## 1NC -- T

#### Interpretation- the affirmative must not garner offense from anything except for the hypothetical implementation of an unconditional right to strike by a just government

#### Violation – they explicitly said that justifications come prior and the theorization of racial capitalism is a higher layer than consquences

#### Government excludes a party – its specific to the governing body of a nation.

(Merriam Webster, xx-xx-xxxx, "Definition of GOVERNMENT," No Publication, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/government, accessed 11-21-2021)//nikki

Full Definition of government

1: the body of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit or organization: such as

a: the officials comprising the governing body of a political unit and constituting the organization as an active agency

The government was slow to react to the crisis.

bcapitalized : the executive branch of the U.S. federal government

ccapitalized

: a small group of persons holding simultaneously the principal political executive offices of a nation or other political unit and being responsible for the direction and supervision of public affairs:

(1): ADMINISTRATION sense 4b

(2): such a group in a parliamentary system constituted by the cabinet or by the ministry

2a: the organization, machinery, or agency through which a political unit exercises authority and performs functions and which is usually classified according to the distribution of power within it

She works for the federal government.

b: the complex of political institutions, laws, and customs through which the function of governing is carried out

3: the act or process of governing

specifically : authoritative direction or control

4: the continuous exercise of authority over and the performance of functions for a political unit : RULE

5: POLITICAL SCIENCE

studied economics and government

6a: the office, authority, or function of governing

bobsolete : the term during which a governing official holds office

7obsolete : moral conduct or behavior : DISCRETION

#### 1. First is clash – spiking out of every disad or counterplan on the basis of theoretical justifications precludes equitable negative engagement and destroys the reoslution’s value as the stasis point of debate – the accessibility of clash is key to evaluate the efficacy of radical political engagement—predictable ground and clash are key to evaluating whether the method of the affirmative is good– the ability to defend a position against a knowledgeable opponent is key to export politics to help black and indigenous people suffering under capitalism

#### 2. Predictable limits – they remove all topic limits by justifying any expansion of the topic beyond the resolutional wording, this is impossible for me to predict and desroys all semblance of in depth debate because the neg is forced to negate affs that go beyond the topic to solve things that generics don’t apply to

#### 3. TVA – read your aff but exclude the defense of justifications and representations as a prior questions – it solves 100% of your offense you don’t even have to take a single card out of the aff

#### 4. SSD solves all of their offense

#### 4. Fairness – a predictable limit is the only way to give the NEG a chance to win – radical AFF choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the AFF far ahead – anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. And, fairness is an intrinsic good ­– debate is a game and requires effective competition - controls the internal link all their education claims.

#### Drop the Debater on T – they foreclose the ability to generate neg offense so they should lose

#### Vote on competing interps over reasonability:

#### a. no brightline for reasonability – forces judge intervention

#### b. incentivizes a race to the bottom –

#### No impact turns or RVIs – A~ Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. B~ Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position. C~ Dead end – strategy guides debates so they’ll desire that people read T to beat them on the impact turn – that proves their strategy is reactive and can’t solve since they rely on the structures they critique.

## 1NC -- K

#### The 1AC’s fiated imagination of a hypothetical just government in which the settler state helps Native folk is an ahistorical dream – produces liberal multicultural fantasies that sustain settler colonialism – they are not getting out of a link after saying any government would be just post-plan

Tate A. LeFevre 2013, Representation, resistance and the logics of difference: indigenous culture as political resource in the settler-state, Settler Colonial Studies, 3:2, 136-140, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2013.781926//rLiu

Settler-colonial regimes of representation In this way, representation always ‘takes place in a terrain already partly sedimented and partly penetrated by relations of power’. 5 To represent is in many senses to make a claim. The claims made by settler-colonial representations ‘empower and disempower Indigenous peoples in the present’. As Aileen Moreton-Robinson reminds us, it was Captain Cook’s representation of Australian Aborigines as ‘uncivilized’ and without any form of land-tenure that led to the doctrine of terra nullius – a legal regime that endured until the 1992 Mabo Decision. Audra Simpson explains that representations of indigenous peoples function as: Categorical forms of recognition and misrecognition … indebted to deep philosophical histories of seeing and knowing; tied to legal fiat, they may enable disproportionately empowered political forms (such as ‘Empire’, or particular nation-states such as the United States, Canada and Australia) to come into being in a very short time, as without that category of knowing and its concomitant force land could not be wrested from those that belong to it, and those to whom it rightfully belongs.7 Exogenous representations of indigenous peoples thus result in a legal and historical effacement of indigeneity on which the legitimacy of the settler-state is in many ways predicated. Yet paradoxically, the settler-state depends on images of indigeneity even as it eliminates indigenous subjects. Settler dominions rely on the imposition of particular representational regimes to which the temporal ‘prior’ and its sign, indigenous peoples are central. The state’s hegemony inscribes itself on the lands and bodies of indigenous peoples, whose representation as distinctively ‘other’ is a crucial component in the construction of national identities.8 As Beth Povenelli has shown, images of indigeneity may be celebrated in settler states under the egis of liberal multiculturalism: An embeddedness, implication and engagement in the nation’s historic brutality towards its colonial subjects is rewritten as the necessary condition of nation-building in late modern liberal democratic societies … [indigenous peoples are] the crucial affective element in the definition of its [the nation’s] borders, interiors, discourses, imaginaries and identities.9 In this way, the valorization of ‘indigeneity’ within state and public discourses – and museums and art shows – may not correspond with improved access to political, cultural and economic rights for actual indigenous peoples. Likewise, Fred Myers had written on the close connection between the explosive growth of the market for Aboriginal art and kitsch and the modernist internationalist aspirations of the Australian state.10 Both indigenous and non-indigenous scholars have examined related examples of the representational paradoxes of ‘settler modernism’, in American, Canadian and Pacific contexts.11 In this issue, Eugenia Kisin explores the similarly complex representational logics behind ‘contemporary’ indigenous art funding in Canada. The battlefield of cultural production ‘Settler modernism’ illustrates how settler states strategically mobilize indigenous cultural productions toward hegemonic ends. As Bourdieu argues, ‘the field of cultural production is the area par excellence of clashes between the … dominant class … and the dominated fractions who are totally involved in this struggle’. Indigenous sovereignty movements are often deeply intertwined with struggles over self-representation and visibility – ‘clashes’ for recognition that play out in the field of cultural production. In this sense, indigenous cultural production can be part of a highly political, potentially transformative social discourse. And as the contributors to this special issue emphasize – indigenous cultural production goes beyond mere critique – it involves the development of ‘a counter-discursive … imaginary that is crucial to … contemporary [Indigenous] self-production and the creation of a “cultural future”’. 13 Along these lines, Faye Ginsburg proposes using the term ‘cultural activism’, in order to fully account for indigenous cultural production as a distinct form of cultural politics marked by concerted actions that are underpinned by political and artistic agendas.Accordingly, these papers explore the ways that indigenous peoples have rejected, taken up, inverted and otherwise played with settler-colonial representational regimes. We see how, ‘over time, and with increasing self confidence, indigenous cultural activists have sought to crack the distorted mirror that has been held up to them’. The forms of cultural production examined here not only reflect, but constitute the social worlds of Indigeneity within settler states, and draw our attention to representation as ‘a formative, not merely an expressive place’.

#### Labor exploitation finds it origins in colonial violence – decolonization is a prerequisite to 1AC solvency

Ronconi 15[Lucas Ronconi, 11-30-2015, "Colonial history affects labor regulations," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/colonial-history-affects-labor-regulations]/ISEE

Enforcement matters: Going beyond the letter of the law When looking at labor regulation, what is important is effective regulation. That is, the combination of both de jure regulations and their enforcement. For example, labor demand depends not only on the letter of the labor code but also on the probability of being caught - and the expected fine in case of noncompliance. Most work, however, has generally focused on the letter of the labor code. This is due to a lack of enforcement data. But how can we credibly estimate the effects of labor regulation if we only consider the letter of the law, ignoring the possibility that enforcement may be weaker in those places where the regulation is more stringent? This is not a purely hypothetical question. Noncompliance with labor regulations is pervasive in less developed countries, and at the same time, those countries tend to have the most stringent laws. In a recent paper, I compiled data on labor inspection resources, activities and fines for almost every country in the world. Interestingly, the results show that countries that have the most protective labor codes tend to enforce less, and the negative relationship remains after taking into consideration differences in GDP per capita. For example, the letter of the labor law in Venezuela and Angola is quite protective, but enforcement and compliance are very low. The opposite occurs in Canada or New Zealand. A colonial origin hypothesis of effective labor regulation Why do a large number of countries have quite protective labor codes but very low levels of enforcement? Why do they choose that combination? If there is a dislike for private market outcomes, they should not only have stringent laws but also enforce them. I argue that this apparent paradox can be explained by considering the long-lasting effects of European colonization strategies and the actual distribution of enforcement across firm size. Let me explain. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and other economic historians, in those territories where the Europeans pursued an extractive strategy, they created an economy characterized by monopolies and the exploitation of labor. This situation led to social unrest, and ultimately to the introduction of stringent labor laws in an attempt to buy social peace. In Latin America, those reforms typically occurred a century after the countries gained independence. In Africa they were usually introduced at the end of the colonial period. But because the rent was focused in a few privileged firms and sectors, and because those who had the capacity to mobilize also worked there, the labor laws only applied in those sectors. Enforcing such a complex labor code on small production units was both unfeasible and economically disruptive. In North America and Oceania, on the other hand, Europeans were more interested in developing places where they, and their descendants, could live. They created more competitive markets, which led to higher wages, a smaller imbalance between capital and labor, less social unrest and demand for redistribution. Furthermore, more competitive markets produce more pressure on the government towards ensuring high levels of compliance across all firms to avoid unfair competition. In those countries where the Europeans pursued an extractive strategy as opposed to former settler colonies, we see more protective labor codes, lower overall enforcement, and different levels of enforcement between larger and smaller firms.

#### Their labor-centric theory of power can’t explain either the fungibility of blackness or the genocidal dispossession of natives.

Robinson, 2020 (Rowland – member of the Menominee Nation (Ka͞eyes-Mamāceqtawak) and PhD Candidate in Sociology @ the University of Waterloo, “An Autoethnographic Account of the Imaginarium of Late Capitalist/Colonialist Storytelling”, dissertation, shae)

Indeed, in many ways because of these deeply held, and often unquestioned conceptions within at least mainstream and orthodox conceptions of Marxism, such as the conception of human-as-Man, of nature and of the human-nature relationship, it is possible for Marxism to actually deepen the commitment to modernity/coloniality within a given situation, even as it may work to struggle against others because of the perceived universality of Marxism. In fact, because of at least orthodox Marxism’s open and enthusiastic commitment to many of the core tenants of euromodernity, and hence its lurching fear of ‘postmodernism’ (itself a Eurocentric critique of euromodernity), a more cynical reading would see this kind of deeper westernization to be an almost inevitable. Marxism is thus, within this kind of understanding, a thoroughly modernist analytic and political project, and is thus tied up with many of the epistemological and ontological dimensions of coloniality. Marxism, like postmodernism and post-structuralism are, as Grosfoguel notes, “epistemological projects that are caught within the western canon, reproducing within its domains of thought and practice a particular form of coloniality of power/knowledge” (2008). This includes in many ways a recapitulation of liberal-bourgeois notions of the human and humanism, a problem with which I grapple significantly in this dissertation [you can catch a few glimpses of this aspect of my work in some previous posts I have made, which also were clips of my dissertation writings]. For Marx, and for the Marxist tradition that followed, this liberal-bourgeois humanist tendency is perhaps most clearly subsumed up within what Tiffany Lethabo King identifies as a Lockean formulation that links labour with land, and labour with property, and eventually labour with the ability to claim status as a proper human subject (2019:23). This analytic has been the site of deep challenge and critique from within both Black and Native Studies. The encounter between Marxist theory and Black and Native Studies is one that destabilizes the former by way of a structural violence that both prefaces the labourcentric analytics of Marxism, as well as exceeds its margins of theorizability and incorporation. From within Black Studies, Saidiya Hartman, for example, theorizes the fungibility of Blackness and of the enslaved Black person as a challenge to the labourcentric theoretical analytic of Marxism, which has historically, and currently, tended to reduce this ongoing structural mechanic and lived experience to mere alienated labour, if an extreme case of such. Pushing beyond these limitations, she proposes racialization, accumulation, and domination as the analytics best suited for understanding the development and position of Black subjectivity, rather than pure labour (2003). Similarly, emerging from Native Studies, Glen Coulthard, in his attempt to think through and with the Marxist analytic, necessarily pushes beyond the Lockean labourcentrism of Marxism in order to find grounding on which to orient both discussions of Native oppression and colonization, and question of Indigenous liberation. He notes in Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, “the history and experience of dispossession, not proletarianization, has been the dominant background structure shaping the character of the historical relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state” (2014:13). Indeed, the relationship between Indigenous people and the processes of proletarianization, or rather the lack thereof (in so far as the cognition of the settler state and society views it), is paradigmatic of the Native as the Savage, and as part of the Wild, an ontological status that I explore later in this dissertation. What is ultimately at stake here concerning Marxism as a particular kind of liberal-bourgeois, euromodern, and labourcentric humanism, is that the violences of conquest, genocide, and enslavement escape the ability of its grammars and registers to make a full accounting of them. If Marxism is to be made applicable to the violent sufferings experienced by genocided and enslaved peoples, it must be stretched so much that it will perhaps become unrecognizable to those theorists who take up and proclaim the myriad Marxist schools of thought. This, of course, reflects Fanon’s old, if perhaps quite understated, prescription that “a Marxist analysis should always be slightly stretched when it comes to addressing the colonial issue” (2004:5).

#### Movements against neoliberalism and worker exploitation must first address the structural dispossession of indigenous people.

Baker 17 (W Oliver Baker, PhD candidate and Mellon Fellow American Literary Studies at the University of New Mexico, intersecting histories of settler colonialism, racial capitalism, white supremacy, and class in American literature and culture, “Democracy, Class, and White Settler Colonialism”, 2017, https://www.academia.edu/34506752/Democracy\_Class\_and\_White\_Settler\_Colonialism)//RC

In recent years. settler state policies have shifted away from a strategy Of direct violence and forced assimilation—mostly in response to the political threat posed by the anticolonial nation• alisms of the mid-twentieth century—and toward what Glen Coulthard describes as a politics of -colonial recognition.- in which settler societies promise greater accommodation and recognition of Indigenous groups but only to the extent that claims of sosvreignty or demands for decoloniza- tion go unheard and remain disavowed: A politics of colonial recognition also calls for reconciliation and healing between settlers and Indigenous peoples as a way to mend what is believed to be a racial or cultural conflict rather than a struggle over land and sovereignty. While settler societies might atnrtn the diversity Of Indigenous cultures or even lament past incidents Of colonial violence. Centuries-old structures and institutions of dispossession remain in place. These can be witnessed today in the underdevelopment of tribal economies that encourages the privati- zation of (or the attempt to dissolve) tribally-held land and resources; neoliberal policies that slash public services and deregulate predatory credit and loan industries. while funding entrepreneurial self-help initiatives in Indian Country; the use of state and police violence to brutalize. incarcerate. and murder unsheltered and working poor Indigenous peoples whose presence -off the reservation- in border towns is seen as a threat and danger to the property and flows of capital of settler society. extraction industries that destructivelv seek to unearth and/or transport fossil fuels on or through tribal lands: and the ongoing refusal of federal governments to honour the treaties, land claims. and rights to self.determination of the Indigenous nations of North America. A second key analytic of settler colonial studies and Indigenous critical theory is the concept of Indigeneity. Although defined in various ways, for this essay3 purposes Indigeneity can be described as the social category of persons whose ways of life. forms of knowing. and modes Of being depend upon originary relationships to land bases that Euro-American settlers have enclosed and continue to occupy. Because Indigenous peoples claim originary ties to these land bases. their presence or attempt to live on and through them challenges the legitimacy of settler society. As a social category constituted through elimination and genocide. Indigeneity should be understood as distinct from, for example. the category of the wage labourer that is structured by proletarianization and hegemony. If wage labourers. whether employed or unemployed. are struc- turally included in the marketplace where their labour power is exploited. the marketplace itself and the liberal state form that upholds it are nonetheless premised on the elimination of Indigenous peoples altogether. The ideological framework that mediates, legitimates. and reproduces Indigenous dispossession and its category of Indigeneity is the colonial and racial grammar of what Jodi Byrd calls "Indianness.¯• The Indian came to be a social ontology in which Indigenous peoples were under- stood as savage. ancient. living fossils of early humanity. stuck outside of time and space in a state of nature. The Indian was and continues to be both abjected and romanticized in settler culture as a person who exists in a state of natural warfare. instability. and conflict. while also appearing liberated from the constraints and alienation of modern life. In this state of nature, the Indian is understood to lack the capacity to labour productivity. possess property. or enter into social con • tracts. Through such meanings. the Indian emerges as the outside or Other to Euro-American forms of liberal democracy. selfhood. and civil society.• As Byrd emphasizes. - European moder- nity hinges upon Indians as the necessary antinomy through which the New World—along with civilization. freedom. sovereignty. and humanity—comes to have meaning. structure. and pres- ence.-•• The Indian. in short, became the figure of the un-sovereign through which it was understood that the Indian might occupy but could never possess the ability or right to own lands or possess selfhood.' i The dispossession of Indigenous lands. resources. and bodies thus came to be seen less as a form of theft than the natural transition from -savage- communalism to civilized market society. Today. Indianness continues. as Byrd puts it. to "transit U.S. empire,- or put into motion, facil. itate, and cohere the United States' settler imperial project that reaches around the world." It is through Indianness that settlers come to view the lands. resources. and bodies of the earth as spaces and objects of a barren wilderness (terra nullius) freely available for expropriation. The current and future populations living in spaces of the lands and controlling the resources that US settler imperialism attempts to seize or control are, as Byrd explains. made "Indian- or abjected as mindless terrorist-savages whose confrontation with the agents of enclosure is under- stood not as an attempt to resist and survive colonization. occupation. and genocide. but an irrational attack against society. civilization. humanity. and the forces of modern progress. In short. Indianness is what legitimates the process of primitive accumulation or what David Harvey calls -accumulation by dispossession.- which is central to the formation. expansion. and domi- nance of global finance capitalism. What an understanding. then. of settler colonialism. Indigeneity. and Indianness demon• strates concerning the question of alliance-building among oppressed groups today is that political organizing through the spaces of the democratic commons or the identity of the settler wage labourer supports rather than disrupts the colonization of Indigenous peoples of North America In the case of the democratic commons. calls for preserving and expanding the public institutions and spaces of liberal democracy in order to cultivate more radical and progressive forms of democracy is a demand not to undo or transform but to uphold the settler colonial state As Byrd argues. "one reason why a racial' and just democratic society is a lost cause in the United States is that it is always already conceived through the prior disavowed and misremembered colonization of Indigenous lands that cannot be ended by further inclusion or more participation."" Coulthard echoes this point. showing that "in liberal settler states...the •com. not only belong to somebody.. .they also deeply inform and sustain Indigenous modes of thought and behavior"" While it should be acknowledged that the democratic Commons histori- eally has served an important role in cultivating and producing emancipatory modes Of analysis and forms Of social belonging. such gains have nonetheless always depended upon the tion of Indigenous peoples. Any defence. then, of the democratic commons today must at the same time defend Indigenous sovereignty. This means rethinking how groups relate in the spaces Of the commons in Ways that do not perpetuate liberal democracy's colonial project Oi building public institutions and democratic spaces through the seizure, theft, and colonization of Indigenous lands. bodies. and resources. Class .first models of a renewed workers' movement also risk reproducing colonial disposses. Sion When they fail to recognize that the Indian and the settler Wage labourer are structurally distinct categories Of oppression. former is constituted by dispossession through elimination. while the latter is structured by exploitation through hegemony. Even though exploited. settler wage labourers nonetheless come to experience their status in settler colonialism as a place Of refuge and protection tiom dispossession and abjection. The role of the settler state is to ensure and safeguard the settler wage labourers right not only to possess but not to be dispossessed of property, even if the only property the wage labourer possesses is labour power. In fact. possessing labour power as a commodity to sell on the market indexes the settler wage laboureös right and ability to enter the social Contract and find security from the forms structural exclusion natu• ralized in the position of the Indian. Such a status explains why. when neoliberal forms of precarious labour and exclusions from waged life increasingly target settler wage labourers, they are felt and represented as abnormal. undeserving, and. more importantly. grievable occurrences. The dispossession Of settlers challenges the symbolic and material consisten€y Of settler societies that are premised on dispossessing colonial peoples in order to reward and advantage settlers Of all classes. Settler society retains and reproduces its coherence as the promised site of settler sov. ereignty, possession. and rights by figuring the neoliberal dispossession of settlers as the exception to be if only because Indigenous dispossession remains the norm to be reproduced and repeated. grievability of neoliberal dispossession. heard today in the refrain that globalization has -abandoned the white working class.- depends upon the ungrievability and normalization of Indigenous dispossession that. in the narratives not only Of manifest destiny but also the demo- cratic commons and normative socialist futures. is depicted and accepted as a natural. inevitable. and necessary process. One of the limits. then. of calling for solidarity through the political identity of the wage labourer is that. in settler colonialism. what organized settler wage labourers demand is not necessarily an end to exploitation but the freedom. protection, and refuge from structural dispossession and exclusion that are normalized and naturalized in the social and racial ontologies of the Indian. Movements on behalf of settler labourers risk ending in reform rather than revolution precisely because they do not so much seek to confront capital as they seek refuge and protection within and through it.

#### A democratic model encourages neoliberal multiculturism which focuses on collective identity which would keep people hoping to qualify for state rights rather than vying for a more just government—turns the case as their democracy is absent of value

Shannon Speed, citizen of the Chickasaw Nation of Oklahoma, Director of American Indian Studies and Associate Professor of Gender Studies and Anthropology at UCLA, 2016,” States of Violence: Indigenous women migrants in the ra of neoliberal multiculturism,” University of Texas at Austin, https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/indigenous/files/critique\_of\_anthropology-shannon.pdf

The 1990s were a time of hope, at least in some regards, for indigenous people in Latin America. ‘‘Globalization’’ and the so-called ‘‘end of history’’ seemed to mandate a wave of democratization and expansion of rights, in tandem with the spread of neoliberal economics. As states undertook an often massive reorientation of their economies (Mexico is particularly notable), ending land reform, eliminating state subsidies for farming and industry, privatizing capital and natural resources, limiting tariffs on foreign goods, and slashing government social welfare programs, they also moved toward popularly elected governments and expanded notions of human rights and the rule of law. A number of states, including Mexico and Guatemala, reformed their constitutions to recognize indigenous peoples and extend to them some level of collective indigenous rights. Often posited as the inevitable spread of neoliberal democracy on a US model (at times with an evolutionist flavor of development toward the highest state of being, naturally epitomized by the United States), these processes seemed to promise at least a minimal increase in political stability, rights, and accountability. Debates about the benefits and limitations for indigenous peoples of the new recognition and rights regimes were the subject of considerable theorizing regarding the period of ‘‘democratic opening’’ in Latin America. While some theorists hailed the recognition of indigenous peoples rights as a significant victory ‘‘shaping the quality of democracy in Latin America’’ and signifying ‘‘a major power shift’’ and ‘‘a more generalized opening of the political system to excluded and vulnerable sectors of society’’ (Van Cott, 2007: 127, see also Van Cott, 2000), others signaled a need to ‘‘qualify somewhat premature and narrow discussion of democratic consolidation’’ (Yasher, 1999). Analysts also sounded alarm bells about the ways in which multicultural rights regimes might work against indigenous peoples, by reinforcing state power and creating structures that, by focusing on collective identity rather than collective well-being, obscured the economic inequalities that were certain only to grow under neoliberalism. Charles Hale questioned the multiculturalism that underpinned the politics of recognition and analytically tied it to neoliberalism, coining the term ‘‘neoliberal multiculturalism’’ as he warned of the dangers of an overinvestment in limited cultural rights at the expense of an analysis of socio-economic inequality and state subject making (Hale, 2005; 2006). Hale (2002) also suggested that the limited rights afforded by neoliberal multiculturalism served to keep people focused on the possibility of qualifying for state-sponsored rights, rather than engaging in struggles for potentially more just systems of governance. Other theorists focused on the dangers for indigenous people of relying on the legal regimes of the state for their liberation and highlighted to multiple forms of state subject-making at work in these arenas (Garcı´a, 2005; Hernandez et al., 2004; Park and Richards, 2007; Postero, 2006; Sieder, 2002; Speed, 2005; Speed and Sierra, 2005).

#### The inevitable presentation of a right to strike as a form of benevolent governance bestowed by the state on Indigenous communities problematizes Indigenous nonconformity as the cause of labor exploitation and shifts the analytical frame of criticism away from the settler state.

Strakosch 17 Elizabeth Strakosch, 10-21-17, Neoliberal Indigenous Policy: Settler Colonialism and the "Post-Welfare" State, <https://books.google.com/books/bout/Neoliberal_Indigenous_Policy.html?id=TPFbrgEACAAJ> mvp

The RPA gives both government and Indigenous parties space to outline their priorities (the Ngaanyatjarra Council in FaCSIA 2005: 1.6, and governments in 1.7). Indigenous priorities include cultural survival, connection to land, securing infrastructure funding and maintaining control over their own affairs. Government objectives reflect the COAG National Framework Principles for Service Delivery to Indigenous Australians (including sharing responsibility, harnessing the mainstream, efficiency and accountability) (Council of Australian Governments 2002), and also indicate specific priority areas. These areas for change in Indigenous lives include early education, substance misuse, family functionality and economic participation (1.7.6). Therefore, the RPA does give Indigenous parties space to articulate their values to governments, and these values do not align with the governments’ own neoliberal principles. However, the following section outlines the common agreement objectives, and these overall objectives are all directed at meeting government goals: In making this Agreement the Ngaanyatjarra Council and the Governments have agreed to work together ... [for the] provision of better coordinated and resourced programs and services to achieve improvements in the priority areas listed in Section 1.7.6. (2.1–2.1.1.1) But as noted above, section 1.7 outlines government priorities, rather than goals agreed upon by both parties. Government priorities have become common priorities, and the key objectives of the partnership. Therefore, while the agreement seeks to harmonise Indigenous and government interests, it requires reform within the Indigenous rather than government parties. The most important priority becomes the commitment by the Indigenous party to share government responsibility and goals. As with all mutual obligation-type compacts, this involves a complex temporal manoeuvre in which the obligations of government become reconfigured as gifts of government, and hence become legitimate consideration in a contractual exchange. In return for this gift, the state makes its own demands for change in its subjects. In the legal and political imaginary of the liberal contract, ‘consideration’ is an objective benefit of legal value which is exchanged by parties to a formal contract (Paterson et al. 2009: 74). It is the ‘price of the promise’: ‘[i]f we need to know whether A’s promise to B can be enforced by B, we must ask whether B ... has given consideration for that promise’ (Paterson et al. 2009: 73, 74). Superficially, the consideration exchanged in an SRA contract seems obvious: Indigenous peoples give the settler state a promise to share responsibility for their own government, and in return, the state offers resources to assist in this government. This is represented in Figure 7.1. However, more careful examination shows that the existence of government consideration relies on a complex temporal movement. Neoliberal Indigenous policy works on the assumption that the proper liberal government of Indigenous lives is the responsibility of Indigenous peoples themselves, but that they need to consciously recognise and accept this responsibility. Thus, while Indigenous governmental responsibility might exist at a theoretical level, there is an important sense in which it does not already exist as an actual fact. This lack is what makes the Indigenous undertaking to share responsibility a benefit to government (as discussed above, the wicked problem of Indigenous disadvantage is a government problem, and the mobilisation of subject responsibility is a government initiative to resolve that problem. This is not to say that this deprivation does cause suffering, or that Indigenous communities do not wish to address it; rather, I suggest that the specific kind of liberal self-government sought by the settler state is not automatically a goal and moral imperative for Indigenous peoples). Until the moment of exchange, in fact, both the responsibility for the full liberal government of Indigenous subjects, and the concrete resources for this government, belong to the government party (see Figure 7.2). The Ngaanyatjarra RPA agreements state that a key purpose of the contract, and therefore a shared interest of Indigenous and government parties, is to ‘share responsibility for achieving measurable and sustainable improvements for people living in the Ngaanyatjarra Lands’ (FaCSIA 2005: 2.1.1). However, ‘sharing responsibility’ is also listed as an objective of the governments, while it is not an interest listed by the Indigenous party (1.6–7). The RPA, therefore, turns an interest of the government party into a mutual interest. It enables government to divest some of the responsibility which would otherwise accrue entirely to it, and this divestment itself is the contractual benefit government seeks. So, in a sense, the major asset or power that Indigenous peoples bring to the contractual table is freedom from the burden of their own liberal/colonial rule, and the ability to take on some of the burden of their own government for the benefit of the state. However, until this responsibility is shared, the concrete resources that the state brings to Indigenous peoples are not recognisable as an item of value to the Indigenous party – they are simply the resources that the state must mobilise to meet its own responsibility to govern. To push this point further, we might even consider the governmental resources, such as unemployment support, community-building projects and adequate education, as rights possessed by Indigenous peoples by virtue of their status as citizens. Neoliberal rationality redefines the goods which the state owes its citizens as voluntary gifts which can legitimately be withheld (Ramia 2002). When governmental responsibility is shared and becomes a common interest with the governed, however, these goods are transformed into contributions to a common cause. They become contractual consideration, and their allocation is seen as an action that requires a reciprocal contribution from Indigenous peoples (Figure 7.3). SRA and RPA quasi-contracts, like the neoliberal SRA program logic which simultaneously recognises and seeks to create Indigenous governance capacity, have a peculiar suspended or circular temporality. Before the moment of contractual agreement, they make no sense. Only in the instant when Indigenous peoples take upon themselves the burden of their own adequate liberal government are government resources removed as a right and regifted as a contractual contribution to a common cause. This is the complex movement by which SRAs attempt to mobilise Indigenous subjects as resources in their own government, and as members of the sovereign community. Conclusion: government and sovereignty in Indigenous capacity building SRAs and RPAs aimed to enact Indigenous governmental consent to multiple, specific and concrete projects. However, this process also worked to generate sovereign consent to the settler state, and to erase Indigenous political difference. Capable Indigenous communities were seen as ‘willing to understand and work with governments’ in the project of addressing their own disadvantage (Morgan Disney 2006: 7). This meant demonstrating acceptance of the neoliberal problematisation of themselves as disadvantaged citizens, and the understanding of this disadvantage as a ‘wicked problem’ requiring Indigenous shared responsibility. In turn, they were asked to accept that their disadvantage was intimately connected to their own behaviour. Within the SRA framework, Indigenous communities could no longer locate the cause of their disadvantage in the action of settler authorities, or refuse to understand their lives as deficient in relation to the settler ‘norm’. Instead, the logic seeks to drive their consent to the settler state’s own framing of itself as the natural and legitimate partner in addressing Indigenous deficiencies. At a deeper level, the liberal settler state is seeking to bind itself to Indigenous communities by asking them to accept their own lives and behaviours as lacking, to request government assistance for change, and to help design the concrete governmental programs for this state intervention. Hindess suggests that liberalism must continually justify its project of rule, given its commitment to the abstract natural freedom of all individuals, and that its sovereign legitimacy therefore constitutes a ‘precarious practical accomplishment’ (Hindess 1997: 261; also Hindess 2005). A liberal polity must show that its (potential) subjects are failing in some way and that sovereign rule is necessary to help them attain their governmental goals. This means that its subjects must identify endless governmental goals, and always understand themselves as failing and in need of state assistance. SRAs aimed to build the capacity of Indigenous communities to identify their ‘needs and priorities’, articulate these to government and advise the government on appropriate interventions (Council of Australian Governments 2002: 1). These communities were being assisted to self-problematise and to provide the settler state with justifications for extending its authority into their lives. If liberal sovereign nation-states constitute a community of mutual governmental responsibility, then SRAs attempt to fully absorb Indigenous subjects into the sovereign state by absorbing them into this governmental community. Simultaneously, the SRA admission that Indigenous peoples were not yet part of such a community of mutual government exposed settler colonial sovereignty as an incomplete project.

#### The alternative is an incommensurable project of decolonization that necessitates the repatriation of indigenous lands, the abolition of slavery and property, and the dismantling of the global imperial metropole – this is a complete disavowal of settler futurity that refuses to be punctuated by narratives of reconciliation.

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. \*Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

**Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements.** **These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts.** **We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects.** There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. **We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.** Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations **The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.** This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. **For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars**: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition **The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state.** As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). **Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.** For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). **Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).** Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. **Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.** Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. **There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.** **Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.** Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. **“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’.** The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. **The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.** It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

#### The role of debate is to disrupt settler logics that produce epistemic or material violence – we control the question of uniqueness as academic institutions are currently saturated with anti-indigenous sentimentality – decolonization is the only ethical demand your ballot should be oriented towards

## 1NC – Case

#### Their own solvency advocate impact turns the aff – COFI evidence in highlighted text says “communists fight agaisnt reformism…reformism leads not to strike victories, but to counterrevolution and fascism.” – this very explicitly turns the idea that labor reformism can be conducive to revolution

#### There’s no explanation of how a right to strike would create a unified revolutionary fvanguard and how that party would then dismantle the capitalist state and institute communism – absent a clear and logical step by step explanation of how they get there you should grang them 0% solvency

### 1NC -- Framing

#### There’s a footnoting DA – an overarching analysis of oppression obscures the specific forms of violence faced by indigenous people and makes decolonization impossible because it always ebcomes a secondary project to the resolution of opppresion writ large

### 1NC -- Policymaking Bad

#### Policy-making perpetuates settler colonialist methods to dominate Indigenous communities, creating homogenous and racist depictions of Indigenous communities

**Abawi, 2017** [Zuhra and Janelle, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and Brady, University of Ontario 2017, Emerging Perspectives 1(1), 20-31, “Decolonizing Indigenous Educational Policies,” <https://journalhosting.ucalgary.ca/index.php/ep/article/view/30353>, p.22-23 Accessed 7.6.17 CT @ GDI]

Policy-making is yet another tool of the colonization, control and domination of Indigenous communities, in which many of the policies are highly racialized and operate on the homogenization, tokenization and white supremacist stereotypical conceptions of Indigenous communities. Schick (2014) noted: Stereotypes about Aboriginal people and federal policies that hampered their progress were useful in creating the mythology of the vanishing Indigenous peoples, and later, producing management systems that enabled the state to control the progress of Aboriginal peoples when they refused to go away. (p. 93) Such tokenized, derogatory depictions of Indigenous people as one homogenous, static group continue to inform and dictate settler government interactions with Indigenous communities. Schick discussed issues of “white resentment” in terms of the colonial settler state and a moral panic, in which white people fear their fate as a possible minority and must therefore re-assert white supremacy or what Schick referred to as “a re-affirmation and re-narration of cultural and social identities” operating to legitimize white privilege and white supremacy (p. 96). Policy-making and legislation are components of the ongoing white settler colonial apparatus, which seeks full domination over Indigenous people, lands and resources. Although the policy documents express the fact that Indigenous knowledge systems, epistemologies and pedagogical approaches vary from Eurocentric paradigms, this acknowledgement is a colour-blind, multiculturalist, difference acknowledgement (Coulthard, 2014). There is a lack of interrogation of how such Eurocentric legislation, policy-making and implementation, education, social services, and legal and government structures have and continue to serve as systems of genocide and assimilation. Anti-colonialism disrupts liberal, multicultural, discursive practices, which claim to advocate for Indigenous education and success, yet operate to ensure that the white settler neo-liberal agenda remains hegemonic. Such policies exist to ensure that Canada’s fastest growing demographic remains economically competitive and fills labour shortages (Cherubini, 2010). How can anticolonialism be implemented through praxis, acts of resistance and Indigenous knowledge systems at the policy-making level? Is such an anti-colonial coalition as described even possible in a truly authentic way, free from neo-colonial influence?

#### Injecting critical theory into policy making dilutes and resiginfies it to support empire – also a link to the aff.

Bolton and Minor, 16

(Michael Bolton, Associate Professor of Political Science, Pace University, Elizabeth Minor, Visiting Research Scholar @ Jindal school of international affairs, “The Discursive Turn Arrives in Turtle Bay: The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons’ Operationalization of Critical IR Theories,” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1758-5899.12343)

Within the IR literature there is a perennial admonition to make theory more ‘relevant’ to policy makers, but this is usually cast in problem‐solving terms: producing knowledge that solves the problems faced by the existing political framework. (Lepgold, 1998; Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005; Walt, 2005). Many of those engaged in critical theorizing resist such demands to be ‘useful,’ suspicious of the operationalization of academic work in oppressive systems, and tend towards a position of ‘resistance’ to the system as a whole. Critical security studies scholar Anna Stavrianakis (2012, p. 233) for example, calls on disarmament activists to demand ‘transgressive change that fundamentally alters the social landscape as well as generates concrete improvements’ rather than calling for ‘incremental changes that leave the parameters of an issue untouched’. Given the centrality of discourse to critical theorizing, resistance is often framed not in terms of taking territory, mobilizing bodies, changing legislation, gaining votes or raising money. Rather it tends to focus on the critical deconstruction of oppressive discourse and disruption of existing norms (e.g. Hargreaves, 2012). As a result, many critical IR scholars see their academic work – undermining dominant discourses through their scholarship and teaching – as their primary form of resistance. (Said, 1996). An emerging generation of political actors were educated by post‐positivist and critical IR scholars and conceive of their work self‐consciously in discursive terms. That is, they frame their intervention in the political arena as a deliberate attempt to reshape the way society speaks about and gives meaning to a particular phenomenon, people, group or activity. Occupy Wall Street activists drew upon critical and discursive theories to strategize their symbolic disruption of the neo‐liberal order (Welty, 2013). LGBTQA activists and ‘third wave’ feminists are trying to change dominant discourses of gender and sexuality (e.g. St. Pierre, 2000). However, critical theory has had less impact on the realm of international military and security policy, which remains heavily influenced by realist thought (Cooper, 2006). As critical theorizing has begun to be used for solving definable political problems (e.g. Davies, 2012; Merlingen, 2013), what Brown (2013) calls ‘critical problem‐solving theory’, it has eroded Cox's (1981) boundary between ‘problem‐solving’ and critical theories. What happens when a theoretical paradigm that explicitly defines itself in critical opposition is instrumentalized and used in problem‐solving ways? This question, which we begin to explore in this article, is underexamined in the literature (see Weizman, 2012, pp. 185–220 for an important exception). According to the epistemic community literature (e.g. Haas 2004), the education of policy makers can shape their later actions (Eriksson and Sundelius, 2005). Most usefully for this article, it shows how at critical junctures policy makers will turn to experts. Policy makers tend to be less interested in meta‐theory or broad academic debates about an issue. Rather, they look for knowledge that can be used instrumentally to solve a particular policy problem (e.g. Hall, 1993). But moving theoretical ideas from academia, through the activist community, to the policy arena, dilutes the original ideas and reinterprets them in instrumental ways. To help understand this, we draw on postcolonial concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘creolization’ of different ‘knowledge systems’ pushed into contact (Shih and Lionet, 2011, p. 30). We find that some ICAN campaigners responsible for its current strategy have ‘translated’ IR discursive theory into the world of disarmament policy making. In doing so, they selected the aspects of critical security studies ‘to transpose and emphasize’ (cf. Tymoczko, 2000 p. 24) as befit their specific political goals. This creative application of critical theory in a new setting, in its translation of theory into political engagement, may necessarily involve rendering it less threatening to elite audiences, in the process of seeking policy changes (cf. Jeffrey, 2013, pp. 107–131).