# 1NC

## 1NC -- T -- Reduce

#### Interpretation: Reduce means unconditional and permanent – the aff is a suspension.

Reynolds 59 – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)

Section 83's counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his "tour" and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway.  [\*\*\*13]  The section says "reduced", does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word "reduce" seems adequately to indicate permanency.

#### Violation – the plan advocates a delay in enforcement, their own sovelncy advocates prove they leverage offense from the fact that they still grant cannabis patents they just do it later

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – Our definition is most precise which is the biggest internal link to predictability - anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution which is the only stasis point we know before the round.

#### 2] Limits and ground– their model allows affs to defend anything from pandemics to Biden’s presidency— there's no universal DA since it’s impossible to know the timeframe when there won’t be IP— that explodes neg prep and leads to random timeframe of the week affs which makes cutting stable neg links impossible — limits key to reciprocal engagement since they create a caselist for neg prep (innovation, collaboration, econ, ptx: all core neg literature thrown away) – controls the internal link to iterative testing and argument refinement

#### 3] TVA solves all of their offense – defend your advantage with a plan text of permanently reducing ip protections for cannabis.

#### DTD on T bc it skewed the entire round – it’s a question of whether or not the aff should have been read in the first place.

#### No RVIs – they’re illogical, you don’t win for being topical

#### Competing interpretations – reasonability is arbitrary and causes judge intervention, leads to a race to the bottom where debaters push the boundaries of what is reasonable in order to justify infinite abuse

## 1NC -- K -- Colonial Capitalism

#### Reformism is not emancipatory but instead contributes to the iterative perfection of colonial capitalism – the transformative potential of legal change is circumscribed by hegemonic power structures that are embedded in international political systems.

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These events – the corporate capture of the global pharmaceutical IP regime, state complicity and vaccine imperialism – are not new. Recall Article 7 of TRIPS, which states that the objective of the Agreement is the ‘protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights [to] contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology’. In similar vein, Article 66(2) of TRIPS further calls on developed countries to ‘provide incentives to enterprises and institutions within their territories to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country’. While the language of ‘transfer of technology’ might seem beneficial or benign, in actuality it is not. As I discussed in my book, and as Carmen Gonzalez has also shown, when development objectives are incorporated into international legal instruments and institutions, they become embedded in structures that may constrain their transformative potential and reproduce North-South power imbalances. This is because these development objectives are circumscribed by capitalist imperialist structures, adapted to justify colonial practices and mobilized through racial differences. These structures are the essence of international law and its institutions even in the twenty-first century. They continue to animate broader socio-economic engagement with the global economy even in the present as well as in the legal and regulatory codes that support them. Thus, it is not surprising that even in current global health crisis, calls for this same transfer of technology in the form of a TRIPS waiver to scale up global vaccine production is being thwarted by the hegemony of developed states inevitably influenced by their respective pharmaceutical companies. The ‘emancipatory potential’ of TRIPS cannot be achieved if it was not created to be emancipatory in the first place. It also makes obvious the ways international IP law is not only unsuited to promote structural reform to enable the self-sufficiency and self-determination of the countries in the global south, but also produces asymmetries that perpetuate inequalities. Concluding Remarks What this pandemic makes clear is that the development discourse often touted by developed nations to help countries in the Global South ‘catch up’ is empty when the essential medicines needed to stay alive are deliberately denied and weaponised. Like the free-market reforms designed to produce ‘development’, IP deployed to incentivise innovation is yet another tool in the service of private profits. As this pandemic has shown, the reality of contemporary capitalism – including the IP regime that underpins it – is competition among corporate giants driven by profit and not by human need. The needs of the poor weigh much less than the profits of big business and their home states. However, it is not all doom and gloom. Countries such as India, China and Russia have stepped up in the distribution of vaccines or what many call ‘vaccine diplomacy.’ Further, Cuba’s vaccine candidate Soberana 02, which is currently in final clinical trial stages and does not require extra refrigeration, promises to be a suitable option for many countries in the global South with infrastructural and logistical challenges. Importantly, Cuba’s history of medical diplomacy in other global South countries raises hope that the country will be willing to share the know-how with other manufactures in various non-western countries, which could help address artificial supply problems and control over distribution. In sum, this pandemic provides an opportune moment to overhaul this dysfunctional global IP system. We need not wait for the next crisis to learn the lessons from this crisis.

#### WTO is a Trojan Horse for accumulation by dispossession and global imperialism---the regime of credibility surrounding it is ideologically manufactured

Screpanti 14 – Ernesto Screpanti, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Siena, Global Imperialism and the Great Crisis: The Uncertain Future of Capitalism, p. 110-113)

The Role of International Organizations

Of the international economic organizations, those that work most effectively to achieve the expansion of “freedom” are the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, the three main political institutions charged with preparing the world for capitalist penetration.

The WTO was founded with the primary aim of favoring the expansion of international trade, and was equipped with effective instruments for disciplining opportunist countries. It fulfills the function of issuing international trade rules and rendering them enforceable better than any national empire has ever managed to do. It achieves this through multilateral agreements carrying binding commitments for signatory states. With the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) these agreements are enforceable. The “judgments” handed down by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) oblige noncompliant countries to conform to the rules, under the threat of economic sanctions ranging from compensating an injured country for damages to the implementation of retaliatory measures.

The rules, especially those known as “nondiscriminatory clauses,” are supposed to foster the expansion of free trade. In reality, they effectively force member states to accept penetration by multinational corporations. The National Treatment clause, for example, obliges governments to extend the best treatment afforded to national firms, including state-owned companies, to foreign ones. The Market Access clause, in turn, prohibits governments from hindering the entrance of multinational firms.60 Together these rules have contributed to creating a norm that encapsulates the essence of the whole set of regulations, a sort of “most favored firm” clause. If an advantage is granted to a firm, for example, a national company, it must be granted to all firms. This implies, among other things, that once a state-owned company has been privatized there is hardly any going back, even if it results in a market failure.

The TRIPs (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) serve to safeguard the ownership of the products of scientific and technological research, trademarks, and the like, and thus to guarantee the profitability of their use. Patents, which are mainly registered in the countries of the imperial Center, cannot be used by developing countries unless they pay the royalties established by the multinational companies to which the patents belong, often even if they apply to vital drugs.61 In the TRIPs, the World Trade Organization clearly reveals its nature as a political organization with the purpose of safeguarding the interests of multinationals. Not by chance, the big corporations played a key role in drawing up the TRIPs agreements.62 While all the other agreements formally have the aim of expanding competition and free trade, the TRIPs agreement takes the form of a protectionist regulation. It explicitly seeks to protect monopoly positions and the monopoly profits provided by scientific and technological research, an activity in which the big multinationals of the North excel.

Even more blatant are the agreements known as TRIMs (Trade- Related Investment Measures). Their content is essentially disciplinary, as they prohibit the adoption of the economic policy instruments63 that the governments of many countries use to protect their economies from certain negative consequences of foreign direct investments. The TRIMs serve to disarm states in their attempts to implement industrial and commercial policies for the benefit of local populations. They mete out discipline in the interests of the multinationals.

But possibly the most brazen of all these agreements is the GATS (General Agreement on Trade in Services), which regulates a highly heterogeneous sector (with 160 sub-sectors) effectively covering the production of all nonmaterial goods, from finance to postal services, from water supply to electricity, from telecommunications to transport, from insurance to banks, from education to health. The sector is so vast that it accounts for two-thirds of global output.

The GATS was expressly proposed, prepared, and armed by certain Anglo-American financial multinational lobbies whose names are well known.64 According to economic science, a large part of the goods covered generate market failures65—because they are produced in conditions of natural monopoly (for example, water supply), because they generate significant externalities (for example, pollution), or because they are commons (for example, woods), public goods (for example, justice), or merit goods (for example, education). This is why their production was traditionally controlled or regulated by the state in the public interest. The GATS instead considers policies that pursue public aims in the production of services as discriminatory. Under the pretense of making markets competitive, it forces signatory states to dismantle public sectors that regulate services and sell off the firms that provide them. In contrast to the other agreements, the GATS is not confined to regulating existing markets but plays a fundamental role as a creator of markets. It seeks to commodify public goods, public utilities, and commons, and to privatize natural monopolies.

Joining the WTO implies acceptance of the rules of national treatment and market access, as well as the principle that public monopolies and public services are unacceptable. Then, when a serious economic crisis arises and leaves a country in need of financial help from the IMF and the WB, the government is forced to sell off state-owned companies and commons to the multinationals.

The WTO has become a partial substitute for gunboats in imperial governance. Through it, the big capital clears and paves the way for expansion and accumulation on a global scale. What is more, it does so with the consent of the exploited countries, which are induced to join the organization to gain access to flows of foreign direct investments from multinationals, assistance from advanced countries, and financial aid from the IMF and WB.

As for the IMF, following the Washington Consensus (of “free market” economics) this pawnbroker for desperate states took on the role of liberator. Previously, based on the Keynesian approach of the Bretton Woods system, the IMF imposed restrictions on the demand side, while granting credit to check the severity of those restrictions as much as possible. With the success of the monetarist ideology of Milton Friedman and the Chicago School in the late 1970s, the “structural” adjustments imposed were expected to affect the supply side, that is, mainly structures of production and ownership, rather than aggregate demand alone. Moreover, a “long-run perspective” was to be preferred, rather than focusing on the “short run.” Thus, from 1979 onward, the IMF began to impose structural reforms with the aim of “relaunching development.” According to neoliberal ideology, such reforms require the deregulation and liberalization of markets. This meant the cutting of tariffs and other forms of protectionism to boost competition, the liberalization of prices to cure inflation, the deregulation of labor markets to foster flexibility and reduce labor costs, the deregulation of financial markets to encourage capital mobility, and the privatization of public utilities to balance national budgets and expand competition. Thus the IMF acts as a bulldozer, preparing the ground for the arrival of multinational capital in desperate states. It does so to make this arrival as profitable as possible: it cuts wages and the cost of raw goods, makes labor flexible, and gets states to sell off public utilities and natural resources at fire-sale prices.

Lastly, the WB plays a more subtle, but no less effective, role in bringing about the expansion of “freedom.” It offers help to developing countries by funding investments in the infrastructure necessary for industrial takeoff, or, in other words, for penetration by multinational capital. Like the IMF, with which it often acts in cooperation, the WB gives nothing for free. In particular, among the conditions for access to its loans, it also demands the demolition of trade barriers, the privatization of services, and the selling off of the commons to private companies.

Could the big multinationals let control over the great international economic organizations slip from their hands? And how could they get those organizations to serve their own interests while maintaining the decision-making autonomy of their managers? A powerful ideological campaign was called for. No sooner said than done. Having unleashed the most imaginative economists and even enlisted the help of the international academic body that decides on the recipients of the Nobel prize for economics, the right doctrines were promptly produced, one more audacious than the other: the right doctrines to replace the dated nineteenth- to twentieth-century free trade theory.66 Then the markets for allegiance, the mass media, the most prestigious U.S. universities, research institutes, and culture academies, sprang into action to defend the new orthodoxy and put the right people in the right places. This is how the great international economic organizations came to be capable of acting autonomously in the interests of multinational capital.

#### “International order” is a dogwhistle for a global governance paradigm of assimilation into Western values that over-represent themselves as progress, “the world”, and history itself imposed through the civilizing mission of war, intervention, and imperialism abroad.

Turner and Nymalm, 19

[Dr. Oliver, IR @ UEdinburgh, UK; and Nicola, Research Fellow @ Swedish Institute for Int’l Affairs and Assistant Prof. of War Studies @ Swedish Defence University: “Morality and progress: IR narratives on international revisionism and the status quo,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32:4 (2019), 407-428, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2019.1623173]//AD

The concept of an international order, or ‘status quo’, as it commonly appears throughout the two historic waves of (Western-dominated) IR literature outlined above, is not imagined to be a static or unmoving condition. Instead, it has always been used within scholarly or conceptual narratives as code for advancement and progress. Robert Gilpin (1987, 72) insists that ‘the international economic order … could not flourish and reach its full development’ without a liberal hegemonic power such as the US or UK. Potential hegemons such as the Soviet Union, he explains, would undo such progress through ‘the imposition of political and economic restrictions’. EH Carr’s criticisms of Western claims to international order intersected with assertions of how it advanced, rather than merely sustained, the global condition. Aside from ‘equal security to all’, he noted, British ascendancy gave rise to a universal currency, acceptance of free trade and a common language. The fate of each of these developments, and by extension the cultivation of ‘a world society’, he argued, was threatened by new challengers (Carr 1939, 213). Progress has been most commonly understood in the West as a product of Enlightenment thought, manifest in material advances in science and technology as a ‘standard of civilization’. 3 This enabled a division of the world into a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian and savage’ non-West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 22–98). As progress became an explanation of how history itself unfolds, a storyline emerged describing a linear trajectory from ancient Greece to modern Europe in which progress was understood as self-generating through characteristics internal to the West (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 36–98), including those of liberal capitalism. The West was seen as ‘a distinctive political order— a “civic union”’ and as having ‘a distinctive political logic’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 1993, 18), in line with portraying the ‘democratic world [as] America’s greatest accomplishment’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 1). Though not necessarily directly visible, the underlying ‘wisdom’ or logical dimension of this narrative persists today through notions of ‘modernization’ and ‘development’ (Buzan and Lawson 2015, 123). More explicitly, when referring to post-1945 history, the growth of US global influence is depicted as having ‘helped usher in a new period of modernization and progress for many parts of the world’ (Deudney and Ikenberry 2012, 4). While comparisons between ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ are less acceptable in modern parlance, the ‘status quo’ is still narrated as a route towards progress and development. The goal of wealth creation in particular is set within a framework of global governance defined by Western conceptions of democracy, human rights and capitalist reforms. ‘As in the past’, observe Bowden and Seabrooke (2006, 3f), ‘the workings of markets continue to be thought of as having a “civilising” effect on society; both internally amongst its members and in external relations with other societies’. In this ‘socialization-to-liberalorder-view’ (Bukovansky 2016, 96), emerging markets are paternalistically depicted as moving towards a brighter future, via the ideal of economic convergence with the more developed West. For example, Mandelbaum (1997) suggests that a ‘useful way to think of Russia and China is as analogous to unruly adolescents’ in the context of their post-Cold-War development. This is coupled with expectations of political convergence and thinking in terms of the ‘liberal theory of history’ (Nymalm 2013) and understandings of the relationship between capitalism and modernity which have arguably become a Western-centric hegemonic view. Argues Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2008, 1), ‘ideas of convergence upon the model of Anglo-American capitalism and liberal democracy are continuously rehearsed in mainstream media, as if the “rise of the rest” is supposed to follow in the footsteps of the rise of the West’. Failed expectations on convergence may in turn intensify a threat discourse of the ‘rising other’ (Nymalm 2017) and ‘revisionism’ they bring.4 For instance, Jaschob et al. (2017) deny any normative connotation in their conceptualization of revisionism, as ‘not all rules and norms are just, and not all existing international orders are better than potential alternatives’. Yet, they motivate their studies with ‘the problem of dissatisfied great powers and the question of why rising powers should want to challenge an established international order that facilitated their extraordinary growth’ (Jaschob et al. 2017, 10). In other words, the order is ‘good’ because it enabled the rise of new powers. Historical IR debates over revisionist and status quo actors and behaviours have evolved over time, but within the controlled and restrictive parameters of conceptual IR narratives. As a result, the concepts themselves have operated not as neutral descriptors, but as powerful narratives of morality and progress with particular characters and plotlines. The effect has been to leave these scholarly concepts devoid of much analytical value, operating more as rhetorical tools to reinforce misleadingly binary conceptions of a Western Self versus a non-Western Other, within unduly selective and essentially predetermined stories of world order and the sources of its vulnerabilities. More than this, by endorsing divisions of a ‘civilized’ West and ‘barbarian’ rest, they have worked to promote suspicions and tensions in the international realm. As John Hobson (2012, 185–187) puts it, models like the HST ‘explicitly justif[y] Western imperialism in the past, as well as in effect advocating a neocivilizing mission in the present’.

#### Nuclear warfare is an everyday reality—and “nuclear criticism” like the affirmative allows the violence to be masked and subordinated in service of an apocalyptic vision- creating a world where we are securitizing against threats Indigenous folks have already faced

Eileen Clare Shaughnessy, 7-12-2014, "The Un-Exceptional Bomb: Settler Nuclearism, Feminism, and Atomic Tourism in New Mexico," UNM Digital Repository, https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/amst\_etds/40/, accessed 1-17-2021 MSchneck

Indeed, the West provided the four basic needs for the atomic project: a supply of uranium ore, milling facilities where the ore could be processed into weapons, areas where the weapons could be tested, and finally, locales where radioactive waste products from this process could be disposed of. As Winona LaDuke notes, “**On a worldwide scale, Native people hold around 70 percent of the world’s uranium resources- from the north of Saskatchewan, to the Diné and other Indigenous territories of the southwest, the Lakota Nation to the Mirarr nation of Australia.”13 The Manhattan Project relied on uranium mined from Diné, Laguna Pueblo, and Acoma Pueblo lands in the four-corners area of the Southwest to build the bomb. The Diné, Laguna Pueblo, and Acoma Pueblo communities have higher rates of lung cancer and stomach cancer directly connected to the mining and milling of uranium**.14 Diné toxicologist Monica Yellowhair reports that: prolonged exposure to uranium not only can result in cancer of the stomach, colon, pancreas and prostate, but has also been shown to cause “genotoxic effects like chromosomal aberrations, micronuclei formation, sister chromatid exchanges and DNA damage.”15 In other words, the effects of uranium exposure can literally alter DNA and wreak havoc for generations. **Atomic testing has produced devastating effects for Indigenous peoples in U.S. and worldwide**. **In the U.S., the Mescarleo Apache reservation was downwind of the very first atomic test in southern New Mexico known as “Trinity”;** in addition, **the ancestral homelands of the Western Shoshone and Southern Paiute in the Mojave desert were seized and bombed repeatedly by the government in the 1950s for nuclear testing**.16 The U.S. conducted 66 nuclear tests on the Marshall Islands, where the people of one island, Rongelap, have experienced so many birth defects (including “jellyfish babies,” babies born without bones) and cancers that a U.S. study later found the island to be unsafe to live on.17 As Andrea Smith argues**, environmental racism in the form of radiation and nuclear testing can be seen as another form of sexual violence precisely because through violating the earth, Native bodies are also violated**.18 Similarly, Rauna Kuokkanen argues **that the militarized reproduction and reinforcement of U.S. Empire is predicated on both Native American lands and Native American bodies.** 19 The present-day Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) sits on more than 43 square miles taken from the Santa Clara and San Ildefonso Pueblos, restricting their access to sacred sites and exposing them to toxic and radioactive waste buried in the land.20 **Oral San Illdefonsan history documents a land transfer from the Pueblo to the Manhattan Project for the war effort that was justified on the grounds that it would be returned after the war**. **This broken promise is not the Pueblos’ only concern** however, as **the legacy of the Manhattan Project continues to contaminate the land, air, and water with radioactive waste that remains “hot” for centuries.** For example, Area G, a thin mesa located on the border between LANL and San Illdefonso, is LANL’s primary waste site; it opened in 1957 with the bulldozing of five San Illdefonsan ruins.

#### Their fantasies of extinction scenarios infinitely defer a meaningful reckoning with settler colonialism

Dalley, 18—Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College (Hamish, “The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, 8:1, 30-46, dml)

In this way, these settler-colonial narratives of extinction begin as a contemplation of endings and end as a way for settlers to persist. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, the native must be invoked and disavowed, and ultimately absorbed into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing true belonging and the possibility of an authentic future in place. Veracini’s description of the settler-colonial historical imagination thus applies, in modified but no less appropriate form, to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include the perception of an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentarism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: it is a fantasy of extinction that tips over into its opposite and becomes a method of symbolic preservation, a technique for delaying the end, for living on in the contemplation of death.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – the hope that, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living. In this way, they make their own redemption, an extinction that is an act of self-preservation, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

**Vote neg to endorse effective indigenous resistance oriented towards the overthrow of economic globalization and racial neoliberalism.**

Jodi **Melamed**, 20**11** (“Represent and Destroy: Rationalizing Violence in the New Racial Capitalism, <<associate professor of English and Africana Studies @ Marquette University >, P181- p186)//pk

There are hundreds of examples, from every continent except Antarctica, of indigenous peoples, on the frontlines of globalization’s expansion, who are fighting for the survival of their communities against national governments seeking to ramp up exports, against extractive industries, against pollution and waste industries, against narco-traffickers, against energy and dam projects, against tourism, and against conservation movements that seek to remove indigenous peoples from their lands for so-called wilderness conservation. These include the Yanomami tribe of northern Brazil, who are being forced off their lands by illegal mining; the U’Wa, Nukak, and others in Colombia, who are being killed and driven off lands by governmentsponsored paramilitaries, left-wing guerrillas, and the U.S.-sponsored Plan Colombia, which pays former drug traffickers to seize Indian lands to grow nonnarcotic crops; uncontacted tribes in Peru, who are facing disease and worse with the construction of an oil pipeline through their territories built by the Anglo-French oil giant Perenco; the 200,000 tribal people in the Ethiopia delta region, who are being evicted to build a giant hydroelectric dam financed by the World Bank; the Lahu, Lisu, Meo, and other Hmong highland tribes in Thailand, who are being evicted after the government’s sale of 25,000 kilometers to an international conservation organization; other “conservation refugees,” including the Masai in Kenya and the Bushmen in Botswana; overfishing jeopardizing the survival of Chukchi and Eskimo in Russia; and mining on North American Indian lands, including those of the Cree, Western Shoshone, Mohawk, and Zuni peoples. Hundreds of other examples can be found on the Web sites and in the publications of indigenous organizations and networks, advocates and NGOs, and UN agencies and other multilateral bodies. These include the Indigenous Environmental Network, the White Earth Land Recovery Project, the Tebtebba Foundation, the International Indian Treaty Council, the Asian Indigenous Women’s Network, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee, Mines and Communities, the International Forum on Globalization, Amazon Watch, Survival International, Cultural Survival, the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 182 � Difference as Strategy Issues, and the International Labour Organization’s Department of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. As indigenous people across the globe over the last forty years have experienced violences generated from the same underlying source, an economic system of accumulation through dispossession, a move to unite opposition has given rise to forceful international indigenous peoples’ movements. One of the central occupations of such movements is illuminating the global resource wars as also paradigm wars, as conflicts at the level of the material politics of knowledge. A materialist understanding of knowledge demonstrates that what counts as legitimate knowledge, emerges from contestatory processes and is not autonomous from but both shapes and is determined by material circumstances and geohistorical conditions. As Chandan Reddy has reflected, “[M]odern western knowledges . . . have been productive of certain expressions of personhood, experience, historical process, materialism, and so forth, while foreclosing other historical, material, and epistemic organizations of subjectivity, historical process, and the so-called natural world.”4 Indigenous peoples’ movements often draw attention to the fact that the material existence of globalization as an economic system relies on the functioning and legitimacy of certain rationalizing modes (e.g., corporate individualism), construals of value (e.g., the sanctity of private property rights), and expressions of personhood (e.g., people as consumers) that many indigenous people do not share. (In this chapter’s opening epigraph, Victoria TauliCorpuz makes this point.) Although most of the knowledge systems of indigenous peoples, communities, and nations have been impacted by the knowledge architecture that supports economic globalization, many yet maintain some epistemic orientations that are defective for, contradict, or offer alternatives to some of its rationalizing modes, values, and notions of personhood—including orientations to collective responsibility—and that can provide the basis for alternative expressions of materialism and economy. Contemporary indigenous cultural activism often goes to work on this epistemic level to mitigate not only the physical violences of the global resource wars but also the violences intrinsic to knowledge systems that restrict what is Difference as Strategy � 183 politically and ethically possible to extractive economies and accumulation by dispossession. Here is what is happening now: As the global resource wars have pushed onto indigenous lands, the knowledge apparatuses sustaining economic globalization have had to bring indigenous peoples into representation in a manner that explains their exploitation as inevitable, natural, or fair. But this state of affairs has also provided an opportunity for indigenous-led cultural activism to insert its own signifying systems into public discourse in order to displace the structures of legitimate knowledge, to contest dominant systems of representation, and to try to open them up to cultural meanings and epistemic orientations originating in indigenous-led interpretative communities. Reductionism and essentialism must be guarded against. The knowledge systems of indigenous peoples differ greatly from one another and are not internally homogenous. They cannot be made completely transparent to culturally nonindigenous peoples, nor can one indigenous episteme be transcoded seamlessly (or even adequately) into another, and recomprehending the world does not change it. Yet encountered on the level of media, transnational movements, and scholarship, the cultural activism of international indigenous peoples’ movements can and does insert into public discourse something like a generalized indigenous inscription of a global world system based on economies of limit and balance, reciprocal relations between people and nature, and the importance of collective rights. Not surprisingly, neoliberal multiculturalism is one of the most useful discourses functioning today to dispossess indigenous peoples of their lands and resources and to make such dispossession appear inevitable, natural, or fair. Neoliberal multiculturalism represents multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism. It represents the access of producers and investors to diverse markets and the access of consumers to diverse goods to be emblematic of multicultural values and required for global antiracist justice. It justifies the removal of indigenous peoples from their lands by describing the entire world as the rightful potential property of global multicultural citizens. At the same time, it stigmatizes indigenous peoples as monocultural, 184 � Difference as Strategy unrealistic, doomed, chauvinistic, or “tribal,” connoting a negative orientation to an exclusively defined group. If liberal multiculturalism is considered as antecedent to today’s neoliberal multiculturalism, then U.S. multiculturalisms can be seen as having long misrepresented or obscured American Indian sovereignty and land tenure claims. By treating American Indians as ethnic minorities within the framework of cultural pluralism, conventional multicultural discourse has made government-to-government relations between the United States and American Indian nations appear counterintuitive. Today, global multiculturalism can be spoken of as a valorized discourse that circulates throughout transnational political modernity in global media, in international civil society, in international NGOs, in the United Nations, and in other multilateral bodies. It can overlap with neoliberal multiculturalism, but it is not identical to it. Rather, it is a discourse in a global political register that globalizes the template of state multiculturalism (often U.S. multiculturalism) in order to represent an order of multicultural states as an adequate image of a multicultural world. One might think that within this discursive field the relationship between multiculturalism and indigenous rights would remain antagonistic, that the more one argued for indigenous peoples’ rights in the language of global multiculturalism, the more one would strengthen state multiculturalisms—that is, national governments— over and against the rights of indigenous peoples. Yet surprisingly, something new is happening. Indigenous-led cultural activism is successfully using its own version of multiculturalism to make the conceptual bases for new categories of indigenous rights and new strategies for claiming land tenure appear necessary, well founded, and just. An example of such a transcoding is in the chapteropening epigraph by Victoria Tauli-Corpuz, Igorot tribal member, founder of Tebtebba (Indigenous Peoples International Center for Policy Research and Education), and current chairperson of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Tauli-Corpuz uses familiar multicultural language that ascribes positive value to difference and antipathy to being homogenized. Yet rather than staying within the field of meanings that multicultural language generally signals, namely Difference as Strategy � 185 that the equal rights of different and diverse peoples must be supported, Tauli-Corpuz uses multicultural reference to assert that a robust right to be different and distinct is the first step in asserting a right for indigenous peoples to opt out of economic globalization and to maintain separate economic systems, in the sense of separate circulations of knowledge, lands, and resources not inscribed within the value forms of capitalist globalization. Of particular interest is indigenous cultural activism that successfully uses its own version of multiculturalism to make the culture/land conceptual bind appear comprehensible, necessary, and well founded. This conceptual bind asserts the inseparability of indigenous peoples from the earth, so that land cannot be thought of apart from its social relations with humans and human existence cannot be thought of apart from its relations to lands, trees, plants, earth formations, waters, and animals. This chapter examines two examples: (1) an activist intervention in the field of law and rights discourse and (2) an activist intervention in the field of literary multiculturalism and how it validates and organizes knowledge about difference and personhood. First examined is how the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP), which is largely but importantly not completely the product of international indigenous activism, transcodes multiculturalism in order to make possible the first-ever recognition by the United Nations of an indigenous right to self-determination, the firstever recognition of collective rights, a new derivation of rights, and a new right to free, prior, and informed consent. Although the final version of UNDRIP passed by the UN General Assembly was a compromise document and even though many nations recognize UNDRIP only as aspirational or in ways that defang it, should it become effective international customary law, it could provide an important legal tool for indigenous peacemaking in the context of the global resource wars. Second, this chapter offers a reading of Blood Run, a long narrative poem by Allison Hedge Coke, a Huron, Cherokee, and Métis poet and a movement builder within the emergent transnational networks of indigenous peoples’ movements. Blood Run narrativizes the mound city of Blood Run, a major precontact trading settlement that 186 � Difference as Strategy was estimated, around 1650, to have had some ten thousand inhabitants and to have comprised at least six distinct tribes, making it the most populous city in North America at the beginning of European settler colonialism. Blood Run is an epistemically resituating work that transcodes multicultural reference to make it possible for a culturally nonindigenous reader to imagine the viability of an (already existing) indigenous world system, which is to say a world-encompassing circulation of meaning, value, relationality, and matter.

#### The role of debate is to disrupt the multiplicities of violence animated by colonial capitalism – we control the uniqueness debate as academic institutions are saturated with anti-indigenous sentimentality now – resistance is the only ethical demand your ballot should be oriented towards.

## 1NC -- Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Linear Futurism DA – cross apply Dalley - voting for util is a mobilization of settler fantasies because of settlers’ drive to prioritize their own extinction and death as leavel to that of indigenous peoples. They reify a TEMPORAL NARRATIVE that uses doomsday rhetoric to bracket out indigenous people as relics of the past and normalize whiteness as equivalent to humanity —this instills a LINEAR FUTURISM that absolves us of responsibility for settler colonialism

#### Death being bad doesn’t translate to arbitrarily inflating the value of arguments based on the magnitude of their impacts – prefer probability first framing

### 1NC -- No Marijuana I/L

#### Cartels have already switched to opium for profits-turns the case because cartel violence increased with partial marijuana legalization

Agren 18 (David Agren covers Mexico as a freelance correspondent for The Guardian, and his writing also regularly appears in The Washington Post, USA Today, Maclean's and Catholic News Service, and resides in Mexico city, 2-24-18, "Mexican cartels pushing more heroin after U.S. states relax marijuana laws," USA TODAY, <https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/02/20/mexican-cartels-switch-gears-after-u-s-states-relax-u-s-states-legalize-marijuana-mexicos-cartels-sw/343389002/>, MX)

As more U.S. states legalize the use of marijuana, Mexico's violent drug cartels are turning to the basic law of supply and demand. That means small farmers, or campesinos, in this border state's rugged Sierra Madre who long planted marijuana to be smuggled into the United States are switching to opium poppies, which bring a higher price. The opium gum harvested is processed into heroin to feed the ravaging U.S. opioid crisis. “Marijuana isn’t as valuable, so they switched to a more profitable product,” said Javier Ávila, a Jesuit priest in this region rife with drug cartel activities. Laws allowing marijuana in states like Colorado, Washington and California are causing shifts in the Mexican underworld that have also led to increased violence as the cartels move away from its cash cow of marijuana to traffic more heroin and methamphetamines. U.S. Customs and Border Protection statistics show that marijuana seizures fell by more than half since 2012, while heroin and methamphetamine seizures have held steady or markedly increased. The switch in illegal drugs coincides with Mexico hitting a record 29,168 murders in 2017, the most since the country started keeping homicide statistics in 1997. The jump in violence stems from several factors: cartels splintering into smaller factions, power struggles within the formidable Sinaloa Cartel after leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán was arrested and extradited to the U.S., plus the rise of the violent Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which expanded nationally and moved in on El Chapo’s turf. Few attribute Mexico's rising violence just to legalized marijuana north of the border or the increasing opioid crisis, but those changes in the U.S. are causing problems here. In Chihuahua, state prosecutor César Peniche said criminal groups on Mexico’s Pacific Coast used to traffic marijuana to California. Now those groups are “looking for other routes to continue their trafficking” by usingborder crossings farther inland, he said. “Criminal groups … enter the state of Chihuahua, and this causes confrontations,” Peniche explained. “It’s creating conflicts between criminal organizations to win control of the routes because some markets have closed, but others have stayed open. This sparks violence.” In Mexico’s heroin-producing heartland of southern Guerrero state, the violence is so bad that the morgues are full and unable to handle all the bodies brought in for autopsies. The U.S. government recently toughened its travel warning to Americans against visiting Guerrero, which includes the tourist resorts of Acapulco and Ixtapa, in addition to remote villages that rely on planting opium poppies. Growers in Guerrero, like those in northwest Mexico, also moved away from marijuana to focus on opium poppies. And they have no problem selling their harvests. “In talking with middlemen and others (selling illegal drugs), the U.S. has an almost insatiable demand. ... The cartels are never sitting on product,” said Myles Estey, producer of the Showtime series The Trade, which filmed in Guerrero. He said the cartels “saw a lot more demand for heroin (in the United States) and responded.”

### 1NC -- Cartels Dead

#### Cartels are dead inevitably

Stewart 17 (Scott, Stratfor analyst of terrorism and security issues “Mexico's Cartels Will Continue to Splinter in 2017”, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/mexicos-cartels-will-continue-splinter-2017)

Stratfor has tracked Mexico's drug cartels for over a decade. For most of that time, our annual forecasts focused on the fortunes and prospects of each trafficking organization. But as Mexican organized crime groups have gradually fractured and fallen apart — a process we refer to as balkanization — we have had to refine the way we think about them. The cartels are no longer a handful of large groups carving out territory across Mexico, but a collection of many different smaller, regionally based networks. So, rather than exploring the outlook of every individual faction, we now take them as loose gatherings centered on certain core areas of operation: Tamaulipas, Tierra Caliente and Sinaloa.

### 1NC – Defense -- Terror

#### No impact to cartels

Barry 13 (Tom, January 9, 2013, Director for the TransBorder project at the Center for International Policy in Wash. DC. “With the Resurrection of Immigration Reform We'll Hear a Lot About Securing Our Borders, But What Does It Really Mean?” http://www.alternet.org/immigration/resurrection-immigration-reform-well-hear-lot-about-securing-our-borders-what-does-it)

One likely reason the Border Patrol does not address its counterterrorism in any detail is that the agency’s border security buildup on the southwestern border has not resulted in the apprehension of members of foreign terrorist organizations, as identified by the State Department.

Experts in counterterrorism agree there is little risk that foreign terrorist organizations would rely on illegal border crossings – particularly across the U.S.-Mexico border – for entry into the United States. While the fear that foreign terrorists would illegally cross U.S. land borders drove much of the early build-up in border security programs under the newly created homeland security department, counterterrorism seems to have dropped off the actual and rhetorical focus of today’s border security operations.

**No terror threat**

Mark **Sullivan 13**, Specialist in Latin American Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues”, 4/5/13, Congressional Research Service, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf

For most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, **threats emanating from terrorism are low**. Terrorism in the region is largely perpetrated by groups in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups. According to the Department of State, most governments in the region have good records of cooperation with the United States on anti-terrorism issues, although progress in the region on improving counterterrorism capabilities is limited by several factors, including corruption, weak governmental institutions, weak or non-existent legislation, and reluctance to allocate sufficient resources. Both Cuba and Venezuela are on the State Department’s list of countries determined to be not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, and Cuba has remained on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism since 1982. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have expressed concern over the past several years about Venezuela’s relations with Iran, with concerns centered on efforts by Iran to circumvent U.N. and U.S. sanctions and on Iran’s ties to Hezbollah, alleged to be linked to two bombings in Argentina in the 1990s. There is disagreement, however, over the extent and significance of Iran’s activities in Latin America. The State Department maintains that there are **no known operational cells of either Al Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the hemisphere**, although it notes that ideological sympathizers continue to provide financial and moral support to these and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia.

**Border smuggling only happens if drug revenue decreases**

**Altman 14**—Tampa Tribune

(Howard, “Cartel, terrorist ties are up for debate”, <http://tbo.com/list/military-news/cartel-terrorist-ties-are-up-for-debate-20141020/>, dml)

There is a lot of concern these days about the possibility that members of Islamic State or other jihadi organizations may take advantage of our porous southern border to smuggle bad guys or weapons into the United States. But one recently former CIA analyst, who was responsible for reporting on the activities of the Mexican cartels, says that concern is largely overstated. The reason? The cartels, says Scott Schlimmer, make so much money from selling cocaine, heroin, marijuana and from human trafficking that they don’t want to risk the blowback from U.S. authorities should a jihadi or weapon of mass destruction wind up crossing the border and creating havoc in the U.S. “They have the capability,” says Schlimmer. “But not the desire.” There are many threats to the homeland, says Schlimmer, but cartels smuggling in jihadis “is one of the less risky threats. “It is almost ironic,” says Schlimmer, “but because of this fear of blowback, the cartels are actually protecting us from terrorists.” Schlimmer, 32, worked for the CIA for seven years, leaving in July. During his time with the agency’s directorate of intelligence, he provided, among other things, analysis to senior policymakers and law enforcement officials on the risk of jihadis crossing the border. He eventually found his way to Tampa, where he is now an adviser for the government and private firms, including Wittenberg Weiner Consulting. He is quick to point out that he speaks for himself, not the agency. I have been tracking the nexus between jihadis and cartels for years, including the curious case of airplanes sold out of the St. Pete-Clearwater Airport. One of the planes crashed in Mexico with nearly four tons of cocaine on board, another was seized in Mexico with more than five tons on board. Both, and many more, at one point wound up in the hands of Walid Makled, who a prosecutor called a king among kingpins. Makled, now jailed in Venezuela, claims that he was working with Iranians and jihadi groups in Venezuela to smuggle drugs. Years of research leads me to believe that there is a close financial connection between jihadis and drug organizations, which is especially strong in West Africa, where drugs flown in from South America are then smuggled under the auspices of al-Qaida and other jihadi groups. I count myself among those concerned that the southern border is vulnerable to jihadi machinations. So when I found out that Schlimmer had been tracking this nexus for the CIA, I was naturally curious about his take. “I really don’t think there is much risk of (jihadis or weapons being smuggled) through the U.S.-Mexico border,” says Schlimmer. “The cartel senior leaders wouldn’t go for it.” That’s because, combined, the Sinaloa, Zetas, Gulf and La Familia cartels, among others, make billions every year.

### 1NC -- Defense -- Mexican State Collapse

#### No spillover – if it does the impact is tiny

Phil Williams and Vanda Felbab-Brown April 2012 (PHIL WILLIAMS is the Wesley W. Posvar Professor ¶ and Director of the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for ¶ International Security Studies at the University of ¶ Pittsburgh. His previous assignments included Visiting Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. ¶ Army War College; and Visiting Scientist at CERT ¶ Carnegie Mellon University, where he worked on cyber-crime and infrastructure protection. Dr. Williams ¶ has worked extensively on transnational criminal networks, terrorist networks, terrorist finances, and has ¶ focused most recently on the rise of drug trafficking ¶ violence in Mexico, VANDA FELBAB-BROWN is a Fellow in the Latin ¶ America Initiative and in the 21st Century Defense ¶ Initiative in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution.upitt strategic studies institute, “DRUG TRAFFICKING, VIOLENCE, AND INSTABILITY” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1101.pdf)

Drug trafficking organizations in Mexico pose ¶ perhaps the second greatest threat to U.S. security on ¶ the part of today’s actors involved in the global drug ¶ trade. Unlike jihadi terrorist groups in Afghanistan ¶ and Pakistan, they do not seek to target the U.S. homeland or intend to conduct a deadly terrorism campaign ¶ against the United States. Nor do they have the capac-ity or desire to overthrow the Mexican government. ¶ Mexico is not a failing state. But any spillover of the ¶ drug war from Mexico could threaten public safety in ¶ certain U.S. localities, including substantial increases ¶ in murder rates, kidnapping, and other violent crime.

**No Mexican state collapse---crime and violence are effects of failed states, not causes**

Neil Couch 12, Brigadier in the British Army, July 2012, “’Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf/view

A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18¶ A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as **effect rather than trigger**.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors.¶ This absence may reflect an assessment that numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure.

### 1NC -- Defense -- Latin America Instability

#### No Latin American instability --- democracy consolidation, macroeconomic stability, and international law.

Feinberg et al. 15—Richard Feinberg is a professor of international political economy at the Graduate School of IR and Pacific Studies, UC San Diego [Richard, “Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations; Harold Trinkunas is a senior fellow and director of Brooking’s Latin America Initiative am; Emily Miller is a Research Assistant at Brooking’s Latin America Initiative [“Better Than You Think: Reframing Inter-American Relations,” *Latin America Initiative in Foreign Policy at Brookings*, March, <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Better-Than-You-Think-Reframing-InterAmerican-Relations.pdf>]

Much of the contemporary U.S. policy toward the hemisphere has its roots in the 1990s. In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the regional agenda became crowded with new initiatives and institutions: the Summit of the Americas, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas, a reoriented Organization of American States (OAS) focused on democracy promotion and a reinvigorated Inter-American Court of Human Rights. At its core, this agenda was intended to consolidate and give regional institutional weight to core U.S. interests in the region, namely free elections, free markets, free trade and cooperative security. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the United States redoubled efforts to secure regional cooperation on combating terrorism and controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Even if some specific initiatives have run aground, such as the FTAA, or have been troubled, such as recent Summits, the hemispheric agenda of the United States has by and large been achieved. In country after country, international and domestic actors have aligned to produce the triumph of democracy and sustainable market-based economies, leading a wave of democratization and liberalization that has swept the globe since the 1970s. The region experienced its last (brief) interstate conflict between Ecuador and Peru in 1995, and the probability of war in Latin America is vanishingly small, an astounding achievement when compared to present troubles in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In addition, although international terrorism and proliferation have not vanished from the region, Latin America is far better off than any other part of the world on this security dimension.22

In contrast to 1980, democracy is now by and large consolidated, with only a few exceptions of backsliding (shown in Figure 5),23 and military coups have become increasingly rare. Latin American democracies have pioneered new forms of political and social inclusion, such as participatory budgeting and conditional cash transfer programs. Civil society has flourished across much of the region, and there is a vibrant media in many countries.

Across Latin America, we have generally witnessed stronger economic growth and better macroeconomic management during the past decade than in the previous two. In the wake of the 1980s debt crisis, bouts of hyperinflation and financial crises in the 1990s, regional political and economic leaders have been much more cautious, accumulating substantial international reserves and keeping close watch on inflation. By 2011, the nine largest economies in Latin America had, on average, accumulated reserves equivalent to 16 percent of GDP.24 At the end of 2013, Brazil was sitting on $376 billion and Mexico on $177 billion (Figure 6). Inflation has fallen dramatically from over 200 percent between 1990 and 1995 to an average of six percent since 2010.25

This improved macroeconomic management has produced significant reductions in poverty and improvements in social inclusion. The size of the middle class in Latin America has also nearly doubled since 2002,26 contributing to economic growth and new demands for improved governance. Figure 727 illustrates the sustained GDP per capita growth and poverty reduction beginning in 2003, which contrast with the income stagnation of the 1980s and modest improvements of the 1990s. Similarly, Figure 8 demonstrates consistent downward trends in inequality in some of the region’s largest economies.28 While Latin America remains the most unequal region of the world,29 it is clear that sound macroeconomic policies have contributed to improved social equity, either directly through broad-based growth, or indirectly through enabling states to finance targeted redistributive policies. The region’s rapid recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis is evidence of the strength of the macroeconomic policies and institutions that have prevailed thus far. This has meant that much of the region has needed fewer loans and external assistance, and also that Latin American leaders have less need to adhere to external conditions for financial support. For example, in 2014 the Brazilian economy slowed down but its external reserves are so large that it does not need to revert to the multilateral institutions for funds or advice. Rather, international markets and competitive pressures are tilting the internal debate in Brazil toward more market-friendly policies, as signaled by the recent appointments of a more orthodox finance minister, Joaquim Levy, and market-oriented politicians to the agriculture and industry portfolios.

Latin America has also expanded its participation in global trade and its range of trading partners. In conjunction with a fall in average tariffs from 39 percent in 1985 to 10 percent in 2005, Latin America’s export volume quadrupled.30 There is now a broad array of free trade agreements in place across the region, not only among Latin American states but also with China, Europe and the United States. This tangible multi-polarity offers nations more options for economic development and export-led growth. For example, growing commodity exports toward China during the 2000s (Figure 9) reflects rising demand relative to traditional Latin American export markets such as Europe and the United States. Latin America’s diversified trade is not the “fault” of U.S. policy inattention but rather a reflection of structural shifts in the global economy. For Latin America, this is a healthy development because it reduces the risks of being tied to the economic prospects of any one region of the world; vulnerabilities of course remain, as South America depends heavily on commodity exports and Central America and Mexico are subject to the ups and downs of the U.S. economy.

Inter-state peace in Latin America has become the status quo. States in the region rarely militarize disputes, and civil conflicts have declined as well; Figure 10 plots civil and international conflicts as measured by magnitude scores that reflect “societal-systemic impact.”31 According to Figure 10, the only nations currently plagued by major episodes of civil violence are Colombia and Mexico, both drug-fueled conflicts.32 Even though most states in the region continue to share some disputed borders, such sources of friction are by and large the province of diplomats and lawyers arguing cases at the International Court of Justice in The Hague rather than of armies.33 Latin America has in place a nuclear-weapon-free zone, and the two leading nuclear technology powers, Argentina and Brazil, have a longstanding non-proliferation institution, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), that monitors their mutual rejection of the pursuit of nuclear weapons.34 While fears about international terrorism in the region have occasionally made headlines in the United States post 9/11, the last major incidents occurred in 1992 and 1994 when Hezbollah agents attacked the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. In its most recent report on terrorism in the region, the U.S. State Department maintained that the majority of terrorist attacks in Latin America were committed by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However such tactics by transnational criminal organizations and insurgents in the hemisphere are largely aimed at domestic audiences rather than linked to international terrorist networks.35

The bottom line is that since the end of the Cold War, Latin America has advanced far and fast along a number of political, security, economic and social dimensions. It is impossible to untangle the relative weight of the external and internal factors contributing to this felicitous outcome, but it is safe to say that Latin American countries have made themselves much more democratic, peaceful and prosperous, and that past instruments of U.S. influence, when smartly deployed, have largely worked themselves out of a job. These achievements are deeply compatible with longrange core U.S. interests in regional peace, democracy and human rights, market-based economies and free trade. As such, a return to a mid-20th century interventionist foreign policy is neither feasible nor desirable.

### 1NC -- Defense -- Nuke Terror

#### The risk of nuclear terror is one in 3 billion

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

#### No nuke winter—conservative estimates

Reisner PhD et al 18 [Jon Reisner, Earth and Environmental Sciences Division, Los Alamos National Laboratory; Gennaro D'Angelo Eunmo Koo Wesley Even Matthew Hecht Elizabeth Hunke Darin Comeau Randall Bos James Cooley] "Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations," AGU Journals, Volume 123, Issue 52 https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/2017JD027331 2-13-2018 RE

There have recently been new simulations of a limited nuclear exchange in the India‐Pakistan region using modern climate models (e.g., Mills et al., 2014; Stenke et al., 2013) that suggest devastating impacts on climate over a decadal time scale, although somewhat less extreme consequences have also been suggested (Pausata et al., 2016). Our team has taken a careful look at some of the assumptions that were used in those studies, using an end‐to‐end modeling sequence. Our series of simulations started with a nuclear weapon explosion followed by a simulation of the fireball and cloud rise. The key improvement in this study is our simulation of fire spread and soot transport in the environment that results from fires initiated by the fireball. Due to the heat of the fire and of the BC particles that are produced, some of the particles are lofted into the stratosphere. However, our comprehensive urban fire simulations indicate that the bulk of the carbon mass remains in the troposphere, where it is quickly removed from the atmosphere. In most previous work, for example, that of Stenke et al. (2013) and Mills et al. (2014), all of the soot produced by the urban fires is directly injected near the top of the troposphere, and therefore much of it rises into the stratosphere, where it shades and cools the Earth. In contrast, if we use a realistic vertical profile for the BC aerosols as input to the climate model, the long‐term global impacts on climate are much less severe than predicted by previous studies. This was true even with conservative, worst case assumptions regarding BC production. To assess the significance of differences between a limited nuclear exchange scenario and the control climate, we created an ensemble of forced (BC‐loaded) simulations using a range of realistic vertical emission profiles, all consistent with our detailed fire simulation. A similar ensemble generated using small atmospheric temperature perturbations allows a robust statistical comparison of our simulated results with and without the carbon forcing. This analysis demonstrates that while modest, statistically significant differences occur during the first few years, longer‐term impacts are unlikely, regional in scope, and limited in scale. None of the simulations produced a nuclear winter effect.

### 1NC -- RC -- Nuke War

#### Colonization and racial injustice is the foundation that makes nuclear war possible – concern with accidents, miscalculations and terrorist acquisition is an epistemological move that SILENCES a focus upon racist foundations of nuclear planning that allows attack in the first place- only by forefronting historical injustices can we ever prevent nuclear War

Elaine Scarry, Walter M. Cabot Professor of Aesthetics and the General Theory of Value at Harvard University, is author most recently of Thinking in an Emergency, August 5 2020, "The Racist Foundation of Nuclear Architecture," Boston Review, http://bostonreview.net/war-security-global-justice/elaine-scarry-racist-foundation-nuclear-architecture

This past Memorial Day, a Minneapolis police officer knelt on the throat of a Black man, George Floyd, for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. Seventy-five years ago, an American pilot dropped an atomic bomb on the civilian population of Hiroshima. Worlds apart in time, space, and scale, the two events share three key features. Each was an act of state violence. Each was an act carried out against a defenseless opponent. Each was an act of naked racism. Each was an act of state violence. Each was an act carried out against a defenseless opponent. Each was an act of naked racism. The first two features—the role of the state and the impossibility of self-defense—probably require little elaboration. Each was an act of state cruelty: in one case, the agents of the state acted on home ground and in the other, on foreign ground. Each was carried out against a defenseless opponent: George Floyd’s hands were handcuffed behind him; he was not resisting arrest or putting the police officers at risk or even verbally challenging them; he used his voice merely to plead that he be permitted to breathe, then called out to his dead mother, whom he soon joined. Nor could the long line of executed Black Americans who preceded George Floyd defend themselves: Breonna Taylor’s work as an emergency medical technician entailed, on a daily basis, protecting both herself and her patients, but she could not, fast asleep in bed, carry out any self-defense when Louisville police, without warrant, burst through her doors after midnight and shot her eight times. The now widely shared recognition that police racism within the United States is not just the practice of individual officers but is instead systemic entails the recognition that Black Americans, in their interactions with the police, have ceased to have the right of self-defense, the right that arguably underlies every other right. Persons of color in the United States—including Native Americans, whose rate of death at the hands of police is the highest of any racial group1—cannot defend themselves. Seeing that one is about to be slain, one may try to resist (to run, to refuse handcuffing, to flail out with arms or weapon), but that resistance will then be retroactively used to justify the slaying that was already underway. One’s only choice is to comply or to resist—in other words, to be slain or to be slain. section separator The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki initiated an era in which—for the first time on Earth and now continuing for seven and a half decades—humankind collectively and summarily lost the right self-defense. Self-defense was not an option for any one of the 300,000 civilian inhabitants of the city of Hiroshima, nor for any one of the 250,000 civilians in Nagasaki three days later. We know from John Hersey’s classic Hiroshima that as day dawned on that August morning, the city was full of courageous undertakings meant to increase the town’s collective capacity for self-defense against conventional warfare, such as the clearing of fire lanes by hundreds of young school girls, many of whom would instantly vanish in the 6,000° C temperature of the initial flash, and others of whom, more distant from the center, would retain their lives but lose their faces.2 The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki initiated an era in which—for the first time on Earth and now continuing for seven and a half decades—humankind collectively and summarily lost the right self-defense. No one on Earth—or almost no one on Earth3—has the means to outlive a blast that is four times the heat of the sun or withstand the hurricane winds and raging fires that follow. Detail from the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Photo courtesy of the author. Detail from the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Photo courtesy of the author. Is it accurate to designate self-defense the right underlying every other right? Freedom of speech matters for thousands of reasons, but at its most elementary, it matters because it increases one’s chance of defending oneself and by this act, surviving. The same is true of the right of free press, the right of free assembly, the right to a fair trial, the right not to be subject to warrantless search and seizure: each has a vast array of benefits, but the bottom line is that each amplifies the right of self-defense, the right to protect and thereby perpetuate one’s own life. Centuries of political philosophers have asked “what kind of political arrangements will create a noble and generous people?” Surely such arrangements cannot be ones where a handful of men control the means for destroying at will everyone on Earth from whom the means of self-defense have been eliminated. The third link between Memorial Day 2020 and August 6 and 9, 1945, is the racism that made each event possible. Racism is a perceptual deformation that results in the judgement that people of a given skin color or ethnic derivation are not simply less deserving (of jobs, education, money, medical care, trust, responsibility, forgiveness, sympathy) but are, in a word, expendable. Lynch them, choke them, burn their faces off; we can do a follow-up study later. When Americans first learned that the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been collectively vaporized in less time than it takes for the heart to beat, many cheered. But not all. Black poet Langston Hughes at once recognized the moral depravity of executing 100,000 people and discerned racism as the phenomenon that had licensed the depravity: “How come we did not try them [atomic bombs] on Germany...They just did not want to use them on white folks.”4 Although the building of the weapon was completed only after Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, Japan had been designated the target on September 18, 1944, and training for the mission had already been initiated in that same month.5 Black journalist George Schuyler wrote: “The atom bomb puts the Anglo-Saxons definitely on top where they will remain for decades”; the country, in its “racial arrogance,” has “achieved the supreme triumph of being able to slaughter whole cities at a time.”6 Still within the first year (and still before John Hersey had begun to awaken Americans to the horrible aversiveness of the injuries), novelist and anthropologist Zora Neale Hurston denounced the U.S. president as a “butcher” and scorned the public’s silent compliance, asking, “Is it that we are so devoted to a ‘good Massa’ that we feel we ought not to even protest such crimes?”7 Silence—whether practiced by whites or people of color—was, she saw, a cowardly act of moral enslavement to a white supremacist. Each of these three passages, and scores of others, are documented in Vincent Intondi’s brilliant history, African-Americans Against the Bomb (2015), which chronicles the repudiation by the Black community of nuclear arms from the 1940s up through President Obama’s April 5, 2009, Prague speech: jazz saxophonist Charlie Parker, composer and pianist Duke Ellington, civil rights and gay activist Bayard Rustin, poet-novelist James Baldwin, playwright Lorraine Hansberry, civil rights leader Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., and sociologist and pan-Africanist W. E. B. Du Bois are among those who spoke out decisively and often. During these same decades, many white people also spoke out against the moral depravity of nuclear weapons, some even suffering terrible costs similar to those suffered by, for example, Du Bois, who because of his ardent denunciation of the American nuclear arsenal was at various points arrested, accused of being an unregistered foreign agent, denied a passport, and eventually prompted to expatriate to Ghana.8 But Black Americans, in addition to educating all who would hear about the moral depravity of the inflicted injuries, have also sought tirelessly to educate the country about the racial scaffolding that provides the gantry on which the missiles are launched. Some readers will recognize as self-evident the U.S. addiction to white racial supremacy that was at work in the flattening of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and that today supports the country’s prodigious nuclear arsenal. Some readers will recognize as self-evident the U.S. addiction to white racial supremacy that was at work in the flattening of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and that today supports the country’s prodigious nuclear arsenal, currently undergoing a 1.2 trillion dollar renewal.9 But other readers—even some who perceive the moral turpitude of nuclear weapons and who work tirelessly for their dismantlement—may be reluctant to recognize that racism. After all, we know nuclear weapons stand to eliminate all humans on Earth, not those of one or another race. Americans and Russians, who together possess more than 93 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal, have long been designated as one another’s major opponent, and Russians are often loosely described as racially white (even though they, like the American people, are made up of many different ethnic groups). That nuclear war stands a high chance of being instigated by accident or by appropriation of the weapons by a hacker or nonstate actor may seem to make the conscious and unconscious racial biases of a U.S. president or nuclear command chain irrelevant. But three lists—the list of geographies where U.S. presidents have contemplated launching a first strike, the list of geographies where the United States has tested its bombs, and the list of countries that the United States condemns for their aspiration to acquire nuclear weapons—may, like avenues of insight radiating outward from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, help to make the racial underpinnings of the nuclear architecture unmistakable. Detail from the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum. Photo courtesy of the author. section separator First, then, the geographies where we know U.S. presidents have contemplated first strikes. Eisenhower considered using an atomic weapon in the Taiwan Straits in 1954. The record of his statements in private meetings shows the presence of race, whether he was at any given moment explaining why he might use the weapon or instead why he might abstain from its use: “The President said that we must recognize the Quemoy is not our ship. Letters to him constantly say what do we care what happens to those yellow people out there.”10 Nixon tells us he contemplated ordering a first strike four times during his presidency. Although he did not name all four targets, we know one in 1969 was North Korea.11 He contemplated striking North Vietnam in 1972.12 Lyndon Johnson contemplated the launch of a nuclear weapon against China to prevent China from acquiring a nuclear weapon.13 To this list may be added the times when U.S. presidents have threatened a first strike, as when the George H.W. Bush administration during the first Gulf War informed Saddam Hussein that if he used chemical weapons, nuclear missiles were positioned to strike his country.14 The U.S. selection of nuclear testing sites indicates a belief that people of color are expendable. Like the countries U.S. presidents have chosen for a first strike, the U.S. selection of nuclear testing sites indicates a belief that people of color are expendable. The painful instance of the Marshall Islands is succinctly summarized by the Washington Post’s Dan Zak: “The United States tested 67 high-yield nuclear bombs between 1946 and 1958, resettling whole islands of Marshallese people, exposing many to radioactive fallout and bequeathing exile and ill health to ensuing generations.”15 One of the bombs was 15 megatons. Describing the total impact of the 67 tests, Zak reckons, “If their combined explosive power was parceled evenly over that 12-year period, it would equal 1.6 Hiroshima-size explosions per day.”16 The picture is not more heartening when one turns to tests carried out on U.S. soil. On the arrival this summer of the 75th anniversary of the July 16, 1945 Trinity test in New Mexico, observers noted the racial distribution: “It should come as no surprise that the downwinders of Trinity were largely impoverished agricultural families, mostly Hispanic and Native.”17 As in New Mexico, so in Nevada. A study published in the medical journal Risk Analysis concludes, “Native Americans residing in a broad region downwind from the Nevada Test Site during the 1950s and 1960s received significant radiation exposures from nuclear weapons testing.”18 The third list is the sequence of countries we have condemned because their leaders and scientists have aspired to develop a nuclear weapon. The United States has treated these aspirants, in each case, people of color—Iranians, Iraqis, Libyans, North Koreans—as immoral, despite our own vast nuclear architecture and despite our 1995 statement at the International Court of Justice that our having a nuclear arsenal, threatening to use it, using it, and using it first do not violate international covenants such as the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.19 The United States sometimes bases its indignation toward nuclear aspirants on the fact that the acquisition of a nuclear weapon by yet another country will violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); it righteously announces this violation while relentlessly overlooking the fact that it has for 50 years been in violation of that treaty, which requires, as one of its major pillars, that existing nuclear states dismantle their own arsenals. A recent article in The Atlantic reports new neuroscience research suggesting that people holding positions of power may suffer brain damage, the incapacitation of mirror neurons that ordinarily enable one to comprehend the position of another person or people.20 A country that has 6,000 nuclear weapons while savaging North Korea for having fewer than 30; a country that has 12 Ohio-class submarines each carrying the equivalent of 4,000 Hiroshima blasts while going to war against Iraq on false evidence that it might have material that could lead to a single nuclear weapon; a country that can’t be bothered to commemorate August 6 and August 9 and the hundreds of thousands incinerated on those days, yet clucks and scolds about Iranian nuclear projects, imposes sanctions, and unleashes a Stuxnet digital worm that subverts Iran’s uranium enrichment plant;21 a country that persuades Libya to dispose of its nuclear materials and after it does so, swoops in to help assassinate the country’s leader, might well appear to be a country whose governors—and perhaps, too, some in its population—no longer have functioning mirror neurons. When this soul-destroying asymmetry is pointed out, the United States says, “Yes, but they (i.e., those people of color) may use them, while we (i.e., we white people in charge of the United States) will not use them,” a manifestly incoherent statement since it is only the United States who has used them, and used them twice.22 Extreme alarm incited by picturing nuclear weapons in the hands of yet-one-more country rarely kicks in when the United States distributes its own weapons to NATO allies, currently Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy (Turkey, too, has U.S. nuclear weapons, but many were removed after 2000 and those that remain have since 2016 become a source of mounting worry23). Since these four countries are traditionally viewed as white-majority peoples, the danger of reckless use is apparently non-existent; the proliferation of the weapons to these countries does not, in the U.S. view, violate the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In a feat of double think that might have startled even George Orwell, they calmly acknowledge that in the event of war (when the NATO sharing countries will be called upon to participate in the delivery of those weapons), the Non-Proliferation Treaty will cease to be in effect.24 So we return to the question: What kind of political arrangements will create a noble and generous people? What kind of arrangements will restrain a country from egregious mass killings in the future? Will enable that country to face responsibility for injuries it has in the past inflicted on home ground (on Native Americans and African Americans), and on foreign ground (the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki)? Will help them to dedicate themselves to dismantling mis-trained and militarized police teams roving their cities and dismantling the nation’s nuclear architecture? These accomplishments are momentous and difficult but surely also minimal if we aspire to one day become a great and good people. The cruelty daily inflicted on people of color in our own city streets acts as a mental rehearsal for carrying out large-scale slayings abroad. It keeps our capacity for cruelty limber; it dulls the mind and gives us practice in pronouncing the word “expendable.” Langston Hughes voiced the opinion that until racial injustice on home ground in the United States ceases, “it is going to be very hard for some Americans not to think the easiest way to settle the problems of Asia is simply dropping an atom bomb on colored heads there.”25 While his statement was made in 1953, near the eighth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, it remains equally relevant today, as we approach the 75th anniversary: then, as now, the safety of the Korean people (among other peoples) was at issue. The cruelty daily inflicted on people of color in our own city streets acts as a mental rehearsal for carrying out large-scale slayings abroad. It keeps our capacity for cruelty limber; it dulls the mind and gives us practice in pronouncing the word “expendable.” Langston Hughes might have with equal accuracy noted the reverse. Our cruelty abroad hardens our hearts, enabling us to tolerate the spectacle of everyday racial injustice at home. Americans, seeing our country boast a vast nuclear architecture that has no other purpose than the instant elimination from Earth of large civilian populations—the launch codes day and night casually tucked in our president’s pocket—consciously or unconsciously absorb the power lesson, suffer the same brain deterioration, and now become dull-witted about whether Native American and Black lives any longer even matter.