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#### Settler colonialism mobilizes temporality itself in service of the consummation of white settler sovereignty – this operates through liberal narratives of progressivism that rely upon a vanishing endpoint of a “better world” achieved through the completion of the project of settler modernity. Normative debate is structured by the imperative of forward motion that locates the plan as a transformative break with colonial society that relegates the backwardness of indigeneity to the past and envisions a settler utopia in its place.

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Time, decolonization and colonial completion Critical geographers use Foucault’s insights to unsettle modern understandings of space as a fixed environment in which politics takes place. Instead, they show that political projects construct, naturalize and respond to particular spatial understandings.30 In relation to Indigenous policy, critical analysts are quick to identify these political deployments of space. SuvendriniPerera, for example, shows that policy-makers represent remote Indigenous communities as ‘set apart from the body of the nation, and as the locus of unspeakable violence and abjection’.31 As part of the discourse of the Northern Territory Intervention, the metaphor of the distant frontier — or vulnerable centre — is pervasive. Remote Aboriginal communities prescribed for Intervention are para - digmatically referred to in media reports as ‘remote Aboriginal societies’, ‘this other Australia’, ‘the remote world’ and as ‘a distinct domain’.32 Unsettling dominant understandings of time is equally important. In his work ‘The End of the Passing Past’, Walters aims to ‘think about change in ways that refuse the obligation to side with or against continuity… and resist the temptations of progressivism and reductionism’.33 He draws on Bruno Latour’s examination of the modern temporal imaginary, and his denat - uralizing of modern political timelines: We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting.34 This interrogation is especially useful in relation to understanding settler colonialism and Indigenous policy-making. Barry Hindess, Elizabeth Povinelli and N. Sheehan, for example, reflect on Western temporal constructions of Aboriginality and indicate how these relate to liberal political agendas. Barry Hindess argues that liberalism tends to locate different cultures in its own past, even when they coexist with liberal societies in the present.35 Indigenous groups, in particular, are located prior to the transformative moment of sovereign agreement, which in turn is read as an indication of their incapacity to enter into this superior, rational political future. Norm Sheehan maintains that settler colonialism in Australia is deeply invested in these kinds of temporal logics: In contrast to previous colonial contexts which tended to focus on constructing difference based on inherent racial traits the antipodean designation as primitive defines this specific other as non-other. The antipodean aborigine is by definition from the origin of (all) mankind which positions this primitive as an earlier and therefore lesser version of European self.36 Elizabeth Povinelli briefly makes a similar point in her analysis of recent Australian Indigenous policy: [E]ven as liberalism came to accept its fate as a culture among other cultures it differentiated the tense and orientation of its cultural difference from other cultures. The West as a general idea would claim the future and claim the potentiality of individuals and assign the past and the constraint of individuals to others — or, it would recognize that these were the values of non-liberal cultures.37 She refers to these patterns of political temporal positioning as ‘technologies of temporality’. Drawing together the work of Walters, Hindess, Sheehan and Povinelli, it becomes apparent that colonialism does not just take place in time. It constructs narratives of time, in ways that create particular political relationships in the present, and attempts to move itself through time to a certain political future. In the remainder of this section, we compare the temporalities of post-colonial and settler-colonial political formations, and argue that both anchor themselves to some sort of transformative ‘endpoint’. This radical political break separates a problematic past from a completed future and, in settler-colonial societies, involves a strange assemblage of ideas about decolonization, revolution, full colonization and sovereign exchange. The term post-colonial implies ‘the notion of a movement be - yond’;38 ‘the “post” in “post-colonial” suggests “after” the demise of colonialism, it is imbued, quite apart from its user’s intentions, with an ambiguous spatio-temporality’.39 In a number of former colonies (both extractive, such as India, and settler, such as Algeria), the formal colonial project has indeed ended. The term postcolonial captures something about the complex political realities of these nation-states today. A dramatic, and often violent, moment of structural decolonization separates these state’s colonial pasts from their post-colonial presents. However, even in relation to those nations which have undergone such institutional transformations, scholars contest the use of the term. Ella Shohat suggests that it erases the ongoing structural imperialisms that persist: ‘How then does one negotiate sameness and difference within the framework of a “post-colonial” whose “post” emphasizes rupture and deemphasizes sameness?’40 Some scholars use the term neocolonialism to indicate political continuity, and to contest the understanding that critical post-colonial work seeks to put out minor spot-fires of inequality left by ‘real’ colonialism.41 If the temporal narrative of post-colonialism is problematic in relation to former extractive colonies, it is altogether inaccurate when applied to ongoing settler colonies such as Australia. Yet post-colonial scholarship has dominated international academic [T]he lack of historical specificity in the ‘post’ leads to a collaps - ing of diverse chronologies … It equates early independence won by settler colonial states, in which Europeans formed their new nation-states in non-European territories at the expense of Indigenous populations, with that of nationstates whose indigenous populations struggled for inde - pendence against Europe.42 Australia has not, and most probably will not, undergo the kind of institutional transfer of control to the Indigenous population that could justify the application of the term post-colonial. And yet it is quite common to see Australia identified as a post-colonial or decolo nizing nation in cultural studies, literary theory and policy analysis.43 One of the greatest contributions of the emerging field of settler-colonial studies is the fact that it provides clear conceptual tools to articulate exactly why it is that nations like Australia and Canada should be understood differently. However, it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of settlercolonial studies in Australian scholarship. Critical Indigenous the - orists are carrying on their own conversation regarding Australian colonial conditions, and have long contested the relevance of the term post-colonial. Irene Watson, for example, argues: I understand the contemporary colonial project as one that has continued unabated from the time of the landing and invasion by the British in 1788 … the Australian state retains a vested interest in keeping the violence going, and the inequalities and iniquities that are maintained against Aboriginal peoples for the purpose of maintaining the life and continuity of the state. A question the Australian state is yet to resolve is its own illegitimate foundation and transformation into an edifice deemed lawful. Within this unanswered questionable structure the Australian state parades as one which has obliterated the ‘founding violence’ of its ‘illegitimate origins’ and ‘repressed them into a timeless past’.44 Aileen Moreton-Robinson instead uses the term post-colonizing, capturing the ambiguous and shifting temporal technologies deployed in settler-colonial Australia. These new conceptual models have grown productively out of the object of our study: the postcolonizing world we inhabit. Our respective geographical locations are framed by nation states such as the USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand where colonization has not ceased to exist; it has only changed in form from that which our ancestors encountered.45 While settler-colonial studies proceeds from a conceptual distinction between extractive and settler colonialism, Indigenous scholarship is based in the lived experiences of ongoing colonization.46 Settlercolonial studies would benefit from connecting to this existing academic conversation that runs parallel to and intersects with its own ideas in important ways. In particular, it draws attention to ongoing Indigenous contestation of colonial projects, and counters the tendency towards totalizing, structural accounts of settler colonialism. As Watson observes: Today our voices are still talking while the colonial project remains entrenched and questions concerning identity politics, and the ‘authentic native’ are constructed and answered by those who have power.47 Up to this point, we have been drawing together points made by other scholars. Settler colonialism has an ongoing, structural temporality, which is generally unacknowledged and contrasts with the linear colonialism–decolonization–post-colonialism narrative. However, we suggest that the application of a unidirectional, progressive temporality to the settler-colonial context is not just an analytical mistake, but a ‘technology of temporality’. This conception is taken up within the settler-colonial project in ways that work towards the consummation of settler sovereignty. The borrowed notion of a ‘radical break’ is variously located in settler colonialism’s past, present or future. By harnessing the decolonizing resonances of this concept of colonial transforma - tion, the settler-colonial project obscures the very different political effects of its own ‘vanishing endpoint’.48 What is this vanishing endpoint, which seems to lurk in all of our imaginations, our policy projects and our political debates? Instead of the moment of decolonization, it is the moment of full colonization — or rather, it is both, because in this imagined moment colonial relationships will dissolve themselves and settler authority will be naturalized. This transformative event is both an impossible colonial dream, premised on the disappearance of Indigenous political difference, and a concrete political project that justifies all manner of tactics in the present. But what are the political con - sequences of such a preoccupation? And do Indigenous participants in the colonial relationship seek the same kind of resolution and dissolution? Significantly, the Western colonial narrative of transformational change maps onto another Western imaginary — the moment of sovereign transformation encapsulated in the social contract. This is the moment that a group of people transition from collective social ‘status’ into individualized freedom and contractual person - hood.49 It is also the movement out of a constraining ‘history’ into an atemporal, rational present. As Hindess argues, liberalism con - signs its Indigenous contemporaries to its own past, and imagines this location in the past to be ‘a kind of moral and intellectual failure’, revealing the incapacity and disinclination to enter into a social contract and join the present.50 Therefore, the movement through time, via a radical transformative moment, is also the developmental movement from incapacity to capacity. An unstable but productive dichotomy emerges between, on the one hand, Indigenous political difference-incapacity-status-injustice-lack of sovereignty, and on the other, colonial completion-capacitycontract-freedom-sovereign inclusion. These oppositions are separated by an image of a single, interchangeable and undefined threshold — the transformative event. This temporal narrative belongs to both progressive and conservative articulations of the settler-colonial future; the settler colonial endpoint is variously positioned as an inevitable global trend,51 a past achievement yet to be fully recognized,52 and a future goal for which Aboriginal people must prepare.53 As Povinelli notes, these conceptions are not only temporal, but also teleological: [T]hese tenses are in turn articulated to other discourses of time and event such as teleological discourses that apprehend events ‘as the realization of an already given end or telos and eschatological discourses that wait for ‘extreme’ or ‘ultimate’ moments and events which immediately precede or accompany ‘the end of history’ and ‘its reversal into eternity’.54 The transformative event is positioned as part of an inevitable and inescapable trajectory (although it may be consistently deferred or delayed). In this way, the eventual legitimacy and stability of the settler-colonial project is always-already assumed. Through this a priori assumption, settler colonialism is able to entrench and sustain itself on the basis of its eventual demise. The following section traces the appearance and temporal location of this settler-colonial end - point in recent Australian Indigenous policy phases.

#### Space management cannot be understood outside of settler colonialism. The infrastructure, institutions, and Eurocentric values of space policy are considered the hallmarks of science and progress, which become weaponized against Indigenous resistance.

Matson and Nunn 17

(Zannah Mae Matson is a PhD student in Human Geography at the University of Toronto, Neil Nunn is a PhD candidate in the Department of Geography and Planning at the University of Toronto, 10-3-17, SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE, EMPIRE, AND THE FINAL FRONTIER: WHAT THE MAUNA KEA LAND DEFENDERS TEACH US ABOUT COLONIAL TOTALITY, Society and Space, <https://societyandspace.org/2017/10/03/space-infrastructure-empire-and-the-final-frontier-what-the-mauna-kea-land-defenders-teach-us-about-colonial-totality/>, JKS)

Mauna Kea is a dormant volcano and the highest point on the archipelago of Hawai’i. When measured from its base at seafloor, it is the tallest mountain on earth. These towering heights, in a region of the world with minimal light pollution has also earned Mauna Kea recognition of being one of the best spots on the planet for examining the cosmos. Long before the development of modern space infrastructure, however, the peak of Mauna Kea was regarded by native Hawaiians as among the most sacred places on the archipelago of Hawai’i. The place where earth meets the heavens. These divergent perspectives are embedded within a larger relationship of imperial domination that has seeded a century of unrest. While the primary focus of the protest was to challenge a half-century disregard for this sacred site by numerous entities and interests, the Battle for Mauna Kea cannot be understood outside Hawaii’s 125 year-long history of colonial occupation. In 1893, the Hawaiian Kingdom and its Queen, Lydia Kamaka’eha Lili’uokalani, were overthrown by a US led military coup (Long, 2017). Speaking to a spirit of resistance that has existed on the islands since the coup, scholar-activist K. Kamakaoka’ilima Long (2017: 15) states: “four decades of land struggles and cultural historical recovery… have grown a Hawaiian sovereignty movement… playing out in both land defense and as a movement to re-realize Hawaiian political independence as a sovereign state.” This recent assertion of self-determination, now known as the battle for Mauna Kea, has grown to become a global movement with broad support from high-profile figures and the hashtags #Wearemaunakea, #ProtectMaunaKea, and #TMTshutdown trending widely on social media. More than just a source of inspiration for the groundswell anti-colonial movements around the world, this story provides a context to better understand ongoing colonial occupation that is reinforced through the constitutive power of space infrastructure. Working from decades of resistance that culminated in the “battle for Mauna Kea,” we engage the notion of colonial totality to conceptualize the resistance to space infrastructure and the ongoing US occupation of Hawaii, reflecting on what this movement provides for better understanding totality and the relationship between space infrastructure and the shifting nature of colonial occupation more broadly. The notion of totality describes the process by which occupied spaces are coded with Western values in the form of normalized cultures, epistemologies, and institutions that produces an “atomistic image of social existence” (Quijano, 2007: 174). The institutions, ideologies and systems that advocate for the construction of space infrastructure exemplify this process. Astronomers frame the building of the observatory infrastructure as an essential piece in advancing our knowledge of outer space and ultimately achieving ‘universal’ progress. The resistance to development of these infrastructural systems is an invitation to consider the relationship between space as a frontier of discovery and ongoing questions of settler colonialism; the blockade has made visible the inherent relationship between the infrastructure of scientific exploration and the logic of totalizing colonial rationality that enables the development of massive telescopes on occupied land. While these perspectives of colonial totality provide a useful understanding of power and institutions that shape this conflict, we suggest that the Hawaiian land defenders’ refusal of the normalizing force of space infrastructure demonstrates the complexities and conditions relating to the notion of totality and ultimately the inadequacies of the concept. During a public comment period at 2015 University of Hawai‘i Board of Regents meeting, Dr. Pualani Kanaka’ole Kanahele gestures to both the totalizing colonial discourse that suppresses her cultural beliefs and the importance of fighting back against these systems: … we believe in the word of our ancestors…they say we are the products of this land and that is our truth…and that is what we are fighting for. This is our way of life. This is not our job. We don’t earn money from doing this. But for generations after generations, we will continue to be doing what we are doing today. What Dr. Kanahele speaks of goes beyond the physical destruction of the sacred ancestral site, to describe a hegemonic normalization and occupation that actively effaces traditional Hawaiian ways of being in the world. The words and actions of the land defenders challenge totalizing structures that classify space according to a narrow set of beliefs about the world. Working from these acts of resistance, we want to suggest that the Hawaiian sovereignty movement illuminates how systems of scientific thought and the project of space exploration rely on Euro-western values being the standard by which all other values are measured. It is this wide acceptance of these structures and principles of reasoning that serve to justify the construction of infrastructure that at once reproduces and fortifies these myths. This self-reinforcing relationship between the production of space infrastructure and the logics that justify it speaks to a powerful aspects of colonial totality: the way it gains power by rendering illegible the very elements relied upon to actively produce the other. The generally unquestioned salience of space infrastructure is a powerful example of this. As Quijano (2007: 174) describes, the relationship between colonialism and scientific discourse is a mutually reinforcing and “part of, a power structure that involved the European colonial domination over the rest of the world.” In Hawai’i, we see the settler colonial process of cultural attrition operating through a totalizing force of colonial knowledge systems that extend beyond physical occupation of land to include an erasure of Indigenous Hawaiian ways of knowing. Although the spatialities and technologies associated with this form of stellar navigation are radically dissimilar, we suggest that on a basic level, this form of space exploration is continuous with a lineage of Euro-western projects of discovery. In short, space as the ‘final frontier’ is not simply a metaphor but speaks to the role of astronomy in upholding the ongoing projection of values onto new territories and extending power and acquisition of territory to those complicit in colonial processes. This extends both to the world’s highest peaks and into the heavens. Space infrastructure is central to this ongoing frontier process that seeks to code ‘new’ territories as knowable according to certain values and, as a result, casts inhabitants who fall outside this paradigm as irrational, less-than-human, and exploitable. However, as Lowe (2015: 2) warns, these abstract promises of human freedoms and rational progress are necessarily discordant with the “global conditions on which they depend.” Which is to say that these atomistic systems dispose of the very relationships and elements of life that make them possible. A belief in respecting the sacredness of the world is just one example of this. It is also essential to recognize the process of establishing colonial totality is one that imperial forces have worked tirelessly to instill. Recognizing this helps to disrupt an appearance of givenness that colonial occupation relies upon. The land defenders have been vocal about this, reminding of us of the fact that since the arrival of James Cook to the Hawaiian Islands in 1778, settler colonial campaigns have been advancing longstanding patterns of cultural removal, fueled by beliefs in colonial supremacy. Following the coup and overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy by US-led forces, a colonial oligarchy banned Hawaiian languages from schools and formalized English as the official language for business and government relations (Silva, 2004: 2-3). This legislation eroded language, culture, and sacred practice; and is an example of what Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (cited in Silva, 2004: 3) describes as a “cultural bomb” of settler colonialism that serves to “annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves.” According to Chickasaw theorist Jodi Byrd, continually reflecting on the historical and ongoing work that maintains the conditions of settler colonialism is essential to resisting the tendency for colonial constraint to appear inevitable, unresolvable, and complete (Byrd, 2011; see also Simpson, 2014). There was nothing, easy, given, or natural about processes of colonial occupation. While we acknowledge the usefulness of totality for thinking about colonial supremacy, we have concerns about its tendency to inscribe an inaccurate depiction of Euro-western superpower with total ideological control over subjugated Indigenous population. Put differently, we are cautious of the work that the notion of totality does to reinforce a too widely accepted view of Indigenous populations as helplessly dominated, or even anachronistic. The Hawaiian sovereignty movement demonstrates that this is not the case. What the battle at Mauna Kea has shown—akin to other efforts of refusal, such as those at Standing Rock—is that the war against colonialism is ongoing. At present, it appears the land protectors have been successful in their goals of halting construction, as the development team behind the project has begun considering secondary sites for the telescope. The resistance at Mauna Kea, then, is a powerful symbol of the possibility of rupturing the normative totality of Modernist scientific rationality, but it also underscores the recalcitrance of the structures of control and the challenges of pushing back against colonial occupation. However, despite this rupturing of hegemonic ideas of science and progress through the resistance movement, the dominant response from the scientific community has been largely one of confusion and perplexity. This reaction to the uprising speaks to the power of the narratives that cement the Western framework as ‘truth,’ ‘natural,’ and ‘given.’ For these representatives of state and international institutions, violent control is re-framed as co-existence to achieve Modernist notions of progress, while the claims of Indigenous people are reduced to frivolous demands with primitive and irrational connections to the past. This, of course, exists with little consideration of the irony of how this frenzy to build infrastructure that works to “know” the cosmos may be read as equally irrational. This essay has sought to consider the relationship between infrastructure and colonialism, emphasizing that even the most futuristic space telescopes have embedded within them a lineage of Euro-western cultural supremacy. It is important to recognize the extant materiality of these infrastructures as a manifestation of hegemonic systems that perpetuate myths of rationality and Euro-western cultural supremacy. The battle for Mauna Kea movement highlights the importance of remembering the long historical processes and extensive exertion of colonial constraint and cultural removal that has been necessary to maintain control of the land. Despite the social processes that naturalize colonial infrastructure, there is nothing essential, necessary, or pre-ordained about enormous telescopes. The success of the land defenders at Mauna Kea, and the support the movement gained around the world, shows us that Euro-western forces and the infrastructure that is central to maintaining their normative influence, are replete with fissures and contradictions worth pushing against. In spite of the hegemonic forces of modernity and rationality behind the construction of the TMT and a continued attempt to assert colonial totality, the battle at Mauna Kea indicates these hegemonic forces have been far from totalizing. The colonial powers do not have the final word. The land defenders at Mauna Kea have demonstrated a powerful vision for disrupting normative ways of occupying land and knowing the cosmos inspiring us to think further on the complexities of mobilizing infrastructure to resist colonialism. It is within these ruptures that we see a potential for a continued learning from the stars and our social existence.

#### Extraterrestrial colonialism is naturalized through the discourse of public ownership – the resolution’s call to condemn the doctrine of private appropriation and replace it with nationalization is a call to recenter the settler public as the legitimate and rightful owners of space and place.

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By Force of Expectation: Colonization, Public Lands, and the Property Relation

Over the course of the long nineteenth century, land policy was increasingly deployed as a means of encouraging western settlement, while also being symptomatic of the tensions among federal administration, private speculators, and extra-legal settler encroachment.13 As is often noted in scholarship on the public domain—but infrequently emphasized in discussions of the United States more generally—almost one-third of all land in the United States is administered by the federal government. This land is disproportionately concentrated in the western states, with federal acreage totaling nearly 80 percent of Nevada, 63 percent of Utah, and 53 percent of Oregon.14 Considered a revenue source for federal war debt during the early national era, public land policy operated initially to survey, secure, and dispose collateral in the service of national solvency in accordance with the Land Ordinance of 1785.15 Enormous giveaways and preferential lease arrangements for railroad corporations and extractive industries accompanied the aftermath of the Civil War. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 inaugurated a new era in federal management of public lands by instituting grazing fees for use of the public domain and effectively ending homesteading.16 In 1976, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act mandated multiple-use standards—including environmental protections aligned with the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act—that continue to govern Bureau of Land Management oversight.17 It was in the context of increased federal management and conservationist legislation that ranchers such as the Bundys increasingly cast themselves as victims of government overreach, as the true embodiment of the American people oppressed by governmental tyranny. Moreover, as has been the case in other settler uprisings in the west, the Bundys displayed no interest whatsoever in the actual and still-present Native peoples whose land they occupied as anything other than a historical metaphor for contemporary white injury. As Ryan Bundy remarked during the 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in Oregon, the militia “recognize that the Native Americans had the claim to the land . . . but they lost that claim. . . . There are things to learn from cultures of the past, but the current culture is the most important.”18 In fact, a variety of claims to land are made in the name of “the public” and “the people” as a collective interest in opposition to the federal government, the extractive industries, or the supposedly special interests of Native American tribes.19 Here, generalized claims to representing “the public” and “the people” obscure the particular and often antagonistic positions that galvanize such claims, as well as casting tribes as a single interest group that fraudulently make claims in the name of sovereignty and treaty rights. The spectrum of debate on public lands today tends to naturalize the white nationalism espoused by the Bundys—even when ostensibly criticizing the occupations as extremist or without merit—by recourse to conceptions of the national public and natural resources as national commons.20 The notion of the commons itself is a logic of apparent universal access and public good that is used to justify indigenous dispossession, depicting the particular and historical belonging of Native peoples as an overly self-interested obstacle to the greater good of the commons. At the same time, recourse to an exceptionalist discourse that casts public lands as “the common birthright of all Americans” has become a frequent rejoinder to either plans for the large-scale transfer of federal lands to states and private industry. For instance, Utah Congressman Jason Chaffetz’s proposed Disposal of Excess Federal Lands Act in January 2017 was abruptly withdrawn after criticism from groups such as Backcountry Hunters and Anglers proclaimed: “It seems the politicians on Capitol Hill have forgotten to whom the land actually belongs. You, me and every other citizen of this country.”21 The substance of the bill echoed both Utah’s 2012 Transfer of Public Lands Act (which demanded that the U.S. Congress convey federal public lands to the state) and the 2016 Republican Party campaign platform (which likewise called for the devolution of public lands to states), even as it remained out of step with public statements by Donald Trump and Montana representative Ryan Zinke, then Trump’s likely nominee on his way to becoming the Secretary of the Interior, who sought to maintain federal control while increasing deregulation to allow for expanded access for private industry.22 Yet both proponents of the populist “to whom the land actually belongs” and legislators espouse a defensive nationalism and incontrovertible possession contingent upon the presumed comprehensive dispossession of indigenous peoples.

#### The affirmative’s refinement of international treaties rooted in settlerism – the imposition of negotiated jurisdiction over space is the mechanism by which settler society continually legitimates its control at the expense of indigenous sovereignty.

Stevenson 18 ((Re)Making Indigenous Water Worlds: Settler Colonialism, Indigenous Rights, and Hydrosocial Relations in the Settler Nation State, https://curve.carleton.ca/system/files/etd/eaabce01-b8fc-4f56-9a2f-ff021030ed3f/etd\_pdf/5b25eacdaec3752421984fd2f2b8df69/stevenson-remakingindigenouswaterworldssettlercolonialism.pdf)

Interpretation of Indigenous rights in our contemporary moment has occurred most definitively through Canada’s Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement policies (CLCAs)—what are often referred to as the “modern treaties” and what the Canadian government calls “the unfinished business of treaty-making” (Government of Canada, “Comprehensive Claims”). In the broadest sense, CLCAs seek to address ownership, management, and use of lands, waters, and natural resources (Land Claims Agreement Coalition; Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada). More significantly, they set out to determine the meaning and breadth of Aboriginal right and title in terms that the state deems legible within the constraints of the assertion of Crown sovereignty. While significant progress has been made by Indigenous peoples through the CLCA process, Bonita Lawrence writes, Ultimately, there is little difference between, on the one hand, historical treaty making and policies based on assimilation, and on the other, modern treaty making and policies based on containment and the notion that Native peoples will be domesticated through subordination to Canadian authority and therefore finally neutralized as sovereign entities. (2012, 74-75) Similarly, Jeff Corntassel critiques Indigenous self-determination that relies on Western rights-based discourse, such as that articulated through the comprehensive claims process, arguing that “the pursuit of a political/legal rights-based discourse leads indigenous peoples to frame their goals/issues in a state-centered (rather than community centered) way.” (2008, 115) 7 In early 2018, the Liberal government under Justin Trudeau announced that it will be exploring a new framework for Indigenous rights in Canada. The development of this framework is still underway at the time of submission of this dissertation. 26 Indeed, major incongruities exist between the state and Indigenous peoples within comprehensive claims agreements. First and foremost, Indigenous peoples insist that what the state calls “Aboriginal title” to land arises from their having lived upon and used the land since time immemorial (Henderson 2002; Kulchyski 2013). Further, within this viewpoint, Aboriginal rights are territorially-based and asserted in the ongoing lived practice of Indigenous culture within the lands and waters that they have always occupied (Battiste and Henderson 2002). Conversely, the Canadian state’s approach suggests that Aboriginal title is derived from a set of legal documents, such as the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and that Aboriginal rights are subject to a set of predetermined tests outlined in the Van der Peet case8 (Christie 2007; Kulchyski 2013; Turner 2006, 2013). Further still, it is the Canadian government’s policy to seek certainty, extinguishment, and perhaps most unapologetically under the former Harper administration, termination, of Aboriginal rights through comprehensive claims agreements (Blackburn 2007; Diabo 2012; Mackey 2014, 2016). In Peter Kulchyski’s words, “Simply put, most First Nations see modern treaties as ways of reaffirming and asserting their continuing ownership of their traditional territories. The state sees modern treaties as a way of ending that ownership in “exchange” for much smaller pieces of land and a small chunk of capital” (2013, 108). The irreconcilability of these different viewpoints over land use and ownership may be best understood as matters of sovereign jurisdiction. As such jurisdictional matters, the “claims” of Indigenous peoples are situated and confined within the framework of Canadian colonial law. Within the courts, the struggle has been whether or not the law 8 The Van der Peet case (1996) further defined Aboriginal rights as outlined under Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The case resulted in a list of 10 criteria, known as the “Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test,” which is intended to determine how Aboriginal rights are to be defined. For a list of the 10 criteria, see: http://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/home/land-rights/van-der-peet-case.html. 27 should recognize Aboriginal right and title based on Indigenous relationships to the land, or whether the Anglo-Canadian norms of private property ownership should be upheld (Bhandar 2015). Shiri Pasternak writes, “At the heart of this encounter, is a conflict over the inauguration of law—or the authority to have authority—and the specific forms of struggle that arise when competing forms of law are asserted over a common space” (2014, 146). Canada’s assertion of jurisdiction over all of the lands and waters within its borders enshrine the form of the law solely within the colonial context, negating Indigenous assertions of sovereign right and title as they might otherwise arise within their own culturally, historically, legally, and politically specific milieu (Pasternak 2014; Borrows 2002, 2010). Indeed, those who find themselves within “the territorial boundaries of Canada are already presumed to exist within a particular body of law” (Pasternak, 148). While section 35 of the Constitution Act recognizes and affirms Aboriginal rights, the various interpretations of this form of recognition highlight the limitations of Indigenous rights and the meaning of Indigenous sovereignty that are derived from state recognition. While many scholars have echoed the sentiment that Section 35 “recognizes Aboriginal rights, but it did not create them” and that “Aboriginal rights have existed before Section 35” (Hanson, “Constitution Act”), Indigenous peoples have consistently had to prove and establish these rights through settler state and judicial forms of recognition. As Taiaiake Alfred states, There had been a lot of court activism and a lot of legal decisions that amounted to the court saying: 'There's such a thing as aboriginal title. You don't have it, but aboriginal title exists, so I'm sending this decision back down so that you can try again to prove that you have it. But when you are the person whose land is being used by mining interests, uranium explorers, settlers and so forth, you don't see as 28 a victory ten more years of lawyers doing battle in court for this vague concept of aboriginal rights and title. (2015, 5) Indeed, despite the 2014 Tsilhqot'in decision, where the supreme court determined that the criteria for Aboriginal title had been met for a small piece of the Tsilhqot’in Nations’ territory, declaring Aboriginal title for the first time in Canadian history (Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia), Indigenous title to land remains over-determined by Western land rights discourse, which has made little room for Indigenous conceptions of land tenure, sovereignty, and the legal orders through which they are articulated and defined. It is within this fraught legal context that many activists and scholars have articulated and enacted a resistance to state-sanctioned engagement over rights disputes in Canada (Alfred 2009; Coulthard 2007, 2014; Diabo 2012). This viewpoint suggests that Indigenous self-determination has been co-opted within a limiting liberal pluralistic “politics of recognition” that seeks to “reconcile Indigenous claims to nationhood with Crown sovereignty,” which is, of course, also jurisdictional sovereignty (Coulthard 2007, 438). Further, following the work of Yellowknife Dene scholar Glen Coulthard, this view of rights claims is best characterized as a settler-colonial relationship, in which power relations “in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power” have been structured and enacted within “a relatively secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority” (Coulthard 2014, 6-7, emphasis in original). Within this viewpoint, Canadian Indigenous rights policies are operationalized in ways that fix interpretations of Indigenous rights within the settler colonial social relations of capitalist ownership and presumed sovereign jurisdiction; attempts on the behalf of Indigenous nations to engage in state-sanctioned 29 rights claims are correspondingly fixed within and limited by this settler colonial purview (Alfred 2005; Coulthard 2014; Corntassel 2008). Indigenous conceptions of rights and assertions of sovereignty, however, exceed and unsettle these limited settler-colonial notions. Indigenous peoples have inherent rights—rights that do not flow from the Crown, and which produce different kinds of knowledge through alternative, albeit subjugated discourses around land, water, peoplehood, culture, belonging, and law. As Heather Dorries states, “This inherent right . . . is derived from the fact that Indigenous peoples were sovereign before European settlers arrived

#### The alternative is an incommensurable project of decolonization that necessitates the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the global imperial metropole – this is a complete disavowal of settler futurity that refuses to be punctuated by narratives of reconciliation.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

#### The role of debate is to disrupt settler logics that produce epistemic or material violence – the alternative demands a radical reconfiguration of the terms of debate that calls into question modern understandings of space within academia – refusal to conform to the rules of the game is necessary to destabilize structures of control.

Walter Mignolo 13, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies @ Duke, B.A. in philosophy @ Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Ph.D. @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 2013, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,” *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol 26:(7-8), pg. 4-5, gender modified

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts ~~himself or herself~~ [themselves] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC -- International Law Bad

#### Exporting western norms and subjectivity globally is imperial peace: a unified global order based in neoliberalism and white supremacy

Ohenewah 15– Christine Ohenewah, Department of International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Liberalism: An Obstacle to Black Unification”, Tapestries: Interwoven Voices of Local and Global Identities: Volume 4, Issue 1 Threats to the American Dream, Article 21]

International discourse has long rendered liberalism as an ideology of optimism, aiming to attain specific objectives: the proliferation of democracy, support for human rights, capitalist expansion, international cooperation, and pacifism. Liberal ideology affirms that the establishment of ‘correct’ political systems and domestic groups is likely to encourage states to engage in international cooperation. Although seemingly benign in its efforts to reinforce international harmony, I contend that liberalism augments cultural hegemony and homogenization. As a mode of Western imperialism, it assumes the guise of world peace to ensure self-interests and ‘ideal’ paradigms, while increasing the global jurisdiction of dominant nation-states. Scholar Patrick Morgan asserts, “It is not that international politics must eventually embrace and inculcate these particular norms, but that, as an elaborate social activity, international politics needs elements of community including a structure of norms. Liberalists are busy pushing their preferred norms with this in mind.” Said another way, states must seek cooperation rather than sovereignty and autonomy and be flexible towards embracing normalized values. We must however question the ‘acceptance of norms’ as a feature of liberalism. In analyzing the mission to spread liberalism to other non-democratic countries, we must interrogate which actors are promoting preferred norms and practices for the international community and at whose expense these norms are being enforced. My chapter responds to the following questions: How is mid-20th century liberalism in tandem with White citizenry? Does liberalism embody a global manifestation of White citizenship? In what ways does liberalism impede the progress of Black unification? Finally, how does liberalism bear resemblance to colonialism? In chapter one we recall that White citizenry predicates itself on norms based in Whiteness, (i.e. hard work, education, high socioeconomic status). Similarly, liberalism comprises of democratic, capitalist, and human rights values. Both systems determine the acceptance of a minority group or nation-state, given that they follow the aforementioned paradigms. Using Ghana as a case study to delve into Kwame Nkrumah’s Pan-African leadership, I argue that liberalism is an ideology rooted in colonialism and serves as a global index of White citizenship. Its disruption of transatlantic Black unification efforts further relies on three elements: primitivism, patronization, and the manipulation of power. In the course of this chapter, I first trace the damaging outcomes colonialism induced within Ghana’s infrastructure. I subsequently discuss the role that late Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah played in buttressing the Pan-African Movement and how Pan-African efforts were curbed by liberal agendas within international politics. Finally, I explain the similarities that modern liberal ideology shares with White citizenry and recapitulates colonial iniquities. If we consider that liberalism resembles colonialism, which ignited calamities within Ghana’s infrastructure, it would then hold that liberal ideology is non-ideal for all nation-states and operates to homogenize the rest of the international community according to Western tradition. Pan-Africanism’s Black unification agenda would thus stand in opposition to an empire of Western governance that has been solidified by colonial conquest. Remembering that antiBlackness works to sustain White supremacy by degrading Black culture, we must then recognize that anti-Blackness and White citizenry function globally through liberalism. We must further recognize that liberalism is an ideology fueled with self-interests that enhance the authority of the West at the expense of nations who refuse Western paradigms. Ghana’s Pan-African Movement, which represented historic collaboration between Africans and African Americans, challenged such paradigms and thus became a target for the West. Attached to various meanings and agendas, liberalism on the one hand is perceived as a progressively humanitarian endeavor whose mission is to bestow peace and democracy unto states in extreme turmoil. On the other hand, liberalism is viewed as a homogenizing scheme, seeking to maintain the global power and selfinterests of Western entities. The subsequent sections serve to outline these two opposing views and provide a comprehensive understanding of the way liberal ideology is situated within international discourse. Proponents of liberalism argue that liberalism is fundamentally optimistic, calling for positive interaction among international actors and chances for a peaceful world (Morgan, 2013). In a liberal framework, international politics is an evolving atmosphere characterized by interdependence, cooperation, peace, and security. Under acceptable models of liberal political systems and domestic groups, states are viewed as being more capable of achieving international cooperation. Proponents also view capitalism as an additional benefit of liberalism, due to its perceived ability to cultivate wealth and higher living standards. The production and accumulation of wealth are thus more rapid and efficient if private actors run economic activities in accordance with the “dictates” of markets (Morgan 2013). Promoting a capitalist or ‘free trade’ society further circumvents the possibility of war, thereby reducing the influence of elites who have historically been devoted to military conquests and national glory (Solingen 1998). Proponents also defend that liberalism is marked by a strong support for democracy, which is crucial to the legitimacy of governmental systems. Western nations have historically upheld this belief by advocating democracy as a means to restore peace within a region. In this vein, scholars contend that sovereignty is not simply a right to national autonomy; it is the responsibility of a government to treat its society with decency. Failure to do so may result in international intervention. Said another way, liberalism refuses to endorse violence as a coercive method unless the political order in question denies all opportunity for peaceful, democratic transition (Martin 1948). Proponents of liberalism finally observe that liberal ideology supports rights and opportunities for women, religious freedoms, and civil rights, among many others. They argue that within liberal ideology, the preservation of human rights is one of its most salient characteristics, as it is derived from states’ long-held concerns about how their prominent religious and ethnic groups are treated by neighboring states. Diplomatic pressures, military interventions, and peace agreements further agitate such concerns (Krasner 1999). Where human rights are involved, liberalism further encourages self-determination, or the acceptance of the present world order’s norms and values, over separatism, claiming that states should deemphasize sovereignty and autonomy. Because most countries are multiethnic, endorsing separatism would invite chaotic dissolutions by fracturing the unity of international states. In examining the arguments in favor of liberalism, it is clear that proponents view this ideology as a means of fostering international cohesion. States are generally non-strict about their autonomy and center sovereignty on their government’s obligation to treat its society with decency. A nation’s inability to do this, however, may result in international intervention. Liberalism further commits itself to propagating capitalist and democratic values on a global scale, and in addition to defending human rights, the notion of selfdetermination is also one of its essential components. The above claims portray liberalism as a wholly optimistic approach that holds the interests of states at heart and offers a resolution for enhancing world peace. I however contend that liberalism’s attempts to reduce state autonomy, expand capitalism and democracy, and augment international cooperation convey a fundamental hypocrisy. Proponents of liberalism fail to deeply examine whom the values of capitalism and democracy are modeled after, who benefits from promoting such norms, and which entities bear their repercussions. This nod towards world homogenization reveals a colonial remnant within modern-day liberalism that reinforces global White supremacy. In contrast to its proponents, opponents of liberalism defend that the ideology reflects Western dominance. In its more forceful version, liberalism is an updated expression of Western imperialism; a rationalization of hegemonic efforts to spread Western values so that the global environment remains palatable for the West. As Ayers (2009) asserts, “In particular, the regime of ‘democratisation’ and the curtailing of democratic freedom constitute a principal means through which imperial rule is articulated.” This means that Western governments are consistently eager to see the overturn of numerous political systems along with a drastic alteration of their social and economic structures. Ayers further refutes the notion of self-determination that liberalism’s proponents support. For Ayers, self-determination is a concept based in non-autonomy and signifies the freedom to “embrace rules, norms, and principles of the emerging liberal global order.” Opponents of liberalism further observe that Western ideas of democracy do not well align with other cultural milieus (Faust 2013). In this vein, liberalism possesses an inherent favoritism towards the Western colonial state. Baudrillard (1975) argues that the emphasis on capitalism, for instance, acts as a Western lens through which peripheral societies are perceived, therefore obstructing the cycles of symbolic exchange that mark other “Third-World” states. Robinson and Tormey (2009) likewise posit that when liberalism assumes a mission of ‘global justice,’ aiming to instill Western cultural norms and values, it imposes a ‘global-local’ conception that reproduces colonial epistemology. This enables a Western reasoning that demonizes non-liberal societies as failed states that are corrupt, lacking, and insufficiently stable. In summary, opponents of liberalism contend that the ideology reflects Western hegemonic modes of influence. For opponents, the notion of self-determination is based in the freedom to accept rules, norms, and values that align with those of Western global powers. Liberalism as a mission of global justice further alienates states by ‘otherizing’ them and thereby emulating colonial epistemologies and practices. While opponents of liberalism thoroughly unearth liberalism’s Western origins and name the violence it launches on other states, they do not adequately locate the factors that continue to sustain liberal longevity. The two aforementioned positions on liberalism provide a helpful overview on the strengths as well as pitfalls of liberal ideology. I however believe that scholars who take a more critical standpoint on liberalism effectively consider its negative reverberations, which contradict aims of world peace and international cooperation. While it is arguable that liberalism, like any ideology, may contain fallacies, there is a marked distinction between “international cooperation” and “international cooperation with Western nation-states.” Thus, I concur with opponents who suggest that liberalism promotes colonial epistemologies and practices that distort the functions of perceived “weaker” entities rather than honoring their self-governance and interests. To expand this body of thought further, I identify the particular elements on which liberalism thrives: primitivism, patronization, and the manipulation of power. Identifying these elements will help contextualize the way liberalism, like White citizenry, has served to dislodge Black unification efforts and will further sustain my claim that liberalism is rooted in a colonial enterprise that maintains global White supremacy. In the sections below, I provide a timeline for the demise of the Pan-African Movement by first discussing the detriments of British colonization on Ghanaian infrastructure.

### 1NC -- No ! -- Asteroids

#### 1. No Kessler effect.

von Fange 17 [Daniel Von Fange‏, Distributed systems engineer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped” May 21st 2017, <http://braino.org/essays/kessler_syndrome_is_over_hyped/>] [modified for readability]

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per [one thousand kilometers] of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than [one in ten thousand]. So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space. Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits. In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment. Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely. Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner. Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided. The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler. Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting) So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect. I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 2. No debris collision

Albrecht 16 [Mark Albrecht is chairman of the board of USSpace LLC. He was head of the White House National Space Council from 1989 to 1992. Paul Graziani is CEO and founder of Analytical Graphics, an Exton, Pennsylvania, company that develops software and provides mission assurance through the Commercial Space Operations Center (ComSpOC), “Op-ed | Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria”, SpaceNews, May 9th 2016, <https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/>] [modified for readability]

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion. Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are exaggerated and misleading. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it certainly is not a crisis. So what are the facts? On the positive side, space is empty and it is vast. At the altitude of the International Space Station, one half a degree of Earth longitude is almost 40 miles long. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects and they behave quite predictably. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance. Since we first started placing objects into space there have been [eleven] known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, hundreds of telecommunications satellites, [thirteen hundred] functioning satellites on orbit today, half a million total objects in space larger than a marble, and fewer than 15 known collisions. Why do people worry?

### 1NC -- No ! -- Space War

#### No space escalation---empirics, de facto norms, and unpredictable consequences

Pavur 19 [James, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training Oxford University, Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space” https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art\_12\_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf]

3. STABILITY IN SPACE

Given the uncomfortable combination of high dependency and low survivability, one might expect to observe frequent attacks against critical military assets in orbit. However, despite decades of recurring prophesies of impending space war, no such conflict has broken out [14]–[18]. It is true that a handful of space security crises have occurred; most notably, the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2008 US ASAT demonstration in response [19]. Moreover, a recent Centre for Strategic and International Studies report suggests increasing interest in attacking US space assets, particularly among the Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iranian militaries [20]. Overall, however, the space domain has remained puzzlingly peaceful. In this section, we outline three major contributors to this enduring stability: limited accessibility, attributable norms, and environmental interdependence.

A. Limited Accessibility

Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420].

Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23].

B. Attributable Norms

There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit.

Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly.

One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime.

C. Environmental Interdependence

A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No escalation

Zarybnisky 18 [Dr. Eric J., MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, 3-28, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf]

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE

While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used high-powered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.