# 1NC

## 1NC -- K -- Settler Colonialism

#### Reformism is not emancipatory but instead contributes to the iterative perfection of colonial capitalism – the transformative potential of legal change is circumscribed by hegemonic power structures that are embedded in international political systems.

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These events – the corporate capture of the global pharmaceutical IP regime, state complicity and vaccine imperialism – are not new. Recall Article 7 of TRIPS, which states that the objective of the Agreement is the ‘protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights [to] contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology’. In similar vein, Article 66(2) of TRIPS further calls on developed countries to ‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions within their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country’. While the language of ‘transfer of technology’ might seem beneficial or benign, in actuality it is not. As I discussed in my book, and as Carmen Gonzalez has also shown, when development objectives are incorporated into international legal instruments and institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances. This is because these development objectives are circumscribed by capitalist imperialist structures, adapted to justify colonial practices and mobilized through racial differences. These structures are the essence of international law and its institutions even in the twenty-first century. They continue to animate broader socio-economic engagement with the global economy even in the present as well as in the legal and regulatory codes that support them. Thus, it is not surprising that even in current global health crisis, calls for this same transfer of technology in the form of a TRIPS waiver to scale up global vaccine production is being thwarted by the hegemony of developed states inevitably influenced by their respective pharmaceutical companies. The ‘emancipatory potential’ of TRIPS cannot be achieved if it was not created to be emancipatory in the first place. It also makes obvious the ways international IP law is not only unsuited to promote structural reform to enable the self-sufficiency and self-determination of the countries in the global south, but also produces asymmetries that perpetuate inequalities. Concluding Remarks What this pandemic makes clear is that the development discourse often touted by developed nations to help countries in the Global South ‘catch up’ is empty when the essential medicines needed to stay alive are deliberately denied and weaponised. Like the free-market reforms designed to produce ‘development’, IP deployed to incentivise innovation is yet another tool in the service of private profits. As this pandemic has shown, the reality of contemporary capitalism – including the IP regime that underpins it – is competition among corporate giants driven by profit and not by human need. The needs of the poor weigh much less than the profits of big business and their home states. However, it is not all doom and gloom. Countries such as India, China and Russia have stepped up in the distribution of vaccines or what many call ‘vaccine diplomacy.’ Further, Cuba’s vaccine candidate Soberana 02, which is currently in final clinical trial stages and does not require extra refrigeration, promises to be a suitable option for many countries in the global South with infrastructural and logistical challenges. Importantly, Cuba’s history of medical diplomacy in other global South countries raises hope that the country will be willing to share the know-how with other manufactures in various non-western countries, which could help address artificial supply problems and control over distribution. In sum, this pandemic provides an opportune moment to overhaul this dysfunctional global IP system. We need not wait for the next crisis to learn the lessons from this crisis.

#### “International order” is a dogwhistle for a global governance paradigm of assimilation into Western values that over-represent themselves as progress, “the world”, and history itself imposed through the civilizing mission of war, intervention, and imperialism abroad.

Turner and Nymalm, 19

[Dr. Oliver, IR @ UEdinburgh, UK; and Nicola, Research Fellow @ Swedish Institute for Int’l Affairs and Assistant Prof. of War Studies @ Swedish Defence University: “Morality and progress: IR narratives on international revisionism and the status quo,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:4 (2019), 407-428, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1623173]//AD

The concept of an international order, or ‘status quo’, as it commonly appears throughout the two historic waves of (Western-dominated) IR literature outlined above, is not imagined to be a static or unmoving condition. Instead, it has always been used within scholarly or conceptual narratives as code for advancement and progress. Robert Gilpin (1987, 72) insists that ‘the international economic order … could not flourish and reach its full development’ without a liberal hegemonic power such as the US or UK. Potential hegemons such as the Soviet Union, he explains, would undo such progress through ‘the imposition of political and economic restrictions’. EH Carr’s criticisms of Western claims to international order intersected with assertions of how it advanced, rather than merely sustained, the global condition. Aside from ‘equal security to all’, he noted, British ascendancy gave rise to a universal currency, acceptance of free trade and a common language. The fate of each of these developments, and by extension the cultivation of ‘a world society’, he argued, was threatened by new challengers (Carr 1939, 213). Progress has been most commonly understood in the West as a product of Enlightenment thought, manifest in material advances in science and technology as a ‘standard of civilization’. 3 This enabled a division of the world into a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian and savage’ non-West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 22–98). As progress became an explanation of how history itself unfolds, a storyline emerged describing a linear trajectory from ancient Greece to modern Europe in which progress was understood as self-generating through characteristics internal to the West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 36–98), including those of liberal capitalism. The West was seen as ‘a distinctive political order— a “civic union”’ and as having ‘a distinctive political logic’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 1993, 18), in line with portraying the ‘democratic world [as] America’s greatest accomplishment’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 1). Though not necessarily directly visible, the underlying ‘wisdom’ or logical dimension of this narrative persists today through notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 123). More explicitly, when referring to post-1945 history, the growth of US global influence is depicted as having ‘helped usher in a new period of modernization and progress for many parts of the world’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 4). While comparisons between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ are less acceptable in modern parlance, the ‘status quo’ is still narrated as a route towards progress and development. The goal of wealth creation in particular is set within a framework of global governance defined by Western conceptions of democracy, human rights and capitalist reforms. ‘As in the past’, observe Bowden and Seabrooke (2006, 3f), ‘the workings of markets continue to be thought of as having a “civilising” effect on society; both internally amongst its members and in external relations with other societies’. In this ‘socialization-to-liberalorder-view’ (Bukovansky 2016, 96), emerging markets are paternalistically depicted as moving towards a brighter future, via the ideal of economic convergence with the more developed West. For example, Mandelbaum (1997) suggests that a ‘useful way to think of Russia and China is as analogous to unruly adolescents’ in the context of their post-Cold-War development. This is coupled with expectations of political convergence and thinking in terms of the ‘liberal theory of history’ (Nymalm 2013) and understandings of the relationship between capitalism and modernity which have arguably become a Western-centric hegemonic view. Argues Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2008, 1), ‘ideas of convergence upon the model of Anglo-American capitalism and liberal democracy are continuously rehearsed in mainstream media, as if the “rise of the rest” is supposed to follow in the footsteps of the rise of the West’. Failed expectations on convergence may in turn intensify a threat discourse of the ‘rising other’ (Nymalm 2017) and ‘revisionism’ they bring.4 For instance, Jaschob et al. (2017) deny any normative connotation in their conceptualization of revisionism, as ‘not all rules and norms are just, and not all existing international orders are better than potential alternatives’. Yet, they motivate their studies with ‘the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question of why rising powers should want to challenge an established international order that facilitated their extraordinary growth’ (Jaschob et al. 2017, 10). In other words, the order is ‘good’ because it enabled the rise of new powers. Historical IR debates over revisionist and status quo actors and behaviours have evolved over time, but within the controlled and restrictive parameters of conceptual IR narratives. As a result, the concepts themselves have operated not as neutral descriptors, but as powerful narratives of morality and progress with particular characters and plotlines. The effect has been to leave these scholarly concepts devoid of much analytical value, operating more as rhetorical tools to reinforce misleadingly binary conceptions of a Western Self versus a non-Western Other, within unduly selective and essentially predetermined stories of world order and the sources of its vulnerabilities. More than this, by endorsing divisions of a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian’ rest, they have worked to promote suspicions and tensions in the international realm. As John Hobson (2012, 185–187) puts it, models like the HST ‘explicitly justif[y] Western imperialism in the past, as well as in effect advocating a neocivilizing mission in the present’.

#### Representations of nuclear war as catastrophic event authorizes limitless violence and genocide against indigenous people

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Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of "strategy" changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of "nuclear testing" since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945? As of 1991, 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth." The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (715 times), France (192times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times)." The primary targets of warfare ("test site" to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times)." Moreover, although I focus primarily on "nuclear tests" in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of "intensive exploitation," "low intensity intervention," or the "nullification of the sovereignty" in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the "unthinkable" single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the "real" of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth's Nuclear Playground, which extensively covers the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . . were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself. Although Firth's book is definitely a remarkablde study of the history of "nuclear testing" in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the "nuclear explosions" and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject ("we") is located higher than the "real" of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the "real" of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

#### Their fantasies of extinction scenarios infinitely defer a meaningful reckoning with settler colonialism

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In this way, these settler-colonial narratives of extinction begin as a contemplation of endings and end as a way for settlers to persist. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, the native must be invoked and disavowed, and ultimately absorbed into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing true belonging and the possibility of an authentic future in place. Veracini’s description of the settler-colonial historical imagination thus applies, in modified but no less appropriate form, to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include the perception of an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentarism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: it is a fantasy of extinction that tips over into its opposite and becomes a method of symbolic preservation, a technique for delaying the end, for living on in the contemplation of death.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – the hope that, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living. In this way, they make their own redemption, an extinction that is an act of self-preservation, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

#### The settler colonial project requires the disappearance or assimilation of the Native, who produces Settler anxieties that confound national belonging – this is an ongoing genocide that also exists in premature moves to reconciliation and the desire to not have to deal with the Indian problem anymore.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Recently in a symposium on the significance of Liberal Arts education in the United States, Eve presented an argument that **Liberal** **Arts education has historically excluded any attention to or analysis of settler colonialism.** **This, Eve posited, makes Liberal Arts education complicit in the project of settler colonialism and, more so, has rendered the truer project of Liberal Arts education something like trying to make the settler indigenous to the land he occupies.** The attendees were titillated by this idea, nodding and murmuring in approval and it was then that Eve realized that she was trying to say something incommensurable with what they expected her to say. She was completely misunderstood. **Many in the audience heard this observation: that the work of Liberal Arts education is in part to teach settlers to be indigenous, as something admirable, worthwhile, something wholesome, not as a problematic point of evidence about the reach of the settler colonial erasure.** Philip Deloria (1998) explores how and why the settler wants to be made indigenous, even if only through disguise, or other forms of playing Indian. Playing Indian is a powerful U.S. pastime, from the Boston Tea Party, to fraternal organizations, to new age trends, to even those aforementioned Native print underwear. Deloria maintains that, “From the colonial period to the present, the Indian has skulked in and out of the most important stories various Americans have told about themselves” (p. 5). The indeterminacy of American identities stems, in part, from the nation’s inability to deal with Indian people. Americans wanted to feel a natural affinity with the continent, and it was Indians who could teach them such aboriginal closeness. Yet, in order to control the landscape they had to destroy the original inhabitants. (Deloria, 1998, p.5) L. Frank Baum (author of The Wizard of Oz) famously asserted in 1890 that the safety of white settlers was only guaranteed by the “total annihilation of the few remaining Indians” (as quoted in Hastings, 2007). D.H. Lawrence, reading James Fenimore Cooper (discussed at length later in this article), Nathaniel Hawthorne, Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, Henry David Thoreau, Herman Melville, Walt Whitman and others for his Studies in Classic American Literature (1924), describes Americans’ fascination with Indigeneity as one of simultaneous desire and repulsion (Deloria, 1998). **“No place,” Lawrence observed, “exerts its full influence upon a newcomer until the old inhabitant is dead or absorbed.”** Lawrence argued that in order to meet the “demon of the continent” head on and this finalize the “unexpressed spirit of America,” white Americans needed either to destroy Indians of assimilate them into a white American world...both aimed at making Indians vanish from the landscape. (Lawrence, as quoted in Deloria, 1998, p. 4). Everything within a settler colonial society strains to destroy or assimilate the Native in order to disappear them from the land - this is how a society can have multiple simultaneous and conflicting messages about Indigenous peoples, such as all Indians are dead, located in faraway reservations, that contemporary Indigenous people are less indigenous than prior generations, and that all Americans are a “little bit Indian.” These desires to erase - to let time do its thing and wait for the older form of living to die out, or to even help speed things along (euthanize) because the death of pre-modern ways of life is thought to be inevitable - these are all desires for another kind of resolve to the colonial situation, resolved through the absolute and total destruction or assimilation of original inhabitants. Numerous scholars have observed that **Indigeneity prompts multiple forms of settler anxiety, even if only because the presence of Indigenous peoples - who make a priori claims to land and ways of being - is a constant reminder that the settler colonial project is incomplete** (Fanon, 1963; Vine Deloria, 1988; Grande, 2004; Bruyneel, 2007). The easy adoption of decolonization as a metaphor (and nothing else) is a form of this anxiety, because it is a premature attempt at reconciliation. The absorption of decolonization by settler social justice frameworks is one way the settler, disturbed by her own settler status, tries to escape or contain the unbearable searchlight of complicity, of having harmed others just by being one’s self. The desire to reconcile is just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian) problem anymore.

#### The alternative is an incommensurable project of decolonization that necessitates the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the global imperial metropole – this is a complete disavowal of settler futurity that refuses to be punctuated by narratives of reconciliation.

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**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

## 1NC -- T -- Medicine

#### Interp -- Vaccines are not medicines

Vecchio 7/22 (Christopher Vecchio, [CFA, Senior Strategist,], 7-22-2021, “Delta Variant Concerns Won't Cripple Markets, US Economy“, DailyFX, accessed: 8-9-2021, https://www.dailyfx.com/forex/video/daily\_news\_report/2021/07/22/market-minutes-delta-variant-concerns-wont-cripple-markets-us-economy.html) ajs

Let’s stick to the facts. The COVID-19 vaccines are not medicines, which by definition “treat or cure diseases.” Vaccines “help prevent diseases,” an important distinction. Why does this matter? Because data coming out of some of the world’s developed economies with high adult vaccination rates suggest that the vaccines are working as intended: tail-risks have been reduced, with hospitalizations and deaths falling relative to the recent spike in infections (which have been occurring primarily among the unvaccinated at this point). Put another way, vaccines are like a Kevlar vest for the immune system; while they don’t make you bulletproof, they dramatically increase the odds of surviving an adverse event.

#### Prefer our interp –

#### 1] Precision – Our definition is most precise which is the biggest internal link to predictability - anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution which is the only stasis point we know before the round.

#### 2] Predictable limits - their interp includes affs that deal with intellectual property protections beyond medicines which justifies thousands of new affs based on the expansive literature base surrounding the multitude of applications of IP law – music, literature, fine art, software, non-pharmaceutical corporate trade secrets and patents, trademarked logos, etc. which explodes neg research burdens and makes it impossible to develop stable generics that are the backbone of neg prep on any topic

#### 3] Ground – their interpretation makes it impossible for neg teams to access stable generic ground – we can’t ready any CPs, DAs, or Ks that apply to pharmaceutical IP law which includes virtually everything read on this topic – Innovation DA, Health Diplomacy DA, Compulsory Licensing CP, Waiver CP, most links to the cap K, etc., not even generic caseturns apply to affs like this one which proves abuse

#### TVA solves all your offense – read an aff about malaria drugs rather than vaccines

#### Paradigm Issues –

#### 1] T is DTD – A] their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start B] DTA is incoherent because we indict their advocacy

#### 2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them

#### 3] Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] only our interp sets norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention C] reasonability causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### 4] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] discourages checking real abuse C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

## 1NC -- Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Linear Futurism DA – cross apply Dalley - voting for util is a mobilization of settler fantasies because of settlers’ drive to prioritize their own extinction and death as leavel to that of indigenous peoples. They reify a TEMPORAL NARRATIVE that uses doomsday rhetoric to bracket out indigenous people as relics of the past and normalize whiteness as equivalent to humanity —this instills a LINEAR FUTURISM that absolves us of responsibility for settler colonialism

#### Even if pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable it’s a question of whose pleasure and whose pain are maximized – utilitarianism justifies things like colonization and slavery because the suffering of black and indigenous people can be outweighed by the pleasure of the white majority

#### The Bostrom argument falls apart when you consider probability, reducing existential risk doesn’t do the same thing as preventing 0.1% of ext

### 1NC -- Squo Solves Malaria

#### Squo solves malaria

Pinker 18—Johnstone Family Professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University [Steven, February 2018, *Enlightment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress*, Chapter 6: Health, Viking, Accessed through the Wake Forest Library] AMarb

Even diseases that are not obliterated are being decimated. Between 2000 and 2015, the number of deaths from malaria (which in the past killed half the people who had ever lived) fell by 60 percent. The World Health Organization has adopted a plan to reduce the rate by another 90 percent by 2030, and to eliminate it from thirty-five of the ninety-seven countries in which it is endemic today (just as it was eliminated from the United States, where it had been endemic until 1951).11 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation has adopted the goal of eradicating it altogether.12 As we saw in chapter 5, in the 1990s HIV/AIDS in Africa was a setback for humanity’s progress in lengthening life spans. But the tide turned in the next decade, and the global death rate for children was cut in half, emboldening the UN to agree in 2016 to a plan to end the AIDS epidemic (though not necessarily to eradicate the virus) by 2030.13 Figure 6-1 shows that between 2000 and 2013 the world also saw massive reductions in the number of children dying from the five most lethal infectious diseases. In all, the control of infectious disease since 1990 has saved the lives of more than a hundred million children.14

### 1NC -- No ! -- Africa War

#### They haven’t isolated the internal link between African civil wars and draw in – the Hicks evidence is contextual to great power competition in Africa not civil wars

#### Host of African wars means no impact, or it’s inevitable.

**Dörrie 15** These Are the Wars That Will Rage in Africa in 2015 Peter Dörrie; Reporting on development, resources, international politics and security in Africa Civil wars, insurgencies and political standoffs will shape the continent on Dec 29, 2014 https://medium.com/war-is-boring/these-are-the-wars-that-will-rage-in-africa-in-2015-3c3e4aa84e16♥Tina

From the civil wars in South Sudan and Central African Republic, to insurgencies in the Sahel and Nigeria and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, Africa’s worst crises drag on … and will probably continue to do so through 2015. South Sudan’s civil war is one year old and still going strong. Neither Pres. Salva Kiir nor his challenger Riek Machar have any incentive to stop fighting, at least not until the next rainy season makes military maneuvers impractical—five months from now. During the rainy season, the possibility exists for a peace treaty. In theory. But in practice, this will only happen if one or both sides suffers a major military defeat or suffers serious international sanctions. Neither is likely. We hope we’re wrong about this, but our guess is that South Sudan’s civil war will see its second anniversary. Of course, the war in South Sudan has its roots in the country’s incredibly violent recent history—in particular, its secession from Sudan. The South’s northern neighbor may have lost a huge chunk of its territory when the South seceded, but its main internal conflicts continued. The most prominent of those, the civil war in Darfur, has slipped from the headlines in recent years, but in fact it’s as bad as ever. The same goes for the genocidal campaign that the regime in Khartoum is perpetrating against the people of the Nuba Mountains. And several other smaller conflicts are simmering There’s little indication that any of this will change in 2015. If it does, the impetus will likely be regime change. President Omar Al Bashir’s throne has looked shakier than ever over the last two years, with major demonstrations challenging his rule in the capital. As now-former heads of states from Tunisia’s Ben Ali to Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré can attest, its hard hanging on to power indefinitely. Like in Darfur, the conflict in Central African Republic also lost some of its media appeal in 2014. Peacekeeping forces have regained a measure of control in parts of the country, although the caretaker government of Pres. Catherine Samba-Panza is still borderline powerless. With France shrinking its military contribution in CAR and rebels and militias still in control of much of the countryside—as well as parts of the capital—the country is looking at an uneasy and at times violent stalemate. Above—Nigerian Mobile Police officers and their armored vehicle. At top—Tuareg milita in Mali. Photos via Wikipedia Boko Haram is worse than ever If there was anything less worthwhile in 2014 than believing in the longevity of South Sudan’s peace treaties, it was listening to the Nigerian military’s frequent announcements that it was just about to defeat the Boko Haram insurgency. Yes, the military scored some victories here and there, but in general Boko Haram is as strong as it ever was. More people died in the conflict in 2014 than in any previous year. And while the Nigerian government throws more and more troops and money at the problem, this is unlikely to end the crisis any time soon. There’s some hope that once this year’s hotly contested presidential elections are over, the political class will get its act together and sort out the insurgency in the north as well as some of Nigeria’s other pressing problems. But that’s a tenuous hope at best—especially since Boko Haram was, early on, a useful pawn in Nigeria’s great political chess game. By now the group has fractured and evolved beyond the control of the political masterminds who nurtured its growth. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups are still active in the Sahel, especially in northern Mali. While the big terror attack that we predicted fortunately didn’t take place in 2014, the risk of a large-scale terrorist operation—comparable to the attack on the In Amenas natural gas facility in 2013—remains all too real. The conflict between secessionist Tuareg rebels and the Malian government likewise continues. At the moment the country is holding together mostly thanks to U.N. and French forces and some determined diplomacy. Outside pressure will likely continue to suppress large-scale conflict, but the potential remains for hostilities between the Tuareg and the army. Meanwhile in Libya, there’s little doubt that the violent standoff will continue between secular forces loyal to Gen. Khalifa Haftar and Islamist militias. Burundian soldiers. Photo via Wikipedia Elections as a risk factor All these conflicts have one thing in common—they’re all well underway. But what new conflicts could emerge in 2015? It will be an interesting year, because many conflict-prone countries have important elections on the calendar. Nigeria, for one. Also Ivory Coast, where the last presidential election reignited a dormant civil war. In West Africa, the tiny country of Togo has already seen huge demonstrations against the continued rule of long-time president Faure Gnassingbé, who is running for re-election in 2015. Togo could potentially go the way of Burkina Faso, where an attempt by Pres. Blaise Compaoré to abolish constitutional term limits led to his violent ouster. On the other side of the continent, Burundi—a fragile country prone to civil war—will also hold elections. Honorable mentions include the ongoing conflicts in Democratic Republic of the Congo, the ramifications in Cameroon of the Boko Haram insurgency and CAR’s civil war, Egypt’s and Tunisia’s fighting with domestic terrorist groups or the Western Sahara conflict. Plus the situations in Somalia, northeastern Kenya and the potential for war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 2015 could be a violent year for Africa.

### 1NC -- Heg Bad

#### Multipolarity is emerging now – *decentering* US-lead over international order is try-or-die for global cooperation on existential threats and averting great power war – the [aff/neg] can only breathe life into a failed strategy

Mazarr 17 (Michael J, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Associate Director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program at the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center, “The Once and Future Order What Comes After Hegemony?,” Jan/Feb, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/once-and-future-order>)

MIX IT UP International orders tend to rest on two pillars: the balance of power and prestige among the leading members and some degree of shared values. Both of these pillars look shaky today. For many years, U.S. grand strategy has been based on the idea that the unitary U.S.-led order reflected universal values, was easy to join, and exercised a gravitational pull on other countries. Those assumptions do not hold as strongly as they once did. If Washington hopes to sustain an international system that can help avoid conflict, raise prosperity, and promote liberal values, it will have to embrace a more diverse order—one that operates in different ways for different countries and regions and on different issues. The United States will be tempted to resist such a change and to double down on the existing liberal order by following the Cold War playbook: rallying democracies and punishing norm breakers. But such a narrow order would create more embittered outcasts and thus imperil the most fundamental objective of any global order: keeping the peace among great powers. Dividing the world into defenders and opponents of a shared order is also likely to be less feasible than in the past. China’s role in the global economy and its standing as a regional power mean that it cannot be isolated in the way the Soviet Union was. Many of today’s rising powers, moreover, have preferences that are too diverse to gather into either a U.S.-led system or a bloc opposed to it. Should China or Russia adopt a significantly more aggressive stance, the United States may find it necessary to focus primarily on containing it and hunker down into a narrow, U.S.-led liberal order. But doing so should remain a last resort. During the Cold War, the central challenge of world politics was to contain—and eventually transform—a single power opposed to the main world order. Today the aim is very different: to prevent war and encourage cooperation among a fractious group of countries. An order that is inclusive and shared will meet that challenge better than one that is narrow, aggressive, and dominated by Washington. The United States would therefore be better off trying to develop several different yet overlapping forms of order: universal and major-power-centric, global and regional, political and economic, liberal and realist. Washington already does this, to an extent. But the tendency in U.S. strategy, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been to pursue a homogeneous liberal order that all states must join in roughly the same way and that pushes its liberal values on every front. The United States would gain more traction if it consciously embraced a more mixed order and accepted some of the difficult compromises that came with it. The first element of such a mixed order would be a forum for regular dialogue among the system’s leading members. At a time when rivalries are growing and many leading states are eager to have a larger voice in international institutions, the world needs a better way to coordinate interests among the system’s major powers—not just China and Russia but also Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, and Japan, among others. A more inclusive UN Security Council combined with the G-20 and various regional and informal conferences would help find areas where major powers can cooperate and smooth over differences among them. This part of the new order would primarily focus on securing the goals laid down in the UN Charter, especially its prohibition on territorial aggression. It would also concentrate on areas where major-power interests overlap, such as fighting climate change, terrorism, and infectious diseases.

#### Liberal hegemony is obsolete – only de-centering US leadership can resolve next-gen prolif and planetary destruction

Sachs 16 (Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor of Sustainable Development and Professor of Health Policy and Management at Columbia University, is Director of Columbia’s Center for Sustainable Development and of the UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, “Learning to Love a Multipolar World,” 12/29, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/multipolar-world-faces-american-resistance-by-jeffrey-d-sachs-2016-12)

NEW YORK – American foreign policy is at a crossroads. The United States has been an expanding power since its start in 1789. It battled its way across North America in the nineteenth century and gained global dominance in the second half of the twentieth. But now, facing China’s rise, India’s dynamism, Africa’s soaring populations and economic stirrings, Russia’s refusal to bend to its will, its own inability to control events in the Middle East, and Latin America’s determination to be free of its de facto hegemony, US power has reached its limits. One path for the US is global cooperation. The other is a burst of militarism in response to frustrated ambitions. The future of the US, and of the world, hangs on this choice. Global cooperation is doubly vital. Only cooperation can deliver peace and the escape from a useless, dangerous, and ultimately bankrupting new arms race, this time including cyber-weapons, space weapons, and next-generation nuclear weapons. And only cooperation can enable humanity to face up to urgent planetary challenges, including the destruction of biodiversity, the poisoning of the oceans, and the threat posed by global warming to the world’s food supply, vast drylands, and heavily populated coastal regions. Yet global cooperation means the willingness to reach agreements with other countries, not simply to make unilateral demands of them. And the US is in the habit of making demands, not making compromises. When a state feels destined to rule – as with ancient Rome, the Chinese “Middle Kingdom” centuries ago, the British Empire from 1750 to 1950, and the US since World War II – compromise is hardly a part of its political vocabulary. As former US President George W. Bush succinctly put it, “You’re either with us or against us.”

#### Hegemony is a dead-end strategy --- creates security dilemmas and interrupts cooperation necessary to solve emerging threats

Sachs 18 --- Prof @ Columbia, PhD in economics from Harvard, (Jeffrey Sachs, American economist, public policy analyst, and former director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, where he holds the title of University Professor, the highest rank Columbia bestows on its faculty, “A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism,” google books)

The exceptionalists believe that, with enough investments, the United States can maintain its military dominance in Asia. The realists, for their part, feel that an arms race with China and with Russia is inevitable, no matter what the eventual outcome. They point to the bad behavior of China and Russia as evidence that diplomacy is very unlikely to succeed. China is busy expanding its military presence in the South China Sea. Russia is hacking U.S. politics, bombing Aleppo, and destabilizing Ukraine. How could the United States possibly trust those countries? As an internationalist, I say, “Not so fast.” China’s and Russia’s actions look aggressive from our point of view, but from the vantage points of China and Russia they are viewed as responses to U.S. actions. Recall the security dilemma—what looks like an offensive action to us may be a state’s attempt to defend itself. Many Chinese strategists plausibly believe that the United States will try to stifle China’s future economic growth and note that the United States outspends China on the military by more than two to one ($596 billion to $215 billion, in 2015), while deploying military bases in more than seventy countries, compared with China’s sole foreign base in Djibouti. Considered through this lens, China hardly seems like the aggressor. Russian strategists similarly argue that the United States, not Russia, provoked the deterioration of relations in recent years. They point to U.S. meddling in Russia’s internal politics going back many years and, perhaps even more provocatively, to U.S. meddling in Ukraine as well. Russian strategists also strongly object to the U.S. attempts to make Ukraine a member of NATO—which would bring the U.S.-led military alliance right up to Russia’s border—and to NATO’s deployment of missile defense systems in Eastern Europe. Russia asserts that such missile defenses are designed to weaken Russian retaliation against U.S. aggression. (The new missile deployments follow America’s unilateral withdrawal in 2002 from the U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.) President John F. Kennedy eloquently framed the debate between the realists and the internationalists (of which he was one) in a commencement speech at American University in 1963: Today the expenditure of billions of dollars every year on weapons acquired for the purpose of making sure we never need them is essential to the keeping of peace. But surely the acquisition of such idle stockpiles—which can only destroy and never create —is not the only, much less the most efficient, means of assuring peace. I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary, rational end of rational men. I realize the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war, and frequently the words of the pursuers fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.5 Kennedy believed that the Cold War could be overcome, and the arms race halted and eventually reversed, through rational, mutually beneficial agreements.6 In the same address, he offered this internationalist vision: So let us not be blind to our differences, but let us also direct attention to our common interests and the means by which those differences can be resolved. And if we cannot end now our differences, at least we can help make the world safe for diversity. For in the final analysis, our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s futures. And we are all mortal. This vision underpinned Kennedy’s successful drive to negotiate the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which in turn led to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. Both treaties are an expression of the hopes and aspirations of internationalism: that a dangerous arms race can be slowed, and eventually reversed, through diplomacy and cooperation. There is one more fundamental point to make about cooperation, demonstrated by game theory, tested in practice, and crucial for successful diplomacy. Cooperation is not blind trust, and it should not be naïve or unconditional. Internationalists like myself have no doubt that evil exists, and that Hitler bullied and duped the West with no intention other than war and conquest. When I speak about the gains from cooperation, it is on the basis of two beliefs: that the gains are large and mutual; and that if cooperation in fact breaks down, a country can still revert to the “realist” position. In game theory, one such strategy of conditional cooperation is called Tit-for-Tat (TFT). The TFT strategy is to be cooperative at the start, but if the other side reneges, to revert to a tougher position and an arms race if necessary. Yet to sustain cooperation it’s also very important not to be doctrinaire or to prejudge one’s counterparts. Most importantly, it’s vital not to mistake the defensive actions of those counterparts as aggression, or to assume that counterparts are incapable of cooperation. Both assumptions are likely to be dangerous and wrong, leading to a self-fulfilling arms race or worse. Table 1.1 offers a schematic account of the three main foreign policy positions. As I summarize in the table, American exceptionalists believe in the dominance of American military power, the limits of cooperation, and the evil intentions of America’s adversaries. Realists believe that U.S. military strength is needed because America’s competitors will almost inevitably challenge American interests. Internationalists believe that humanity faces shared urgent challenges and vulnerabilities that make global cooperation necessary and achievable through rational diplomacy backed by threats if cooperation fails. American exceptionalism, I will argue throughout this book, is passé, a throwback to the years after World War II when the United States dominated the world economy and was far ahead of the rest of the world in military and civilian technology. Times are very different now. The U.S. economy is actually smaller than China’s when both are measured by a common set of international prices. It is still true today that U.S. military power is vast, with an unrivaled archipelago of military bases in dozens of countries. But we have seen repeatedly that U.S. firepower cannot enforce peace on the ground, much less the political outcomes sought by the United States. Another fundamental change from the early postwar years is the much greater need for global cooperation regarding global warming, emerging diseases, and other environmental threats. If the United States and China come to view each other as military competitors, they are far less likely to view each other as partners in environmental sustainability. Our mind-set—conflict or cooperation—will shape not only our arms spending but also our chances to control global warming, fight newly emerging diseases, or invest together in new science and technology. A third fundamental change is that the world now has the established institutional machinery to sustain global cooperation, thanks to more than seventy years of the United Nations and its various component institutions. It would be especially foolhardy and indeed reckless for the United States to turn its back on these global institutions—as indeed it is already starting to do, and as we’ll consider further in chapter 15. To make the world safe in the face of global warming and ensure the best life possible not just for Americans but for all the inhabitants of this small planet, we must reconsider long-held assumptions. American exceptionalism has reached a double dead end. It’s no longer feasible, because the United States is no longer the dominant power that the exceptionalists imagine, and so it no longer works for guiding effective foreign policy—and hasn’t for a while. Yes, the United States may have “won” the Cold War (in the exceptionalist telling), but it lost the Vietnam War and made a mess of wars and CIA adventurism in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and other places where exceptionalism crashed against on-the-ground realities. A continuation of American exceptionalism, whether in its traditional forms or in Trump’s America First version, would spell further dangers and damage for the United States and for the world. If we’re smart, we can find a safe position for the United States without the claim of global dominance. Yet to do so we must reconsider a tenet that’s been central to American identity for centuries —as we’ll see in the next chapter.

### 1NC -- Threat Construction

#### **The China threat is constructed by biased Western studies that use one-sided interpretations of geopolitics to twist evidence in service of Washington’s national security agenda**

Hirono & Suzuki 14 (Miwa & Shogo, senior research fellow @ China Policy Institute “Why Do We Need ‘Myth-Busting’ in the Study of Sino–African Relations?,” *Journal of Contemporary China*, Volume 23, Issue 87) cut- MS

For Western scholars, studies of China's international relations are generally still in the service of the national security agenda of the Western policy community. Historically, the study of the non-West has been closely linked to Western government policies. Long before the term ‘area studies’ came into existence in the United States (US) in the 1950s, there was a notion that scholarship should serve the political goals of the elite. ‘Oriental studies’ was recognized as a discipline in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, due to Western colonialists' needs to control non-Western people.7 For example, Sir William Jones, a British legal scholar, founded the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1784, and also worked as an official of the British East India Company; he felt absolutely no conflict of interest in serving imperialism and set the pattern which later Orientalists and area studies experts emulated.8 In addition to those who engaged in commercial activities, Christian missionaries laid the foundation for the development of Orientalism, with a belief that the West should help the non-West adopt ‘superior’ Western civilization.9 Edward Said rightly states that the purpose of Orientalism was ‘to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, even incorporate, what is a manifestly different world’.10 Later, social anthropologists joined the Orientalists by bringing more in-depth understanding of the customs and lifestyles of the colonized, in order to aid colonial administrators and missionaries.11 However, it was only after World War II (WWII) that area studies really flourished. One of the earliest and best known examples of this genre of scholarship was The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture, written by American anthropologist Ruth Benedict in 1946. This was the product of Benedict's involvement with the US Office of War Information during WWII.12 As the Cold War and the subsequent standoff between the US and the Soviet Union became entrenched in the 1950s, area studies served to fulfill the West's strategic need to understand the enemy or processes by which states hostile to Western interests could be brought into the so-called ‘free world’. Research on Asia, particularly China and Japan, was a major beneficiary of this development. As Bruce Cummings states: Japan got a favored placement as a success story of development, and China got obsessive attention as a pathological example of abortive development. The key processes were things like modernization, or what was for many years called ‘political development’ toward the explicit or implicit goal of liberal democracy.13 Cummings also documents various area studies departments' close working relations with US government agencies in the early Cold War period, particularly their role in providing a steady source of new recruits and specialist consultants: ‘For those scholars studying potential enemy countries, either they consulted with the government or they risked being investigated by the FBI; working for the CIA thus legitimized academics and fended off J. Edgar Hoover’.14 While the Cold War has officially ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there still remains ample state demand for the study of China, partly because of the ‘concern’ of Western elites that China is the only strategically competitive peer that could pose a real threat to the West's power and dominance. China is the last remaining communist great power, and its antipathy to liberal democratic governance, coupled with its steady military build-up, has made it a latent ‘threat’ to Western interests. Therefore, the research agenda of Chinese foreign policy in Africa continues to be influenced by this national interest. For example, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published five reports between 2008 and 2009 on China's activities in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia, showing heightened US interests and anxieties in this field.15 Furthermore, China is the only non-African country to feature in the CRS's reports on Africa. Studies of the US or Europe in Africa are conspicuously absent.16 Scholars and analysts have also jumped on this policy bandwagon, and published a series of works that confirm China's ‘threat’ in Africa. Authors of these works voice their disquiet that the Chinese government is trying to sabotage Western attempts to introduce ‘good governance’ (such as liberal democratic governance or improved transparency) by propagating its model of ‘authoritarian capitalism’. Many also warn darkly that an important part of China's objectives in Africa is to challenge US global hegemony.17 China's non-conditional aid—denounced as ‘rogue aid’ by some critics—and trade-oriented relations with ‘rogue states’ such as Sudan and Zimbabwe are frequently criticized, because they undermine attempts to introduce democracy to the region, provide a lifeline for autocratic rulers, and encourage and exacerbate human rights abuses by them.18 In the words of Gemot Pehnelt, ‘Chinese engagement enables African governments to reject demands made by the IMF, the World Bank and other donors for enhancing transparency, implementing anti-corruption strategies, and furthering their democratization efforts’.19 China's priority is, these scholars argue, simply to secure energy resources rather than to improve human rights conditions in those states.20 Chinese firms (often bundled together under the somewhat misleading label of ‘China’ or ‘China Inc.’) are also accused of neocolonial behavior, such as exploiting African workers, flooding the African market with cheap Chinese consumer goods and ruining the local economy, or stripping African states of their resources.21 It is, of course, necessary to acknowledge that not all works portray China as a threat, as evidenced from the ‘myth-busting’ literature. Brautigam demonstrates that much of China's allegedly pernicious political influence is greatly exaggerated, and that its aid can, at times, actually deliver real benefits to the recipient states.22 China's aid to authoritarian leaders has not been as vast as is often claimed, and is not as susceptible to being misused. With regard to weapons trade, Western corporations also engage in arms trade with rogue states (at times far more than the Chinese), making Western criticisms of Chinese weapons sales ring somewhat hollow—in fact, a recent study has concluded that the US ‘tends to transfer conventional arms to authoritarian regimes to a greater extent than does China, which in turn tends to export more to African democracies and regimes that generally respect human rights’.23 Studies on China's development activities in Africa have also found that Beijing's role in propping up isolated African autocrats is greatly exaggerated: there is, for instance, no concrete evidence of a systematic attempt to export China's development model of authoritarian capitalism, whose existence is highly debatable.24 African scholars such as Adekeye Adebajo have also pointed out that the US has provided ‘support for a cantankerous warlord's gallery’,25 which again reminds us that many governments support undemocratic regimes, provided that it is in accordance with their national interests. With regard to economic exploitation of African labor, Chinese enterprises are found to be neither better nor worse than many of their Western counterparts, and their buying up of African natural resources often pales into insignificance compared to Western purchases. Yet, it is important to note that even this type of literature is essentially an extension of the same question that dominates the Western policy community: does China's rise present a threat to Western interests in Africa? The starting point of their enquiry is the same as that of their respective governments' national security concerns. This close link between the academic and national security agendas in the West suggests that there is still a key governmental interest in understanding the Chinese ‘enemy’. In the latter half of the twentieth century, the core objective of US foreign policy was to combat communist regimes and advance liberalism and capitalism. After the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy has strived for the maintenance of US hegemony or, at least, US strategic superiority vis-à-vis China. Therefore, the US government has encouraged social scientists to study subjects that assist such policy purposes. This is demonstrated, for example, by the fact that state funding for Asia-related topics has been linked to government programs such as the National Security Education Act.26 In addition, since 2008, the US Department of Defense has provided a number of million-dollar-level Minerva Research Initiative funds to university-based social science research programs, focusing on ‘areas of strategic importance to US national security policy’.27 It has seven priority research topics, including science, technology and military transformation in China and developing states. China is the only country specifically mentioned in all seven priority research topics. This tendency of government funding policies fostering close links between academic and policymaking communities is replicated in other states as well. In the United Kingdom (UK), the Research Excellence Framework (REF) and Research Councils UK pay particular attention to the importance of ‘non-academic impact’,28 such as that on political decision making. This includes ‘fostering global economic performance, and specifically the economic competitiveness of the United Kingdom; increasing the effectiveness of public services and policy; enhancing quality of life, health and creative output’.29 According to this academic strategy, one of the most effective ways to make non-academic impact in area studies (as well as other academic disciplines, for that matter) would be to demonstrate their utility in achieving these goals set by the policy community. The prospect of a positive evaluation of research impact, which leads to increased state funding to universities, coupled with greater opportunities for applying for external funding, could serve to encourage research that addresses the interests of the policy elites. Nevertheless, Stephen Walt, Joseph Nye and Alexander George argue that the gap between scholars and policy community is ever growing.30 They claim that policymakers tend to ignore academic research because of its irrelevance to their day-to-day work of policymaking.31 While this gap may be the case for the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations since WWII in general, China-specific discussions have remained, as discussed above, closely related to the strategic interests of the state. When area studies falls into this trap of policy research, academic research tends to end up focusing on a predictable and stereotyped agendum that fit with national interests. This results in what Amitav Acharya calls a state of ‘entrapment’, which … occurs when scholars, after having offered consequential intellectual input at an early stage of policymaking …, remain beholden to the choices made by officials and thereby [become] unwilling or incapable of challenging officially sanctioned pathways and approaches for the fear of losing their access and influence.32 It is not our intention to claim that the close link between academia and policy community is necessarily problematic. However, what we need to be vigilant about is the tendency for policy needs to influence the academic research agenda in the study of Sino–African relations, rather than the other way around (i.e. academic research agenda influencing policy direction). Other options for academia include deliberately maintaining intellectual distance from the policy community, so that scholars can freely advance their research without being constrained by structural and political obstacles that the policy community faces. It is problematic that much of the scholarship on Sino–African relations remains focused on whether or not China is a threat: such a debate is influenced by and remains confined to Western governments' strategic interests, and could crowd out the intellectual space for alternative research topics. This is not to say that all literature that revolves around the China threat and ‘myth-busting’, necessarily seeks to inform Western policymakers and their interests.33 Particularly, scholars outside Western academic circles often do not have ties with Western policymakers and may regard the latter as antagonistic to African and/or Chinese interests. However, research on Sino–African relations undertaken by Chinese analysts has frequently been reactive to Western debates of Sino–African relations, which results in defensive essays refuting Western criticisms of the PRC's role in Africa.34 Ironically, this only serves to further entrench the ‘myth-busting’ narrative, irrespective of their intention to inform or not to inform Western policymakers. The close link between the national security agenda and the academic literature in the West can be also seen as a by-product of Western exceptionalism that remains prevalent in the discipline of IR. As a field of study which emerged in the West as a self-conscious academic discipline, Acharya and Barry Buzan argue, it is almost a truism to say that ‘the main ideas in this discipline are deeply rooted in the particularities and peculiarities of European history, the rise of the West to world power, and the imposition of its own political structure onto the rest of the world’.35 This cultural/geographical bias has often resulted in a somewhat one-sided interpretation of global order, in that Western dominance is seen as progressive and thus the only form of hegemony that matters historically and normatively. The rise of a non-Western state or non-Western hegemony is both poorly theorized and almost axiomatically seen as a threat. The in-built Eurocentric biases of IR theory have resulted in the European regional order being conceptualized as a product of something rational and liberal, as it ensured the survival of individual sovereign states and prevented the emergence of a (universal) empire.36

#### Transition wars only seem inevitable because their scholarship primes you to believe it – only a disinvestment from western narrative production by embracing the possibility of power transition solves.

Gries and Jing, 19

[Peter, Chair and Director of China Institute @ UManchester, Prof. Chinese Politics, studies the political psychology of international affairs, with a focus on China and the United States; and Yiming, assistant professor @ Institute of Psychology, Chinese Academy of Sciences: “Are the US and China fated to fight? How narratives of ‘power transition’ shape great power war or peace,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:4 (2019), 456-482, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1623170]//AD

Who cares? First, narrative power matters for war and peace. These studies contribute to a better theoretic understanding of when perceived power transitions will lead to conflict, and when they will not. Our experiments clearly reveal that perceptions of structural changes in great power relations are malleable, shaped by media-disseminated narratives, helping to account for the contingency of their effect on great power conflict. It is individual-level, intersubjective and pliable understandings of US–China relations, not the system-level, objective balance of power itself, that will determine war or peace. Second, situations matter. Our manipulation checks consistently revealed that exposure to different media narratives of US–China relations had a massive impact on intersubjective perceptions of the nature of the bilateral relationship. Narratives powerfully shape perceptions. Specifically, our experimental primes demonstrate the powerful role that the media play in shaping inter-nation feelings, intuitions and foreign policy preferences. Third, people matter too. Intergroup (mis)trust and emotions link the macro- and micro-levels, contributing to a better theoretic understanding of just how the system-level changes in the balance of power emphasized in Realist, PT and other structural IR theories have their effects on the individuals who actually make foreign policy. International systems do not act; people and groups of people act. It is individual American and Chinese politicians, military officers, and diplomats who will determine whether there is a great power conflict in the twenty-first century. Fourth, intuitions and emotions also matter. Given that human rationality is bounded, a better understanding of the role of human psychology in power transitions is vital. These studies suggest that intergroup mistrust and emotions like anger are likely mechanisms linking perceptions of the nature of US–China relations to the endorsement of tougher China policies. Intergroup emotions and intuitions thus link macro- and micro-level processes, providing a better understanding of exactly how structural changes in the balance of power actually shape foreign policy preferences, and ultimately policymaking, although that is beyond the scope of this study. Finally, individual differences matter as well. As psychologist Kurt Lewin (1935) famously argued over 80 years ago, most human attitudes and behaviours are the product of both the person and the situation. Pre-existing ideologies like nationalism, and personality characteristics like uncertainty avoidance, moderate the effects of narratives like CNN media interviews on intergroup anger and trust. Not all Americans are alike, but their differences shape their intergroup emotions and foreign policy preferences in systematic ways that can and should be studied and understood. In conclusion, great power conflict is not inevitable. Thucydides was right to allude to the psychology of fear to understand the contingency of power transitions. ‘Sparta chose war for reasons of identity,’ Ned Lebow and Dan Tompkins (2016) rightly argue, ‘not security.’ Intersubjective perceptions, intergroup (mis)trust and emotions, and personality characteristics can help us better understand both whether a perceived PT will lead to war, and how it would have its effect.