# Round 1 – NC

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Violation: Their advocacy states the aff as a general principle, which is not a fiated version of the aff

#### Standards:

#### Ground- we don’t get to read CPs or even DAs because those all are predicated upon the aff being a policy and they can spike out of links by saying we must prove the aff as a general principle is bad in a normative sense, kills fairness because none of my arguments stick and education because they can skirt questions of topic literature.

#### Burden of Rejoinder- the burden of the neg is to prove that the aff is a bad idea but we can’t do this when they’re a general principle because we become constrained to solely normative indicts and can’t test the aff from multiple angles. Kills neg flex and our ability to engage.

#### 3] SSD is good – it forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it.

TVA: defend a fiated version of the plan with some sort of treaty and an alienation framework

#### Vote neg – they’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first.

#### Voters:

#### Fairness is an impact—a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins, c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### Use competing interps – topicality is question of models of debate which they should have to proactively justify and we’ll win reasonability links to our offense.

#### Drop the debater because dropping the arg is severance which moots 7 minutes of 1nc offense

#### No rvis—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

#### No impact turns—exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

## 2

#### Use the Role of Ballot of maximizing expected well-being

#### 1. Pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable.

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about** the way **pleasure** feels **and** something **undeniably bad about** the way **pain** feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, **I might ask: “What for?”** This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “**But** what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the **pleasure is not good for anything further;** it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: **“We never ask** [a man] **what his end is in being pleased, because** we assume that **pleasure is** choice **worthy in itself.”**4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.**

#### 2. Extinction comes first!

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

## Case

### Lbl

ThEIR OWN CARD STATES EXTINCTION IS SOMETHING TO BE MINDFUL OF – I read green

**Levine 15** [Nick Levine is an MPhil candidate in history of science at the University of Cambridge, Jacobin, “Democratize the Universe” 3/21/2015, [https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/space-industry-extraction-levine]/](https://jacobinmag.com/2015/03/space-industry-extraction-levine%5d/) lm

**The privatization of the Milky Way has begun.**

Last summer, **the** bipartisan [**ASTEROIDS Act**](https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/5063) was introduced in Congress. The legislation’s **aim is to grant US corporations property rights over** any natural resources — like the platinum-group metals used in electronics — that they extract from asteroids.

Whether and how we should go to space are not profound philosophical questions, at least not primarily. What’s at stake is not just the “stature of man,” as Hannah Arendt [put it](http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-conquest-of-space-and-the-stature-of-man), but **a** political-economic **struggle over the future of the celestial commons**, which could result in a dramatic intensification of inequality — or a small step for humankind toward a more egalitarian state of affairs on our current planet.Undoubtedly, there are good reasons to be skeptical about going to space. Some have argued that it shifts attention away from solving the difficult problems of economic and environmental justice on Earth — think of Gil Scott-Heron’s spoken-word poem “Whitey on the Moon,” which juxtaposes the deprivation of the American underclass with the vast resources diverted to space. Scott-Heron’s critique is powerful, but it’s important to remember that he was denouncing an unjust economic system. He wasn’t issuing a timeless condemnation of space pursuits as such. Whether the aims of providing for all and developing outer space are mutually exclusive depends on the political forces on the ground.

We might also question whether mining asteroids would be detrimental to our current planet’s environment in the medium term. If we don’t find a renewable way to blast off into outer space, **the exploitation of** these **resources** could **lead to an intensification of,** not a move away from, **the fossil-fuel economy.**

If the environmental impact of space mining turns out to be large, it would be analogous to fracking — a technological development that gives us access to new resources, bu**t with devastating ecological side effects** — and ought to be opposed on similar grounds. On the other hand, some speculate that mining the Moon’s Helium-3 reserves, for example, could provide an abundant [source of clean energy](https://io9.gizmodo.com/5908499/could-helium-3-really-solve-earths-energy-problems). The terrestrial environmental impact of space activity remains an open question that must be explored before we stake our hopes on the economic development of outer space.

Philosophers have suggested that we might have ethical duties to preserve the “natural” states of celestial bodies. Others fear that our activities might unknowingly wipe out alien microbial life. **We should remain sensitive to the** aesthetic and cultural value of outer space, as well as the **potential for extinction and the exhaustion of resources misleadingly proclaimed to be limitless.**

Of course, there’s nothing inevitable about the benefits of productivity gains being distributed widely, as we’ve seen in the United States over the past forty years. This is a problem not limited to space, and **the myth of the “final frontier” must not distract us from** the already **existing problems** of wealth and income distribution **on Earth.**

### Top-Level

#### The affirmative has no enforcement mechanism – private corporations can just circumvent since they have the funding to launch rockets on their own.

**Sheetz 21** [Michael, “Elon Musk’s SpaceX raised about $850 million, jumping valuation to about $74 billion”, CNBC. 16 February 2021. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/16/elon-musks-spacex-raised-850-million-at-419point99-a-share.html] //DebateDrills LC

**SpaceX completed another monster equity funding round of $850 million last week**, people familiar with the financing told CNBC, sending **the company’s valuation skyrocketing to about $74 billion.**

**The company raised the new funds at $419.99 a share**, those people said — or just 1 cent below the $420 price that [Elon Musk](https://www.cnbc.com/elon-musk/) [made infamous in 2018](https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/28/sec-says-elon-musk-at-tesla-chose-420-price-as-pot-reference.html) when he declared **he had “funding secured” to take**[**Tesla**](https://www.cnbc.com/quotes/TSLA)**private** at that price.

The latest round also represents **a jump of about 60% in the company’s valuation** from its previous round in August, when [S**paceX raised near $2 billion at a $46 billion valuation**](https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/14/tesla-investor-ron-baron-spacex-has-a-chance-to-be-just-as-large.html).

SpaceX did not immediately respond to CNBC’s request for comment. In addition to SpaceX further building a war chest for its ambitious plans, **company insiders and existing investors were able to sell $750 million in a secondary transaction**, one of the people said.

The people spoke on condition of anonymity because SpaceX is not a publicly traded company and the fundraising talks were private. SpaceX raised only a portion of the funding available in the marketplace, with one person telling CNBC that **the company received “insane demand” of about $6 billion in offers over the course of just three days**.

### Cap good

#### Capitalism turns alienation --- maintaining growth brings people out of poverty and gets them out of alienation

Pinker 18 (Stephen, professor of psychology at Harvard, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, EM) \*\*Modified for gendered language

In the stacked layer graph in figure 8-5, the thickness of the bottom slab represents the number of people living in extreme poverty, the thickness of the top slab represents the number not living in poverty, and the height of the stack represents the population of the world. It shows that the number of poor people declined just as the number of all people exploded, from 3.7 billion in 1970 to 7.3 billion in 2015. (Max Roser points out that if news outlets truly reported the changing state of the world, they could have run the headline NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN EXTREME POVERTY FELL BY 137,000 SINCE YESTERDAY every day for the last twenty-five years.) We live in a world not just with a smaller proportion of extremely poor people but with a smaller number of them, and with 6.6 billion people who are not extremely poor. Figure 8-5: Extreme poverty (number), 1820–2015 Sources: Our World in Data, Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2017, based on data from Bourguignon & Morrison 2002 (1820–1992) and the World Bank 2016g (1981–2015). Most surprises in history are unpleasant surprises, but this news came as a pleasant shock even to the optimists. In 2000 the United Nations laid out eight Millennium Development Goals, their starting lines backdated to 1990.25 At the time, cynical observers of that underperforming organization dismissed the targets as aspirational boilerplate. Cut the global poverty rate in half, lifting a billion people out of poverty, in twenty-five years? Yeah, yeah. But the world reached the goal five years ahead of schedule. Development experts are still rubbing their eyes. Deaton writes, “This is perhaps the most important fact about wellbeing in the world since World War II.”26 The economist Robert Lucas (like Deaton, a Nobel laureate) said, “The consequences for human welfare involved [in understanding rapid economic development] are simply staggering: once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”27 Let’s not stop thinking about tomorrow. Though it’s always dangerous to extrapolate a historical curve, what happens when we try? If we align a ruler with the World Bank data in figure 8-4, we find that it crosses the x-axis (indicating a poverty rate of 0) in 2026. The UN gave itself a cushion in its 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (the successor to its Millennium Development Goals) and set a target of “ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere” by 2030.28 Ending extreme poverty for all people everywhere! May I live to see the day. (Not even Jesus was that optimistic: he told a supplicant, “The poor you will always have with you.”) Of course that day is a ways off. Hundreds of millions of people remain in extreme poverty, and getting to zero will require a greater effort than just extrapolating along a ruler. Though the numbers are dwindling in countries like India and Indonesia, they are increasing in the poorest of the poor countries, like Congo, Haiti, and Sudan, and the last pockets of poverty will be the hardest to eliminate.29 Also, as we approach the goal we should move the goalposts, since not-so-extreme poverty is still poverty. In introducing the concept of progress I warned against confusing hard-won headway with a process that magically takes place by itself. The point of calling attention to progress is not self-congratulation but identifying the causes so we can do more of what works. And since we know that something has worked, it’s unnecessary to keep depicting the developing world as a basket case to shake people out of their apathy—with the danger that they will think that additional support would just be throwing money down a rat hole.30 So what is the world doing right? As with most forms of progress, a lot of good things happen at once and reinforce one another, so it’s hard to identify a first domino. Cynical explanations, such as that the enrichment is a one-time dividend of a surge in the price of oil and other commodities, or that the statistics are inflated by the rise of populous China, have been examined and dismissed. Radelet and other development experts point to five causes.31 “In 1976,” Radelet writes, “Mao single-handedly and dramatically changed the direction of global poverty with one simple act: he died.”32 Though China’s rise is not exclusively responsible for the Great Convergence, the country’s sheer bulk is bound to move the totals around, and the explanations for its progress apply elsewhere. The death of Mao Zedong is emblematic of three of the major causes of the Great Convergence. The first is the decline of communism (together with intrusive socialism). For reasons we have seen, market economies can generate wealth prodigiously while totalitarian planned economies impose scarcity, stagnation, and often famine. Market economies, in addition to reaping the benefits of specialization and providing incentives for people to produce things that other people want, solve the problem of coordinating the efforts of hundreds of millions of people by using prices to propagate information about need and availability far and wide, a computational problem that no planner is brilliant enough to solve from a central bureau.33 A shift from collectivization, centralized control, government monopolies, and suffocating permit bureaucracies (what in India was called “the license raj”) to open economies took place on a number of fronts beginning in the 1980s. They included Deng Xiaoping’s embrace of capitalism in China, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its domination of Eastern Europe, and the liberalization of the economies of India, Brazil, Vietnam, and other countries. Though intellectuals are apt to do a spit take when they read a defense of capitalism, its economic benefits are so obvious that they don’t need to be shown with numbers. They can literally be seen from space. A satellite photograph of Korea showing the capitalist South aglow in light and the Communist North a pit of darkness vividly illustrates the contrast in the wealth-generating capability between the two economic systems, holding geography, history, and culture constant. Other matched pairs with an experimental group and a control group lead to the same conclusion: West and East Germany when they were divided by the Iron Curtain; Botswana versus Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe; Chile versus Venezuela under Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro—the latter a once-wealthy, oil-rich country now suffering from widespread hunger and a critical shortage of medical care.34 It’s important to add that the market economies which blossomed in the more fortunate parts of the developing world were not the laissez-faire anarchies of right-wing fantasies and left-wing nightmares. To varying degrees, their governments invested in education, public health, infrastructure, and agricultural and job training, together with social insurance and poverty-reduction programs.35 Radelet’s second explanation of the Great Convergence is leadership. Mao imposed more than communism on China. He was a mercurial megalomaniac who foisted crackbrained schemes on the country, such as the Great Leap Forward (with its gargantuan communes, useless backyard smelters, and screwball agronomic practices) and the Cultural Revolution (which turned the younger generation into gangs of thugs who terrorized teachers, managers, and descendants of “rich peasants”).36 During the decades of stagnation from the 1970s to the early 1990s, many other developing countries were commandeered by psychopathic strongmen with ideological, religious, tribal, paranoid, or self-aggrandizing agendas rather than a mandate to enhance the well-being of their citizens. Depending on their sympathy or antipathy for communism, they were propped up by the Soviet Union or the United States under the principle “He may be a son of a bitch, but he’s our son of a bitch.”37 The 1990s and 2000s saw a spread of democracy (chapter 14) and the rise of levelheaded, humanistic leaders—not just national statesmen like Nelson Mandela, Corazon Aquino, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf but local religious and civil-society leaders acting to improve the lives of their compatriots.38 A third cause was the end of the Cold War. It not only pulled the rug out from under a number of tinpot dictators but snuffed out many of the civil wars that had racked developing countries since they attained independence in the 1960s. Civil war is both a humanitarian disaster and an economic one, as facilities are destroyed, resources are diverted, children are kept out of school, and managers and workers are pulled away from work or killed. The economist Paul Collier, who calls war “development in reverse,” has estimated that a typical civil war costs a country $50 billion.39 A fourth cause is globalization, in particular the explosion in trade made possible by container ships and jet airplanes and by the liberalization of tariffs and other barriers to investment and trade. Classical economics and common sense agree that a larger trading network should make everyone, on average, better off. As countries specialize in different goods and services, they can produce them more efficiently, and it doesn’t cost them much more to offer their wares to billions of people than to thousands. At the same time buyers, shopping for the best price in a global bazaar, can get more of what they want. (Common sense is less likely to appreciate a corollary called comparative advantage, which predicts that, on average, everyone is better off when each country sells the goods and services that it can produce most efficiently even if the buyers could produce them still more efficiently themselves.) Notwithstanding the horror that the word elicits in many parts of the political spectrum, globalization, development analysts agree, has been a bonanza for the poor. Deaton notes, “Some argue that globalization is a neoliberal conspiracy designed to enrich a very few at the expense of many. If so, that conspiracy was a disastrous failure—or at least, it helped more than a billion people as an unintended consequence. If only unintended consequences always worked so favorably.”40 To be sure, the industrialization of the developing world, like the Industrial Revolution two centuries before it, has produced working conditions that are harsh by the standards of modern rich countries and have elicited bitter condemnation. The Romantic movement in the 19th century was partly a reaction to the “dark satanic mills” (as William Blake called them), and since that time a loathing of industry has been a sacred value of C. P. Snow’s Second Culture of literary intellectuals.41 Nothing in Snow’s essay enraged his assailant F. R. Leavis as much as this passage: It is all very well for us, sitting pretty, to think that material standards of living don’t matter all that much. It is all very well for one, as a personal choice, to reject industrialization—do a modern Walden if you like, and if you go without much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept twenty years off your own life, then I respect you for the strength of your aesthetic revulsion. But I don’t respect you in the slightest if, even passively, you try to impose the same choice on others who are not free to choose. In fact, we know what their choice would be. For, with singular unanimity, in any country where they have had the chance, the poor have walked off the land into the factories as fast as the factories could take them.42 As we have seen, Snow was accurate in his claims about advances in life and health, and he was also right that the appropriate standard in considering the plight of the poor in industrializing countries is the set of alternatives available to them where and when they live. Snow’s argument is being echoed fifty years later by development experts such as Radelet, who observes that “while working on the factory floor is often referred to as sweatshop labor, it is often better than the grand[parent] of all sweatshops: working in the fields as an agricultural day laborer.” When I lived in Indonesia in the early 1990s, I arrived with a somewhat romanticized view of the beauty of people working in rice paddies, together with reservations about the rapidly growing factory jobs. The longer I was there, the more I recognized how incredibly difficult it is to work in the rice fields. It’s a backbreaking grind, with people eking out the barest of livings by bending over for hours in the hot sun to terrace the fields, plant the seeds, pull the weeds, transplant the seedlings, chase the pests, and harvest the grain. Standing in the pools of water brings leeches and the constant risk of malaria, encephalitis, and other diseases. And, of course, it is hot, all the time. So, it was not too much of a surprise that when factory jobs opened offering wages of $2 a day, hundreds of people lined up just to get a shot at applying.43 The benefits of industrial employment can go beyond material living standards. For the women who get these jobs, it can be a liberation. In her article “The Feminist Side of Sweatshops,” Chelsea Follett (the managing editor of HumanProgress) recounts that factory work in the 19th century offered women an escape from the traditional gender roles of farm and village life, and so was held by some men at the time “sufficient to damn to infamy the most worthy and virtuous girl.” The girls themselves did not always see it that way. A textile mill worker in Lowell, Massachusetts, wrote in 1840: We are collected . . . to get money, as much of it and as fast as we can. . . . Strange would it be, if in money-loving New England, one of the most lucrative female employments should be rejected because it is toilsome, or because some people are prejudiced against it. Yankee girls have too much independence for that.44 Here again, experiences during the Industrial Revolution prefigure those in the developing world today. Kavita Ramdas, the head of the Global Fund for Women, said in 2001 that in an Indian village “all there is for a woman is to obey her husband and relatives, pound millet, and sing. If she moves to town, she can get a job, start a business, and get education for her children.”45 An analysis in Bangladesh confirmed that the women who worked in the garment industry (as my grandparents did in 1930s Canada) enjoyed rising wages, later marriage, and fewer and better-educated children.46 Over the course of a generation, slums, barrios, and favelas can morph into suburbs, and the working class can become middle class.47 To appreciate the long-term benefits of industrialization one does not have to accept its cruelties. One can imagine an alternative history of the Industrial Revolution in which modern sensibilities applied earlier and the factories operated without children and with better working conditions for the adults. Today there are doubtless factories in the developing world that could offer as many jobs and still turn a profit while treating their workers more humanely. Pressure from trade negotiators and consumer protests has measurably improved working conditions in many places, and it is a natural progression as countries get richer and more integrated into the global community (as we will see in chapters 12 and 17 when we look at the history of working conditions in our own society).48 Progress consists not in accepting every change as part of an indivisible package—as if we had to make a yes-or-no decision on whether the Industrial Revolution, or globalization, is a good thing or bad thing, exactly as each has unfolded in every detail. Progress consists of unbundling the features of a social process as much as we can to maximize the human benefits while minimizing the harms. The last, and in many analyses the most important, contributor to the Great Convergence is science and technology.49 Life is getting cheaper, in a good way. Thanks to advances in know-how, an hour of labor can buy more food, health, education, clothing, building materials, and small necessities and luxuries than it used to. Not only can people eat cheaper food and take cheaper medicines, but children can wear cheap plastic sandals instead of going barefoot, and adults can hang out together getting their hair done or watching a soccer game using cheap solar panels and appliances. As for good advice on health, farming, and business: it’s better than cheap; it’s free. Today about half the adults in the world own a smartphone, and there are as many subscriptions as people. In parts of the world without roads, landlines, postal service, newspapers, or banks, mobile phones are more than a way to share gossip and cat photos; they are a major generator of wealth. They allow people to transfer money, order supplies, track the weather and markets, find day labor, get advice on health and farming practices, even obtain a primary education.50 An analysis by the economist Robert Jensen subtitled “The Micro and Mackerel Economics of Information” showed how South Indian small fishermen increased their income and lowered the local price of fish by using their mobile phones at sea to find the market which offered the best price that day, sparing them from having to unload their perishable catch on fish-glutted towns while other towns went fishless.51 In this way mobile phones are allowing hundreds of millions of small farmers and fishers to become the omniscient rational actors in the ideal frictionless markets of economics textbooks. According to one estimate, every cell phone adds $3,000 to the annual GDP of a developing country.52 The beneficent power of knowledge has rewritten the rules of global development. Development experts differ on the wisdom of foreign aid. Some argue that it does more harm than good by enriching corrupt governments and competing with local commerce.53 Others cite recent numbers which suggest that intelligently allocated aid has in fact done tremendous good.54 But while they disagree on the effects of donated food and dollars, all agree that donated technology—medicines, electronics, crop varieties, and best practices in agriculture, business, and public health—has been an unalloyed boon. (As Jefferson noted, he who receives an idea from me receives instruction without lessening mine.) And for all the emphasis I’ve placed on GDP per capita, the value of knowledge has made that measure less relevant to what we really care about, quality of life. If I had squeezed a line for Africa into the lower right corner of figure 8-3, it would look unimpressive: the line would curve upward, to be sure, but without the exponential blastoff of the lines for Europe and Asia. Charles Kenny emphasizes that the actual progress of Africa belies the shallow slope, because health, longevity, and education are so much more affordable than they used to be. Though in general people in richer countries live longer (a relationship called the Preston curve, after the economist who discovered it), the whole curve is being pushed upward, as everyone is living longer regardless of income.55 In the richest country two centuries ago (the Netherlands), life expectancy was just forty, and in no country was it above forty-five. Today, life expectancy in the poorest country in the world (the Central African Republic) is fifty-four, and in no country is it below forty-five.56 Though it’s easy to sneer at national income as a shallow and materialistic measure, it correlates with every indicator of human flourishing, as we will repeatedly see in the chapters to come. Most obviously, GDP per capita correlates with longevity, health, and nutrition.57 Less obviously, it correlates with higher ethical values like peace, freedom, human rights, and tolerance.58 Richer countries, on average, fight fewer wars with each other (chapter 11), are less likely to be riven by civil wars (chapter 11), are more likely to become and stay democratic (chapter 14), and have greater respect for human rights (chapter 14—on average, that is; Arab oil states are rich but repressive). The citizens of richer countries have greater respect for “emancipative” or liberal values such as women’s equality, free speech, gay rights, participatory democracy, and protection of the environment (chapters 10 and 15). Not surprisingly, as countries get richer they get happier (chapter 18); more surprisingly, as countries get richer they get smarter (chapter 16).59 In explaining this Somalia-to-Sweden continuum, with poor violent repressive unhappy countries at one end and rich peaceful liberal happy ones at the other, correlation is not causation, and other factors like education, geography, history, and culture may play roles.60 But when the quants try to tease them apart, they find that economic development does seem to be a major mover of human welfare.61 In an old academic joke, a dean is presiding over a faculty meeting when a genie appears and offers him one of three wishes—money, fame, or wisdom. The dean replies, “That’s easy. I’m a scholar. I’ve devoted my life to understanding. Of course I’ll take wisdom.” The genie waves his hand and vanishes in a puff of smoke. The smoke clears to reveal the dean with his head in his hands, lost in thought. A minute elapses. Ten minutes. Fifteen. Finally a professor calls out, “Well? Well?” The dean mutters, “I should have taken the money.”

#### Embracing globalism is good and alt exacerbates climate change significantly—also poverty, violence, and exploitation date back much further than capitalism

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(Rasmus, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalisation,” Globalizations, August)

While neither xenophobia nor militarism is by any means new in history, what is striking is the **lack of enthusiasm** among contemporary elites and leading academics for accelerating globalisation processes or actively planning for a future of shared prosperity. As climate change has emerged as the defining political issue of our time, the rise of the poor is increasingly treated as a problem rather than a transformative opportunity (Myers & Kent, 2003). What is worse, **cultural perfectionist ideas** about the perceived superficiality of “mass consumption” have been allowed to **blend with protectionist fears of foreign competition** into a **silent acceptance of chronic poverty** abroad, preferably **under the guise of “sustainable livelihoods”** powered by small-scale renewable energy, as a tolerable price for avoiding a climate emergency. According to Paul and Anne Ehrlich, avoiding a collapse of global civilisation will require “widely based cultural change” and dramatic reductions of both “population size and overconsumption” (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013:5). For those subscribing to such views, a delayed or incomplete globalisation is seen as a blessing of sorts as it takes away some of the urgency of climate mitigation.

The primary aim of this paper is to show that, far from offering a path to long-term climate stability, such a development may lead policy-makers to **grossly underestimate** the true scope of the climate/energy challenge (Arto et al., 2016) and pursue policies that continue to lock in non-scalable forms of low-carbon technologies. More generally, beyond the formidable human cost of maintaining a divided world, the possibility of incomplete globalisation is likely to make the transition to a “Good Anthropocene” (Ellis, 2014) more difficult, reduce overall resilience, and **divert resources** away from important social and environmental ends.

The paper is structured so that it proceeds from a general critique of traditional environmental ideas of intentional localisation through a more specific discussion on the effects of “climate nationalism” towards a normative argument in favour of deliberately, i.e. by political and democratic means, accelerating the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet as a way of reducing global environmental risks. **None of this comes from facile cornucopian optimism** or any attempt to downplay the existential challenges that humanity is currently facing with regard to the natural environment. It is rather the very urgency of those risks that makes it important to **contest existing discourses** on the relationship between globalisation and the environment, both those discourses that reflect **Malthusian beliefs** (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013) and those who deny the very reality of global environmental problems such as climate change.

The transition fallacies of localism

One long-running theme in the literature on sustainability **has been the virtues of localism and decentralisation** (Dobson, 2007:95; Goodin, 1992:147). Local economies are thought to be (a) intrinsically more sustainable, (b) better equipped to cope with resources scarcities, and (c) less vulnerable to environmentally catastrophes. As a consequence, the “Transition Town” movement and others have come to see intentional localisation as an appropriate response to climate change and other Anthropocene risks (Barry & Quilley, 2009; North, 2010). While such arguments obviously form part of a much broader discussion on political economy and the future of capitalism, there are many reasons to be **sceptical of this localist discourse**.

Starting with the first claim and assuming a basic natural resource point of view, it is clear that different geographical locations have different endowments of everything from soil types to moisture variability. This naturally invites specialisation and **intensification** of production. If each locale were to produce the full range of goods necessary even for meeting **basic human needs**, then **efficiency would be much lower** and **land use much higher** than today. Inefficient modes of production would thus not only require higher inputs of labour, energy, and raw materials but also **leave less room for nature** (Desrochers & Shimizu, 2012). As agricultural production would be pushed into landscapes of increasingly lower productivity (e.g. poorer soils, less favourable climatic conditions, and steeper slopes) the result would be **lower yields yet again**. In a field such as metallurgy, even the most rudimentary processes require inputs that are geographically dispersed. To unthink trade is therefore essentially to unthink modern civilisation. While this may in fact be the explicit goal of some of the most radical voices (Zerzan, 2008) there is very little recognition in localist literature for how much of human welfare that actually depends on economies of scale, specialisation, and exchange. Yet, it simply suffice to consider how little most individuals in advanced economies know of farming, forestry or mining to realise what an enormous loss in productivity and knowledge that would follow if these tasks were to be more broadly shared within local communities. Similarly, the ecological toll that would follow if billions of people would go out in nature in search for food and fuel is clearly unfathomable. It is thus not surprising that most advocates of localism **fall short of endorsing autarky** or complete self-reliance. However by romanticising the local and discriminating in favour of it (Woodin & Lucas, 2004:30) these scholars show little appreciation for the enormous gains in welfare, not to mention the formidable progress in science and technology, which have been made possible over the last centuries precisely thanks to specialisation and the integration of markets.

Even if pre-modern human history was essentially defined by poverty, social domination, and violent conflict, **it is still common to blame the prevalence of such ills on modernity.** Yet, as many have rightly pointed out, what is difficult to explain is not underdevelopment but that development was at all possible. According to a progressive reading of history, the key driver behind the great acceleration of the last centuries has been the emergence of broad social investments (Lindert, 2004). While both Marxists and libertarians may think otherwise, equality is crucial for modern capitalism to function as it provides both consumers who can afford the goods of industrialism and producers who can create ever more sophisticated things of value to others. Whatever short-term gains that may be obtained through exploitation or other unequal forms of exchange, they are dwarfed by the long-term gains that come with greater measures of equality as clearly illustrated by the resounding economic success of welfare capitalism over the course of the 20th century (Berman, 2006). The same of course holds true in a globalised economy. Rich countries may benefit in the short run from low consumer prices of imported goods but, for every Bangladesh that becomes a South Korea, the value of rising global demand and new export markets is obviously much greater.

As for the second claim that localism promotes resilience, there is a strong intuitive argument that if consumption and production are taking place in close proximity, supply chain interruptions can be minimised. Yet, considering how deeply integrated global supply chains have already become, the opposite may in fact be the case. This is so because either discrimination in favour of local products (1) remains the kind of boutique concern for environmental elites that it is in the present and then it will not matter much in a situation of global trade disruption or (2) it forms part of a comprehensive protectionist regime and then it may be the very thing that triggers the disruption of global trade in the first place. As a consequence, the best way to mitigate situations of resource scarcity is therefore rather to ensure the existence of a robust world trade system (Deudney, 1990:470) since it not only allows communities to offset immediate local shortages but also gives them more time to come up with substitutes through technological innovation (the costs of which presumably can be shared among a large number of consumers worldwide). Moreover, judging from the history of the 20th century, the existence of an open world trade system is in itself crucial for driving overall growth and making eventual economic convergence possible (Williamson, 1996).

Finally, as to the third claim, that decentralised local communities would be better suited to cope with environmental disasters thanks to their **“organic” or “embedded” nature**, **the opposite again seems to be the case**. As the events following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami clearly illustrate, the existence of cosmopolitan norms of solidarity abroad and the possibility to bring in resources from unaffected, far-away lands offered **much better help than any policy of national isolation**. Likewise, after the super typhoon Haiyan hit in 2013, remittances from people working overseas and the help from international NGOs have been essential for the rebuilding of the city of Tacloban in the Philippines. As these and many other similar cases illustrate, accelerated global integration appears **far more appropriate** in any real-world scenario of environmental catastrophe than traditional environmental visions of **self- sufficiency and communitarianism**.

#### Independently, the affs theorization is too wide sweeping and misdiagnoses. Their gripe isn’t with capitalism as an economic system but with neoliberal ideology which emphasizes laissez faire capitalism.

**Gertz and Kharas 19** (Geoffrey Gertz is a fellow in the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings. Homi Kharas is interim vice president and director of the Global Economy and Development program at Brookings. “Beyond neoliberalism: Insights from emerging markets”. April 2019.)

Across Western economies, **the future of cap**italism **is** suddenly **up for debate**. Driven in part by the twin shocks of Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, **the** prevailing **neoliberal economic model-which prioritized a light touch regulatory regime, minimal barriers to trade and foreign investment, and** overall **a small role for the state in managing the economy** is under attack from both the left and the right. **Will** neoliberalism **be displaced**? And what will come next? Around the world, meanwhile, emerging markets have been grappling with similar questions for decades. **Neoliberalism spread unevenly across emerging markets**, and likewise many of them have been moving beyond neoliberalism for decades. These varied experiences provide valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of neoliberalism and the future of economic and political policymaking in a post-neoliberal world. If the Washington Consensus mantra of “stabilize, privatize, and liberalize” has lost relevance today, what—if anything—has taken its place? How are different countries reevaluating the relative roles of states and markets in delivering economic development? Are there new “models” that are generalizable and applicable across countries and contexts? This report, which is the output of an academic workshop hosted in January 2019, seeks to provide some initial answers to these questions. It is organized around five big issue areas where **neoliberalism provides** incomplete or **unsatisfactory policy guidance**: growth strategies and industrial policy, inequality, finance and monetary policy, the environment, and power, and politics. In an introductory chapter, Geoffrey Gertz and Homi Kharas set the stage for this discussion. They consider multiple conceptual definitions of “neoliberalism,” distinguishing between neoliberalism as an organized intellectual and political movement, as an approach to the academic study of economics, and as a specific policy program. They then discuss the reasons why neoliberalism is under threat at this particular moment, and introduce several cross-cutting questions to shape the debate, including whether neoliberalism should be adapted or overturned; whether any successor to neoliberalism will need a coherent, unified theory, or if an ad hoc, experimentalist approach is better; whether scientific and engineering advances can improve the potential of centralized planning systems; and whether today’s global governance institutions can accommodate a diversity of economic models. The second chapter examines the future of economic growth strategies, industrial policy, and the globalization of production processes. Danny Leipziger notes that **many countries have indeed benefitted from active government involvement in the economy**, citing examples such as Singapore, Malaysia, and South Korea. He cautions, however, that this does not suggest every developing country should pursue an aggressive industrial policy, as such strategies are likely only to be effective **when governments have** requisite other policies in place, including **strong macroeconomic management**, control of corruption, and stable and long-lasting political regimes. Leipziger concludes that going forward more **governments are** **likely** to adopt a more assertive role in steering the productive economy, but the key to their success will be their ability **to get these more basic governance functions right.** Against the backdrop of a more protectionist and fractured global economy, this will prove a significant challenge. In the third chapter, Ana Revenga and Meagan Dooley assess recent trends in income inequality around the world and strategies for tackling these inequities. Revenga and Dooley note that while cross-country global inequality has been falling in recent years, the picture on within-country inequality is more complicated. While some countries (notably in Latin America) have seen falling inequality, many others have seen sharp increases, and in particular the top 1 percent have increased their share of total income—one of the key sources of discontent with the neoliberal model. They distinguish between three sets of drivers of within-country inequality: pre-distributional concerns, meaning inequality of opportunity; in-distribution concerns, meaning the polarization of the labor market between high-earning and low-earning jobs; and post-distribution concerns, meaning government use of taxes and transfers to reallocate resources. They conclude with a set of policy recommendations aimed at each of these drivers, noting that more active government policy is necessary to ensure market-based growth delivers widespread gains. The fourth chapter turns to the financial system and monetary policy. Rakesh Mohan begins by noting that **the** **neoliberal era of financial liberalization** was characterized by frequent crises in emerging and developing countries, and **led to a system where finance served its own ends rather than supporting the needs of the real economy.** Since the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, however, many emerging markets have begun shifting toward a “middle path” on finance and monetary policy, which includes stronger capital account management, a role for both public and private banks in financial sector development, and a more active regulatory stance to ensure financial stability. Mohan argues that though many emerging markets have been experimenting with such policies for a long time, they have still generally been considered “unconventional,” and it is time to drop such designations.

#### Asteroid mining is key to sustaining our world after we run out of resources.

**Elvis 21** [Martin (senior astrophysicist at the Center for Astrophysics, Harvard and Smithsonian), “Riches in Space”, Vox. 2 July 2021. https://aeon.co/essays/asteroid-mining-could-pay-for-space-exploration-and-adventure] //DebateDrills LC

What can we actually do with asteroids? That brings us to my favourite thing about them: their resources. Being an idealistic astrophysicist, my interest is in the money to be made from them. That really is idealistic because, **if we can make a profit mining the asteroids, then doing bigger things in space will become a lot cheaper**. **Capitalism has its faults, but one thing it does well is to make things cheaper.** I want to use it as a tool so that we can build far bigger telescopes than we could practically realise today. What do astronomers want? More light! Bigger telescopes! Asteroid mining could make that dream a reality.

The siren call of asteroids for miners is that **the Main Belt asteroids contain vast amounts of resources.** **The iron found in asteroids adds up to some 10 million times the iron that we have in proven reserves on Earth**. That’s a lot. It’s enough to build many rings of iron girders all the way around Earth’s orbit, along the lines of the science fiction novel Ringworld (1970) by Larry Niven. Not that a ringworld is a sensible thing to make, but it is a really big ring. More plausibly, with that much iron we could build cities in space, as envisaged by the physicist Gerard K O’Neill in the 1970s. Each of these cities would be big enough for a million people to live in. They would be rotating cylinders, and as a citizen of one you would be walking around inside the cylinder’s surface, feeling a fake gravity from the centrifugal force. **That’s the scale of resources we’re talking about.**

**These vast material supplies could make for an era that people call ‘post-scarcity’, where there’s plenty for everyone**, just as there is in the 23rd century of the Star Trek science fiction franchise. **The starship crew on Star Trek don’t work to keep themselves fed and housed, that’s taken for granted. They work for adventure and exploration. Asteroid wealth could help all of us take a step towards that happy state.**

The problem is how to get started. Iron in space is not going to make for giant profits in the short run. On the ground, it sells for less than $200 a ton. It would be worth more in space, but unfortunately there’s no one to buy huge tonnages of iron in space. To adapt the tagline from the Alien movies – ‘In space, no one can hear you sell.’ It certainly isn’t worth bringing space iron back to Earth since the cost of doing so would far exceed the price it scould command. Starting to mine space for resources will have to begin with something so valuable that the cost of obtaining it in space is small by comparison. For now, **the best bets are precious metals and – surprise – water.**

**Precious metals are obvious**. Platinum sells for about $33.5 million a ton, and we know from meteorites that some asteroids are richer in platinum than any mine on Earth. That sounds promising. Platinum sales run at about 200 tons, or billions of dollars, per year. The bad news is that ‘richer than any mine on Earth’ is still concentrations of just tens of grams per ton, and extracting those precious grams isn’t easy. We can’t just bring an asteroid near to Earth to start extracting the platinum where we can have heavy machinery to work on it. That would take way too much fuel because, to carry more mass, rockets have to carry exponentially more fuel; unlike airplanes, they don’t get the oxygen for free from their surroundings, they have to pull it along with them. Any refining of platinum will have to be done robotically out in the native orbit of the asteroid. That’s quite a challenge.

Water is a less obvious money-maker. **The surprise is that water is also worth millions per ton** – if it’s sold in space. **Water in space is really useful**. It’s good for drinking, and the oxygen in it is good for breathing. You can split the hydrogen from the oxygen in H2O and you’ve got rocket fuel, and water is good at absorbing radiation to protect people from cancer-causing cosmic rays. So, in principle, **water in orbit is pretty valuable. The good news is that up to 10 per cent of a water-rich asteroid can be water.** It won’t be simple ice, most likely, but will be bound into clays and other rocks. Even better, **water is much easier to extract than precious metals**. Simply heating up the rock will release water that can then be captured.

#### Their climate change, exploitation, and collapse inevitable arguments ultimately rely on a false premise of growth requiring more resources—capitalist growth can be and is sustainable, prefer this evidence for its empirics

Smith 21—Noah Smith; former assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University; <https://noahpinion.substack.com/p/people-are-realizing-that-degrowth>; September 6 2021; (AG DebateDrills)

First, note that the typical argument against degrowth, which [I laid out in a Bloomberg post](https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-10-23/economic-growth-shouldn-t-be-a-death-sentence-for-earth?sref=R8NfLgwS) a while back, is that we don’t need it; we can raise human living standards without exhausting the planet. This argument was capably put forward by Andy McAfee, in his excellent book [More From Less](https://www.amazon.com/More-Less-Surprising-Learned-Resources_and/dp/1982103574), which you should buy and read. Essentially, the idea that economic growth requires growth in resource use is false; rich countries have started to grow while using less and less of the planet’s most important resources. For example, here is U.S. use of fresh water and various metals, as well as trade-adjusted carbon emissions:

[Chart, bar chart

Description automatically generated](https://cdn.substack.com/image/fetch/f_auto,q_auto:good,fl_progressive:steep/https%3A%2F%2Fbucketeer-e05bbc84-baa3-437e-9518-adb32be77984.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F333353cd-c549-4514-88f7-0b9d06348059_820x530.png)

[Chart, line chart

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So the idea here is that we don’t need degrowth; instead, we can keep raising everyone’s standard of living without exhausting the planet’s resources. Because growth doesn’t just mean using more and more stuff; instead, it can mean finding more efficient ways to use the stuff we have.

Degrowthers have two counters to this. Their first counter, typically, is to show a graph of resource use for the entire world, and show that it’s correlated with global growth. This is a weak response, for two reasons:

Degrowthers have no idea how to combine various resources into an overall measure of resource use, so they [typically go with gross weight](https://www.jasonhickel.org/blog/2018/9/14/why-growth-cant-be-green)