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#### Settler colonialism mobilizes temporality itself in service of the consummation of white settler sovereignty – this operates through liberal narratives of progressivism that rely upon a vanishing endpoint of a “better world” achieved through the completion of the project of settler modernity. Normative debate is structured by the imperative of forward motion that locates the plan as a transformative break with colonial society that relegates the backwardness of indigeneity to the past and envisions a settler utopia in its place.

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Time, decolonization and colonial completion Critical geographers use Foucault’s insights to unsettle modern understandings of space as a fixed environment in which politics takes place. Instead, they show that political projects construct, naturalize and respond to particular spatial understandings.30 In relation to Indigenous policy, critical analysts are quick to identify these political deployments of space. SuvendriniPerera, for example, shows that policy-makers represent remote Indigenous communities as ‘set apart from the body of the nation, and as the locus of unspeakable violence and abjection’.31 As part of the discourse of the Northern Territory Intervention, the metaphor of the distant frontier — or vulnerable centre — is pervasive. Remote Aboriginal communities prescribed for Intervention are para - digmatically referred to in media reports as ‘remote Aboriginal societies’, ‘this other Australia’, ‘the remote world’ and as ‘a distinct domain’.32 Unsettling dominant understandings of time is equally important. In his work ‘The End of the Passing Past’, Walters aims to ‘think about change in ways that refuse the obligation to side with or against continuity… and resist the temptations of progressivism and reductionism’.33 He draws on Bruno Latour’s examination of the modern temporal imaginary, and his denat - uralizing of modern political timelines: We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting.34 This interrogation is especially useful in relation to understanding settler colonialism and Indigenous policy-making. Barry Hindess, Elizabeth Povinelli and N. Sheehan, for example, reflect on Western temporal constructions of Aboriginality and indicate how these relate to liberal political agendas. Barry Hindess argues that liberalism tends to locate different cultures in its own past, even when they coexist with liberal societies in the present.35 Indigenous groups, in particular, are located prior to the transformative moment of sovereign agreement, which in turn is read as an indication of their incapacity to enter into this superior, rational political future. Norm Sheehan maintains that settler colonialism in Australia is deeply invested in these kinds of temporal logics: In contrast to previous colonial contexts which tended to focus on constructing difference based on inherent racial traits the antipodean designation as primitive defines this specific other as non-other. The antipodean aborigine is by definition from the origin of (all) mankind which positions this primitive as an earlier and therefore lesser version of European self.36 Elizabeth Povinelli briefly makes a similar point in her analysis of recent Australian Indigenous policy: [E]ven as liberalism came to accept its fate as a culture among other cultures it differentiated the tense and orientation of its cultural difference from other cultures. The West as a general idea would claim the future and claim the potentiality of individuals and assign the past and the constraint of individuals to others — or, it would recognize that these were the values of non-liberal cultures.37 She refers to these patterns of political temporal positioning as ‘technologies of temporality’. Drawing together the work of Walters, Hindess, Sheehan and Povinelli, it becomes apparent that colonialism does not just take place in time. It constructs narratives of time, in ways that create particular political relationships in the present, and attempts to move itself through time to a certain political future. In the remainder of this section, we compare the temporalities of post-colonial and settler-colonial political formations, and argue that both anchor themselves to some sort of transformative ‘endpoint’. This radical political break separates a problematic past from a completed future and, in settler-colonial societies, involves a strange assemblage of ideas about decolonization, revolution, full colonization and sovereign exchange. The term post-colonial implies ‘the notion of a movement be - yond’;38 ‘the “post” in “post-colonial” suggests “after” the demise of colonialism, it is imbued, quite apart from its user’s intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-temporality’.39 In a number of former colonies (both extractive, such as India, and settler, such as Algeria), the formal colonial project has indeed ended. The term postcolonial captures something about the complex political realities of these nation-states today. A dramatic, and often violent, moment of structural decolonization separates these state’s colonial pasts from their post-colonial presents. However, even in relation to those nations which have undergone such institutional transformations, scholars contest the use of the term. Ella Shohat suggests that it erases the ongoing structural imperialisms that persist: ‘How then does one negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a “post-colonial” whose “post” emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness?’40 Some scholars use the term neocolonialism to indicate political continuity, and to contest the understanding that critical post-colonial work seeks to put out minor spot-fires of inequality left by ‘real’ colonialism.41 If the temporal narrative of post-colonialism is problematic in relation to former extractive colonies, it is altogether inaccurate when applied to ongoing settler colonies such as Australia. Yet post-colonial scholarship has dominated international academic [T]he lack of historical specificity in the ‘post’ leads to a collaps - ing of diverse chronologies … It equates early independence won by settler colonial states, in which Europeans formed their new nation-states in non-European territories at the expense of Indigenous populations, with that of nationstates whose indigenous populations struggled for inde - pendence against Europe.42 Australia has not, and most probably will not, undergo the kind of institutional transfer of control to the Indigenous population that could justify the application of the term post-colonial. And yet it is quite common to see Australia identified as a post-colonial or decolo nizing nation in cultural studies, literary theory and policy analysis.43 One of the greatest contributions of the emerging field of settler-colonial studies is the fact that it provides clear conceptual tools to articulate exactly why it is that nations like Australia and Canada should be understood differently. However, it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of settlercolonial studies in Australian scholarship. Critical Indigenous the - orists are carrying on their own conversation regarding Australian colonial conditions, and have long contested the relevance of the term post-colonial. Irene Watson, for example, argues: I understand the contemporary colonial project as one that has continued unabated from the time of the landing and invasion by the British in 1788 … the Australian state retains a vested interest in keeping the violence going, and the inequalities and iniquities that are maintained against Aboriginal peoples for the purpose of maintaining the life and continuity of the state. A question the Australian state is yet to resolve is its own illegitimate foundation and transformation into an edifice deemed lawful. Within this unanswered questionable structure the Australian state parades as one which has obliterated the ‘founding violence’ of its ‘illegitimate origins’ and ‘repressed them into a timeless past’.44 Aileen Moreton-Robinson instead uses the term post-colonizing, capturing the ambiguous and shifting temporal technologies deployed in settler-colonial Australia. These new conceptual models have grown productively out of the object of our study: the postcolonizing world we inhabit. Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonization has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.45 While settler-colonial studies proceeds from a conceptual distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, Indigenous scholarship is based in the lived experiences of ongoing colonization.46 Settlercolonial studies would benefit from connecting to this existing academic conversation that runs parallel to and intersects with its own ideas in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to ongoing Indigenous contestation of colonial projects, and counters the tendency towards totalizing, structural accounts of settler colonialism. As Watson observes: Today our voices are still talking while the colonial project remains entrenched and questions concerning identity politics, and the ‘authentic native’ are constructed and answered by those who have power.47 Up to this point, we have been drawing together points made by other scholars. Settler colonialism has an ongoing, structural temporality, which is generally unacknowledged and contrasts with the linear colonialism–decolonization–post-colonialism narrative. However, we suggest that the application of a unidirectional, progressive temporality to the settler-colonial context is not just an analytical mistake, but a ‘technology of temporality’. This conception is taken up within the settler-colonial project in ways that work towards the consummation of settler sovereignty. The borrowed notion of a ‘radical break’ is variously located in settler colonialism’s past, present or future. By harnessing the decolonizing resonances of this concept of colonial transforma - tion, the settler-colonial project obscures the very different political effects of its own ‘vanishing endpoint’.48 What is this vanishing endpoint, which seems to lurk in all of our imaginations, our policy projects and our political debates? Instead of the moment of decolonization, it is the moment of full colonization — or rather, it is both, because in this imagined moment colonial relationships will dissolve themselves and settler authority will be naturalized. This transformative event is both an impossible colonial dream, premised on the disappearance of Indigenous political difference, and a concrete political project that justifies all manner of tactics in the present. But what are the political con - sequences of such a preoccupation? And do Indigenous participants in the colonial relationship seek the same kind of resolution and dissolution? Significantly, the Western colonial narrative of transformational change maps onto another Western imaginary — the moment of sovereign transformation encapsulated in the social contract. This is the moment that a group of people transition from collective social ‘status’ into individualized freedom and contractual person - hood.49 It is also the movement out of a constraining ‘history’ into an atemporal, rational present. As Hindess argues, liberalism con - signs its Indigenous contemporaries to its own past, and imagines this location in the past to be ‘a kind of moral and intellectual failure’, revealing the incapacity and disinclination to enter into a social contract and join the present.50 Therefore, the movement through time, via a radical transformative moment, is also the developmental movement from incapacity to capacity. An unstable but productive dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, Indigenous political difference-incapacity-status-injustice-lack of sovereignty, and on the other, colonial completion-capacitycontract-freedom-sovereign inclusion. These oppositions are separated by an image of a single, interchangeable and undefined threshold — the transformative event. This temporal narrative belongs to both progressive and conservative articulations of the settler-colonial future; the settler colonial endpoint is variously positioned as an inevitable global trend,51 a past achievement yet to be fully recognized,52 and a future goal for which Aboriginal people must prepare.53 As Povinelli notes, these conceptions are not only temporal, but also teleological: [T]hese tenses are in turn articulated to other discourses of time and event such as teleological discourses that apprehend events ‘as the realization of an already given end or telos and eschatological discourses that wait for ‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany ‘the end of history’ and ‘its reversal into eternity’.54 The transformative event is positioned as part of an inevitable and inescapable trajectory (although it may be consistently deferred or delayed). In this way, the eventual legitimacy and stability of the settler-colonial project is always-already assumed. Through this a priori assumption, settler colonialism is able to entrench and sustain itself on the basis of its eventual demise. The following section traces the appearance and temporal location of this settler-colonial end - point in recent Australian Indigenous policy phases.

#### Space management cannot be understood outside of settler colonialism. The infrastructure, institutions, and Eurocentric values of space policy are considered the hallmarks of science and progress, which become weaponized against Indigenous resistance.

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Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery… have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement… playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: … we believe in the word of our ancestors…they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth…and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the ‘final frontier’ is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past. This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

#### Their fantasies of extinction scenarios infinitely defer a meaningful reckoning with settler colonialism

Dalley, 18—Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College (Hamish, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, 8:1, 30-46, dml)

In this way, these settler-colonial narratives of extinction begin as a contemplation of endings and end as a way for settlers to persist. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, the native must be invoked and disavowed, and ultimately absorbed into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing true belonging and the possibility of an authentic future in place. Veracini’s description of the settler-colonial historical imagination thus applies, in modified but no less appropriate form, to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include the perception of an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentarism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: it is a fantasy of extinction that tips over into its opposite and becomes a method of symbolic preservation, a technique for delaying the end, for living on in the contemplation of death.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – the hope that, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living. In this way, they make their own redemption, an extinction that is an act of self-preservation, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

#### The war machine of US Empire relies on the repetitive displacement of indigeneity as the ontological condition of its formation – their scenarios of militaristic conflict are rooted in the interpellation of indigeneity as the “savage”, the “original enemy combatant” undeserving of life.

Byrd 11 [Jodi A., Associate Professor of English and American Indian Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*, 2011, p. xxvii-xxviii GC]

There is more than one way to frame the concerns of The Transit of Empire and more than one way to enter into the possibilities that transit might allow for comparative studies. On the one hand, I am seeking to join ongoing conversations about sovereignty, power, and indigeneity—and the epistemological debates that each of these terms engender—within and across disparate and at times incommensurable disciplines and geographies. American studies, queer studies, postcolonial studies, American Indian studies, and area studies have all attempted to apprehend injury and redress, melancholy and grief that exist in the distances and sutures of state recognitions and belongings. Those distances and sutures of recognitions and belongings, melancholy and grief, take this book from the worlds of Southeastern Indians to Hawai'i, from the Poston War Relocation Center to Jonestown, Guyana, in order to consider how ideas of “Indianness” have created conditions of possibility for U.S. empire to manifest its intent. As liberal multicultural settler colonialism attempts to flex the exceptions and exclusions that first constituted the United States to now provisionally include those people othered and abjected from the nation-states origins, it instead creates a cacophony of moral claims that help to deflect progressive and transformative activism from dismantling the ongoing conditions of colonialism that continue to make the United States a desired state formation within which to be included. That cacophony of competing struggles for hegemony within and outside institutions of power, no matter how those struggles might challenge the state through loci of race, class, gender, and sexuality, serves to misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism that made the United States possible as oppressor in the first place. As a result, the cacophony produced through U.S. colonialism and imperialism domestically and abroad often coerces struggles for social justice for queers, racial minorities, and immigrants into complicity with settler colonialism. This book, on the other hand, is also interested in the quandaries poststructuralism has left us: the traces of indigenous savagery and “Indianness” that stand a priori prior to theorizations of origin, history, freedom, constraint, and difference.3 These traces of “Indianness” are vitally important to understanding how power and domination have been articulated and practiced by empire, and yet because they are traces, they have often remained deactivated as a point of critical inquiry as theory has transited across disciplines and schools. Indianness can be felt and intuited as a presence, and yet apprehending it as a process is difficult, if not impossible, precisely because Indianness has served as the field through which structures have always already been produced. Within the matrix of critical theory, Indianness moves not through absence but through reiteration, through meme, as theories circulate and fracture, quote and build. The prior ontological concerns that interpellate Indianness and savagery as ethnographic evidence and example, lamentable and tragic loss, are deferred through repetitions. How we have come to know intimacy, kinship, and identity within an empire born out of settler colonialism is predicated upon discourses of indigenous displacements that remain within the present everydayness of settler colonialism, even if its constellations have been naturalized by hegemony and even as its oppressive logics are expanded to contain more and more historical experiences. I hope to show through the juridical, cultural, and literary readings within this book that indigenous critical theoryq provides alternatives to the entanglements of race and colonialism, intimacy and relationship that continue to preoccupy poststructuralist and postcolonial studies. The stakes could not be greater, given that currently U.S. empire has manifested its face to the world as a war machine that strips life even as it demands racialized and gendered normativities. The post-9/11 national rhetorics of grief, homeland, pain, terrorism, and security have given rise to what Judith Butler describes as a process through which the Other becomes unreal. “The derealization of the ‘Other’” Butler writes, “means that it is neither alive nor dead, but interminably spectral. The infinite paranoia that imagines the war against terrorism as a war without end will be one that justifies itself endlessly in relation to the spectral infinity of its enemy, regardless of whether or not there are established grounds to suspect the continuing operation of terror cells with violent aims.”4 But this process of derealization that Butler marks in the post-9/11 grief that swept the United States, one could argue, has been functioning in Atlantic and Pacific “New Worlds” since 1492. As Geonpul scholar Aileen Moreton-Robinson argues, discourses of security are “deployed in response to a perceived threat of invasion and dispossession from Indigenous people,” and in the process, paranoid patriarchal white sovereignty manages its anxiety over dispossession and threat through a “pathological relationship to indigenous sovereignty.”5 In the United States, the Indian is the original enemy combatant who cannot be grieved.

#### The alternative is an incommensurable project of decolonization that necessitates the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the global imperial metropole – this is a complete disavowal of settler futurity that refuses to be punctuated by narratives of reconciliation.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

#### The role of debate is to disrupt settler logics that produce epistemic or material violence – we control the question of uniqueness as academic institutions are currently saturated with anti-indigenous sentimentality – decolonization is the only ethical demand your ballot should be oriented towards

#### The alternative demands a radical reconfiguration of the terms of debate that calls into question modern understandings of space within academia – refusal to conform to the rules of the game is necessary to destabilize structures of control.

Walter Mignolo 13, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies @ Duke, B.A. in philosophy @ Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Ph.D. @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 2013, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,” *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol 26:(7-8), pg. 4-5, gender modified

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts ~~himself or herself~~ [themselves] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Linear Futurism DA – cross apply Dalley - voting for util is a mobilization of settler fantasies because of settlers’ drive to prioritize their own extinction and death as leavel to that of indigenous peoples. They reify a TEMPORAL NARRATIVE that uses doomsday rhetoric to bracket out indigenous people as relics of the past and normalize whiteness as equivalent to humanity —this instills a LINEAR FUTURISM that absolves us of responsibility for settler colonialism

#### The ROB takes out any policymaking arguments they have here – it doesn’t matter if policymakers use util if this debate isn’t a question of the best policy option but rather one of the best disruption to settler colonialism

#### Util doesn’t achieve equality rather it assumes it without attention to structural conditions of dispossession that destroy equality now, a corrective filter that forefronts settler violence is necessary – ansswers their ontologically bad args

#### The Bostrom argument falls apart when you consider probability,reducing existential risk doesn’t do the same thing as preventing 0.1% of ext

### 1NC -- Mining

#### 1. No Kessler effect.

von Fange 17 [Daniel Von Fange‏, Distributed systems engineer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped” May 21st 2017, <http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/>] [modified for readability]

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per [one thousand kilometers] of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than [one in ten thousand]. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely. Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner. Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 2. No debris collision

Albrecht 16 [Mark Albrecht is chairman of the board of USSpace LLC. He was head of the White House National Space Council from 1989 to 1992. Paul Graziani is CEO and founder of Analytical Graphics, an Exton, Pennsylvania, company that develops software and provides mission assurance through the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC), “Op-ed | Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria”, SpaceNews, May 9th 2016, <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/>] [modified for readability]

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion. Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are exaggerated and misleading. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it certainly is not a crisis. So what are the facts? On the positive side, space is empty and it is vast. At the altitude of the International Space Station, one half a degree of Earth longitude is almost 40 miles long. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects and they behave quite predictably. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance. Since we first started placing objects into space there have been [eleven] known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, hundreds of telecommunications satellites, [thirteen hundred] functioning satellites on orbit today, half a million total objects in space larger than a marble, and fewer than 15 known collisions. Why do people worry?

#### 3. Debris growth down

Wall 19 [Mike Wall, Ph.D, Space.com Senior Space Writer, “Space Junk Menace: New Guidelines Urged to Help Fight Orbital Debris Threat”, Space.com, Oct 15th 2019, https://www.space.com/space-junk-threat-satellites-guidelines-reduce-orbital-debris.html]

But we can stave off the Kessler syndrome — or at least minimize the odds that it happens anytime soon — if spacecraft builders and operators follow a few simple rules, according to the Space Safety Coalition (SSC). The SSC, a newly established group of space-industry stakeholders, laid out those proposed voluntary guidelines last month in a document called "Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations." There are space-junk mitigation guidelines on the books already, which were drawn up by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee and the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. But those guidelines were last revised in 2007, the SSC noted. "Plans to increase our space population with more cubesats and other small satellites, as well as new, large constellations of satellites, were not envisioned when the above-mentioned guidelines and standards were established," the new "best practices" document states. "These new planned spacecraft and constellations, coupled with improvements in space situational awareness, space operations and spacecraft design, all provide an opportunity to expand upon established space operations and orbital debris mitigation guidelines and best practices." One of the key new recommendations is that all spacecraft that operate at an altitude above 250 miles (400 kilometers) should feature a propulsion system that allows them to maneuver their way out of potential collisions. That's a natural dividing line, Scott said; the International Space Station circles at about that altitude, and nobody wants out-of-control satellites falling back to Earth through the orbiting lab's path. Also, below 250 miles, there's enough atmosphere to create significant drag on spacecraft, causing them to deorbit relatively quickly when their operational lives are over. (The space community could designate the below-250-mile region an "experimental zone," Scott wrote in a recent blog post. Such a move would keep space "affordable for operators of the growing number of inexpensive, experimental or educational cubesats," he wrote.) The SSC also recommends that satellite designers consider building encryption into their command and control systems, so that spacecraft cannot be hijacked by hackers intent on causing havoc in orbit. And the best practices include anti-littering guidelines. For example, the handlers of satellites that operate in low-Earth orbit should include in their launch contracts a requirement that rocket upper stages be disposed of promptly, via a controlled reentry into Earth's atmosphere. As of today (Oct. 15), 31 space-industry stakeholders have endorsed the new guidelines. And there are some big names in that group, including Maxar (the parent company of satellite operator DigitalGlobe and the spacecraft manufacturer SSL, among other subsidiaries), OneWeb, Rocket Lab, Iridium, SES and Intelsat. "You don't want to wait for a disaster before you take action," Scott said. "It really is time, and you're seeing operators like Maxar and OneWeb being proactive."

#### The asteroid impact threat is propaganda meant to legitimize continued research into militarized technologies

Mellor 7 – Felicity Mellor, PhD in Theoretical Physics from Newcastle University, Colliding Worlds: Asteroid Research and the Legitimization of War in Space, Social Studies of Science, Vol. 37, No. 4, August, Jstor

During the 1980s and 1990s, a small group of planetary scientists and astronomers set about actively promoting the asteroid impact threat. They drew on an expanded empirical base, but also on narratives of technological salvation. Despite their concerns that their warnings were greeted by a 'giggle factor' and that funding remained too low, they succeeded in capturing the attention of the media and of some policy-makers and in establishing the impact threat as a legitimate and serious topic for scientific study. By the eve of the new millennium, the meaning of asteroids had undergone a significant transformation. Asteroids had gone from being distant relics of Solar System history to being a hidden enemy that could strike at any time with catastrophic consequences. The reconceptualization of asteroids was accompanied by a reconceptualization of both space and astronomy. In Newtonianism, space had been conceived as an empty geometrical abstraction in which God's handiwork was displayed to the knowing observer. Space was both predictable and dis tant. Now, with the promotion of the impact threat, space was configured as the source of an enemy against which we must defend ourselves. This threatening conception of space matched the conception of space as a theatre of war promoted by the supporters of SDI. Space had become a place, a technologized location for human action where wars could be fought and human salvation sought. Thus astronomy was also reconceptualized. Further developing the violent metaphors already appropriated by impact-extinction theory (Davis, 2001), astronomers recast their role as impassioned prophets of doom and saviours of mankind rather than as cold calculators of cosmic order. Traditionally, Solar System astronomy had dealt with the grand narratives of planetary history and the timeless certainties of celestial dynamics. The technologies of astronomy - telescopes and, later, space probes - were the tools through which new knowledge had been sought. They were not, on the whole, instruments of action. Now, however, astronomy was to be prophetic and interventionist. As comets had been in a far earlier period, both asteroids and comets were now treated as 'monsters' - portents of Earthly calamities. It was the purpose of planetary astronomy to watch for these portents. Equally, it was the duty of astronomers to warn the unsuspecting public and to intervene to save the world. Planetary astronomy was transformed from the passive observation of the heavens to the active surveillance of the heavens, and the instruments of astronomy were to be supplemented with the technologies of war. By the 1980s and 1990s, asteroid science, defence science and science fiction all presented space as an arena for technological intervention where an invisible enemy would be defeated for the greater good of mankind. Science fiction provided a culturally available resource that could give con crete form to the ideas of both asteroid scientists and weapons designers. Through narrative, the timeless and universal speculations of science could be converted into a specific sequence of events. By drawing on narratives of technological salvation, asteroid scientists made their case more com pelling, but they also became dependent on narrative scenarios shared by the defence scientists. Even as the scientists themselves attempted to pull back from concrete proposals for weapons systems, their own discourse irresistibly drew them towards the militaristic intervention demanded by the narrative imperative. The identification of asteroids as a threat required a military response. Astronomer Duncan Steel (2000b), writing about the impact threat in The Guardian newspaper, put it most clearly when he stated that 'we too need to declare war on the heavens'. Just as the overlap between science and science fiction was mutually supportive, so the overlap between impact science and defence helped legitimize both. The civilian scientists could draw on a repertoire of metaphors and concepts already articulated by the defence scientists to help make the case for the threat from space. They would no longer be a marginalized and underfunded group of astronomers, but would take on the ultimate role of defending the world. Similarly, in the context of the impact threat, the defence scientists could further develop their weapons systems without being accused of threatening the delicate nuclear balance of mutually assured destruction or, in the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and the 9/11 attacks, of irresponsibly generating a climate of fear in the absence of an identifi able enemy. The civilian scientists attempted to still their consciences in their deal ings with the defence scientists by suggesting that, with the end of the Cold War and the demise of SDI, the latter had lost their traditional role. This argument was naive at best. In fact, as we have seen, the US defence sci entists had taken an interest in the impact threat since the early 1980s, from the time that SDI had greatest political support during the defence build-up of the Reagan era. Even at the time of the fractious Interception Workshop, George H.W. Bush was maintaining SDI funding at the same level as it had been during the second Reagan administration. If outwardly the Clinton administration was less supportive when it took office in 1993 and declared that SDI was over, many of those involved in the programme felt that it would actually go on much as before (FitzGerald, 2000: 491). SDI was renamed, and to some extent reconceived, but funding continued and was soon increased when the Republicans gained a majority in Congress.33 After George W. Bush took office in 2001, spending on missile defence research was greatly increased, including programmes to follow on from Brilliant Pebbles (Wall, 2001a; 2001b). Thus the defence scientists had shown an interest in the impact threat from the time of the very first meeting onwards, regardless of the state of funding for missile defence, which in any case continued throughout the This is not to suggest that the impact threat was not used by the defence scientists as a means of maintaining the weapons establishment. Indeed, the impact threat offered a possible means of circumventing or undermining arms treaties.34 But it does mean that the attempt to access new sources of funding, while being an important factor in the promotion of asteroids as a threat, did not fully explain either the weapons scientists' interests or the civilian scientists' repeated meetings with them. The asteroid impact threat offered a scientifically validated enemy onto which could be projected the fears on which a militaristic culture depends. Far from providing a replacement outlet for weapons technologies, the promotion of the asteroid impact threat helped make the idea of war in space more acceptable and helped justify the continued development of space based weaponry. Arguably, with the Clementine and Deep Impact mis sions, the asteroid impact threat even facilitated the testing of SDI-style systems. The asteroid impact threat legitimized a way of talking, and thinking, that was founded on fear of the unknown and the assumption that advanced technology could usher in a safer era. In so doing, it resonated with the politics of fear and the technologies of permanent war that are now at the centre of US defence policy. In this post-Cold War period, scholars of the relation between military and civilian science need to examine carefully claims about 'ploughshare' or 'conversion' technologies. New technologies arise not just out of funding and policy decisions, but also out of the social imaginaries in which new weapons can be imagined and construed as necessary. Concepts such as 'dual use' or 'cover' also need to be assessed critically.35 One way of char acterizing the Clementine missions would be as dual-use technologies whose scientific aims served as cover for the testing of SDI technologies. Yet this fails to reveal the ways in which these missions were just one con crete output of a more fundamental conceptual alliance between weapons designers and astronomers. In this paper, I have attempted to show that by also considering the narrative context in which such initiatives are located, it is possible to throw some light on the cultural web that binds civilian sci ence to military programmes. But the focus on narrative also begs a question: Which stories would we prefer to frame our science? Should science be driven by fear or by curiosity? Should it be aimed at creating technologies of war or cultures of compassion? These are normative questions, but they are also precisely the questions that make the military influence on science such an important issue. Narratives are inherently ideological and a refusal to see them as such does no more to enhance the scholar's objectivity than it does the scientist's. The stories told by the asteroid scientists led them into collaborations with weapons scientists and helped fuel a discourse of fear that served a particular ideological purpose. This should be both recognized and chal lenged, not for the sake of regaining some impossible ideal of an undis torted science but because there are other stories, based on different ideological assumptions, that we could tell in order to guide science towards more peaceful ends.

#### No space escalation---empirics, de facto norms, and unpredictable consequences

Pavur 19 [James, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training Oxford University, Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space” https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art\_12\_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf]

3. STABILITY IN SPACE

Given the uncomfortable combination of high dependency and low survivability, one might expect to observe frequent attacks against critical military assets in orbit. However, despite decades of recurring prophesies of impending space war, no such conflict has broken out [14]–[18]. It is true that a handful of space security crises have occurred; most notably, the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2008 US ASAT demonstration in response [19]. Moreover, a recent Centre for Strategic and International Studies report suggests increasing interest in attacking US space assets, particularly among the Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iranian militaries [20]. Overall, however, the space domain has remained puzzlingly peaceful. In this section, we outline three major contributors to this enduring stability: limited accessibility, attributable norms, and environmental interdependence.

A. Limited Accessibility

Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.

Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime.

C. Environmental Interdependence

A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No escalation

### 1NC -- Multilateralism

#### The attempt to explore space reflects an insatiable urge to colonize and dominate. Going to space does not resolve problems on earth---it merely expands the destructive potential of our worst impulses

Bormann 9 – Natalie Bormann, Department of Politics, Northeastern University, Boston, and Michael Sheehan, Professor of International Relations at Swansea University, Securing Outer Space, p. 1-3

For fifty years, much of our thinking about socio-political, economic and military-related issues were defined, shaped and driven by the Cold War and the central icy of a comfortable paradox - that of a bipolar nuclear confrontation. A decade and a half after the end of that confrontation we are still deemed to be living in a period, the 'post'-Cold War era, that is defined only in relation to the preceding one. And while there is a strong temptation, if\* not an expectation, for some scholars to adhere to these well-known and totalizing terms of the debate, for others the past two generations have been animated by a different, and pervasive, intervention - the 'space age'. The movement of humanity into space and the development of satellite technology in retrospect may well appear as the defining characteristic of this period.

The fiftieth anniversary of the beginning of the space age was marked on 4 October 2007. It was on this day, in 1957, that the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first satellite to be placed in orbit. This dramatic event not only ushered in the space era, it also triggered a set or questions regarding the assumptions and effects that were (and are) constitutive of this new endeavor: questions of the global, the international, the political, the ethical, the technical, the scientific, humankind and modernity — to name but a few. In what ways would these questions guide, alter and intervene with our activities in space? But also, in what ways would the space age guide, alter and intervene with these questions?

That day in October 1957 also marked the beginning of serious concerns regarding the modes and kinds of space activities that we would be witnessing, and these concerns were dominated from the outset by the fact that the first journey into space was accompanied by - if not entirely driven by - the Cold War arms race. The initial steps in the exploration of space were inexorably linked with pressures to militarize and securitize this new dimension. As a geographical realm that had hitherto been pristine in relation to mankind's warlike history, this immediate tendency for space exploration to be led by military rationales raised profound philosophical and political questions. What should the purpose of space activity be, and what should it not be? And how would we approach, understand and distinguish between military activities, civilian ones, commercial ones, and SO forth?

More than a half century later, the questions as to what we bring to space' as well as how space activities challenge us, and to what effects, seem ever more pressing. While the debate over some of the assumptions, modes and effects of the space age never truly abated, most of the contributors in this volume agree that there is sense of urgency in raising concern, re-conceptualizing the modes of the debate, and engaging critically with the limits and possibilities of the dimension of space vis-a-vis the political.

This sense of urgency reflects the revitalization of national space programmes, and particularly that of the United States and China since the start of the twenty-first century. In January 2004, at NASA headquarters, US President George W. Bush announced the need for a new vision for America's civilian and scientific space programme. This call culminated in a Commission's Report on Implementation of United States Space Exploration Policy, which emphasized the fundamental role of space for US technological leadership, economic validity, and most importantly, security. While this certainly stimulated the debate over the future direction of US space exploration, it has led many to express concern over the implicitly aggressive and ambitious endeavor of colonizing space in the form of calling upon the need for permanent access to and presence in space. A critical eye has also been cast on the Commission's endorsement of the privatization and commercialization of space and its support for implementing a far larger presence of private industry in space operations.

Certainly also at the forefront of the current debate on space activities are notions of its militarization and securitization. The deployment of technologies with the aim to secure, safeguard, defend and control certain assets, innovations and activities in space is presented to us as an inevitable and necessary development. It is argued that just as the development of reconnaissance aircraft in the Fitst World War led inexorably to the emergence of fighter aircraft to deny the enemy the ability to carry out such reconnaissance and then bombers to deliver weapons against targets that could be identified and reached from the air, so too has the 'multiplier effect' on military capabilities of satellites encouraged calls for the acquisition of space-based capabilities to defend one's own satellites and attack those of adversaries, and in the longer term, to place weapons in space that could attack targets on Earth. Here, the Bush administration's indication that it envisaged a prominent role for space-based weapons in the longer term as part of the controversial national missile defence system contributed to the atmosphere of controversy surrounding space policy.

As space has become crucial to, and utilized by, far more international actors, so the political implications of space activities have multiplied. The members of the European Space Agency have pursued space development for economic, scientific and social reasons. Their model of international space Cooperation has been seen as offering an example to other areas of the world, particularly in their desire to avoid militarizing efforts. Yet even Europe has begun to develop military space capabilities, following a path that has already been pursued by other key states such as China and India, suggesting that there is an inevitability about the militarization, and perhaps ultimately the weaponization, of space. How we conceptualize space has therefore become of fundamental moral, political and strategic importance.

Outer space challenges the political imagination as it has always challenged the human imagination in many other fields. For millennia people have looked up to the stars and imagined it as the home of gods or the location of the afterlife. For centuries they have looked to it for answers about the physical nature of the universe and the place of mankind's ancestral home within it. And for decades, it has been seen as the supreme test for advanced technology. Space exploration is a driver of innovation, encouraging us to dream of what might be possible, to push back the boundaries of thought and to change the nature of ontological realities by drawing on novel epistemologies. The physical exploration of the solar system through the application of science and technology has been the visible demonstration of this.

The challenges that Space poses for political theory are profound. If space-is about the use of imagination, and the application of novel developments to create new possibilities for human progress, how has political theory and political reality responded to this challenge'? The answer, at least thus far, is both that it has changed everything, and that it has changed very little. For international law, most notably in the Outer Space Treaty, the denial of territoriality and limitations on sovereignty beyond planet Earth offers a fundamental challenge to the way in which international relations has been conceptualized and operationalized in the modern era. On the other hand, the dream of many, that humanity would leave behind its dark side as it entered space, has not been realized. For the most part, the exploration and utilization to space has reflected, not challenged, the political patterns and impulses that characterized twentieth-century politics and international relations. Propaganda, military rivalry, economic competition and exploitation, North—South discrimination and so on have extended their reach beyond the atmosphere. Industrialization and imperialism in the nineteenth century helped produce powerful new social theories, as well as new philosophy, political ideologies and conceptualizarions of the meaning of politics and the nature of human destiny

#### The rhetoric of space exploration affirms a narrative of U.S. exceptionalism---this propels material violence

**Billings 7** – Linda Billings, Ph.D., Research Associate at SETI Institute, Societal Impact of Space Flight, p. 483-484

The ideas of frontier pioneering, continual progress, manifest destiny, free enterprise, and rugged individualism have been prominent in the American national narrative, which has constructed and maintained an ideology of "Americanism"—what it means to be American, and what America is meant to be and do. In exploring the history of U.S. spaceflight, it is useful to consider how U.S. space advocacy movements and initiatives have interpreted and deployed the values and beliefs sustained by this national narrative.The aim here is to illuminate the role and function ot ideology and advocacy in the history of spaceflight by examining the rhetoric of spaceflight advocacy.' Starting from the premise that spaceflight has played a role in the American national narrative and that this national narrative has played a role in the history of spaceflight, this paper examines the relationship between spaceflight and this narrative. Examining the history of spaceflight advocacy reveals an ideology of spaceflight that draws deeply on a durable American cultural narrative—a national mythology—of frontier pioneering, continual progress, manifest destiny, free enterprise, rugged individualism, and a right to life without limits. This ideology rests on a number of assumptions, or beliefs, about the role of the United States in the global community, the American national character, and the "right" form of political economy. According to this ideology, the United States is and must remain "Number One" in the world community, playing the role of political, economic, scientific, technological, and moral leader. That is, the United States is and must be exceptional. This ideology constructs Americans as independent, pioneering, resourceful, inventive, and exceptional, and it establishes that liberal democracy and free-market capitalism (or capitalist democracy) constitute the only viable form of political economy." The rhetoric of space advocacy exalts those enduring American values of pioneering, progress, enterprise, freedom, and rugged individualism, and it advances the cause of capitalist democracy. Helving into the language or rhetoric of spaceflight is a productive way of exploring the meanings and motives that are embedded in and conveyed by the ideology and advocacy of spaceflight—the cultural narrative of pioneering the space frontier. According to rhetorical critic Thomas Less], rhetorical analysis can shed some light on . . . |T|he processes of communication that underpin decision making in free societies . . . .Judgments on matters of public policy take their cues from rhetoric, and so an understanding of any society s rhetoric will tell us a lot about its ideas, beliefs, laws, customs and assumptions—especially how and why such social features came into being.1 To begin this, analysis, some definition of key concepts is warranted, starting with culture and communication. Anthropologist Clifford Goertzs definition of culture is operative in tins analysis: [Culture is an| historically transmitted pattern of meanings embedded in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life. |It is a context within which social action can be] intelligiblv—that is, thickly—described.1 Building on Geertz's conception, communication theorist James Carey has characterized culture as a predominantly rhetorical construction, "a set of practices, a mode of human activity, a process whereby reality is created, maintained and transformed," primarily by means of communication."' Social norms can be constructed.perpetuated,and resisted—and ideologies can be propagated—"through ritualized communication practices." 'When advocates speak of advancing scientific and technological progress by exploring and exploiting the space frontier, they are performing ritual incantations of a national myth, repeating a cultural narrative that affirms what America and Americans are like and are meant to do. For the purposes of this analysis, communication is a ritual, culture is communication, and communication is culture. Standard definitions of ideology and advocacy are operational here. An ideology in .1 belief system (personal, political, social, cultural). Advocacy is the act of arguing in favor of a cause, idea, or policy.