use (Foucault, 1983, p. xiii). The problem of this scenario is clear: **common sense has yet to force us to think in a manner capable of subtracting desire from majoritarian thought in lieu of alternative forms of organization and experimental expression**. In so far as it functions as a vehicle of ‘molarization’, reifying a common universe of reference for enunciation, the school fails to produce conditions for thinking in a manner that is not already anticipated by such referential ‘possibilities’. Hence, **while antithetical to the espoused purpose of schooling, the majoritarian impulse of the school has yet to produce conditions for thinking** – at least in the Deleuzian (2000) sense whereupon thought proceeds from a necessary violence to those habits of repetition with which thought becomes contracte

#### The aff is key to adopt and test new resistance strategies within colleges and universities as contemporary pedagogical sites – operating internally is essential to hearing from multiple perspectives and forming new affective relations

Manning and Massumi 18 [Erin and Brian; “A Cryptoeconomy of Affect”; interviewed by Uriah Todoroff for The New Inquiry; Massumi is known for his translations of French post-structuralist classics like Deleuze and Guattari’s *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987); Manning is a prolific author whose last published book was *The Minor Gesture* (2016). They work together at the SenseLab in Montreal, a research laboratory Manning created to experiment with collective pedagogy. The lab provides a base for intellectual and creative activity that is intended to spin off into projects that grow or die according to their own momentum.; https://thenewinquiry.com/a-cryptoeconomy-of-affect/; BP]

There are people all over the world we don’t know who are doing this kind of work, who are creating ways of working together, inventing new forms of collaboration, engaging with complex ecological models of encounter, who are inventing new forms of value. We never believe we are alone doing this work. The question we have isn’t the usual start-up question of how to scale up, it’s how do we create techniques for the registering of that which doesn’t register? The 3E Process Seed Bank is deeply allied to the question of what else learning and living can be, having grown out of its sister project the Three Ecologies Institute. We actually began there, with the Three Ecologies Institute, working from Félix Guattari’s definition of the three ecologies as the conceptual (psychic, mental), the environmental, and the social. It was only two years ago that we realized that thinking value transversally across the three ecologies required us to also take financial value into account. We see the 3E as a kind of intensifier of modes of thinking and living dedicated to inventing ways that we can continue to learn together, regardless of our age, background, or learning style. We don’t see it as an opposite to the university; we see it as a parasite. You could put the emphasis on the site: a para-site, a para-institution that maintains relations with the institution of the university but operates by a different logic. It would be very naive of us to think you could just walk out of capitalism. We’re not that naive. Neoliberalism is our natural environment. We therefore operate with what we call strategic duplicity. This involves recognizing what works in the systems we work against. Which means: We don’t just oppose them head on. We work with them, strategically, while nurturing an alien logic that moves in very different directions. One of the things we know that the university does well is that it attracts really interesting people. The university can facilitate meetings that can change lives. But systemically, it fails. And the systemic failure is getting more and more acute. And so what we imagine is that the Institute, assisted by the 3E Process Seed Bank, will create a new space that might overlap with some of the things the university does well, without being a part of it (or being subsumed by its logic). **MASSUMI.—** Going back to the question of value, we want to create an economy around the platform that does not follow any of the usual economic principles. There will be no individual ownership or shares. There will be no units of account, no currency or tokens used internally. The model of activity will not be transactional. Individual interest will not be used as an incentivizer. What there will be is a complex space of relation for people to create intensities of experience together, in emergent excess over what they could have created working separately, or in traditional teams. It’s meant to be self-organizing, with no separate administrative structure or hierarchy, and even no formal decision-making rules. It’s anarchistic in that sense, but through mobilizing a surplus of organizing potential, rather than lacking organization. You could also call it communistic, in the sense that there is no individual value holding. Everything is common. **MANNING.—** Undercommon. **MASSUMI.—** Yes, undercommonly. The undercommons is Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s word for emergent collectivity, which is one of our inspirations. We want to foster emergence and process, but at the same time find ways of making it sustainable. That means that the strategic duplicity has to extend to the economy as we currently know it. We have to be parasitical to the capitalist economy, while operating according to a logic that is totally alien to it. What we’re thinking of is making the collaborative process moving through the platform function according to the radically anti-capitalist principles we were just talking about, centering on the collective production of surplus values of life, and separating that from the dominant economy by a membrane. A membrane creates a separation, but at the same time allows for movements across. It has a certain porosity. The idea is that we would find ways, associated with the affect-o-meter we were describing earlier, to register qualitative shifts in the creative process as it moves over its formative thresholds, and moves back and forth between online operations and offline events. What would be registered is the affective intensity of the production of surplus value of life, its ebbs and flows. The membrane would consist in a translation of those qualitative flows into a numerical expression, which would feed into a cryptocurrency. Basically, we’d be mining crypto with collaborative creative energies—monetizing emergent collectivity. The currency would be “backed” by the confidence we could build in our ability to keep the creative process going and spin it off into other projects, as evidenced by the activities of the Three Ecologies Institute as an experiment in alter-education.

#### Thus, I affirm. “Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.” as a general principle I’ll defend the resolution as a general principle and PICS don’t negate because general principles tolerate exceptions. I’ll spec whatever you want me to in cx as long as it doesn’t force me to abandon my maximum.

### Contention 1:

#### Capitalism arose in Western Europe centered around appropriation of land for private use – This force supported by the state ruptures all existing relations, political or otherwise, and commodifies them into a single logic centered around accumulation of capital – this obliterates potential for affective desire: (Saldanha 1)

Saldanha, Arun. *Space after Deleuze*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

As US hegemony started to appear doomed already in the mid-1970s, capital’s axiomatic creativity allowed it to start rearranging the North/South polarity globally (see ATP 566n23). Evidently capital has no special fondness for white people. As we saw at the end of the previous chapter, Deleuze has great interest in a question fundamental to both post-Braudelian comparative history and, at the beginning of capitalism’s adventure, Hegel: why did Europe become dominant? “The only universal history is the history of contingency. Let us return to this eminently contingent question that modern historians know how to ask: why Europe, why not China?” ( AO 224). While shipping in other civilizations supported commerce and despotic territoriality, Western Europeans developed the mad desire to cross the oceans and subdue populations. Capitalism proper requires a singular kind of adventurous zeal to extend the new conjunction of capital and labor fl ows. Closely following Marx, Deleuze and Guattari argue that the fl ows of commodities, technology, industry, money, and armies through China, India, or the Roman Empire were not allowed to “stream together” ( ATP 452). Capitalism only appears where and when labor is deterritorialized from serfdom and village, and capital from land and market square. The two fl ows are “conjugated” through the comparability granted by a uniform system of prices (including wages) and exchange rates. Conjugation is what capitalist fl ow is all about, from the machinic entangling of money, raw materials, tools, invention, and labor- power in eighteenth- century Lancashire to the computerized stock markets today. The new highly lucrative form of exploitation of industrial labor rapidly diffused by conjugating (deterritorializing) one market after another, so that Marx and Engels would in fi ve decades talk of one economic world- system. Globalization was of course an old dream of some emperors and holy men across the world, but it was only industrial wage- labor, fi nanced through previously accumulated mercantile wealth, that could kickstart this runaway process. Unlike the territorial morphology of antiquities and feudalisms, capital strives to absorb and overcode all political entities of the world. Now “we can depict an enormous, so-called stateless, monetary mass that circulates through foreign exchange and across borders, eluding control by the States, forming a multinational ecumenical organization, constituting a de facto supranational power untouched by governmental decisions” ( ATP 453). However, states have always been crucial for providing infrastructure and laying down axioms conducive to capital fl ow, especially through war and technology. For Marx (1992: part 8), of course, the “primitive accumulation” by states on the basis of dispossessing colonized populations was in hindsight another necessary territorializing project for capitalism to take off. Deleuze and Guattari push this further: “there is a violence that necessarily operates through the State, precedes the capitalist mode of production, constitutes the ‘primitive accumulation’, and makes possible the capitalist mode of production itself” ( ATP 447). A long passage in A Thousand Plateaus locates the origins of geographical FLOWS79 inequality in the extortion practices of ancient empires (437–47). The mere fact that agriculture produces a fl ow of surplus that has to be siphoned and distributed creates wealth for those who capture it. A state is in fact nothing but an “apparatus of capture.” The despot invents a new kind of arithmetic, money, in order to seize rent and tribute and, from around the sixteenth century, profi ts from trade and manufacturing. For thousands of years, therefore, the state machine has involved a “general space of comparison and a mobile center of appropriation” (444). Deleuze and Guattari make the startling claim that any sedentary society is already urban, stockpiling by exploiting many peripherals at once (440). In retrospect, but only in retrospect, the state, the city, and capitalism were and are tangible in nomadic and agricultural societies as transcendental limits in both the mathematical and geographic sense. These limits were actively staved off as undesirable by the nomads and savages. It is as if they presaged the global catastrophes of our twenty- fi rst century.

#### Capitalism thrives off the industrial appropriation of “new lands” or areas of space – imposing it’s own Eurocentric narrative of capital onto the areas and blocking off new relationships that people could create with the land (Saldanha 2)

Saldanha, Arun. *Space after Deleuze*. Bloomsbury Academic, 2018.

Deleuze formulates the island concept by drawing from Daniel Defoe’s classic Robinson Crusoe of 1719, which launched a central philosophical fi gure – “conceptual persona” in the terms of What is Philosophy? – of European colonial modernity. Crusoe embodies the early- capitalist belief in the power of civilization to recommence itself from scratch anywhere by virtue of its orderliness and, in this case, the sheer determination of one virtuous man and his slave, Friday. The celebration of industriousness is also a racialization or facialization (see next chapter) of the bodily affections of the protagonists. Crusoe and Friday form a microcosmic analogy of the real assemblage of plantation labor, which was in the eighteenth century accumulating towards British industrialization. Now, for Marxists (like Amin 1976 or Smith 2008), as much as for Deleuze and Guattari, to think human multiplicity (social formation) is to think inequality and mobility as themselves generative. We now add that the degree zero of European colonial society is found in the shipwreck narrative, and updated in disaster and adventure movies wherein the apocalypse challenges a white man to rebuild the civilization that spawned him. The white man believes it is his responsibility to conquer the furthest bits of earth and transcend all obstacles to his industriousness. The tragedy of ever-encroaching colonization includes the complicity of “savage” populations whom we now wish could have resisted the white man’s greedy appropriation, deadly guns and diseases, and quasi- divine self- confi dence. Robinson’s vision of the world resides exclusively in property; never have we seen an owner more ready to preach. The mythical recreation of the world from the deserted island gives way to the reconstitution of bourgeois life from the reserve of capital. [. . .] Robinson’s companion is not Eve, but Friday, docile towards work, happy to be a slave, and too easily disgusted by cannibalism. Any healthy reader would dream of seeing him eat Robinson. DI 12 The myth of subduing a wild island and savages represents a central racist myth driving the expansionism of capitalism. Deleuze takes issue not just with the racism but the metaphysical duality supporting it. According to the myth, Crusoe creates his little civilization by imposing a spatiotemporal regime upon himself, Friday, and “nature.” This legal regime is presented as something external to the bodies and ecosystems it organizes. It is what the dominant European political tradition calls a social contract, the rules whereby society maintains itself. Rational agents are to engage each other according to this contract if they are to live together peacefully. Society emerges only when competing individuals transfer some of their natural freedom to the collective level. In his lectures on Rousseau of 1959–60, Deleuze argues against this classical liberal conception (R 19ff). The Hobbesian presupposition is that a “war of all against all” is inevitable without a strong law. This is a convenient justifi cation of European conquest and government. Crusoe’s situation is not at all the state of “nature” as Crusoe already enjoys a theological privilege prior to his shipwreck. Why is he in the Pacifi c in the fi rst place? Humans never “revert” to “nature” when stranded on an island, as happens in William Golding’s The Lord of the Flies (1954). While Hobbes places in nature a determinism of competition that says much about early colonialist England (and nothing, incidentally, about the life of animals and plants), Deleuze reads in Rousseau’s version of the social contract a very different idea of nature, a “genetic virtuality” in which it makes no sense to talk about either atomistic individuals or human instincts (R 10). There is in Rousseau even a proto-Marxist understanding of the irreducibility of the social (R 11). Such a perspective allows one to see that violence or oppression does not constitute a primordial fact, but supposes a civil state, social situations, and economic determinations. If Robinson enslaves Friday, it is not due to Robinson’s natural disposition, and it is not by the power of his fi st; he does it with a small capital and the means of production which he saved from the debts, and he does it to subjugate Friday to social tasks, the ideas of which Robinson has not lost in his shipwreck. DI 53 It is only because of the recent inventions of capitalism and racism that Robinson Crusoe can institute the law on “his” island, not because there is some “natural” antagonism between different bodies, much less an innate superiority. If it is not beholden to some grim nature, a population might as well build an entirely new egalitarian society if they really want to, as they do in Aldous Huxley’s Island ( 1962 ). Following Rousseau’s notorious concept of the general will, Deleuze notes that a people creates itself to the extent that it exerts a rational, virtuous, fully egalitarian volition relatively autonomous from its physical- geographical limitations (R 24).

## UV

#### 1) I do not contend theory is coherent but if it is:

#### a) 1AR gets theory if the 1N does, only way to be reciprocal

#### b) drop the debater because the 1ar is too short to rectify abuse AND have a shot on substance due to severance from dropping the argument

#### c) No neg RVI since a 6-minute 2N dump on theory makes the 3 min 2AR impossible deterring affs from checking abuse.

#### d) Make them weigh neg theory against side bias because otherwise aff abuse is just fairly rectifying for time skew, and you presume aff