# Round 6 – NC

### NC - OFF

#### The Council for TRIPs should vote to reduce intellectual property protections to delay patent enforcement for cannabis , amending TRIPs to mandate the plan.

#### The United States should:

#### --Publicly rescind support for the WTO waiver

#### -- Veto this motion and refuse to comply

#### The remaining member nations should initiate proceedings against the United States through the World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement Body, which ought to find against the United States. The United States ought to comply with this ruling.

#### The counterplan has the United States oppose the plan but get overruled by the other nations. After the WTO DSB finds against them, they will comply---that solves the case but avoids politics because the US initially opposed the waiver and was forced into it.

#### Counterplan competes ---

#### 1] The plan has the “member nations” act individually, while the counterplan is the WTO through the Council and eventually the DSB. That’s distinct, since member nations are not international bodies.

**Collins Dictionary n.d.** “member nations” RJP, DebateDrills https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/member-nations

member nations

The [United](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/unite) [Nations](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/nation) is an [international](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/international) organization [comprised](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/comprise) of about 180 member nations.

Sociology (1995)

At the Nato [summit](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/summit), he called on all the member nations to [pledge](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/pledge) to [spend](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/spend) at least 2% of their [national](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/national) [income](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/income) on [defence](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/defence" \o "Definition of defence).

Times, Sunday Times (2015)

The [beneficiaries](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/beneficiary) will not be [limited](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/limit) to EU member nations, but [worldwide](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/worldwide).

Times, Sunday Times (2012)

Definition of 'nation'

nation

(neɪʃən)[Explore 'nation' in the dictionary](https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/nation)

COUNTABLE NOUN

A nation is an individual country considered together with its social and political structures.

#### 2] Normal means---it’s countries requesting a waiver, which the counterplan does not do.

James **Bacchus 20**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “An Unnecessary Proposal: A WTO Waiver of Intellectual Property Rights for COVID-19 Vaccines,” CATO, December 16, 2020, <https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/unnecessary-proposal-wto-waiver-intellectual-property-rights-covid-19-vaccines>, RJP, DebateDrills

In a sign of their increasing frustration with global efforts to ensure that all people everywhere will have access to COVID-19 vaccines, several developing countries have asked other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to join them in a sweeping waiver of the intellectual property (IP) rights relating to those vaccines. Their waiver request raises anew the recurring debate within the WTO over the right balance between the protection of IP rights and access in poorer countries to urgently needed medicines. But the last thing the WTO needs is another debate over perceived trade obstacles to public health.

#### 3] Counterplan is neither certain nor immediate---the US reduction hinges on the outcome of DSB. That makes the counterplan competitive.

#### “Resolved” is definite and immediate

Collins 3 Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/resolved

resolved [rɪˈzɒlvd] adj

fixed in purpose or intention; determined

#### Ought and should are used interchangeably.

Anastasia **Koltai 18**. CEO of MyEnglishTeacher, “Difference Between Ought to and Should,” MyEnglishTeacher, September 25, 2018, <https://www.myenglishteacher.eu/blog/difference-between-ought-to-and-should/>, RJP, DebateDrills.

In most cases, SHOULD and OUGHT TO are used interchangeably today. Both SHOULD and OUGHT TO are used to express advice, obligation, or duty.

#### “Should” is immediate

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.[16](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn16)

[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]

[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

### NC - OFF

#### The plan would require US companies to disclose information and waive IP protections---the counterplan has the US resist to avoid political backlash, but that violates WTO disclosure requirements.

Jorge Contreras 21. Presidential Scholar and Professor of Law at the University of Utah with an adjunct appointment in the Department of Human Genetics, JD @ Harvard, “US Support for a WTO Waiver of COVID-19 Intellectual Property – What Does it Mean?” Bill of Health Harvard Law, May 7, 2021, <https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/07/wto-waiver-intellectual-property-covid/>, RJP, DebateDrills

The proposed WTO IP waiver is significant because it includes trade secrets. Thus, under the waiver’s original language, a country that wished to suspend trade secret protection for COVID-19 technology could do so without violating the TRIPS Agreement. Such a country could also, presumably, mandate that foreign companies operating in the country disclose their proprietary manufacturing, storage, and testing information to local producers under a compulsory license.

The details of this disclosure requirement, and any compensation payable to the originator of the information, would need to be worked out in whatever waiver is eventually adopted by the WTO, but the prospect for a mandatory trade secret transfer — something that would be unprecedented in the international arena — is worth watching carefully. [As reported by Intellectual Asset Management on May 4, 2021](https://www.iam-media.com/coronavirus/brazilian-senate-passes-compulsory-covid-19-know-how-licensing-bill), the Brazilian Congress is currently considering legislation that would nullify the patents of any company that fails to disclose know-how and data related to a compulsory COVID-19 patent license. It will also be interesting to see whether the United States stands behind such a requirement, which goes far beyond the compulsory licensing of patents.

Will the U.S. require companies to share their know-how with others?

As noted above, under the waiver, a country could impose a trade secret disclosure requirement on companies operating within its jurisdiction. But that requirement would have little effect on U.S. vaccine producers who do not, themselves, have material operations overseas. Only the U.S. government could require a U.S.-based company to disclose its trade secrets. Would the U.S. impose such a requirement? This is not known, but I think it’s unlikely. It is one thing for the U.S. to agree not to challenge other countries’ compulsory licensing regimes as violations of TRIPS, but a very different thing for the U.S. to issue a compulsory licensing order of its own, particularly in the area of trade secrets, where it would be met with significant internal opposition.

#### That gets litigated through the DSB, which we fiat finding against the United States. The DSB is underutilized currently but using it for major dispute settlement shores it up---that’s key to combat Chinese IP violations.

James **Bacchus 18**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “How the World Trade Organization Can Curb China’s Intellectual Property Transgressions,” CATO, March 22, 2018, <https://www.cato.org/blog/how-world-trade-organization-can-curb-chinas-intellectual-property-transgressions>, RJP, DebateDrills.

Quite rightly, President Donald Trump and his Administration are targeting the transgressions of China against US intellectual property rights in their unfolding trade strategy. But why not use the WTO rules that offer a real remedy for the United States without resorting to illegal unilateral action outside the WTO?  
  
Seventeen years after China joined the WTO, China still falls considerably short of fulfilling its WTO obligations to protect intellectual property. About 70 percent of the software in use in China, valued at nearly $8.7 billion, is pirated. The annual cost to the US economy worldwide from pirated software, counterfeit goods, and the theft of trade secrets could be as high as $600 billion, with China at the top of the IP infringement list. China is the source of 87 percent of the counterfeit goods seized upon entry into the United States.  
  
One possible response by the United States is the one the Trump Administration seems to be taking: slapping billions of dollars of tariffs on imports of more than 100 Chinese products through unilateral trade action. Given its protectionist predilections, taking this approach is surely tempting to the Trump Administration. Doing so will, however, harm American workers, businesses, and consumers, and contribute to further turmoil in the global economy.

The results will likely include retaliation by China against the goods and services of American companies and workers; lawful economic sanctions imposed by China on American exports to China after the US lost to China in WTO cases; the hidden tax of higher prices for American consumers; less competitiveness in the US market and in other markets for American companies that depend on Chinese imports as intermediate goods in production; and doubtless still more American and global economic landmines from the downward spiral of tit-for-tat in international trade confrontations.  
  
These tariffs are not only self-defeating and counter-productive; they are also illegal under international law. Where an international dispute falls within the scope of coverage of the WTO treaty, taking unilateral action without first going to WTO dispute settlement for a legal ruling on whether there is a WTO violation is, in and of itself, a violation of the treaty. The WTO treaty establishes mandatory jurisdiction for the WTO dispute settlement system for all treaty-related disputes between and among WTO Members. The WTO Appellate Body has explained, “Article 23.1 of the (WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) imposes a general obligation to redress a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements only by recourse to the rules and procedures of the DSU, and not through unilateral action.”  
  
Thus, the United States is not permitted by the international rules to which it has long since agreed to be the judge and the jury in its own case. Imposing tariffs on Chinese products without first obtaining a WTO ruling that Chinese actions are inconsistent with China’s WTO obligations is a clear violation by the United States of its WTO obligations to China – as WTO jurists will doubtless rule when China responds to the tariffs by challenging the tariffs in the WTO.  
  
Such a legal loss by the United States, with all its unforeseeable economic and geopolitical consequences, can be avoided while still confronting Chinese IP violations effectively. Before resorting to unilateral action outside the WTO and in violation of international law, the United States should take a closer look at the substantial rights it enjoys under the WTO treaty for protecting US intellectual property against abuse.  
  
Potential remedies in the WTO exist and should not be ignored. These remedies can be enforced through the pressure of WTO economic sanctions. WTO rules do not yet cover all the irritants that must be addressed in US-China trade relations. Even so, instead of just concluding that there are no adequate remedies under WTO rules to help stop IP infringement, the United States should first try to use the remedies in rules we have already negotiated that bind China along with all other WTO Members.  
  
A number of these rules have not yet been tested against China or any other country – which is not proof they will not work. Generally, when tried for the first time, WTO rules have been found to work, and, generally, when China has been found to be acting inconsistently with its WTO obligations, it has complied with WTO rulings. The actual extent of Chinese compliance with WTO judgments can be questioned; in some instances it is seen by some as only “paper compliance.” But whether any one WTO rule can in fact be enforced cannot be known if no WTO Member bothers to try to enforce it.  
  
The WTO rules in the WTO Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – the so-called TRIPS Agreement – are unique among WTO rules because they impose affirmative obligations. Yet, this affirmative aspect of WTO intellectual property rules has been largely unexplored in WTO dispute settlement. In particular, WTO Members have so far refrained from challenging other WTO Members for failing to enforce intellectual property rights.  
  
On enforcement, Article 41.1 of the TRIPS Agreement imposes an affirmative obligation on all WTO Members: “Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures… are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.”  
  
Note that this “shall” be done by all WTO Members; it is mandatory for compliance with their WTO obligations. And yet what does this obligation mean by requiring that effective actions against infringements must be “available”? Is this obligation fulfilled by having sound laws on the books, as is generally the case with China? Or must those laws also be enforced effectively in practice, which is often not the case with China?  
  
The Appellate Body has said that “making something *available* means making it ‘obtainable,’ putting it ‘within one’s reach’ and ‘at one’s disposal’ in a way that has sufficient form or efficacy.” Thus, simply having a law on the books is not enough. That law must have real force in the real world of commerce. This ruling by the Appellate Body related to the use of the word “available” in Article 42 of the TRIPS Agreement and to a legal claim seeking fair and equitable access to civil judicial procedures. Yet the same reasoning applies equally to the enforcement of substantive rights under Article 41.  
  
In the past, the United States has challenged certain parts of the overall Chinese legal system for intellectual property protection – and successfully – in WTO dispute settlement. Despite its overall concerns about enforcement by China of US intellectual property rights, the United States has not, however, challenged the Chinese system as a whole in the WTO. Instead of indulging in the illegality of unilateral tariffs outside the legal framework of the WTO, the Trump Administration should initiate a comprehensive legal challenge in the WTO, not merely, as before, to the bits and pieces of particular Chinese IP enforcement, but rather *to the entirety of the Chinese IP enforcement system*.  
  
To be sure, a systemic challenge by the United States to the application of all China’s inadequate measures relating to intellectual property protection would put the WTO dispute settlement system to a test. It would, what’s more, put both China and the United States to the test of their commitment to the WTO and, especially, to a rules-based world trading system.  
  
As Trump’s trade lawyers will hasten to say, a systemic IP case against China in the WTO would also involve a perhaps unprecedented amount of fact-gathering. It would necessitate an outpouring of voluminous legal pleadings. It would, furthermore, force the WTO Members and the WTO jurists to face some fundamental questions about the rules-based trading system. Yet it could also provide the basis for fashioning a legal remedy that would in the end be mutually acceptable to both countries, and could therefore help prevent commercial conflict and reduce a significant obstacle to mutually beneficial US-China relations.

#### China is engaging in rampant IP theft---shoring up WTO dispute resolution will determine the trajectory of Chinese theft.

James **Bacchus et al 18**. Member of the [Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies](https://www.cato.org/herbert-stiefel-center-trade-policy-studies), the Distinguished University Professor of Global Affairs and director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity at the University of Central Florida. He was a founding judge and was twice the chairman—the chief judge—of the highest court of world trade, the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization in Geneva, Switzerland. “Disciplining China’s Trade Practices at the WTO: How WTO Complaints Can Help Make China More Market‐​Oriented,” CATO, November 16, 2018, <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more>, RJP, DebateDrills

Unquestionably, pervasive intellectual property violations are a threat to millions of U.S. jobs in critical innovative U.S. industries. The U.S. International Trade Administration has estimated that U.S. IP-intensive industries doing business in China have lost about $48 billion in sales, royalties, and license fees to various forms of encroachment on their intellectual property rights. These U.S. firms have spent $4.8 billion to address possible Chinese IP infringements. An improvement in intellectual property protection and enforcement in China to levels comparable to those in the United States would likely translate into 923,000 new jobs in the United States.[15](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-015) And these most recent numbers are from 2011—before the recent intensification of China’s mercantilist industrial strategy.

After 17 years in the WTO, China still falls far short of fulfilling its WTO obligations to protect copyrights, trademarks, patents, and other intellectual property rights. Millions of Chinese live on the illegal gains of widespread counterfeiting of U.S. and other foreign products. The Chinese, for example, are “addicted to bootleg software.”[16](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-016) According to the Business Software Alliance, about 70 percent of the software used in China, valued at nearly $8.7 billion, is pirated.[17](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-017) The annual cost to the U.S. economy worldwide from pirated software, counterfeit goods, and the theft of trade secrets “could be as high as $600 billion.”[18](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-018) China “remains the world’s principal IP infringer,” accounting, for example, for 87 percent of the counterfeit goods seized upon entry into the United States.[19](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-019)

Before taking unilateral action outside the WTO in response to widespread Chinese IP infringements, the United States should take a closer look at the substantial rights it enjoys under the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement for protecting U.S. intellectual property against theft and other abuses, in particular those obligations related to the domestic enforcement of these protections. Potential remedies in the WTO exist and should not be ignored, and these remedies can be enforced through the pressure of WTO economic sanctions.

A more specific obligation related to intellectual property is that American companies have, in effect, been forced to turn over their technology to Chinese partners—in some cases by revealing their trade secrets—in exchange for being allowed to do business in China and have access to the booming Chinese market. Here, Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement, which establishes a WTO obligation for the “Protection of Undisclosed Information,”[20](https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/disciplining-chinas-trade-practices-wto-how-wto-complaints-can-help-make-china-more#endnote-020) can help. The United States was among the leaders in advocating the inclusion of Article 39 in the TRIPS Agreement, but the United States has, to date, not initiated an action in WTO dispute settlement claiming a Chinese violation of this WTO obligation.

Beyond intellectual property, there have been long-standing though somewhat vague allegations from U.S. industry groups that China forces foreign companies who wish to operate in China to make investments through joint ventures, and to then transfer their technology to their Chinese partners. As they describe it, transferring technology to Chinese companies is often a condition for the ability to make an investment there. Specific details of these arrangements are difficult to uncover. The companies involved may be reluctant to complain because they fear having their investment permission revoked by the Chinese government. All the same, in response to the USTR’s request for comments under Section 301 regarding China’s trade practices, a wide range of organizations have identified forced technology transfer as a concern. There is a specific provision of China’s WTO Accession Protocol that addresses the issue of forced technology transfer. The United States should invoke it as the basis of a WTO complaint.

Finally, one of the most frequently raised concerns about Chinese trade practices is the Chinese government’s provision of subsidies to both state-owned enterprises and private companies. These subsidies are offered through a variety of programs, including the Made in China 2025 initiative and its specific implementing measures. Fortunately, the WTO has extensive and detailed rules on subsidies that can be used to challenge China’s behavior. WTO Members have brought several complaints against Chinese subsidies already, including an ongoing case related to agriculture subsidies (see Appendix 1), and there are additional complaints still to be brought.

#### Stopping tech stealing is key to avoid war

Timothy R. **Heath 18**. RAND Senior Defense and International Analyst, “Avoiding “Avoiding U.S.-China Competition Is Futile: Why the Best Option Is to Manage Strategic Rivalry”; Asia Policy; Vol 13 No 2; April 2018, RJP, DebateDrills

This article argues that the structural drivers of U.S.-China competition are too deep to resolve through cooperative engagement and that policymakers must instead accept the reality of strategic rivalry and aim to manage it at a lower level of intensity. main argument Rising tensions between China and the U.S. have spurred fears that the two countries could end up in conflict or recreate the Cold War. To avoid these outcomes, analysts have proposed ways to defuse competition and promote cooperation. However, because these arguments do not address the structural drivers underpinning U.S.-China competition, such proposals are unlikely to end the rivalry. Conflict is not inevitable, however, and aggressive strategies that unnecessarily aggravate the sources of rivalry are likely to prove dangerously counterproductive. The best option at this point is, paradoxically, for the U.S. to accept the reality of the growing strategic rivalry and manage it at a lower level of intensity. policy implications • Maintaining a technological edge is critical for the U.S. to successfully manage the rivalry with China. Policies should be pursued to ensure that the U.S. continues to attract and nurture the best science and technology talent and retains its status as the global leader in technology. • To compete with China’s narrative about leading regional integration, the U.S. should both put forth a compelling vision for the region that encompasses widely held economic, security, and political values and continue to bolster its diplomatic and military positions in Asia. • To maintain the U.S.-China rivalry at a stable level, policymakers in both countries should prioritize measures that discourage the mobilization of popular sentiment against the other country and encourage cultural exchanges. • U.S.-China competition will likely become increasingly entwined with rivalries between China and U.S. allies and partners such as Japan and India. U.S. policymakers will need to take into account the independent dynamics of those separate rivalries when managing relations with China. The United States and China find themselves increasingly enmeshed in a strategic rivalry, the basic nature of which remains poorly understood in the United States. To be sure, disagreements between the two countries have gained widespread attention. Disputes involving Chinese confrontations with U.S. allies and partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan have frequently grabbed the headlines. At other times, disagreements over Chinese trade practices and U.S. military activities in the South China Sea have occasioned discord. All these sources of conflict are genuine, but they mask the main drivers of rivalry, which are twofold. First, the United States and China are locked in a contest for primacy—most clearly in Asia and probably globally as well. The United States has been the dominant power, and China seeks to eventually supplant it. By definition, two different states cannot simultaneously share primacy at either the regional or global level. Second, economic, demographic, and military trajectories suggest that China has the potential to contend in a significant way for leadership at the global systemic level. At this level, the most decisive competition will be for technological leadership. Should China supplant the United States as the world’s premier country in terms of technology, its claim to regional and global supremacy will be difficult to deny. And once it has gained that supremacy, China will be well positioned to restructure institutional arrangements to privilege itself and disadvantage the United States. Although this competition is occurring simultaneously at both levels, observers have focused primarily on the struggle for primacy at the regional level and overlooked or downplayed the competition at the global systemic level.1 To counter China’s pursuit of regional primacy, the United States has bolstered its alliances in Asia (albeit inconsistently), expanded diplomatic outreach to China and rising powers in Southeast Asia, and revised its military posture—efforts captured by President Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.” President Donald Trump may have abandoned the rebalance, but many of the related initiatives remain more or less in place.2 China’s challenge at the global systemic level, especially in the field of technology, has received less attention. Confidence in the proven U.S. ability to produce new technologies and facile assumptions about the difficulties China will face in promoting innovation in new industries have led many to dismiss the challenge posed by China. **But the contest for technological leadership is actually even more consequential than that for regional primacy.** Should China succeed in surpassing the United States as the world’s technological leader, U.S. diplomacy and military power will not suffice to hold the line either in Asia or around the globe**.** Under those conditions, countries throughout the world, including U.S. allies in Asia, will be forced to come to terms with the new leading economy. Military power projection could be far less relevant as China moves to consolidate its leading status at both the regional and global levels in such a scenario. Accordingly, although the United States cannot abandon its efforts to bolster its diplomatic and military position in Asia, the country must step up its efforts to strengthen its faltering lead in new technology development. While China clearly grasps the stakes, it is not clear that the United States does. For example, China’s government has promoted R&D into quantum computing. The investment appears to be paying off, as the country has leaped ahead of the United States in developing quantum communications.3 Similarly, the U.S. Congress has proposed to dispense with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles, even as China pushes ahead in its plan to become the lead producer of this technology.4 And while the U.S. government seeks to restrict immigration and discourage foreign students from attending U.S. universities (and staying after they receive their advanced training), China has revised its policies to welcome foreigners, prioritizing those with science and technology expertise. Moreover, Chinese investment in basic R&D is rapidly catching up to that of the United States.5 Studies have also noted a shrinking U.S. lead in science and technology as such investment is beginning to bear fruit.6 Similarly, the United States has lost its once-undisputed lead in the per capita number of engineers and scientists.7 Understanding the nature of the U.S.-China rivalry at the regional and global systemic levels, as well as how these two levels interact with one another, is essential if the United States is to successfully manage the challenge posed by China in a manner that avoids war. This study aims to contribute to that understanding. The article is organized into the following sections: u pp. 95–102 provide an overview of the growing rivalry between China and the United States, including a discussion of the meaning and role of strategic rivalry in interstate conflict and a comparison with the U.S.-China rivalry during the Cold War. u pp. 102–4 review the dynamics of the rivalry at the regional systemic level. u pp. 104–10 analyze the dynamics of the rivalry at the global systemic level. u pp. 110–15 examine why proposals to avoid rivalry through cooperation or aggressive competition are unlikely to succeed. u pp. 115–19 discuss the idea of strategic rivalry management and offer recommendations on ways to sustain the rivalry at a lower level of intensity the growing rivalry between the united states and china Strains between China and the United States have deepened in the past few years over a proliferating array of issues. President Trump has stepped up accusations against China of unfair trade practices and inadequate pressure on North Korea. He also provoked controversy early in his term when he floated the idea of increasing official contacts with Taiwan, which Beijing considers a renegade province.8 These disputes add to tensions that had expanded under President Obama, who moved to strengthen U.S. alliances in Asia, promote a regional trade pact, criticize Chinese behavior in the cyber and maritime domains, and shift more military assets to the Asia-Pacific as part of the rebalance to Asia strategy.9 China has in turn dismissed U.S. concerns about the construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea, intensified its criticism of U.S. security leadership in Asia, and tightened its grip on disputed maritime territories.10 The baleful state of bilateral relations has spurred plenty of finger-pointing. On the Chinese side, officials denounce the United States’ “Cold War mindset” and warn of conflict if Washington does not adjust its policies.11 A 2015 defense white paper described an “intensifying competition” between the great powers.12 Military officials and many Chinese analysts regard increasing tension between the two countries as unavoidable, although they do not regard war as likely. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deputy chief of staff Qi Jianguo commented that “no conflict and no confrontation does not mean no struggle” between China and the United States.13 According to Chinese official media, polls in China suggest a large majority believes that the United States intends to pursue a containment policy.14 Reflecting this point of view, Niu Xinchun, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, argued that the “greatest obstacle to the further integration of emerging countries such as China into the international system comes from the United States.”15 Western officials and commentators tend to blame China for current strains. Senior U.S. leaders have criticized “assertive” Chinese behavior, while some analysts blame Xi Jinping for pushing a more confrontational set of policies.16 Other Western observers worry that a further souring of relations could lead to conflict.17 But even if war remains unlikely, the deepening tensions increase the risks of miscalculation, crises, and potential military clashes involving the world’s two largest powers. Echoing a view widely held among U.S. foreign policy experts and officials, former CIA director General Michael Hayden has warned that mishandling the U.S.-China relationship could be “catastrophic.”18 Rivalry at the Heart of the U.S.-China Relationship This widespread concern reflects a realistic appraisal of the dangers inherent in the U.S.-China relationship. But developing successful policies to manage an increasingly sensitive and complex situation requires an accurate assessment of the phenomenon of interstate rivalry that lies at the heart of that relationship. Rivalry is a concept that, while widely acknowledged, remains poorly understood. To be sure, most experts take for granted the idea that powerful nations compete for status and influence, and they acknowledge the danger posed by a rising power’s challenge to a status quo power. Yet investigation into the phenomenon of rivalry too often stops at these well-trodden findings. Less often discussed are the conclusions regarding the dynamics of rivalry that experts on conflict studies have arrived at within the past few years. Much of this scholarship draws from improvements to the analyses and data regarding interstate crisis and conflict.19 This research has generated useful and interesting insights regarding the start and conclusion of rivalries, crises, and war, although these remain largely unexplored outside academic circles. Analysts have established, for example, that rivalry is perhaps the most important driver of interstate conflict. As defined by political scientists, “rivals” are states that regard each other as “enemies,” sources of real or potential threat, and as competitors. At the root of rivalries thus lie disputes over incompatible goals and perceptions that countries possess both the ability (real or potential) and the intention to harm each other. Wars have historically tended to be fought by pairings of these states and their allies. Rivals have opposed each other in 77% of wars since 1816 and in over 90% of wars since 1945.20 Not only are rivals more likely to fight than non-rivals, but rivals also have a tendency to be recidivists because they are unable to resolve their political differences on the battlefield. Yet that does not always discourage them from trying to do so repeatedly. Rivals that cannot prevail due to parity frequently compete for advantage by building internal strength through arms racing or by leveraging external power through the strengthening of alliances and partnerships. Rivals are also prone to serial militarized crises**.** Mutual perceptions of each other as hostile enemies and the inconclusive outcome of previous militarized disputes typically fuel a pattern of recurrent crises characterized by deepening resentment, distrust, and growing willingness to risk escalation. Studies have also established that the risk of conflict increases sharply after three episodes of militarized crises.21 Rivalries do not progress in a linear direction, however. Their intensity can wax and wane in response to shocks and other important developments. Periods of relative stability can alternate with turbulent periods of tension and conflict. Similarly, cooperative activities can be interspersed with periods of acute tension and hostility. Nevertheless, the link between rivalry, crises, and interstate conflict is pervasive. Drawing from these sources, one can describe the Sino-U.S. relationship as a rivalry characterized as a competition between two major powers over incompatible goals regarding their status, leadership, and influence over a particular region—in this case principally the Asia-Pacific. The dynamics of this type of strategic rivalry differ in significant ways from the far more numerous rivalries over territory that have characterized conflict between so many countries, especially weaker and poorer ones. In contrast with rivalries over territories, strategic rivals do not necessarily share borders, although allies of one power may be engaged in a territorial dispute with the other major power. Strategic rivalries among major powers tend to be especially long-lived, with the average enduring for about 55 years.22 Strategic rivalries are incredibly complex phenomena that include overlapping and often reinforcing layers of disputes over leadership, status, and territory between the principal rivals and their allies. Such rivalries are almost always multilateral affairs that also involve allies and partners, some of which have their own rivalries with the other side. Competition in the economic, political, and military domains can serve as expressions as well as drivers of rivalry, as can sports and cultural competition. Strategic rivalries can be confined to one region, with the basic conflict reducible in some respects to which rival will occupy the top rung of the regional hierarchy. In other cases, however, a rivalry can span regional and global domains either sequentially or simultaneously. The U.S.-China rivalry, for instance, is already both a regional and, to a lesser extent, a global rivalry, but there is still considerable room for competition to expand. The complex and overlapping nature of the disputes makes strategic rivalries extremely crisis- and conflict-prone. Strategic rivalries come in a grim package deal that includes strained and hostile relations, serial crises, and in some cases wars. The comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the disputes also explains why such rivalries have proved so durable and why their wars have been so devastating. Conflict between strategic rivals has historically occasioned the most destructive wars, of which World Wars I and II are the most recent examples. The fact that experts at the time of each historic episode of systemic conflict consistently underestimated the duration or extent of war offers cold comfort to analysts today who seek to predict the trajectory of any conflict that might involve China and the United States. Comparisons of the Current Environment with the U.S.-China Rivalry during the Cold War How did the two countries arrive at this position? The most widely accepted narrative argues that China’s rapid economic growth has provided the resources with which it can press demands on long unresolved issues such as unification with Taiwan. China and the United States may have enjoyed stable relations in the 1980s when they cooperated on a limited basis against the Soviet Union, but that foundation of cooperation eroded considerably once the Soviet bloc dissolved in the early 1990s. Moreover, China’s rapid growth in economic power has given the country fresh resources to press its own demands on the United States and U.S. allies. By 2010, China’s economy had outpaced that of Japan to become the second-largest in the world.23 The persistence of long-standing sources of antagonism, such as the U.S. security partnership with Taiwan, has both reflected and aggravated a broader competition for leadership. For its own reasons, Washington has resisted Beijing’s demands, and the result has been growing fear and distrust.24 The intensifying rivalry between the rising power and the status quo leader is as old as antiquity itself. Indeed, Graham Allison coined the term “Thucydides trap” to describe such a situation, a term that he subsequently applied to the current U.S.-China situation.25 The popular narrative is not entirely incorrect, yet in some ways it remains incomplete. A closer look at history reminds us that antagonism between China and the United States is not unprecedented. In the 1950s and 1960s, the two countries engaged in an intense strategic competition for status and influence in Asia, one that occasionally burned hot, as it did when they clashed on the Korean Peninsula or more indirectly in Vietnam. This Cold War–era rivalry saw a complex network of competing alliances and partnerships, principally in Asia. The United States supported Taiwan and South Korea in bitter disputes with China and its allies, North Korea and the Soviet Union. This rivalry terminated in the 1970s primarily due to Beijing’s decision to counter a growing Soviet menace and the United States’ decision to pursue China as a potential partner for its own rivalry with the Soviet Union. But the existence of a period of intense U.S.-Chinese tension and competition provides a helpful baseline of comparison. What requires explanation is not the fact that the United States and China are engaged in a rivalry but the difference between today’s rivalry and that of the Cold War. What distinguishes the rivalry today from that of the earlier period is both the closer parity in relative power—albeit still more potential than real—between the two countries and the comprehensiveness, complexity, and systemic nature of the disputes between them. Paradoxically, these features make the current rivalry potentially far more threatening to the United States, despite the fact that so far U.S.-China relations have remained peaceful, and even though the U.S. and Chinese militaries fought each other in the Korean War. The dangerous potential of the current rivalry ultimately owes to the risk that China could rise to the position of global system leader and subordinate the United States accordingly. As has happened in previous power transitions, China as a system leader could exploit existing arrangements to its benefit and to the detriment of the outgoing leader, the United States. Due to the enormous rewards that accrue to a systemic leader and the high costs for the state that loses this position**,** struggles for global leadership have historically proved to be especially destructive. The possibility that China and the United States could find themselves in a similar struggle, while unlikely at this point, cannot be ruled out given the reality of the relative decline in U.S. power and the concomitant increase in Chinese comprehensive national power. At the most basic level, this fact may be measured superficially by the U.S. share of world GDP, which eroded from 40% in 1950 to 16% in 2014, adjusted for purchasing power parity. Over the same period, China’s share expanded from around 5% to 17%.26 An important consequence of the narrowing of the gap in comprehensive power has been an intensifying competition for leadership in the international economic and political order. In this way, the popular discussion of the Thucydides trap correctly recognizes the dangers of the U.S.-China competition. This feature contrasts sharply with the previous episode of rivalry. In the 1950s and 1960s, the asymmetry in power meant that the United States and China competed for influence and even clashed militarily in countries along China’s borders, but rarely elsewhere. As a largely rural, impoverished country, China had little stake in the system of global trade promoted by the industrialized West. Excluded from the United Nations, Maoist China also lacked the institutional ability to influence geopolitics and project power much beyond its immediate environs—and even that capability was sorely handicapped. Outside Asia, the United States faced minimal competition from China and generally regarded the Soviet Union as a more pressing threat. By contrast, the current competition features a China fully enmeshed in a political and economic order led by the United States. While generally supportive of this order, China is also seeking to revise aspects of the regional and international order that it regards as obstacles to the country’s revitalization as a great power. The main theater of this competition for influence and leadership is the Asia-Pacific, as it was in the Cold War, but U.S.-China rivalry increasingly is expanding globally. Moreover, unlike the largely military, regional, and ideological Cold War competition, the current contest is far more multifaceted and comprehensive in nature; it includes military, economic, technological, and political dimensions. The following two sections review the state of the competition at both the regional and the global systemic levels. the u.s.-china rivalry at the regional level At the regional level, U.S.-China competition spans the political, economic, and military realms. Politically, the two countries have feuded over the role of liberal values and ideals, a dispute that widened after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. However, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis elevated the potential threat of conflict between the two countries and may therefore be regarded as the starting point of the current rivalry. Coinciding with impressive gains in China’s economic and military power following two decades of market reforms, the standoff saw Washington and Beijing deploy military assets to back up their respective positions regarding Taiwan’s right to hold a presidential election, elevating the risk of a clash. Since then, the competition for political influence and leadership has intensified. In 2011, the United States announced its rebalance to Asia, which was aimed in part at shoring up U.S. alliances, partnerships, and influence.27 Although on the surface Washington has abandoned the effort, the Trump administration has reintroduced a vision for Asia’s economic and security order premised on values favorable to U.S. interests.28 The 2017 National Security Strategy stated, for example, that the United States upholds a “free and open Indo-Pacific.”29 Beijing, by contrast, has increased its efforts to advance a vision for a regional order premised on Chinese leadership. In recent years, China has promoted major economic and geostrategic initiatives to deepen Asia’s economic integration through the Belt and Road Initiative, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and other initiatives.30 In 2017, China for the first time issued a white paper that outlined the government’s vision for Asia-Pacific security. The paper stated that China takes the advancement of regional prosperity and stability “as its own responsibility.”31 These policies build on directives issued by Xi Jinping in 2013, when he called for policies to bolster China’s attractiveness as a regional leader.32 Economically, the two countries are competing over the evolution of Asia’s economic future—a region anticipated to drive global growth in coming decades. Both countries are also competing to shape the terms of trade. President Trump may have abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but his advisers have advocated other measures to shape favorable trade terms.33 Meanwhile, China has stepped up advocacy of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a proposed free trade agreement for the region that excludes the United States.34 China also has promoted the AIIB, while the United States and Japan continue to instead support the Asian Development Bank.35 Militarily, the growing arms race and the establishment of rival security institutions stand among the most obvious manifestations of an increasing competition in this domain. China and the United States have designed an array of military capabilities and doctrines partly aimed at each other. The PLA has developed weapons systems to counter potential U.S. intervention in any contingency along China’s periphery, which the United States has in turn sought to counter with its own innovations, such as the Joint Operational Access Concept.36 U.S. secretaries of defense Chuck Hagel and Ashton Carter outlined a “third offset” strategy to compete with China and Russia in military technology.37 To promote regional security, the United States has strengthened its military alliances and partnerships, while China has strengthened ties with Russia and argued that regional security is best protected through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, and other Chinese-led institutions. In 2014, Xi indirectly rebuked the United States for seeking to bolster its security leadership in the region, stating that “it is for the people of Asia to uphold the security of Asia.”38

### NC – OFF

#### Settler colonialism is the permeating structure of the nation-state which requires the elimination of indigenous life and land via the occupation of settlers. The appropriation of land turns Natives into ghosts and chattel slaves into excess labor.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40)

Our intention in this descriptive exercise is not be exhaustive, or even inarguable; instead, we wish to emphasize that (a) decolonization will take a different shape in each of these contexts - though they can overlap - and that (b) neither external nor internal colonialism adequately describe the form of colonialism which operates in the United States or other nation-states in which the colonizer comes to stay. **Settler colonialism operates through internal/external colonial modes simultaneously because there is no spatial separation between metropole and colony.** For example, **in the United States, many Indigenous peoples have been forcibly removed from their homelands onto reservations, indentured, and abducted into state custody, signaling the form of colonization as simultaneously internal (via boarding schools and other biopolitical modes of control) and external (via uranium mining on Indigenous land in the US Southwest and oil extraction on Indigenous land in Alaska) with a frontier (the US military still nicknames all enemy territory “Indian Country”).** **The horizons of the settler colonial nation-state** are total and **require** a mode of **total appropriation of Indigenous life and land**, rather than the selective expropriation of profit-producing fragments. **Settler colonialism is different from other forms of colonialism** in that **settlers come with the intention of making a new home on the land,** a homemaking **that insists on settler sovereignty over all things** in their new domain. Thus, **relying** solely **on postcolonial literatures or** theories of **coloniality that ignore settler colonialism will not help to envision the shape that decolonization must take in settler colonial contexts**. Within settler colonialism, the most important concern is land/water/air/subterranean earth (land, for shorthand, in this article.) **Land is what is most valuable, contested, required**. **This is both because the settlers make** Indigenous **land their** new home and **source of capital,** and also because **the disruption of Indigenous relationships to land represents** a profound **epistemic, ontological, cosmological violence**. **This violence is not temporally contained in the arrival of the settler but is reasserted each day of occupation.** This is why Patrick Wolfe (1999) emphasizes that **settler colonialism is a structure and not an event**. In the process of settler colonialism, **land is remade into property and human relationships to land are restricted to the relationship of the owner to his property**. Epistemological, ontological, and cosmological relationships to land are interred, indeed made pre-modern and backward. Made savage. **In order for the settlers to make a place their home, they must destroy and disappear the Indigenous peoples that live there.** Indigenous peoples are those who have creation stories, not colonization stories, about how we/they came to be in a particular place - indeed how we/they came to be a place. **Our/their relationships to land comprise our/their epistemologies, ontologies, and cosmologies.** For the settlers, Indigenous peoples are in the way and, in the destruction of Indigenous peoples, Indigenous communities, and over time and through law and policy, Indigenous peoples’ claims to land under settler regimes, land is recast as property and as a resource. **Indigenous peoples must be erased, must be made into ghosts** (Tuck and Ree, forthcoming). At the same time, **settler colonialism involves the subjugation and forced labor of chattel slaves, whose bodies and lives become the property, and who are kept landless.** Slavery in settler colonial contexts is distinct from other forms of indenture whereby excess labor is extracted from persons. First, **chattels are commodities of labor and therefore it is the slave’s person that is the excess.** Second, unlike workers who may aspire to own land, the slave’s very presence on the land is already an excess that must be dis-located. Thus, **the slave is a desirable commodity but the person underneath is imprisonable, punishable, and murderable. The violence of keeping/killing the chattel slave makes them deathlike monsters in the settler imagination**; they are reconfigured/disfigured as the threat, the razor’s edge of safety and terror. The settler, if known by his actions and how he justifies them, sees himself as holding dominion over the earth and its flora and fauna, as the anthropocentric normal, and as more developed, more human, more deserving than other groups or species. The settler is making a new "home" and that home is rooted in a homesteading worldview where the wild land and wild people were made for his benefit. He can only make his identity as a settler by making the land produce, and produce excessively, because "civilization" is defined as production in excess of the "natural" world (i.e. in excess of the sustainable production already present in the Indigenous world). In order for excess production, he needs excess labor, which he cannot provide himself. **The chattel slave serves as that excess labor, labor that can never be paid because payment would have to be in the form of property (land).** The settler's wealth is land, or a fungible version of it, and so payment for labor is impossible.6 The settler positions himself as both superior and normal; the settler is natural, whereas the Indigenous inhabitant and the chattel slave are unnatural, even supernatural. **Settlers are not immigrants.** Immigrants are beholden to the Indigenous laws and epistemologies of the lands they migrate to. Settlers become the law, supplanting Indigenous laws and epistemologies. Therefore, settler nations are not immigrant nations (See also A.J. Barker, 2009). Not unique, the United States, as a settler colonial nation-state, also operates as an empire - utilizing external forms and internal forms of colonization simultaneous to the settler colonial project**.** This means, and this is perplexing to some, that dispossessed people are brought onto seized Indigenous land through other colonial projects. Other colonial projects include enslavement, as discussed, but also military recruitment, low-wage and high-wage labor recruitment (such as agricultural workers and overseas-trained engineers), and displacement/migration (such as the coerced immigration from nations torn by U.S. wars or devastated by U.S. economic policy). **In this set of settler colonial relations, colonial subjects who are displaced by external colonialism, as well as racialized and minoritized by internal colonialism, still occupy and settle stolen Indigenous land. Settlers are diverse, not just** of **white European descent, and include people of color**, even from other colonial contexts. **This tightly wound set of conditions and racialized, globalized relations exponentially complicates what is meant by decolonization, and by solidarity, against settler colonial forces.** Decolonization in exploitative colonial situations could involve the seizing of imperial wealth by the postcolonial subject. In settler colonial situations, seizing imperial wealth is inextricably tied to settlement and re-invasion. Likewise, the promise of integration and civil rights is predicated on securing a share of a settler-appropriated wealth (as well as expropriated ‘third-world’ wealth). Decolonization in a settler context is fraught because empire, settlement, and internal colony have no spatial separation. Each of these features of settler colonialism in the US context - empire, settlement, and internal colony - make it a site of contradictory decolonial desires7. **Decolonization as metaphor allows people to equivocate** these **contradictory decolonial desires because it turns decolonization into an empty signifier to be filled by any track towards liberation.** In reality, **the tracks walk all over land/people in settler contexts.** Though the details are not fixed or agreed upon, in our view, **decolonization** in the settler colonial context **must involve the repatriation of land simultaneous to the recognition of how land and relations to land have always already been differently understood and enacted; that is, all of the land, and not just symbolically.** **This is precisely why decolonization is** necessarily **unsettling, especially across lines of solidarity**. “Decolonization never takes place unnoticed” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). **Settler colonialism and its decolonization implicates and unsettles everyone.**

#### The case is NOT offense – their scenarios for “extinction” are metaphorical invocations that sustain settler futurity – only the alternative can prevent them and other ongoing extinctions

Mitchell 17 (Audra Mitchell, CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Associate Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, former Senior Lecturer in International Relations, department of Politics, University of York, Ph.D. Queen’s University of Belfast, “Decolonizing against extinction part II: Extinction is not a metaphor – it is literally genocide,” Worldly, 9-27-2017, <https://worldlyir.wordpress.com/2017/09/27/decolonizing-against-extinction-part-ii-extinction-is-not-a-metaphor-it-is-literally-genocide/>)KMM

Extinction is not a metaphor… Extinction has become an emblem of Western, and white-dominated, fears about ‘the end of the(ir) world’. This scientific term is saturated with emotional potency, stretched and contorted to embody almost any nightmare, from climate change to asteroid strikes. In academic and public contexts alike, it is regularly interchanged with other terms and concepts – for instance, ‘species death’, global warming or ecological collapse. Diffused into sublime scales – mass extinctions measured in millions of (Gregorian calendar) years, a planet totalized by the threat of nuclear destruction – ‘extinction’ has become an empty superlative, one that that gestures to an abstract form of unthinkability. It teases Western subjects with images of generalized demise that might, if it gets bad enough, even threaten us, or the figure of ‘humanity’ that we enshrine as a universal. This figure of ‘humanity’, derived from Western European enlightenment ideals, emphasizes individual, autonomous actors who are fully integrated into the global market system; who are responsible citizens of nation-states; who conform to Western ideas of health and well-being; who partake of ‘culture’; who participate in democratic state-based politics; who refrain from physical violence; and who manage their ‘resources’ responsibly (Mitchell 2014). Oddly, exposure to the fear of extinction contributes to the formation and bolstering of contemporary Western subjects. Contemplating the sublime destruction of ‘humanity’ offers the thrill of abjection: the perverse pleasure derived from exposure to something by which one is revolted. Claire Colebrook detects this thrill-seeking impulse in the profusion of Western blockbuster films and TV shows that imagine and envision the destruction of earth, or at least of ‘humanity’. It also throbs through a flurry of recent best-selling books – both fiction and speculative non-fiction (see Oreskes and Conway 2014; Newitz 2013; Weisman 2008). In a forthcoming intervention, Noah Theriault and I (2018) argue that these imaginaries are a form of porn that normalizes the profound violences driving extinction, while cocooning its viewers in the secure space of the voyeur. Certainly, there are many Western scientists, conservationists and policy-makers who are genuinely committed to stopping the extinction of others, perhaps out of fear for their own futures. Yet extinction is not quite real for Western, and especially white, subjects; it is a fantasy of negation that evokes thrill, melancholy, anger and existential purpose. It is a metaphor that expresses the destructive desires of these beings, and the negativity against which we define our subjectivity. But extinction is not a metaphor: it is a very real expression of violence that systematically destroys particular beings, worlds, life forms and the relations that enable them to flourish. These are real, unique beings, worlds and relations – as well as somebody’s family, Ancestors, siblings, future generations – who are violently destroyed. Extinction can only be used unironically as a metaphor by people who have never been threatened with it, told it is their inevitable fate, or lost their relatives and Ancestors to it – and who assume that they probably never will. This argument is directly inspired by the call to arms issued in 2012 by Eve Tuck and Wayne K. Yang and more recently by Cutcha Risling-Baldy. The first, seminal piece demonstrates how settler cultures use the violence of metaphorical abstraction to excuse themselves from the real work of decolonization: ensuring that land and power is in Indigenous hands. Risling-Baldy’s brilliant follow-up extends this logic to explain how First People like Coyote have been reduced to metaphors through settler appropriation. In both cases, engagement with Indigenous peoples and their relations masks moves to innocence: acts that make it appear as if settlers are engaging in decolonization, while in fact we are consolidating the power structures that privilege us. In this series, want to show how Western, and white-dominated, discourses on ‘extinction’ appear to address the systematic destruction of peoples and other beings while enacting moves to innocence that mask their culpability and perpetuate structures of violence. As I argued in Part I of this series, extinction is an expression of colonial violence. As such, it needs to be addressed through direct decolonization, including the dismantling of settler colonial structures of violence, and the resurgence of Indigenous worlds. Following Tuck, Yang and Risling-Baldy’s lead, I want to show how and why the violences that drive extinction have come to be invisible within mainstream discourses. Salient amongst these is the practice of genocide against Indigenous peoples other than humans. …it is literally genocide. What Western science calls ‘extinction’ is not an unfortunate, unintended consequence of desirable ‘human’ activities. It is an embodiment of particular patterns of structural violence that disproportionately affect specific racialized groups. In some cases, ‘extinction’ is directly, deliberately and systematically inflicted in order to create space for aggressors, including settler states. For this reason, it has rightly been framed as an aspect or tool of colonial genocides against Indigenous human peoples. Indeed, many theorists have shown that the ‘extirpation’ of life forms (their total removal from a particular place) is an instrument for enacting genocide upon Indigenous humans (see Mazis 2008; Laduke 1999; Stannard 1994). Specifically, the removal of key sources of food, clothing and other basic materials makes survival on the land impossible for the people targeted. Nehiyaw thinker Tasha Hubbard (2014) makes a qualitatively distinct argument. She points out that the Buffalo are First People, the elder brothers of the Nehiyaw people (and other Indigenous nations – see Benton-Banai 2010). Starting in the mid-1800s, the tens of millions of buffalo that ranged across Turtle Island were nearly eliminated through strategic patterns of killing carried out by settler-state-sponsored military and commercial forces. Their killing was linked to governmental imperatives to clear and territorially annex the Great Plains by removing its Indigenous peoples. As Hubbard points out, methods of destroying buffalo herds included large-scale killing, but also the disruption of their social structures, the destruction of the ecosystems on which they rely, and the removal of calves. These acts involve each of the components of the definition of genocide enshrined in the UN Genocide Convention: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. From Hubbard’s viewpoint, rooted in Nehiyaw philosophy and ethical-legal principles, the systematic destruction of the buffalo is not like genocide, nor is it exclusively a tool for carrying out genocide against human peoples. It is genocide in its own right: an attempt to destroy a particular First People and the possibilities of its continuity. In other words, the deliberate and systematic attempt to eliminate the buffalo, enacted by settler states, simultaneously enacted genocide against Indigenous peoples and their nonhuman relatives. Genocides of Indigenous peoples (human and otherwise) continue apace in contemporary settler states, transformed into multiple manifestations. For instance, they are integral to ‘biosecurity’ strategies designed to police the biological boundaries of these states and their citizens. Laced with racializing and xenophobic rhetoric (Subramaniam 2001), strategies such as culling or planned eradications are intended to remove ‘invasive’ or ‘foreign’ life forms in order to protect ‘Native’ ones. Many of the ‘invasive’ life forms targeted for destruction were transported to unfamiliar lands through colonial patterns of settlement and global trade flows. However, this logic of elimination (Wolfe 2006) is often perverted, turned against Indigenous\* beings whose flourishing impedes the expansion or consolidation of the colonial state. For instance, Deborah Bird Rose (2011 a, 2011 b) shows how this form of violence is continually waged against flying foxes, who are framed by the settler state as “pest[s] whose extinction is [deliberately] sought”. This act of elimination involves explicit genocidal ideation, or the imagination of the destruction of a people. Rose characterizes it as a “matter of imagining a world without [dingoes or flying foxes], then setting out to create it” (Rose 2011a). The Australian settler state has used multiple tactics to induce terror and preclude flourishing amongst flying foxes, from the emission of high-pitched electronic signals to smearing trees with python excrement (Rose 2011b). Indeed, in 2014, I lived near to the roosting site of a group of flying foxes in Turrbal and Jagera Country (suburban Brisbane to settlers). Such nesting places are called ‘colonies’ , reflecting a Western scientific rhetoric that frames Indigenous peoples as ‘invaders’ of the settler state. The trees that housed the nesting site backed onto a municipal facility, whose fence had been covered with barbed wire, in which many of the bats snared their wings and starved to death. This ‘security’ measure – designed to protect the facilities relied upon by urban settlers from the intrusion of flying foxes – is a powerful weapon for precluding ongoing flourishing of Indigenous other-than-human peoples. I learned from neighbours that this ‘colony’ had previously been ‘moved’ from several other sites around the city, suffering significant declines in population each time. Indeed, despite reported declines of 95% in flying fox communities in Queensland and neighbouring New South Wales, the Queensland settler state legalized the shooting of the bats in 2012 by fruitgrowers. Of course, in some cases, the elimination of life forms is not as targeted or intentional – it may take the form of land-based extractive violence, the creep of ocean acidification, the decimation of rainforests by climate change. Proponents of a Eurocentric definition of genocide could argue that these events lack intention. Indeed, within international law, intention to commit genocide is a necessary criteria for conviction. However, theorists of critical genocide studies have long argued that this definition is inadequate: it brackets out a great many of the acts, logics and structures that produce the destruction of unique peoples. According to Tony Barta, definitions of genocide that focus on ‘purposeful annihilation’, and in particular on physical killing, have “devalu[ed] all other concepts of less planned destruction, even if the effects are the same” (Barta 2000, 238). For this reason, he shifts the focus from ‘genocidal intention’ to ‘genocidal outcome’ – that is, from the abstract assignation of genocidal agency to the felt and embodied effects of eliminative violence. It is the focus on intent, he contends, that allows white Australians to imagine that their relationship with Aboriginal people is non-genocidal despite overwhelming evidence of systematic and deliberate racialized destruction over several centuries. In contrast, an approach based on ‘genocidal outcomes’ makes it possible to account for complex causality and weak intentionality – that is, for myriad acts mediated by subtle, normalized structures that, together, work to eliminate a people. I want to argue that the same logic applies to nonhuman peoples: the destruction of a life form, its relations with other beings and its possible futures is a genocidal outcome, whether or not intention can be identified. Similarly, Christopher Powell (2007) argues that, since a ‘genos’ is a “network of practical social relations, destruction of a genos means the forcible breaking down of those relationships…these effects could be produced without a coherent intent to destroy. They could result from sporadic and uncoordinated actions whose underlying connection is the production of a new society in which there is simply no room for the genos in question to exist. They might even result from well-meaning attempts to do good” (Powell 2007, 538) As I have argued elsewhere, extinction is defined by the breaking of relations and the systematic destruction of the conditions of plurality that nurture co-flourishing worlds. Whether inflicted out as a deliberate act of extirpation, or as the convergent effect of eliminative logics expressed over centuries and enormous spatial scales, extinction is the destruction of relations and the heterogenous societies they nurture. Understood in this way, ‘extinction’ is not a metaphor for genocide or other forms of large-scale violence: it is a distinct manifestation of genocide. Masking the genocidal logics that drive extinction involves several moves to innocence (Tuck and Yang 2012). Treating extinction as something short of genocide entrenches Eurocentric understandings of personhood that are limited to homo sapiens, which is itself an act of violence against these peoples. Ironically, the entrenchment of this dichotomy also enables the logic of ‘dehumanization’, in which human communities are likened to reviled nonhumans (for instance, cockroaches) in order to motivate violence against them. As I have argued elsewhere (Mitchell 2014), the logic of generalised ‘dehumanisation’ is uniquely effective in Western frameworks in which the lack of ethical status for beings other than humans removes obstacles to their mass destruction. Within worlds in which human and nonhuman persons are linked through complex systems of law, treaties, protocols and long-standing relations, this claim is illogical. Within Western settler states, however, it functions as a means of justifying ongoing violence against Indigenous peoples and their relations. In addition, by framing extinction as a problem for a universal figure of ‘humanity’ (more on this to follow…) mainstream discourses of extinction obscure its profound entwinement with race and racializing structures. These examples make it clear that eliminative violence is targeted on specific groups of people and their other-than-human relations, as defined by the aggressors. Indeed, patterns of genocidal violence extend racializing categories, hierarchies and eliminative impulses to other-than-human peoples. Just as approaching gender violence separately from race effaces their intersection, understanding extinction as distinct from race is deeply misleading. This is not only because racialized people are more likely to suffer from the effects of ‘extinction’ and other forms of environmental racism (which they are). It is also because the eliminative violence that drives extinction extend and enact race beyond the category of homo sapiens by defining particular groups against white settler norms and as threats to the settler society. To approach extinction separately from issues of race is, therefore, to miss one of its most defining features. Extinction is not a metaphor – in many cases, it is quite literally genocide enacted against Indigenous peoples and their other-than-human relations. To treat it as a metaphor is to obscure and participate in the structures of violence that drive it. From this perspective, in addition to active decolonisation efforts, and the resurgence of Indigenous peoples, addressing extinction also requires attacking the genocidal, racializing, eliminative logics that are diffused throughout settler (and other) states. It also requires honouring the unique relations, worlds and peoples that are targeted by these discourses and practices.

#### This requires you adopt an ethic of incommensurability in making comparisons and evaluating argumentative burdens – evaluate the 1ac as a scholarly artifact

Tuck & Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities, William T Grant Scholar and former Ford Foundation Postdoctoral Fellow, is Unangax and an enrolled member of the Aleut Community of St. Paul Island, Alaska, and K. Wayne Yang, University of California, San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, 1(1), 2012, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/download/18630/15554>)KMM

Conclusion An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

### Case

Morell 17 - Its using carphentlt as a wepaon not using it as drug – not using people using it as a weapon

Henry – doesn’t even mention terrorist – it’s a generic card it just lists terrorist groups and toxic chemicals and nerve gas it’s the sqyo not opiods – switching to the plan wont solve any of this

The next card – they don’t even get to nuclear war thye don’t have an internal link to why this goes to nuclear war none of their cads even talk about that don’t get access

Checmical wmd causes exitnction – this just proves that weed wouldn’t hel because they are using chemical weapons

Exitnction is fabricated to create futures where settlers are living – the plan exists as a form of settler anxiety where they outline an impact where they say they need to solve – it never will happen and only used to leave to more indigious indisposition

#### Drug Overdoes from addictive opioids are rooted in OPIOID patents – they incentivize companies to aggressively market and overprescribe them which leads to huge amounts of people becoming addicted

Vertinsky 8-2 [Liza Vertinsky, Associate Professor, Project Leader for Global Health Law & Policy Project, Global Health Faculty Fellow, Emory University School of Law, 8-2-2021, “To Address the Overdose Epidemic, Tackle Pharma Industry Influence” The Harvard Law Petrie-Flom Center, Accessed 8-18-2021, <https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2021/08/02/opioids-pharma-regulatory-capture/> ww

A recently released government report estimates that 93,000 people died from drug overdose in 2020. This estimate reflects a jump in the death toll of almost 30% from 2019 to 2020, with opioids as a primary driver.¶ In response, President Biden has called for historic levels of funding for the treatment and prevention of addiction and drug overdose.¶ Transforming mental health and addiction services is a critical part of tackling the overdose crisis, but it is not enough, on its own, to address this epidemic, or to prevent a future one. We must also alter the conditions that fueled expanded use, and abuse, in the first place. As I argue in Pharmaceutical (Re)capture, a forthcoming article in the Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law and Ethics, this includes a change in how we regulate markets for prescription drugs.¶ To truly combat the epidemic, I suggest, we have to understand how pain became such a lucrative business and how regulators failed to protect the public health as the market for prescription opioids grew. Then, we need to put this understanding to work in the redesign of pharmaceutical regulation.¶ Although an increase in the illegal use of synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, accounts for many of the current overdose deaths, the overdose epidemic has its roots in the increased prescribing of opioids. As I describe in a case study of the opioid epidemic, these are drugs that have been developed through the direct and indirect use of public funds, incentivized by government grants of patent, data, and market exclusivities, approved for use by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, prescribed by state-licensed physicians, paid for by highly regulated public and private insurers, and otherwise subject to government approval and oversight. I show how this epidemic emerged as the result of an intertwined evolution of medical approaches to treating pain, growth of the business of treating pain, and patient beliefs about the appropriate treatment of pain, an evolution largely driven by those with the largest financial stakes in opioid prescriptions and sales.¶ Pharmaceutical (Re)capture provides a framework for understanding the multi-faceted ways in which the largest industry players influence the operation of pharmaceutical markets, and uses this framework to expose the limitations of current regulatory approaches.¶ In an ideal world, regulations are designed to protect the public interest, but, in reality, special interests can sometimes dominate regulatory decisions – a phenomenon generally referred to as regulatory capture. While helpful in explaining why regulators may sometimes fail to adequately protect the public interest, this concept is too narrow to encompass broader forms of industry influence over all material aspects of pharmaceutical markets and their regulation.¶ Instead, I develop the concept of pharmaceutical capture to encompass the myriad of ways in which the largest corporate actors influence markets for prescription drugs, with the market for prescription opioids as a particularly salient example.¶ Pharmaceutical capture occurs when the magnitude and scope of corporate influence is significant enough to alter the incentive structures, and corresponding decisions, of a sufficient number of pharmaceutical industry stakeholders in ways that ensure that relevant markets yield the outcomes desired by the industry captors. Understanding how pharmaceutical capture occurs is an essential first step in improving the effectiveness of regulatory strategies in pharmaceutical markets.¶ Although recent court settlements with some of the largest manufacturers and distributors of opioids have resulted in industry payouts of as much as $26 billion, these payments pale in comparison to the profits reaped from opioid sales. More importantly, the court settlements do little to change the market conditions that allowed for the growth of opioid profits at the expense of public health. With the exception of Purdue, which is now in the midst of a bankruptcy reorganization, major manufacturers and distributers of opioids continue to operate in much the same fashion as they did before, with court settlements operating more like parking tickets than drivers of change. Indeed, some of the very companies that benefitted from opioid sales are now reaping profits from the sale of treatments for addiction. Even the addiction treatment industry now has its own share of problems arising from the increasing demand for, and profitability of, addiction treatment services.¶ I conclude that an effective regulatory response towards the opioid epidemic must be geared towards addressing, and curtailing, pharmaceutical capture. Drawing lessons from the sophisticated corporate strategies used to influence market design, I offer three guiding principles for regulatory redesign. The first is the need for a holistic, systemic approach to regulation to replace current fragmented approaches. The second is the need to recalibrate key underlying policy assumptions about pharmaceutical markets and their appropriate regulation. The third is the need to make regulation more robust to corporate interests through strategies that narrow the divergence of private interests from the public interest, make capture more costly, and/or provide greater resources and rewards for regulating in the public interest.