# 1NC

## 1NC -- T -- FW

#### The text of the resolution calls for debate on hypothetical government action

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### Vote Neg --

#### Procedural Fairness -- post facto topic change alters balance of prep, which structurally favors the aff because they speak last and get perms. Debate is a competition that necessitates boundaries and limits that ensure one side doesn’t win by default. *All of our specific strategies, link to disads, and specific actor and mechanisms are moot* – This isn’t conductive to a fair, educational debate.

#### all 2AC defense to this claim will rely on concessionary ground which isn’t a stable basis for a year of debate while all the aff has to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world.

#### Clash —any alternative to our model of the topic as a baseline discussion wrecks the point of having a predictable stasis point which is the resolution. Their model of debate turns into a monologue that means their args are presumptively false because they haven’t been tested by a well-researched opponent and encourages overly broad and not specific research to create policies that counter oppression which also reinforces dogmatism and precludes the refining of those strategies.

#### Intellectual humility- Putting our positions up for debate and studying their flaws best breaks down our neural bias towards intellectual arrogance, and fosters a culture of better scholarship---our brains are terrible at knowing when we’re wrong and updating our beliefs. The impact is intellectual humility---rewards bluster instead of thoroughness that trends us and society towards extreme, unvetted positions where we criticize without accepting criticism (Having a neg to argue against is essential to foster well thought out ideas and policies)

#### SSD solves all of their offense – there is no independent reason as to why they can’t read their nontopical advocacy as a K on the neg. Their model of debate produces insular debates that destroy education, ethics and reproduces violence– turns case

Evans 12 [Rashad, JD., Black debate extraordinare and JD, “The 1NC,” Nov 20, http://www.rwesq.com/the-1nc/]

Now, the debate! First, let me look at Casey Harrigan’s (“CH”) definition of SSD. He says that : Definition: switch side debate (SSD) is the practice that requires debaters to argue both for and against a given topic in alternating rounds. In effect, it has meant that debaters’ arguments are divorced from personal conviction and instead made contingently as a means of “testing” the truth value of a proposition. I will accept this definition, but I think it requires some more refinement. In a practical sense, SSD, at a minimum, requires that the affirmative defend the resolution. For the most part, the negative is unconstrained (except by competition) and most debates in which SSD comes up the question is whether the affirmative team should be required to affirm the topic, including some defense of an action by the United States Federal Government (“USFG”). **The essential question posed by SSD is whether the affirmative team should be required to defend the resolution even when they (1) fundamentally disagree with all or part of it and/or (2) are compelled to affirm other ideas because of their “personal convictions.”** The answer to this question must be yes. First, there are multiple ways to skin a cat and even more ways to affirm the resolution in the world of parametric debate because one need only affirm an interpretation of the resolution and not the resolution writ large. Therefore, there are rare instances in which there is no interpretation of the resolution that you cannot defend and these rare instances are most likely the product of lack of creativity and research. So in reality, the question is an even simpler one: should the affirmative team be required to defend an interpretation of the resolution. There are immense constitutive and instrumental benefits to SSD that cannot be otherwise obtained and therefore must be required. I ask that the judges: George, Justin and Kyla evaluate this debate holistically, which requires that they evaluate the benefits of SSD to the speaker (constitutive) and to society (instrumental). This also requires that they exclude nothing in their analysis of this debate. The Constitutive Debaters benefit from SSD. It requires that they engage in topics that they may not otherwise engage. The resolution poses a unique question and the debate round is a unique time to answer that question. One is much more likely to consider their personal convictions outside of the debate round than they are to consider the resolution outside the debate round. Therefore, independently of whether one agrees with the resolution or not, there are benefits to defending an interpretation of the resolution in that it requires you to consider something you may not have otherwise considered. These thought experiments create more informed and thoughtful debaters and citizens. SSD creates a unique opportunity for self-reflexivity. The idea is to let your personal convictions guide you in the debate. The resolution doesn’t require that you suppress your identity or convictions, but is instead an opportunity to infuse that identity and those convictions into the resolution and public policy discussion. So, given who you are, what you believe and what you know what say you regarding energy production? What say you regarding democracy assistance? What say you regarding federal control in Indian Country? Therefore, the resolution is an opportunity for you to refine your personal convictions and put your identity in politics instead of relying exclusively on identity politics.SSD allows you to check your own privilege. Here, I will rely on my personal experience. I once participated in a 30 day creative challenge where the challenge leader would pose questions on facebook and the group would answer them in the comments section. One day he asked us to imagine we could be the other gender for 3 days and to discuss what would we do. I thought about this on the A-train from Harlem to Chelsea and again from Chelsea to Harlem and had no answer because I couldn’t imagine being a woman. I explained that as a gay man I don’t need to be a woman to have sex with a man, I don’t want a baby in me and more importantly I don’t want the physical vulnerability of being a woman. This realization really forced me to reevaluate my previous jokes even that as a gay many I was ontologically indistinct from a woman. I am not. I am gay and I am black…in many ways I am the the worlds bottom, but even I could would not want to occupy the body of a woman. That thought experiment taught me a lot about myself, privilege and the world. Sometimes, you have to take a walk in someone else’s stiletto to learn who you really are. Seriously CH, have you walked in stilettos? It will change your life. SSD is both necessary and sufficient to ensure that you debate your personal convictions. Remember, if you are staunchly opposed to the resolution you get to lodge those complaints on the negative. Also, remember that what is good for the goose is good for the gander and if you don’t have to debate the resolution then no one has to debate the resolution. This loosening of the restrictions on the resolution may mean that no one gets to debate anything they want. I mean lets face it, no one wants to be topical! There’s always a better version of your aff that isn’t topical. Every 2AC considers severance or intrinsicness because the resolution is flawed or insufficient. However, a true debater understands that they both have to debate on the affirmative and the negative and that in order to do either effectively there must be stability in the relationship between the affirmative and the negative. Therefore, committing yourself to the resolution is key preserving your own negative ground to engage in your critique of the resolution. As goes the resolution so goes your personal convictions about that resolution. The Instrumental SSD is the only way to organize a fair debate tournament. We must have a topic. There must be rules and allowing any and everyone go rogue because of their “personal convictions” it is a recipe for disaster. I don’t want to live and debate in that world. There must be strict requirements on defending the resolution to allow for fair and predictable negative ground. By the way, protecting fair negative ground is easier and more important than all other concerns regarding fairness. All people of all convictions have to be negative at some point. Which means that the affirmative-negative dialiectic is the only intersectional analysis that can be performed because all people of all identities will eventually find themselves on the affirmative or negative side in debate. Preserving negative ground then preserves the ground of women, minorities and hippies.SSD ensures that we have all hands on deck in these extraordinary times. We need all perspectives and all peoples to engage in all debates. SSD facilitates this. Allowing students to pick their own topic because of their “personal convictions” may mean that important issues get ignored all together. I mean, what would happen if we let the students set the curriculum? Would they learn anything, ever? How many times have you heard these questions in a classroom: why do I have to learn this? Will this be on the exam? My major is X, why do I need to learn Y? Blah. Yes, students would almost always like to do what they want to do. If we allowed this where would we be as a country? Who will be there to tackle the important questions pertaining to immigration, energy production, the Arab Spring, etc? Engaging the resolution from your specific social location can cause others to change their views. There are several examples of creative interpretations of the resolution that have inspired folk to view the topic and life differently. This is when debate is at its best and when it’s engaging in important knowledge production. Debate and debaters have the potential to infuse new arguments, ideas and perspectives into the resolution and into the broader discussion. Now, the line by line! CH says: 1. It presumes debate as a “pedagogical bull-pen”, which undermines the activity’s potential for radical change. Students are told “you can’t know anything until you debate both sides”, ignoring the VAST WEALTH of lived experience that underwrites specific claims about identity, the world, praxis, and the topic. In some ways, it is like Loyola’s argument about info accumulation – we are told to place a hold on “conviction” until we have “enough information” and “enough testing” when in reality there is either never a point where “enough is enough” OR we have \*already\* crossed that point and should be able to utilize the debate space for advocacy. It makes debate into a game about hypothetical action rather than a potential site for social justice. First, there are radically topical interpretations of the resolution. Second, how does one know that their lived experience is dispositive of any debate without testing it against the research and lived experiences of others. It’s not that you can’t know anything until you debate both sides but more importantly that you debate both sides before you conclude you know anything. Lastly, there is no internal link between resolutional debate and the loss of social justice. In fact, one should always debate the resolution in a way that produces social justice. 2. It is anti-Black. The norm of SSD and topic construction mandating USFG action presume that public policy is valuable because it is equally accessible to all participants, when in reality access is ANYTHING BUT that, relies on a belief that USFG action is a locus for change when in reality and history it has produced the opposite, marginalizes individual perspectives as “too local”, and does not account for the specific conditions of Black participation in debate. Your anti-Blackness argument is without warrant. To the extent that anti-Blackness is a problem, SSD is the solution. Certainly, holding on to ones conviction in avoidance of debate has never benefited Black people in the past. Thinking itself is Blackness (whiteness is anti-thought), so avoiding a debate because of personal conviction is quintessentially anti-Black. In fact, many of debates current ills stem from people avoiding debates and holding fast to their convictions. Also, the USFG is not uniquely anti-Black. The world is anti-Black, so to isolate the USFG is to fundamentally misunderstand Blackness. The USFG has been a locus for change where others have failed. For instance, the civil rights act regulated the racist behavior of private individuals and corporations. School desegregation required federal intervention to ensure state compliance with the constitution. The Violence Against Women’s Act regulates individual behavior in the home which was once considered a private matter. This is not to suggest that the USFG is a saint, but to suggest that the question requires more nuance and that nuance is provided only by SSD. The specific conditions of Blackness require SSD. After years of exclusion from education generally and debate specifically, its right time that we jump into the discussions. Black SSD not equal white SSD. Black debaters are the future and they will remake the world partially in an image of themselves. This requires that they theorize their Blackness across topic (basically, the k aff applies to neg to)

#### Anatomizing Power---the aff’s attempt to shift the focus away from the core imperial power of the USFG which reflects a privileged position that obscures national liberation movements and hinders them by removing pressure from the USFG.

Maupin, 21 [​Caleb Maupin is a widely acclaimed speaker, writer, journalist, and political analyst. He has traveled extensively in the Middle East and in Latin America. He was involved with the Occupy Wall Street movement from its early planning stages, and has been involved many struggles for social justice. He is an outspoken advocate of international friendship and cooperation, as well as 21st Century Socialism. “Chapter Two: Redefining Capitalism and Socialism,” 7/1/21, Midwestern Marx]//Townes

Kropotkin’s writing has an almost religious faith in the good intentions of human beings and their willingness to cooperate without coercion, combined with a gentle pacifism that fears the cruelty of authoritarian structures. He writes: “We shall see then what a variety of trades, mutually cooperating on a spot of the globe and animated by the social revolution, can do to feed, clothe, house, and supply with all manner of luxuries millions of intelligent men. We need write no fiction to prove this. What we are sure of, what has already been experimented upon, and recognized as practical, would suffice to carry it into effect, if the attempt were fertilized, vivified by the daring inspiration of the Revolution and the spontaneous impulse of the masses.”

However, despite holding a vision of a voluntary society where all cooperate with each other in the absence of coercion, Kropotkin was not opposed to using force and violence to achieve his goals. The Anarchist organizations and networks he associated with throughout Europe advocated “Propaganda of the Deed,” the use of bombings and assassinations in the hopes of sparking a rebellion among the wider population. How much Kropotkin was directly involved in such activities remains unclear, but it is clear that many people who were inspired by Kropotkin’s teachings and worked with his organizations engaged in Left Adventurist Terrorism.

In 1916, most anarchists and revolutionary socialists were protesting and opposing the war between imperialist powers. Kropotkin published his “Manifesto of The Sixteen” that announced support for British and American imperialism in their war against Germany, Austria, and Turkey. This earned Kropotkin a large amount of scorn and was seen as a slap in the face and betrayal of the many socialists like Rosa Luxemburg and Eugene Debs, who went to prison for opposing the war.

Peter Kropotkin is a figure that is worthy of respect despite criticisms of his political line and actions. He was willing to make great sacrifices and take great risks on behalf of oppressed peasants and factory workers, and he did a great deal to put forward a vision of post-capitalist society that would resolve the injustices of the world. Marxists of course reject Left Adventurism and Terrorism along with idealistic fairy tales. They favor instead to build a mass movement of workers to seize control of the state, and create a rational, centrally planned economy to eliminate all scarcity, marching toward the ultimate goal of a stateless, classless world.

The fact that the BreadTube internet universe claims Kropotkin’s legacy and presents itself as the main representative of not just Kropotkin’s ideas, but all anti-capitalism in 21st Century America is deeply problematic. The intellectual laziness and shallow analysis presented by various BreadTube voices is a total disservice to his legacy, however complex it may be.

The Marxist Definition of Capitalism

The teachings of Karl Marx understand socialism to be a result of the innate human drive for progress and the expansion of productive forces. For most of humanity’s existence, we lived as hunter gatherers in tribes. The first social revolution came with the domestication of animals and the growing of crops. The dawn of agriculture brought forth a new mode of production and a new set of social relations to correspond to it. Soon society was divided between landowners and slaves.

Eventually feudalism, a more efficient mode of production, replaced slavery. In the 1700s capitalism emerged in Europe as the mercantile classes replaced the kings and nobles, and industrial production replaced subsistence farming.

Capitalism resulted in the creation of two social classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie are those who own the banks, factories, land, means of transportation and other centers of economic power, and operate them in order to make profits. The rest of society makes up another class, the proletariat, a class Marx described as: “the modern working class, developed — a class of laborers, who live only so long as they find work, and who find work only so long as their labor increases capital. These laborers, who must sell themselves piecemeal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.”

The interests of the capitalists who own the means of production and the workers who sell their labor power to capitalists are diametrically opposed. Capitalists seek to drive wages down and maximize their profits. As a result workers form unions and organize strikes in the hopes of increasing their pay and bettering their conditions.

Capitalism is defined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels as a system in which the means of production are privately owned and operated to make profits for those who own them. Marx described capitalism as “the anarchy of production.” Engels explained “For in capitalistic society, the means of production can only function when they have undergone a preliminary transformation into capital.” Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, said that capitalism was a system of “Profits in command.” The capitalist system is defined as a system of production for profit.

The capitalist is always looking to make production more efficient in order to increase his profits. As Marx explained, “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production.” The capitalist seeks to hire the least amount of workers, replace human labor with machines, de-skill jobs, and make human labor more easily replaceable, all in order to churn out more and more products for lower and lower cost. The capitalist seeks to increase his profit margin so those profits can be reinvested and his operations can expand only to make more profits, which can then be reinvested again. This is what Marx referred to as “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation.”

Driving down labor costs, however, has an unplanned side-effect. The purchasing power of workers is derived from the wages they are paid. In the drive to efficiently produce goods and maximize profits, the capitalist system is prone to cyclical crises of overproduction. The workers cannot afford to buy back the products they produce. The market becomes glutted with products that cannot be sold. As a result, prices drop, companies go out of business, and workers lose their jobs, because too much has been created.

Marx wrote in his text The Poverty of Philosophy: “From day to day it has becomes clearer that the production relations in which the bourgeoisie moves have not a simple, uniform character, but a dual character; that in the selfsame relations in which wealth is produced, poverty is also produced; that in the selfsame relations in which there is a development of the productive forces, there is also a force producing repression; that these relations produce bourgeois wealth; i.e., the wealth of the bourgeois class — only by continually annihilating the wealth of the individual members of this class and by producing an ever-growing proletariat.”

This problem of abundance creating poverty is uniquely capitalist. In previous systems, people starved because not enough food had been created, but in capitalism, starvation can occur because too much food has been produced. In previous systems, homelessness resulted from a lack of housing, but in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis when “the housing bubble burst,” many Americans lost their homes or became homeless because too much housing had been constructed.

Marxists often will cite a parable dialogue between a coal miner and his son.

Son: Father, I am very cold, why can’t we light the stove?

Father: We cannot light the stove because we don’t have any coal.

Son: Why don’t we have any coal?

Father: Because I lost my job at the coal mine and we do not have any money to purchase coal.

Son: Why did you lose your job at the coal mine?​

Father: Because there is too much coal.

Friedrich Engels explained why cyclical economic crises result from the built-in problem of production organized for profit in his text Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, writing: “The whole mechanism of the capitalist mode of production breaks down under the pressure of the productive forces, its own creations. It is no longer able to turn all this mass of means of production into capital. They lie fallow, and for that very reason the industrial reserve army must also lie fallow. Means of production, means of subsistence, available laborers, all the elements of production and of general wealth, are present in abundance.”

Imperialism: The Capitalism of Our Time

Much of BreadTube’s discussion of capitalism centers around the inequity of relations between employers and employees. This is certainly a very big aspect of Marxian analysis of capitalism. Marx described the alienating environment of the worker, the way workers are reduced to “appendages of machines” who sell their labor power to the employer like any other commodity. Marx described how the worker is not paid the full value of ~~his~~ labor, with the surplus value being stolen from in order to become the profits of the capitalist.

However, the bulk of Marx’s analysis was focused on the problems that flow from production being organized for profits, as shown above. The irrational profit motive leads to capital centralizing into fewer and fewer hands, gluts overproduction, poverty amidst plenty, and all kinds of social chaos.

In the aftermath of Marx’s death, Vladimir Lenin analyzed the further development of capitalism. Lenin showed that increasingly the industries became dominated by financial institutions, and that the banks who supply credit become the central institutions in western countries. In the 1890s, capitalism in the United States, Britain, France, Germany and other western countries became dominated by huge conglomerates. Banks and industries tied together in huge trusts as multinational corporations spread their tentacles across the globe. The western monopolies worked to stop economic development in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and maintain their dominance in global trade. Excess commodities were dumped onto the developing world that served as a captive market. This higher stage of capitalism was called “Imperialism.”

Lenin described the five stages of imperialism: “We have to begin with as precise and full a definition of imperialism as possible. Imperialism is a specific historical stage of capitalism. Its specific character is threefold: imperialism is monopoly capitalism; parasitic, or decaying capitalism; moribund capitalism. The supplanting of free competition by monopoly is the fundamental economic feature, the quintessence of imperialism. Monopoly manifests itself in five principal forms: (1) cartels, syndicates and trusts—the concentration of production has reached a degree which gives rise to these monopolistic associations of capitalists; (2) the monopolistic position of the big banks—three, four or five giant banks manipulate the whole economic life of America, France, Germany; (3) seizure of the sources of raw material by the trusts and the financial oligarchy (finance capital is monopoly industrial capital merged with bank capital); (4) the (economic) partition of the world by the international cartels has begun. There are already over one hundred such international cartels, which command the entire world market and divide it “amicably” among themselves—until war redivides it. The export of capital, as distinct from the export of commodities under non-monopoly capitalism, is a highly characteristic phenomenon and is closely linked with the economic and territorial-political partition of the world; (5) the territorial partition of the world (colonies) is completed.”

It is because of this global setup called imperialism that Nigeria can be the top oil producing country in Africa, exporting more of this valued commodity than any other country on the continent. Yet they still have only 62% literacy, along with a very low life expectancy and a high infant mortality rate, according to the CIA World Factbook.

It is because of imperialism that Honduras and Guatemala are drug and gang infested countries where much of the population lacks access to education and running water. In comparison, Nicaragua, which has broken out of imperialism, has been able to roll back poverty and raise living standards. The Central American countries that have economies and governments dominated by the United States are kept poor, subject to foreign domination and impoverishment.

When the British colonized India and Bangladesh, they burned the looms and forced people that had been weaving for thousands of years to import their cloth from British textile mills. In more recent times, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) devastated the agricultural sectors of Mexico, Haiti, and other countries. Writing for the New York Times on November 24th, 2013, Laura Carlsen explained: “As heavily subsidized U.S. corn and other staples poured into Mexico, producer prices dropped and small farmers found themselves unable to make a living. Some two million have been forced to leave their farms since NAFTA. At the same time, consumer food prices rose, notably the cost of the omnipresent tortilla. As a result, 20 million Mexicans live in “food poverty”. Twenty-five percent of the population does not have access to basic food and one-fifth of Mexican children suffer from malnutrition. Transnational industrial corridors in rural areas have contaminated rivers and sickened the population and typically, women bear the heaviest impact.”

Much of the developing world is very rich in terms of natural resources and human labor. In order to maintain a monopoly, the western multinational corporations, with full support of the government apparatus and international institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, force countries into unnatural poverty due to foreign economic domination.

The mechanism for enforcing the rule of western monopolies is war. If countries break out of the grip of western capitalism and begin to develop their economies, they become subject to attack. If one looks at the economies of Russia, China, Venezuela, Iran, Cuba, Syria, or any other country the imperialists target for regime change, one will see a level of independence and striving toward development that the international monopolies cannot permit. Often this independence is directly related to the most valuable commodity in our outmoded fossil fuel economy, petroleum.

Vincent Copeland’s text, Expanding Empire, describes in clear terms the nature of imperialist economics: “The expansion into foreign countries resulted from a new stage in the expansion of business: The export of capital. Business had been exporting ordinary commodities of trade for centuries. The export of capital was something new—especially for the United States. And it couldn’t be done without foreign wars. The reason for this isn’t very complicated. The export of capital goods—that is, machinery, mining equipment, railroad engines, earth-moving tools, etc., is intended not to make just a quick "small" profit, but a constantly repeating profit that can go on forever, if the exploiter can hold onto the "investment." The investment of capital in a foreign country should be regarded somewhat like sending a huge suction pump. The pump pulls out the metals from the ground, the products from the soil and the fruits from the trees—with the help, of course, of the labor of the "native" people working on this suction pump. It is as if the pump were connected to pipes that run back to the "home" country, via the banks and big corporations. All the rich products are showered from the pipes into the treasuries of these institutions, in the form of profits… Whole nations are drained by these great suction pumps—or "investments." And the profits are so great that rival groups of big business, led by small cliques of big banks, go to war with each other over the exploitation of these nations.”

BreadTube voices tend to talk of capitalism in merely the simple factory floor analogies rather than understanding the concentration of global economic power in the hands of monopolistic associations. BreadTubers talk of “pencil factories” where workers produce the pencils, but a capitalist gets the profits. These analogies are certainly relevant in understanding the nature of capitalist production, but BreadTube voices obscure the big picture for a microcosm that obscures analysis of global events.

Furthermore, BreadTube voices tend to argue that anything resembling Lenin’s analysis of capitalism in its imperialist stage is somehow anti-semitic. BreadTubers will often claim that references to bankers, international bankers, or globalism is merely a coded repackaging of Nazi conspiracy theories about Jewish global domination. This allegation is absurd, and would render not just all adherents of Marxism-Leninism, but also many liberal critics of globalization such as Noam Chomsky, Arundhati Roy, and Naomi Klein to be Nazi propagandists.

The world is not dominated by low level businessmen who own individual factories, but by an elite of ultra-rich, globally oriented capitalists. These capitalists do not focus their business efforts on a single national market. The ruling class of Wall Street and London are “globalists,” and they dominate the world economy with gigantic financial institutions, “international banks.” To analyze a world of gigantic multinational corporations that beat down entire nations simply in terms of the inequity between the owners of an allegorical pencil factory and his employees is simply inadequate. By declaring analysis of gigantic corporations or finance capitalists dominating the world to be “fascist” or “Trump-like” BreadTube is, in essence, blocking out and “cancelling” essential contemporary Marxist analysis.

Lenin’s understanding of imperialism enabled him to reorient much of the Marxist movement. Marx argued that all nationalism was a barrier to workers solidarity, though in his later life he became somewhat sympathetic to the Irish freedom struggle. Marx argued that European colonialism was bringing development and progress to places like India. Lenin’s understanding of how capitalism developed in the late 19th century laid the basis for revolutionaries embracing the national liberation struggles of colonized people. As the Chinese Communist Party’s document Long Live Leninism, published April 16, 1960, summarizes: "Lenin pointed out that the oligarchy of finance capital in a small number of capitalist powers, that is, the imperialists, not only exploit the masses of people in their own countries, but oppress and plunder the whole world, turning most countries into their colonies and dependencies. Imperialist war is a continuation of imperialist politics.”

Lenin understood that an aristocracy of labor, a strata of well paid workers enabled European social-democratic parties to become reformist and eventually support the First World War. Lenin saw that the revolutionary energy was coming from the east and the colonized world: “In the light of the law of the uneven economic and political development of capitalism, Lenin came to the conclusion that, because capitalism developed extremely unevenly in different countries, socialism would achieve victory first in one or several countries but could not achieve victory simultaneously in all countries.”

Lenin argued that socialism in the developing world would come about with the working class leading the struggle to liberate entire nations from the yoke of imperialist domination. Because of the stratification of the working class within the imperialist homelands and the rise of social reformism and the aristocracy of labor, Communists in western countries had a special task: “The liberation movements of the proletariat in the capitalist countries should ally themselves with the national liberation movements in the colonies and dependent countries; this alliance can smash the alliance of the imperialists with the feudal and comprador reactionary forces in the colonies all dependent countries, and will therefore inevitably put a final end to the imperialist system throughout the world.”

Imperialism, the rule of the world by western monopolies who keep the world poor in order to make themselves rich, is the capitalism of our time. Opposing capitalism in our time means opposing imperialism, and this understanding is essential, especially for those living in the imperialist world centers. The lack of any analysis of imperialism and anti-imperialism, and the constant allegation that those who do analyze such things are covert anti-semites reveals a very big flaw in the BreadTube sphere and its viewpoint.

#### Tactics---the aff conflates the most radical position with the most revolutionary - success isn’t based on how you think but what you achieve which means that understanding the political state intimately is key to mobilizing effective tactics.

1. Sims and Lynch, 21 [Joe Sims is co-chair of the Communist Party USA (2019-). He is also a senior editor of People's World and loves biking.​Maicol David Lynch is a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party USA and an activist and organizer in Working America and Indivisible. He writes from New York City and is most passionate about the struggles against imperialism in Latin America and the fight against xenophobia in immigrant communities in the USA. “The Socialist Moment and Mass Radicalization.” 6/29/2021, Midwestern Marx]//Townes
2. In a word, America is growing more radical. But what is the meaning of this word that falls so easily from our lips? Radicalization is an objective process born out of the class struggle and capitalist crisis. Yet, like all objective processes, it has subjective ripples. These eddies, while influenced by basic class conflicts, are not limited to them. As a result, different people are radicalized for different reasons. The environment, police violence, sexism, and other forms of gender discrimination, the treatment of animals, in addition to poverty, racism, immigrant rights, voter suppression, unemployment, and discrimination on the job can lead to folks seeking deeper, more radical solutions.
3. In general, the communist movement welcomes the growing radicalization of the broad public, particularly its working-class majority. It means people are waking up. But after getting out of bed, do folks step to the right or to the left? This is an issue often dismissed as a “war over words,” since the word “radical” literally means “to the root.”
4. But the roots, indeed, the entire tree of radicalization has many branches. And the winds of change blow them in myriad directions. Today, in bourgeois discourse, anything to the left or right of the political or religious center is often labeled “radical” by the ruling-class hegemony. This war of words should not be dismissed — it’s an important part of the ideological struggle.
5. For example, in the mainstream media, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is often referred to as “radical,” along with the right-wing “radicals” who attacked the Capitol earlier this year. On the other hand, the Republicans in Congress attack Medicare for All for being a “radical socialist demand” while condemning Black Lives Matter marches as the product of “radical anarchism.”
6. Here a class analysis is helpful in determining what’s really radical, that is, what actually goes to the root, and what doesn’t.
7. For us, policies that get to the root of solving the problem of working-class exploitation and promote greater equality and democracy are radical. Simply put, those that don’t are not.
8. Suppressing the vote isn’t radical — it’s deeply conservative. Neither is opposing marriage equality. On the other hand, proportional representation, a voting method that could greatly expand democracy for minority parties, is a positive, radical democratic demand.
9. Historically, as capitalism became a world system and grew into imperialism, the radicalization of the broad working-class public led to the creation of what’s called the world revolutionary process. Frustrated and angered by inequality and exploitation, middle- and working-class forces formed unions and political parties to press forward their just demands and interests. The October Revolution was born out of this struggle and brought with it a new stage in the process, the period of the transition from capitalism to socialism.
10. ​There is also a worldwide counter-revolutionary process at work that has led to world wars, as well as regional and local armed conflicts. It has promoted repression and the growth of fascism. U.S. imperialism is one of the leading, if not the leading sponsors. The Trump movement and its international counterparts are contemporary examples of these efforts. Notwithstanding important differences on domestic policy, the Biden administration’s policy toward China and Venezuela continues the anti-socialist drive.
11. Today’s radicalization process is drawing millions . . . some toward revolutionary Marxism. ​
12. On the other side of the class and democratic ledger, a deep and thoroughgoing radicalization process is at work today in the U.S. Beginning first with Occupy Wall Street, followed by the movements for Black lives and the mass protests led by women in the initial days of the Trump administration, today’s radicalization process is drawing millions into its various orbits, some of whom are, as if by the very force of gravity itself, drawn toward the working-class and revolutionary Marxism. It has crystallized in what we’ve called the socialist moment.
13. Communists highly value the growth of these radical democratic trends. Their contributions, new ideas, and victories are very important.
14. Those trends that gravitate toward the working class and Marxism are adding fresh forces along with new opportunities and challenges. One of the challenges is the growth in the influence of what might be termed “middle-class” or “petty bourgeois radicalism.”
15. By middle-class radicalism is meant a rather eclectic set of ideas and practices that historically have their origins in this strata’s frustration and primitive rebellion. Pressed on all sides and stuck between capitalism’s two main classes, the petite bourgeoisie’s class aspirations are crushed time and again. Viewing the world from a frog’s perspective — always looking up — they are ever being pushed down into the ranks of the working class.
16. ​Their political practices and outlook are largely shaped by these conflicted conditions of life. Absent the experience of working in large groups and being forced to collectively bargain, they tend to seek basic change along narrow, individual paths as opposed to seeing the need for moving masses in struggle, an outlook that lends itself to anarchism, individual acts of terrorism, and an unfounded confidence in the actions of small groups and self-styled “vanguards.” Some tend to be anti-corporate but not yet anti-capitalist, “anti-establishment” but out of touch with working-class needs, modalities, and political imperatives.
17. Middle-class radicalism is a mass concept and political trend.
18. As a result, these trends run up against and counter to the realities of struggle, a reality that is framed today by the broad democratic fight against the fascist danger. Mass electoral movements of both right and left are defining characteristics of these days and times, but the need to build political majorities for real change, particularly in the electoral arena, is largely lost on this trend, disdained in favor of allegedly more militant, revolutionary action such as abstract calls for general strikes regardless of whether or not the conditions for such important actions exist.
19. Middle-class radicalism should be treated not so much as the expression of this or that individual or organization but rather as a mass concept and political trend, one that rises and falls in tempo with the class, democratic, and anti-imperialist struggles both domestically and worldwide. Needless to say, each episode brings with it the unique features of the political terrain on which it’s born.
20. For example, after the defeat of the McCarthy period in the 1960s, the labor left was confronted with the growing influence of radical middle-class strata who were approaching but had not yet reached consistent working-class positions. These forces viewed Marxism-Leninism as old hat, the communist parties as outmoded, the working class as no longer revolutionary, unity an unrealistic watchword, and the class struggle a pipe dream. Inspired by the likes of Régis Debray, Herbert Marcuse, and others, they sought to forge a New Left, with new sources of revolutionary activity.
21. Regarding their class backgrounds, CPUSA leader James E. Jackson wrote, “They have come to the party out of the non-proletarian classes … from the poor workers in agriculture and the urban petite-bourgeoisie — the students, the intellectuals, the professionals.”
22. ​Applauding this development, Jackson also warned of potential conflicts:
23. It is a welcome sign of the times that the petty-bourgeois militants — from the cities or countryside — enroll in movements of mass actions and the best among them come to the party. At the same time, they generate mass pressure and constitute the primary source for the current attacks upon vital features of the Communist Party’s policies in the spheres of ideology, organization and tactics.
24. Today a new wave of radicalism is presenting itself in a climate quite different from the one that was confronted by Jackson and his comrades. Importantly, a new, New Left is once again emerging. The difference is that its roots now are closer to the working class and people’s movements. This is due, in part, to the class’s changing composition. Sections of the population once considered middle class have become “proletarianized,” that is, pushed into the working class. At the same time, a wider section of the working class have access to higher education and have become politically literate. Add to this the increase in women, people of color, and of course the growth in the service sector, and you have a very different situation indeed.
25. Thus the problem today is not so much the influx of middle-class elements but the remaining influence, that is, the residue of petty-bourgeois ideology, a problem exacerbated by the relative weakness of the Marxist left and the growth of the internet.
26. The impact of this residue should not be underestimated. With respect to ideological trends it reflects the ongoing impact of remnants of Maoism, Trotskyism, and to varying degrees strands of anarchism.
27. What, then, are the main challenges presented by middle-class radicalism?
28. Tactics that do not correspond to the realities of the political moment;
29. The idea that armed struggle is either imminent or inevitable and with it a downplaying of electoral work;
30. Static concepts of the party, e.g., the notion that a cadre party is its universal and final form;
31. A belief that the most radical position is always the most revolutionary;
32. One-sided readings and interpretations of Marxism.
33. It’s inevitable that each generation’s initial imbibing of Marxism not only is shaped by the conditions and influences of the times but also is necessarily incomplete due to newness itself. During the wave of radicalization that swept Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, for example, Lenin complained of Marx and Engels’ doctrine being learned in an “extremely one-sided and mutilated form.” In the U.S. during the radical ’60s, one-sided interpretations repeated themselves, this time influenced not only by the New Left but also by a middle-class radicalism of a special type in the form practiced by the Mao leadership in China.
34. On the other hand, the problem is exacerbated by the relative state of the communist movement itself. After the collapse of what was called “really existing socialism” due to right pressures, a serious ideological crisis and disintegration occurred within the communist movement. In response, there were manifest tendencies to over-correct to the left. These right and left opportunist swings exist to this day, in response to conditions on the ground and the communist’s relative maturity in addressing them. As Gus Hall pointed out, middle-class radical leftist errors cannot be effectively addressed unless right mistakes are corrected as well.
35. In this regard, slowness in recognizing and responding to new circumstances contributes to the problem. One of the criticisms of the Communist Party from emerging young revolutionary forces is its approach to united front policy, electoral politics, and fighting the extreme right. Here, an understanding of the party’s correct policy with respect to fighting the fascist danger was somewhat confounded by its not taking initiative and fielding its own candidates. As a result, the CPUSA was accused of tailing the Democratic Party. In this regard, a long overdue decision to run communist candidates for office was taken recently by the CPUSA National Committee.
36. With respect to tactics, it is vitally important to have an accurate assessment of where the struggle is at any given point in time. Tactics, as Gus Hall used to say, is timing. Take for example the issue of prison abolition and defunding the police, two important slogans that emerged in the fight against racist police murder. The key question is when and how these end goals can be obtained.
37. Communists understand that the prison-industrial complex and the police force are institutions of the capitalist state. Our long-term vision anticipates the “withering away,” to use Marx’s phrase, of the state. This includes the socialist state as well. That’s what communism is all about: human freedom.
38. How, then, is it possible to build a mass movement powerful enough to bring this about? The end goal has been established — are there way stations along the route, radical reforms that will take us, a quarter or one-half the way there?
39. Of course there are.
40. An approach advanced by ourselves and others, most notably the National Alliance Against Racist and Political Repression, believes that the election of civilian control boards is one such step. We believe that the fight for such institutions is an important part of the fight for democracy and working-class empowerment. Think about it: These community boards would control hiring, firing, funding, the whole nine yards. They would help create conditions where alternatives to policing could be enacted, including the allocation of money to do so.
41. This approach was often attacked by those who do not believe defunding the police is a “radical” enough step at this point in time. But why pit one goal against a step in the direction of achieving it?

#### Instead, the aff could talk about racialized capitalism while still staying in the bounds of Lincoln Douglas Debate: TVA — affirm the resolution with advantage areas about black workers and their exclusion from current labor movements

## 1NC -- Case

### Read: 1NC -- Presumption

#### Vote negative on presumption – this aff solves nothing:

#### 1] Systems – all of their inherency is about external institutions and material conditions outside of debate. Their advocacy does not alter any of thoseor result in a breakdown of patriarchy writ large. They need to explain IN DETAIL what the aff’s solvency mechanism is and how it changes the world.

#### 2] There’s no ballot key warrant. At best, their solvency says introducing this refusal is effective to generate solidarity but NOWHERE does it say tying it to the ballot is good or necessary which means the aff has no inherency because they already introduced and read the 1AC.

#### We’ll impact turn their attempt to attach the ballot to refusal and a liberation strategy:

#### A] It’s a double turn with the aff’s entire K of liberalism and humanism. It attaches their faux subversive method to the traditional liberal notions of communication and agonistic dialogue that they say exclude women.

#### B] Attaching liberation to the ballot in a competition is a violent model of debate. It puts the judge in an inappropriate position because it requires the judge decide we should be in solidarity with women and forces debaters to negate personal survival strategies. Debate’s just a game and tasking the judge with determining whether someone’s identity or personal resistance should be accepted is incredibly violent

#### C] It’s a palliative --- giving --- a W does nothing to make debate better, and viewing ballots as currency for social movements is terminally unsustainable because losses are inevitable and can signal failure to advocates of their method.

### 1NC -- Infoshop

#### The 1ac is just an infoshop—an organization where radicals meet to discuss ideals in the abstract—this disconnection from society precludes any possibility or revolutionary change. True politics must occur at a level of class consciousness and organizing, they just recreate new elitism and maintain the status quo.

Olson 2013 (Joel, associate professor at Northern Arizona University, “The problem with infoshops and insurrection US anarchism, movement building, and the racial order”, ‘Contemporary Anarchist Studies’, published in 2013)

An infoshop is a space where people can learn about radical ideas, where radicals can meet other radicals, and where political work (such as meetings, public forums, fundraisers, etc.) can get done. In the infoshop strategy, infoshops and other “autonomous zones” model the free society (Bey 1985). Building “free spaces” inspires others to spontaneously create their own, spreading “counterinstitutions” throughout society to the point where they become so numerous that they overwhelm the powers that be. The very creation of anarchist free spaces has revolutionary implications, then, because it can lead to the “organic” (i.e. spontaneous, undirected, nonhierarchical) spreading of such spaces throughout society in a way that eventually challenges the state. An insurrection, meanwhile, is the armed uprising of the people. According to the insurrection strategy, anarchists acting in affinity groups or other small informal organizations engage in actions that encourage spontaneous uprisings in various sectors of society. As localized insurrections grow and spread, they combine into a full-scale revolution that overthrows the state and capital and makes possible the creation of a free society.3 Infoshops serve very important functions and any movement needs such spaces. Likewise, insurrection is a central event in any revolution, for it turns the patient organizing of the movement and the boiling anger of the people into an explosive confrontation with the state. The problem is when infoshops and insurrection are seen as revolutionary strategies in themselves rather than as part of a broader revolutionary movement. In the infoshop model, autonomous spaces become the movement for radical change rather than serving it. The insurrection model tries to replace movement building with spontaneous upheaval rather than seeing upheaval as an outcome of social movements. The infoshops and insurrection models, in other words, both misunderstand the process of social transformation. Radical change may be initiated by spontaneous revolts that are supported by subterranean free spaces, but these revolts are almost always the product of prior political movement building, and their gains must be consolidated by political organizations, not the spaces such organizations use. Social movements, then, are central to radical change. The classical anarchists understood this well, for they were very concerned to build working-class movements, such as Bakunin’s participation in the International Working Men’s Association, Berkman and Goldman’s support for striking workers, Lucy Parson’s work in the International Working People’s Association, and the Wobblies’ call for “One Big Union.” (To be sure, there were also practices of building free spaces and engaging in “propaganda by the deed” in classical anarchism, but these were not the sole or even dominant approaches.) Yet surprisingly much of the contemporary anarchist milieu has abandoned movement building. In fact, the infoshops and insurrection models both seem to be designed, at least in part, to avoid the slow, difficult, but absolutely necessary work of building mass movements. Indeed, anarchist publications like Green Anarchy are explicit about this, deriding movement building as inherently authoritarian (for example Morefus n.d.). The anarchist emphasis on hierarchy contributes to this impatience with movement building because the kind of political work it encourages are occasional protests or “actions” against myriad forms of domination rather than sustained organizing based on a coherent strategy to win political space in a protracted struggle. A revolution is not an infoshop, or an insurrection, or creating a temporary autonomous zone, or engaging in sabotage; it cannot be so easy, so evolutionary, so “organic,” so absent of difficult political struggle. A revolution is an actual historical event whereby one class overthrows another and – in the anarchist ideal – thereby makes it possible to abolish all forms of oppression. Such revolutions are the product of mass movements: a large group of people organized in struggle against the state and/or other institutions of power to achieve their demands. When movements become powerful enough, when they sufficiently weaken elites, and when fortune is on their side, they lead to an insurrection, and then perhaps a revolution. Yet in much of the anarchist milieu today, building free spaces and/or creating disorder are regarded as the movement itself rather than components of one. Neither the infoshops nor insurrection models build movements that can express the organized power of the working class. Thus, the necessary, difficult, slow, and inspiring process of building movements falls through the cracks between sabotage and the autonomous zone. Ironically, this leads many anarchists to take an elitist approach to political work. Divorced from a social movement, the strategy of building autonomous zones or engaging in direct action with small affinity groups assumes that radicals can start the revolution. But revolutionaries don’t make revolutions. Millions of ordinary and oppressed people do. Anarchist theory and practice today provides little sense of how these people are going to be part of the process, other than to create their own “free spaces” or to spontaneously join the festivals of upheaval. This is an idealistic, ahistorical, and, ironically, an elitist approach to politics, one that is curiously separated from the struggles of the oppressed themselves. C.L.R. James argues that the task of the revolutionary is to recognize, record, and engage: recognize in the struggles of the working class the effort to build a new society within the shell of the old; record those struggles and show the working class this record so they can see for themselves what they are doing and how it fits into a bigger picture; engage in these struggles with the working class, participating rather than dominating, earning leadership rather than assuming it, and applying lessons learned from previous struggles (James et al. 1974).4 This is a much more modest role for revolutionaries than germinating the revolution or sparking it, and one that is clearly consistent with anarchist politics. Yet the infoshops and insurrectionary models reject this approach for a top-down one in which anarchists “show the way” for the people to follow, never realizing that throughout history, revolutionaries (including anarchist ones) have always been trying to follow and catch up to the masses, not the other way around.

### Read: 1NC -- Horizontalism Bad

#### Their understanding of debate as spilling in demonstrates their fidelity to the present day carving out of spaces for freedom by radicals -- this produces horizontalist modes of knowledge that lack a platform of organizing

Marcus 12. associate book editor at Dissent Magazine (Fall, David, “The Horizontalists”, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/the-horizontalists)

There is a much-recycled and certainly apocryphal tale told of **an ethnographer** traveling in India. Journeying up and down the Ganges Delta, he **encounters a fisherman who claims to know the source of all truth. “The world,” the fisherman explains, “rests upon the back of an elephant.” “But what does the elephant stand on?” the ethnographer asks. “A turtle.” “And the turtle?” “Another turtle.” “And it?”** “Ah, friend,” **smiles the fisherman, “it is turtles all the way down.”** As with most well-circulated apocrypha, it is a parable that lacks a clear provenance, but has a clear moral: **that** despite our ever-dialectical minds, we will never get to the bottom of things; **that, in fact**, ***there is nothing*** **at the bottom of things.** What we define as society is nothing more than a set of locally constructed practices and norms, and what we define as history is nothing more than the passage of one set to the next. Although we might “find the picture of our universe as an infinite tower of tortoises rather ridiculous,” as one reteller admitted, it only raises the question, “Why do we think we know better?” **Since the early 1970s we have wondered—with increasing anxiety—why and if we know better. Social scientists, literary critics, philosophers, and jurists have all begun to turn from their particular disciplines to the more general question of interpretation. There has been an increasing uneasiness with universal categories of thought**; a whispered suspicion and then a commonly held belief that the sum—societies, histories, identities—never amounts to more than its parts. **New analytical frameworks have begun to emerge, sensitive to both the pluralities and localities of life.** “What we need,” as Clifford Geertz argued, “are not enormous ideas” but “ways of thinking that are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and singularities.” This growing anxiety over the precision of our interpretive powers has translated into a variety of political as well as epistemological concerns. Many have become uneasy with universal concepts of justice and equality. Simultaneous to—and in part because of—the ascendance of human rights, freedom has increasingly become understood as an individual entitlement instead of a collective possibility. The once prevalent conviction that a handful of centripetal values could bind society together has transformed into a deeply skeptical attitude toward general statements of value. If it is, indeed, turtles all the way down, then decisions can take place only on a local scale and on a horizontal plane. There is no overarching platform from which to legislate; only a “local knowledge.” **As** Michael **Walzer argued** in a 1985 lecture on social criticism, “**We have to start from where we are,” we can only ask, “what is the right thing** ***for us*** **to do?”** This shift in scale has had a significant impact on the Left over the past twenty to thirty years. Socialism, **once the “name of our desire**,” has all but disappeared; new desires have emerged in its place: situationism, autonomism, localism, **communitarianism, environmentalism**, anti-globalism. Often spatial in metaphor, they have been more concerned with where and how politics happen rather than at what pace and to what end. Often local in theory and in practice, they have come to represent a shift in scale: from the large to the small, from the vertical to the horizontal, and from—what Geertz has called—the “thin” to the “thick.” Class, race, and gender—those classic left themes—are, to be sure, still potent categories. But they have often been imagined as spectrums rather than binaries, varying shades rather than static lines of solidarity. Instead of society, there is now talk of communities and actor networks; instead of radical schemes to rework economic and political institutions, there is an emphasis on localized campaigns and everyday practices. The critique of capitalism—once heavily informed by intricate historical and social theories—has narrowed. The “ruthless criticism of all,” as Karl Marx once put it, has turned away from exploitative world systems to the pathologies of an over-regulated life. As post-Marxists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe declared in 1985, Left-wing thought today stands at a crossroads. The “evident truths” of the past—the classical forms of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very meaning of the Left’s struggles and objectives—have been seriously challenged….From Budapest to Prague and the Polish coup d’état, from Kabul to the sequels of Communist victory in Vietnam and Cambodia, a question-mark has fallen more and more heavily over the whole way of conceiving both socialism and the roads that should lead to it. In many ways, the Left has just been keeping up with the times. Over the last quarter-century, there has been a general fracturing of our social and economic relations, a “multiplication of,” what one sociologist has called, “partial societies—grouped by age, sex, ethnicity, and proximity.” This has not necessarily been a bad thing. Even as the old Left—the vertical Left—frequently bemoaned the growing differentiation and individuation, these new categories did, in fact, open the door for marginalized voices and communities. They created a space for more diversity, tolerance, and inclusion. They signaled a turn toward the language of recognition: a politics more sensitive to difference. But this turn was also not without its disadvantages. Gone was the Left’s hope for an emerging class consciousness, a movement of the “people” seeking greater realms of freedom. Instead of challenging the top-down structures of late capitalism, radicals now aspired to create—what post-Marxists were frequently calling—“spaces of freedom.” If one of the explicit targets of the global justice movement of the late 1990s was the exploitative trade policies of the World Trade Organization, then its underlying critique was the alienating patterns of its bureaucracy: the erosion of spaces for self-determination and expression. The crisis of globalization was that it stripped individuals of their rights to participate, to act as free agents in a society that was increasingly becoming shaped by a set of global institutions. What most troubled leftists over the past three or four decades was not the increasingly unequal distribution of goods and services in capitalist societies but the increasingly unequal distribution of power. As one frequently sighted placard from the 1999 Seattle protests read, “No globalization without participation!” Occupy Wall Street has come to represent the latest turn in this movement toward local and more horizontal spaces of freedom. Occupation was, itself, a matter of recovering local space: a way to repoliticize the square. And in a moment characterized by foreclosure, it was also symbolically, and sometimes literally, an attempt to reclaim lost homes and abandoned properties. But there was also a deeper notion of space at work. Occupy Wall Street sought out not only new political spaces but also new ways to relate to them. By resisting the top-down management of representative democracy as well as the bottom-up ideals of labor movements, Occupiers hoped to create a new politics in which decisions moved neither up nor down but horizontally. While embracing the new reach of globalization—linking arms and webcams with their encamped comrades in Madrid, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Santiago—they were also rejecting its patterns of consolidation, its limits on personal freedom, its vertical and bureaucratic structures of decision-making. Time was also to be transformed. The general assemblies and general strikes were efforts to reconstruct, and make more autonomous, our experience of time as well as space. Seeking to escape from the Taylorist demands of productivity, the assemblies insisted that decision-making was an endless process. Who we are, what we do, what we want to be are categories of flexibility, and consensus is as much about repairing this sense of open-endedness as it is about agreeing on a particular set of demands. Life is a mystery, as one pop star fashionista has insisted, and Occupiers wanted to keep it that way. Likewise, general strikes were imagined as ways in which workers could take back time—regain those parts of life that had become routinized by work. Rather than attempts to achieve large-scale reforms, general strikes were improvisations, escapes from the daily calculations of production that demonstrated that we can still be happy, creative, even productive individuals without jobs. As one unfurled banner along New York’s Broadway read during this spring’s May Day protests, “Why work? Be happy.” In many ways, the Occupy movement was a rebellion against the institutionalized nature of twenty-first century capitalism and democracy. Equally skeptical of corporate monopolies as it was of the technocratic tendencies of the state, it was ultimately an insurgency against control, against the ways in which organized power and capital deprived the individual of the time and space needed to control his or her life. Just as the vertically inclined leftists of the twentieth century leveraged the public corporation—the welfare state—against the increasingly powerful number of private ones, so too were Occupy and, more generally, the horizontalist Left to embrace the age of the market: at the center of their politics was the anthropological “man” in both his forms—*homo faber* and *homo ludens*—who was capable of negotiating his interests outside the state. For this reason, the movement did not fit neatly into right or left, conservative or liberal, revolutionary or reformist categories. On the one hand, it **was sympathetic to the most classic of left aspirations: to dismantle governing** hierarchies. On the other, its language was imbued with a strident individualism: a politics of anti-institutionalism and personal freedom that has most often been affiliated with the Right. Seeking an alternative to the bureaucratic tendencies of capitalism and socialism, Occupiers were to frequently invoke the image of autonomy: of a world in which social and economic relations exist outside the institutions of the state. Their aspiration was a society based on organic, decentralized circuits of exchange and deliberation—on voluntary associations, on local debate, on loose networks of affinity groups. If political and economic life had become abstracted in the age of globalization and financialization, then Occupy activists wanted to re-politicize our everyday choices. As David Graeber, one of Occupy’s chief theoretical architects, explained two days after Zuccotti Park was occupied, “The idea is essentially that “the system is not going to save us,” so “we’re going to have to save ourselves.” Borrowing from the anarchist tradition, Graeber has called this work “direct action”: the practice of circumventing, even on occasion subverting, hierarchies through practical projects. Instead of attempting “to pressure the government to institute reforms” or “seize state power,” direct actions seek to “build a new society in the shell of the old.” By creating spaces in which individuals take control over their lives, it is a strategy of acting and thinking “as if one is already free.” Marina Sitrin, another prominent Occupier, has offered another name for this politics—“horizontalism”: “the use of direct democracy, the striving for consensus” and “processes in which everyone is heard and new relationships are created.” It is a politics that not only refuses institutionalization but also imagines a new subjectivity from which one can project the future into the present. Direct action and horizontal democracy are new names, of course, for old ideas. They descend—most directly—from the ideas and tactics of the global justice movement of the 1990s and 2000s. Direct Action Network was founded in 1999 to help coordinate the anti-WTO protests in Seattle; horizontalidad, as it was called in Argentina, emerged as a way for often unemployed workers to organize during the financial crisis of 2001. Both emerged out of the theories and practices of a movement that was learning as it went along. The ad hoc working groups, the all-night bull sessions, the daylong actions, the decentralized planning were all as much by necessity as they were by design. They were not necessarily intended at first. But what emerged out of anti-globalization was a new vision of globalization. Local and horizontal in practice, direct action and democracy were to become catchphrases for a movement that was attempting to resist the often autocratic tendencies of a fast-globalizing capitalism. But direct action and horizontal democracy also tap into a longer, if often neglected, tradition on the left: the anarchism, syndicalism, and autonomist Marxism that stretch from Peter Kropotkin, Emma Goldman, and Rosa Luxemburg to C.L.R. James, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Antonio Negri. If revolutionary socialism was a theory about ideal possibilities, then anarchism and autonomism often focused on the revolutionary practices themselves. The way in which the revolution was organized was the primary act of revolution. Autonomy, as the Greco-French Castoriadis told *Le Monde* in 1977, demands not only “the elimination of dominant groups and of the institutions embodying and orchestrating that domination” but also new modes of what he calls “self-management and organization.” With direct action and horizontal democracy, the Occupy movement not only developed a set of new tactics but also a governing ideology, a theory of time and space that runs counter to many of the practices of earlier leftist movements. Unlike revolutionary socialism or evolutionary social democracy—Marx’s Esau and Jacob—Occupiers conceived of time as more cyclical than developmental, its understanding of space more local and horizontal than structural and vertical. The revolution was to come but only through everyday acts. It was to occur only through—what Castoriadis obliquely referred to as—“the self-institution of society.” The seemingly spontaneous movement that emerged after the first general assemblies in Zuccotti Park was not, then, sui generis but an elaboration of a much larger turn by the Left. As occupations spread across the country and as activists begin to exchange organizational tactics, it was easy to forget that what was happening was, in fact, a part of a much larger shift in the scale and plane of Western politics: a turn toward more local and horizontal patterns of life, a growing skepticism toward the institutions of the state, and an increasing desire to seek out greater realms of personal freedom. And although its hibernation over the summer has, perhaps, marked the end of the Occupy movement, OWS has also come to represent an important—and perhaps more lasting—break. In both its ideas and tactics, it has given us a new set of desires—autonomy, radical democracy, direct action—that look well beyond the ideological and tactical tropes of socialism. **Its occupations and general assemblies, its flash mobs and street performances, its loose network of activists all suggest a bold new set of possibilities for the Left: a horizontalist ethos that believes that revolution will begin by transforming our everyday lives**. It can be argued that **horizontalism is, in many ways, a product of the growing disaggregation and individuation of Western society; that** **it is a kind of** free-market leftism: a politics jury-rigged out of the very culture it hopes to resist. For not only does it emphasize the agency of the individual, but it draws one of its central inspirations from a neoclassical image: that of the self-managing society—the polity that functions best when the state is absent from everyday decisions. But **one can also find in its anti-institutionalism an attempt to speak in today’s language for yesterday’s goals. If we must live in a society that neither trusts nor feels compelled by collectivist visions, then horizontalism offers us a leftism that attempts to be, at once, both individualist and egalitarian, anti-institutional and democratic, open to the possibilities of self-management and yet also concerned with the casualties born out of an age that has let capital manage itself for far too long**. Horizontalism has absorbed the crisis of knowledge—what we often call “postmodernism”—and the crisis of collectivism—what we often call “neoliberalism.” But instead of seeking to return to some golden age before our current moment of fracture, it seeks—for better and worse—to find a way to make leftist politics conform to our current age of anti-foundationalism and institutionalism. As Graeber argued in the prescriptive last pages of his anthropological epic, Debt: The First 5,000 Years, “Capitalism has transformed the world in many ways that are clearly irreversible” and we therefore need to give up “the false choice between state and market that [has] so monopolized political ideology for the last centuries that it made it difficult to argue about anything else.” We need, in other words, to stop thinking like leftists. But herein lies the problem. Not all possible forms of human existence and social interaction, no matter how removed they are from the institutions of power and capital, are good forms of social organization. Although it is easy to look enthusiastically to those societies—ancient or modern, Western or non-Western—that exist beyond the structures of the state, they, too, have their own patterns of hierarchy, their own embittered lines of inequality and injustice. More important, to select one form of social organization over the other is always an act of exclusion. Instituting and then protecting a particular way of life will always require a normative commitment in which not every value system is respected—in which, in other words, there is a moral hierarchy. More problematically, **by working outside structures of power** one may circumvent coercive systems but one does not necessarily subvert them. **Localizing politics—**stripping it of its larger institutional ambitions—has, to be sure, its advantages. But without a larger structural vision, it **does not go far enough**. “Bubbles of freedom,” as Graeber calls them, **may create a larger variety of non-institutional life. But they will always neglect other crucial avenues of freedom: in particular, those social and economic rights that can only be protected from the top down**. In this way, the anti-institutionalism of horizontalism comes dangerously close to that of the libertarian Right. **The turn to previous eras of social organization, the desire to locate and confine politics to a particular regional** space, the deep skepticism toward all forms of institutional life not only mirror the aspirations of libertarianism but **help** cloak those hierarchies **spawned from non-institutional forms of power and capital**. This is a particularly pointed irony for a political ideology that claims to be opposed to the many injustices of a non-institutional market—in particular, its unregulated financial schemes. Perhaps this is an irony deeply woven into the theoretical quilt of autonomy: a vision that, as a result of its anti-institutionalism, is drawn to all sites of individual liberation—even those that are to be found in the marketplace. As Graeber concludes in *Debt*, “Markets, when allowed to drift entirely free from their violent origins, invariably begin to grow into something different, into networks of honor, trust, and mutual connectedness,” whereas “the maintenance of systems of coercion constantly do the opposite: turn the products of human cooperation, creativity, devotion, love and trust back into numbers once again.” In many ways, this is the result of a set of political ideas that have lost touch with their origins. The desire for autonomy was born out of the socialist—if not also often the Marxist—tradition and there was always a guarded sympathy for the structures needed to oppose organized systems of capital and power. Large-scale institutions were, for thinkers such as Castoriadis, Negri, and C.L.R. James, still essential if every cook was truly to govern. To only “try to create ‘spaces of freedom’ ‘alongside’ of the State” meant, as Castoriadis was to argue later in his life, to back “down from the problem of politics.” In fact, this was, he believed, the failure of 1968: “the inability to set up new, different institutions” and recognize that **“there is no such thing as a society without institutions.” This is—and will be—a problem for the horizontalist Left as it moves forward**. As a leftism ready-made for an age in which all sides of the political spectrum are arrayed against the regulatory state**, it is always in danger of** becoming absorbed into the very ideological apparatus it seeks to dismantle. For it aspires to a decentralized and organic politics that, in both principle and practice, shares a lot in common with its central target. Both it and the “free market” are anti-institutional. And the latter will remain so without larger vertical measures. Structures, not only everyday practices, need to be reformed. The revolution cannot happen only on the ground; it must also happen from above. A direct democracy still needs its indirect structures, individual freedoms still need to be measured by their collective consequences, and notions of social and economic equality still need to stand next to the desire for greater political participation. Deregulation is another regulatory regime, and to replace it requires new regulations: institutions that will limit the excesses of the market. As Castoriadis insisted in the years after 1968, the Left’s task is not only to abolish old institutions but to discover “new kinds of relationship between society and its institutions.” Horizontalism has come to serve as an important break from the static strategies and categories of analysis that have slowed an aging and vertically inclined Left. OWS was to represent its fullest expression yet, though it has a much longer back story and still—one hopes—a promising future. But horizontalists such as Graeber and Sitrin will struggle to establish spaces of freedom if they cannot formulate a larger vision for a society. Their vision is not—as several on the vertical left have suggested—too utopian but not utopian enough: in seeking out local spaces of freedom, they have confined their ambitions; they have, in fact, come, at times, to mirror the very ideology they hope to resist. In his famous retelling of the turtle parable, Clifford Geertz warned that in “**the search of all-too-deep-lying turtles,” we have to be careful to not “lose touch with the hard surfaces of life—with the political, economic, stratificatory realities** within which men are everywhere contained.” This is an ever-present temptation, and one that, in our age of ever more stratification, we must resist.

### 1NC -- Identity Politics Bad

#### Reform through the lens of identity politics tokenizes and commodifies minorities’ suffering and kowtows to those who benefit from their oppression – idpol serves to maintain and reify the state and capitalism.

Anonymous, 2012, “Identity, politics, and anti-politics: a critical perspective” 2012. <http://libcom.org/library/identity-politics-anti-politics-critical-perspective>

2: Identity Politics and Anti-Identity Politics. Given the political effectiveness of these organi­zations, their model has been emulated by oth­ers seeking to reform the current socio-economic order. This has led to **identity politics becoming a central part of the contemporary United States political order. This is especially true in the liberal reformist movement**, where organizations such as the NAACP, HRC, and NOW are prominent. **With their successes in political reform, they (and many other identity-politics organizations) have become embedded in the dominant political** **discourse**. It is here that we encounter one of the main problems of identity politics**: the groups which sought to challenge identity-based oppression have instead merely entered into a partnership with those who benefit from oppression. This partnership concerns the ability to define the political agenda for a certain identity.** This is clearly demonstrated in the queer community by the HRC, with their push for hate crime laws, marriage, and military service. These demands show that the HRC has accepted the logic of and requested partnership in the government and the marketplace. Essentially, the HRC is fight­ing for assimilation into, rather than the destruc­tion of, a system that creates and enforces the very oppression they are allegedly struggling against. However, even identity politics does not have unfet­tered power in the political mainstream. Even the appearance of altering power relations in this soci­ety is, to some, a threat. These reactionaries claim that identity politics seeks special rights for certain groups. This flawed logic rests on the idea that, since people are guaranteed equality under the Constitu­tion, then the problem of legal inequality is non-existent. Even if one accepts the logic of the state, the discrepancy between legal/political equality and social equality is telling. **Another reaction to the Left’s adoption of identity politics is the rise of hard-Right identity politics. This leads to absurdities such as men’s rights move­ments, white rights movements, and groups dedi­cated to preserving Christian culture and identity.** One can see a connection between these two reac­tionary positions, despite their apparent contradic­tions. **Each position represents a different tactic towards the same goal: maintaining a class-based society along with the homophobic, white-suprem­acist, and patriarchal structures that uphold it**. This stands in contrast to identity politics, which seeks to mildly reform class society and its institutions. In short, there today exists a tension between pro­gressive identity politics and reactionary anti-iden­tity politics. **The failure of both rests in their reliance on the state and capitalism as basis for their vision of society. Both seek to better manage the present order. It is clear: there exists a subset of people in this society that benefit from the current social or­der**. These people include queer people, people of color, women, and every identity. Politicians, police, prison guards, landlords, and bosses: these are our enemies. They come in all forms. It is equally clear that queer-bashers, rapists, and racists are similarly enemies of liberation. While in some cases these are not people with access to and the backing of institutional power, the violence they inflict is no less real or important. Indeed, their tactics are taken directly from the state, and uphold systems of control even after the formal powers of­ficially abandon them. **Identity is meaningful in that it marginalizes us in different ways, and the affinity that comes from similar or shared experiences is powerful**. However, it must always be remembered that such **affinity is rendered useless when it is integrated in a system of domination and control.**

### Read: 1NC -- Ballot bad

#### Resistance via the ballot can only instill an adaptive politics of being and effaces the institutional constraints that reproduce the violent underside of liberalism

Brown 95—prof at UC Berkeley (Wendy, States of Injury, 21-3)

For some, fueled by **opprobrium toward** **regulatory norms** or other mo- dalities of domination, the language of "resistance" has taken up the ground vacated by a more expansive practice of freedom. For others, it is the discourse of “empowerment” that carries the ghost of freedom's valence ¶ 22¶. Yet as many have noted, insofar as resistance is an effect of the regime it opposes on the one hand, and insofar as its **practitioners often seek to void it of normativity to differentiate it** from the (regulatory) nature of what it opposes on the other, it is **at best** politically rebellious; **at worst**, politically amorphous. Resistance stands **against**, **not for**; it is re-action to domination, rarely willing to admit to a desire for it, and it is **neutral** with regard to possible political direction. Resistance is in no way constrained to a radical or emancipatory aim. a fact that emerges clearly as soon as one analogizes Foucault's notion of resistance to its companion terms in Freud or Nietzsche. Yet in some ways this point is less a critique of Foucault, who especially in his later years made clear that his political commitments were not identical with his theoretical ones (and un- apologetically revised the latter), than a sign of his misappropriation. For Foucault, resistance **marks the presence of power** and expands our under- standing of its mechanics, but it is in this regard an analytical strategy rather than an expressly political one. "Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet. or rather consequently, **this resistance is never in a position of exteriority to power**. . . . (T]he strictly relational character of power relationships . . . depends upon a multiplicity of points of resis- tance: these play the role of adversary, target, support, or handle in power relations.\*39 This appreciation of the extent to which resistance is by no means inherently subversive of power also reminds us that it is only by recourse to a very non-Foucaultian moral evaluation of power as bad or that which is to be overcome that it is possible to equate resistance with that which is good, progressive, or seeking an end to domination. ¶ If popular and academic notions of resistance attach, however weakly at times, to a tradition of protest, the other contemporary substitute for a discourse of freedom—“empowerment”—would seem to correspond more closely to a tradition of **idealist reconciliation**. The language of resistance implicitly acknowledges the extent to which protest always transpires inside the regime; “empowerment,” in contrast, registers the possibility of generating one’s capacities, one’s “self-esteem,” one’s life course, without capitulating to constraints by particular regimes of power. But in so doing, contemporary discourses of empowerment **too often signal** **an oddly adaptive** **and harmonious relationship with domination** insofar as they locate an individual’s sense of worth and capacity in the register of individual feelings, a register implicitly **located on some- thing of an other worldly plane** **vis-a-vis** social and **political power**. In this regard, despite its apparent locution of resistance to subjection, contem- porary discourses of empowerment partake strongly of liberal solipsism—the radical decontextualization of the subject characteristic of¶ 23¶ liberal discourse that is **key to the fictional sovereign individualism of liberalism**. Moreover, in its almost exclusive focus on subjects’ emotional bearing and self-regard, empowerment is a formulation that **converges with a regime’s own legitimacy needs** in masking the power of the regime.¶ This is not to suggest that talk of empowerment is always only illusion or delusion. It is to argue, rather, that while the notion of empowerment articulates that feature of freedom concerned with action, with being more than the consumer subject figured in discourses of rights and eco- nomic democracy, contemporary deployments of that notion also **draw so heavily on an undeconstructed subjectivity** that they risk establishing a wide chasm between the (experience of) empowerment and an actual **capacity to shape the terms of political, social, or economic life**. Indeed, the possibility that one can “feel empowered” without being so **forms an important element of** **legitimacy** for the antidemocratic dimensions of liberalism.

### 1NC -- Personal PTX Bad

#### Starting politics from a position of personal survival is a politics of resentment—it can only position itself reactively against the universal, inevitably re-instantiating the terms of oppression

\*We do not condone any of our authors’ uses of gendered, ableist, or otherwise offensive language. We apologize in place of our authors\*

Bhambra ’10 (Gurminder K Bhambra, University of Warwick, and Victoria Margree, University of Brighton, “Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow,” academia.edu

We wish to turn now to a related problem within identity politics that can be best described as the problem of the reification of politicised identities. Brown (1995) positions herself within the debate about identity politics by seeking to elaborate on “the wounded character of politicised identity’s desire” (ibid: 55); that is, the problem of “wounded attachments” whereby a claim to identity becomes over-invested in its own historical suffering and perpetuates its injury through its refusal to give up its identity claim. Brown’s argument is that where politicised identity is founded upon an experience of exclusion, for example, **exclusion** itself **becomes perversely valorised** in the continuance of that identity. In such cases, group activity operates to **maintain and reproduce** the identity created by injury (exclusion) **rather than** – and indeed, often in opposition to – **resolving the injurious** **social relations** **that generated claims around that identity in the first place**. If things have to have a history in order to have a future, then the problem becomes that of how history is constructed in order to make the future. To the extent that, for Brown, identity is associated primarily with (historical) injury, the future for that identity is then **already determined by the injury “as both bound to the history that produced it and as a reproach to the present which embodies that history**” (ibid 1995: 73). Brown’s suggestion that as it is not possible to undo the past, the focus backwards entraps the identity in reactionary practices, is, we believe, too stark and we will pursue this later in the article. Politicised identity, Brown maintains, “emerges and obtains its unifying coherence through the politicisation of exclusion from an ostensible universal, as a protest against exclusion” (ibid: 65). Its continuing existence **requires** both **a belief in** the **legitimacy of the universal ideal** (for example, ideals of opportunity, and reward in proportion to effort) and enduring exclusion from those ideals. Brown draws upon Nietzsche in arguing that such identities, produced in **reaction** to conditions of disempowerment and inequality, then **become invested in their own impotence through practices of**, for example, **reproach, complaint, and revenge**. These are “reactions” in the Nietzschean sense since they are s ubstitutes for actions or can be seen as negative forms of action. Rather than acting to remove the cause(s) of suffering, that suffering is instead ameliorated (to some extent) through “the **establishment of suffering** as the measure of social virtue” (ibid 1995: 70), and is compensated for by the **vengeful pleasures of recrimination**. Such practices, she argues, stand in sharp distinction to – in fact, provide obstacles to – **practices that would seek to dispel the conditions of exclusion.** Brown casts the dilemma discussed above in terms of a choice between past and future, and adapting Nietzsche, exhorts the adoption of a (collective) will that would become **the “redeemer of history”** (ibid: 72) through its focus on the possibilities of creating different futures. As Brown reads Nietzsche, the one thing that the will cannot exert its power over is the past, the “it was”. Confronted with its impotence with respect to the events of the past, the will is threatened with becoming simply **an “angry spectator”** mired in bitter recognition of its own helplessness. The one hope for the will is that it may, instead, achieve a kind of mastery over that past such that, although “what has happened” cannot be altered, the past can be denied **the power** of continuing to determine the present and future. It is only this **focus on the future**, Brown continues, and the capacity to make a future in the face of human frailties and injustices that **spares us** **from** a rancorous **decline into despair**. Identity politics structured by ressentiment – that is, by suffering caused by past events – can **only** break out of the cycle of “slave morality” by remaking the present **against the terms of the past**, a remaking that requires a “forgetting” of that past. An act of liberation, of self-affi rmation, this “forgetting of the past” requires an “overcoming” of the past that offers identity in relationship to suffering, in favour of a future in which identity is to be defi ned differently. In arguing thus, Brown’s work becomes aligned with a position that sees the way forward for emancipatory politics as residing in a movement away from a “politics of memory” (Kilby 2002: 203) that is committed to articulating past injustices and suffering. While we agree that investment in identities premised upon suffering can function as an obstacle to alleviating the causes of that suffering, we believe that Brown’s argument as outlined is problematic. First, following Kilby (2002), we share a concern about any turn to the future that is fi gured as a complete abandonment of the past. This is because for those who have suffered oppression and exclusion, the injunction to give up articulating a pain that is still felt may seem cruel and impossible to meet. We would argue instead that the “turn to the future” that theorists such as Brown and Grosz call for, to revitalise feminism and other emancipatory politics, need not be conceived of as a brute rejection of the past. Indeed, Brown herself recognises the problems involved here, stating that [since] erased histories and historical invisibility are themselves such integral elements of the pain inscribed in most subjugated identities [then] the counsel of forgetting, at least in its unreconstructed Nietzschean form, seems inappropriate if not cruel (1995: 74). She implies, in fact, that the demand exerted by those in pain may be no more than the demand to exorcise that pain through recognition: “all that such pain may long for – more than revenge – is the chance to be heard into a certain release, recognised into self-overcoming, incited into possibilities for triumphing over, and hence, losing itself” (1995: 74-75). Brown wishes to establish the political importance of remembering “painful” historical events but **with a crucial caveat**: that the purpose of remembering pain is to enable its release. The challenge then, according to her, is to create a political culture in which this project does not mutate into one of **remembering pain for its own sake**. Indeed, if Brown feels that this may be “a pass where we ought to part with Nietzsche” (1995: 74), then Freud may be a more suitable companion. Since his early work with Breuer, Freud’s writings have suggested the (only apparent) paradox that remembering is often a condition of forgetting. The hysterical patient, who is doomed to repeat in symptoms and compulsive actions a past she cannot adequately recall, is helped to remember that traumatic past in order then to move beyond it: she must remember in order to forget and to forget in order to be able to live in the present.7 This model seems to us to be particularly helpful for the dilemma articulated by both Brown (1995) and Kilby (2002), i nsisting as it does that “forgetting” (at least, loosening the hold of the past, in order to enable the future) cannot be achieved without first remembering the traumatic past. Indeed, this would seem to be similar to the message of Beloved, whose central motif of haunting (is the adult woman, “Beloved”, Sethe’s murdered child returned in spectral form?) dramatises the tendency of the unanalysed traumatic past to keep on returning, constraining, as it does so, the present to be like the past, and thereby, disallowing the possibility of a future different from that past. As Sarah Ahmed argues in her response to Brown, “in order to break the seal of the past, in order to move away from attachments that are hurtful, we must first bring them into the realm of political action” (2004: 33). We would add that the task of analysing the traumatic past, and thus opening up the possibility of political action, is unlikely to be achievable by individuals on their own, but that this, instead, **requires** **a “community” of participants** dedicated to the serious epistemic work of remembering and interpreting the objective social conditions that made up that past and continue in the present. The “pain” of historical injury is not simply an individual psychological issue, but stems from **objective social conditions which perpetuate**, for the most part, forms of **injustice and inequality into the present**.

### 1NC -- Ontology Wrong

#### Anti-blackness is structured politically, not ontologically, their understanding results in bad faith which serves only to sustain anti-black power structures

Lewis Gordon 17, professor of philosophy at UCONN-Storr, professor of philosophy at the University of the West Indies at Mona, “The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race”

\*French non-sense was translated by google

Should the analysis remain at white and black, the world would appear more closed than it in fact is. For one, simply being born black would bar the possibility of any legitimate appearance. This is a position that has been taken by a growing group of theorists known as “Afro-pessimists” (Wilderson 2010; Sexton 2011). Black for them is absolute “social death:’ li is outside of relations. Missing from this view is; however, is at least what I argued in Bad Faith and Antiblack Racism, which is that no human being is “really” any of these things; the claim itself is a manifestation of mauvaise foi [bad faith]. The project of making people into such is one thing. People actually becoming such is another. This is an observation Fanon also makes in his formulation of the tone of nonbeing and his critique of Self—Other discourses in Peau noir, masques blancs (Black Skin, White Masks). Fanon distinguishes between the zone of nonbeing (nonappearance as human beings) and those of being. ‘The latter presumes a self-justified reality, which means it does not call itself into question. The former faces the problem of illegitimate appearance (Fanon 1952, chapters; Gordon 1999; AIcoir 2006; Yancy 2008). Thus, even the effort “to be” is in conflict as the system in question presumes legitimate absence of certain groups. Yet, paradoxically, the human being comes to the fore through emerging from being in the first place. Thus, the assertion of being is also an effort to push the human being out of existence, so to speak. The racial conflict is thus changed to an existential one in which an existential ontology is posed against an ontology of being. Existential ontology pertains to human being, whereas ontological being pertains to gods. This is why Fanon concludes that racism is also an attack against human being, as it creates a world in which one set stands above others as gods and the rest as below human. Where, in this formulation, stand human beings? The argument itself gains some clarity with the etymology of “existence” which is from the Latin expression exsístere (to stand out, to emerge -that is, to appear). Black [people] thus face the paradox of existing (standing out) as nonexistence (not standing out). The system of racism renders black appearance illicit. This conundrum of racialized existence affects ethics and morals. Ethical relations are premised on selves relating to another or others. The others must, however, appear as such, and they too, manifest themselves as selves. Implicit in such others as other selves is the formalization of ethical relations as equal. as found in the thought of Immanuel Kant and shifted in deference to the other in that of Emmanuel Levinas, Racism, however, excludes certain groups from being others and selves (if interpreted as being of a kind similar to the presumed legitimate selves). Thus, the schema of racism is one in which the hegemonic group relates to its members as selves and others, whereas the nonhegemonic groups are neither selves nor others. They, in effect, could only be such in relation to each other. It is, in other words, a form of ontological segregation as a condition of ethics and morals. The fight against racism, then, does not work as a fight against being others or The Other. It is a fight against being nonothers. Fanon’s insight demands an additional clarification. Racists should be distinguished from racism. Racists are people who hold beliefs about the superiority and inferiority of certain groups of racially designated people. Racism is the system of institutions and social norms that empower individuals with such beliefs. Without that system, a racist would simply be an obnoxious, whether overtly deprecating or patronizing, individual. With that system, racist points of view affect the social world as reality. Without that system, racists ultimately become inconsequential and, in a word, irrelevant beyond personal concerns of saving their souls from unethical and immoral beliefs and choices. Fanon was concerned with racists in his capacity as a psychiatrist (therapy, if necessary), but he was also concerned with racism as a philosopher, social thinker, and revolutionary (Fanon 1959/1975). The latter, in other words, is a system, from an antiracism perspective, in need of eradication. An objection to the Afro-pessimistic assertion of blackness as social death could thus be raised from a Fanonian phenomenological perspective: Why must the social world be premised on the attitudes and perspectives of antiblack racists? Why don’t blacks among each other and other communities of color count as a social perspective? And if the question of racism is a function of power, why not offer a study of power, how it is gained and lost, instead of an assertion of its manifestations as ontological? An additional problem with the Afro-pessimistic model is that its proponents treat “blackness” as though it could exist independent of other categories. A quick examination of double consciousness (Du Bois 1903)—a phenomenological concept if there ever were one by virtue of the focus on forms of consciousness and, better, that of which one is conscious, that is, intentionality would reveal why this would not work. Double consciousness involves seeing oneself from the perspective of another that deems one as negative (for example, the Afro-pessimistic conception of blackness). That there is already another perspective makes the subject who lives through double consciousness relational. Added is what Paget Henry (2005) calls polemic, ted double consciousness and Nahum Chandler (2014, 6o—6i) calls the redoubled gesture, which is the realization that the condemnation of negative meaning means that one must not do what the Afro pessimist does. Seeing that that position is false moves one dialectically forward into asking about the system that attempts to force one into such an identity: This relational matter requires looking beyond blackness ironically in order to understand blackness. This means moving from the conception of meaning as singular, substance-based, fixed, and semantical into the grammar of how meaning is produced. Such grammars, such as that of gender, emerge in interesting ways (Gordon 1999, 124—129; 1997,73—74). However, as all human beings are manifestations of different dimensions of meaning, the question of identity requires more than an intersecting model; otherwise there will simply be one (a priori) normative outcome in every moment of inquiry: whoever manifests the maximum manifestation of predetermined negative intersecting terms. That would in effect be an essence before an existence indeed, before an actual event of harm. This observation emerges as well with the Afro-pessimist model when one thinks of pessimism as the guiding attitude. The existential phenomenological critique would be that optimism and pessimism are symptomatic of the same attitude: a priori assertions on reality. Human existence is contingent but not accidental, which means that the social world at hand is a manifestation of choices and relationships in other words, human actions. Because human beings can only build the future instead of it determining us, the task at hand, as phenomenology—oriented existentialists from Beauvoir and Sartre to Fanon, William R. Jones, and this author have argued, depends on commitment. This concern also pertains to the initial concerns about authenticity discourses with which I began. One could only be pessimistic about an outcome, an activity. It is an act of forecasting what could only be meaningful once actually performed. Similarly, one could only be optimistic about the same. What however, if there were no way to know either? Here we come to the foi [faith] element in mauvaise foi [bad faith]. Some actions are deontological, and if not that, they are at least reflections of our commitments, our projects. Thus, the point of some actions is not about their success or failure but whether we deem them worth doing. Taking responsibility for such actions—bringing value to them— is opposed to another manifestation of mauvaise foi [bad faith]: the spirit of seriousness. The spirit of seriousness involves attributing a form of materiality to human values that elides the human role in the construction of those values. Detailed analyses of this form of mauvaise foi [bad faith] in Africana phenomenology emerges in the thought of George Yancy (2008) and this author (Gordon 1995, 1997, 1999, 2000). The importance of this concept pertains to the understanding of racism as a social phenomenon but also as a value. It addresses what Abdul JanMohamed (2011) calls our social investments in such phenomena. Returning to the distinction between racists and racism, the former are what existentialists such as Sartre and Beauvoir call “serious” people and the latter is the system that supports such values as supposedly objective features of reality. In other words, the formers’ values are preserved in the latter as ontological. The turn to social reality raises an important theme of Africana phenomenology, and, indeed, all phenomenological treatments of oppression: Discussions of race and gender make no sense without a philosophical anthropology. In Africana philosophy, the answer is straightforward: Euro-modernity denied the humanity of whole groups of people, which means the question of what it is to be human was crucial. These considerations emerged not only in colonial and racist terms but also at reflective levels of method as hegemonic models of "science" began to dominate concerns for legitimacy. Many such models were premised, however, on ideological frameworks in which greater value was placed on "purity" in which mixture is supposedly "impure." The result is a philosophical anthropology in search of so- called purity as a standard of not only human value but also identity. Kimberly Crenshaw (1991) offers a critique through her work on intersectionality in legal theory. Examples in Africana phenomenology include Michael Monahan's The Creolizing Subject (2011), Jane Anna Gordon's Creolizing Political Theory (2014), and writings by this author (Gordon 1997, 2006, 2010). The arguments they advanced reject any philosophical anthropology of converging "purities," where separate, pure "races" meet. Instead, the notion of racial purity is rejected from the outset. The authors, however, go further, as with the discussion of intersectionality, to propose questions of mixture at methodological levels. It is the appeal to methodological purity that obscures lived realities of mixture. In other words, the actual human world is not one of purity (being-in-and-by-itself) but instead relations of living negations of purity (existence, being-and-negations-of-and-for-being, and more). Monahan and J. Gordon prefer the term creolizing for this reason because it is, they contend, a radical kind of mixture-one that in effect manifests not only new forms of being but also challenges the stasis of being. Their use of the present participle is to illustrate that mixing-especially of the licit and the illicit-is not a closed achievement but instead an ongoing activity of reality. From their argument, purity, like normativity, is an effort of imposing closure on the openness or, as Fryer contends (2008), queer dimensions of reality. Put differently, ascribing ontological status to purity and straightness does not work. It requires, in effect, denying the elements of reality that do not match up and involves attempting to force reality into a preferred or pleasing falsehood instead of a (for the purist) displeasing truth. In effect, creolizing militates against disciplinary decadence or, in other words, mauvaise foi [bad faith]. As the context is human reality, the conclusion of Africana phenomenology presenting an open anthropology comes to the fore. This openness raises one of the final ingredients, if we will, for this discussion: the relationships between humanity and freedom. The freedom question is paradoxical: to be free means also to possess the ability to evade it. This is what critics of this approach, premised on a phenomenological treatment of mauvaise foi miss. Existential phenomenology collapses into an essentialism, they protest, because of the assertion of human reality as freedom. Others also read discussions of mauvaise foi as appealing to an essential unavoidability collapsed into futility. What they fail to ask, however, is what human reality would be if human beings were incapable of acting in mauvaise foi. Could a being incapable of attempting to evade its freedom truly be free? Would not the absence of that capability mean human beings must essentially act in good faith? What, then, would happen to freedom? And if there were no freedom, wouldn't human beings simply have a nature that poses none of the recognizable human problems because human behavior would already be determined? These considerations occasion what could be called an indirect proof: Human freedom exists by virtue of our efforts to evade it. This kind of argument is also, by the way, a form of transcendental argument as it points to a condition for the possibility of what is being studied. This kind of transcendentalism, where existence and conditions of possibility meet, could also be called ironic as it is premised on what "is" by virtue of what it is not. Peter Caws (1992), in his discussion of Sartre's structuralism in his debate with Levi-Strauss, reminds us that the aim of bringing human responsibility to human relations is a plea for the realization of the human role in a human world. It is structure in human terms, which means it requires a philosophical anthropology premised on metaevaluation, metacritique, metatheory, and incompleteness. I regard all this as a way of saying that Euro-modernity posed challenges to what it means to be human, free, and responsible for the conditions by which any practice as such is justified. Race, gender, class, and sexuality, from this perspective, can be illuminated through these three considerations, but we should remember that, as illumination, we receive only part of the story as these categories and their relationship to each other are, from this approach, still in the making. There could, in other words, be more categories to come as the relationship across the extant human identities continue to shift and disorient what it means to be human.

### 1NC -- Ontology Bad

#### The cartographic possibility of ontological mapping is predicated on a prior ante-ontology of the Savage which has come to be aligned with the figural Indian. As the ontological prior, the Indian takes on an anachronistic quality—a ghost, a wolf, a fossil—which must be annihilated as it troubles the structural coherence of human and non-human.

Belcourt 16 (Billy-Ray (Cree), Rhodes Scholar, Doctoral Candidate in English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta “A Poltergeist Manifesto” *Feral Feminisms* 6 <http://www.feralfeminisms.com/a-poltergeist-manifesto/> DA: 2017-07-30) NIJ

Savagery connotes a state of non-ontology: Indigenous peoples are forced to cling to a barely extant humanity and coterminously collapse into a putatively wretched form of animality. Savagery is lethal, and its Indian becomes the prehistoric alibi through which the human is constituted as such. Indigenous peoples have therefore labored to explain away this savagery, reifying whitened rubrics for proper citizenship and crafting a genre of life tangible within the scenes of living through that are constitutive of settler colonialism as such. These scenes, however, are dead set on destroying the remnants of that savagery, converting their casualties into morally compatible subjects deserving of rights and life in a multicultural state that stokes the liberal fantasy of life after racial trauma at the expense of decolonial flourishing itself. This paper is therefore interested in the subjectivities and forms of sociality that savagery destroys when applied from without, and the political work of appropriating that savagery in the name of decolonization. Ours is a form of indigeneity that hints at a fundamental pollutability that both confirms and threatens forms of ontology tethered to a taxonomized humanity built in that foundational episode of subjection of which Simpson speaks. I am suggesting that savagery always-already references an otherworld of sorts: there are forms of life abandoned outside modernity’s episteme whose expressivities surge with affects anomalous within the topography of settler colonialism. This paper is not a historicist or nostalgic attachment to a pre-savage indigeneity resurrected from a past somehow unscathed by the violence that left us in the thick of things in the first place. Instead, I emphasize the potentiality of ferality as a politics in a world bent on our destruction—a world that eliminates indigeneities too radical to collapse into a collective sensorium, training us to a live in an ordinary that the settler state needs to persist as such, one that only some will survive. This world incentivizes our collusion with a multicultural state instantiated through a myth of belonging that actively disavows difference in the name of that very difference. We are repeatedly hurried into a kind of waning sociality, the content and form of which appear both too familiar and not familiar enough. In short, we are habitually left scavenging for ways to go on without knowing what it is we want. Let’s consider Jack Halberstam’s thoughts on “the wild”: It is a tricky word to use but it is a concept that we cannot live without if we are to combat the conventional modes of rule that have synced social norms to economic practices and have created a world order where every form of disturbance is quickly folded back into quiet, where every ripple is quickly smoothed over, where every instance of eruption has been tamped down and turned into new evidence of the rightness of the status quo. (2013, 126) Where Halberstam finds disturbance, I find indigeneity-cum-disturbance par excellence. Halberstam’s “wild” evokes a potentiality laboured in the here and now and “an alternative to how we want to think about being” in and outside an authoritarian state (2013, 126-27). Perhaps the wild risks the decolonial, a geography of life-building that dreams up tomorrows whose referents are the fractured indigeneities struggling to survive a historical present built on our suffering. Ferality is a stepping stone to a future grounded in Indigenous peoples’ legal and political orders. This paper does not traffic in teleologies of the anarchic or lawless as they emerge in Western thought; instead, it refuses settler sovereignty and calls for forms of collective Indigenous life that are attuned to queerness’s wretched histories and future-making potentialities. Indigeneity is an ante-ontology of sorts: it is prior to and therefore disruptive of ontology. Indigeneity makes manifest residues or pockets of times, worlds, and subjectivities that warp both common sense and philosophy into falsities that fall short of completely explaining what is going on. Indigenous life is truncated in the biopolitical category of Savage in order to make our attachments to ourselves assimilable inside settler colonialism’s national sensorium. Settler colonialism purges excessive forms of indigeneity that trouble its rubrics for sensing out the human and the nonhuman. In other words, settler colonialism works up modes of being-in-the-world that narrate themselves as the only options we have. What would it mean, then, to persist in the space of savagery, exhausting the present and holding out for futures that are not obsessed with the proper boundary between human and nonhuman life? This paper now turns to the present, asking: what happens when indigeneity collides with queerness inside the reserve, and how might a feral theory make sense of that collision?

#### Their ontological theorization of blackness inscribes blackness as the death toll -- a site of only negation from which to build the totality of Man. Instead you should prefer to disfigure this coherency through the liminal breath that animates being human as praxis, this proves that the progress endorsed by the aff is a mode of resistance to the structural positionality indicted by the kritik.

Wingate, 19 [Colin Wingate, undergrad at university of Minnesota, their work is a lateral move unmooring Black being from a primary citation of death and abjection. Drawing inspiration from the fields of Black Feminist Thought, Black Studies, Caribbean Thought, Black Queer studies, and Black Performance studies as they intersect through the medium of Caribbean literature such as fiction, poetry/poetics, I argue that to begin at the position of life becomes an invitation to explore the modes by which Black peoples improvise their being (via writing/movement/imagination), break with the “human.” “Fast and Out of Place”, 2019, AGITATE!]//Townes

I want to think about the spatialization of the repetitions of abjection as something settling on top of, draping over the bodies of Black peoples, and furthermore structuring them as what might be called the “death toll” – the primary archive of Black being. Concurrently, it is these very ontoepistemic conditions that orient Black being and that Black studies works to undo. The death toll becomes the nexus through which the abjection of Black peoples and the liberation of Black peoples run. This presents what we name and practice as Black studies, both as an investigation of the subject which may be called “the fact of Blackness, ” and an always already imbricated investment in the liberation of Black peoples from the zone of non-being which we might name as the (anti-Black) world. This poses a particular dilemma: how can we attend to Black being that is not overdetermined by its pregurement as death? “In citing Black women, accumulations of abjections concurrently mask and become the fact of Black woman’s living. I want to push against a certain practice which requires, via a produced affect of obligation towards academic rigor and ethical investment, the recitation of abjection: the historiography of Black peoples from slavery through the ongoing dialectic antagonisms of Black liberation versus Black abjection as the dominate mode of engagement within Black studies. And here is my “scholarly gambit” – that I read into this Black woman’s death, reading it aslant to ask what are the possibility towards Black life that are opened up once we resolve ourselves to death not as just the material breakdown of the body, but a refusal to adhere to the ontological-epistemological script encoded with the “desire to be a subject, to be Man, to perform the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom” that is named “life. ” This is not to say that she had to die, for let’s make it plain – none of us need to die – but that in shifting the register from her death to her living takes on a generative dimension where something akin to freedom might reside. “Insubordinate” Black. “Disobedient” Black. “Uncooperative” Black. “Disorderly” Black. “Ill-bred” Black. “Ill-mannered” Black. “Ill-natured” Black. “Uncivil” Black. Unruly: the little Black girl whose afro “prevents” the class from learning; unruly: the Black youth “stalking” around his neighborhood; unruly: the “suspicious” Black man outside the bodega; unruly: the group of Black women who on their 4(#marker-468- 4)5(#marker-468-5) 6(#marker-468-6) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 7/23 way to a party are harassed by the police for attempted “solicitation” as they wait for their lyft; unruly: the Black students’ “disorderly conduct” in protesting the lack of Black teachers in their classrooms; unruly: the Black family “making a ruckus” on a neighborhood stoop celebrating their child winning a school spelling bee; unruly: the “resisting” Black body, borne to the ground by bullet and knee, whose gasping/screaming/writhing/praying/begging/crying attests to the life inside it, infusing it, refusing the arrest of death which this White world demands of it; unruly: those Black folks who refuse to let their kin stay dead, chanting the transitioned names along hashtags, songs, voices, paintings, letters, dances that keep them buckling in the grave soil. Civility. Order. Respect(ability). Obedience. Discipline. These are codes that structure the rule of law binding human beings to sociality. One may only look to the word civilization to mark what is known as the decorum of existence. Engendering the unrestrained violence which is accepted price of entering this world called modernity. This rule of law details what Caribbean intellectual Sylvia Wynter articulates as the “descriptive statement/prescriptive statements” or metacode/metalanguage/metasystems by which “what it is to be human” is inscribed. To inquire into what might be termed civil/orderly/respectable/obedient/disciplined is to always already speak of the underpinning ontological/epistemological prescriptions for subjecthood or humanity. However, as Frank Wilderson reminds us, Black folks do not hold the ontological position of “human” who occupy civil society, but rather are staged outside it as a “provision… enabling modality for Human ethical dilemmas. ” 7(#marker468-7) 8(#marker-468-8) 9(#marker-468-9) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 8/23 To clarify, it is not that black folks are simply failing to be civil/orderly/respectable/ obedient/disciplined, but rather we fail to adhere to the descriptive statement of being human. Consequently, black folks do not belong to humanness, and in this not belonging, we become unlawful. This failure, or unruliness produces Black as “Other, ” while simultaneously constituting those who observe the descriptive statement as “human. ” These ontologicalepistemological abrasions within and against Whiteness are perceived as the willful rejection of the normative mode of being, agitating the descriptive statement of Man. Unruly: the presence of Black folks that always disrupts, distorts, fractures, and breaks the logics of modernity which they are sutured into as Black subjects. Such impediments to White life are removed through the deployment of violence, in the forms of imprisonment and lynchings, as a means of disciplining black folks back into the “correct” performance of being as dictated by descriptive statement of human-as-Man. But violence as discipline cannot be reasoned within the conjunction of “if. ” This is to say violence towards black folks is a condition of failing to act according to the rules of civil society (as it is for White subjects) while living within the afterlife of slavery. Violence must be integrated within a larger network of genealogies determining the ontoepistemolgies of Black subjects. Unruly: the jungle which grows in dark skin, planted and cut down by White hands. “The brutalities of transatlantic slavery, summed up in archival histories that give us a bit of (asterisked-violated) blackness, put meaningful demands on our scholarly and 10(#marker-468-10) 11(#marker-468-11) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 9/23 activist questions. While the tenets and the lingering histories of slavery and colonialism produced modernity as and with and through blackness, this sense of time-space is interrupted by a more weighty, and seemingly truthful (truthful and truth-telling because iterated as scientic, proven, certied, objective), underside – where black is naturally malignant and therefore worthy of violation; where black is violated be-cause black is naturally violent; where black is naturally unbelievable and is therefore naturally empty and violated; where black is naturally less-than-human and starving to death and violated; where black is naturally dysselected, unsurviving, swallowed up; where black is same and always and dead and dying; where black is complex and difcult and too much to bear and violated. ” This is to say that any and all acts performed by black folks are always already unruly acts; and therefore, violence is permissible against Black subjects for they have already committed a violence/violation of not living within the code of be-ing human. It is through this capacity for “gratuitous violence” acted upon black folks that the “gift” of subjecthood is bestowed upon them. The circulation of violence, structuring while simultaneously breaking down black folks/Black subjects, stabilizes and reproduces the descriptive statement of “Man. ” The question becomes then: what is this descriptive statement to which black folks are incapable of prescribing? Wynter observes the descriptive statement of “human” as in fact “overrepresented” by what she calls “Man, ” the category of subject articulated as White/Western/Heterosexual/Man, or what she terms “ethnoclass (i.e. Western bourgeois). ” This “overrepresentation” marks the praxis/logics of being (re)presented, “discursively and empirically” by the 12(#marker-468-12) 13(#marker468-13) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 10/23 dominate subject named “Man, ” the “measuring stick through which all other forms of being are measured. ” Consequently, in black folks failing to be Man (in acting, in thinking, in speaking, etc.), we also fail to perform their descriptive statement as “human. ” What does this mean for black folks to not t into this room which is named Being? That its angles, its contours, its curves, its shades are unbearable to us. That Blackness bumps into the walls, jostles the furniture, cutting itself on corners, whispers misheard as bellows. Are we too big? Is it too small? Or is it that there is something always already present in the room, and it cannot hold us both. How might we imagine Black folks resisting their ongoing consignment to the zone of non-being that has been/can be/is willfully (mis)read as a refusal to partake in the project of humanity? How might so-called slave illnesses such as “Dysaesthesia aethiopica” (i.e. “rascality”) and “Drapetomania” (i.e. running away disease), be (re)imagined as simply black folks being unwilling to labour on land which is not theirs? That a history of Black peoples in this (s)p(l)ace called the West is one structured between a kind of forced living-indeath and an unavoidable death-as-living. To be “unruly” (and its various incantation such as “irrational” and “savage”) is then to remark on the condition of the living of black folks struggling under their enforced ontological label. And if this is indeed the case, can it not be conceivable that we are more than a little fed the fuck up? Blackness does something to Whiteness. Blackness vexes Whiteness. 14(#marker-468-14)15(#marker-468-15) 16(#marker-468-16) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 11/23 Vexation borne from a simple fact that Blackness, Blackness embodied in folks, things that have been “Blackened” do not work in ways which Whiteness understands them. Black(nes)s don’t not move in trackable trajectories. Black(nes)s don’t not act in a reasonable manner. Black(nes)s don’t think in ways recognized as cognizant. Black(nes)s don’t even lay down and die properly. Addendum: (In the way Whiteness wants them to) Unruly: the Black/Slave that does not/can not/will not work. The questions then become: One) what is “unruliness” to Black folks?; Two) what can “unruliness” do for Black folks within the afterlife of slavery? Three) What is it to know Black? To think Black? What is that we called Black? And what we attach to Blackness? Questions concerning being are often bound up in language. This might be an obvious declaration, but what I am specically gesturing to is the act of denition as a way to produce subjects. The question of definition marks a metonymical action by which objects/persons/concepts are bound to a specific set of ontologies inscribed via language used to name them. Moreover, it demarks how those bound within the strictures of a given definition are crystalized. That is for the sake of coherency of their being, for them to be known and for others to know them, their movement, movement for thought, movement for being, is stilled. This stillness soon becomes concretization – the defined are now the referent – to return to again and again in the production of new knowledges, and beings. Why do we need a definition of Blackness and its embodiments? What violences are replicated in the process of defining Blackness, “the citation of blackness – the scholarly stories we tell?” If Blackness is indeed the Other of Whiteness, the ebb and ow which negates/structures modernity, then language – as the ontological/epistemological tether of persons/places/things/concepts, through their corresponding signier as words – will always fail by design to account for Black being. Black being’s inherent fungibility is contingent on a sort of (non)meaning in ux, allowing for its endless deployment in constructing the descriptive statement of Man. It is due to the “inability of language to cohere around the bodies” of Black folks that there can be no corresponding being-inlanguage for Blackness to inhabit. Without a doubt, we cannot depend on a canonical reading of ‘unruly’ to describe ‘Blackness, ’ for if we take seriously the coloniality of being/truth/power/freedom, it has always already been compromised by the logics of antiblackness. I want to look towards how black folks have come to engage burdens of be-ing with the wake of the afterlife of slavery. I want to take what C. Riley Snorton calls a “scholarly gambit, ” rejecting any form of an “exhaustive or even fully explanatory” denition of unruliness, of Black life, in order to deal with the “political and ethical imperative to the right to opacity. ” This is to say, I refuse to invest in a totalizing project of (re)defining “unruly” or making any claim to what “unruly” is not. Rather, we must receive the life of Black folks as theory. That always already embedded in Black folks’ bodies, moving through this anti-black world, is a 17grammar or what bell hooks calls a “critical speech” which rather must be “witnessed” as the testimony of living-asresistance while continuously being (dis)formed by antiblackness. Unruly: the uncontainable, the innumerable, the ruckus, the restless. Blackness wiggling out of place, thwarting any effort to clutch it. I nd myself thinking about what are the types of discursive moves one must performe so that we might read Blackness another way, what might be called unruly way: First, to read “unruliness” as endless (re)articulations through various bodies of Black folks; Second, the (re)orientation from being (noun) to be-ing (verb), what Sylvia Wynter calls “Being human as praxis. ” At the convergence of these two moves Blackness emerges at the moment in which black people act in accordance to how they desire to live in the world. This is not to say that one can fully escape language as dened within the logics of anti-Black. Rather these moves attempt to clear for us an ideological space, gaps of knowingbeing wherein language from the zone of non-being is imagined, and alternative readings of unruliness emerge as a practice embodied in the everyday living of Black folks. Unruliness: the spilling over of Blackness that cannot be contained in the Black subject’s body, living their life of Black folks which descriptive statement of Man is unable to account for and, therefore, is perceived as a Black body in rebellion against the teleology place before it. How might we looks at this “living their life” in terms of what Thomas DeFrantz calls “Black creativity, ” a practice formed out of “a constellation of living that has everything to do with 22(#marker-468-22) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 14/23 imagining together forward. ” That Blackness embodied has a sort of ingenuity serving as an ontological choreography that has the potential to produce counternarratives to the “script of life” called the descriptive statement of the category of “Man. ” Here I’m thinking of Dionne Brand’s claim that life in the Black Diaspora is “fiction . . . a creation of empires, and also self-creation. ” It is precisely this tension – between “living inside and outside” of Black life for Black folks and Black life as the Human Other underpinning this ecosystem of antiblackness – where unruliness resides. Black folks living within the afterlife become who Wynter’s characterizes as “homo narrans, ” a “hybrid- auto- institutinglanguaging- storytelling species, ” whose (re)fashioning of their being exceeds their descriptive statement, via “radiant moments of ordinariness made like art. ” I am reminded of Michelle D. Commander’s claim that literature is the grounds on which “the enslaved and their descendants took and have continued to take back control over their bodies. ” Taking up Commander’s provocation: how might literature, and art in general, serve as a site where a method of unruliness, or Black liveliness is produced, bearing witness to an alternative archive capable of refracting endless modalities of Black being under threat of erasure by the Black subjecthood within the afterlife of slavery? “ . . . queen of the Convoi Sans Peur; queen of the rebels, queen of evenings; queen malingering and sabotages; queen of ruin; who lost an ear and been shacked to a ten-pound iron for two years after the rebellion of 1819 had been betrayed, after the plan to kill de Lambert, and all his own had been discovered… she had been given a ten-pound iron ring to 23(#marker-468-23) 24(#marker-468- 24) 25(#marker-468-25) 26(#marker-468-26) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 15/23 wear. She had been given thirty-nine lashes. She had been given her own ear in her mouth. She had been given a heart full of curses and patience. ” In Brand’s inventorying of Marie Ursule’s accumulated titles, she marks the double bind of Black life’s ontoepistemic nature within modernity: subjugated in order to prevent the threat of distortion that is their be-ing; yet, it is this very subjugation that produces the unbearable condition of Black life under chattel slavery that emboldens the Slave to rebel against their descriptive statement as the Human Other. Marie Ursule’s epithets denote dominion, but also eneshment. Marie Ursule is rebellion. Marie Ursule is malingering and sabotage. Marie Ursule is ruin. Indeed, what does Marie Ursule’s embodiment of unruliness ask of us in rethinking how life is encoded into Black folk’s bodies within the ontological regime of Man? “Breathing in sleep was the only time you owned the movement of your chest. When breath was all that was left to you, how light and heavy and in your middle it was. How limbs went limp but moved by some instinct to turn and turn only to help breathing. ” How do we think of the Black body as the consigning of Black life to simply a biological unit, forced to bear the codes of the Human Other? That our bodies, the extension interacting with the world, can not only be held captive, but hijacked for the living for other humans. And that our heart, despite it being the transit site in circulating life throughout our bodies, works to undermine our freedom from the category of human-as-Man which Black life desires. 27(#marker-468-27) 28(#marker-468-28) 2/10/2020 Fast and Out of Place – AGITATE! agitatejournal.org/article/fast-and-out-of-place/ 16/23 For Marie Ursule, bound to the numbing choreography of the iron ring, breathing and breathing blackly is to hold and to exhale brief moments that might be akin to freedom. Marie Ursule breathing, or rather the cognition of that breathing, re-constitutes her back as living. It is Sharpe’s “aspiration, ” the practice of putting breath, life, back into the body of Black folks in the wake. Marie Ursule is not the totality of a captive body, but the eneshment of an entity struggling to mark a new referent of living in a world overdetermined by the sensibilities, consciousness, needs, desires, and fears of her captor. As Brand notes, for Marie Ursule breathing is bound up with ownership of “movement” – the very capacity for movement engendering the otherwise – what might be done – that Ashon Crawley wonders could be “constitutive for flight, for movement. ” Breathing blackly opens up the capacity of acting otherwise. To think and act otherwise is not to think solely of some trackable, alternative solution to the problem of colonized, anti-Black existence, but to continuously grapple with the severity of occupying a reality of coloniality, of anti-Blackness and the with possibilities of be-ing beyond it while living within it. Breathing may be the preface to a whole other series of actions that mobilize counter-movements, movements of exchange, capacity to fundamentally change the state of things, transmutation of black esh to black bodies, black bodies to black be-ing. Might we imagine the pause, the sharp inhale and deep exhales of Marie Ursule as prefaces to rebellion? Breath becomes a catalysis for Black life, a life which desire to actualize an ontological imperative exceeding the black body. Breathing becomes an unruly act by speaking to the quiet and quotidian forms of resistance that undergird the living of black folks within an ecosystem of anti-Blackness. If we can still breathe in the deep mire of an anti-Black climate, what else is possible for us? Unruly: the Black heart which beats beyond the body which contains it has passed. To speak of Marie Ursule, and by extension Dionne Brand, is to always speak of the gure who haunts this paper. That is Brand. That is Wynter. That is Spillers. That is Davies. That is Williamson. That is Sharpe. That is McKittrick, Morison, Christian, and Campt. That is the gure of the Black woman intellectual. What investment, if any, does Black feminist thought or Black women have in unruliness? Can unruly thought work alongside Black feminist thought towards our mutual abolition of the category of Man? The Black feminist intellectual project is uniquely primed to simultaneously contest the un/making of Black folks with the descriptive statement of Man, and to conceptualize new modes of be-ing beyond it. Spillers speaks towards this provocation in her essay, “Interstices: A Small Drama of Words, ” where she notes that Black women’s sexuality and gender becomes the site of “great drama” among the identity–categories which formulate Black/Men and White/(Wo)men; unable to properly integrate her, evacuates Black women from the matrix of gender and race which converges into the human subject. Black women instead become the site marking the “passage between the human and the non-human world. ” From this particularly deep zone of non–being, Black women’s insistence on personhood becomes misread as “unruly” within the descriptive statement of Man. Unruly: she is one who upheaves. “Black femininity and black feminism are therefore also establishing new oppositional demands that recast human normalcy through the politics/poetics of black femininity. Importantly, black feminism and the discourses of marginality-identity have made a difference to feminism and to other social theories by: disrupting the category of “woman” and the centered subject (race, class, gender, location); calling into question the patriarchal and feminist meanings of private/public, home, work, motherhood, selfhood, nation; critiquing black political movements, black popular culture, feminist theory, and activism; reshaping women’s studies, black studies, cultural studies; rehistoricizing transatlantic slavery and post-slavery landscapes. ” How might unruliness be understood as a sort of ideological byproduct of Black feminist intellectual work that emerges out of the demands to establish a new mode of being? This is say that Black feminist thought is already unruly thought. Unruly: the excess energy from the engine that is Blackness. And yet, this “energy, ” this “excess” has become enmeshed within the language constituting the descriptive statement of Human Other. Redirected through the various networks of subjections and abjections, “unruly” (dis)forms, (mis)reads, and (re)embodies into the trope of the “Loud Black woman” or the “Angry Black women” or the “Crazy Black woman. ” These tropes, these fictions of Black women’s life function as a proxy for a subjectivity that is perceived as “impracticable and illegible. ” This illegibility is read simultaneously within the category of “Man” as an immoral erratic which Tiffany Lethabo King names “misandry” and “misanthropy” ; the Black women is one who hates all men and, therefore, all of humanity. Marie Ursule: Queen of Ruin. Their “distrust of and animus toward the (over)representation of man/men as the human” exposed the limits of the fiction of the descriptive statement of the category of Man to hold all forms of life within itself. It is this orientation against the master code of symbolic life where we find Black feminist thought; in the face of this gratuitous subjection, Black feminist thought is activated to combat the category of Man – through a variety of practices, knowledges, and beings oriented to a “radical commitment to the significance of black female life and the humanity of all black peoples. ” Unruly: She is who wants to destroy the world. Surely, the unruly then is not simply a phenomenological condition, another iteration of the archival knowledge deeming Blackness and its embodiments as borne out of suffering and solely bearing subjection, but rather a potential means of critique – a sort of theorization determined by what Christina Sharpe describes as a “blackened knowledge, an unscientific method, that comes from observing that where one stands is relative to the door of no return and that moment of historical and ongoing rupture. ” I want to emphasize this phrase “living their life” as an extension of Tina M. Campt’s conception of the quiet as the daily actions performed by Black folks filled with “impact and affect, which creates the possibility for it to register as meaningful. ” This meaningfulness stems from the constant cognition that Black being is constantly mediated, hobbled, dulled, silenced, occluded, obscured, restrained, quailed, exterminated by antiblackness within the afterlife of slavery. And yet: Black life flourish. That for Black folks to live, they must pit themselves against the very order of life to which they have been bound. That the ultimate act of unruliness is to move towards death. No, to run toward death. To skip. To sing. To wine. To milly rock. Death is threshold between the rigid codes of colonial and anti-black, and the vast illegible, unimaginable that might be called a sort of freedom. This is to say that for us to live, we must embark into the realm of Unruliness, the life of Black folks; their “radical capacity to live – to live deeply righteous lives” that always already marks the failure of the category of Man to account for modalities of be-ing outside its enforced descriptive statement