# Trips – NC

### T - FWK

#### Interpretation: The affirmative should defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution

#### Standards:

#### 1] Topicality’s a procedural constraint for effective debate –

#### A] they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model.

#### B] The ability to select anything to say is bad for debate and makes the terms affirmative and negative meaningless. Being forced to switch-sides is debate’s greatest value and it solves all of their exclusion offense.

#### C] their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus every 2 months

#### 2] Structurally favoring the AFF is bad since it manipulates debate’s balance and kills competitive equity – some level of equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made.

#### 3] key to have well-prepared opponents. They transform debate into a monologue which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subjected to well researched scrutiny.

#### 4] Key to research – forces debaters to explore the topic literature instead of having the same debates throughout their entire career

#### Vote neg – they’ve destroyed the round from the beginning and topicality’s key to set the correct model of debate which means it comes first.

#### Voter:

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense.

#### Precision o/w – anything else justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse and because the 2N doesn’t get new disads to whole rez so it’s permanently skewed.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

#### No impact turns to T—T is a procedural that determines case’s validity and every argument says the aff is bad

#### T comes before 1AR theory – a) norms – we only have a couple months to set T norms but can set 1AR theory norms anytime, b) magnitude – T affects a larger portion of the debate since the aff advocacy determines every speech after it

#### Topicality is not intrinsically violent

Freedman 11 Jesse Freedman, 6-13-2011, "Historical Musings," No Publication, [http://booksinq.blogspot.com/2011/06/historical-musings.html RE//](http://booksinq.blogspot.com/2011/06/historical-musings.html%20RE//) recut AG

As a history teacher, I’ve always found it interesting to discuss with high schoolers the complicated idea of ‘causation’ (that is, what caused, what contributed to, past events). What’s striking about conversations involving this topic is the extent to which students are willing (often through no fault of their own) to attribute events to ideologies - as if Nazism itself were responsible for the Holocaust. Regarding Nazism (and Fascism, too), I stress that, without Nazis, Nazism (as an ideology) would have been unable to do, well, to do anything. This, I think, is key: that students confront the idea that systems of belief are not, in and of themselves, capable of destruction. Ideology becomes dangerous - in a historical sense - when individuals activate their core tenets. At the high school level, conversations involving causation can lead in other directions as well. Most rewarding, I think, are those which involve the idea of ‘attribution.’ Continuing for a moment with the example of the Second World War: students must address in their thinking the notion that Germany (with a capital ‘G’) was not in itself responsible for the Holocaust. True, that country initiated the events which conspired against Europe's Jews, but again, a nation cannot act without individuals. To attribute to Germany (as many text books do) blame for the Holocaust seems, therefore, as irresponsible as attributing that same umbrella of blame to Nazism. After discussions involving ideology and attribution, students, I find, are more effectively positioned to handle the crux of the issue involving causation - that is, that individuals, and individual action, trigger historical events. To get at the Holocaust, students need to wrestle with documents which reflect the mindset, the priorities, of the German people. While it can be an awkward process for students - to say nothing of nations - to come to terms with who, exactly, ‘became’ a Nazi, or a Fascist, or a Collaborator (in France), these discussions are important - vital, even - in our ability to accurately recreate the past in American classrooms today.

## Cap K

#### The aff is a double turn---positioning the 1AC as a way to undermine meaning or representation is itself an imposition of meaning that reaffirms the system they claim to oppose. Takes out form/content args

Francois Debrix 3, professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnical Institute, Rituals of Mediation: International Politics and Social Meaning, p. xxxvii-xxxix, google books

Wodiczko's projections encourage their observers to not just remain passive consumers of rituals of transformation or representation.33 They intimate that social meanings come from the inside, from the mediated visions that, in late modernity, have taken over the social domain within which individual subjects interact. Wodiczko's method is to "manipulate the system from within (and) interfere with (itsl codes."34 Because mediation's codes are crucial to the production of meaning and social meaning maintains relations of power, wealth, and cultural governance, the commanding force of mediation must be revealed. To reveal media- tion, Wodiczko chooses to ironically mimic and exaggerate the effects of some media forms and objects (architecture, public monuments, televi- sion) by defacing and perverting them. Wodiczko's point is not to use different mediated forms to condemn mediation's excesses. His method is rather to use and reappropriate traditionally mobilized modern ritu- als of transformation to display their power of signification. The problematization of mediation is not an end in itself for Wodiczko, though. Problematizing modern rituals of transformation by defacing them is necessary for him to the extent that it contributes to reopening social meaning and to freeing up cultural possibilities. Another project by Wodiczko, the Alien Staff, demonstrates the capacity Of perverting and mimicking (re)mediations to open up (their) meaning.35 The Alien Staff is a situation performance concocted by Wodiczko to reveal the pluralizing potential of mediation once it has been freed from transfor- mative and representational rituals. In this art project, Wodiczko asked immigrants (in the United States mostly) to walk about the city and carry a tall stick made to look like a biblical staff (a new type Of flåneur perhaps). The staff opens up at its top to reveal an inserted television screen. On the screen, the same individual who carries the biblical staff is shown telling his or her life story. The staff bearer is asked to meander around the city and abruptly Stop in front Of pedestrians. The pedestri- ans are then faced with the staff and its mini TV screen. The staff bearer never speaks, and in fact remains as still and stoic as can be. Only the staff is active and conveys information. At one level, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a work of critical trans- formation and radical mobilization performed by this new kind of me- diating ritual. Wodiczko, perhaps, uses the magical staff and its talking head as a metaphor for the silencing of immigrant populations in in- dustrialized societies. Postmodern mediations do not give voice to im- migrants in societies still governed by Modern Man's political power and regime of economic production. This is one possible interpreta- tion offered by Wodiczko's art. Wodiczko does not indicate whether the problematization of postmodern media forms is the intended meaning of the display. But I think that Wodiczko, as silent as his staff bearer, re- fuses to tell the meaning of this art performance on purpose. Explain- ing the art scene would imply that one signification has been imposed. Meaning would be foreclosed and, contrary to the image that is shown, the immigrant would thus be forced to speak. By forcing the immigrant to speak (through someone else's narrating voice), the social system that "silenced" the immigrant in the first place would be reaffirmed. At another level, this performative (re)mediation by Wodiczko is an ironic play of meaning. The contrasting image of a silent human being with this same being's talking face on a miniature TV screen mimics the blinding sight and the deafening sound of contemporary media(tions) that have no place for the immigrant. Who pays attention to television's message anyway? But instead of individual silence or the media's white noise, Wodiczko's Alien Staff speaks volumes. While it denounces and challenges our postmodern mediating rituals, it also offers people (im- migrants in this case) vectors of speech, new methods of signification and presentation Of themselves. Outside the dominant code, different forms of meaning may be accessed. Perhaps, through new mediations of meaning, new social interactions and cultural practices may be developed. Wodiczko observes: "If I could make it more playful. Laughter—all the jokes, the disruptions, the changes of topics, all the absurdity and impossibility of talking about identity. This is the new community." Wodiczko's mediated art forms reimagine subjectivities and commu- nities but do not give them names. They enable meaning by multiplying the ways by which meaning is produced. They Offer different paths through which presentation Of one's body and self can be realized with- out having to postulate this presence from systems Of representation or transformation. In fact, multiple, possibly not essential, but certainly meaningful presentations Of one's selves (as immigrant, as Street per- former, as artist, as talking head) are facilitated. At the same time, Wodiczko's performances are not inaccessible to observers in search Of more traditional representational and transformative rituals Of media- tion. AS a ritual Of representation, Wodiczko's Alien Staff may be taken as an allegory for the im—ble passage of some individuals in demo- cratic political Systems from the status of alien to that Of citizen. Simi- larly, Alien Staff could be interpreted as a ritual Of transformation that denounces the unequal status of some individuals in society visa-vis Others and thus calls for a change of condition. Although those are possi- ble interpretations of Wodiczko's mediations, however, they may not be the most fruitful as they merely seek to impose one (their) privileged understanding of the method of mediation onto Wodiczko's own rituals. In the end, Wodiczko provides a pluralizing model of mediation. Differ- ent outcomes of mediation can take place because, after all, the method of mediation is neither value-free nor the sole possession of romantic man. What Wodiczko's plural approach to the manipulation of the medium and to the use of mediation wants to avoid is not the fact that mediation is being used to produce social meanings. This, Wodiczko suggests, is inevitable and in a sense desirable. What it wants to avoid and what it protects against is the idea, prevalent among proponents of mediation as either or transformation, that desirable so- cial meanings are decided and often established before the method of mediation even has a chance to deploy its cultural and political effects. When this happens, mediation remains an empty middle point between two distant realities or is used as a tool for something else, for some other more romantic social reality that mediation helps to substantiate. When this happens, mediation negates pluralization. The following es- show that contemporary transnational cultural interactions often mobilize mediations to dc just this. The (mediating) internationals that result from such mediations

#### The 1AC’s performative cultivation of a community of care is ultimately a resilience project that strips away agency in favor of capitulation to neoliberalism. Debate creates a market economy for this which is why they tell you to “let my people’s text heal your soul.”

**Evans and Reid 14** [Brad Evans, professor of international relations at the University of Lapland, Finland and Julian Reid, senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Bristol, *Resilient Life*, 2014, p. 102-4]

The significance of linking self-worth and achievement to the ‘social norm’ cannot be underestimated as it allows us to illustrate the differences between the learning processes of resilience as compared to a properly critical pedagogy which would encourage children to question the fundamental tenets of power and inequality in the world. **Strategies of** resilience when applied to children take the form of training exercises which enable them to deal with the localized effects of their vulnerability and the forms of attachments and dependencies they have created which amplify the problems. The examples of youths falling into membership of inner-city gangs become a prime example of a vulnerable child that has fallen through the cracks. Countering this is the idea of ‘educational resilience**’**, defined as the ‘heightened likelihood of success in school and other life accomplishments despite environmental adversities brought about by early traits, conditions, and experiences’.20 But how exactly do we measure success? Is the educationally resilient the vulnerable subject who goes on to fulfill their neoliberal potential, or is it the subject who goes to war with the system that seeks to render them resilient as such? Resilience, as we have learned, is more a code for social compliance than a political ambition to transform the very sources of inequality and injustices experienced by marginalized populations. We find this in early educational theories where resilience is again conflated with strategies of resistance such that the resilient child, individualistically conceived, pathologically outlives its conditions of impoverishment to exhibit social achievement in ways that are altogether in tune with the normal functioning of society.21 Indeed, more than simply learning to cope in conditions of impoverishment and vulnerability, as Steven Condly succinctly puts it in an approving review of the prevailing mainstream educational approaches, the doctrine of resilience offers new ways to assess qualities, competences and capabilities, as ‘resilient children tend to possess an above average intelligence and have a temperament that endears them to others and that also does not allow them to succumb to self-pity’.22 What of course qualifies as ‘self-pity’ in another setting could easily be read as a conscious attempt to challenge that which is beyond the control or individual responsibility of the particular subject. Sheila Martineau is attuned to this and writes of the political dangers of resilience in education with considerable foresight: ‘Though resilience conveyed anomalous childhood behaviour in the context of traumatic events in the 1970s, it has become detached from the traumatic context … dangerously, resilience has become constructed as a social norm modelled on the behavioural norms and expectations of the dominant society’.23 Resilience, in other words, becomes a normalized standard for mapping out (ab)normal behaviours such that the very terms of success are loaded with moral claims to a specific maturity, wherein the maturity itself is qualified through one’s ability to connect to the liberal order of things and partake in the world such that to resist means, without contraction, that one successfully learns to conform. Or to put it in more critical terms, since the ‘solution’ is to teach children to overcome ‘obstacles’ to personal development without ultimately challenging wider relations of power, the resilient child (which, although said to include all children, overwhelmingly concentrates on those from poorer, culturally and racially distinct backgrounds) encounters policies which, instead of ‘treating the individual’, end up by virtue of its logic ‘blaming the victim’.24 Disadvantage as such becomes once again the means to author new forms of discrimination that plays the vulnerable card to remove any political claims that things could be otherwise. Today we can situate these earlier demands for resilience within the strategic context of what Henry Giroux calls the ‘war on youth’. Indicative of **the neoliberal** assault on the education **system** more generally, Giroux maintains that youth has become a privileged object for power in a way that seeks to strip away any sense of critical awareness and political agency at the earliest possible stages of intellectual development. As he wr**it**es, since ‘neoliberalism is also a pedagogical project designed to create particular subjects, desires, and values defined largely by market considerations’, questions of ‘destiny’ become ‘linked to a market-driven logic in which freedom is stripped down to freedom from government regulation, freedom to consume, and freedom to say anything one wants, regardless of how racist or toxic the consequences might be’.25 This has a profound bearing upon education policy as ‘Critical thought and human agency are rendered impotent as neoliberal rationality substitutes emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to political problems’**.**26 Hence, within this ‘depoliticized discourse, youths are told that there is no dream of the collective, no viable social bonds, only the actions of autonomous individuals who can count only on their own resources and who bear sole responsibility for the effects of larger systemic political and economic problems’. Whilst education therefore should have a pedagogical commitment to the globally oppressed, what takes its place is a substitution for education that produces vulnerable consumers whose very training renders the political impossible**.**

#### The alternative is to endorse affirmative sabotage. Only a commitment to the contradictions of the simulation can form a basis for strategic planning against postmodern neoliberalism.

Angela **Davis and** Gayatri Chakravorty **Spivak** (Angela Yvonne Davis is an American political activist, philosopher, academic, and author. She is a professor emerita at the University of California, Santa Cruz. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak is an Indian scholar, literary theorist, and feminist critic. She is a University Professor at Columbia University and a founding member of the establishment's Institute for Comparative Literature and Society. “Planetary Utopias”. June 24, 20**18**.)

Nikita Dhawan: Another extremely instructive lesson that we have learnt from you is to adopt a critical posture towards the tools, concepts, vocabularies and organising practices that characterise landscapes of struggle. There is this wonderful, possibly apocryphal, quote that ‘The last capitalist we hang shall be the one who sold us the rope.’ **What do we do with this double bind that the instruments we have to use to change unjust structures are inherited from these very structures**? Angela Davis: This is what we have and **we have no other choice than to use them and to simultaneously question them.** **And so the process of developing critical habits, habits of self-questioning, is a process that never ends.** And we are learning a great deal now especially, given the activism of transgender communities. We are learning a great deal about what it means to challenge categories that we have considered to be so normal that they aren’t even worth questioning. But they actually constitute the arena, the ground of our thinking. Thus when we look at movements around transgender issues, movements against the violence directed against transgender women of colour, we realize that they constitute the sector of the population that is the target of more forms of violence – state, personal, individual, etc. – and more consistent violence than any other group. So we are learning how to challenge the binary structure of gender even though there is often a telling awkwardness, especially in instances where you are asked to introduce yourself with your preferred pronouns. And that awkwardness is good and productive because it makes us question that which we haven’t previously known how to question. So I don’t think anything is immune from that process, **even the ways in which we are formulating this question about how to be critical** regarding that which we consider most normal, that which otherwise **is ideologically constructed.** And I guess **it’s about** education, about **the kind of education** that Gayatri was speaking about, as **opposed to the education that simply wants to produce skilled subjects who are able to participate well in the machinery of global capitalism.** The last thing I would say is that we have to really beware of these terms that are supposed to carry the entire weight of struggles for justice. Sara Ahmed was talking about the term diversity yesterday and I really hate that notion. I cannot stand the notion of diversity, because it means largely the effort to make the machine run more effectively with those who were previously excluded by the machine. Who wants to be assimilated into a racist institution, when the institution continues to maintain its racist structure? This is why **we always have to be hyperconscious of our vocabularies.** This is a practice that I want to carry to my grave. Gayatri Spivak: Yes, **it is legitimation by reversal**. Before they were all bad and now they are all good. This is why I find ‘Global South’ to be a reverse racist term. I mean there are some real self-constructed native informants selling themselves from these places. But **this issue of having only a tainted methodology with which to work, I find that to be completely ok. You work with what you can: an affirmative sabotage.** When Audre Lorde said that you can’t break down the master’s house with the master’s tools, she was extremely angry because of the treatment she had received at NYU. A thing like ‘The subaltern cannot speak’ – these are enraged declarations. Many take it as an excuse for avoiding homework. ‘No, no, we don’t have to read any of the master’s tools. No, the house will not be broken down.’ Lorde was not giving a formula for saving intellectual labour. In that context I would say that the masters had the leisure of the theory class. They had all the leisure on our backs – and some of us also collaborating with our tongues hanging out, so let’s not just do a finger-pointing – to develop these theories. And also, they had such a very long time in early capitalism that they could do this slowly, whereas many colonial places got the mode of exploitation without the mode of production, so they couldn’t do it from inside. **We should take** those **well-developed methods**, make our former masters our servants as it were, put them on tap rather than on top, inhabit them well, **turn them around**. Don’t accuse them, don’t excuse them, **use them for something which they were not made for.**

## Case

#### The 1NCs demonization of transparency is wrong and makes radical organizing less effective. Turns case.

Birchall 15 [Clare, Prof. Contemp. Culture in English @ King’s College London, Prof. European Journal of Social Theory Vol. 18(2), pp. 196-8//ak47]

My second suggestion looks like another path altogether, but it too can be thought of as pushing transparency ‘further than it is meant to go’ – so far, in fact, that it begins to appear as its opposite. This route requires us to abandon, at least temporarily, the transparency bandwagon altogether, overcrowded as it is with liberals and neoliberals, and opt instead for secrecy. This is not the secrecy that has for so long been commandeered by the state or the right: those practices that have given secrecy a bad name. Rather, we can look to different spaces, subjectivities and relations opened up by critical theories of, and aesthetic experiments with secrecy. For instance, Jacques Derrida has a ‘taste for the secret’ (Derrida and Ferraris, 2001), but not the common, contextual secret that hides somewhere waiting to be revealed. He is interested, rather, in the unconditional secret: ‘an experience that does not make itself available to information’ (1992: 201). It is an undepletable excess that defies not only the surface/depth model and its promise that truth can be revealed, but also the attendant metaphysics of presence. Eschewing the hermeneutic drive and circumventing attempts to anticipate revelation, the unconditional secret within a text should be thought of as an encounter with the Other through which a responsibility of reading is made possible (and, it is important to note if we are to take proper account of Derrida’s aporia, impossible). The secret, here, is fashioned in a productive capacity, in the service of ethics. In terms of democracy, Derrida defends the secret qua singularity, seeing it as an alternative to ‘the demand that everything be paraded in the public square’ (Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 59). ‘If a right to the secret is not maintained,’ he writes, ‘we are in a totalitarian space’ (Derrida and Ferraris, 2001: 59). In light of such a formulation, we should be concerned for those who do not want to adhere to the dominant doctrines of democracy, including the doctrine of transparency. The subject of democracy is not simply one who is asked to be transparent to the state and act on transparency (a subject, as we have seen, imagined by data-driven transparency). The subject is also, in the guise of Derrida’s non-self-present subject, one that is constituted by a singularity that prevents full capitulation to the demands of transparency. Echoing Derrida somewhat, but with his attention more attuned to the politics of race and relationality, the Martiniquan philosopher E´douard Glissant discusses a ‘right to opacity’ as the right not to be reduced to, or rendered comprehensible/transparent by the dominant, Western filial-based order (see Glissant in conversation with Diawara, 2011).6 This means not settling for an idea of ‘difference’ as the basis of an ethical relation to the Other, but pushing further towards recognition of an irreducible opacity or singularity (Glissant, 1997: 190). For Glissant, opacity is the ‘foundation of Relation and confluence’ (1997: 190). The ethical subject is more aligned with secrecy than transparency in Glissant’s writing in a way that offers us an alternative to the moral certitude of the ‘transparency movement’ and the idea of the ‘good’ neoliberal data subject. Such reformulations of the politics of the secret and secrecy enable us to begin to rethink the role of transparency in the relationship between constituted and constituent power (Negri, 1999), as well as interrupt the flow of communicative capitalism and the logic of control that require visible, surveillable and quantifiable subject-objects. For further inspiration, we can draw on the politico-aesthetic imagination of two collectives that span both ends of the twentieth century: Ace´phale (1936–39) and Tiqqun (2001/2009, published 1999–2001). Georges Bataille wanted to ‘use secrecy as a weapon rather than a retreat’ (Lu¨tticken, 2006: 32) and imagined how a secret society named Ace´phale (which translates as ‘Headless’) could regenerate or revolutionize society at large by instigating the kind of unorthodox values he championed throughout his oeuvre, including expenditure, risk, and loss.7 Disgusted with politics, even revolutionary politics, which he considered as too swayed by the promise and spoils of power, Bataille wanted a community invested, rather, in freedom and he thought the best way to do this was through a secret society (as well as its public counterparts, the publication that shared Ace´phale’s name and the Colle`ge de Sociologie). In their ‘Cybernetic Hypothesis’, the collective, Tiqqun, who were highly influenced by Bataille among others, call for ‘interference’, ‘haze’ or ‘fog’ as the ‘prime vector of revolt’ (2001/2009). They see opacity as a means to challenge the political project of cybernetics and ‘the tyranny of transparency which control imposes’ (2001/2009). Tiqqun itself, which published a journal in 1999 and 2001, opted for collective anonymity over individual publicity. After its dissolution, some members went on to write and work under the equally anonymous Invisible Committee. (In fact, while the Invisible Committee chose to operate under the auspices of secrecy, the arrest of some of its members in 2008 under the charge of domestic terrorism quickly placed them in an unwelcome spotlight.8) Artists have certainly been influenced by Bataille’s Ace´phale (for example, Goldin þ Senneby’s show, ‘Headless’ (2008), which explores the shadowy world of offshore finance) and have taken up Tiqqun’s call for becoming fog-like (Seth Price’s ‘How to Disappear in America’ (2008) provides advice on how to evade the law,9 while Zach Blas’ ‘Facial Weaponization Suite’ (2011–present) produces masks to protest against biometric facial recognition). We can also look to certain technological practices that question the promise and probe the political economy of openness. Take, for example, Freedom Box (http://freedomboxfoundation. org) and TOR (https://www.torproject.org), which both, in different ways, try to facilitate secure networks and online anonymity;10 TrackMeNot (http:// cs.nyu.edu/trackmenot/), a browser extension that aims to derail surveillance and dataprofiling by flooding engines with random search terms; the (now defunct) Web 2.0 Suicide Machine that scrambled one’s online identity by erasing individual data and friendship links on social media sites; the sentence generator from Motherboard (http://nsa.motherboard.tv) that encourages us to tweet or e-mail security-sensitive words; or the decentralized hacktivist culture that connects under the title Anonymous.11 While such theories of, and experiments with secrecy alone will not be enough to challenge the logic that informs neoliberal transparency and its subjectivities, they might offer a ‘space’ in which a form of visibility that works for rather than against social justice might be imagined. Galloway and Thacker describe such tactics and technologies as affording non-existence – a chance to be ‘unaccounted for’ not because the data subject is hiding, but because s/he is invisible to a particular screen. They write, ‘One’s data is there, but it keeps moving, of its own accord, in its own temporary autonomous ecology’ (2007: 135). It is important to recognize alternative imaginings of the data subject such as this because, as Fisher optimistically points out, ‘the very oppressive pervasiveness of capitalist realism means that even glimmers of alternative political and economic possibilities can have a disproportionately great effect’ (2009: 80–1). Experiments with both secrecy and transparency, with existence through the play of optics, might just offer the conditions under which politics can be rethought. Though the first term might suggest a closing down, ‘critical transparency studies’ is not intent on condemning transparency. It operates, rather, according to an ‘in principle’ openness to openness – an openness that can lead as much to a reconfigured secrecy as a reconfigured transparency, depending on the demands of the local context and global conjuncture. It is ‘critical’ in the analytic vein, but also, perhaps, in terms of having a decisive or crucial role in the success, failure, or existence of transparency.

#### Will to transparency is key to comutation which solves crisis escalation.

Corneliu Bjola 19, Head of the Oxford Digital Diplomacy Research Group, University of Oxford, 11/10/19, “Diplomacy in the Age of Artificial Intelligence,” http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano\_en/contenido?WCM\_GLOBAL\_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano\_in/zonas\_in/ari98-2019-bjola-diplomacy-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

Taking note of the fact that developments in AI are so dynamic and the implications so wide-ranging, another report prepared by a German think tank calls on Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) to immediately begin planning strategies that can respond effectively to the influence of AI in international affairs. Economic disruption, security & autonomous weapons, and democracy & ethics are the three areas they identify as priorities at the intersection of AI and foreign policy. Although they believe that transformational changes to diplomatic institutions will eventually be needed to meet the challenges ahead, they favour, in the short term, an incremental approach to AI that builds on the successes (and learns from the failures) of “cyber-foreign policy”, which, in many countries, has been already internalised in the culture of the relevant institutions, including of the MFAs.13 In the same vein, the authors of a report prepared for the Centre for a New American Security see great potential for AI in national security-related areas, including diplomacy. For example, AI can help improve communication between governments and foreign publics by lowering language barriers between countries, enhance the security of diplomatic missions via image recognition and information sorting technologies, and support international humanitarian operations by monitoring elections, assisting in peacekeeping operations, and ensuring that financial aid disbursements are not misused through anomaly detection.14

From an AI perspective, consular services could be a low-hanging fruit for AI integration in diplomacy as decisions are amenable to digitisation, the analytical contribution is reasonable relevant and the technology favours collaboration between users and the machine. Consular services rely on highly structured decisions, as they largely involve recurring and routinised operations based on clear and stable procedures, which do not need to be treated as new each time a decision has to be made (except for crisis situations, which are discussed further below). From a knowledge perspective, AI-assisted consular services may embody declarative (know-what) and procedural knowledge (know-how) to automate routinised operations and scaffold human cognition by reducing cognitive effort. This can be done by using data mining and data discovery techniques to organize the data and make it possible to identify patterns and relationships that would be difficult to observe otherwise (e.g., variation of demand for services by location, time, and audience profile).

Case study #1: AI as Digital Consul Assistant

The consulate of country X has been facing uneven demand for emergency passports, visa requests and business certifications in the past five years. The situation has led to a growing backlog, significant loss of public reputation and a tense relationship between the consulate and the MFA. An AI system trained with data from the past five years uses descriptive analytics to identify patterns in the applications and concludes that August, May and December are the most likely months to witness an increase of the demand in the three categories next year. AI predictions are confirmed for August and May but not for December. AI recalibrates its advice using updated data and the new predictions help consular officers manage requests more effectively. As the MFA confidence in the AI system grows, the digital assistant is then introduced to other consulates experiencing similar problems.

Digital platforms could also emerge as indispensable tools for managing diplomatic crises in the digital age and for good reasons. They can help embassies and MFAs make sense of the nature and gravity of the events in real-time, streamline the decision-making process, manage the public’s expectations, and facilitate crisis termination. At the same time, they need to be used with great care as factual inaccuracies, coordination gaps, mismatched disclosure level, and poor symbolic signalling could easily derail digital efforts of crisis management.15 AI systems could provide great assistance to diplomats in times of crisis by helping them make sense of what it is happening (descriptive analytics) and identify possible trends (predictive analytics). The main challenge for AI is the semi-structured nature of the decisions to be taken. While many MFAs have pre-designed plans to activate in case of a crisis, it is safe to assume that reality often defies the best crafted plans. Given the high level of uncertainty in which crisis decision-making operates and the inevitable scrutiny and demand of accountability to occur if something goes wrong, AI integration can work only if humans retain control over the process. As a recent SIPRI study pointed out, AI systems may fail spectacularly when confronted with tasks or environments that differ slightly to those they were trained for. Their algorithms are also opaque, which makes difficult for humans to explain how they work and whether they include bias that could lead to problematic –if not dangerous– behaviours.16

#### It prevents, rather than causing, endless violence.

James Andrew Lewis 18, senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, January 2018, “Rethinking Cybersecurity: Strategy, Mass Effect, and States,” https://espas.secure.europarl.europa.eu/orbis/sites/default/files/generated/document/en/180108\_Lewis\_ReconsideringCybersecurity\_Web.pdf, p. 16-17

Cyber Operations and Interstate Conflict

International relations are being reshaped by the confluence of several powerful trends, some created by new technologies, some by the powerful reaction to American hegemony, and some from the fraying of the international order created after 1945. In contrast to sunny millennial optimism, efforts to improve cybersecurity must be designed for a period where, for an unknown duration, there will be increased conflict as states challenge the liberal postwar order. We are at the end of a sustained period of strategic stability17 and conflict, albeit at low levels, will be the norm. Conflict between states will take new forms and cyber operations will be an important part of this. They are ideal for the new strategic environment, given their opacity, the lack of clear norms, and inadequate defenses.

Opponent actions that stay below this threshold inhabit a "gray area," that is neither peace nor war, where the United States and its allies, unable to use military force in response, have so far been stymied in designing and articulated an effective reply. Opponents will exploit gray areas in international law to coerce without triggering armed conflict. Deterrence will be more difficult in this opaque environment, and we will see increased use by our opponents of coercive acts that fall below thresholds for the use of force or armed attack.

The future of armed conflict is that major powers will try to avoid armed confrontation. Wars between big, heavily armed states are expensive and risky, particularly if they have nuclear weapons. The major powers will not renounce the use of force and coercion—Russia, the United States, China, Iran, North Korea, and others use force or the threat of force all the time— but they will try to avoid war with each other. If major powers do stumble into conventional war, cyber attacks will be a part of the fighting, but the real nature of cyber conflict involves something other than warfare and lacks the sharp discontinuity between war and peace. The experience of the last decade suggests that the norm for interstate conflict will be increasingly continuous and not kinetic.

1. **Native violence requires material solutions. Baudrillard’s “world of simulation” and denial of objectivity are the tools of the colonizer to destabilize identities to rationalize the destruction of Native livelihood.**

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In view of the above, it is clear to see how fluid boundaries, the relativizing of difference and negation of grand narratives—primarily serves whitestream America. The multiphrenia of postmodern plurality, **its "world of simulation" and obliteration of any sense of objective reality, has given rise to a frenetic search for the "authentic" led by culture vultures and capitalist bandits fraught with "imperialist nostalgia.**"25 In response, American Indian communities have restricted access to the discursive spaces of American Indian culture and identity and the non-discursive borders of American Indian communities. In short, **the notion of fluidity has never worked to the advantage of indigenous peoples. Federal agencies have invoked the language of fluid or unstable identities as the rationale for dismantling the structures of tribal life.** Whitestream America has seized upon the message of relativism to declare open season on Indians, and whitestream academics have employed the language of signification and simulation to transmute centuries of war between indigenous peoples and their respective nation-states into a "genetic and cultural dialogue" (Valle and Tones 1995, 141). Thus, in spite of its "democratic" promise**, postmodernism and its ludic theories of identity fail to provide indigenous communities the theoretical grounding for asserting their claims as colonized peoples, and, more important, impede construction of transcendent emancipatory theories.** Despite the pressures of cultural encroachment and cultural imperialism, however, indigenous communities continue to evolve as sites of political contestation and cultural empowerment. They manage to survive the dangers of colonialist forces by employing proactive strategies, which emphasize education, empowerment, and self-determination, and defensive tactics that protect against unfettered economic and political encroachment. Thus, whatever else the borders of indigenous communities may or may not demarcate, they continue to serve as potent geographic filters of all that is non-Indian—dividing between the real and metaphoric spaces that differentiate Indian country from the rest of whitestream America. Pedagogical Implications of Postmodern Theories As students learn to navigate the plurality of difference, **it is equally important to avoid falling into the (postmodern) trap of relativism. A postmodern theory of difference that insists on impartiality masks the power and privilege that underpins whitestream culture and perspectives**. In other words, American Indian students do not enter into a social space in which identities compete with equal power for legitimacy; rather, they are infused into a political terrain that presumes their inferiority. For example, postmodern musings of subjectivity as disembodied and free-floating ignore the fact that American Indian students, along with other indigenous peoples, are "engaged with the state in a complex relationship in which there are varying degrees of interdependency at play" (Alfred 1999, 85). As such, **American Indian students are neither free to "reinvent" themselves nor able to liberally "transgress" borders of difference, but, rather, remain captive to the determined spaces of colonialist rule**. These students experience the binds of the paradox inherent to current modes of identity theory and it becomes increasingly evident that "neither the cold linearity of blood-quantum nor the tortured weakness of self-identification" (both systems designed and legitimated by the state) will provide them any relief (Alfred 1999, 84). Thus, while postmodern theorists rightly question the whole notion of origins and work to disrupt the grand narrative of modernism, its hyperelastic and all-inclusive categories offer little to no protection against the colonialist forces of cultural encroachment and capitalist commodification.

**5. Vote NEG on presumption –**

**a) Ballot’s not key – it doesn’t change the way information exchanges – even if the alt works it doesn’t warrant a ballot.**

**b) They can’t solve their offense – the 2AC should be forced to explain what their aff actually does and how it spills up to resolve simulation warfare on a macro-level.**

**c) No spillover – Yelling at your computer in a zoom room doesn’t inspire broad changes in the way people think like their evidence talks about.**

**6. Communication and meaning are possible and desirable – framing speech as pure flux destroys any benefits gained from intersubjective processes of meaning in specific political contexts**

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(Fasil, Addis Ababa University, Master’s Thesis in Philosophy, “Habermas and the Discourse of Modernity,” http://etd.aau.edu.et/bitstream/123456789/3596/3/FASIL%20MERAWI.pdf)

As Culler sees it, Derrida raised three main objections towards Searle’s speech act theory. First, any speech act can be quoted and be analyzed in another context and the idea that meaning will be the same in another context, is something fictional. Habermas criticized Derrida for failing to recognize that what Austin meant by the fixation of meaning in everyday communication and the normal use of language, is based on idealizing presuppositions that are present in every communicative action (PDM, 195-196). Second, Derrida argued that, for a normal speech act to be successfully employed, meaning needs to be arrested, and this to be done by presenting general rules and conditions under which a given utterance is to be employed and analyzed. But speech acts can have different meanings depending on the contexts. Here, Derrida speaks of ‘grafting’ i.e. that a speech act can be quoted in another context. So, the contexts are infinite and one cannot come up with a theory of the employment of speech acts specifying where and how they should be employed since meaning is contextual, and the contexts are many. Here, culler supports Derrida’s argument by claiming that even the “intentions of the speakers...are to be interpreted in different contexts.” (PDM, 197) Searle objected to Derrida’s second argument, by asserting that, what prevents flux and fluctuation of meaning is not found in what is uttered, but the general assumptions in which it is uttered. So, when using speech acts on a day to day level, participants are operating within a set of assumptions that define what something normally means and does not mean. Further, the assumptions within which speech acts occur, **are not** theoretical **constructs** that are **built to arrest meaning**, but **necessary assumptions behind the process of communication**. Finally, Derrida, against Searle argued that, it is the potential of the text to be interpreted in many ways and not our intentions and assumptions that make different interpretations possible. So, the text by itself plays a context creating function. As Habermas sees it, as long as participants in an intersubjectivist communicative process are oriented towards understanding, then meaning will not be deferred. **Wrong interpretations** and abnormal usages of language **could be** simply **identified** as something that hinders consensus and understanding. Idealizations that are found beyond communicative action and the fact that the various claims raised during communication are open to critique, and can be empirically tested will easily help to “distinguish between ‘usual’ and ‘parasitic’ uses of language” (PDM, 199). By ‘parasitic’, Habermas meant that the normal use of language in everyday communication is for reaching understanding. Other artistic, metaphorical and non-literal usages of language are derived from the normal usage. Further, eventhough ‘parasitic’ usages of language prevail in everyday communication; still actors are able to bypass these usages since they are oriented towards reaching understanding. By revising the Derrida/Searle debate and employing his arguments as well, Habermas believes that, he managed to defend his communicative rationality with its validity claims. In everyday communication the infinite flow of meaning, poetic and rhetoric elements are **put**s **aside for the sake of understanding**. Having done this, Habermas wants to refute the idea that there is no distinction between logic and rhetoric and that all texts can be analyzed on literary and rhetorical terms. The issue as, Habermas sees it, is the acceptance that all language contains literary and rhetorical elements, while at the same time defending philosophy and the special forms of inquiry against the domination of literary elements, and hence the viewing of their validity claims as something impure and contaminated with artistic and metaphorical elements. Habermas, claims that Derrida’s general notion of text as a mixture of Heterogeneous elements, makes him blind to the fact that in everyday communication there is the possibility to raise and defend claims in **reference to** the three **validity** claims, and that the various specialized forms of inquiry are also oriented towards **solving specific problems** (PDM, 205). Habermas thinks that there is an affinity between Rorty and Derrida in relation to their views on language, communicating subjects. In Rorty, the languages of the sciences and other forms of inquiries create the contexts that necessarily determine everyday communication. Further, the capacity of validity claims to challenged inherited horizons is unacknowledged. (PDM, 206) Furthermore, both Derrida and Rorty, failed to distinguish between everyday interaction in which distinct validity claims are raised, and the various forms of inquiry that are geared toward solving specific problems (PDM, 207). Derrida is accused by Habermas of failing to distinguish between how language has a capacity of making the world visible and intelligible and how it can be used to solve specific problems. So, Derrida in his general notion of a ‘text’ tried to merge all the sciences, including philosophy, criticism, art, literature and so on under one category of literature. Habermas claims that on the one hand, we have everyday world of communication based in the different validity claims, while on the other, the various specialized forms of inquiry that are geared at solving specific problems. Philosophy and literary criticism are found between the two. Literary criticism connects everyday world and the artistic realm, while philosophy, is related to the forms of inquiries in having a universalistic dimension. Philosophy facilitates disputation of claims between everyday world and specialized inquiries. (PDM, 207-208)

**7. The aff’s act of radical resistance only feeds into the war machines of post-enlightenment capitalism—instead of flipping the script, the aff produces more tools that are used to suppress and reap capital off of their own movements turning the aff**

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(Andrew, Media Theorist in Aesthetics and Politics at CalArts University, writing for University of Minnesota, “Dark Deleuze”, June 2016, pgs. 375-402, DOA 9.26.17, <https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/dark-deleuze>, SOB)

The Conspiracy against this world will be known through its war machines. A war machine is itself “a pure form of exteriority” that “explains nothing,” but there are plenty of stories to tell about them (TP, 354, 427). They are the heroes of A Thousand Plateaus – Kleist’s skull crushing war machine, the migratory war machine that the Vandals used to sack Rome, the gun that Black Panther George Jackson grabs on the run, and the queer war machine that excretes a thousand tiny sexes. “Each time there is an operation against the state – insubordination, rioting, guerilla warfare, or revolution as an act – it can be said that a war machine has revivied” (386). War machines are also the greatest villains of A Thousand Plateaus, making all other dangers “pale by comparison” (231) – **there is the constant state appropriation of the war machine that subordinates war to its own aims** (418), the folly of the commercial war machine (15), the paranoia of the fascist war machine (not the state army of totalitarianism (230-31), and, worst of them all, the “worldwide war machine” of capitalism, “whose organization exceeds the State apparatus and passes into energy, military-industrial, and multinational complexes” to wage peace on the whole world (387, 419-21, 467). “**Make thought a war machine,”** Deleuze and Guattari insist. “**Place thought in an immediate relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside**” (TP, 376-77). **Two important inventions follow: speed and secrecy.** **These are the affects of the war machine, its weapons of war, which “transpierce the body like arrows”** (356, 394). The resulting violence is not so vulgar as to encourage blow-by-blow bloodletting or a once-and-for-all immediate killing but institutes an economy of violence who’s hatred is unlimited and therefore durable. The war machine engages in war along two pole: one forms a line of destruction “prolongable to the limits of the universe,” while the other draws a line of flight for the “composition of a smooth space and of the movement of people in that space” (422). Deleuze and Guattari would prefer to promote the connectivist line by saying they “make war only on the condition that they simultaneously create something else” (423). But **today, that path leads to collusion with capitalism’s drive** toward creative destruction (Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, Democracy, 87). This is certainly not lost on those in Silicon Valley who spread the mantra of “disruptive innovation.” We can thus take heed of Deleuze and Guattari’s warning against treating terms as having “an irresistible revolutionary calling” (387). It is time to accept Nietzsche’s invitation to philosophize with a hammer, rendered here in the voice of Krishna: “I am become Time, the destroyer of worlds**.” We must find an appetite for destruction that does not betray** Deleuze and Guattari’s **“abolitionist dream.” This takes the “progressive, anxiety-ridden revelation” that destroying worlds is just another way of “smashing capitalism, of redefining socialism, of constituting a war machine capable of countering the world war machine by other means”** (385, 417, 372). Make the whole world stand still. Indeed, it may be the only way to think the present in any significant sense. To be clear: the suspension of the world is not a hunt for its conditions of reproduction or a meditative “rhapsody of sensations” (DR, 56). It is thought that treats the world as if stuck by an unspecified disaster, where the best friends you have left are your own ideas. This is not the banal disaster movie, whos ambitions are usually limited to teaching us what are the bare essentials to survive. **Writing the disaster is how we break free from the stifling perpetual present, for the present carries with itself a suffocating urgency**. The present imposes material limits. To it, the past and future are the empty form of time, and they must endure the complications of having a body to become part of the present (LS, 146-47, 165). The past and future exist in their own right only through representation – the former in history as the present memorialization of things passed and the latter in the yet to come as the projection of an image of the present (147). **Such re-presentation is why the future appears with the distinct impression that “we have seen it all before”** (Flaxman, Fabulation of Philosophy, 392). The productivity sees the event of thought as an eminently practical reorientation towards the present achieved while generating a new image of the future (WP, 58). IN contrast**, those learning to hate the world must short-circuit the “here and now” to play out the scene differently**. While still being in this world, they turn away from it. This is the life of characters so agitated that they force the world to stand still – Dostoyevsky’s Idiot, the head of Kurosawa’s seven samurai (TR, 317-18). **Against bleating urgency that “there is a fire, there’s fire … I’ve got to go,” they insist that everything could burn to the ground but nothing happens, because one must seek out a more urgent problem!**