# Round 2 – NC

### T

#### Interpretation – The affirmative cannot defend getting rid of appropriation by non-private entities.

#### Private entities are majority owned and managed by nonstate actors

Warners 20 (Bill, JD Candidate, May 2021, at UIC John Marshall Law School) "Patents 254 Miles up: Jurisdictional Issues Onboard the International Space Station." UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law, vol. 19, no. 4, 2020, p. 365-380. HeinOnline. EE

To satisfy these three necessary requirements for a new patent regime, the ISS IGA must add an additional clause ("Clause 7") in Article 21 specifically establishing a patent regime for private nonstate third parties onboard the ISS. First, Clause 7 would define the term "private entity" as an individual, organization, or business which is primarily privately owned and/or managed by nonstate affiliates. Specifically defining the term "private entity" prevents confusion as to what entities qualify under the agreement and the difference between "public" and "private."99 This definition would also support the connection of Clause 1 in Article 21 to "Article 2 of the Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization." 100 A succinct definition also alleviates international concerns that the changes to the ISS IGA pushes out Partner State influence. 101 Some in the international community may still point out that Clause 7 still pushes towards a trend of outer space privatization. However, this argument fails to consider that private entities in outer space have operated in space almost as comprehensively as national organizations. 102

#### **There are many commercial Chinese companies that are state owned**

Liu et al 19 (Irina, Evan Linck, Bhavya Lal, Keith W. Crane, Xueying Han, Thomas J. Colvin, IDA Science and Technology Policy Institute) Evaluation of China’s Commercial Space Sector, Institute for Defense Analysis Science & Technology Institute <https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx> EE

1. Definition of a Commercial Company

Prior to examining the commercial space industry, we first define what companies we include in our evaluation, as the boundary of what includes a commercial company in China varies depending on whom is asked. For example, many SOEs conduct commercial activities with the private sector, buying and selling goods and services from and to households and businesses. However, many of these SOEs prioritize state goals over profitability and do not face traditional market pressures (e.g., they may receive funding from the state to offset losses if costs exceed revenues). In China, therefore, a commercial company is an enterprise that has a primary goal of pursuing profits, rather than meeting government policy goals.

Notably, this definition of commercial differs from the conception of commercial in the United States. The 2010 National Space Policy defined the term commercial as:

space goods, services, or activities provided by private sector enterprises that bear a reasonable portion of the investment risk and responsibility for the activity, operate in accordance with typical market-based incentives for controlling cost and optimizing return on investment, and have the legal capacity to offer these goods or services to existing or potential nongovernmental customers.

Commercialization, under a U.S. perspective, has two dimensions:

1. risk-taking, especially financial, by entities other than the government. Generally, for a company’s activities to be considered commercial, at least some private capital must be at risk or the company must sell to the private sector.

2. the breadth of the customer base, which includes both governmental and nongovernmental customers

Although the above definition fits well with companies in the United States and Europe, ownership in China can be complex (Szamosszegi and Kyle 2011). For example, a majority state-owned company may sell services to households and businesses commercially and have some private investors. Many of the Chinese experts with whom we spoke would consider such a company to be commercial, despite being backed by the state, provided its primary purpose was to sell commercially in pursuit of profits.

Alternatively, a company that is mostly privately-held that has some investment from provincial or municipal VC firms or from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and sells solely to the government would also be considered commercial. As such, we use a different framework than one used in the United States for defining “commercial,” as we believe it is more appropriate. Although both these hypothetical companies would be considered commercial, they would be referred to differently in Chinese. Companies that are more privately-held are referred to as 民营企业 (mínyíng qǐyè), meaning a company operated by a civil entity. Companies that are majority-owned by the state fall under the label 国有企业 (guóyǒu qǐyè), meaning state-owned enterprise.

Interviews and a literature review revealed that Chinese nationals do not consider all SOEs that offer commercial services as commercial companies. This distinction was manifested in literature and news reports on China’s commercial space industry, as authors often differentiate between commercial space (商业航天, shāngyè hángtiān) and space commercialization (航天商业化, hángtiān shāngyèhuà), with the latter referring to government-focused SOEs selling their space products and services in commercial markets 4 and the former referring to both commercially-focused state-owned companies and privately-held companies selling to commercial markets.

#### Violation: They defend all commercial companies in China – conceeded in cross x.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Vote neg for predictable limits. Their aff justifies ignoring words in the resolution which destroys any predictable basis of neg prep. There’s no non-arbitrary way to choose which words aren’t changeable under their interp. This leads to debates where we’re forced to go for generics which destroys education.

#### 2] Clash: they destroy clash by attaching and adding anything they want to the resolution – this allows them to unlink from ks and das that were prepped for the actual res and prevents any engagement.

#### Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations—it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for. Reasonability is arbitrary and unpredictable, inviting a race to the bottom and we’ll win it links to our offense. Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game that needs rules to evaluate it and education gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### No RVIs—it’s your burden to be fair and T—same reason you don’t win for answering inherency or putting defense on a disad.

### CP

#### Counterplan Text: the People’s Republic of China should:

#### ban ASAT use, development, deployment, and research

#### formally end its alliance with Russia and cease covert cooperation

#### Publicly oppose the PPWT and declare its passage unlawful.

### DA

#### Private sector innovation is recovering due to Covid

**Am et al. 20**[Partner at McKinsey & Company focused on the intersection of Food, Sustainability, and Innovation, McKinsey & Company, “Innovation in a crisis: Why it is more critical than ever”, June 17, 2020, <https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/innovation-in-a-crisis-why-it-is-more-critical-than-ever>] DD MN

The **COVID-19** **pandemic** **has upended** **nearly every aspect of life, from the personal (how people live and work) to the professional (how companies interact with their customers, how customers choose and purchase products and services, how supply chains deliver them). In our recent survey of more than 200 organizations across industries, more than 90 percent of executives said they expect the fallout from COVID-19 to fundamentally change the way they do business over the next five years, with almost as many asserting that the crisis will have a lasting impact on their customers’ needs (Exhibit 1).**

However, more than three-quarters also agreed that the crisis will create significant new opportunities for growth, although this varies significantly by industry (Exhibit 2).

Of course, seeing the opportunities emerging from this crisis is not the same as being able to seize them. **Fewer than 30 percent of these same executives feel confident that they are prepared to address the changes they see coming.** **The area** in which they feel the **most challenged is delivering net new growth** opportunities (Exhibit 3).

How are executives responding? As might be expected, they are largely focusing on maintaining business continuity, especially in their core. Executives must weigh cutting costs, driving productivity, and implementing safety measures against supporting innovation-led growth. Unsurprisingly, investments in innovation are suffering. The executives in our survey strongly believe that they will return to innovation-related initiatives once the world has stabilized, the core business is secure, and the path forward is clearer. However, only a quarter reported that capturing new growth was a top priority (first- or second-order) today, compared to roughly 60 percent before the crisis hit (Exhibit 4).

This **decline in** focus on **innovation is evident across every industry** we surveyed; the sole exception is pharmaceuticals and medical products, where we see an almost 30-percent increase in the immediate focus on innovation (Exhibit 5).

#### NASA is stepping down from spending on space – privatization is now k2 innovation

**Cooper 15**[science writer and contributer to Inside Science, Inside Science, “Space Privatization, Tourism And Morals”, March 24, 2015, <http://www.insidescience.org/content/space-privatization-tourism-and-morals/2701?utm_source=Folwd.com>] DD MN

And **space exploration is about to pick up**, according to Impey. The original 1960s space race that spawned the Apollo missions rose out of geopolitical strife during the Cold War. **Now, the** **federal funds for space travel are drying up. In the mid-1960s the NASA budget topped out at almost 4.5 percent of the U.S. Government's budget, a number that has now shrunk to roughly 0.5 percent.**

"**NASA has very little slack in its budget for new, clever initiatives**," said Impey. "**We are** now **witnessing a transition to a more private enterprise driven space program**."

He thinks the **rise of space travel will mirror the development of the Internet**. Impey explained, that people have forgotten many of the **first Internet pioneers**—those who came even before the military began investing in the Internet. **Since** then **[the first Internet pioneers], the Internet has expanded with the** commercial sector driving much of the innovation.

**Over the next 100 years**, **we could** decide to **tackle anything** **from building a**[**space elevator**](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_elevator)**on the moon to sending nanobot probes to another star system or** **even** constructing **a space colony**, said Impey.

#### China’s private sector is uniquely key to innovation

**Dychtwald 21**[founder and CEO of Young China Group, a think tank and consultancy focusing on China's emerging identity on the world stage and the evolving East and West millennial mindset, Harvard Business Review, “China’s New Innovation Advantage”, May-June 2021, <https://hbr.org/2021/05/chinas-new-innovation-advantage>] DD MN

But can China innovate? Can it compete at a global level with developed nations that have built their economies on innovation for decades? Many observers are doubtful. In recent years, they note, the West has steadily produced an abundance of innovations and innovators, while China has produced relatively few. **In March 2014 this magazine published “**[**Why China Can’t Innovate**](https://hbr.org/2014/03/why-china-cant-innovate)**,” by Regina M. Abrami, William C. Kirby, and F. Warren McFarlan, an article that captured the conventional wisdom. The authors’ arguments were sound and well supported at the time. But just two years later eight of the 10 companies that had reached a $1 billion valuation in the shortest time ever were Chinese—and six of those eight were founded the year that article was published.**

Those are startling numbers for a country that in 2020 ranked only 14th on the Global Innovation Index. Something clearly propelled those Chinese companies to the top, but the metrics we use to evaluate innovation have missed it. We tend to focus on people and companies that generate big new ideas—charismatic heroes with dash, daring, and dynamic thinking. By that measure the U.S. innovation ecosystem stands apart. **But in the past five years**, **as an “innovation cold war” has taken shape between world powers, China has achieved a** **kind of** **parity with the United States**—and the driving force behind its success may not be its innovators at all.

**To understand what’s powering the global rise of Chinese companies, we need to recognize that** **China** now **has at its disposal a resource that** no other country has**:** **a vast population that has lived through unprecedented amounts of change** **and, consequently, has developed an astonishing propensity** for **adopting and adapting to innovations, at a speed and scale** that is **unmatched elsewhere** on earth.

**It’s that aspect of China’s innovation ecosystem—its hundreds of millions of hyper-adoptive and hyper-adaptive consumers—that makes China so globally competitive** **today. In the end,** **innovations must be judged by people’s willingness to use them. And on that front China has no peer.**

#### Innovation bolsters space exploration and research – prefer an empirical study of Europe

**Hufenbach 17**[ESA Directorate of Human & Robotic Exploration, ESTEC, “Engaging the private sector in space exploration”, 2017, <https://room.eu.com/article/engaging-the-private-sector-in-space-exploration>] DD MN

Fostering open technology **innovation is** **not only about promoting broader use of the International Space Station (ISS) but could also have a** **positive impact on future missions to the Moon and Mars**. **ESA is** committed to participating in the development of a market-driven economy in low Earth orbit and here Bernard Hufenbach explains the agency’s step-wise approach to **partnering with private companies** that are ready to share risks. He also highlights pilot projects that are aiming to demonstrate their feasibility and commercial viability.

**In 2015, ESA** launched a process for setting up **strategic partnerships with the private sector** to **facilitate its exploration ambitions - and to foster growth and competitiveness of the European space and non-space industrial base.**

**The initiative is** nurturing the gradual **establishment of private sector services**, led by European companies for low Earth orbit (LEO) exploitation **in** support of **lunar exploration. It aims to strengthen the competitiveness of European industry, stimulate research and development and integrate innovative solutions into ESA space exploration missions.**

#### Space is the sole solution to climate change

**Autry 19**[American space policy expert, educator, entrepreneur and author, Foreign Policy, “SPACE RESEARCH CAN SAVE THE PLANET—AGAIN”, July 20, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/07/20/space-research-can-save-the-planet-again-climate-change-environment/>] DD MN

Today conservationists and other critics are more likely to see space programs as militaristic splurges that squander billions of dollars better applied to solving problems on Earth. These well-meaning complaints are misguided, however. Earth’s problems—most urgently, **climate change**—**can be solved only from space. That’s where the tools and data already being used to tackle these issues were forged and where the solutions of the future will be too.**

**Space research has** already **been critical in averting one major environmental disaster. It was NASA satellite data that revealed a frightening and growing hole in the ozone layer over the South Pole, galvanizing public concern that, in 1987, produced the Montreal Protocol: the first international agreement addressing a global environmental problem. Since then, thanks to worldwide restrictions on damaging chlorofluorocarbons, the ozone situation has stabilized, and a full planetary recovery is expected. As this case showed, space can provide the vital information** needed **to understand a problem—and** a surprising range of ways to **solve it**.

Climate change is a poster child for the critical role of space data. **Trekking across the globe to measure ice sheets with drills and gauge sea temperatures from the sides of ships is an expensive, slow, and insufficient way to assay the state of the planet. Satellites operated by NASA, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and an increasing number of commercial firms provide a plethora of multispectral imaging and radar measurements of developments such as coral reef degradation, harmful plankton blooms, and polar bears negotiating thinning ice. Much of the technology involved in observing the Earth today was initially developed for probes sent to explore other planets in our solar system.**

Indeed, **understanding the evolution of other planets’ climates is essential for modeling possible outcomes on Earth. NASA probes revealed how, roughly 4 billion years ago, a runaway greenhouse gas syndrome turned Venus into a hot, hellish, and uninhabitable planet of acid rain. Orbiters, landers, and rovers continue to unravel the processes that transformed a once warm and wet Mars into a frigid, dry dust ball—and scientists even to conceive of future scenarios that might terraform it back into a livable planet.** **Discovering** **other worlds’ history and** **imagining their future offers important visions for climate change mitigation strategies on Earth, such as mining helium from the moon itself for future clean energy.**

#### Climate change risks ‘extinction domino effect’

**Flinders 18**[public research university in Adelaide, South Australia, Flinders University, “Climate change risks 'extinction domino effect'”, November 29, 2018, <https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/11/181129122506.htm>] DD MN

This would be the worst-case scenario of what scientists call **'co-extinctions', where an organism dies out because it depends on another doomed species**, with the findings published today in the journal Scientific Reports.

**Think of a plant's flower pollinated by only one species of bee -- if the bee becomes extinct, so too will the plant eventually.**

"**Even the most resilient species will inevitably fall victim to** the synergies among **extinction** drivers **as extreme stresses drive ecosystems to collapse**." says lead author Dr Giovanni Strona of the European Commission's Joint Research Centre based in Ispra in northern Italy.

Researchers from Italy and Australia simulated 2,000 'virtual earths' linking animal and plant species. Using sophisticated modelling, they subjected the virtual earths to **catastrophic environmental changes** that ultimately **annihilate**d **all life**.

**Examples** of the kinds of catastrophes they simulated **include**d runaway **global** **warming, scenarios of 'nuclear winter' following the detonation of multiple atomic bombs, and a large asteroid impact.**

"What we were trying to test is whether the variable tolerances to extreme global heating or cooling by different species are enough to explain overall extinction rates,"

"But because all species are connected in the web of life, our paper demonstrates that even the most tolerant species ultimately succumb to extinction when the less-tolerant species on which they depend disappear."

"**Failing to take into account** these **co-extinctions** therefore **underestimates the** rate and **magnitude of** **the loss of entire species from events like** **climate change by up to 10 times**," says co-author Professor Bradshaw of Flinders University in South Australia

Professor Bradshaw and Dr Strona say that their virtual scenarios warn humanity not to underestimate the impact of co-extinctions.

"Not taking into account this domino effect gives an unrealistic and exceedingly optimistic perspective about the impact of future climate change," warns Professor Bradshaw.

It can be hard to imagine how the demise of a small animal or plant matters so much, but the authors argue that tracking species up to total annihilation demonstrates how the loss of one can amplify the effects of environmental change on the remainder.

"Another really important discovery was that in the case of global warming in particular, the combination of intolerance to heat combined with co-extinctions mean that 5-6 degrees of average warming globally is enough to wipe out most life on the planet," says Dr Strona.

Professor Bradshaw further warns that their work shows how **climate warming creates extinction cascades in the worst possible way, when compared to random extinctions or even from the stresses arising from nuclear winter.**

### DA

#### China views resources in space as key to foreign policy iniatives

Blair, Yali, 19, 03/2019, “The Space Security Dilemma”, Bruce G. Blair is the President of the World Security Institute. He was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1987-2000. Mr. Blair is the author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces. He is presently completing a new book on U.S. nuclear policy.sChen Yali is the editor-in-chief of Washington Observer. She is also a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group based in Beijing. Chen worked for China Daily as a reporter and opinion writer on politics and international affairs between 1994 and 2000, URL: <https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BB_Editors-Notes-Space-Security-Dilemma_2006.pdf>, KR

A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before it’s too late. ShuXing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the “Enclosure Movement” in late 18th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and “once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations.” A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given China’s population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (‘win-lose’) attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both parties lose.

Maj. Gen. Chang Xianqi and Sui Junqin of the PLA Institute of Command and Technology (aka. Armament Command and Technology Academy) offer a straightforward description of the aims of China’s space activities over the next five to 20 years, and explain why perceptions or accusations of hidden military aims in China’s manned space flight program (which sent two astronauts into space in October 2005) do not withstand logical scrutiny. They characterize the country’s space mission as dedicated to advancing science and to supporting China’s economic modernization. They dismiss two key allegations concerning the manned space program that the Shenzhou spacecraft’s ability for mid-course orbital maneuvering indicates a Chinese military effort to apply the technology to Chinese strategic missiles in order to give these missiles the ability to avoid U.S. missile defenses, and that China envisions its manned spacecraft as platforms for conducting real-time reconnaissance and intelligence collection for military ends. China’s orbital maneuver technology, they note, is decades old and evolved independently of the U.S. missile defense program, while the inefficiencies of conducting surveillance from manned platforms compared to satellites are widely appreciated and have led other space-faring nations to choose satellites for this mission.

#### The plan forces China to respond since they can’t pursue resources – that form of militarization creates arms control and escalation crises

Blair, Yali, 19, 03/2019, “The Space Security Dilemma”, Bruce G. Blair is the President of the World Security Institute. He was a project director at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1987-2000. Mr. Blair is the author of numerous articles and books on security issues including the Logic of Accidental Nuclear War and Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces. He is presently completing a new book on U.S. nuclear policy.sChen Yali is the editor-in-chief of Washington Observer. She is also a Program Manager of Chen Shi China Research Group based in Beijing. Chen worked for China Daily as a reporter and opinion writer on politics and international affairs between 1994 and 2000, URL: <https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BB_Editors-Notes-Space-Security-Dilemma_2006.pdf>, KR

While the China space threat consists of a spectrum of possibilities, the U.S. space threat to China clearly goes beyond the realm of possibilities, Zhang Hui at Harvard University contends in his article that examines threats from a Chinese perspective. Drawing on authoritative sources, he argues that the United States is unambiguously committed not only to exploiting space for military purposes, but also to controlling space by all necessary means including weapons deployed in space. The objective is not only to protect U.S. space assets, but to deny adversaries the use of space in wartime. In its most ambitious rendition, controlling space applies even to the transitory period of several minutes when an adversary’s missiles are passing through space enroute to their wartime targets on enemy soil. This prospective role for U.S. space control weapons – shooting down an adversary’s ballistic missiles – is the central concern of Zhang’s analysis, as it represents the most serious threat to China’s security. A space-based U.S. missile defense system, especially one designed to shoot down ballistic missiles during their several minutes of boosted flight after launch (boost-phase defenses), would pose the gravest potential threat by enabling the United States to neutralize China’s strategic nuclear missile deterrent.

In some respects Zhang and many U.S. analysts understate the degree of potential threat to China by stressing the huge cost of the thousands of space- based interceptors needed to maintain an around-the-clock vigil of Chinese missile launches, and by stressing the relative ease by which China’s missiles could punch holes in this defensive constellation. The understatement derives from the fact that a far less extensive galaxy of U.S. space-based interceptors would be needed if the United States could choose the moment for initiating hostilities as part of a preemptive offensive strategy. Even a constellation of dozens of interceptors could be decisive if the United States enjoyed the luxury of setting the terms of the onset of conflict and the interceptors were optimally positioned at that moment.

In Zhang’s view, China could counter by deploying anti-space weapons designed to cripple the U.S. missile defense network, but such a step could ignite an arms race in space (and, we might add, create impulses to preemptively strike in space during a crisis). Alternatively, China could ramp up its arsenal of nuclear missiles and warheads to the point at which it would overwhelm the U.S. defense capability, but the downsides are numerous. A Chinese missile build-up could trigger nuclear reactions from India. If Pakistan follows suit, an arms race in South Asia could result. It could also require China to re-start its fissile materials production facilities and thereby unravel China’s commitment to the multinational treaty calling for all countries to stop future production of such materials.

#### Turns aff war impacts and hyper-escalate their conflict scenarios since other states have incentives to match China

## Case

### AT: Space Militarization

#### No uniqueness – most of Chinese militarization isn’t private

Lee-Singer, 21, “China’s Space Program Is More Military Than You Might Think”, 7/16/21, Defense One, P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and securityTaylor A. Lee is an analyst with BluePath Labs, a DC-based consulting company that focuses on research, analysis, disruptive technologies, and wargaming. URL <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-you-might-think/183790/>, KR

The militarized tilt of the Chinese space program complicates these plans. Space planning and directing organizations, the ground infrastructure supporting its space programs, and the taikonauts themselves are all under the purview of the People’s Liberation Army. Understanding these connections is important for any plans to cooperate with China in space, whether governmental or commercial.

On the organizational side, China’s equivalent to NASA is the civilian China National Space Administration, which has a focus on the space program’s international exchanges. It falls under the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which handles defense-related science and technology, including China’s state-owned defense conglomerates. However, unlike NASA, the CNSA doesn’t oversee China’s astronauts. The organization actually in charge of China’s manned space program is the China Manned Space Engineering Office, which is under China’s Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department.

Likewise, the infrastructure of China’s space program is also heavily militarized. The launch sites, control centers, and many of the satellites are directly run by the PLA. Taikonauts lift off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (aka Base 20 of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, its space and cyber arm); directed by the PLASSF’s Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, with Telemetry, Tracking and Control support from the Xi’an Satellite Control Center (aka the PLASSF’s Base 26); and land at one of two sites in Inner Mongolia operated by the two bases.

#### No link:

#### Even if they’re right that they work on private projects to help each other – the larger iniative is space dominance which the aff doesn’t solve

#### their card literally says they’ve already militarized it so they don’t need alliances (which is what the impact ev is ABOUT, not alliances)

1AC Bowman and Thompson 3/31 [(Bradley Bowman, the senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies) (Jared Thompson, a U.S. Air Force major and visiting military analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.) “Russia and China Seek to Tie America’s Hands in Space” Foreign Policy 3/31/2021. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/31/russia-china-space-war-treaty-demilitarization-satellites/] BC

Consider the actions of the United States’ two great-power adversaries when it comes to anti-satellite weapons. China and Russia have sprinted to develop and deploy both ground-based and space-based weapons targeting satellites while simultaneously pushing the United States to sign a treaty banning such weapons.

To protect its vital space-based military capabilities—including communications, intelligence, and missile defense satellites—and effectively deter authoritarian aggression, Washington should avoid being drawn into suspect international treaties on space that China and Russia have no intention of honoring.

The Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), which Beijing and Moscow have submitted at the United Nations, is a perfect example. PPWT signatories commit “not to place any weapons in outer space.” It also says parties to the treaty may not “resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects” or engage in activities “inconsistent” with the purpose of the treaty.

On the surface, that sounds innocuous. Who, after all, wants an arms race in space?

The reality, however, is that China and Russia are already racing to field anti-satellite weapons and have been for quite some time. “The space domain is competitive, congested, and contested,” Gen. James Dickinson, the head of U.S. Space Command, said in January. “Our competitors, most notably China and Russia, have militarized this domain.”

#### China-Russian alliances don’t last- “US causes them to draw together” narrative is wrong

Carafano 19 (Vice President, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute, James Jay Carafano is a leading expert in national security and foreign policy challenges., <https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/why-the-china-russia-alliance-wont-last>, August 7th, 2019, “Why the China-Russian Alliance won’t last”)//AK

So, now everybody wants to be Bismarck. They see themselves shaping history by artfully moving big pieces on the geostrategic chessboard. And one gambit they just can’t resist is moving to snip the growing bonds of Sino-Russian cooperation. My advice to them: Just stop. Fears of an allied China and Russia running amok around the world are overblown. Indeed, there is so much friction between these “friends,” any attempt to team up would likely give both countries heat rash. Siren’s Cat Call Here’s the lame narrative that’s animating the Bismarck wannabes: The United States is pushing back against Moscow and pressing Beijing. This is driving Moscow and Beijing closer together. Beijing and Moscow will then gang-up on the United States. To prevent this, the United States should make nice with Moscow (undermining the incipient Sino-Russian détente) and then focus on beating back against China. This is an idea that should be dumped into the dustbin before it has any history. Yes, China and Russia are going to work together to some degree. They have important things in common. For example, both are unaccountable authoritarian regimes that share the Eurasian continent. Other indicators of compatibility: they like doing business with each other, and both like to make up their own rules. Heck, they don’t even have to pretend the liberal world order is a speed-bump in their joint ventures. Both happily engage with the world’s most odious regimes, from Syria to Venezuela. And, of course, neither has any compunction about playing dirty when it serves their interests. They already play off of each other to frustrate foreign-policy initiatives from Washington. For example, if the United States pressures Russia to vote a certain way on a measure before the UN Security Council, Russia will often don the white hat and vote as we desire, knowing that Beijing will veto the measure for them. Similarly, if the United States leans on Beijing stop giving North Korea some form of aid and comfort, Beijing can go along with the request, knowing that Moscow will pick up the baton for them. What the neo-Bismarcks need to ask themselves is: Why would Russia or China ever consider giving up these practices? Why would they make the ongoing great power competition easier for the United States? That makes no sense. That is not in their self-interest. Any notion that the United States could somehow seduce Russian president Vladimir Putin from playing house with Beijing is fanciful. Putin doesn’t do something for nothing; his price would be quite high. He could demand a free hand in Ukraine, or lifting sanctions, or squelching opposition to Nordstream II, or giving Russia free rein in the Middle East. Any of these “deals” would greatly compromise American interests. Why would we do that? And what, exactly, is Putin going to deliver in return? What leverage does Russia have on Beijing? The answer is not near enough to justify any of these concessions. On the other hand, what leverage would a Russia-China alliance have on the United States? They wouldn’t jointly threaten Washington with military action. A central element of both their strategies is that they want to win against the United States “without fighting.” Moscow might be happy if the United States got distracted in a military mix-up with China. Conversely, Beijing could okay with the Americans have an armed confrontation with the Russians. But, neither of them will be volunteering to go first anytime soon. Even if they linked arms to threaten the United States in tandem, the pain would not be worth the gain. As long as America maintains a credible global and strategic deterrent, a Sino-Russian military one-two punch is pretty much checkmated. Peace through strength really works. If direct military confrontation is out of bounds, then what can Beijing and Moscow do using economic, political, and diplomatic power or tools of hybrid warfare? The answer to that question is easy: exactly what they are already doing. We have plenty of evidence of on-going political warfare aimed at the United States, its friends, allies, and interests. Some of these activities are conducted in tandem; some are instances of copy-catism; and some are independent and original. The political warfare takes many forms—ranging from corrosive economic behavior to aggressive diplomacy to military expansionism and more. All these malicious efforts are a problem. What they don’t add up to is an existential threat to vital U.S. interests. In other words, we can handle this without sucking up to Putin and undermining our own interests. In fact, we already have a national-security strategy that adequately addresses these concerns. There are also limits to the Sino-Russia era of good feelings. Other than trying to take America down a notch, their global goals are not well aligned. Indeed, the more they try to cooperate, the more their disparate interests will grate on the relationship. For example, China is meddling more in Central Asia and the Arctic—spaces where Russia was dominant. Moscow has to ask itself: Why is Beijing elbowing in? There is an argument that rather than looking for a strategic partnership, China is just biding its time till Russia implodes, and Beijing steps in and sweeps up the choice pieces. And, as much as Putin likes to tweak Trump about Moscow’s ties with Beijing, it is becoming more apparent to Washington that Russia is ever more the junior partner. Can Putin really continue to play Robin to a Chinese Batman? As for China, they have to ask: What does Robin really bring to the dynamic-duo? Play the Long Great Power Game The world doesn’t require a twenty-first century Bismarck. The United States will do better simply by continuing its strategy of pushing back on Russia and China, while letting them know there’s an off-ramp waiting for them if—and only if—they respect U.S. interests. Sure, this makes double duty for Washington. The United States has to mitigate Moscow’s efforts to destabilize Europe, even as it pushes for a free and open Indo-Pacific. But these tasks are not beyond our capabilities—and for us the pain is worth the gain. Rather than try to pry Putin and Xi Jinping apart, Trump should continue to squeeze them from both sides. The natural friction in the Russian and Chinese relationship will prevent them from effectively ganging up on the United States. And it wouldn’t hurt if the United States should find subtle ways to remind them that they would be foolish to trust each other too much. The primary interest of both Putin and Xi is to assure the survival of their regimes. The American squeeze play will leave them with little choice but to accept the fact that America is strong, it’s here to stay, and their regimes have to live with it. This is the only kind of global balancing that will bring about stable relationships in the long-term.

#### Relations aren’t useful militarily- kills the militarization internal link

Cheng 21 (December 21, 2021, “China and Russia likely won’t support each other militarily analysts say”, Evelyn Cheng is CNBC.com’s Beijing correspondent, covering China’s economy and financial markets. <https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/17/china-and-russia-likely-wont-support-each-other-militarily-analysts.html>)//AK

Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin virtually for the second time this year on Wednesday. The meeting came just days after the U.S. and the other Group of 7 major economies condemned Russia’s military build-up and “aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine.” Beijing likely wants to ensure that if it were to take military action against Taiwan, “the Russians wouldn’t do anything,” said Angela Stent, a professor at Georgetown University. “I think both sides recognize, Putin knows, that if he invaded Ukraine, China [isn’t] going to send military help.” Russia lays out demands as it masses troops on the Ukraine border BEIJING — International pressure may have pushed China and Russia closer together, but not enough for the two countries to send military support to each other, U.S.-based analysts said. Chinese President Xi Jinping met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin virtually for the second time this year on Wednesday. It came just days after the U.S. and the other Group of 7 major economies condemned Russia’s military build-up and “aggressive rhetoric towards Ukraine.” “Beijing and Moscow are forging closer ties because both governments view deeper bilateral cooperation as beneficial to their respective national interests, and not primarily because of an ideological affinity between Xi and Putin,” said Neil Thomas, analyst for China and northeast Asia at consulting firm Eurasia Group. Russia-China relations not an alliance between both countries, says think tank China and Russia would rather “divide Washington’s political attention between strategic hotspots in Europe and the Indo-Pacific,” he said in an email. It’s not clear what Beijing’s position on Ukraine is, but China has come under similar international scrutiny over human rights issues, and territorial claims on the democratically self-ruled island of Taiwan. Neither of them specifically endorsed the position of the other with regard to their points of sensitivity, so I think they both want to preserve some sort of flexibility. This year, while Moscow has sent troops to the border with Ukraine, Beijing has increased military activity near Taiwan. U.S. President Joe Biden recently made confusing statements on whether Washington would defend Taiwan upon attack. Beijing likely wants to ensure that if it were to take military action against Taiwan, “the Russians wouldn’t do anything,” said Angela Stent, professor emerita and director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University. “I think both sides recognize, Putin knows, that if he invaded Ukraine, China [isn’t] going to send military help,” she said on CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia” on Thursday. “But they’ll remain completely neutral and that allows them to do whatever they want in what they consider to be their sphere of influence.” China is cautious on Russia-Ukraine tensions: Professor Official reports from both Beijing and Moscow portrayed the two leaders’ virtual meeting Wednesday as a yet another friendly conversation that strengthened the countries’ relationship. Analysts highlighted the rare and more personal use of “you” in Xi’s address of Putin, as released by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, “neither of them specifically endorsed the position of the other with regard to their points of sensitivity, so I think they both want to preserve some sort of flexibility,” William Courtney, adjunct senior fellow at the Rand Corp. said on CNBC’s “Capital Connection” on Thursday. He is a former U.S. ambassador to Georgia and Kazakhstan. In the video call, Xi said he looked forward to meeting the Russian leader in person at the Olympics in Beijing in February. The Chinese leader also “reaffirmed China’s commitment to firmly support Russia in maintaining long-term stability,” according to a release from China’s foreign ministry. Russia talks up China’s goodwill Moscow struck an even more optimistic tone. In the video call, Putin said Russia’s relations with China were at their best level ever, according to statements from both countries. A Kremlin aide also claimed to reporters after the meeting that Xi said the bilateral relationship was stronger and more effective than that of allies, although the two sides do not have such a formal alliance. “President Xi stressed that he understands Russian concerns and fully supports our initiative to develop appropriate security guarantees for Russia,” said Yury Ushakov, Russian presidential aide on foreign policy. Russia-China relations not an alliance between both countries, says think tank Putin has said Washington should not allow Ukraine to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in return for assurances that Russia would not invade. But Biden told Putin in a virtual meeting last week that Washington would not accept such a demand. An attack on one member of NATO — a powerful military alliance — is considered an attack on all member countries. Ukraine has wanted to join NATO since 2002, but Russia has objected on grounds that such a move would be a direct threat to its borders. China’s diplomatic self-interest Releases from China’s foreign ministry did not describe the relationship with Russia as a kind of alliance. The two countries are major trading partners, with China buying significant amounts of energy products from Russia. “China does not want a formal military alliance with Russia, because it wants to avoid direct involvement in the messy international politics of Moscow’s destabilizing moves in Eastern Europe, and has an ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ that opposes military conflict and emphasizes the importance of dialogue,” Eurasia Group’s Thomas said. “Russia is very much the junior partner in the bilateral relationship,” Thomas said. “And Moscow’s ambition in Ukraine [is] not nearly important enough to Beijing for it to abandon its longstanding opposition to formal alliances in international affairs.” While looking out for its own interests, Beijing claims a core principle of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” is “building a community with a shared future for mankind with a view to defending world peace and promoting common development.” Earlier this week, China’s foreign ministry said Xi sent a message of condolence to Biden over the deaths and other destruction from strong tornadoes in the U.S.

### AT: ASAT Prolif

#### No link – chronological is not equal to casual – their ev says ASATS is another example, not b/c of its space sector

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With China planning an ambitious space programme that includes its own space station, it is likely that there will be more such risky incidents in the future as well. It is somewhat disturbing because China’s space programme has advanced to a degree that it undertakes missions including landing on the South Pole-Aitken Basin (on the far side of the Moon), returning rocks from the moon, and an interplanetary mission to Mars, which clearly demonstrates China has the technical capability to design and launch rockets whose spent stages can land without putting others at risk. That it has not done so is odd. It is not exactly what can be characterised as responsible behaviour in space.

Another example of China breaking norms and engaging in irresponsible behaviour in space is its ASAT test. China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007, at an altitude of 850 kilometres, resulted in creating around 3,000 pieces of space debris. More significantly, it broke the unwritten moratorium that was in place for two decades. Beijing also started developing various counterspace capabilities with the goal of competing with the US. Nevertheless, each of China’s actions have led to a spiral effect, with others seeking to match China’s actions, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, given the contested nature of Asian and global geopolitics. For example, China’s repeated ASAT tests have led to the US’ own ASAT test (Operation Burnt Frost in 2008), and India’s ASAT test (Mission Shakti in 2019). India had no plans to go down this path until China’s first ASAT test, which became a gamechanging moment for India. Even so, India did not react to it for more than a decade, but the final decision was a carefully calibrated and a direct response to China’s growing military space capabilities and its less-than responsible behaviour. Other countries like Japan and France are also contemplating moves in this direction. Australia may not be far behind either.

Even though it may not be linked to the uncontrolled re-entry of the Chinese rocket, Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University noted that “about six minutes after Tianhe and the CZ-5B separated, they both came close to the ISS—under 300 km, which given uncertainties in trajectory is a tad alarming.” Making this point, he added “it’s \*possible\* that this ISS/Tianhe close encounter was one of those unlikely coincidences. I’m open to that possibility, but they should still have spotted the closeness and warned NASA (or better, called a collision avoidance hold in the count).”

Rocket re-entries are not uncommon, but space powers have tried to avoid the freefalls by usually conducting controlled re-entries so that they may fall in the ocean, or they may be directed towards the so-called “graveyard” orbits that may lie there for decades. But Jonathan McDowell, an astrophysicist at the Astrophysics Center at Harvard University argues that the Chinese rocket was designed in a manner that “leaves these big stages in low orbit.” And even in the case of controlled re-entries, there are failures sometimes and they can be dangerous too. SpaceX’s rocket debris landing on a farm in Washington in March this year is a case in point.

Moriba Jah, an Associate Professor at The University of Texas at Austin argues in a media interview that such events are going to become more common, and will happen more frequently and, therefore, humanity should come together to “jointly manage near earth space as a commons in need of coordination, protocols, and practices to maximise safety, security, and sustainability.” On the NASA Administrator’s statement, Jah said this should not be “singling out China.” Certainly, this is not about apportioning blame, but China’s actions cannot be condoned either.

What can be done? Given that usable orbits in space are finite in nature, there will need to be steps taken by all the space players to ensure that their actions do not contribute to further pollution of space and make it unusable in the near term. States have to invest in technologies that would aid in cleaning up and getting rid of some of the debris. States also need to come together in developing norms, rules of the road, and legally binding and political instruments on large rocket body re-entries.

The Long March 5B episode has yet again rekindled the debate on the need for rules for rocket and large body re-entries. Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation, for instance, questioned why, despite all ranting about China’s rocket re-entry issues, the US State Department has “consistently oppose[d] anything stronger than voluntary guidelines.” Weeden has provided a useful Twitter thread on the US hesitancy to get on board with legal agreements on outer space. One problem is that while the US abides by international obligations, other do not. This is a concern that Weeden notes “has a grain of truth” but adds the caveat that “reality is not that definitive”.

While he is correct to note that the issue is complicated, it is also true that countries like China have a terrible track record when it comes to meeting their treaty commitments. China’s violation of its own commitments with respect to nuclear non-proliferation, or in the South China Sea and East China Sea are well-known. Given this history, it is difficult to believe that China will allow itself to be bound by any restraints on its space programme, even if it signs any of these agreements. But given the US’ almost allergic reaction to signing legal agreements that others like China may violate, it doesn’t hurt China to keep bringing up PPWT-like (Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects) measures every now and then. This puts the whole international community in a bind. If we have to ensure safe and uninterrupted access to space, creating a secure, sustainable, and predictable outer space framework is essential. But unless all states demonstrate a commitment to living up to existing rules and norms, creating new ones will be difficult.

#### No China ASATs - China can’t hit high enough orbits where our military satellites would be

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Jaganath Sankaran, “Limits of the Chinese Antisatellite Threat to the United States,” Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 8, No. 4. Pp. 19-46. Winter 2014. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26270815.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab5dce757fd3faf27546af10c9c6c9d80>

China’s Missiles Will Not Be Enough

The substantial range of orbital altitudes—1,000 km to 36,000 km— across which satellites operate poses a challenge to China’s ability to attack US military satellites. Of the three sets of orbiters discussed above, ISR imagery satellites operating at altitudes less than 1,000 km are most vulnerable to ASAT attack by China’s intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). This was demonstrated by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test. On 11 January 2007, China launched a two-stage, solid-fuel, mediumrange Dong Feng (DF)-21 ballistic missile using a mobile transportererector-launcher (TEL) from the Xichang Space Center which slammed into one of its polar-orbiting LEO weather satellites (Feng Yun 1C) orbiting at an altitude of approximately 850 km.13

Caution should be exercised, however, in linearly scaling this Chinese ASAT capability to satellites operating at higher altitudes. The DF-21 ballistic missile used in the 2007 test cannot reach either GPS or communications satellites. In fact, even China’s most powerful solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are unable to reach an altitude of 20,000 km where GPS satellites operate. These limitations of Chinese missiles are due to fundamental constraints of physics.

To illustrate: a Chinese ICBM carrying a 2,000 kilogram (kg) payload with a burn-out velocity of 7.0 km/sec (traveling a ground distance of approximately 11,500 km) when launched straight up with a reduced payload of 500 kg reaches a maximum altitude of only 10,500 km. The same ICBM with a reduced payload of 250 kg reaches an approximate maximum altitude of only 15,000 km. This limitation, as discussed above, implies that China would not be able to execute an ASAT attack against GPS satellites operating at 20,000 km or US military communications and SIGINT satellites operating at 36,000 km using its current missile inventory. To reach these higher orbiting satellites, China would have to build new and more-powerful ICBMs. Even if it manages to develop such an ICBM, China certainly will not be able to produce a large number of them without substantial financial stress. Alternatively, it can use its liquid-fueled space launch vehicles; however, this imposes other difficulties discussed below.

#### China would honor the commitment.

Cerny et. al 21[Michael B. Cerny has a Bachelor’s in International Relations from Emory University, Raphael J. Piliero is a Fulbright Scholar in Taiwan. David Bernstein has a Bachelors from Georgetown, Brandon W. Kelley is the Associate Director of Debate at Georgetown , May 2021,*Space and Missile Wars: What Awaits*, Chapter 5: Countering Co-Orbital ASATs: Warning Zones in GEO as a Lawful Trigger for Self-Defense https://npolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Space\_and\_Missile\_Wars.pdf, 12-18-2021 amrita]

There is some evidence to suggest that **Russia** and **China would** also **accept the warning zone proposal.** **First**, **Russian** and **China** might **recognize that warning zones are mutually beneficial**, **giving them a legal right to defend their satellites** while maintaining stability as a variety of RPO capable spacecraft are rapidly deployed.454 Even if the two parties do not accede to the agreement at first, **the failure of existing proposals** to address dual-use threats from RPO capable spacecraft **might** **encourage Russia** and China towards acceptance of warning zones. Second, **the U**nited **S**tates can **gain political leverage** and engage in "full-contact lawfare" **by highlighting** the **contradictory positions of Russia** and China regarding space arms-control diplomacy.455 As the two nations continue to conduct potentially destabilizing RPO tests in orbit, the international community will **eventually recognize** their dual-use nature as **ASATs**. This is especially salient considering the recent Russian testing of the Nudol, as well as the much-pilloried Chinese direct-ascent and debris-producing ASAT test of 2010. With regards to China, this reality is particularly relevant when one considers **China’s desire to leave a mark on international institutions in the space domain**. For example, Brian Weeden and Xiao He, an assistant research fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, argue that China feels boxed out of most international arenas where the US is already well-established. **Space offers an area** where China can proactively participate and lead in international governance, shaping rules **to align with their own interests**.456 Furthermore, He writes that China has recognized international resistance to the PPWT proposal and considers the likelihood of success as remote. Furthermore, Chinese President **Xi** Jingping has **emphasized coop**erative **security** a central aspect of China’s foreign political approach, hoping to produce win-win outcomes in contrast to the zero-sum thinking that dominated during the Cold War.457 Additionally, **China has an economic incentive** to pursue stability in orbit. As China continues to use satellites to expand its Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), they have a strong incentive to protect their own assets.458 Such international and economic incentives similarly exist for Russia, a declining power with a desire to increase international engagement in orbit.

### AT: US Heg

#### Hegemony falling now, and trying to reverse ruins the economy but triggers counterbalancing --- multipolarity is best --- it doesn’t force US abdication but leads to a peaceful transition and world order

Preble 18 Christopher A. Preble, Christopher A. Preble is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute and the author of “The Power Problem: How American Military Dominance Makes Us Less Safe, Less Prosperous and Less Free.” “Adapting to American Decline.” The New York Times. April 21, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/opinion/sunday/adapting-to-american-decline.html

The news that Mike Pompeo, the C.I.A. director, met in secret with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong-un, over the Easter weekend has renewed hope that one of the world’s most dangerous standoffs might be resolved without war. On Saturday, in fact, Mr. Kim announced that he would halt nuclear tests. Mr. Pompeo’s trip was surprising for many reasons: he went personally, it was kept a secret and it was revealed at a time when others were questioning his fitness to become secretary of state.

But it says something about America’s place in world affairs that at least one aspect of the trip was no surprise at all: that Americans are deeply, centrally involved in a dispute involving two sovereign countries thousands of miles away from Washington.

Of course, there’s a good historical reason. Under American tutelage, South Korea eventually evolved from a desperately poor autocracy to one of the wealthiest democracies on the planet. American taxpayers continue to spend billions of dollars a year to help maintain regional security. A similar process played out in other parts of Asia and in Europe, where the American security umbrella, including tens of thousands of military personnel, provided room for those countries’ leaders to build strong democracies and economies.

American leaders argued that such policies served the cause of global peace and security. They also reasoned that the substantial costs would be tolerable. And, so long as American productivity and workers’ wages were rising, it seemed that Uncle Sam could ensure a decent standard of living at home and security around the world.

It is becoming harder, though, for America to maintain this global posture. Eventually, it may become impossible, in part because we helped create the conditions that allowed other countries to prosper and grow. There may come a time, not too far in the future, when Americans would be surprised to hear that they are responsible for keeping peace on the Korean Peninsula.

Americans should be debating how to manage that transition in a way that avoids destabilizing the rest of the world. Unfortunately, if the current administration’s maneuvers between the two Koreas are any indication, this is the last thing on the minds of policymakers.

There is no question that America’s share of global wealth is shrinking. By some estimates, the United States accounted for roughly 50 percent of global output at the end of World War II. By 1985, its share stood at 22.5 percent. It has fallen to 15.1 percent today, and the [International Monetary Fund](http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PPPSH@WEO/WEOWORLD/USA) projects that it will slip to 13.7 percent by 2023.

The proliferation of various technologies — from crude explosives to advanced robotics — has made it easier for even relatively small and weak countries and nonstate actors to challenge the big and powerful United States. These days any truly determined country, even a very poor one like North Korea, can develop nuclear weapons to deter attacks.

Yet Americans may be the last people to recognize the changing shape of global power. It’s not that senior national security officials don’t understand that they have a problem. The Trump administration’s [National Defense Strategy](https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf), for example, speaks of “an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield” and worrisome “trends” that “will challenge our ability to deter aggression.”

Its answer? Try harder.

The document predicts that America’s allies will lose faith and the country’s global influence will wane unless taxpayers commit to “devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage.”

The problem is, the United States already spends more on its military than the next seven or eight nations combined. Total annual expenditures, including for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, have averaged $561 billion since 2001. So, how much more must Americans spend to maintain a military edge sufficient to deter attacks against others?

About $196 billion more, on average, over the next five years. The Trump administration projects spending $3.78 trillion from 2019 to 2023, or $756.9 billion a year. Some doubt that even that will be enough.

Ideally, this additional spending will discourage others from challenging us. Even if it did, however, that would require Americans to accept less domestic spending, higher taxes or both in order to allow others to underspend on their militaries.

But what worked before might not work in the future. America’s insistence upon maintaining primacy at all costs may stimulate greater resistance from the likes of China and Russia. And the risk that the United States gets drawn into wars that it need not fight and cannot win will remain high, no matter how much we spend. We are faced with the prospect, then, of frequent uses of force — like the missile strike against suspected Syrian chemical weapons sites this month that even supporters admitted was unlikely, by itself, [to accomplish much](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/14/us/politics/trump-syria-policy.html).

There are, however, alternatives to simply spending more and trying harder. Of course, the easy, and unpalatable, options would hand over the reins of global leadership to China, or simply have American forces withdraw quickly and let the chips fall where they may.Instead, America should seek a new arrangement that asks the beneficiaries of today’s relatively peaceful and prosperous world order to make a meaningful contribution to maintaining it. The American security umbrella will stay aloft — and American military power will remain formidable — but others will need to do more.

Rather than treating allies like reckless teenagers who can’t be trusted without Uncle Sam’s constant supervision, or feckless weaklings that will jump at the chance to capitulate to rapacious neighbors, Washington should empower mature, like-minded states to deal with local challenges before they become regional or global crises.

Some countries, in fact, are already moving in this direction. South Korea has undertaken its own bilateral negotiations with North Korea. Unsettled by Donald Trump’s threats to renege on American security commitments, or offended by his attempt to extract tribute in exchange for American protection, these countries’ leaders are thinking seriously about different security arrangements. As Constanze Stelzenmüller explained [in a recent paper for the Brookings Institution](https://www.brookings.edu/research/normal-is-over/), Europeans, in particular, have an “existential” interest in “preserving an international order that safeguards peace and globalization.”

Of course, one purported advantage of an American-funded global security order is that it supposedly allows Washington to call the shots — and, naturally, some worry that its allies would show less deference and be less willing to comply with Washington’s dictates if they were less dependent upon American power. But that already happens: In fact, some allies have been known to act recklessly when they believe that America has their back. Look at the ruinous war that Saudi Arabia is waging in Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries. Greater independence could induce greater caution.

And the benefits flow both ways. If Washington was slightly less confident that it could call the tune and expect others to dance, that might help America to avoid costly mistakes. Would the United States have invaded Iraq if it didn’t believe that other countries would help clean up after?

Transitioning to a world with many capable actors won’t be easy. It will require a deft hand to unwind defense arrangements, and patience as others find their way. Given their own domestic spending priorities and continued uncertainty about whether the United States will recommit to the old model, most American allies are likely to take a wait-and-see attitude. A gentle nudge might be needed to move them from comfortable adolescence to empowered adulthood.

The columnist Charles Krauthammer once cast [decline as a choice](http://www.weeklystandard.com/decline-is-a-choice/article/270813), as though, by mere force of will, the United States could remain atop the international order forever.

On the other hand, it was Mr. Krauthammer who in 1990 spoke of [America’s unipolar “moment”](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1991-02-01/unipolar-moment) — a temporary state of affairs, occasioned by a unique set of circumstances that defined the first few years of the post-Cold War world. That world no longer exists. Wishing it back into existence won’t make it so.

The United States is the most important country in the world and will remain so for many years by virtue of its strong economy and prodigious military capabilities. But admitting that the United States is incapable of effectively adjudicating every territorial dispute or of thwarting every security threat in every part of the world is hardly tantamount to surrender. It is, rather, a wise admission of the limits of American power and an acknowledgment of the need to share the burdens, and the responsibilities, of dealing with a complex world. It is about seizing the opportunity to make changes that benefit us and others.

The alternative is a renewed commitment to discourage self-reliance among allies. That will be an undertaking far more onerous than any the United States has attempted since World War II — and one that is unlikely to work.

### General

#### Nation-centric approaches lead to a regulatory race to the bottom

Heise 18 -- Jack Heise (Judicial Law Clerk at U.S. Courts of Appeals), Space, the Final Frontier of Enterprise: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining Under a Revised International Framework, 40 Mich. J. Int'l L. 189 (2018). https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol40/iss1/5 WJ

However, a nation-centric, first possession framework has drawbacks that highlight the desirability of an international governance regime for as- teroid mining. First, the experience of colonization was one that prompted conflict between colonizers.122 The peaceful character of space is one of the great achievements of the OST, and it should not be jettisoned. Second, a regime characterized by national actors could spark a race to the bottom with respect to domestic regulation, leading to the same “flags of convenience” problem present in the maritime context as asteroid mining and spaceflight companies relocate to avoid taxes, labor and safety standards, and tort liability.123 An international framework, by contrast, could more easily prevent this problem by facilitating the creation of uniform standards for labor, safety, and liability, making relocation to under-regulated states a less attractive prospect. The drawbacks of a system governed by individual nations, in conjunction with the advantages of a global system illustrated above, point to the desirability of a revised framework governing asteroid mining that is international in character.