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#### Settler colonialism mobilizes temporality itself in service of the consummation of white settler sovereignty – this operates through liberal narratives of progressivism that rely upon a vanishing endpoint of a “better world” achieved through the completion of the project of settler modernity. Normative debate is structured by the imperative of forward motion that locates the plan as a transformative break with colonial society that relegates the backwardness of indigeneity to the past and envisions a settler utopia in its place.

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Time, decolonization and colonial completion Critical geographers use Foucault’s insights to unsettle modern understandings of space as a fixed environment in which politics takes place. Instead, they show that political projects construct, naturalize and respond to particular spatial understandings.30 In relation to Indigenous policy, critical analysts are quick to identify these political deployments of space. SuvendriniPerera, for example, shows that policy-makers represent remote Indigenous communities as ‘set apart from the body of the nation, and as the locus of unspeakable violence and abjection’.31 As part of the discourse of the Northern Territory Intervention, the metaphor of the distant frontier — or vulnerable centre — is pervasive. Remote Aboriginal communities prescribed for Intervention are para - digmatically referred to in media reports as ‘remote Aboriginal societies’, ‘this other Australia’, ‘the remote world’ and as ‘a distinct domain’.32 Unsettling dominant understandings of time is equally important. In his work ‘The End of the Passing Past’, Walters aims to ‘think about change in ways that refuse the obligation to side with or against continuity… and resist the temptations of progressivism and reductionism’.33 He draws on Bruno Latour’s examination of the modern temporal imaginary, and his denat - uralizing of modern political timelines: We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting.34 This interrogation is especially useful in relation to understanding settler colonialism and Indigenous policy-making. Barry Hindess, Elizabeth Povinelli and N. Sheehan, for example, reflect on Western temporal constructions of Aboriginality and indicate how these relate to liberal political agendas. Barry Hindess argues that liberalism tends to locate different cultures in its own past, even when they coexist with liberal societies in the present.35 Indigenous groups, in particular, are located prior to the transformative moment of sovereign agreement, which in turn is read as an indication of their incapacity to enter into this superior, rational political future. Norm Sheehan maintains that settler colonialism in Australia is deeply invested in these kinds of temporal logics: In contrast to previous colonial contexts which tended to focus on constructing difference based on inherent racial traits the antipodean designation as primitive defines this specific other as non-other. The antipodean aborigine is by definition from the origin of (all) mankind which positions this primitive as an earlier and therefore lesser version of European self.36 Elizabeth Povinelli briefly makes a similar point in her analysis of recent Australian Indigenous policy: [E]ven as liberalism came to accept its fate as a culture among other cultures it differentiated the tense and orientation of its cultural difference from other cultures. The West as a general idea would claim the future and claim the potentiality of individuals and assign the past and the constraint of individuals to others — or, it would recognize that these were the values of non-liberal cultures.37 She refers to these patterns of political temporal positioning as ‘technologies of temporality’. Drawing together the work of Walters, Hindess, Sheehan and Povinelli, it becomes apparent that colonialism does not just take place in time. It constructs narratives of time, in ways that create particular political relationships in the present, and attempts to move itself through time to a certain political future. In the remainder of this section, we compare the temporalities of post-colonial and settler-colonial political formations, and argue that both anchor themselves to some sort of transformative ‘endpoint’. This radical political break separates a problematic past from a completed future and, in settler-colonial societies, involves a strange assemblage of ideas about decolonization, revolution, full colonization and sovereign exchange. The term post-colonial implies ‘the notion of a movement be - yond’;38 ‘the “post” in “post-colonial” suggests “after” the demise of colonialism, it is imbued, quite apart from its user’s intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-temporality’.39 In a number of former colonies (both extractive, such as India, and settler, such as Algeria), the formal colonial project has indeed ended. The term postcolonial captures something about the complex political realities of these nation-states today. A dramatic, and often violent, moment of structural decolonization separates these state’s colonial pasts from their post-colonial presents. However, even in relation to those nations which have undergone such institutional transformations, scholars contest the use of the term. Ella Shohat suggests that it erases the ongoing structural imperialisms that persist: ‘How then does one negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a “post-colonial” whose “post” emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness?’40 Some scholars use the term neocolonialism to indicate political continuity, and to contest the understanding that critical post-colonial work seeks to put out minor spot-fires of inequality left by ‘real’ colonialism.41 If the temporal narrative of post-colonialism is problematic in relation to former extractive colonies, it is altogether inaccurate when applied to ongoing settler colonies such as Australia. Yet post-colonial scholarship has dominated international academic [T]he lack of historical specificity in the ‘post’ leads to a collaps - ing of diverse chronologies … It equates early independence won by settler colonial states, in which Europeans formed their new nation-states in non-European territories at the expense of Indigenous populations, with that of nationstates whose indigenous populations struggled for inde - pendence against Europe.42 Australia has not, and most probably will not, undergo the kind of institutional transfer of control to the Indigenous population that could justify the application of the term post-colonial. And yet it is quite common to see Australia identified as a post-colonial or decolo nizing nation in cultural studies, literary theory and policy analysis.43 One of the greatest contributions of the emerging field of settler-colonial studies is the fact that it provides clear conceptual tools to articulate exactly why it is that nations like Australia and Canada should be understood differently. However, it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of settlercolonial studies in Australian scholarship. Critical Indigenous the - orists are carrying on their own conversation regarding Australian colonial conditions, and have long contested the relevance of the term post-colonial. Irene Watson, for example, argues: I understand the contemporary colonial project as one that has continued unabated from the time of the landing and invasion by the British in 1788 … the Australian state retains a vested interest in keeping the violence going, and the inequalities and iniquities that are maintained against Aboriginal peoples for the purpose of maintaining the life and continuity of the state. A question the Australian state is yet to resolve is its own illegitimate foundation and transformation into an edifice deemed lawful. Within this unanswered questionable structure the Australian state parades as one which has obliterated the ‘founding violence’ of its ‘illegitimate origins’ and ‘repressed them into a timeless past’.44 Aileen Moreton-Robinson instead uses the term post-colonizing, capturing the ambiguous and shifting temporal technologies deployed in settler-colonial Australia. These new conceptual models have grown productively out of the object of our study: the postcolonizing world we inhabit. Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonization has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.45 While settler-colonial studies proceeds from a conceptual distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, Indigenous scholarship is based in the lived experiences of ongoing colonization.46 Settlercolonial studies would benefit from connecting to this existing academic conversation that runs parallel to and intersects with its own ideas in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to ongoing Indigenous contestation of colonial projects, and counters the tendency towards totalizing, structural accounts of settler colonialism. As Watson observes: Today our voices are still talking while the colonial project remains entrenched and questions concerning identity politics, and the ‘authentic native’ are constructed and answered by those who have power.47 Up to this point, we have been drawing together points made by other scholars. Settler colonialism has an ongoing, structural temporality, which is generally unacknowledged and contrasts with the linear colonialism–decolonization–post-colonialism narrative. However, we suggest that the application of a unidirectional, progressive temporality to the settler-colonial context is not just an analytical mistake, but a ‘technology of temporality’. This conception is taken up within the settler-colonial project in ways that work towards the consummation of settler sovereignty. The borrowed notion of a ‘radical break’ is variously located in settler colonialism’s past, present or future. By harnessing the decolonizing resonances of this concept of colonial transforma - tion, the settler-colonial project obscures the very different political effects of its own ‘vanishing endpoint’.48 What is this vanishing endpoint, which seems to lurk in all of our imaginations, our policy projects and our political debates? Instead of the moment of decolonization, it is the moment of full colonization — or rather, it is both, because in this imagined moment colonial relationships will dissolve themselves and settler authority will be naturalized. This transformative event is both an impossible colonial dream, premised on the disappearance of Indigenous political difference, and a concrete political project that justifies all manner of tactics in the present. But what are the political con - sequences of such a preoccupation? And do Indigenous participants in the colonial relationship seek the same kind of resolution and dissolution? Significantly, the Western colonial narrative of transformational change maps onto another Western imaginary — the moment of sovereign transformation encapsulated in the social contract. This is the moment that a group of people transition from collective social ‘status’ into individualized freedom and contractual person - hood.49 It is also the movement out of a constraining ‘history’ into an atemporal, rational present. As Hindess argues, liberalism con - signs its Indigenous contemporaries to its own past, and imagines this location in the past to be ‘a kind of moral and intellectual failure’, revealing the incapacity and disinclination to enter into a social contract and join the present.50 Therefore, the movement through time, via a radical transformative moment, is also the developmental movement from incapacity to capacity. An unstable but productive dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, Indigenous political difference-incapacity-status-injustice-lack of sovereignty, and on the other, colonial completion-capacitycontract-freedom-sovereign inclusion. These oppositions are separated by an image of a single, interchangeable and undefined threshold — the transformative event. This temporal narrative belongs to both progressive and conservative articulations of the settler-colonial future; the settler colonial endpoint is variously positioned as an inevitable global trend,51 a past achievement yet to be fully recognized,52 and a future goal for which Aboriginal people must prepare.53 As Povinelli notes, these conceptions are not only temporal, but also teleological: [T]hese tenses are in turn articulated to other discourses of time and event such as teleological discourses that apprehend events ‘as the realization of an already given end or telos and eschatological discourses that wait for ‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany ‘the end of history’ and ‘its reversal into eternity’.54 The transformative event is positioned as part of an inevitable and inescapable trajectory (although it may be consistently deferred or delayed). In this way, the eventual legitimacy and stability of the settler-colonial project is always-already assumed. Through this a priori assumption, settler colonialism is able to entrench and sustain itself on the basis of its eventual demise. The following section traces the appearance and temporal location of this settler-colonial end - point in recent Australian Indigenous policy phases.

#### Under American leadership outer space is a perpetual site of conquest and colonization – the latest iteration of the genocidal project of terra nullius aimed at the naturalization of settler sovereignty over the “untamed” and “unknown” geographies of space at the expense of indigenous life.

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(Zannah Mae Matson is a PhD student in Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Neil Nunn is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, 10-3-17, SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPIRE, AND THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHAT THE MAUNA KEA LAND DEFENDERS TEACH US ABOUT COLONIAL TOTALITY, Society and Space, <https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/>, JKS)

Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery… have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement… playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: … we believe in the word of our ancestors…they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth…and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the ‘final frontier’ is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past. This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

#### International order is a dogwhistle for a global governance paradigm of assimilation into Western values that over-represent themselves as progress, “the world”, and history itself imposed through the civilizing mission of war, intervention, and imperialism abroad.

Turner and Nymalm, 19

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The concept of an international order, or ‘status quo’, as it commonly appears throughout the two historic waves of (Western-dominated) IR literature outlined above, is not imagined to be a static or unmoving condition. Instead, it has always been used within scholarly or conceptual narratives as code for advancement and progress. Robert Gilpin (1987, 72) insists that ‘the international economic order … could not flourish and reach its full development’ without a liberal hegemonic power such as the US or UK. Potential hegemons such as the Soviet Union, he explains, would undo such progress through ‘the imposition of political and economic restrictions’. EH Carr’s criticisms of Western claims to international order intersected with assertions of how it advanced, rather than merely sustained, the global condition. Aside from ‘equal security to all’, he noted, British ascendancy gave rise to a universal currency, acceptance of free trade and a common language. The fate of each of these developments, and by extension the cultivation of ‘a world society’, he argued, was threatened by new challengers (Carr 1939, 213). Progress has been most commonly understood in the West as a product of Enlightenment thought, manifest in material advances in science and technology as a ‘standard of civilization’. 3 This enabled a division of the world into a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian and savage’ non-West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 22–98). As progress became an explanation of how history itself unfolds, a storyline emerged describing a linear trajectory from ancient Greece to modern Europe in which progress was understood as self-generating through characteristics internal to the West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 36–98), including those of liberal capitalism. The West was seen as ‘a distinctive political order— a “civic union”’ and as having ‘a distinctive political logic’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 1993, 18), in line with portraying the ‘democratic world [as] America’s greatest accomplishment’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 1). Though not necessarily directly visible, the underlying ‘wisdom’ or logical dimension of this narrative persists today through notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 123). More explicitly, when referring to post-1945 history, the growth of US global influence is depicted as having ‘helped usher in a new period of modernization and progress for many parts of the world’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 4). While comparisons between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ are less acceptable in modern parlance, the ‘status quo’ is still narrated as a route towards progress and development. The goal of wealth creation in particular is set within a framework of global governance defined by Western conceptions of democracy, human rights and capitalist reforms. ‘As in the past’, observe Bowden and Seabrooke (2006, 3f), ‘the workings of markets continue to be thought of as having a “civilising” effect on society; both internally amongst its members and in external relations with other societies’. In this ‘socialization-to-liberalorder-view’ (Bukovansky 2016, 96), emerging markets are paternalistically depicted as moving towards a brighter future, via the ideal of economic convergence with the more developed West. For example, Mandelbaum (1997) suggests that a ‘useful way to think of Russia and China is as analogous to unruly adolescents’ in the context of their post-Cold-War development. This is coupled with expectations of political convergence and thinking in terms of the ‘liberal theory of history’ (Nymalm 2013) and understandings of the relationship between capitalism and modernity which have arguably become a Western-centric hegemonic view. Argues Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2008, 1), ‘ideas of convergence upon the model of Anglo-American capitalism and liberal democracy are continuously rehearsed in mainstream media, as if the “rise of the rest” is supposed to follow in the footsteps of the rise of the West’. Failed expectations on convergence may in turn intensify a threat discourse of the ‘rising other’ (Nymalm 2017) and ‘revisionism’ they bring.4 For instance, Jaschob et al. (2017) deny any normative connotation in their conceptualization of revisionism, as ‘not all rules and norms are just, and not all existing international orders are better than potential alternatives’. Yet, they motivate their studies with ‘the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question of why rising powers should want to challenge an established international order that facilitated their extraordinary growth’ (Jaschob et al. 2017, 10). In other words, the order is ‘good’ because it enabled the rise of new powers. Historical IR debates over revisionist and status quo actors and behaviours have evolved over time, but within the controlled and restrictive parameters of conceptual IR narratives. As a result, the concepts themselves have operated not as neutral descriptors, but as powerful narratives of morality and progress with particular characters and plotlines. The effect has been to leave these scholarly concepts devoid of much analytical value, operating more as rhetorical tools to reinforce misleadingly binary conceptions of a Western Self versus a non-Western Other, within unduly selective and essentially predetermined stories of world order and the sources of its vulnerabilities. More than this, by endorsing divisions of a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian’ rest, they have worked to promote suspicions and tensions in the international realm. As John Hobson (2012, 185–187) puts it, models like the HST ‘explicitly justif[y] Western imperialism in the past, as well as in effect advocating a neocivilizing mission in the present’.

#### The alternative is an incommensurable project of decolonization that necessitates the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the global imperial metropole – this is a complete disavowal of settler futurity that refuses to be punctuated by narratives of reconciliation.

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**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

#### The role of debate is to disrupt settler logics that produce epistemic or material violence – we control the question of uniqueness as academic institutions are currently saturated with anti-indigenous sentimentality – decolonization is the only ethical demand your ballot should be oriented towards

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Their fantasies of extinction scenarios infinitely defer a meaningful reckoning with settler colonialism

Dalley, 18—Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College (Hamish, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, 8:1, 30-46, dml)

In this way, these settler-colonial narratives of extinction begin as a contemplation of endings and end as a way for settlers to persist. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, the native must be invoked and disavowed, and ultimately absorbed into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing true belonging and the possibility of an authentic future in place. Veracini’s description of the settler-colonial historical imagination thus applies, in modified but no less appropriate form, to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include the perception of an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentarism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: it is a fantasy of extinction that tips over into its opposite and becomes a method of symbolic preservation, a technique for delaying the end, for living on in the contemplation of death.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – the hope that, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living. In this way, they make their own redemption, an extinction that is an act of self-preservation, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

### 1NC -- Heg Bad

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy---it sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence---you should place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

McClintock 9 – Anne McClintock, Chaired Professor of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at University of Wisconsin–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge, PhD from Columbia, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe, March, Issue 28, p. 50-74

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.” I have come to feel that we cannot understand the extravagance of the violence to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power. Taking shape, as it now does, around fantasies of global omnipotence (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with nightmares of impending attack, the United States has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe. For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat. Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end. But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “a consensual hallucination,” 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.

I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible (the better politically to challenge) those established but concealed circuits of imperial violence that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the continuities that connect those circuits of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a super-carceral state. 5

Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of intellectual inquiry, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace the shadowlands of empire? If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters? For imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere, an offshore fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, from within, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”?

We now inhabit a crisis of violence and the visible. How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible, while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the haunted no-places and penumbra of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to forfeit the long-held US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the United States as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters. The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6

Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history.

Paranoia

Even the paranoid have enemies.

—Donald Rumsfeld

Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the proliferating circuits of imperial violence—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the pervasive presence of the paranoia that has come, quite violently, to manifest itself across the political and cultural spectrum as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8

Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal.

Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty?

A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body, the methods by which schools, the military, training camps— not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11

The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution.

—C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

The barbarians have declared war.

—President George W. Bush

C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding crisis of legitimacy in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that an imperial state claims legitimacy only by evoking the threat of the barbarians. It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place. On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with perpetual nightmares of impending attack. The enemy is the abject of empire: the rejected from which we cannot part. And without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom. Those people were a kind of solution.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus? “And now what shall become of us without any barbarians?” By rights, the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12

The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a political casus belli and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an immense boon: “There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland, which gives it some oomph.” In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, “Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden.” After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before.” Charles Krauthammer, for one, called for a declaration of total war. “We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.” 13

#### Hegemony is unsustainable and causes cycles of violence that make extinction inevitable---giving it up is more effective

Jackson 17 – Richard Jackson, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago and Former Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, “The Pacifism Papers 2: The Pacifist State”, 10-18, https://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2017/10/18/the-pacifism-papers-2-the-pacifist-state/

Nevertheless, I would like to suggest today, following the pacifist scholar Brian Martin, that we are at an opportune moment for bringing back the proposition that states should completely disarm and dissolve their military forces and commit to a radically nonviolent kind of politics. In addition to the repudiation of just war by the Catholic Church, there are other good reasons for arguing that it is time to take the Pacifist State seriously, and to consider dissolving the military as an institution.

First of all, the last few years, as well as an honest appraisal of the last few centuries, have clearly demonstrated that war and military force is hugely destructive and largely incapable of achieving positive political goals such as creating peace, strengthening democracy, enforcing human rights, defeating fascism, and so on. Instead, it has the tendency to perpetually create the conditions for the following war, not least through the logic of the security dilemma – the fact that building up arms in one state produces anxiety in another, leading to a spiral of insecurity and tension. The war on terror is a perfect example of this broader failure, with millions killed, increased instability, and no reduction in the levels of terrorism and violence.

Second, the existence of nuclear weapons and the continual development of other forms of destructive weaponry makes it extremely risky for the whole world. The dangers of escalation and misperception, and the psychology of crises – such as the current crisis on the Korean Peninsula – make disarmament and demilitarisation a critical priority at the present time.

Third, the costs of war and militarism are unsustainable in a time of climate change and austerity. Global military spending of over a trillion dollars per annum could, and should, be better spent on mitigating the effects of climate change, poverty reduction, healthcare, education, housing and the like. We should also note that militaries are one of the largest producers of greenhouse gases in the world; dissolving them would go a long way to towards reaching carbon reduction targets and perhaps pushing back the worst case scenarios of climate change. Militaries are also a poor form of economic investment: dollar-for-dollar, investing in green technology, for example, produces more jobs and more wealth than investing in the military.

Lastly, as I and many others have shown, today we know that everything that militaries claim to be able to do – such as national defence, humanitarian protection, security, and so on – can be done by other nonviolent means. In other words, we don’t actually need the military anymore. We could do perfectly well without it, and without its risks and costs we could make a much better society and a much better world.

Is Military Force Necessary?

Of course, the idea that nation states need military forces – for self defence, for peacekeeping, for a sense of identity – is so widely accepted these days that it is little more than common sense. Therefore, the first objection that someone will make to the notion of the Pacifist State will be: Does the idea of a demilitarised, unarmed nation state make any sense? Does the prospect of replacing military defence with forms of nonviolent social defence make sense? Related to this, does it make any sense to think that we could protect vulnerable civilians in situations of civil war or genocide without using military forces? I have already suggested some reasons – that militaries are horribly expensive, they haven’t done a good job of creating peace, they contribute to climate change, and so on. But are there are other reasons why it would make sense to dissolve the military.

I would argue that it does make sense – it actually makes more sense than keeping the military in place – if you understand a few things about the nature of violence, and the nature of nonviolence. First of all, it makes sense when you recognise some of the prevalent myths that surround our collective understanding of violence and what it can purportedly do. Most people think that having military force and the ability to use violence means that we have power, and that we can force others to either stop doing something we don’t like (deterrence) or do something we want them to do (compelance). The belief is that with violent capabilities we can deter others from attacking us, force others to stop committing abuses, or establish the conditions for peace and democracy. According to this belief, violence can be used as a predictable tool of politics: bomb ISIS and you will deter them from attacking the West; invade Gaza or Iraq and you will stop terrorist attacks; overthrow Gaddafi and you will bring democracy to Libya; arm the police and you will prevent attacks on tourists in Paris; and so on.

However, this is a belief that misunderstands and confuses the relationship between violence, force, and power, and particularly, the relationship between brute force and coercion. In fact, the effectiveness of violence to deter or compel depends entirely on how people respond to the violence, not the violence itself, and the capacity to kill and destroy actually bears little relation to the ability to coerce. Just because you can threaten me with violence does not guarantee that I will obey you or submit to your wishes. In reality, the application of violence can provoke either deterrence or retaliation, intimidation or rage, submission or resistance, and the desired response can never be assured. Even when force is used for purportedly good reasons – such as intervening to protect civilians from violent attack – the response by the actors involved and those who are witnessing it cannot be predicted. In a great many cases, including Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Libya, and elsewhere, so-called well-intentioned interventions have ended up killing large numbers of civilians and provoking more widespread violence and instability. Military force and violence, is therefore, an unreliable tool of politics because it produces a great many unpredictable outcomes – as the rise of ISIS and the defiance of North Korea indicates.

More broadly, a realistic understanding of the current global balance of forces (in which most states cannot realistically defend themselves from the large states), and a realistic understanding of the security dilemma demonstrates that the common faith in military force is misplaced. The truth is that New Zealand, or most other countries in the world, could not use their military forces to protect the nation from invasion, especially if it was from a powerful nation. Out of the world’s 200 or so nation states, only a handful could successfully use military force to repel an invasion. More importantly, in a world of nuclear weapons, the military would be impotent to stop a nuclear attack.

Added to this, we know that the possession of military force actually makes other nations nervous and anxious, because they cannot be sure of the real reason why we possess military forces. We may claim it’s solely for defence, but other states cannot be sure it’s not for a preemptive attack. This is called the “security dilemma”, and its internal logic dictates that states must keep up a sufficient level forces to deter other states from being tempted to attack them first. So, if we combine nuclear weapons with the security dilemma, the result is a world where the possession of military forces makes arms races inevitable and misperceptions, tensions and crises much more likely. In other words, military forces actually contribute more to international insecurity than to security; they make us more likely to be attacked – and if we were attacked, they are unlikely to help us much, anyway.

So much for the myths of violence and what it can do. Nonviolence, on the other hand, can do all the things that violence purports to do, and it has a better record of successfully achieving its goals over the past one hundred years or so. For example, nonviolence can be used to exert power, to deter actions, and to coerce – through things like boycotts, mass demonstrations, the threat of sanctions, physical interposition, and the like. It can make even powerful states change their behaviour. Gandhi and King demonstrated this in their struggles in India and the United States. This means that if the purpose of the military is to exert power and deter opponents, then an alternative exists; we can use nonviolence to do the same things that are most often claimed to be the exclusive domain of violence.

Perhaps more importantly, well-known research by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephen in their 2011 book, Why Civil Resistance Works, shows that over the past one hundred years or so, nonviolent movements have been twice as successful as violent movements in achieving their goals, even when the goal involves a major demand like regime change or secession, and even when it involves a very ruthless opponent. Apart from the well-known cases of Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King in the United States, other examples of successful nonviolent movements include: the solidarity movement in Poland; the people power movement in the Philippines; the Iranian revolution; the singing revolution in the Baltic states; the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia; the peaceful revolution in East Germany; the bloodless revolution in Bulgaria; the colour revolutions in Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia; the wave of democratic transitions during the 1990s in Africa; the cedar revolution in Lebanon; the Arab Spring; and many more individual cases. There are even examples of successful nonviolent resistance to the Nazis during WWII.

Added to this, there is also a growing literature on how unarmed peacekeeping can be a highly successful means of protecting vulnerable civilians in the midst of civil war and widespread violence. Studies are now coming in from places like Syria, Colombia, South Sudan and elsewhere which show that in many cases, being unarmed actually assists peacekeepers and nonviolent peace volunteers in protecting civilians. In short, it is simply not the case that military forces are necessary for deterrence or for protecting vulnerable people. Nonviolence can do anything that violence can do (apart from kill and destroy, obviously), and it has a historical record of success that is better than that of military force.

It can also be argued that dissolving the military makes sense if the real purpose of the government is the protection and well-being of its people. That is, if we look over history, we can note that the military has most often been used not in self defence against other nations, but as a force for the suppression of groups and individual citizens within the state itself. This is certainly true for the post-colonial states, in which the military was deployed for decades in the suppression of indigenous peoples. Getting rid of the military, therefore, is a way of guaranteeing that it cannot be used against the people. Second, as mentioned, in modern war, civilians bear the brunt of the casualties: in wars since 1945, around 90 percent of casualties have been civilians. We know from the research that nonviolent resistance to invasion and armed attack results in fewer civilian casualties than when violent resistance is used. If states want to protect their civilians, in other words, they should not use the military but use nonviolent means to protect the lives of their citizens.

Dissolving the military also makes sense if you understand the nature and purpose of politics, how violence is actually the negation of politics, and how difference and deep-rooted conflict is part of the central human condition. That is, the purpose of politics is help people deal with their differences and conflicts through dialogue and compromise, which is the opposite of violence. Violence destroys the possibility of dialogue and compromise; it destroys the possibility of persuading your opponent, or of being persuaded by your opponent. Instead, it eradicates the Other; while politics is about treating people as equals and with dignity, violence is about eradicating people altogether.

In other words, the risk of maintaining a standing military is that, as we have seen in so many countries, when there is a deep political crisis or conflict, the military will be used to settle it, most often by violently eradicating those it views as the enemy. That is, one of the central problems with modern states, rooted as they are on the monopoly of legitimate violence, is that in an intense political crisis, or a perceived threat, the governing party (or elite factions) can always resort to military violence as the final form of arbitration. Removing the military from politics, and replacing it with civilian defence, therefore would remove one of the permissive conditions of violent political conflict. In short, this implies, as Stanley Hauerwas puts it, that ‘nonviolence is the necessary condition for a politics not based on death’.

Finally, dissolving the military also makes sense if you understand the inseparability of means and ends. It is common to think of the military as a tool – an instrument which can be picked up, used for a purpose, and then put back in the toolbox. But this is a false understanding of reality. In reality, the way we act, and the things we do, define us and shape us; they create or constitute us. In terms of the military, using military force is rooted in a specific kind of logic, and once you actually use this kind of logic, it is almost impossible to break free of the logic. Instead, military logic becomes a normal part of political thinking. More broadly, in order to use military force, you first have to construct a war system and a war society to support it. You have to have scientists and engineers who design weapons, strategists who design military strategy, suppliers who make the weapons, medical professionals who look after the troops when they’re ill or injured, laws and doctrines governing the use of violence and killing, cultural beliefs that support killing and dying for the nation (as seen in popular entertainment and children’s toys, for example), categories of friend and enemy, and worthy and unworthy victims, memorialisation for the war dead, and so on. All these practices, processes and institutions have to become embedded in society. They thus shape and impact society; they create and reaffirm a society based on violence. In the end, they make society into a war system.

From this perspective, it is not possible to make society more peaceful through using military means, just as it is not possible to make society more truthful by telling lots of lies. Gandhi argued this point by suggesting that the belief that we can separate means and ends would be the same as thinking “that we can get a rose through planting a noxious weed.” He goes on to say, “The means may be likened to a seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connexion between the means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree… We reap exactly what we sow”. ​This is not to say that the military cannot do good in the short-term, but rather, as Gandhi again, puts it: “I object to violence because when it appears to do good, the good is only temporary; the evil it does is permanent.” The philosopher Hannha Arendt makes a similar point; she says “[t]he practice of violence, like all action, changes the world, but the most probable change is to a more violent world.”

Is a Pacifist State Realistic

A second and final objection to the idea of dissolving the military will be this: Is the Pacifist State a realistic proposition? How might it work in practice? Are there any real-world practical examples? On the basis of the research I mentioned at the beginning of my talk, and a great deal more recent research, I would argue that dissolving the military and creating a pacifist state is not only practical and realistic, but it is also essential for the survival and flourishing of the planet and its people. Although not as well researched or well known as all the wars and military campaigns, there are some important areas of nonviolent research which strongly indicated that it is indeed realistic to think about how a pacifist state would work in practice.

#### Multipolarity is emerging now – *decentering* US-lead over international order is try-or-die for global cooperation on existential threats and averting great power war – the [aff/neg] can only breathe life into a failed strategy

Mazarr 17 (Michael J, Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Associate Director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program at the RAND Corporation’s Arroyo Center, “The Once and Future Order What Comes After Hegemony?,” Jan/Feb, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-12-12/once-and-future-order>)

MIX IT UP International orders tend to rest on two pillars: the balance of power and prestige among the leading members and some degree of shared values. Both of these pillars look shaky today. For many years, U.S. grand strategy has been based on the idea that the unitary U.S.-led order reflected universal values, was easy to join, and exercised a gravitational pull on other countries. Those assumptions do not hold as strongly as they once did. If Washington hopes to sustain an international system that can help avoid conflict, raise prosperity, and promote liberal values, it will have to embrace a more diverse order—one that operates in different ways for different countries and regions and on different issues. The United States will be tempted to resist such a change and to double down on the existing liberal order by following the Cold War playbook: rallying democracies and punishing norm breakers. But such a narrow order would create more embittered outcasts and thus imperil the most fundamental objective of any global order: keeping the peace among great powers. Dividing the world into defenders and opponents of a shared order is also likely to be less feasible than in the past. China’s role in the global economy and its standing as a regional power mean that it cannot be isolated in the way the Soviet Union was. Many of today’s rising powers, moreover, have preferences that are too diverse to gather into either a U.S.-led system or a bloc opposed to it. Should China or Russia adopt a significantly more aggressive stance, the United States may find it necessary to focus primarily on containing it and hunker down into a narrow, U.S.-led liberal order. But doing so should remain a last resort. During the Cold War, the central challenge of world politics was to contain—and eventually transform—a single power opposed to the main world order. Today the aim is very different: to prevent war and encourage cooperation among a fractious group of countries. An order that is inclusive and shared will meet that challenge better than one that is narrow, aggressive, and dominated by Washington. The United States would therefore be better off trying to develop several different yet overlapping forms of order: universal and major-power-centric, global and regional, political and economic, liberal and realist. Washington already does this, to an extent. But the tendency in U.S. strategy, especially since the end of the Cold War, has been to pursue a homogeneous liberal order that all states must join in roughly the same way and that pushes its liberal values on every front. The United States would gain more traction if it consciously embraced a more mixed order and accepted some of the difficult compromises that came with it. The first element of such a mixed order would be a forum for regular dialogue among the system’s leading members. At a time when rivalries are growing and many leading states are eager to have a larger voice in international institutions, the world needs a better way to coordinate interests among the system’s major powers—not just China and Russia but also Brazil, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, and Japan, among others. A more inclusive UN Security Council combined with the G-20 and various regional and informal conferences would help find areas where major powers can cooperate and smooth over differences among them. This part of the new order would primarily focus on securing the goals laid down in the UN Charter, especially its prohibition on territorial aggression. It would also concentrate on areas where major-power interests overlap, such as fighting climate change, terrorism, and infectious diseases.

#### American hegemony makes China war inevitable

Michael Swaine, Senior Associate Asia Program, “Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4—20—15, http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/

U.S. efforts to sustain and enhance its military superiority in China’s backyard will further stoke Beijing’s worst fears and beliefs about American containment, sentiments inevitably reinforced by domestic nationalist pressures, ideologically informed beliefs about supposed U.S. imperialist motives, and China’s general commitment to the enhancement of a multipolar order. In fact, by locking in a clear level of long-term vulnerability and weakness for Beijing that prevents any assured defense of Chinese territory or any effective wielding of influence over regional-security-related issues (such as maritime territorial disputes, Taiwan, or the fate of the Korean Peninsula), absolute U.S. military superiority would virtually guarantee fierce and sustained domestic criticism of any Chinese leadership that accepted it. This will be especially true if, as expected, Chinese economic power continues to grow, bolstering Chinese self-confidence. Under such conditions, effectively resisting a U.S. effort to sustain predominance along China’s maritime periphery would become a matter of political survival for future Chinese leaders.

#### And Russia war !

Sachs 18 --- Prof @ Columbia, PhD in economics from Harvard, (Jeffrey Sachs, American economist, public policy analyst, and former director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, where he holds the title of University Professor, the highest rank Columbia bestows on its faculty, “A New Foreign Policy: Beyond American Exceptionalism,” google books)

But worse was to come. Against the advice and wishes of some NATO members, President George W. Bush decided in 2008 to offer NATO membership to Georgia and Ukraine. This offer, I believe, crossed Putin’s red line. Georgia is Russia’s immediate neighbor in the underbelly of the Caucuses. Ukraine lies directly athwart Europe and Russia; it is a vital buffer against European invasion, home to Russia’s Black Sea naval port, and vital hub of Russia’s military industry. The idea that either Georgia or Ukraine would join NATO was unacceptable to Putin. I imagine he saw it as akin to an American president’s view were Mexico or Canada invited by China to join a military alliance. Here again it’s helpful to recall the security dilemma. While NATO portrays itself as a defense alliance and claims that Russia has nothing to fear from NATO enlargement, to believe that Russia also sees things this way is utterly naïve. What might look defensive to NATO surely looks offensive to Russia, especially as NATO continues to deploy new weapons systems that Russia finds threatening, to engage in new overseas missions such as the NATO-led overthrow of Libya’s Moammar Khadafy in 2011, and to expand to new countries. Albania and Croatia joined in 2009, and Montenegro in 2017. Russia countered the push toward NATO enlargement with wars in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014); I don’t think these two Russian wars, hundreds of miles apart, were coincidental; they were triggered by the prospect that these two countries, right on Russia’s borders and deeply intertwined with Russia’s economic and security interests, would suddenly become members of NATO. Were Ukraine to join NATO and the European Union, Russia’s military base in Sevastopol, on the Crimean Peninsula, would flip into NATO hands. In the end, Putin’s actions stopped the advance of NATO to these countries, but not the intention in the minds of American exceptionalists. The tensions with Russia, now including Western sanctions against the Russian economy and the Putin regime, remain very high. Putin, in turn, raised the stakes significantly by Russia’s meddling in the 2016 U.S. election. U.S. policies in the Middle East after 2001 further inflamed the tensions. According to former NATO commander Wesley Clark, America’s wars in the Middle East have been designed, in part, to deprive Russia of influence and friendly regimes in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Putin repeatedly railed against America’s regime-change tactics, regarding them as directly destabilizing to the Middle East, hostile to Russia’s interests in the region, and a potential forerunner of similar actions by the United States against Russia itself. By now the situation has become one of almost nonstop tit-for-tat retaliation. U.S. actions spur Russian counteractions, which in turn spur further American responses such as sanctions against the Russian regime, followed by further Russian responses such as cybermeddling in the 2016 U.S. elections. Trust has disappeared, hardliners on both sides call for escalation, and recriminations fly in both directions. Americans claim that Putin is trying to recreate the Russian Empire; Putin claims that the United States is trying to establish military dominance over Russia. Hard-liners on one side point to the hard-liners on the other for their proof. The real solution to this spiraling conflict is to retrace our steps to Gorbachev’s vision. There is no fundamental reason why economic cooperation and demilitarization could not stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific across Russia and Central Asia. Indeed, the rise of China makes this more likely. Russia stands to benefit from the growing economic integration of Eurasia. As China recognizes, cooperation across Eurasia would indeed benefit all parts of the Eurasian landmass. Europe, Russia, China, India, and other parts of Eurasia could work together to connect renewable energy, telecommunications, transport grids, watershed management, environmental protection, and other infrastructure and services. These are all areas of potential massive mutual gain. While the United States doubles down on its exceptionalist foreign policy—indeed, pushing for an exceptionalism ever more extreme, with its strains of protectionism and racism—the rest of the world is recognizing the promise of an internationalist approach. We can learn the hard way by staying the current course and falling further and further behind. Or we can embrace a new foreign policy with sustainable development at its heart. The first step in doing so will be to disentangle ourselves from unnecessary wars and break our addiction to regime change, matters I’ll turn to in part II.

### 1NC -- Space Leadership Bad

#### American leadership over space colonization leads to increased militarization in space, which guarantees great power conflict

Salazar, 18 (Juan A. Ortiz Salazar is a double major in Materials Engineering and Political Science at Cal Poly, 2018, “SPACE PRIVATIZATION, COLONIZATION, AND MILITARIZATION: A NEW FRONTIER FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW”, <https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1101&context=paideia>, accessed 7/21/2021) TK

Discussion & Research Implications Conflict in the 21st Century If outer space can indeed be analyzed and predicted by realism, then the 21st century will be characterized by intense competition to obtain space power and/or inhibit other states from achieve it. Conflict in space will be exacerbated by public and private ventures that international law could not conceive when created, such as space privatization and colonization. Prominent scholars in the fields of international relations and astropolitics recognize the possibilities of conflict. Laura Grego, Senior Scientist at the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, writes:52 In recent decades, satellites have become increasingly important in the economic, civil, and military spheres. At the same time, space has become more crowded with satellites and the debris from their use, and many more states have become spacefaring. However, the legal and normative regime has not kept pace with these changes. Recent trends and events – including demonstrations of antisatellites (ASAT) capability, a collision between satellites, and a dramatic increase in dangerous space debris – make clear that the space environment needs more protection, that satellites face growing risks, and that space activities may be a potential source of mistrust and tension between countries. While voluntary confidence-building and transparency measures can help solve some of these issues, more substantive engagement is required to keep space safe and secure into the future. Moreover, the US space program may be directing the world to confrontations in space. The 2018 Defense authorization bill requires the Department of Defense (DoD) to establish a new Space Corps and a new Space Command by January 2019.53 Furthermore, General John E. Hyten, Commander, Air Force Space Command, stated space is vital and essential to joint warfare.54 Therefore, he contended implementing a new Space Mission Force that “move[s] beyond the status quo and adopt[s] new tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)” is necessary so that the US may execute “swift and deliberate action” when deterrence fails.55 The amount of factual knowledge available on parties involved, as well as technology being developed increase uncertainty and fear among international actors.

### 1NC – No ! -- Debris

#### 1. No Kessler effect.

von Fange 17 [Daniel Von Fange‏, Distributed systems engineer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped” May 21st 2017, <http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/>] [modified for readability]

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per [one thousand kilometers] of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than [one in ten thousand]. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely. Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner. Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 2. No debris collision

Albrecht 16 [Mark Albrecht is chairman of the board of USSpace LLC. He was head of the White House National Space Council from 1989 to 1992. Paul Graziani is CEO and founder of Analytical Graphics, an Exton, Pennsylvania, company that develops software and provides mission assurance through the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC), “Op-ed | Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria”, SpaceNews, May 9th 2016, <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/>] [modified for readability]

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion. Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are exaggerated and misleading. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it certainly is not a crisis. So what are the facts? On the positive side, space is empty and it is vast. At the altitude of the International Space Station, one half a degree of Earth longitude is almost 40 miles long. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects and they behave quite predictably. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance. Since we first started placing objects into space there have been [eleven] known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, hundreds of telecommunications satellites, [thirteen hundred] functioning satellites on orbit today, half a million total objects in space larger than a marble, and fewer than 15 known collisions. Why do people worry?

#### The asteroid impact threat is propaganda meant to legitimize continued research into militarized technologies

Mellor 7 – Felicity Mellor, PhD in Theoretical Physics from Newcastle University, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 37, No. 4, August, Jstor

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a 'giggle factor' and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God's handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and dis tant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact-extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy - telescopes and, later, space probes - were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as 'monsters' - portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war. By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give con crete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more com pelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists. Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that 'we too need to declare war on the heavens'. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifi able enemy. The civilian scientists attempted to still their consciences in their deal ings with the defence scientists by suggesting that, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of SDI, the latter had lost their traditional role. This argument was naive at best. In fact, as we have seen, the US defence sci entists had taken an interest in the impact threat since the early 1980s, from the time that SDI had greatest political support during the defence build-up of the Reagan era. Even at the time of the fractious Interception Workshop, George H.W. Bush was maintaining SDI funding at the same level as it had been during the second Reagan administration. If outwardly the Clinton administration was less supportive when it took office in 1993 and declared that SDI was over, many of those involved in the programme felt that it would actually go on much as before (FitzGerald, 2000: 491). SDI was renamed, and to some extent reconceived, but funding continued and was soon increased when the Republicans gained a majority in Congress.33 After George W. Bush took office in 2001, spending on missile defence research was greatly increased, including programmes to follow on from Brilliant Pebbles (Wall, 2001a; 2001b). Thus the defence scientists had shown an interest in the impact threat from the time of the very first meeting onwards, regardless of the state of funding for missile defence, which in any case continued throughout the This is not to suggest that the impact threat was not used by the defence scientists as a means of maintaining the weapons establishment. Indeed, the impact threat offered a possible means of circumventing or undermining arms treaties.34 But it does mean that the attempt to access new sources of funding, while being an important factor in the promotion of asteroids as a threat, did not fully explain either the weapons scientists' interests or the civilian scientists' repeated meetings with them. The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of space based weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact mis sions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy. In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about 'ploughshare' or 'conversion' technologies. New technologies arise not just out of funding and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as 'dual use' or 'cover' also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of char acterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one con crete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian sci ence to military programmes. But the focus on narrative also begs a question: Which stories would we prefer to frame our science? Should science be driven by fear or by curiosity? Should it be aimed at creating technologies of war or cultures of compassion? These are normative questions, but they are also precisely the questions that make the military influence on science such an important issue. Narratives are inherently ideological and a refusal to see them as such does no more to enhance the scholar's objectivity than it does the scientist's. The stories told by the asteroid scientists led them into collaborations with weapons scientists and helped fuel a discourse of fear that served a particular ideological purpose. This should be both recognized and chal lenged, not for the sake of regaining some impossible ideal of an undis torted science but because there are other stories, based on different ideological assumptions, that we could tell in order to guide science towards more peaceful ends.

### 1NC -- Threat Con Bad

#### Fear of Russian conflict is rooted in a racist and exceptionalist mythology that necessitates the construction of threats to justify militarism---this straight-turns the case---their claims are false peddlings of neo-cons, but their framing makes them real through spiraling antagonism

Roberts 16 – Dr. Kari Roberts, PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council, “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, Prepared for presentation at the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) Annual Conference, 5-17, https://cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2016/Roberts.pdf

Conceptualizing Russophobia

As Time magazine’s person of the year in 2007, Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to publicly address the negative views of Russia that exist in the West, accusing “some” Americans of perpetuating false view of Russians as “a little bit savage still or they just climbed down from the trees, you know, and probably need to have their hair brushed or their beards trimmed. And have the dirt washed out of their beards and hair. That’s the civilizing mission to be accomplished.”14 Though Putin’s characterization may be somewhat extreme, Russophobia is well documented in Russia, with politicians and analysts giving voice to this phenomenon and its influences on policy makers. However, much less has been written on Russophobia in English, and for Western audiences. But if we ever hope to truly understand the many facets of the Russia-US relationship, we must consider the ways in which attitudes toward Russia may be influencing American decision making.

Western characterizations of Putin are that he is an evil dictator, abusing democracy, human rights and the rule of law, bent upon re-drawing Europe’s map, asserting Russia’s influence and balancing against American power at every turn. This characterization of Russia’s president is reflected in a 2009 Economist article in which Putin was said to be looking for a war with the West, having “tantrums” over controversial disagreements in the Middle East and Georgia, “stumbling” into disputes with the West, and driven by “paranoia” and “encirclement.”15 While some of these criticisms of Putin may not be entirely unreasonable, there is more to such critiques of Putin than simply policy disagreement. An inherent mistrust of Russia and of Russians themselves, has colored western, and especially American, views about post-Soviet Russia dating back to the Yeltsin presidency.

DW Benn, writing about the misunderstanding of Russia in the West, notes the presence of these ideas in the centuries old words of Lord Palmerston himself, who once described a Russian colleague as “’civil and courteous’ but with ‘all the cunning of a half-educated savage.’”16 According to Benn, a special disdain for the Russian people permeates the discourse about Russia, and is easily hidden in the above criticisms about contemporary Russian politics and foreign policy.17 George Kennan once famously wrote that the political personality of the Soviet Union was one that could not tolerate rivals, and was too “insensitive,” “fierce” and “jealous” to share power. The Soviets were absorbed with securing absolute power consistent with an ideology that instructs them to believe that the outside world is hostile and must be resisted.18 One does not have to look very hard to find these same sentiments about contemporary Russian leaders.

Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics.20 This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.

For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.”21 Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate.22 Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests.23 This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.”24 He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s.25 In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.”26 This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.

Tsygankov is quick to label American Russophobia as a political phenomenon rather than a cultural phenomenon, leaving open the possibility for its willful reversal.27 While it may be the case that Russophobia’s presence in American foreign policy making may not be a fait accompli, its presence in the American discourse may reflect more of a cultural presence of anti-Russianism that is self-reinforcing. In fact, Tsygankov himself notes that public opinion followed elite opinion and policy,28 which testifies to its presence in the popular discourse. Tsygankov claims that the infusion of Russophobia into elite and popular attitudes about Russia is the result of a willful construction of an anti-Russian lobby in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. “The Lobby,” is a deliberate cabal of anti-Russian military hawks, or those who presume American geopolitical hegemony can best be achieved by the military defeat of Russia, as well as those who assertively presume the hegemony of so-called liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.29 This Lobby allegedly dates back to the early 20th Century, its views solidified by the Cold War, to which members of Congress and policy makers in the White House have been sympathetic.30 While Tsygankov acknowledges that some of the Lobby’s success could be attributed to the absence of a pro-Russia lobby in the US,31 his attention is trained on the Lobby’s political goal of fostering anti-Russian sentiment in the West in support of a “global power struggle” against a potential “resurgent” Russia, rife with what Zbigniew Brzezinski once labeled “neo-colonial thinkers.”32

Tsygankov seeks to explain the construction and persistence of an anti-Russian lobby that is purposefully distorting Russia’s role in the world, its history and its interests to advance an anti-Russia agenda; however, this is not the precise case made herein. Tsygankov’s premise is not fundamentally rejected here, but it is not fully embraced either. There does seem to be a culture of anti-Russianism present in Washington that has influenced foreign policy elites, but it may not necessarily be the result of an intentional drive to keep Russia down. What this paper shares with Tsygankov is the conviction that Russophobia exists, has a significant influence on American foreign policy concerning Russia, and therefore must be better identified and understood. The goal here is not to reveal malevolence toward Russia, but rather to name this Russophobia, discuss its genesis, and connect it with foreign policy outcomes in the hope of illuminating what remains a significant impediment to a more constructive Russia-US relationship.

In his writing on Russophobia, Anatol Lieven suggests that anti-Russianism is derived in part from the myth of America’s own exceptionalism. This mythology sees the US standing taller than other nations, able to make objective observations about other states’ motives, and thereby construct appropriate policy in response. Lieven warns of the dangers of such assumptions, because they render US policy makers “incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations” to its own policies.33 Lieven takes on NATO expansion directly, noting that, among the many reasons Russia opposes it, is the US’ failure to appreciate what it means for Russia. US policy makers have been genuinely puzzled by Russia’s failure to perceive its enlargement as benign, which is due in part to the American rhetoric that exists alongside the policy decision itself. It is not only the physical expansion of NATO that is problematic, but the corresponding failure to bother understanding Russia’s interests. This unwillingness to understand Russia, combined with the embrace of longstanding and outworn stereotypes about Russia, assumptions about the pattern of history in Russia, as well as a Cold War “hangover” of sorts, which cannot shake the image of Russia-as-threat, all contribute to define Russophobia and the discourse within which American foreign policy is made.

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making.34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China,38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias”41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia.42 For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.”43 Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,”44 thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.46

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal.47 Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas.48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.50

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries.51 Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them.52 Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

Russophobia ought not be confused with criticism of Russia. Heikki Luostarinen cautions that Finland, for example, no longer exhibits Russophobia, but that it remains free to offer social and political criticism.53 Russophobia is more than a disagreement or even competing values; in fact, during the Cold War, Russophobia took on what Luostarinen identifies as racist tones reflected in movies about the evils of the Soviet empire.54 The USSR was often cast not simply as the enemy, but as an evil villain, which justified its complete evisceration and for which no action taken toward this goal could be considered illegitimate. This demonization of the enemy may have parallels with the post 9/11 discourse about terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). During the Cold War, hostilities with the Soviet Union gave way to “fear, moral disgust and ignorance,” which were coupled with a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union. Luostarinen explains that this enemy imaging involves the belief, by a cultural or political group and even a nation state itself, that one’s very security and fundamental values are purposefully and meaningfully threatened by the other.55 This enemy becomes essential to identity construction and may even serve some collective psychological need to perceive a threat for which a harsh response is justified. Externalizing a common threat can be essential to legitimizing a collective identity and historical experience.56 This “us vs. them” narrative can feed a powerful nationalism, which can provide a context for behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to legitimize. This enemy construction can become ingrained as mythology among members of a society. The “enemy image may strengthen integration within a given group and moderate internal conflicts; it may help to bring the rank and file behind the group leaders; it may be used (scapegoat) to explain any injustices within the group.”57 Luostarinen is careful to note that the construction of an enemy image does not mean that the so-called enemy itself is not guilty of actions that contribute to its demonization. The construction of an enemy image of Russia stems largely from the very real fact that, for centuries, Russia has stood for much of what Western values opposed: “autocracy, national repression, and conservatism” and later “radicalism and social revolution.”58 Fear of Russian aggression has been in place since the 16th Century, blossoming alongside the growth of Russian power.59 But this fear was coupled with the racist view of Russians as an inferior, inherently violent race that could not be trusted, thereby necessitating the conclusion that peaceful coexistence could not be countenanced; mistrust of the Russian leadership transformed into a cultural loathing of Russians themselves.60 John Gleason describes as deep seated fear or dislike of Russia, which is the result of misunderstanding of Russian history and culture, rooted in “competitive imperial ambitions.”61 Gleason notes that it may be a natural inclination to fear that which we know the least,62 which could help to explain the presence of Russophobia in earlier periods when connection with cultures across the globe was a rare occurrence. It does far less to explain the persistence of Russophobia in a time in which, notwithstanding the warnings of Samuel Huntington and others for whom cultural difference is a basis for conflict,63 contemporary access to a diversity of cultures can prompt cultural awareness, acceptance, and even fusion. This does not appear to be the case with American views of Russia, which remain imbued with an air of repugnance in which even minor differences take on elevated significance.

This lingering hostility toward Russia – Russophobia - has fostered an environment in which cooperation is difficult and missed opportunities abound. As a consequence of the perpetual misinterpretation of Russia, US leaders miss key opportunities for finding compatibility with Russia, particularly in key matters of security such as fighting terrorism, dealing with weapons proliferation, illegal drugs, energy security and working together to address instability in strategic and volatile regions64 and informs the pursuit of a foreign policy agenda that needlessly antagonizes Russia in an already uncertain international system. Moreover, the expansion of NATO eastward is evidence for some that the US continues to fight the Cold War and has perpetuated in response an extant anti-Americanism in Russia that will continue to make it difficult for the US to pursue its interests.