# 1AC -- Chrononormativity

#### The dead are living here.

#### The generations upon generations of children, parents, brothers and sisters and siblings of all stripes and all colors.

#### Whose lives are missing from history.

#### Whose bodies are buried in unmarked graves, forgotten by time.

#### They interrupt this debate with the lingering atemporality of their unwritten histories, unspoken narratives, and unrealized liberation.

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By portraying the reciprocal derangement of bodies and sequences, K.I. P. offers a through-the-looking-glass view of how time binds a socius. By ‘‘binds,’’ I mean to invoke the way that human energy is collated so that it can sustain itself. By ‘‘time binds,’’ I mean something beyond the obvious point that people find themselves with less time than they need. Instead, I mean that naked flesh is bound into socially meaningful em- bodiment through temporal regulation: binding is what turns mere exis- tence into a form of mastery in a process I’ll refer to as chrononormativity, or the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum productivity. And I mean that people are bound to one another, en- grouped, made to feel coherently collective, through particular orchestra- tions of time: Dana Luciano has termed this chronobiopolitics, or ‘‘the sexual arrangement of the time of life’’ of entire populations. Chrononormativity is a mode of implantation, a technique by which institutional forces come to seem like somatic facts. Schedules, calendars, time zones, and even wristwatches inculcate what the sociologist Evitar Zerubavel calls ‘‘hidden rhythms,’’ forms of temporal experience that seem natural to those whom they privilege. Manipulations of time con- vert historically specific regimes of asymmetrical power into seemingly ordinary bodily tempos and routines, which in turn organize the value and meaning of time. The advent of wage work, for example, entailed a violent retemporalization of bodies once tuned to the seasonal rhythms of agricultural labor. An even broader description of chrononormativity appears in Pierre Bourdieu’s discussion of habitus—a social group’s culti-vated set of gestural and attitudinal dispositions. Bourdieu argues that ‘‘the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations’’ structuring the norms of embodiment, personhood, and activity in a culture takes shape within the rhythms of gift exchange. For Bourdieu, cultural competence and thus belonging itself are matters of timing, of coming to inhabit a culture’s expectations about the temporal lapses be- tween getting and giving such that they seem inborn. More recently, Judith Butler has shown how the rhythms of gendered performance— specifically, repetitions—accrete to “freeze” masculinity and femininity into timeless truths of being. Zerubavel’s “hidden rhythms,” Bourdieu’s “habitus,” and Butler’s “gender performativity” all describe how repe- tition engenders identity, situating the body’s supposed truth in what Nietzsche calls ‘‘monumental time,’’ or static existence outside of histori- cal movement. But Bourdieu alone allows us to see that subjectivity emerges in part through mastering the cultural norms of withholding, delay, surprise, pause, and knowing when to stop—through mastery over certain forms of time. In temporal manipulations that go beyond pure repetition, his work suggests, institutionally and culturally enforced rhythms, or timings, shape flesh into legible, acceptable embodiment. In chronobiopolitics, this process extends beyond individual anato- mies to encompass the management of entire populations: people whose individual bodies are synchronized not only with one another but also with larger temporal schemae experience belonging itself as natural. In a chronobiological society, the state and other institutions, including repre- sentational apparatuses, link properly temporalized bodies to narratives of movement and change. These are teleological schemes of events or strate- gies for living such as marriage, accumulation of health and wealth for the future, reproduction, childrearing, and death and its attendant rituals. Indeed, as the anthropologist John Borneman’s work clarifies, so-called personal histories become legible only within a state-sponsored time- line. his timeline tends to serve a nation’s economic interests, too. In the United States, for instance, states now license, register, or certify birth (and thus citizenship, eventually encrypted in a Social Security id for taxpaying purposes), marriage or domestic partnership (which privatizes caretaking and regulates the distribution of privatized property), and death (which terminates the identities linked to state benefits, redistribut- ing these benefits through familial channels), along with sundry privileges like driving (to jobs and commercial venues) and serving in the military (thus incurring state expenditures that often serve corporate interests). In the eyes of the state, this sequence of socioeconomically ‘‘productive’’ moments is what it means to have a life at all. And in zones not fully reducible to the state—in, say, psychiatry, medicine, and law—having a life entails the ability to narrate it not only in these state-sanctioned terms but also in a novelistic framework: as event-centered, goal-oriented, in- tentional, and culminating in epiphanies or major transformation. The logic of time-as-productive thereby becomes one of serial cause-and- effect: the past seems useless unless it predicts and becomes material for a future. These teleologies of living, in turn, structure the logic of a “peo- ple’s” inheritance: rather than just the transfer of private property along heteroreproductive lines, inheritance becomes the familial and collective legacy from which a group will draw a properly political future—be it national, ethnic, or something else. Chronobiopolitics harnesses not only sequence but also cycle, the dia- lectical companion to sequence, for the idea of time as cyclical stabilizes its forward movement, promising renewal rather than rupture. And as Julia Kristeva argues, the gender binary organizes the meaning of this and other times conceived as outside of—but symbiotic with—linear time. Kristeva claims that Woman, as a cultural symbol, comes to be correlated with the endless returns of cyclical time, as well as the stasis of monu- mental time: the figure of Woman supplements the historically specific nation-state with appeals to nature and eternity. Luciano dates a par- ticularly Anglo-American version of this arrangement to the early nine- teenth century, when ‘‘separate spheres’’ were above all temporal: the repetitions and routines of domestic life supposedly restored working men to their status as human beings responding to a ‘‘natural’’ environ- ment, renewing their bodies for reentry into the time of mechanized production and collective national destiny. In the wake of industrializa- tion in the United States, she writes, mourning was newly reconcep- tualized as an experience outside of ordinary time, as eternal, recurrent, even sacred—and so, I would argue, were any number of other affective modes. Mid-nineteenth-century writers figured maternal love, domestic bliss, romantic attachments, and eventually even bachelorhood as havens from a heartless world and, more importantly, as sensations that moved according to their own beat. The emerging discourse of domesticity, especially, inculcated and validated a set of feelings—love, security, har- mony, peace, romance, sexual satisfaction, motherly instincts—in part by figuring them as timeless, as primal, as a human condition located in and emanating from the psyche’s interior. In this sense, the nineteenth cen-tury’s celebrated ‘‘heart,’’ experienced by its owner as the bearer of archaic or recalcitrant sensations, was the laboring body’s double, the flip side of the same coin of industrialization. The fact that the wage system privat- ized domestic activities also meant that they could be experienced as taking place in a different time zone. In the home, time bound persons “back” to “nature,” a state of innocence that could be understood as restorative only if women’s domestic labor were fully effaced. If time becomes history through its organization into a series of discrete units linked by cause and effect, this organization in turn retrospectively con- structs an imagined plenitude of “timeless” time to which history can return and regroup. Thus the monumental or sacred time that Kristeva also describes as ‘‘Women’s Time’’ does not escape chronobiopolitical regulation either. Luciano’s crucial extension of and intervention into Kristeva’s work dem- onstrates that nations and other public forms of engroupment depend not only on progressive, linear time and the cyclical time that buttresses it but also on the illusion that time can be suspended. Pauses or interrup- tions in the routinized rhythms of everyday life, in the sequences expected to unfold naturally from one another, become the material for a people- hood experienced as pre- or a-political, as merely human. In describing the narrative texture of modern nationality, Homi Bhabha too refines the distinction between linear-historical time and the more static times of cyclic and monumental time: he describes the dialectic between a ‘‘peda- gogical’’ time in which historical events seem to accrete toward a given destiny, and a ‘‘performative’’ time in which a people recreates itself as such through taking up a given activity simultaneously. Soliciting the masses to stop and feel together, activities done in tandem with strangers seen and unseen, like singing the national anthem or watching the Olym- pics, revivify national belonging as a matter of shared emotion rather than civic action. Bhabha claims that within performative strategies of national belonging, fissures can open up to suggest other historical moments or ways of living. And indeed, as Luciano points out, in counterpoint to the time of factory life in the antebellum United States, a set of ‘‘performa- tive’’ sensations and corporeal forms was imagined, or even felt, not just as a contribution to national destiny but also as an impediment to or bulwark against the pedagogical time of history proper. Mourning and romance, empathy and affection were not segmented into clock-time, even if highly ritualized public performances like courtship and grieving did follow timelines; the sentiments and their perceived rhythms coun-tered ‘‘work time’’ even as they were also a product of it. So did the time of specific bodily needs. As Eli Zaretsky writes, ‘‘The family, attuned to the natural rhythms of eating, sleeping, and child care, can never be wholly synchronized with the mechanized tempo of industrial capital- ism.” Emotional, domestic, and biological tempos are, though cultur- ally constructed, somewhat less amenable to the speeding up and micro- management that increasingly characterized U.S. industrialization. Time’s Wounds As Luciano puts it, in the dialectic between linear-national history and cyclical-domestic time, history appears as damaged time; time appears as the plentitude that heals the historical subject. Time, then, not only “binds” flesh into bodies and bodies into social but also appears to ‘‘bind’’ history’s wounds. But the figure of damaged time also became the signa- ture of late-nineteenth-century decadence and modernism. Of course, the appearance of sexual identity as a field of knowledge and self-description was part of a more general movement toward the abstraction and tax- onomizing of human qualities, the reification of both space and time, that began with industrial capitalism. In this sense, homosexual identity was simply the product of a historical moment in time. But sexual dissi- dents have also in many ways been produced by, or at least emerged in tandem with, a sense of “modern” temporality. The double-time of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was somewhat different from the highly gendered, sacred time of antebellum domesticity: rather than evoking timelessness, it trafficked in signs of fractured time. Its signature was interruptive archaisms: flickering signs of other histori- cal moments and possibilities that materialized time as always already wounded. Thus gay men, lesbians, and other ‘‘perverts’’ have also served as figures for history, for either civilization’s decline or a sublimely fu- turistic release from nature, or both. Here we might cite, for instance, the poet Renée Vivien’s Sapphic vampires, the novelist Djuna Barnes’s hybrid animal/child/lesbian Robin Vote, or T. S. Eliot’s sexually alien- ated J. Alfred Prufrock declaring himself to be ‘‘Lazarus, come from the dead!’’ Sexual dissidents became figures for and bearers of new cor- poreal sensations, including those of a certain counterpoint between now and then, and of occasional disruptions to the sped-up and hyperregu- lated time of industry. Freud’s concept of the unconscious acknowledged exactly this doubled time: it relocated modernity’s temporal splittings into the psyche’s in- terior (and thus from their moorings in historically specific changes). Freud theorized the ‘‘normal’’ self as a temporal phenomenon, the ego as a manifestation of displaced and disavowed past experiences. The Freud- ian unconscious refused to make an experience obsolete or to relegate it to the past; within the Freudian paradigm that Laplanche and Pontalis term Nachträglichkeit, or deferred action, the mind recorded the signs of an event when the subject could not consciously process its meaning, and preserved these signs for future uses.≤≥ So even as an emerging consumer market and what Foucault calls the ‘‘incitement to discourse’’ about sexual types put an ever greater premium on novelty, the interlaced models of the unconscious and Nachträglichkeit insisted on a certain semiotic re- calcitrance. And in Freud, what we might now claim as a queer intem- pestivity evidenced itself in and with the body as well as the emotions. The repetitions and returns that disturb the Freudian subject appear not as pictorial or narrative memories per se but in forms that are at once metaphorical and visceral: a ‘‘slip of the tongue,’’ repetitive bodily acts, lingering symptoms with no apparent physical etiology. In this sense, the ‘‘perverse’’ Freudian body itself became the scene of and catalyst for en- countering and redistributing the past. This was particularly true of the body erotic. As early as the eighteenth century, Henry Abelove and Paul Morrison have argued, erotic life began to assume the contours of mechanized productivity, and specific sexual practices came to be seen as ‘‘foreplay,’’ acceptable en route to intercourse but not as a substitute for it.≤∂ In Freud’s update, these practices were remnants of childhood itself, not merely adult means to an orgasmic end. Psychologizing what had once been biological paradigms, Freud identi- fied taboo sexual practices as normal childhood behavior in which the pathological adult subject was simply stuck or frozen due to an inability to remember, conceptualize, or narrate past events. Orality, anality, fe- tishism, and so onthat lie became, in the Freudian itinerary, places that chil- dren visited on their way to reproductive, genital heterosexuality, but not places to stay for long. This stubborn lingering of pastness (whether it appears as anachronis- tic style, as the reappearance of bygone events in the symptom, or as arrested development) is a hallmark of queer affect: a “revolution” in the old sense of the word, as a turning back. Heather Love’s Feeling Backward, for instance, astutely diagnoses the ‘‘backwards’’ emotions elaborated by artists for whom the birth of the modern homosexual identity-form was constraining rather than liberating: shame, passivity, melancholy, and recoil, to name but a few, were ways of refusing the progressive logic by which becoming ever more visible was correlated with achieving ever more freedom.≤∑ Late-nineteenth-century perverts, melancholically at- tached to obsolete erotic objects or fetishes they ought to have outgrown, or repeating unproductive bodily behaviors over and over, also used pas- tess to resist the commodity-time of speedy manufacture and planned obsolescence.

#### To conceptualize a just government we must first ask, “what is justice?”

#### Justice is erasure, justice is generations of queer lives were sacrificed at the altar of state and capital.

#### They died from the disease and died from going back into the closet and died for staying there and died for coming out.

#### Justice is their ashes that rest on the lawn of the White House,

#### Justice is the cops who raid our communities and entrap our bodies in our own codified criminality.

#### Justice is constant deferral, because all you do, all you ever did and ever will do, is sit back and watch.

#### To rehearse the narrative script of your resolution is to rehearse the grammars of our death.

**Mary Nardini Gang ’09 –** (criminal queers from Milwaukee, “*Toward the Queerest Insurrection*,” pg. 7-10) //recut -- nikki

Cops beat us on the streets and our bodies are being destroyed by pharmaceutical companies because we can’t give them a dime. Queers experience, directly with our bodies, the violence and domination of this world. Class, Race, Gender, Sexuality, Ability; while often these interrelated and overlapping categories of oppression are lost to abstraction, queers are forced to physically understand each. We’ve had our bodies and desires stolen from us, mutilated and sold back to us as a model of living we can never embody. Foucault says that “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.” We experience the complexity of domination and social control amplified through heterosexuality. When police kill us, we want them dead in turn. When prisons entrap our bodies and rape us because our genders aren’t similarly contained, of course we want fire to them all. When borders are erected to construct a national identity absent of people of color and queers, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble. The perspective of queers within the heteronormative world is a lens through which we can critique and attack the apparatus of capitalism. We can analyze the ways in which Medicine, the Prison System, the Church, the State, Marriage, the Media, Borders, the Military and Police are used to control and destroy us. More importantly, we can use these cases to articulate a cohesive criticism of every way that we are alienated and dominated. Queer is a position from which to attack the normative - more, a position from which to understand and attack the ways in which normal is reproduced and reiterated. In destabilizing and problematizing normalcy, we can destabilize and become a problem for the Totality. The history of organized queers was borne out of this position. The most marginalized - transfolk, people of color, sex workers - have always been the catalysts for riotous explosions of queer resistance. These explosions have been coupled with a radical analysis wholeheartedly asserting that the liberation for queer people is intrinsically tied to the annihilation of capitalism and the state.

#### **To define the category of the worker is to define the limits of life – the accumulation of labor and capital is parasitic on political economy of heteronormativity – any response to the resolutional questions demands that we engage the alterity of queerness.**

Nguyen ‘21 -- [Duc Hien, Dept. of Economics @ U Mass-Amherst, Review of Radical Political Economics 00(0) “The Political Economy of Heteronormativity,” pp. 1-17, DOI: 10.1177/04866134211011269//ak47]

In an essay published in the March 1997 issue of the Review of Radical Political Economics, Richard Cornwall observed that “historically, Marxist theory. .. has erased individual subjectivity by either ignoring individual tastes or taking them as largely socially constructed by the social relations of production” (Cornwall 1997). This, he argues, contributes to a silence on queer issues by Marxist political economic theories. Such silence mirrored the larger social silence at the time on queer desire and queer lives, a silence that equaled social (and for many victims of the AIDS pandemic, physical) death. Seeking to deconstruct that silence, Cornwall’s impressive essay1 was a call to go beyond analyses that assume a natural divide between operation of the economy on the one hand, and social structures of sexual orientation and erotic desire on the other. Unfortunately, his call was largely ignored. As Petrus Liu observes in a recent review, queer theory and Marxism continue to appear as analytically distinct, even politically incompatible, projects (Liu 2020). This theoretical gap, I believe, is partly responsible for the persistent representation of sexuality as something private, an individual’s attribute that has nothing to do with production, exchange, consumption, and reproduction. In reality, sex, sexual desires, and sexuality are material relations integrally connected to labor, capital, and the accumulation of surplus value. This oversight is a disservice to radical political economics and our collective anticapitalist revolutionary project. In this paper, I propose an intervention by examining the relationship between heteronormative sexuality and neoliberal capitalism. My analysis is motivated by the following set of questions: What is the relationship between sexuality, capitalism, and queerness? What role, if any, do heteronormativity, homophobia, and transphobia play in neoliberal capitalist production? Is queerness always a threat to patriarchal-capitalist social order, or can it be co-opted into servicing the status quo? Does recent success of the gay and lesbian rights movement in legalizing samesex marriage and securing protection against discrimination gesture toward a disappearance of heteronormativity? And what does neoliberal capitalism have to do with it? My main theoretical approach is social reproduction theory. In the next section, I summarize social reproduction theory’s main themes, especially its key insight that social reproduction provides the condition of possibility for capitalist production. In section 3, I revisit an important and influential exchange between Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler in 1997, colloquially called the Redistribution–Recognition debate. In this debate, Butler contends that reproduction is the missing tie that binds sexualities to capitalist production. Extending her insight, I elaborate on the roles that heteronormativity plays in enabling capitalist social reproduction. Through this, I hope to show that capitalism has come to rely on a particular kind of sexual hegemony (Chitty 2020), one that can ensure its reproductive needs are satisfied through the normalizing of certain subjects and the violent censoring of others. The heteronormative regulation of sexuality dialectically interrelates with other social relations of power such as racism, patriarchy, and settler-colonialism to form the ongoing condition of possibility for capitalist accumulation. Genuine queer emancipation, therefore, cannot be realized without a fundamental overhaul of the political economic structure.2 If sexuality is indeed a fundamental feature of the mode of production, then changes in the relations of production might signal changes in what is considered sexually normal/normative and what is considered queer. The contribution of a queer Marxist theory is in articulating such dynamic entanglement between the mode of production and the simultaneous making of a sexual subject. In the final section of this essay, I do this by examining how neoliberal capitalism has responded to demands from the LGBT rights movement by remaking heteronormativity.3 On the one hand, this neoliberal version of sexuality seems to break the heteronormative mold, allowing room for certain forms of queerness, transness, and sexual fluidity. On the other hand, the neoliberal sexual subjects are still constituted by capital’s need for reproduction and accumulation, such that “whatever freedom they enjoy is increasingly dependent on and constrained by. .. [a] marketplace that [is] much more hospitable to people with money, whatever their sexuality, than to thosewithout” (Drucker 2015: 3). That more gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender folks (albeit only those with middle- or upper-class background) are seemingly able to cross the divide between normative sexual elites and deviant sexual vagabonds is often touted as moral progress by the mainstream LGBT rights movement, neglecting the fact that progress and morality are often defined in terms of capitalist value. In the last instance, the logic of reproductive heteronormativity is perpetuated. Queers—understood as those who are at the margin of the intersectional webs of normative race, gender, class, and sexuality—remain oppressed and dominated by those who are at the center. In an analytical intervention like this, definitions and terminologies are very much part of the problem. Yet, supplying precise definitions is an impossible task, not least because categories such as sex, gender, sexuality, queerness, and the like are themselves effects of certain deployments of discourse and power whose aim is to regulate and dominate (Foucault [1978] 1990; Butler 1990). The best I can offer is to be clear and consistent in what meanings I try to communicate in using these terms. First, by heteronormativity, I refer to the set of institutions, practices, ideologies, and discourses that produce cisgender heterosexuality as natural, universal, monolithic, and “the standard for legitimate and prescriptive sociosexual arrangement” (Ingraham 1994: 204–7). As part of the hegemonic practices of heteronormativity, homophobia and transphobia refer to institutionalized practices that internally and externally stigmatize and suppress nonnormative genders and sexualities. Thus, I see heteronormativity and homophobia/transphobia as two sides of the same coin. Second, (trans)genders and (homo)sexualities are “neither self-evident experience nor natural explanatory frameworks,” but categories with imperfect boundaries and complicated histories (Valentine 2007: 15). For instance, the term homosexuality has been used variously to denote gender-nonconforming erotic behaviors, gender-conforming same-sex desires, a marker of personal identity, and a class of social collectivity (D’Emilio 2008; Rubin 1984; Sears 2017). Likewise, the meaning of transgender is characterized by an ongoing contestation among scholars, activists, and the individuals and collectives whom it seeks to name (Valentine 2007). Being mindful of this, I use the umbrella term queer to refer to gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, gender-nonconforming, intersex individuals, and other persons who do not identify as cisgender and/or heterosexual. At the same time, queer is not merely or exclusively a personal embodiment of sexual positionality. Rather, queer refers to those who are “targets of racial normalizing projects intent on pathologizing them across the dimensions of race, class, gender, and sexuality, simultaneously making them into deviants while normalizing their degradation and marginalization until it becomes... the norm” (C. Cohen 2019). In other words, the queer subjects also stand in opposition to what is constituted as the normal, normative, and proper subjects under bourgeois ideology. In my writing then, there is a fluidity in moving back and forth between these two senses of this key word that I hope readers will kindly entertain. And last but not least, by neoliberalism or neoliberal capitalism, I refer to institutions and policies that valorize and implement upward redistribution of wealth, globalization of trade and finance, privatization of common resources and public properties, rolling back of the welfare state, a moralized family with gendered marriage at the center, and discourses on individual choice and responsibility (Duggan 2003). Designating the contemporary form of capitalism as neoliberal is not meant to contrast it with earlier periods in capitalist history. Instead, it serves to remind us that the historical foundation of capitalism, of which heteronormative sexuality is a part, “has not been surpassed but served instead as material conditions reproduced in new ways in the present” (Goldstein 2018: 83). 2. Social Reproduction: Expanding the Analysis of Capitalism Social reproduction theory started as a feminist intervention in orthodox Marxist theories. Marxist feminists argue that traditional Marxist analyses of capitalism neglect issues of patriarchy and gender oppression and that this tendency stems partly from a nearly exclusive focus on processes of production and accumulation (Vogel 2013; Bhattacharya 2017; also see J. Cohen 2018). Looking beyond the point of production, Marxist feminists ask how labor power is renewed each day after it has been expended during production. What happens after the working day has ended that makes it possible for workers to go back to work the next morning? Individual capitalists may be perfectly content with not knowing the answers, leaving the fulfillment of social reproduction needs to the “self-preservation drive” of the worker (Marx [1867] 1976: 718). For the capitalist class as a whole, however, social reproduction provides the sine qua non condition for capitalist production, that without which production cannot be sustained. Yet the incessant drive toward unlimited accumulation “threatens to destabilize the very reproductive processes and capacities,” and the cumulative effect is an erosion of the social conditions necessary for production (Fraser 2017b: 24). This inherent contradiction between capitalist production and reproduction has generated destabilizing crises both historical and contemporary (Mohandesi and Teitelman 2017; Bhattacharya 2017). Social reproduction processes are categorized into three broad groups. The first group consists of “activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintenance of life on a daily basis” (Laslett and Brenner 1989: 382). These include the provisions of food, clothing, shelter, and other needs for daily replenishment of labor power. They are the basic, foundational components of our everyday lives, constitutive of our survival. They are also highly gendered: wife, daughter, mother, grandmother are often deemed responsible for these social reproductive activities within the family.4 At the same time, women’s reproductive labor is not recognized nor remunerated as work. This erasure serves to naturalize social reproduction, deepen women’s economic vulnerability and dependency, and reinforce the patriarchal structure of a conventional family. As such, the burden of social reproduction remains at the core of women’s oppression (Vogel 2013; Bhattacharya 2017). However, not every woman is equally impacted by this burden. As women increase their participation in the paid labor market, especially in the Global North, a divide is materialized between those who can afford to purchase reproductive services from the market and those who cannot. Globally, a neocolonial chain of care is taking shape whereby women of color and migrant women from the Global South perform reproductive services in the households of affluent (and usually white) women in the Global North (Federici 2012b; Farris 2015; Hopkins 2017). Daily social reproduction, therefore, draws our attention simultaneously to the gendered and racialized violence done in the name of capitalist reproductive needs and to the uneven ways in which different bodies are subjected to that violence. Second, social reproduction refers to the generational replacement of workers’ wear and tear, that is, the replenishment of the labor force. This includes childbearing and rearing, caring for the sick and the elderly, education and skills training for workers. It also includes other strategies to maintain the labor force such as forced or voluntary migration, or the use of unemployment and welfare to establish control over a reserve army of labor. Insofar as biological reproduction is concerned, the conventional heteronormative, monogamous, patriarchal family remains the privileged site.5 This is one reason why sexuality and fertility were made into a matter of public concern and a target for intervention by the bourgeois state since the eighteenth century in the West (Foucault [1978] 1990; Humphries 1991). Even today, the fight for control over women’s biological reproductive capacity is still raging across the globe in the form of legal and legislative battles over abortion rights, as well as state-sponsored campaigns like the current push for a baby boom in China, “Fertility Day” in Italy, and the “Marriage early, have kids soon” policy in Vietnam (Myers and Ryan 2018; Pianigiani 2016; Coppolaro-Nowell 2016; Nguyen and Nguyen 2020). Third, social reproduction refers to the reproduction of social practices, institutions, norms, ideologies, and policies that “enable capital accumulation and transmit inequalities” (J. Cohen 2018). Encompassing far more than just the site and techniques of production, social reproduction “calls forth a range of cultural forms and practices. .. including those associated with knowledge and learning, social justice and its apparatus, and the media” (Katz 2001: 711). These practices and institutions are designed to ensure an unevenly developed working class, turning socially constructed differences in age, gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, religion, and ablebodiedness into hierarchies of skill, authority, and value (Reich, Gordon, and Edwards 1973; Callinicos 1992; Harvey 2000; Russel 2001; Folbre 2012). This is especially important for the capitalist class because their interest lies in the reproduction not of a generic working class but of one that is divided, hierarchical, and vulnerable to exploitation (Vogel 2013). Social reproduction under capitalism, therefore, entails the perpetuation of inequality and oppression in the forms of racism, sexism, homophobia, xenophobia, and so forth.6 In sum, social reproduction theory expands the analysis of capitalism to encompass daily reproduction of labor power, intergenerational reproduction of the labor force, and social structures and institutions that enable capital accumulation. As Nancy Fraser notes, capitalism is not just a mode of production, but also that which “constitute[s] [workers] as social beings, forming their habitus and the socioethical substance ... in which they move” (Fraser 2017a: 147). Understanding capitalism requires us to understand the processes by which workers are (re)produced as a subject. For instance, we do not experience our gender, sexuality, race, class position, occupation, and other markers of identities “as separate and compartmentalized phenomena that intersect in an external way” (Arruzza 2017: 195). What it’s like to be a woman or a man is always already constituted by multiple relations of power, one of which is the ability to perform (or not perform) reproductive labor (Hartmann 1979; Davis 1983; Matthaei 1995). Thinking specifically about sexuality, categories of homosexualities, transness, and queerness are invented and sustained not simply as an embodied sex/gender positionality (e.g., the opposite other of a cisgender-heterosexual subject), but also as a form of social regulation, designating a position outside of the normal and the normative (Butler 1990; C. Cohen 1997; Valentine 2007; Clare 2015). The question then is: who benefits from such construction of heteronormativity/ queerness, and how does it get reproduced as part of capitalism? Is there a structural relationship among heteronormativity, queerness, and the accumulation of surplus value? If there is, what is the implication for queer political struggle? In approaching these questions, my departure point is the Recognition–Redistribution exchange between Nancy Fraser and Judith Butler—an influential discourse that touches upon the circulation of capital and the reproduction of labor (albeit not explicitly in those terms). 3. The Redistribution–Recognition Debate In her seminal 1997 book Justice Interruptus, Nancy Fraser distinguishes between two different kinds of injustice, maldistribution and misrecognition. Maldistribution refers to socio-economic injustices rooted in the political economic structure of society, such as exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation. Misrecognition refers to cultural domination, disrespect, and status subordination which are rooted in social patterns of symbolic representation. This distinction might be blurred in practice, as the two kinds of injustices “are intertwined. .. economic injustice and cultural injustice are usually interimbricated so as to reinforce each other dialectically” (Fraser 1997b: 15). Nonetheless, maintaining an analytical distinction between economic injustice and cultural injustice is important because their remedies can generate mutual interferences when pursued simultaneously. In particular, recognition claims tend to promote group differentiation and affirming the cultural values of group specificity, while redistribution claims often aim to undermine group differentiation and affirming egalitarian distribution of material resources (Fraser 1997b: 16). To clarify her schema, Fraser compares and contrasts the injustices faced by the exploited working class, by gay and lesbian people, by women, and by racial minorities.7 Along the conceptual spectrum of recognition–redistribution, class struggle is located at the redistribution end. The capitalist class’s expropriation of surplus value produced by workers constitutes a paradigmatic case of maldistribution. While members of the working class may also suffer from cultural denigration, these cultural injustices are not autonomous but derivative from the political economy of class instead. In fact, the notion of class itself is wholly rooted in the political economic structure of society. The appropriate remedy, therefore, is redistribution, that is, a “restructuring [of] the political economy so as to alter the distribution of social burdens and social benefits,” which in Marxist theories ultimately means the abolition of the class structure as such (Fraser 1997b: 17). At the other end of the spectrum, the subjugation and devaluation of gays and lesbians constitutes a paradigmatic case of misrecognition. According to Fraser, social collectivity defined by their “despised sexuality” is a mode of differentiation rooted in the cultural-valuational structure of society. Members of this collectivity are distributed throughout the class structure. A homosexual capitalist suffers the same kind of injustices as a homosexual proletariat does: both “are subject to shaming, harassment, discrimination, and violence, while being denied legal rights and equal protections—all fundamentally denials of recognition” (Fraser 1997b: 18). Gays and lesbians also suffer serious economic marginalization, but these fundamentally derive from an unjust cultural-valuational structure that privileges heterosexuality and perpetuates homophobia. Overcoming heterosexism and homophobia therefore requires not a transformation of the political economic structure of society but a revaluation of sexual norms and values so as to “accord positive recognition to gay and lesbian sexual specificity” (Fraser 1997b: 19). Unlike the exploited workers and the misrecognized homosexuals, women as a collectivity is situated in the middle of the spectrum, combining features of both exploited class and despised sexuality. Gender injustice consists of both the gendered division of labors (within wage work, and between wage labor and unpaid domestic labor)8 and “androcentrism,” or the authoritative construction of norms that privilege masculinity and devalue femininity (Fraser 1997b, 20). As a group, women face a vicious cycle of economic and cultural subordination, which dialectically reinforce one another. Sexist and patriarchal norms are institutionalized in production relations, preventing women from full and equal participation in the economy. Simultaneously, unequal economic opportunities and distribution of resources generate dependency and oppression, which are then used to further perpetuate misogyny and male domination. Redressing gender injustices therefore requires both altering the unequal distribution of resources and changing the patriarchal signification of women and femininity.9 Writing in the post-1989 period under the “postsocialist” condition,10 Fraser sees her redistribution–recognition schema as an attempt to recenter class as a relevant social collective and economic redistribution as an indispensable half of the struggle for justice for all. While sympathetic to Fraser’s project, Butler takes her to task over her conception of sexuality as wholly rooted in cultural-valuational structure and homophobia as ultimately a matter of cultural recognition. In an essay titled “Merely Cultural,” Butler argues that the regulation of sexuality is not merely a matter of culture, but a matter central to the functioning of political economy. Conceptual models that fail to articulate the systematic ties between the regulation of sexuality and the mode of production will risk reproducing the division that locates certain struggles as part of political economy and others, such as queer struggle, as exclusively cultural and inessential (Butler 1997: 270).11 Contending that the oppression of non-normative sexualities is not merely a matter of cultural recognition, Butler writes: Is it possible to distinguish, even analytically, between a lack of cultural recognition and material oppression. . . ? [L]esbians and gays are rigorously excluded from state-sanctioned notions of the family...; are stopped at the border; are deemed inadmissible to citizenship; are selectively denied the status of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly; are denied the right, as members of the military, to speak their desires; or are deauthorized by the law to make emergency medical decisions about dying lovers, or to receive the property of dead lovers, or to receive from the hospital the bodies of dead lovers.... Is this simply the circulation of vilifying cultural attitudes or do such disenfranchisements mark a specific operation of the sexual and gendered distribution of legal and economic entitlement? (Butler 1997: 273) At one level, Butler simply points out the obvious, namely that symbolic representation of homosexuality, which excludes gays and lesbian from many aspects of legal personhood, also produces material disenfranchisement that is indissociable from cultural vilification. As such, redressing queer oppression requires both recognition and redistribution. This is not incompatible with Fraser’s analysis, however. In her original analysis, Fraser does not deny that queer people can face maldistribution so entrenched to the point where any prospect of recognition is completely impeded. She even concludes that “a politic of sexual redistribution may be needed both in itself and to help get a politics of recognition off the ground” (Fraser 1997b: 25). At a deeper level, however, Butler wants to deconstruct the cultural/economic and recognition/ redistribution binaries themselves. Consider, for instance, the co-production of the heterosexual-cisgender subjects as the normative and the homosexual, bisexual, transgender, and other queer subjects as the abject others. Butler argues that this is not simply a matter of symbolic representation, but a process of producing human beings themselves, their interrelations, and the material conditions of their life (Butler 1997: 271–72). This co-production of the sexually normative subjects and the sexually queer subjects (which I refer to as heteronormativity) serves an important economic function in capitalist production. The heteronormative logic is not arbitrary, and deeply implicated in the arrangement of productive and reproductive labor under capitalism: Is there any way to analyze how normative heterosexuality and its “genders” are produced within the sphere of reproduction without noting the compulsory ways in which homosexuality and bisexuality, as well as transgender, are produced as the sexually “abject,” and without extending the mode of production to account precisely for this social mechanism of regulation? It would be a mistake to understand such productions as “merely cultural” if they are essential to the functioning of the sexual order of political economy—that is, if they constitute a fundamental threat to its very workability. The economic, tied to the reproductive, is necessarily linked to the reproduction of heterosexuality. (Butler 1997: 274) This passage contains two radical claims. First, economic production and reproduction are necessarily linked to the reproduction of heteronormativity. This implies that any structural transformation of economic production and social reproduction (be it redistribution or revolution) will alter the production and reproduction of what qualifies as a person and a sex (Butler 1997: 276). Second, disrupting heteronormativity could potentially throw a wrench into the working engine of capitalism, undermining its workability. As such, representing the queer struggle as one for positive recognition without acknowledging its fundamentally subversive political economic implication is a mistake, both analytically and strategically when it comes to building revolutionary alliance. This also suggests that a diverse and equally flourishing social field of sexuality cannot be realized unless sexuality is understood as an integral component of an expansive economic sphere, which includes both the reproduction of goods and the social reproduction of persons (Butler 1997: 272). Contra Butler, Fraser sees sexuality as belonging “to a status order that is differentiated from, and complexly related [to] the economic structure.” This status order exists in a space of personal life, which is “disconnected from the imperatives of production and reproduction” (Fraser 1997a: 283–84). According to Fraser, there is no necessary link between heteronormativity, queer recognition, and capitalist production. And as I summarized earlier, confounding redistribution and recognition à la Butler risks masking the possible contradictions that arise when claims for recognition and redistribution are pursued simultaneously (Fraser 1997b: 34 esp. note 14). Claims to recognize the dignity and positive worth of queer sexuality could mark them off as a distinct social group and undermine claims for egalitarian distribution of socioeconomic resources and entitlements.12 In revisiting this exchange between Fraser and Butler, it is fascinating to note the affinity between Butler’s perspective and social reproduction theory, even if Butler uses the term reproduction only in a narrow sense.13 For scholars who are familiar with the works of Butler and Fraser, my suggestion here is likely a surprising reversal. Butler has never self-identified as a social reproduction theorist, nor is she recognized within the canon as one, whereas Fraser has been a key figure in the social reproduction literature, especially in her more recent writings (e.g., Fraser 2017b; Arruzza, Bhattacharya, and Fraser 2019). On the other hand, Butler’s writings, especially on gender performativity and the materiality of sex, are considered among the founding texts of queer theory. The overlooking of her insight that the regulation of sexuality is a constitutive feature of political economy is perhaps symptomatic of a broader omission of sex from radical political economic theorizing. Following Butler, I want to stage an intervention by elaborating on how social reproduction could be the missing tie that binds sexuality to production. This also serves as a rudimentary schema demonstrating the relationship between heteronormativity and capitalism, and the analytical gains we can have from a political economic interrogation of sexuality. 4. Heteronormativity and Capitalist Social Reproduction At the core of Butler’s 1997 critique is the notion that sexuality is a fundamental part of the mode of production, and that queer struggle can pose a threat to capitalism’s workability. In particular, she highlights three areas where heteronormativity plays a critical role: in the sexual division of labor, in the normative heterosexual family, and in the production of a particular kind of sexgender persons as proper subjects for capitalism. Taking cue from her argument, in this section I sketch out the ways in which capitalism has benefited from the construction of workers whose production, reproduction, and personhood are articulated through and along heteronormative sex-gender categories. This is not to argue that heteronormativity is necessary for capitalist accumulation, or that a successful struggle against the heteronormative regulation of sexuality will spell the end of capitalism. Rather, I am suggesting that heteronormativity enables capital surplus accumulation while being perpetuated itself through capitalist relations of production and social reproduction. As such, queer struggle is always a political economic struggle: genuine queer emancipation cannot be achieved without an overhaul of the productive and reproductive structure. This dialectic is at the heart of a queer Marxist theory. First, let us consider the division of labor between men and women. Capitalists benefit from the gendered division of labor in production and reproduction, under which women’s labor is unrecognized, unremunerated, and devalued (Folbre 2021; Moos 2021). Empirical evidence points to the continuing existence of gender wage gap, glass ceiling, care penalty, motherhood penalty, and widespread implicit and explicit cultural biases against women in the labor market (Blau and Kahn 2017). At home, women perform three-quarters of all unpaid household work, totaling 4.5 trillion hours a year or the equivalence of 2.1 billion full-time jobs (Heintz 2019). This is unequivocally a material oppression of women, justified by discourses of femininity and womanhood in which housework and carework are presented not as work. Instead, they are represented as a natural attribute of women, an internal need coming from the depth of the female psyche that finds fulfillment in being housewives, mothers, caregivers, and nurturers (Federici 2012c; Brewer 1997). This identification is both a patriarchal restriction of the opportunities available to women in society and a concealment of the fact that these reproductive activities are essential to the reproduction of labor and capital. Notice, furthermore, that the gender division of labor and its concomitant discourses of femininity predicate on a prior conception of heterosexuality, one that presupposes an opposition between men and women: “Woman’s position as subordinate other, as (sexual) property, and as exploited laborer depends on a heterosexual matrix in which woman is taken to be man’s opposite” (Hennessy 2018: 25). At its core, heteronormativity is the unification of sex, gender, and desire in binaries where male is differentiated from/elevated above female, masculinity is differentiated from/elevated above femininity, and heterosexuality is differentiated from/elevated above homosexuality. Heteronormativity makes possible the constructions of gendered persons as “women” and “men.” As same-sex desire, trans-gender, and anatomically sexually ambiguous bodies threaten to expose this artificial engendering, heteronormativity works to counter those threats. Practices such as the determination of a newborn’s sex/gender based on bodily sex organs, the depiction of same-sex desire as gender inversion or as a rebellious phase that can be “cured” through conversion therapy, and the perversion and criminalization of transgender people into sexual predators are all part of the heteronormative regulation of sexuality which makes categories of men and women appear as “natural” and the social division of labor between them “normal.” This is what Butler alludes to when she argues that “it is not that nonheterosexual forms of sexuality are simply left out, but that their suppression is essential to the operation of that prior normativity” (Butler 1997: 274). This suppression is not a onetime event but an ongoing process that maintains the gender division of labor and foregrounds the gender oppression of women. To illustrate, consider Sylvia Federici’s argument that sex is sold to the working class as the “other” of work, as compensation for work and an escape from the alienating discipline of capitalist production. In reality, however, for women “sex is work. .. it is a duty. The duty to please is so built into our sexuality” (Federici 2012d: 24). Federici’s analysis captures vividly how women’s sexuality and their reproductive labor are exploited. My analysis here complements hers by identifying the heteronormative logic as what enables this exploitation. Heteronormativity naturalizes the category of women, builds the duty to please into their sexuality, and orients that sexuality toward a man (their husband) to the point where “giving pleasure to man is an essential part of what is expected of every woman” (Federici 2012d: 25). A queer challenge to heteronormativity, in this context, means interrogating “what is a woman?” and deconstructing the gender binary, thereby contesting the social assignment of labor and care along gendered lines. The queer challenge also means casting a critical look at the sites where the suppression of queerness and reproduction of normative heterosexuality take place. This occurs, first and foremost, in the family. As Butler notes, “the reproduction of gendered persons, of ‘men’ and ‘women,’ depended on the social regulation of the family and, indeed, on the reproduction of the heterosexual family” (Butler 1997: 272). At one level, she gestures toward the fact that it is at home where children first acquire their heterosexuality. It is often from parental choices over clothing (blue shirt or pink dress?), appearance (short hair or long hair?), toys (Barbie or Superman?), hobbies (ballet or soccer?), and so forth that the abstract heteronormative script containing what it means to be a girl/woman and a boy/man first crystallizes into concrete materiality. The reproduction of heterosexuality, therefore, relies on the reproduction of a heteronormative ideal of the family, one that is built around the axes of monogamous husband-wife and parent-children (Federici 2012a; Fraser 2017a). Embedded in this normative ideal is the representation of heterosexuality as the pinnacle of human sexuality, monogamous heterosexual marriage as the condition of “happily ever after,” and childbirth as natural and desirable (especially for women). At a second level, Butler’s statement also reflects the material reality that family is the privileged, taken-for-granted site of social reproduction under capitalism. Ideologically construed as a private domain, the family appears to be separated from and opposite to the market and the factory (or the office) (Fraser 2017a). But, as the physical space where labor power, social relations, kinships, customs, norms, and tradition are reproduced, the family is indispensable for the functioning of capitalism as such (Hewitson 2014; Naidu and Ossome 2018). As a site of nonmarket production, income pooling, mutual aids, and a source of genuine affection and reciprocity, the family is critical to the survival of the working class (Laslett and Brenner 1989). Through its social reproductive functioning, the family is a fundamental feature of the mode of production. At the same time, it can be a site of conflict and oppression. As a private, self-sufficient unit dedicated to aggrandizing its own consumption ends, family can be a source of dependency that ties workers and their dependents to continuing waged employment and exploitation (Nash 1993). It is within the family that the transmission of compulsory heterosexuality, the gendered division of labor, and the identification of femininity with unpaid reproductive labor take place. Queer struggle against heteronormativity, then, implies the question of how to survive without a (heterosexual) family when the precarity of surviving alone can become unbearable. Among minority communities, especially queer people of color, there is a rich tradition of “chosen family,” formed by persons unrelated by kinship but connected through a mutual desire for belonging. These flexible family formations certainly exceed the heteronormative mold, but can they be a bastion against capitalism’s alienation, or will they unwittingly replicate the dependency, exclusion, and exploitation endemic to the conventional family? A priori, both are possible. I take this unresolved (and perhaps unresolvable) ambiguity as a further reminder that the family is a fundamental part of the mode of production and reproduction, and therefore contains within it all of capitalism’s contradictions. Last but not least, let us turn to Butler’s argument that heteronormativity is “a mode of producing the subject” (Butler 1997: 276). Compulsory normative heterosexuality is not merely about recognizing some subjects as normal and vilifying other subjects as abnormal and unworthy. It is about the process of subject formation itself, the attempt to constitute legible personhood on the basis of heteronormative sex-gender. In this process, the sexually abjects are produced as something other than human, a non-subject Other. This foregrounds and naturalizes the cultural denigration and economic discrimination to which they are subjected. Rosemary Hennessy makes a similar observation that queers are the bottom rung “upon which socially favored categories and identities rest” (Hennessy 2018: xv–xviii; see also Rubin 1984). In a capitalist society built upon the myth of free exchange among equals, the consequence of being constitutively less-than-equal is that queers are always already worth-less, their labor power cheapened. This manifests in labor market discrimination and economic marginalization of queer workers. Empirical evidence shows that lesbian, gay, transgender, and gender-nonconforming workers face persistent discrimination and harassment in the workplace (Weichsalbaumer 2003; Tilcsik 2011, Schneebaum and Badgett 2019; Martell 2018; Baumle, Badgett, and Boutcher 2019). A disproportionately larger number of queer people live in conditions of abject poverty, surviving precariously in the margins by doing sex work, trafficking drugs, and performing other illicit and often dangerous work. Queer youths have one of the highest rates of mental illness, suicide, and homelessness. Under heteronormative capitalism, queer lives are marked by transphobia, homophobia, “compounded by the preoccupation with survival, the insecurity of work, and paralysis bred of fear and need” (Hennessy 2006: 394). In short, heteronormativity functions as a mode of exploitation that contributes to the accumulation of surplus value, not unlike how patriarchy enables the exploitation of women at home and in the workplace (Folbre 2021). The heteronormative production of the subject also fulfills capital’s critical “need to maintain political and ideological hegemony over a divided working class” (Vogel 2013: 168). Every time the homo/hetero, trans/cis, masculine/feminine binaries14 are reproduced as normatively opposite, the proletariat’s class consciousness gets displaced by internal hierarchies and division. Rosemary Hennessy’s studies of gay and lesbian operators in Mexican maquiladoras document how managers deploy homophobic discourses to brew tensions, distrust, and hostility between queer and non-queer workers (Hennessy 2006). Moreover, these hierarchies dialectically (re) produce one another. For instance, white supremacy is constructed not just through slavery and anti-Black racism, but also through discourse equating queer desires as sexually disabled and diseased (Ferguson 2003). Universalization of whiteness in America is accomplished not only by designating Blacks as a eugenic threat but also by promoting reproductive heterosexual marriage among whites as the cure (Carter 2007). Heteronormativity underlies the uneven development of heterogeneous subjects along categories of differences, a process fundamental to capital’s ongoing exploitation and domination. To sum up, heteronormativity, through its production of normative gender/sexual subjects, plays important roles in capitalist production. Combining insights from social reproduction theory and from Butler’s 1997 critique, I have clarified how heteronormativity functions to stabilize the gender division of labor, reproduce the normative reproductive family, constitute queer subjects as devalued and exploitable, and contribute to the internal stratification within the working class. The implication is that homophobia and transphobia are not simply problems of individuals acting in hateful and oppressive ways, nor could they be “competed-away” under market forces. They are hardwired into the structure of capitalist mode of production and reproduction. Queer struggle, therefore, cannot be dismissed as merely cultural and irrelevant to political economy. Instead, it must be situated as part of the broader struggle against capitalism, and alongside rather than displacing or being displaced by other revolutionary movements against racism, sexism, patriarchy, fascism and settler colonialism. Part of that struggle is in developing a queer Marxist theory capable of articulating how sex dialectically interrelates with other social relations of power to provide the condition of possibility for capitalist accumulation and reproduction.

#### Under the dominant regimes of heteronormativity the economic sphere is a constant site of precarity which locates queerness at the margins of a fundamentally capitalist world order – labor organizing itself is dependent on the constitutive otherization of queerness.

Hollibaugh ‘15 – (Amber Hollibaugh, “Queer Precarity and the Myth of Gay Affluence,” New Labor Forum , Fall 2015, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Fall 2015), pp. 18-27. Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24718618>. (Hollibaugh is the former Chief Officer of Elder & LBTI Women's Services at Howard Brown Health Center in Chicago.[3] She has been director of education, advocacy and community building at (Services & Advocacy for GLBT Elders) (SAGE), a New York program dedicated to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender senior education, advocacy, and community organizing.[4] In 1970, Hollibaugh was a leader in the Canadian movement for abortion rights.[5] In 1978, she was a co-founder with Allan Bérubé and others of the San Francisco Lesbian and Gay History Project.[6] In 1982, she was a speaker at the 1982 Barnard Conference on Sexuality, a key event in what became known as the Feminist Sex Wars. Hollibaugh has written on the marginalization she experienced afterwards as a result of being a former sex worker and her involvement in the sadomasochism community.[7] Hollibaugh was the director and co-producer with Gini Reticker of The Heart of the Matter, a 60-minute documentary film about the confusing messages women students receive about sexuality and sexually transmitted diseases such as AIDS.[8] The film won the 1994 Sundance Film Festival Freedom of Expression Award; it premiered to a national audience on PBS.[9][10] In the 1990s, Hollibaugh argued that American liberalism was in disarray, but was looking to the Left for guidance in how to reshape itself.[11] Stafford has analyzed her memoir My Dangerous Desires (2000) in terms of femme lesbian narratives.[12] In 2002, Jenrose Fitzgerald discussed Hollibaugh and Singh's 1999 essay Sexuality, Labor, and the New Trade Unionism in Social Text. Fitzgerald says that their presentation of the relationship between sexual politics and the labor movement proposed a labor movement "that will take on immigration issues, racism, health care, and the nuances of economic inequality alongside more mainstream labor and 'gay rights' concerns."[13] In Hollibaugh's writings on sexuality, she has declared that "there is no human hope without the promise of ecstasy."[14] Meryl Altman says that Hollibaugh is "a powerful organizing speaker, a very fine incisive writer and a brilliant theorist."[15] ) // ingp

These are the statistics of queer precarity. They tell us that LGBT/Q and gender non conforming people are particularly vulnerable to economic injustice. And they also suggest that we need to understand how LGBT/Q peo ple survive in low-paying and non-unionized service work and in street or alternative econo mies. While across the United States, many people suffer without stable employment, because of gendered and sexual discrimination, intensified neoliberal economic restructuring has had particularly harsh consequences for LGBT/Q people. In the "recovery" from the Great Recession of 2008, job growth has clus tered in low-wage fields such as retail, health care, reception, child care, and cleaning.23 These jobs rarely provide benefits like health insurance, paid sick leave, or retirement sav ings. Yet because of histories of discrimination and criminalization, many queer and trans peo ple are funneled into low-wage jobs, or seek them out as sites where gender expression and sexuality will not be disciplined in the same ways as in professional jobs. Still, working at a gay bar or club, in retail, or in the cash econo mies around LGBT/Q neighborhoods yields little economic security. As a 2014 report compiled by The Murphy Institute, Retail Action Project (RAP), and Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) notes, Retailers' demands for open availability and the use of unpredictable scheduling means that workers already struggling with low wages and discrimination in our economy—women, people of color, caregivers, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer workers—are left in a constant state of insecurity.24 For LGBT/Q people with disabilities, including people with HIV and AIDS, satisfy ing work is even scarcer. Research shows that lesbian, gay, and bisexual people have a higher prevalence of disability than their heterosexual counterparts, due, presumably, to ongoing eco nomic and health disparities and the lifelong toll oppression takes.25 Among gay and bisex ual men, African-Americans are the racial/eth nic group most affected by HIV, accounting for the highest number of new HIV infections in 2010.26 These health disparities ramify histories of chronic physical and mental health issues connected to poverty, criminalization, home lessness, and discrimination.27 As the social safety net continues to unravel, the barriers LGBT/Q people face grow. Many queer and trans people turn to cash or alternative economies: exchanging sex or drugs for resources, even as they are often working full-time in low-wage jobs. A 2007 study found that 60 percent of transgender youth of color had engaged in sexual exchange for money or other resources, such as food or clothing—increasing their chances of run-ins with criminal justice systems.28 A 2010 study found that 60 percent of respondents survived on a combination of formal and informal work (e.g., combining retail salary and sex for money).29 But sex work exists outside of labor-law protections; workers lack the right to organize and are subject to criminalization, incarceration, and police violence. Yet the alternatives—underpaid, temporary, at-will employment where queer and trans workers face discrimination and harassment—are not necessarily better options. This content downloaded from 184.189.154.10 on Thu, 18 Nov 2021 20:47:30 UTC All use subject to http Hollibaugh and Weiss 23 The Invisibility of Class and Race in the LGBT Movement In spite of the economic precarity these statis tics demonstrate, the mainstream LGBT move ment has veered away from poverty, class, and economic justice, dismissing the relevance of the economic crisis to LGBT/Q lives as though "economic justice is simply 'not a gay issue.'"30 The contradictions at the heart of neoliberal capitalism create new modes of inclusion and exclusion: inclusion of some LGBT citizen consumers, and exclusion of queer and trans others. As Alan Sears argues, in the context of commodification, a person becomes visible as "queer" only through the deployment of particular market goods and services. Others are invisible, either because they are literally left outside the door (for example, because they cannot afford the cover charge) or because they cannot look "gay" or "lesbian" if they are old, fat, skinny, transgendered, racialized, stigmatized as disabled or ill, or obviously poor.31 LGBT people are only visible in the marketplace; meanwhile, non-white, non-middle-class, non gender-normative queer and trans people are invisible as good gay citizens and consumers. This leaves the majority of LGBT/Q people out of the existing gay/lesbian movement. As Cathy Cohen argues, LGBT movements emphasize structural assimilation and an end to state dis crimination (same-sex marriage, for example), rather than social or economic transformation.32 Yet the goals of mainstream LGBT activist orga nizations—same-sex marriage rights, military service, and adoption rights—are low on the list of priorities for the majority of queer and trans communities. Jobs and economic justice, health care, and violence prevention are the priorities of many LGBT people of color—goals that rank far higher than the white, middle-class's "big three." A 2014 study showed that HIV/AIDS, violence, equal employment rights, and bullying are higher priorities for black and Latino/a LGBT youth than same-sex marriage.33 Transgender people name employment discrimination, access to health care, hate crimes protection, and ability to change iden tity documents as main concerns.34 The Welfare Warriors Research Collaborative respondents were particularly concerned with housing and homelessness, violence, and discrimination—and never once identified gay marriage as a priority.35 HIVIAIDS, violence, equal employment rights, and bullying are higher priorities for black and Latino/a LGBT youth than same-sex marriage. As long as the LGBT movement responds primarily to the needs and desires of wealthy, tradi tionally gendered, white gay men and lesbians, it cannot serve as a social movement for broad based social or economic change. If class, race, and poverty are not part of the political work around queerness, the movement cannot contest the crisis facing queer and trans people today—it cannot even name or see it, preferring, instead, the myth of gay affluence. And indeed it appears, as Allan Bérubé writes, that "queer studies has mostly ignored the economy and queer activists promote our 'community' as the hottest marketing niche around."36 But this state of affairs inadver tently reinforces the precarious economic situa tion most queer and trans people face. The Invisibility of Queerness in the Labor Movement Because so many issues facing queer and trans people are economic, the labor movement seems an ideal place to look for solutions. But traditional labor organizing only rarely addresses the differ ences that gender and sexuality make for workers more generally. And even when labor organizing takes up these issues, it tends to focus on inclusion or identity politics: for example, organizations such as Pride at Work that seek to incorporate LGBT/Q people into already-existing labor unions. Other less traditional efforts, such as those to organize retail workers or excluded workers, only occasionally, if ever, address queer and trans people or gender/sexuality concerns. Union organizing is crucial to contesting and expanding protections from the forms of This content downloaded from 184.189.154.10 on Thu, 18 Nov 2021 20:47:30 UTC All use subject to http 24 New Labor Forum 24(3) workplace discrimination LGBT/Q workers regu larly face.37 Yet without diminishing the important roles LGBT identity activism and union labor organizing have played, we need to ask not so much about bringing unions to gay workplaces or gay, lesbian, and trans people into union leader ship; instead, we need to think about economic justice and queer sexual politics together so we might prioritize the lives of people for whom queer economic justice cannot be reached with gay marriage. We need to look toward organizing queer people whose survival struggles in precari ous economies have not been addressed by tradi tional union organizing. We need to look toward organizing queer people whose survival struggles in precarious economies have not been addressed by traditional union organizing. One potential place for this analysis is worker center organizing. Organizing the unorganized is at the forefront of new labor work today; it is especially crucial for the millions of workers who are excluded from the protection of U.S. labor laws (the right to organize, minimum wage, overtime protections, protection against being fired for sexual orientation or gender iden tity, and health and safety protections) "by design or by default."38 These include farmworkers, domestic and other care workers, day laborers, tipped minimum-wage workers such as restau rant workers, guest workers, workers in right-to work states, taxi drivers, workfare workers, and formerly incarcerated workers. Such "excluded workers" are majority of color and often immi grant, and they include disproportionately high numbers of queer and trans people in the retail, health care, and service sectors. Yet although worker centers have launched innovative campaigns that tackle the linkage of class with racism, exploitation of undocu mented immigrants, sexism, and ageism, few organizers highlight or even address sexuality, queerness, gender non-conformity, or other LGBT issues. Organizers and workers alike must learn to see beyond the myth of gay afflu ence to connect gender and sexual justice to economic justice. This might mean making the links between racial, sexual, and gendered dis crimination visible, as when Restaurant Opportunity Center New York (ROC-NY) sought to connect front-of-the house sexual harassment to back-of-the-house racial dis crimination—an education in "seeing gender," as one staff member put it.39 It might mean keeping the focus on workers, rather than the affluent gay consumer. For example, in 2012, in the midst of a conservative backlash over J.C. Penney's hiring of Ellen DeGeneres as a spokesperson and the use of lesbian and gay couples in their advertising, RAP issued this statement: RAP stands by J.C. Penney's use of LGBTQ spokespersons and couples in their advertising, and hopes this commitment to diversity extends to their LGBTQ employees in the form of gay- and transgender-friendly workplaces free of discrimination in hiring and promotions. However, J.C. Penney's recent layoffs and elimination of commissions sales positions disproportionately affect minorities, such as LGBTQ workers who experience workplace discrimination in hiring, promotions, and pay. J.C. Penney should stand by their support of a diverse workforce, not just a diverse customer base, by reinstating commissions for their employees.40 Yet we should be careful that we are not only celebrating the gay-friendly workplace policies of companies such as San Francisco's Levi Strauss (in providing domestic partnership ben efits, for example) while ignoring the work con ditions of the people who make the jeans in sweatshops across the globe.41 Unless issues of gender and sexuality are understood as an integral part of the struggle—unless we keep our focus on both sexuality and economic inequality—the par ticular vulnerabilities of the queer precariat are likely to go "unseen" by organizers and schol ars alike. Queer precarity is invisible in much of our current LGBT and labor movement organizing. We need a queer economic justice campaign This content downloaded from 184.189.154.10 on Thu, 18 Nov 2021 20:47:30 UTC All use subject to http Hollibaugh and Weiss 25 that is genuinely queer—not about inserting gay and lesbian people into an existing set of rights and protections but about asking ques tions about power, sexuality, and desire that resist the easy satisfaction of incorporation and instead pursue the difficult work of transforma tion. How many of our campaigns for economic justice depend on assumptions that make LGBT/Q lives invisible—assumptions that the family is heterosexual, that we are able to work (the core definition of "ablebodiedness"), or that we have access to "free" privatized care work performed within the domestic sphere? The ongoing fraying of the social safety net means that LGBT/Q low-wage workers, despite working multiple jobs, often cannot support or shelter their families or buy food. To address these realities, we need a radical political vision that moves beyond identity politics to analyze queerness as it connects to work and the econ omy, while also insisting that economic ques tions are central to desire, sexuality, and intimacy. A queer labor perspective sees how gender and sexuality are central components of economic justice—from the very start.

#### And so this resolution asks us to presume a world that has never and will never exist.

#### To abstract away from queer realities, to build a world in negligent fantasy, to formulate advocacy on a level playing field untouched by the stain of queer life.

#### But the dead are living here.

#### What was once past is now present.

#### Their ghosts haunt this space, this resolution, this debate.

#### Thus we affirm queer time travel – an understanding of queer histories of violence, trauma, kinship, and hope as always already materializing in the present. The 1AC is a queer time machine through which we become unstuck in time, existing at the confluence of past, present, and future that lies beyond the productive regimes of chrononormativity. Our hauntological echo of the calls of the dead embraces queer collectivity across time and generates possibilities of life in moments outside the sequence.

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When I talk about time travel as a weapon of queer culture and against chrononormativity, I am speaking conceptually not of a linear time machine that can travel up and down a time stream a la Robert Zemeckis’ Back to the Future (1985) where the past, present, and future become wholly separated countries that can be visited, left, and returned to, but of a time travel that is an unmooring. Part of a rebellion against chrononormativity is, to borrow a term from Kurt Vonnegut Jr’s 1969 novel Slaughterhouse-Five, to become “unstuck in time.” (Vonnegut 24). A good breakdown of the static and cyclical nature of womanhood under chrononormativism appears in author Ted Chiang’s novella Story of Your Life (2000). In Chiang’s work, it takes an encounter with an inhuman subjectivity, through the extra-terrestrial language of the Heptapods that the narrator Louise’s perception of self becomes unstuck. Through her experience of past and future as present Louise’s experience of time becomes a “simultaneous mode of awareness” (Chiang 31), making her experience the chrononormative stages of womanhood both out of order and all at once. Through this experience, her sense of self is redrawn from static, sequential and separate identities of different productive moments into an identity of many simultaneous selves, structured around the life and death of her daughter, forcing her to reconsider the artificial barriers between the different stages of her life: childless, a new mother, and a mother who has lost their child. Louise must experience the loss of her daughter before her birth, going against the schedule of chronobiopolitics. Freeman notes that “mourning, romance, empathy, and affection” (Freeman 6) are all imperfect acts of resisting the imposed system, as these feelings cannot be “segmented into clock time” (6) even if public artifices such as funerals or weddings and other events meant to symbolize such feelings do. I would argue that Chiang’s story is an exercise in becoming aware of chronogeopolitics but does not radically reject it, Louise ultimately choosing to still embrace acting out the timeline set for her, even though she is aware of its artifice. Nevertheless, when the project of unmooring oneself from chronogeopolitics ties itself to a queer culture as opposed to the dominant straight one which chrononormativity promotes, then becoming unstuck in time can become a far more radical act. Queer time machines are built out of community, and out of the legacy that communities leave for each other across time, regardless of the limitations that timelines of the state would attempt to impose Queer time travel is an act not of productivity and forward momentum, but of connection with a past and future that are still, in many ways, present. Here I return to K.I.P, Freeman’s primary example of queer art as a rejection of our chronogeopolitical landscape. Freeman describes K.I.P. as a “Queer hauntology exercise” (13). Hauntology was a term coined in Jacques Derrida’s work Specters of Marx, an extrapolation of the idea that Karl Marx’s theories argue for “an ethics of responsibility towards the other across time” (9). Hauntology exists in a space where history continues to interact with the present, the figure of the ghost or the dead are not removed from us, but still present in our social and cultural consciousness, even though we cannot reach through time to act on this responsibility. The dead call for a “different future” (9) than the one we can deliver to them, for possibilities now lost. K.I.P. exposes a queerness to viewers that “jam[s] historical sequence” (13). We see the artist Nguyen pasting their own image onto a historical moment that they “never experienced but nevertheless clearly mourns for” (13). In this film, we are watching many historical moments blend and interact in a “community of past and present viewers” (13). There is the actual pornography, its male performers unknowingly documenting the freeness of queer identity as it existed before the devastation of the AIDS epidemic. Then are the original viewers of the erotica, both pre- and post- aids, then there is Nguyen, reaching across decades to touch a moment of queer identity in the 1970s with a queer identity of the 21st century. There is Freeman, present by analysis, and there is us, the spectators watching from the ever-retreating goalpost of modernity. In Slaughterhouse-Five, time for Vonnegut’s protagonist Billy Pilgrim is once again experienced out of sequence in a chaotic restructuring of subjectivity, where Billy can go “to sleep a senile widower and awaken on his wedding day” (23), forcing another disintegration of the walls between the productive identities of chronogeopolitics. Billy must reconcile identities like widower and bachelor, soldier and veteran, child and elder, not as separate sequential identities, but as a single simultaneous form. Here, like in K.I.P., time is structured not by signification but trauma. Time for Billy splintered into a similar before and after of trauma centred on the Allied bombing of the German city of Dresden, an event experienced by Billy and Vonnegut himself as prisoners of war. Vonnegut creates another performance of hauntology, forcing Billy Pilgrim to watch a documentary on the firebombing “backwards then forwards” (75) so that he can see bomber planes suck “bullets and shell fragments” (75) back into their machine guns and the fires back into their bombs, until “the American fliers turned in their uniforms and became high school kids. And Hitler turned into a baby” (75), and then is forced to watch history and its trauma and violence play out again. It is also worth noting that, like in Arrival, the subjectivity of Vonnegut’s human character is changed, in part, by interaction with aliens. Hauntology takes a “collective past” (Freeman 14) and brings it into both the collective and personal present. When we experience hauntology, we are not trying to “write a lost object into the present” (14) but experiencing the past as something still directly happening and affecting us. Through hauntology, we experience “the present itself as a hybrid” (14) of collective pasts and futures. While in Vonnegut’s case, the hauntology creates a hybrid from the experiences of war, queer hauntology is a broader experiment, a haunting of the past that is intergenerational and ever-evolving. This experiment in queer hauntology presents what Freeman describes as a “queer becoming-collective across-time” (11). In K.I.P., we can separate past from present only by noting how the different moments of queerness are “split by prior violence and future possibility” (9) and not merely the chrononormative classifications of time separated by the signification of sequences and cycles that the chrononormative cycle demands. We, through Nguyen and Freeman, are subjected to a description of queer culture that belongs simultaneously to many different moments of queer history, and all of them, pre and post aids crisis. For the queer observer, K.I.P’s haunting might not present itself as only a historical note, but as an ever-present encounter, the power of the erotic and the power of longing not at all being a separate country but a present happening. In drawing her literary examples of queer hauntology and chrononormativity, Freeman turns to Shakespeare, and particularly to Hamlet – a story that resists chrononormativity and invites hauntings through both the structure of the play and its content in equal measure. Hamlet is a play of overlapping bodies. There are the bodies of the dead, the living, the legislative body of the court of Denmark, the body of the prince himself, the body of players within the play, the non-corporeal body of the dead returned, and the play itself existing as its kind of stationary body. In Hamlet, like perhaps in K.I.P, the body becomes a metaphor for “the means for and effect of convoluting time” (Freeman 14), and in turn the narrative timelines that are present in the two primary forms of most of Shakespeare’s own other narratives – namely the marriage plot of the comedy, and the revenge plot of the tragedy. Hamlet both stops and confuses these narratives, the wedding being the beginning of the play instead of the end, the prince unable to ever truly enact his revenge. When Freeman suggests that Hamlet is a story yearning for a “lost Eden [from an] era prior to the establishment of the catholic church” (Freeman 16), this presents itself both through Hamlet’s seeming homoeroticism, and also the very fact that the timeline of the church constrains the play. Unlike many other Shakespearean revenges, Hamlet is frozen by the timeline of a Christian universe, literally unable to kill his uncle while in prayer without also giving his uncle the implicit victory that a Christian timeline demands “A villain kills my father, and for that I, his sole son, do send this same villain to heaven” (Hamlet III.3 76-77). Hamlet stands in stark contrast to, for example, Titus Andronicus, where the timeline of the state declares death to be an absolute end. In Freeman’s queer reading of Hamlet, this frozen nature of the narrative and its prince also spill out in his inability to pursue Laertes instead of Ophelia, trapped in a world and a time where “love between men is, indeed, out of joint” (Freeman 16), present but unreachable. If anything the “fantasia of corporeal disfigurement and fragmentation” (15) of Hamlet is only heightened in Tom Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1967), itself a 20th century hauntology experiment within the Hamlet Narrative, cyclically taking place before, during, and after the events of the original play, always experiencing the present as that aforementioned hybrid. Here Stoppard’s two protagonists only amplify those themes of homo-erotic desire, becoming both inseparable and intermingled in their identities, as well as carrying the fragmentation of timeline to its extreme, living a life-after-death that refuses to fade, experiencing “death, and then eternity (Stoppard 2.228). I reference Stoppard not to pull away from Freeman’s analysis of Shakespeare, but to illustrate how ripe Shakespeare’s body of work is for such queer readings and instances of hauntology, and how older works can become queered and unstuck from a time when a modern setting applies pressure. Stoppard’s play is a hybrid of his work and Shakespeare, of timelines and the sensibilities of modernity and antiquity. As Freeman applies her queer reading to the appearance of The Ghost in Hamlet, I could also argue for a queering of the haunting that occurs near the end of Richard the Third, where the ghosts of the tyrants victims return as the “thousand several tongues, And every tongue brings in a several tale, and every tale condemns me for a villain.” (Richard III V.3.194-195), each body of the dead returning to press themselves onto Richard in the present, to declare “despair and die” (V.3.125) to their murderer. Though Richard III is actually guilty of his crimes, I think a queer reading can link this experience of haunting to the sense of guilt and grief mapped onto queer hauntology’s such as K.I.P. as a result of the split between pre and post aids crisis. It is hard not to read the title K.I.P. as Freeman does, with K.I.P. laced with the suggestion of “rest in peace,’ indicating both the desire to enliven the dead and the understanding that this is never wholly possible.” (Freeman 13) Freeman spills out from Hamlet into Midsummer Night’s Dream as a better erotic companion for K.I.P. than the bard’s other works, mapping how the sexual timelines of both the mortal and fairy world “move in tandem with one another” (Freeman 17), and with the character of Puck (who is notably undefined by normative gender throughout the history of the character and their performances) acting as the agent of unmooring for the normative sexual timeline of the other characters, both altering the Fairy Queens plans for love, and overriding the sexual agency and timelines of the four human characters that wander into the fairy domain. Freeman also touches on the queerness of the Rude Mechanicals of Midsummer Night’s Dream. Like in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead, and Hamlet, the players within the play exist as a performance of hauntology. The present is a hybrid, players performing histories as tangible and still happening through the device of the story within the story– with the narrative of Hamlet echoed and repeated by both the players in Hamlet and Stoppard’s addition, and the Mechanicals imprinting and queering the story of Romeo and Juliet through the farce of Pyramus and Thisbe (where the two heteronormative lovers are both played by male actors) The players in all these cases, which exist so utterly outside the capitalist and heteronormative timelines of productivity, Freeman argues, represent a “queerness [that] consists of a bodily difference” (18). In that way, I can return to my earlier examples, and point to a similar queerness in the aliens that cause the unmooring of time in the science fiction stories of Vonnegut and Chiang, and the queerness of bodily and sexual difference that is the queerness found in K.I.P., a queerness that has been forever altered through time and trauma, and can never be fully regained. Watching the players, or aliens, bring a performance of queerness, and queer longing exposes us to subjectivities that have found space outside of chrononormativity, outside of the rigorous heteronormativity that is demanded by the productivity of capitalism. Freeman describes queerness as a culture and community where its members are “of times out of joint […] a subjugated class” (Freeman 18). If queerness is forever at odds with a chrononormative timelines because queerness and queer culture do not abide by those timelines, then Queerness comes into being as a rejection of the state’s timelines, as a rejection of the call for reproductive and monetary productivity that those timelines demand. When faced queer performances, such as K.I.P., we face a sense of lust and longing and desire, for emotion and connection that is unstuck and unmoored from how we have come to read and signify time. We become Nguyen, and Hamlet, and the players, and Stoppard, and Billy Pilgrim, and Louise, the face pressed on top of a scene and a moment that never included us, but always includes us, our bodies separated by chronology but joined by longing. Through its performance, its hauntology, its existence, and its art, queerness becomes a rebellious time machine.

#### So when the 1NC gets up and says “debate is a game” you should ask yourself “for who?”

#### For us, debate is a constant site of erasure.

#### There is no fiat, no radical politics, no legal advocacy until we break the compulsory silence of civil society.

#### The 1AC is a radical counternarrative that reconfigures the terms of debate – refusal to conform to the rules of the game is necessary to destabilize structures of control. Thus the role of the ballot is to endorse the best strategy of epistemic disruption.

Walter Mignolo 13, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies @ Duke, B.A. in philosophy @ Universidad Nacional de Cordoba, Ph.D. @ Ecole des Hautes Etudes, 2013, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom,” *Theory, Culture and Society* Vol 26:(7-8), pg. 4-5, gender modified

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation.2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations. In what follows I revisit the formal apparatus of enunciation from the perspective of geo- and bio-graphic politics of knowledge. My revisiting is epistemic rather than linguistic, although focusing on the enunciation is unavoidable if we aim at changing the terms and not only the content of the conversation. The basic assumption is that the knower is always implicated, geo- and body-politically, in the known, although modern epistemology (e.g. the hubris of the zero point) managed to conceal both and created the figure of the detached observer, a neutral seeker of truth and objectivity who at the same time controls the disciplinary rules and puts ~~himself or herself~~ [themselves] in a privileged position to evaluate and dictate. The argument is structured as follows. Sections I and II lay out the ground for the politics of knowledge geo-historically and bio-graphically, contesting the hegemony of zero point epistemology. In Section III, I explore three cases in which geo- and body-politics of knowledge comes forcefully to the fore: one from Africa, one from India and the third from New Zealand. These three cases are complemented by a fourth from Latin America: my argument is here. It is not the report of a detached observer but the intervention of a de-colonial project that ‘comes’ from South America, the Caribbean and Latinidad in the US. Understanding the argument implies that the reader will shift its geography of reasoning and of evaluating arguments. In Section IV, I come back to geo- and body-politics of knowledge and their epistemic, ethical and political consequences. In Section V, I attempt to pull the strings together and weave my argument with the three cases explored, hoping that what I say will not be taken as the report of a detached observed but as the intervention of a de-colonial thinker.

#### The performative intervention of the 1AC is a prerequisite to the political – effectual macropolitical change must be guided by embodied queer resistance.

Traber ’18 (Becca Traber, 01-17-2018, "Fiat and Radical Politics by Becca Traber," NSD Update, <http://nsdupdate.com/2018/fiat-and-radical-politics-by-becca-traber/,1-8-2021>) //recut-nikki, bracketed for gendered language

Insisting on fiat in all cases functionally means that we cannot run arguments about politics outside the state without radically distorting the nature of that politics. Many debaters assume that the only “practical” or “pragmatic” politics occur through the state. However, this is not the case. Things like the feminist movements intervention on norms of sexual harassment are examples of politics outside the state. Collapsing the recent backlash to sexual harrasment precipitated by Harvey Weinstein and others to possible state action ignores that the state could not possibly intervene in an adequate way to change those norms. The norms about sexual behavior in the workplace must change, but they can only reasonably change through politics engaged outside the state. Thinking of it in terms of state politics conceals the necessity of non-state politics.  This is uniquely bad because the reality of the situation is that the percentage of debaters who will have a chance to be internal to the state is minuscule, but all debaters could plausibly engage in non-state movement politics. All the evidence that people read in favor of fiat and state-based implementation makes education claims that assume the necessary training one needs to engage in politics involves thinking about the state, but fiat is not the tool to do that. Fiat doesn’t ask us to think about how to engage in politics as citizens who live under a state, it asks us to pretend that we are the state. In a real way, it is also inadequate as a way of roleplaying a policy-maker, because the reality of politics as a legislature is significantly more complicated than being able to wave a magic wand and implement whatever policy is wanted. Fiat is a construction where we don’t even roleplaying as a human, much less as plausibly political actors.The reality is that while radical and leftist politics occasionally results in policy action, conceiving of it in terms of policy action distorts the nature of that politics. If one were to set about with the goal of combating anti-blackness, as history has demonstrated, the first step cannot be to try to be a policy maker. A politician with a radical advocacy cannot get elected until that advocacy has enough support that people will vote for her. For instance, a politician who ran on dismantling the United States or erasing all distinctions between animals and people to solve anthro would not have a constituency without a substantial social movement to develop that constituency. This problem is inherent to any advocacy which significantly challenges status quo ideals. Things in the status quo are in the status quo because a lot of people and powerful people agree with them. Before that can change more than incrementally, a lot of people have to change their mind. If you were to seriously consider how to implement a strategy of radical politics, it would make no sense to have the first step be electoral. None of the major social movements were driven by policy action— policies are driven by social movements. Fiating radical politics hides the radical politics entirely. Focusing on policy actions, in this context, actively distorts how we should consider radical politics. Even if it were the case that we would eventually need policy actions to finally solve issues of marginalization, that does not mean that we should start off with a question of fiat. Fiat erases the work necessary to allow for policy changes. It does not help us think about the movements we will have to create and the ways we will have to persuade. This means that claims about the necessity of state action are besides the point– state action is only caused by a lot of non-state action that we have to think about first and that fiat erases. The conceptual work that debaters often want to exclude by insisting of fiating policy is exactly the type of thing that radical politics does. Radical politics needs to persuade and imagine new possibilities, first and foremost. Fiating away the process of change by which radical politics would be implemented makes irrational critical parts of radical politics in the real world. A good example is the alternate social institutions implemented by Black nationalist organizations like the Black Panther Party. If we don’t have to consider the process of change, the benefit of having alternate institutions becomes significantly less. The types of benefit are different, as well. In a world of fiat, the only benefit of creating an institution outside of the state would be incidental to the immediate effects of the institution. Why develop free breakfast outside the school system when we could just fiat free breakfast inside of it? The fact that it would not be possible in the immediate future to implement the breakfast in the school system or the state and people need breakfast (or other help) right now should be relevant to the consideration of what political strategy to use. Fiat is a crutch that prevents us from seeing ways we can intervene in our communities to create good things, right now, without relying on the vast institution of the state. Fiat trains debaters to think like legislators, not like organizers, but the only way to have substantial change from the status quo is to organize. The available set of options in legislative space can change, but it can only change from the outside. Using fiat erases this and is fundamentally incompatible with what it would take to organize. There is an inherent conservatism in the insistence on fiat, in that fiat is only comprehensible with extremely incrementalist politics. The type of policies that are able to be enacted by people already in positions of power are always going to be close to the policies that are already in place. Not debating about the means through which policies get enacted means that we can never explore changes that involve changing the means of policy enactment. The reality is, however, that there are occasionally radical changes in public life. These changes are never in a meaningful way first caused by the passage of the policy and always rely on a process of social change that came before. Fiat assumes we already know the realm of the possible and erases any potential of thinking about changing it. This means that arguments focusing on the fact that the state can be useful in radical politics misunderstand the issue. Even if the state is a useful part of political change at some point in the process, it certainly isn’t the initial step. And even if we need to think about politics while acknowledging that the state is a real force (ie “use the state as a heuristic”), we must do so by imagining what our movements look like in the world as it is. That is, we should not ignore that the state exists, but it’s existence doesn’t mean that we should fiat a policy action in the state as a way of implementing a radical policy solution. It would be enough to take seriously the state as an obstacle for non-state politics, while still advocating for non-state politics. And, moreover, the idea of using the state as a tool for change ignores the reality of what social change takes. This means fiating with radical politics is not only misleading, it actively teaches wrong things about what radical politics looks like. The type of education it provides is counterproductive if we actually want our debates to help further a political project. One thing someone could think is that we need to imagine fiating a policy option as a first step in a political project, because we need to imagine what the goal of the political project should look like. Fiat, as a form of ideal theory, helps us determine the possibilities of political action. However, this as a framing necessarily means that we would be determining the political goals of radical politics without considering the process through which those goals are created over the course of the development of a movement.  That is, the discussion of the effects of a policy as the first step in thinking about politics abstracts away from the reality of differential epistemic access to the world. When a debater offers her policy action, ~~she is~~ [they are] not doing so in conversation with all the relevant communities that could be affected by that policy. She is not participating in a conversation–she is stopping the conversation and asserting that a policy “would be best” in the abstract. Different perspectives can give guidance on how we ought to understand what a desirable policy action would be. What this means is that the purpose of radical political action should always develop in a fluid way, through the actual practice of political change and from within the movement itself. We don’t need to decide at the beginning what we ought to do in an absolute sense and the attempt to do so forecloses conversation. Objectives in social movements are determined in a more fluid way than a formal policy white paper. We determine our objectives in the process of conversation. This means the model of fiating the final goal of radical politics not only distorts the nature of social movements and collective action, it assumes a certainty about the objective of politics in a way that prevents the possibility of minoritarian critique.  The process of developing a politics changes the objectives of political movements and to ignore this process forecloses the real radical possibility of diverse collective action. The insistence on fiat in round functions to erase minority perspectives empirically. If the AC has a radical policy option, they will often use policy making good arguments to take out various critiques that try to point out how the AC is missing the perspectives of minority voices. The focus on policy making is used as a weapon to preclude discussion. This not only is a moral harm in itself, it means that we will be engaging in bad politics. A policy making first framework excludes epistemic contributions from people outside the mainstream, meaning that we will inevitably miss harms to marginalized populations at the core of our advocacies. The erasure of critique from the outside means we cannot trust that the plan will do what it claims to do without horrible externalities.