### 1

#### 1] Interpretation – Affs must defend a reduction in intellectual property protections that protect the medicines.

#### Medicines are physical substances

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### 2] Violation - Data exclusivity protects clinical trial data, NOT MEDICINE. The plan doesn’t affect the actual production of Medical Substances, just the structural factors that influence it.

Thrasher 5-25 Rachel Thrasher 5-25-2021 "Chart of the Week: How Data Exclusivity Laws Impact Drug Prices" <https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2021/05/25/chart-of-the-week-how-data-exclusivity-laws-impact-drug-prices/> //sid

Data exclusivity is a form of intellectual property protection that appliesspecifically to data from pharmaceutical clinical trials. While innovator firms run their own clinical trials to gain marketing approval, generic manufacturers typically rely on the innovator’s clinical trials for the same approval. Data exclusivity rules keep generic firms from relying on that data for 5 to 12 years, depending on the specific law. Data exclusivity operates independently of patent protection and can block generic manufacturers from gaining marketing approval even if the patent has expired or the original pharmaceutical product does not qualify for patent protection. Although data exclusivity laws are matters of domestic legislation, the United States, the EU and others increasingly demand in their free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations that their trading partners protect clinical trial data in this way. Data exclusivity is just one of a host of “TRIPS-plus” treaty provisions designed to raise the overall level of intellectual property protection for innovator firms. Although the WTO’s Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) does require Member states to protect clinical trial and other data from “unfair commercial use,” it does not require exclusivity rules that block the registration of generic products.

#### The 1AR will read a ton of cards saying Data Exclusivity is an IP Protection, THAT’S NOT SUFFICIENT since our argument is it has to protect the SUBSTANCE. The Aff is both Effects and Extra-T because they effect things unrelated to Medical IP – both of which are voters for Limits and Ground.

#### 3] The Standard is Limits – allowing Affs that relate to the factors and structures surrounding Medicines allows treatments, drug discovery techniques, computer programs, and production techniques that all have IP protections to be topical which eviscerate a stable locus of predictability.

#### 4] Paradigm Issues –

#### a] Topicality is Drop the Debater – it’s a fundamental baseline for debate-ability.

#### b] Use Competing Interps – 1] Topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical and 2] Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation.

#### c] No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages Baiting since the 1AC will purposely be abusive, and 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

### 2

#### 1] Interp – the Affirmative must defend that all members of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce Intellectual Property for Medicines.

#### Actions regarding IP protections by member nations of the WTO must go through TRIPS.

Microsoft Academic No Date “Trips Agreement” <https://academic.microsoft.com/topic/2780454388/publication/search?q=TRIPS%20Agreement&qe=And(Composite(F.FId%253D2780454388)%252CTy%253D%270%27)&f=&orderBy=0> //Elmer

The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (**TRIPS**) **is** an international **legal agreement** **between** all the **member nations of the** World Trade Organization (**WTO**). It **establishes** minimum **standards for** the **regulation** by national governments of different forms **of** intellectual property (**IP**) **as applied to** nationals of other **WTO member nations**. TRIPS was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1989 and 1990 and is administered by the WTO.

#### TRIPS applies to all member states.

WTO No Date "Frequently asked questions about TRIPS [ trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights ] in the WTO" <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm#Who'sSigned> //Elmer

Does the TRIPS Agreement apply to all WTO members? **All** the **WTO agreements** (except for a couple of “plurilateral” agreements) **apply to all WTO members**. The members each accepted all the agreements as a single package with a single signature — making it, in the jargon, a “single undertaking”. The **TRIPS** Agreement **is part of that package**. Therefore it **applies to all WTO members**. (More on the single undertaking.)

#### 2] Violation – they don’t, they specify [x country].

#### 3] Standards –

#### a] Limits – there are 164 countries in the WTO and the Aff’s model justifies single country Affs or permutation of country Affs literally unlimiting the Topic – this eviscerates a predictable stasis and shifts away from the core topic controversy of global medical access vs innovation.

CCA 21 "World Trade Organization" <https://advocacy.calchamber.com/international/trade/world-trade-organization/> (The California Chamber of Commerce is the largest broad-based business advocate to government in California, working at the state and federal levels for policies to strengthen California.)//Elmer

**The WTO and its 164 member nations** is the only global international organization dealing with the rules of trade between nations. At its heart are the WTO agreements, negotiated and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations and ratified or approved in their parliaments or legislatures. The goal is to help producers of goods and services, exporters and importers conduct their business.

#### Pre-empting PICs – a] No Link – you can specify Medicines or IP Protections and avoid all PICs – there’s a reason no one reads PICs against Weed, Evergreening, or HIV/AIDs – because there are no net benefits – the terminal impact to our interp is smarter Plans not infinite PICs – put the burden on the Aff to show PICs to Affs that specify Medicines/IP Protections and have carded proof of PIC net benefits, b] 1AR Solvency Deficits – universal ground areas like vaccine imperialism or drug prices means PICs can’t access modelling or signaling that doom solvency, and c] Functional Limits – lack of unique impacts limits PICs since they have to have offense – doesn’t apply to 1ACs since the burden of rejoinder constrains Negatives so 1ACs only need a marginal impact – proven by this Aff.

#### b] Ground – Specifying Countries obliterates generics like Innovation that only apply to universal actions since their Link is scope-based – no generics spill-down to countries since the 1AR will say “other countries fill-in” which requires neg research on every possible Aff.

#### 4] TVA – Affirm all member nations reduce Data Exclusivity IP Protections for Medicines.

#### 5] C/A Paradigm Issues.

### 3

#### Representations matter – speech acts shape reality and has existential effects.

Collins and Glover 2 John Collins, Dr, John Collins, and Ross Glover, eds. Collateral language: a user's guide to America's new war. NYU Press, 2002. (Ass. Prof. of Global Studies at St. Lawrence)//Elmer

The Real Effects of Language As any university student knows, theories about the “social con­struction” and social effects of language have become a common feature of academic scholarship. Conservative critics often argue that those who use these theories of language (e.g., deconstruc­tion) are “just” talking about language, as opposed to talking about the “real world.” The essays in this book, by contrast, begin from the premise that **language matters** in the most concrete, im­mediate way possible: its **use**, **by** political and military **leaders**, **leads directly to violence in the form of war,** mass murder (in­cluding genocide), the physical destruction of human commu­nities, and the devastation of the natural environment. Indeed, **if the world ever witnesses a nuclear holocaust**, **it will** probably **be because** **leaders** in more than one country have **succeeded in convincing** their **people**, **through** the use of political **language, that** the use of **nuclear weapons** and, if necessary, the destruction of the earth itself, **is justifiable**. From our perspective, then, **every act of political violence**—from the horrors perpetrated against Native Americans to the murder of political dissidents in the So­viet Union to the destruction of the World Trade Center, and now the bombing of Afghanistan—**is intimately linked with** the use of **language**. Partly what we are talking about here, of course, are the processes of “**manufacturing consent**” and shaping people’s per­ception of the world around them; people are more likely to sup­port acts of violence committed in their name if the recipients of the violence have been defined as “terrorists,” or if the violence is presented as a defense of “freedom.” Media analysts such as Noam Chomsky have written eloquently about the corrosive ef­fects that this kind of process has on the political culture of sup­posedly democratic societies. At the risk of stating the obvious, however, the most fundamental effects of violence are those that are visited upon the objects of violence; the **language** that shapes public opinion is the same language that burns villages, besieges entire populations, **kills** and maims human bodies, and leaves the ground scarred with bomb craters and littered with land mines. As George Orwell so famously illustrated in his work, acts of vio­lence can easily be made more palatable through the use of eu­phemisms such as “pacification” or, to use an example discussed in this book, “targets.” It is important to point out, however, that the need for such language derives from the simple fact that the violence itself is abhorrent. Were it not for the abstract language of “vital interests” and “surgical strikes” and the flattering lan­guage of “civilization” and ‘just” wars, we would be less likely to avert our mental gaze from the physical effects of violence.

#### Our Interpretation is that the Affirmative is a scholarly artifact that should be held to their rhetorical and political consequences – prefer:

#### 1] Education – Debate is an educational space – accountability for rhetoric is key to develop better critical thinkers.

#### 2] Policy Ed – How we justify arguments influence how their implemented – rhetoric and consequences can’t be separated – Kissinger vs Pacifists both wanted us out of Afghanistan but their rhetoric influences how its implemented.

#### 3] Fairness – the Plan is only 5 sec – mooting the rest of it arbitrarily excludes Neg Ground.

#### 4] Portability – Debate’s role is to export debaters to be policy-makers and decision-makers – what we discuss here shapes howe we act out-there – proven by Karl Rove and Neal Katyal

#### 5] Serial Policy Failure – specifically true about the Middle East – reps are the root cause of policy failures and Middle East conflict.

Bilgin 5, Pinar. Regional security in the Middle East: A critical perspective. Routledge, 2005. (Assistant Prof of International Relations at Bilkent University)//Elmer

Reflecting upon the history of US engagement with the Middle East, Douglas Little identifies **representations of the region as the problem behind policy failures**. According to Little, it is 'American Orientalism' defined as 'a tendency to underestimate the peoples of the region and to overestimate America's ability to make a bad situation better' that has often **misled US policy-makers in their dealings with the region**. Regarding the future, Little (2002:314) writes: Although there is greater appreciation for the complexities of the Muslim world than a generation ago, most Americans still view radical Islam as a cause for instant alarm. Having been fed a steady diet of books, films and news reports depicting Arabs as demonic anti-Western others and Israelis as heroic pro-Western partners and having watched in horror the events of 11 September, the American public understandably fears Osama bin Laden and cheers Aladdin. Little's argument builds upon that of Edward Said in his 1978 book Orientalism, where the author pointed to the relationship between **representations and practice**. Said's point was that the academic discourse of Orientalism (defined as 'a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between “the Orient” and [most of the time] “the Occident”' [Said 1995a: 2]) had not only helped to make the Middle East what it has become but also **made it difficult to become something else**: a book on how to handle a fierce lion might … cause a series of books to be produced on such subjects as the fierceness of lions, the origins of fierceness, and so forth. Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject - no longer lions but their fierceness - we might expect that the ways by which it is recommended that a lion's fierceness be handled will actually increase its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is, and that is what in essence what we know or can only know about it. (Said 1995a: 94) This is because the Orientalist discourse does not merely represent the 'Orient' but also lays down the rules that enable one to 'write, speak and act meaningfully' (Agnew and Corbridge 1995:45). In his later works (see Said 1994b, 1995b, 1997, 2001) Said went on to show how contemporary representations of the Middle East (and Islam) in the media (as well as academia) have reduced it to terrorism and very little else. Said's argument is in line with E.P. Thompson's observation on the impact British historical representations of India have had on Indian politics (Said 2001:44-5). According to Thompson, writings on India in English 'simply left out the Indian side of things' thereby deepening the irreconcilability between Indians and the British. Thompson wrote: Our misrepresentation of Indian history and character is one of the things that have so alienated the educated classes of India that even their moderate elements have refused to help the Reforms [of colonial policy]. Those measures, because of this sullenness, have failed, when they deserved a better fate. (quoted in Said 2001:45) Reading Thompson, one is reminded of the numerous attempts made by US policy-makers during the Cold War to generate reform and modernisation movements in the Middle East; some of which attempts have backfired (as with Iraq, Libya and Iran) (Little 2002:193-227). What Little, Thompson and Said are pointing to are the different impact representations have on those who produce the representations and those who are represented. What all share is the damaging effect representations have had on both groups of actors. According to Said, the Middle East as a **spatial representation** **has been repressive** in that it has had 'the kind of authority … [that] doesn't permit or make room for interventions on the part of those represented' (Said 2001:42). The Middle Eastern security discourse, which is informed by this representation, has reflected the Cold War security concerns of the great powers while neglecting that of regional states and peoples. Hence the argument that the current state of regional insecurity in the Middle East has its roots in practices that have been informed by its dominant representation: the 'Middle East'. By way of adopting this spatial representation, the Middle East has been categorised in terms of its politics (as the region that 'best fits the realist theory of international politics' [Nye 2000:163]) and the type of foreign policy its 'nature' demands. In the immediate aftermath of the US-led war on Iraq, one newspaper columnist warned: 'Middle East is not Europe' (Zaharna 2003). Indeed. Yet, this should not be taken to suggest that the Middle East is destined to relive its insecure past. Such representations that emphasised Middle Eastern insecurities without reflecting upon their roots have had the effect of privileging certain security practices (such as the 1998-99 bombing campaign directed at obtaining Iraqi cooperation with the UN team inspecting the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programme) whilst marginalising others (such as the adoption of a more comprehensive long-term policy of creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East). Becoming aware of the 'politics of the geographical specification of politics' (Dalby 1991:274) and exploring the mutually constitutive relationship between (**inventing**) regions, and (**conceptions and practices** of) security is **not mere intellectual exercise**; it helps reveal the role human agency has played in the past and could play in the future. Such awareness, in turn, would enable one to begin thinking differently about **regional security to help constitute an alternative future** whilst remaining sensitive to regional actors' multiple and contending conceptions of security, what they view as referent object(s), and how they think security should be sought in this part of the world.

#### Three Links:

#### 1] Middle East - Usage of contrived impact scenarios to threaten inevitability of conflict in the Middle East is a tool to justify Western Interventions.

Morrissey 14, John. "US Central Command and liberal imperial reach:‘Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century’." The Geographical Journal 182.1 (2014): 15-26. (School of Geography and Archaeology, National University of Ireland, Galway)//Elmer

In an age of transnational global capitalism, many of the companies availing of the commercial opportunities enabled by CENTCOM's security architectures in the Middle East and Central Asia have a distinctly multinational hue. However, CENTCOM's self-fashioned neoliberal ‘world policeman’ role has meant that its mission has not significantly altered since the US government committed to the Carter Doctrine with the establishment of the command in 1983. Its grand strategy has consistently been one of global ‘geoeconomic deterrence’. This paper has outlined the dual military and economic security logics of this strategy, which have resulted in the Middle East and Central Asia being repeatedly scripted as requiring regulative military interventionism. For CENTCOM, the ‘Central Region’ has long needed securitization from itself. Its energy resources and global geographical position, coupled with its seemingly perpetual political instability and irregular military threats, implicitly assign CENTCOM an enduring mission. In this mission, securing resources have often been theorised as the primary objective; Michael Klare (2004), for example, envisaging the Iraq conflict as yet another illustration of the contemporary world's ‘resource wars’ (cf. Le Billon 2004). However, does such a reading overly emphasise what Neil Smith (2003, xiv) calls ‘the old language of resource-driven geopolitics’? As Smith remarks, America's contemporary imperial wars may well force ‘geopolitics to the fore’, but should not ‘blind us to the deeper geo-economic aspiration for global control’ (Smith, 2003, xiv). CENTCOM's intervention in Iraq was never simply about resources, but rather forms part of a much longer US regional grand strategy whose mission has combined both military and economic security interests in endeavouring to shape the regional and global economy. From its first forward deployment in reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers with American ensigns in the US strategic tilt towards Iraq in the Iran–Iraq war, CENTCOM's mission centrally involved what Mona Domosh (2013, 945) theorises at the heart of a longstanding US liberal interventionary urge: a ‘geoeconomic imagination’. CENTCOM's first intervention in the Persian Gulf served a range of elite, corporate economic interests. In more recent times, defence companies such as Raytheon have posted unprecedented global sales ($16.8 billion in 2002) on the back of securing large-scale contracts to supply CENTCOM with various electronic and IT services for its then new deployable headquarters in Qatar (PR Newswire 2003). The myriad security think-tanks and policy institutes in Washington and elsewhere, which serve the DoD in frequently complicit ways, are also an elite interest. And, of course, the interested parties served by CENTCOM's mission are not just those in, or related to, the military. Operating as ‘Guardians of the Gulf’ by patrolling vital assets, key access points and pivotal transportation networks serve as a security blanket for a raft of Western companies that are increasingly expanding to the region (Smith 2005; Gillem 2007; Klein 2007). Since 1983, successive CENTCOM Commanders have annually affirmed the conflation of military and economic ‘vital interests’ at the heart of US national security. CENTCOM's most recent posture statement underlines once more what will continue to ‘keep U.S. attention anchored in this region’: ‘oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy’ (US Central Command 2013). US global ambition and military imperial reach today is given important context by reading the history of CENTCOM in the so-called ‘Central Region’, which has been consistently posited as a geoeconomic pivot, vital to US and global economic health. The command's military strategic calculus has been perennially mobilised in tandem with a discursive identification of future economic risk whose potential volatility must be preemptively guarded against for the broader global economy. The US military has long orientated a ‘global special mission’, which it reaffirms repeatedly with renewed rhetorical verve. ‘Our global responsibilities are significant; we cannot afford to fail’ concludes the Obama administration's most recent national security document (US Department of Defense 2012, 8). The global future is never entirely ‘controllable’, of course, as Foucault notes, and so securitization must ‘take into account precisely what might happen’ (2007, 20). For the past 30 years, CENTCOM's military-economic strategy to secure the aleatory future of the most energy-rich region on earth has been one of forward presence, deterrence and readiness to intervene. Perhaps the DoD describes this strategy best: ‘shaping activities’ (US Department of Defense 2001, 32).

#### 3] Disease – Biosecurity simulations are a tactic of violent sovereignty – their reps are inaccurate and produce policy failure.

Masco 14 (Joe, Prof. of Anthropology @ U. Chicago, *The Theater of Operations: National Security Affect from the Cold War to the War on Terror*, pp. 169-176)//Re-cut by Elmer

To commit to preempting futures not yet realized is to engage the expert imagination in a new way and to move past factual evidence as the necessary orientation for policy. The imaginative, the hypothetical, the “what-if” gains coherence through rehearsal and repetition, and it is instantiated as a future that must be preempted through simulation and gaming. Scenario-based war gaming was an innovation of Cold War nuclear policy, pioneered at the rand Corporation as a way to bring rationality to the escalating nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. In an effort to manage nuclear terror via rational choice theory, defense intellectuals at rand sought to bring a mathematical clarity to nuclear policy. They approached nuclear war via scenario-driven games, involving technical assessments of Soviet military capabilities. rand analysts also sought to understand the emotional make-up of Soviet leaders, their perceptions of strength and weakness, and specifically their risk tolerances across a wide range of nuclear policy actions (see Kahn 1960; see also Schelling 1966). War gaming was a key tool of Cold War policy and became an increasingly elaborate and formalized means of decision making (from training to strategy making to testing specific organizations and personalities) throughout the military. The assumption behind such gaming is that if one can model the kind of threats that are likely to occur (through imaginative practices and collective reasoning), then one can mobilize against them or at least come to appreciate the complexity of the task. Each exercise is constituted by a set of formal rules and concepts that sets the field of action, allowing officials and planners to experience emergency conditions in a hypothetical future. Cold War gaming assumed that Soviet leaders were rational (notably, devoted to their own political and biological survival), an assumption that enabled nuclear deterrence as a concept. Mutual assured destruction requires that all parties understand nuclear war is simultaneous suicide and thus work to control escalating risks out of self-interest. The innovation of the War on Terror is that it focuses not on state military capabilities (a probable future based on observable technical capabilities) but rather on perceived terrorist desires (an improbable but hyperviolent future that need not be grounded in observed technological capacities).23 Moreover, counterterror imagines an enemy (from terrorists to microbes) that cannot be reasoned with or deterred. These conceptual innovations move official threat evaluation more deeply into the imaginary than ever before, but they also produce a future that is understood to be ever more violent, ever more catastrophic.24 Put differently, the complexity and unpredictability of the real world is always reduced in gaming, and certain futures become consolidated as more likely than others via consensus-driven scripts and conceptual repetition across games and agencies. In biosecurity gaming, anticipatory preemption is now linked to certain predetermined catastrophic scenarios (global contagions and engineered diseases), pulling expert thought across a vast range of disciplines and agencies relentlessly to specific worst-case scenarios that exceed current administrative capabilities.25 This type of gaming is an expert exercise in the self-generation of terror, a psychosocial mobilization of certain catastrophic futures as the most vital ones for attempted governance. This expert process necessarily produces an ever-expanding counterterror state that privileges specific imaginary threats over existing forms of everyday violence.26 Consider the tabletop exercise known as Atlantic Storm, staged by the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center on January 14, 2005.27 A particularly elaborate biosecurity game, it engaged former American, Canadian, and European officials to play the leaders of their home countries, with former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright cast as the president of the United States (see figure 4.8). One of the larg- est and most publicized exercises of its kind, Atlantic Storm imagines a terrorist use of smallpox on multiple nations during a summit meeting in Washington, D.C. It challenges players to coordinate an official response of the transatlantic allies to a global epidemic in a world with limited sup- plies of smallpox vaccine. The exercise plays out in real time during the course of a day, with participants seated around a table, confronted by television screens and a large digital clock. Information is provided to the group via simulated newscasts from the “Global News Network” (gnn)— which announces the smallpox outbreaks, attributes the terrorist attacks to an Al Qaeda–related group calling itself the Al-Jihad Al-Jadid, and then tracks the escalating course of the global epidemic. Framed as a race against time—Bernard Kouchner (cofounder of Médecins Sans Frontières, who plays the president of France) declares early on: “This is the emergency period. We must not waste one hour”—the tabletop exercise is designed to terrify and to shock policy makers. The use of simulated mass media provides an impressive element of realism to the game, as gnn delivers breaking news to the assembled heads of state periodically throughout the day, allowing players and the audience of about a hundred official observers to feel the escalating health crisis and the terror of global contagion.28 The exercise is not intended to model a smallpox outbreak but rather to consider official responses to an international health emergency. Participants are asked to distribute a limited supply of smallpox vaccine, control the spread of the disease, live up to national and international obligations during the crisis, engage the World Health Organization, and maintain public confidence in their governments. In fact, none of these goals is achievable given the design of the exercise. The limited administrative re- sources (from vaccine to information to international health agreements) available, and the speed of the simulated outbreak, result in the spread of smallpox from local terrorist attacks to global contagion. The prerecorded gnn sequences give regular updates on the spread of the disease across Europe and the United States and can literally offer nothing but escalating projections of contagion. Moreover, given the incubation period for small- pox (at least a week), the attacks would have actually occurred long before the summit begins, and thus the simulated contamination—regardless of how the players respond in the game—is already widespread in Europe and North America. Rather than constituting effective governance, the exercise is designed to give players the feeling of helplessness in the midst of an esca- lating crisis. By fusing national security and public health on a global scale, the exercise also creates an affective context for immediately building a new biosecurity infrastructure. The Atlantic Storm exercise materials state that all aspects of the scenario are grounded in “scientific fact” but also note that this is “one possible set of plausible events” (see UPMC Center for Health Security 2005). But the scenario presents a nearly perfect affective exercise in the production of terror: smallpox is described early in the exercise by gnn as the “most dreaded disease in history. It is painful. Kills one-third. Leaves some survivors blind and most disfigured.” In the scenario, terrorists have gained possession of the virus from a former Soviet bioweapons facility (smallpox exists today only in small samples in the United States and Russia), built a laboratory disguised as a brewery in Austria, used publicly available microbiology equipment to weaponize the disease, and distributed it to their agents in the form of an aerosol spray for use in mass transit areas in Turkey, Germany, and Sweden. gnn turns for medical advice to D. A. Henderson (2009), the person who in real life led the World Health Organization’s success- ful campaign to eliminate smallpox. But rather than exploring the public health measures that Henderson actually used to contain and eliminate the disease, gnn almost immediately cuts away from him to track news of the spreading contagion. Thus, the twentieth-century logics of public health are both recognized and silenced here by the twenty-first-century biosecu- rity logics of affective mobilization. Participants in the exercise do not learn how to manage smallpox but rather are asked to experience an existential force that cannot be stopped and to feel the helplessness of that situation. In the last act of the scenario, a smallpox outbreak occurs in the Washing- ton, D.C., area, allowing summit participants to feel personally threatened by the disease in addition to being responsible for its global spread. The final gnn report, set six weeks in the future, drives the point home: the terrorist attacks have become a “cascading horror” involving millions of deaths around the world. A massive disruption of the global economy and transportation routes has occurred, leaving governments teetering on the brink of collapse under the threat of public uprisings and rising xenopho- bia. Global vaccine stockpiles have been consumed and there is no end in sight for this fast-moving, now planetary biocrisis. The formal conclusions drawn from the Atlantic Storm exercise un- derscore the difficulty of building an emergency medical system in the midst of a global crisis, the strategic value of vaccine stockpiles, and the need for new administrative and legal understandings that can organize resources and communication across local, state and international agen- cies. Organizers of the exercise also sought to produce a consensus that homeland security actually begins overseas. Thus, the sense of urgency promoted by the exercise involved not only the logistical problem of coun- tering bioterror attacks on two continents but also how to scale public health from the national to the global level. At the beginning of the exer- cise, for example, the United States has enough vaccine for all of its 300 million citizens, which could be the very definition of smallpox prepared- ness in a world with many competing security problems. But in this simu- lated catastrophe, the problem of epidemic disease is transformed into a collective transnational problem, merging domestic health concerns with a proliferating global economic, administrative, and military crisis. Atlantic Storm redefines public health in foreign countries as a strate- gic national security interest of the United States and thereby scales U.S. domestic security up to a planetary level.As Albright, playing the U.S. president, notes in a discussion of Turkey’s request under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) (which states that an attack on one member of nato is an attack on all members) for large stocks of smallpox vaccine: You all are talking about cooperation and I think that is very impor- tant. And I am a different president than the previous one [refer- ring to George W. Bush] but it is still the same country. A lot of our people are very knowledgeable about the fact that when we wanted cooperation—at the time we were attacked and 3,000 people died and Article 5 was invoked—but when we really needed help in Iraq, many of you decided it was not useful. We wanted cooperation. The relationship between security and health is powerfully remade in this simulation, with the biopolitical stakes of an imaginary smallpox epidemic rearticulating how war, alliance, and commerce are imbricated in a new global calculus of threat, one that finally collapses the foreign into the domestic, as well as the terrorist into the microbe. Crucially, there are no steps or escalations in this simulated health and security crisis (see Kahn 1965)—the announcement of the terrorist event to participants in the exercise was also the de facto announcement of global contagion. Atlantic Storm is an exercise in the affective production of urgency— fomenting a state of global emergency for its players—not an effort to test policy options. Unlike nuclear war gaming in the Cold War era, which tested outcomes and modeled tactics in an effort to give leaders more options in a time of nuclear crisis, Atlantic Storm can end only with the recognition of un- preparedness in the face of a proliferating global crisis.29 Unlike the 1952 fcda film, the goal of this exercise is not to reestablish the authority of a caring state over its citizens in the face of new technological dangers. Instead, Atlantic Storm is designed to demonstrate the contemporary limits of federal governance and to create a productive panic among security professionals charged with preempting collective dangers, now emanating both from the future and the other side of the planet. Biosecurity is imaginatively constituted as technologically achievable in Atlantic Storm (with the right stockpiles, global governance structures, and surveillance techniques) and simultaneously pushed off into a distant future, creating a new administrative horizon to be engineered with biosecurity institution building on a global scale.30 Atlantic Storm remains a highly influential bit of insecurity theater, one that biosecurity experts now cite as having “proven” the limits of contem- porary global governance in the face of epidemic disease and the need for a new biosecurity infrastructure to manage bioterrorism. Although the exercise was made widely available to the public in online, digital, and textual versions, its primary audience was always U.S. policy makers. Indeed, contemporary U.S. biosecurity might be said to have been born in crucial ways through tabletop simulation: a June 2001 bioterrorism exercise known as Dark Winter, which modeled a smallpox attack on Oklahoma City by Iraqi agents, successfully launched a national campaign to stockpile enough smallpox vaccine for every American.31 Mobilizing images of diseased children and simulated news coverage of the outbreak, the scenario also was staffed with former U.S. officials playing key roles. Dark Winter helped trans- form a small U.S. stockpile of vaccine for a disease eradicated during the Cold War into a national emergency in the United States. In the hours after the September 2001 anthrax attacks, Dark Winter also provided a powerful script for U.S. security professionals to use in thinking about the unfolding events. When a biological weapons alarm sounded in the White House on September 20, 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney screened a film of the Dark Winter exercise for the president and the National Security Council (Wald 2008, 176; Mayer 2008, 3). In other words, top-level U.S. national security officials turned to the Dark Winter simulation at a moment of actual cri- sis to understand their own immediate physical vulnerability. Biosecurity simulations were crucial to creating the imagined conditions of possibility for an emerging military focus on wmds in Iraq as well as the necessary administrative enthusiasm for constructing a U.S. biosecurity apparatus. Thus, in the realm of anticipatory preemption, biosecurity simulations have proven to be wildly productive affective and political tools, producing in short order a new geopolitics and a new national biosecurity infrastructure.

#### The alternative is to refuse the discourse of the 1AC in favor of deconstruction – that solves

Hirst 15 (Aggie [She], Lecturer in International Politics @ City University London, “Derrida and Political Resistance: The Radical Potential of Deconstruction” *Globalizations*, Vol. 12.1)//re-cut by Elmer

There are many manifestations of the practical consequences of deconstructive resistance across a range of academic disciplines and activist sites. Drawing on the work of scholars and activists who have explicitly linked their radical political projects to deconstruction, whether through endorsing or critiquing it, this section provides two accounts of deconstruction read as a form of activism, followed by a brief snapshot of three examples of its praxio-logical utility in the contexts of feminist, queer, and post-colonial political interventions. Crucially, I am not trying to claim for deconstruction the successes of these latter movements, nor am I suggesting that the actors involved by any means do or should self-identify as proponents of deconstruction. To do so would be a crude and colonising appropriation. Rather, the point made is that the movements and interventions discussed share with deconstruction a commitment to disrupting prevailing norms and assumptions reflective of the second- and third-order critiques outlined above, specifically as regards problematising essentialised or naturalised agents of resistance. One pertinent account of the concrete consequences of deconstruction is provided by Martin McQuillan. He suggests it can be conceptualised as a form of ‘textual activism’: in deconstruction’s movements, he argues, ‘an intervention takes place (a textual activism) which produces the movement, history and becoming of a necessary political analysis which links the political to critical thought today’ (2008, p. 6). This is because deconstruction (unlike philosophy) reads. Such reading qua reading does not generalise from the exemplary but accepts the challenge of the exemplary to thought as an articulation of the troubling otherness which presents itself as an arrival in reading. Reading in this sense has very little to do with the quiet spaces of university libraries... Rather, this reading is an interminable, unconditional critical liveliness to the world around us, its histories and its futures. (2008, p. 6–7) In elucidating this notion of textual activism, McQuillan makes the point that deconstruction intervenes not simply at the level of thought or philosophy but rather in ways which have substantive material effects. Simply put, this is because the ways we think have a direct bearing on the ways we act; in the post-9/11 world, the stupefaction and mystification of domestic thought is inseparable from the military violence which is only one aspect of this world-wide struggle. Thus, critical reason and deconstruction are more important now than ever and this textual activism will be affiliated in unpredictable ways... to the material processes of the political. (2008, p. 9) McQuillan emphasises here the extent to which ‘textual’ readings and interventions are by no means dissociable from the concrete sphere of global politics. While certainly not their sole origin or source, socio-political framings and discourses of war and militarism in the post-9/ 11 world clearly functioned to provide the conceptual foundations and parameters without which the justifications proffered by statespersons in the USA and elsewhere for the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan could not have been convincing or indeed intelligible. Many scholars of global politics using Derrida’s thought have made similar points in a range of empirical con- texts (Arfi, 2012; Bulley, 2009; Edkins, 1999; Fagan, Glorieux, Hasˇimbegovic ́, & Suetsugu, 2007; Zehfuss, 2002). Concurrently, Paul Bowman frames **deconstruction** **as a form of ‘martial art’**. He suggests that ‘although Derrida mainly read and wrote (monstrously faithfully) about “mere” philosophical texts, these **texts** are to be **understood as “indices of real history”,** produced by and productive of particular biases: effects that have effects’ (2010, p. 38). This analogy emerges in part from the embeddedness of deconstruction in relations of violence: it is ‘construed as responding to challenges, intimately attentive, listening, sticking, yielding, inverting and displacing, always patient, calm and adaptive’ (2010, p. 40) in a manner reflective of martial arts, particularly t’ai chi. Bowman elaborates on parallel misreadings of deconstruction and t’ai chi as ‘philosophical, isolated, inward-looking, navel-gazing: as not really real’; both are framed as ‘digressions away from reality, truth, and direct, practical engagement’ (2010, p. 41). However, like t’ai chi, deconstruction has, he demonstrates, a series of concrete praxiological implications. For instance, deconstruction makes possible a form of engagement with political antagonists which emphasises ‘listening’: in contrast to simply denouncing and dismissing interlocutors, deconstruction ‘listens by sticking to the other... Derrida listened, stuck and yielded to the texts and institutions of philosophy, in order to invert and displace conceptual orders and foci’ (2010, p. 44). Bowman suggests that in academic contexts, this might mean, for instance, seeking to publish in journals other than those reflecting one’s own disciplinary and ethico-political commitments, dealing with difference in terms and contexts other than the familiar.

### Economy

#### Jordan Pharma high now – that’s 1AC Salih – flips Uniqueness negative – either a] Jordan pharma isn’t enough and can’t solve your impacts or b] Jordan pharma is already solving – it’s high even with Data Exclusivity which disproves your causal analysis.

#### Jordan Pharma is shifting to innovation – most recent analysis proves – IPR is key – specifically solves Economic Growth.

* Note – I used date last updated since it reflects most recent info

WIPO 8-25 8-25-2021 "Evolving Towards IP-Fueled Innovation" <https://www.wipo.int/ipadvantage/en/details.jsp?id=2647> (World Intellctual Property Organization)//Elmer

Background Operating out of the capital of Amman, **Hikma** is **transforming** the **Jordanian pharmaceutical industry** (Photo: Manni Manae) Ever since its inception, the Jordanian pharmaceutical industry has s**teadily grown into the country’s highest value-added export industry.** By 2010, sixteen pharmaceutical companies were exporting 81% of their production per year to over sixty countries, with high quality products and affordable pricing driving demand. In 2008, sales of the top ten pharmaceutical companies exceeded US$ 500 million. For much of its history, Jordan’s pharmaceutical industry has focused on producing affordable generic drugs. **Jordan’s** accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000 and a free trade agreement with the United States in 2001 strengthened its intellectual property (**IP) system**, and the Jordanian pharmaceutical industry **has been evolving as a result.** Leading this evolution is Al Hikma Pharmaceuticals (Hikma), the largest pharmaceutical company in Jordan. Founded in the capital of Amman in 1978 by Mr. Samih Darwazah, Hikma’s initial focus was to develop a branded pharmaceuticals business across the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), which it did by manufacturing patented pharmaceutical products under license. In 1991, the company’s success led it to establish a presence in the United States through the acquisition of West-Ward Pharmaceuticals (West-Ward). In only three years Hikma became compliant with United States Federal Drug Administration (USFDA) regulations, and in 1996 it became the first Arab company to receive USFDA approval. Shortly after its early successes in the United States, Hikma established an innovative injectable pharmaceutical manufacturing venture in Portugal targeting the MENA and Portugal markets. By the late 1990s, Hikma’s organic innovation and presence in Europe, MENA and North America led to significant expansion of the company. Licensing and Partnerships Hikma’s early success came through the manufacturing and marketing of branded generic drugs. While this continues to be an important part of the company’s overall strategy, **Jordan’s comprehensive economic reforms**, its accession to the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement and the country’s increased level of IP protection **brought** many **new opportunities** for Hikma. The greatest of these was the **increased confidence of international partners**, which brought even more licensing and partnership opportunities. Prior to Jordan’s IP reforms, companies in the country would use slightly different formulas to manufacture a patented product for the generic market. While this was not considered to be IP infringement, it proved difficult to attract foreign investment in the industry. Under the new IP laws, Jordanian companies seeking to make generic versions of patented products cannot use different formulas or ingredients; they must use the exact, patented formula. To do so would require licensing and partnership agreements with the patent holder, and this change brought an opportunity that Hikma was quick to seize upon. Obtaining products under license has always been a part of Hikma’s strategy, and the new IP laws helped the company capitalize on the increased appeal of the country’s pharmaceutical industry generated for foreign investors. The company’s strong market position and established infrastructure made it a clear partner for multinational pharmaceutical companies seeking access to fast growing MENA markets. By the time IP laws in Jordan changed, Hikma already had a proven track record of working with global licensing partners, and its USFDA approved facilities combined with its highly skilled workforce and existing production capabilities made the company even more attractive to multinational partners. In 2007, the company’s successful utilization of new domestic IP laws through increased licensing agreements and partnerships yielded profits of US$ 198 million. As of 2010, it manufactured and marketed 40 licensed branded products through partnerships with multinational corporations such as LG Life Sciences of the Republic of Korea, Sinclair of the United Kingdom and MonoSolRx of the United States. Licensing deals and partnerships have also given Hikma unique acquisition opportunities, which in turn have brought the company access to new markets. In 2007, Hikma acquired Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing (APM), which was the third largest pharmaceutical company in Jordan, through which it significantly increased its presence in Saudi Arabia, as APM gets over one third of its revenue from Saudi Arabia. That same year, it entered the Egyptian market through the acquisition of Alkan Pharma, which became Hikma Egypt, and also entered Germany through acquiring two well known pharmaceutical companies in the injectable oncology market: Ribosepharm and Thymoorgan. These acquisitions, along with new licensing agreements, allowed the company to launch 28 new products, receive 167 approvals and submit 74 regulatory filings in Europe, Jordan and the United States in 2007. Injectable products are one of Hikma's three major business segments (Photo: Adrian Clark) Commercialization Hikma commercializes its products under three major segments: branded, injectable and generic pharmaceuticals. The branded segment manufactures branded generic pharmaceutical products for sale across the MENA region and Europe. The company has been involved in branded pharmaceuticals since its start, and as such enjoys a very good reputation in this area. The company’s injectable segment manufactures injectable generic pharmaceutical products in powder, liquid and lyophilized forms for sale in MENA, Europe and the United States. Lastly, the generic segment produces non-branded generic pharmaceutical products. This segment is focused primarily on the United States, as it is the largest market for the company’s non-branded generic products. The company’s business in this segment is operated by West-Ward, and as of late 2010 it sold 49 generic compounds in 108 dosage forms and strengths. The company has twelve world class manufacturing facilities which provide it with the flexibility to select the most appropriate manufacturing strategy for a particular product, taking into account factors such as cost, regulatory requirements and capacity. Manufacturing facilities are located in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, five of which have been approved by the USFDA, which provides the company with the capability to produce products for the United States market at a lower cost. Maintaining a local manufacturing presence in the MENA region is essential for the company’s growth, as some markets restrict the range of products that can be imported from outside the region. Research and Development Sparked by Jordan’s new IP framework, Hikma has secured the resources it needs to continue and expand its research and development (R&D) activities through licensing agreements, partnerships and acquisitions. The company’s R&D team is spread throughout Europe, Jordan and the United States, and focuses on developing technically challenging products such as injectables, complex formulations, unstable compounds and sustained release tablets and capsules. The R&D team aims to continually increase the number of approvals that it receives from regulatory authorities in its markets for newly developed products which have a strong market potential. Hikma’s R&D division is in charge of product formulation, process design and monitoring of bio-equivalency testing for all of its business segments. Beyond developing new products, it also improves existing products and manufacturing techniques, as well as performing R&D activities related to the manufacture of chemical synthesis, fermentation and purification. To accelerate its R&D efforts, Hikma aims to invest up to six percent of its total annual revenue in R&D, and also cooperates with leading R&D organizations through its collaborative partnerships. All of these factors have **allowed Hikma to transform** into a company that not only produces generics, but **into a company that innovates new products**, **making a substantial impact to** the growth of the company and the **Jordanian pharmaceutical industry**. At the end of 2009, Hikma’s R&D department contributed to a total of 116 compounds and 190 dosage forms and strengths pending regulatory approval, giving the company **a significant pipeline of innovative new products.** The Hikma trademark is protected in Europe (OHIM trademark No.005727425) Patents and Trademarks In 2007, Hikma filed its first Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) international patent application for a nanoparticle pharmaceutical carrier invention made in collaboration with the Queen’s University of Belfast. By 2010, the company has also filed three patent applications with the European Patent Office (EPO). Because branded products are an important part of Hikma’s business, the company has protected several of its brand names through registering trademarks. The company has utilized the international Madrid system to register a trademark for its Cefofix antibiotic in 1992, which was granted in 1995. It has also registered its name and slogan, “Hikma Quality,” with the Trademarks and Designs Registration Office of the European Union (OHIM). Business Results As the IP landscape in Jordan has changed, so has Hikma’s approach to its future growth and success. **Foreign investment, licensing, partnerships and acquisitions** **have all contributed to Hikma’s rapid growth**. The company’s success was recognized internationally in 2005 when it was **listed on the London Stock Exchange**. In 2007, it had an increase in revenue of 41.6% from the previous year. By 2009, Hikma was the fifth largest pharmaceutical company in the MENA region, enjoying a 3.7% market share, 12.4% annual growth rate and over US$ 400 million in sales. For the six months ended June 30, 2010, revenue was up 11.3% and operating profit was up by 20.2% on the previous year. The company is one of the top twenty generic prescription providers in the United States, has a geographic footprint spanning 49 countries, and is the licensing partner of choice for multinational companies looking to expand into the MENA region. An Effective IP System for Economic Growth **Jordan’s** **strengthened IP system** has **helped** **put** the **Jordanian pharmaceutical industry on the path of innovation**. While many Jordanian companies were previously focusing on manufacturing generic drugs, Hikma is an example of a company that is now creating its own patentable drugs and innovations. Inspired by Hikma’s success, Jordanian pharmaceutical companies have expanded their distribution networks to over sixty countries worldwide. Jordan has evolved into a leading knowledge economy in the region, and the pharmaceutical industry is just one example how **IP can lead the growth of an entire economy.**

#### Data Exclusivity is key to Pharma Innovation Investment.

Gangil, J, et al 10. “Do Intellectual Property Rights and Data Exclusivity Encourage Innovation in the Pharmaceutical World?” Systematic Reviews in Pharmacy, vol. 1, no. 2, 22 Dec. 2010, p. 190., doi:10.4103/0975-8453.75088. //sid

The purpose of data exclusivity is to ensure that the initial registrants of a new drug can recover the costs of testing the drug for efficacy and safety. Extensive testing directly translates into considerable costs for generating the data necessary to obtain approval of each new active ingredient. Drug developers challenge that they cannot afford to bring drugs to market without data exclusivity because later registrants, who did not have to invest in the high cost of obtaining marketing approval, can free-ride on the initial registrant’s approval and sell the same or similar drug at a lower price.[7] Experts argue that data exclusivity offers benefits to domestic innovators in developing countries and, in particular, that it provides incentives for research to identify new uses for the existing unpatented product. Data exclusivity is likely to have the largest effect in countries where for historical or other reasons there are many products with no current patent protection that may gain rights to exclusivity. Today in many developing countries, there are numerous medicines that are not patented. This is often the case in developing countries where TRIPS-based laws have only recently been introduced. In addition, even where there are patent laws, companies may not have considered the market sufficiently valuable to justify the expense and administrative cost of securing patents. In that case, the introduction of data exclusivity laws may bring into exclusivity drugs that would otherwise be open to generic competition. The perceived absence of strong patent protection in India, even after the law was revised in 2005, and the presence of a large number of products without patent protection due to the absence of product patent protection before 2005, is a major reason why the international pharmaceutical industry lobbied very hard for a strong data exclusivity regime in India. In contrast, Indian companies focusing principally on generics argued for a weaker data protection regime.[8] In certain cases it is observed that “data exclusivity” helps innovator companies to recover investments made on discovering and developing a new drug; for example, according to a published article, Aventis’s innovative drug Leflunomide for rheumatoid arthritis took 17 years from discovery to commercialization.[9] Data Exclusivity Plays a Key Role for Biologics New Economics Research supports 13–16 years of data exclusivity for biologics. A new working paper by Duke University economist Dr. Henry Grabowski, “Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities,” identifies 12.9–16.2 years or about 13–16 years of data exclusivity as necessary to sustain investment in the research and development (R and D) of new biologics in any approach to creating an abbreviated pathway for follow-on biologics (FOBs). The Duke University working paper states that without sufficient data exclusivity, there would be little incentive to develop and market new biologics with uncertain or few remaining years of patent protection. Under this scenario, innovators would be less likely to pursue the development of a molecule if there were uncertainty regarding the possibility of recouping their investments and achieving a positive return.[10]

#### Data Exclusivity ­does not prevent competitive products.

GaBi Online 11 “Data Exclusivity Is Not the Same as Market Exclusivity.” GaBi Online, 26 Jan. 2011, www.gabionline.net/policies-legislation/Data-exclusivity-is-not-the-same-as-market-exclusivity. //sid

Furthermore, Mr Quinn states that it is fiction that 12 years of data exclusivity would extend innovators’ monopoly power. “Data exclusivity does not give it any sort of monopoly”, he writes. “You would be hard pressed to find a term that is used more and understood less than the term ‘monopoly’. “Patents don’t give monopolies, and neither would data exclusivity. If patents gave monopolies then how is it possible that anyone other than Apple could sell a portable MP3 player? Apple has the iPod and iPhone locked up tight, but not so tight that other companies are prohibited from selling similar products. Look at all the iPhone wanna-bes that are on the market now. Seriously! You have to stop thinking that patents grant monopolies. What they do is make it difficult for others to copy an innovation, but if you can make something that does the same thing that isn’t a copy, then patent law does not prevent that”. He explains that similarly, products that compete with innovative biologicals can still beintroducedduring the period of data exclusivity**.** A period of data exclusivity merely means that those who do not innovate cannot piggyback off the hard work of innovators and rely on the research conducted by the innovator company. They must conduct their own safety and efficacy research and testing to obtain FDA approval and, obviously, not infringe the patents owned by the innovator. “So can we please stop using the world ‘monopoly’? No matter how many times it is used it will never accurately describe the protections provided. If you doubt that do a patent search and you will see in every industry numerous patents that all purport to cover similar things. How else, for example, could Microsoft and Apple both have patent portfolios? How else could Motorola and Nokia have patent portfolios? How else could AMD and IBM have patent portfolios? And so on” Mr Quinn states. (see also [Minimal 12 years of biologicals data exclusivity required](http://www.gabionline.net/Biosimilars/News/Minimal-12-years-of-biologicals-data-exclusivity-required), [12 years exclusivity workable for patients; not anticompetitive](http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/General/12-years-exclusivity-workable-for-patients-not-anticompetitive) and [Innovative biologicals development must be preserved](http://www.gabionline.net/Pharma-News/Innovative-biologicals-development-must-be-preserved))

#### AT Wolf 21 - Multiple Alt Causes to Instability – coups, COVID econ issues, refugees, water scarcity – zero reason Pharma can overcome – your ev

1AC Wolf 4-14 “A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes” Albert B. Wolf, an associate research fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS and an assistant professor of political science at the American University of Central Asia. April 14, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/14/jordan-abdullah-hamzah-hashemite-family-reunion-cant-hide-economic-woes/> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

­­A Hashemite Family Reunion Can’t Hide Jordan’s Woes Making nice after an alleged coup attempt obscures serious challenges, including **water scarcity, a refugee crisis, and unhelpful neighbors**. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is no stranger to royal intrigues and attempted coups. The first 20 years of the late King Hussein’s rule was wracked with coup plots, assassination attempts, and **a civil war** with the country’s large Palestinian population. Most recently, the former crown prince and half-brother of King Abdullah II, Prince Hamzah, was accused of engaging in sedition and placed under the “protection of the king” (i.e., house arrest) until the two made a joint appearance on Sunday. On Monday, the prince pledged his allegiance to the incumbent monarch and seemingly defused the latest royal tempest. But his display of deference doesn’t mean the end of instability in Jordan.This episode is a symptom of the challenges Abdullah has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring, not the problem itself. It is unlikely to be the last challenge the king faces to his rule unless Jordan’s economy undergoes significant economic reforms—quickly. Jordan has experienced multiple bouts of protests that were brought on by economic downturns (including **during the Arab Spring and** the **COVID**-19 pandemic) and were met with a combination of changes in economic tactics and giveaway programs, repression, and government reshuffles. This plot supposedly came from within the royal court, giving a tabloid quality to a security threat, especially after the **prince** made his **house arrest** all the more unusual by issuing a personal statement online. However, Hamzah’s alleged plan to overthrow Abdullah is a distraction from Jordan’s ongoing strategic and economic problems that do not have readily apparent solutions. Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, described the latest royal feud as the “most serious political crisis” Jordan has faced in 50 years. Regional experts have heard these warnings before. However, Abdullah’s combination of political savvy and luck in negotiating the challenges he has faced since the outbreak of the Arab Spring does not mean he will continue be lucky in the future. Domestic stability cannot be taken for granted. Tourism, Jordan’s biggest industry, ground to a halt after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic. It had accounted for $5.8 billion in revenues in a $43 billion economy in 2019, but Jordan could not allow tourists back into the country as COVID-19 spread. Furthermore, remittances, which had accounted for $3.7 billion in 2018, were estimated to drop by nearly 20 percent for the entire region in 2020. Two weeks ago, protests broke out in Amman along with other cities because of the deaths of six people from COVID-19 at government hospitals. The cause was low oxygen supplies. However, the literature on comparative authoritarianism shows that protests may provide elites with opportunities to reveal their preferences and split from the incumbent regime. Should more protests occur due to the worsening economic situation, water shortages, the coronavirus crisis, or the strains of hosting a large refugee population, a window of opportunity may open for Prince Hamzah or another opportunistic contender for the throne. (According to Jordan’s Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 34 percent of the population are refugees, most of whom are Palestinian. The U.N. refugee agency counts 663,210 Syrians who have registered as refugees—while the Jordanian government counts more than 1.3 million.) Many commentators and Jordan watchers have expressed shock and surprise at Hamzah’s open criticism of Abdullah. However, the more shocking display has been the public outpouring of criticism of the incumbent monarch. Popular radio programs have reported regular call-ins criticizing Abdullah, blaming him for the country’s poor economic performance and corruption. Prior to the pandemic, the country had less than 2 percent annual growth, and nearly 1 in 4 adults were unemployed. Some Jordanians who have been left behind economically felt that Hamzah used the language of the Arab street to speak to people’s needs in order to advance his own interests. Even Jordanian Finance Minister Mohamad al-Ississ reportedly said, “Unemployment is this country’s greatest problem.” Official figures put unemployment at 24 percent currently. Jordan’s supposed regional allies are not helping. The kingdom is surrounded by “frenemies” like Israel and Saudi Arabia, which, despite benefiting from the stability and cooperation of the Hashemite royal family, tend to engage in behaviors that undermine its steadiness. These frenemies’ behaviors exacerbate Jordan’s domestic political tensions. One of the most significant issues is water. Access to water is a problem for many Jordanians—and water theft is a big business that the state has failed to address. While water consumption continues to rise, an agreement with Israel’s government over providing an additional 8 million cubic meters remains elusive. Because of these problems, ordinary Jordanians are at the mercy of water thieves who drill untapped reservoirs without the permission of the state and charge what they want to people currently unserved and underserved by the state. Jordan has made clear it hopes to build a canal to the Red Sea or Dead Sea to ameliorate these problems, but, so far, it has been unable to cut a deal with Israel. There are rumors—and this time they are just that, rumors—that Saudi Arabia was involved in the alleged plot to overthrow Abdullah. It is important to note that once details of the arrests of Hamzah and others had leaked, most countries issued statements of support for Abdullah. However, some in Jordan fear that the Saudis are interested in a peace deal with Israel in order to displace the Hashemites as the guardians of Al-Aqsa Mosque and take over custodianship of Jerusalem’s holy places. The royal family’s latest feud is an allegory for Jordan’s ongoing economic and strategic problems. Should they continue, it is highly likely that this moderate ally of the United States and the West will find itself convulsed by domestic challenges again in the future. This could come in at least two forms: The first is another civil conflict with Jordan’s large Palestinian population. The second could be another challenge for the throne, possibly from Hamzah or from another royal rival who has yet to reveal himself.

#### AT Younes 18:

#### 1] The fact that Pharma is high now disproves their ability to access 1AC Younes since Econ instability is happening despite thriving Pharma – no quantification of why some more generics would solve – U/Q overwhelms the Link – multiple Alt Causes – here’s your ev.

1AC Younes 18 “Jordan’s economic crisis threatens political stability” Ali Younes, 14 Feb 2018 <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2018/2/14/jordans-economic-crisis-threatens-political-stability> SM//re-cut by Elmer

Jordan’s economic crisis threatens political stability **Anger simmers after** the **government hiked taxes** between 50-100 percent **on** key food staples such as **bread**. Angry at the decision to **increase food prices** last month, restive Jordanians are demanding the government’s resignation and the dissolution of parliament. Last month, the government implemented a tax rise of between 50-100 percent on key food staples such as bread, in order to decrease its $700m budget deficit. Jordan’s **debt has now reached $40bn** and its debt-to-gross-domestic-product ratio has reached a record 95 percent, up from 71 percent in 2011.

#### 2] The line about Jordan Econ being connected w/ Middle East is mis-highlighted – it says Middle East issues cause Jordan Instability NOT the other way around.

#### AT Al-Shami – No I/L – the Economic Instability they’ve identified comes from the Crown Prince trying to start a coup – it’s perception-based which domestic production from Pharma can’t solve – here’s your ev

1AC Al-Shami et al 4/13 “Jordan’s Thorny Spring Spells Trouble for the Middle East” Farah Al-Shami, Research Fellow, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Tuqa Nusairat, Deputy Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East - Atlantic Council, Paolo Maggiolini, Associate Researcher, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Lecturer in History of Islamic Asia, Catholic University of Milan, Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for Middle East Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Director - The Intelligence Project, Brookings, April 13, 2021 <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/jordans-thorny-spring-spells-trouble-middle-east-30024> SM//Re-cut by Elmer

**Jordan's** image, painstakingly built by the country’s authorities as an oasis of relative **stability** within a turbulent Middle East, **took a hit** on April 3, **when** former **Crown Prince** Hamzah bin Hussein was **accused of cooperating with** “**foreign entities” to destabilize the state.** The incident, widely presented as a family disagreement, resulted in the arrest of eighteen people and Hamzah's oath of allegiance to the Crown and the Constitution two days later. While investigations are still ongoing, the recent controversy comes as an unexpected novelty for the country. Since the Hashemite kingdom's origins, Jordan has always been seen as an island of stability in an otherwise unstable neighbourhood. At the same time, King Abdullah II has long been held in high regard in the United States, as Washington has relied on his steadying influence and views him as a highly reliable partner. Today, Amman remains one of the United States’ closest allies in the region, especially in counterterrorism operations and intelligence-sharing in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Nevertheless, despite its apparent stability, the country faces substantial socio-economic challenges. Jordan has been hard hit by the coronavirus (it ranks among the highest COVID-19 infection and death rates per capita in the region), while its unemployment rate reached one-fourth of the population in 2020. Furthermore, the country is currently home to over 660,000 Syrian refugees while also hosting a large community of Palestinian refugees. Hence, coming at a particularly uncertain moment for the country and combined with pre-existing structural problems, the tensions within the ruling family risk detracting attention from long-needed socio-economic reforms. Jordan’s uneasy geopolitical position “The kingdom of Jordan has so far been spared a visit by the Arab Spring, apart from several random and discontinuous waves of protests. For years now, **economic** demands have been growing and calls for less **corruption**, and more **transparency** have been rising. Against this backdrop, the ruling family is not only facing challenges on the economic front but also subtle opposition from the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been very active in other countries visited by the Arab Spring as well. Moreover, Iran and its hegemony over Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon puts Jordan in a difficult geopolitical position that requires close collaboration with GCC countries to counterbalance, especially that these countries are also ruled by monarchies. Thus, at the moment, the ruling family is trying to avoid having these geopolitical challenges spill into the local political scene and cause a serious threat to its rule via a combination of chaos and uprisings.” Farah Al-Shami, Research Fellow, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) Amman’s economy needs less foreign loans and more support for structural reforms “One positive spill-over from the incident might be bringing Jordan back to the radar of its foreign allies, who tend to take the stability in the country for granted and have been ignoring quieting of Jordanians dissatisfied with dire economic situation in the country, further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. What Jordan needs, however, is not more loans – its foreign debt already amounts to over 90% of its GDP – but development aid and technical assistance in implementation of wise economic reforms that would not further harm the already impoverished population. Austerity is not an answer at a time when the cost of living is growing, remittances – falling, and officially one in four (and realistically more) Jordanians is out of work.” Katarzyna Sidło, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Department, Center for Social and Economic Research (CASE) Jordan’s social mobilization limbo and the risk of a security clampdown “Jordan, a resource-poor country that was initially lauded for containing COVID-19, has struggled to manage the economic fallout. Remittances and tourism have declined as has assistance from neighboring Gulf countries. With many businesses in ruins due to COVID-19 lockdowns, the government has to do more to ensure social safety net programs help vulnerable populations climb out of economic despair. The government is also struggling to support the nearly one million refugees in the country. While Jordanians have been protesting for months, recent events involving Prince Hamzah are likely to make Jordanians think twice before going out into the streets. The government must act fast to address economic challenges while avoiding a security clampdown that could make matters worse.” Tuqa Nusairat, Deputy Director, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East - Atlantic Council Jordan-Israel relations must refocus on shared interests and avoid political calculus “While it is still difficult to establish the extent of the alleged coup plot in Jordan, what seems particularly intriguing are the allegations of foreign meddling. Ten years ago, while protests and dissents were mushrooming, Amman was counting on Saudi aid and Israel’s implicit support. Today, while regional powers, including both countries, are voicing support for the king, Amman is becoming increasingly concerned that the Tel Aviv can be to the detriment of its legitimacy. The recent incident at the Israeli-Jordan border and the rapprochement between Riyadh and allegations pointing to Israel and Saudi Arabia are only the most recent episodes in a stream of tensions developing since 2017. These are like a wake-up call. Jordan-Israel relations have always been based on solid shared interests and not on political calculus. It is of utmost importance to recognize this for the future of the region and the security of both countries.” Paolo Maggiolini, Associate Researcher, Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) and Lecturer in History of Islamic Asia, Catholic University of Milan The US and international support for Amman is essential to preserve the region’s stability “The Biden administration is facing an unexpected crisis in Jordan where King Abdallah faces unprecedented divisions within the **ruling family exacerbated by foreign meddling**, the pandemic and recession. **At risk is the stability of the lynchpin of the region**. Saudi support for Prince Hamzah’s challenge to the King raises serious questions about the reckless and dangerous behaviour of the Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. Biden has moved quickly to signal support for Abdallah. He needs to rally international help for Jordan’s weak economy and deep structural problems. Keeping Jordan stable is critical to survival of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty which is deeply unpopular.”

#### AT Lazaroff – This is not about the Plan OR collapse of Israel-Jordan – it’s about Netanyahu’s plan to annex the West Bank – zero Internal Link since it’s not causal – here’s your ev.

1AC Lazaroff 20 “Will annexation destroy Israeli-Jordanian peace, set kingdom aflame?” Tovah Lazaroff is the Deputy Managing Editor of The Jerusalem Post May 1, 2020 <https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/will-annexation-destroy-israeli-jordanian-peace-set-kingdom-aflame-626104> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

The possible **collapse of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty** and potential destruction of a stable regional ally, the Hashemite Kingdom, **is** one of the **stronger** **arguments** **against** Prime Minister Benjamin **Netanyahu’s plan to annex West Bank settlements** this year. The 1994 peace treaty with Jordan, as well as the 1979 treaty signed with Egypt, have been a foundation cornerstone of Israeli regional security and gateway to the Arab world. The value of the two treaties, in an otherwise hostile region, has only increased in relation to the growing threats from Iran and ISIS and other Islamic fundamentalist terrorist groups. So **the idea of an Israeli plan**, either unilateral or in conjunction with the US, that **would risk those treaties** and the stability of Israel, after a decade of regional turmoil, has to give one pause. “Unilateral annexation will damage stability in the Middle East” and harm Israel, said former Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) director Ami Ayalon. “The peace treaty with Egypt and the peace treaty with Jordan are in a way the two cornerstones of our [regional] policy and our security for the last 30 to 40 years,” he said. A retired admiral, Ayalon is among a group of more than 220 former security officers who have embarked on a campaign against the move through the group Commanders for Israel’s Security. Last week, he and two other high-level former security officials, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Gadi Shamni and former Mossad director Tamir Pardo, published an article in US-based Foreign Policy magazine, warning about the implications to Jordan and Egypt. There are many rational reasons for the two countries to maintain ties with Israel, Ayalon told The Jerusalem Post. Egypt relies on Israel for intelligence and security cooperation when it comes to fighting al-Qaeda and ISIS in Sinai. Jordan has water and gas deals with Israel. Both countries also rely heavily on financial assistance from the United States, which is tied to the peace deals. Still, those factors would not be enough to offset the danger to the Kingdom from the street, Ayalon said. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, however, regional leaders cannot afford to ignore public opinion, particularly on a topic where emotions run high, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he said. Rulers in both Egypt and Jordan “have to listen to the voices of the street because they understand that power,” he said. Egyptian President Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has more flexibility than Jordan’s King Abdullah, Ayalon said. Jordan is home to a large number of Palestinians, and there are also many young people who are radicalized, Shamni said. “They will never accept Jordanian silence with regards to annexation,” he said. “To survive, the king will have to take extreme steps that might even severely damage the Israeli-Jordanian peace agreement.” Throughout the years, **Israeli actions in the West Bank**, Jerusalem and **Gaza have had a destabilizing influence**, Ayalon said. “But there is a huge difference between incremental change” and a large unilateral act, such as **annexation**, particularly one that is against the declared will of all Arab leaders, he said. Shamni, who was also Israel’s former military secretary to the US and a military adviser to former prime minister Ariel Sharon, said the plan **creates unnecessary turmoil and security problems**. At issue is Israel’s eastern border, which is its calmest out of the five borders, he said. There are hostilities along the Lebanese, Syrian and Gaza borders, and even the Egyptian border can be problematic because of terrorist groups in the Sinai Desert, he said. But the combined efforts of Israeli and Jordanian security forces have kept violence at bay, Shamni said. Jordan acts as an additional security buffer for Israel and provides a strategic safeguard against terrorism and other security threats, he said. Jordan’s location, bordering Iraq on the other side, makes peaceful relations with Israel particularly significant, he added. Coordination with Jordan is crucial for Israel’s safety along this critical stretch, Shamni said.

### Public Health

#### AT OECD –

#### 1] This is about Healthcare Infrastructure – that goes far beyond Medicines which the plan can’t effect since lack of hospitals, medical equipment, doctors, and medical personnel all thump the Aff’s ability to solve to zero – here’s your ev.

OECD 20 OECD [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] “COVID-19 crisis response in MENA countries”, 06 November 2020 <https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/view/?ref=129_129919-4li7bq8asv&title=COVID-19-Crisis-Response-in-MENA-Countries&_ga=2.237304256.1316433697.1631849561-29263471.1631849561> SM //Re-cut by Elmer

The revival in COVID-19 cases that followed the gradual easing of restrictions and reopening of the economy in several MENA countries, similarly to elsewhere in the world, is putting to the test the capacity of healthcare systems throughout the region to deal with a second wave of the pandemic. Two main trends are emerging, with on the one hand, a number of countries where precautionary measures and enforcement seem to have succeeded in flattening the curve, and, on the other hand, countries where limited capacity to enforce physical distancing and overstrained healthcare systems are making it increasingly challenging for governments to control the situation. Challenges to health systems and health sector resilience MENA countries’ containment efforts have proved particularly important in light of the region’s varying levels of health system preparedness. The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the extent of the healthcare sector’s resilience across MENA economies. Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries and Jordan GCC economies have undertaken substantial investments in healthcare infrastructure, alongside efforts to increase the number of doctors and nursing personnel. While the GCC remains behind the global average in healthcare expenditure, budget allocations have been increasing significantly. This has considerably improved the quality of healthcare services in the region. In an assessment of COVID-19 preparedness published mid-March by the WHO, which ranked countries on a scale of 1 (no capacity) to 5 (sustainable capacity), all GCC countries except Qatar scored either 4 or 5. Despite accounting for close to half of the COVID-19 regional cases, GCC governments have succeeded in bringing the outbreak under control in their countries, displaying recovery rates significantly higher than the global average5. This results from a strategy based on prevention, strict control measures adopted and effectively enforced early on, and important means allocated to case detection and tracking. The UAE and Bahrain are among global leaders in terms of testing, ranking respectively first and third for the number of new tests per 1,000 people as of late September.6 Countries have also made available significant financial and material resources for COVID-19 treatment to avoid overwhelming health services, including by building dedicated treatment facilities, such as in the UAE. Jordan, which has an overall weaker health system and lower level of COVID-19 preparedness, managed to adopt a strategy similar to that of GCC countries. This has so far proved to be effective, although at high economic and societal cost. As a result of a swift government reaction and effective implementation of lockdown measures enabled by the state’s high enforcement capacity, COVID-19 infection and mortality rates in Jordan have remained consistently low. The government has also significantly scaled up its testing capacity to reach 70,000 tests per 1 million inhabitants in August, more than three times the test ratio recommended by the WHO. As of October 14, cases are on the rise again and curfews are being re-introduced. Developing MENA economies (Maghreb, Egypt) Developing MENA economies have been suffering from low health expenditures, human resource shortages in the health care sector and lack of medical equipment. Total health expenditure per capita in most MENA countries is significantly below averages for countries in similar income categories. Furthermore, the number of physicians per 1,000 inhabitants in the region is much below the WHO recommended threshold of 4.45 doctors, nurses, and midwives per 1,000 population, and as low as 0.72 and 0.79 in Morocco and Egypt respectively.7 The limited capacity of health systems to handle a large-scale outbreak prompted governments to adopt strict containment measures. However, while these measures contributed to limit the number of COVID-19 infections and related deaths in the first few months following the outbreak, the progressive de-confinement was accompanied by a rapid rise in cases, further straining countries’ health systems. In most countries, this is largely due to large religious gatherings, wedding celebrations and other social events where control measures were not sufficiently applied.8 Loosening compliance with preventive measures and difficulty to enforce physical distancing in large, densely populated cities (e.g. Cairo) have raised concerns over the evolution of the situation. As of October, international and social media, as well as NGOs reported that hospitals were struggling to manage the growing influx of COVID-19 patients, with some reaching full capacity, while healthcare professionals have pointed out to the lack of necessary medical equipment, doctors, medical personnel and ICU beds to deal with a second wave of such magnitude. This also challenging the massive testing strategy, as testing sites are becoming increasingly saturated. In some countries, observers have pointed to an ill-managed re-opening of international borders, while emerging social movements within the medical personnel risks adding pressure to an already tense health sector. Fragile and conflict-affected countries Lebanon had initially managed to contain the first COVID-19 wave by adopting strong containment measures early on with high levels of compliance from the population. However, following the explosion in the port of Beirut on 4 August, which destroyed half of the city’s medical centres and left three of its hospitals “non-functional” according to the WHO, the health situation has gotten largely out of control. Reported numbers of COVID-19 cases and related deaths have been rising at unprecedented speed, sparking worries regarding the capacity of ICU and dedicated facilities to absorb the second wave, as many are already at capacity treating those wounded in the blast. In the current emergency setting, with adherence to public health measures being compromised, the rise in cases shows no sign of slowing down. At the same time, possibilities for re-implementing strict containment measures are constrained by the economic crisis. Indeed, the two-week lockdown which had been announced after the explosion was eased prematurely due to economic pressures. In other fragile and conflict-affected countries, the COVID-19 outbreak poses a major challenge given damages to health systems.9 In emergency settings, where availability of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services is scarce, applying preventive measures to limit the spread of the disease has proved difficult. Countries where healthcare facilities have been partially destroyed during the war and governance remains extremely fragile and uncoordinated in certain areas, and lack the necessary capacity to respond to the crisis in terms of medical facilities, equipment and personnel. In Syria, the WHO10 estimates that 70% of health care workers have left the country as migrants or refugees, while only 64% of hospitals and 52% of primary health care centres remain fully operational. One possible explanation for the low number of COVID-19 cases reported in these countries at the beginning of the pandemic is the fact that, due to lack of bed capacity or difficulty to reach hospitals, people often die at home.11 In addition, the lack of testing capacity has resulted in months of under-reporting, in particular in Syria and Yemen. The situation has worsened over the summer, with numbers of COVID-19 cases and related deaths rapidly growing. At the same time, enforcement of containment measures has proved difficult in the context of already fragile economic situations, which cannot afford the necessary restrictions to limit the spread of the virus. Developments in the MENA health systems and health policies In some MENA countries, COVID-19 vaccine developments are likely to rapidly boost the supply and infrastructure of the healthcare industry. For example, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Morocco have partnered with foreign countries (notably China and Israel) and private companies alike to support vaccine research, and have engaged into advanced trial phases. Phase III trials started in the UAE in July12 and in Saudi Arabia in August for vaccines developed by two Chinese companies, respectively Sinopharm and CanSino Biologics. Egypt has also engaged in a partnership with China for the development and distribution of two COVID-19 vaccines developed by Sinopharm. This could lead to a reinforced China-MENA collaboration in this field13. With more investment (both public and private) in healthcare provision, opportunities for the private sector to support the development of health systems will increase14. In the Gulf, the surge in demand – driven by ageing populations, mandatory health insurance and high levels of lifestyle-related diseases such as diabetes – along with new government strategies and regulatory reforms are propelling private investment in the healthcare industry. In particular, a recent report produced by Mashreq and Frost & Sullivan found that the COVID-19 crisis had considerably boosted investments in digitisation and telehealth. The research estimates annual investment in digital infrastructure in the GCC to grow by 10% to 20% over the next two years, while teleconsultations are expected to be multiplied by four by Q4 2020.15 In Morocco, a HealthTech startup of the research and development centre MAScIR is now capable of producing 1 million RT-PCR tests per month, and a public-private partnership between the Ministry of Industry and various private sector actors has allowed to develop a locally produced ICU bed, massively cheaper than those imported from abroad.

#### 2] No Jordan key to Middle East Health card – 1AR will spin “Drug Exports” as a warrant – a] They can’t solve Patent issues that prevent export/production of COVID Vaccines – their I/L is about Drug Prices of medicines whose Patents have worn off NOT COVID vaccines which still have patent protection and b] Their ev is about generics exports – no ev about generics being key to solve COVID pandemic.

#### AT Alaadin –

#### 1] No COVID Impact on Conflict

Salemi 20 Colette Salemi 10-15-2020 "Does COVID-19 raise the risk of violent conflict? Not everywhere" <https://archive.is/h591O#selection-309.0-312.0> (Colette Salemi is a PhD student in applied economics at the University of Minnesota. Her research focuses on conflict, forced displacement, environmental degradation and their intersections.)//Elmer

How we did our research We **used** the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (**ACLED**), a **database** **that counts** the **number of conflict events daily around the world**. For 2019 and 2020, ACLED includes more than 100 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe — and tracks three categories of violent conflict: battles, violence against civilians and explosions/remote violence. We examine trends in the number of conflict events over time. To see whether the trend changes in response to covid-19, we look at what happened after the World Health Organization declared a global pandemic (March 11) or the country declared a lockdown. [Don’t miss any of TMC’s smart analysis! Sign up here for our newsletter.] The **relationship between pandemics and conflict is theoretically unclear.** In some countries, job losses from the covid-19 pandemic mean people have fewer income-generating options — that can make participation in violence seem a more viable alternative. But if **market disruptions** and reduced global demand are **driving down** the **value of natural resources** such as oil wells, then **we** may **see less conflict** over control of such resources. We then **conducted** case **studies** based **on** our knowledge of countries with high rates of violent conflict before **covid**-19. These include countries with active civil wars (such as Syria) as well as countries with violent militia groups (such as the Philippines). Conflict during the coronavirus pandemic varies greatly **Worldwide**, **we didn’t observe an increase in violent conflict**. **If anything, conflict has decreased**, as the figure below shows. **Violent conflict** between March and August 2020 **was 23 percent lower** than violent conflict during the same period in 2019. Comparing these time periods, battles are down 20 percent and remote violence and bombings are down 40 percent. But violence against civilians — the deliberate attack of unarmed noncombatants by armed groups — continued at similar rates globally.

Chart, line chart

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#### 2] If their Internal Link is exporting Drugs – Alaaldin turns this since militants steal those drugs – your ev.

1AC Alaaldin 20 “COVID-19 will prolong conflict in the Middle East” Ranj Alaaldin [visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center and nonresident fellow in the Foreign Policy program. He's also the director of a Carnegie Corporation project on proxy warfare in the Middle East.], April 24, 2020 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/04/24/covid-19-will-prolong-conflict-in-the-middle-east/> SM //re-cut by Elmer

CONFLICTS AROUND THE REGION In Libya, as Frederic Wehrey and others have pointed out, the pandemic has provided a boost to militias, providing an opportunity for them to channel medical aid to their fighters and instrumentalize the crisis to reward and reinforce patronage networks and favored communities. Troublingly, Libya’s hospitals are routinely targeted by rocket attacks, exacerbating the situation. In Yemen, militias loyal to the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) stormed into the southern port of Aden and stole medical aid donated by the World Health Organization (WHO), including nine ambulances destined for the health ministry. The conflict in Yemen has involved indiscriminate attacks that have devastated medical facilities and water supplies, contributing to what the international community has described as the world’s greatest man-made humanitarian crisis, including the worst cholera outbreak in modern history. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has reinforced its status as an alternative to the Lebanese state by committing close to 5,000 doctors, medics, and nurses to fight the pandemic. In Iraq, ISIS has ramped up its attacks in northern Iraqi villages and is moving to exploit Baghdad’s growing list of crises — ranging from the escalation between the U.S. and Iran, the decline in oil prices, and country-wide protests. During a public health crisis, ISIS can revive itself and expand its influence by catering to the needs of local communities in ways other authorities — like the Baghdad government — have not. At a minimum, Baghdad’s failures allow ISIS to position itself as a viable alternative. Combined with its current campaign of fear and intimidation, targeted assassinations, and extortion, this provides it with a patchwork, under-ground infrastructure of influence that establishes a launching pad from which to seize towns and cities in the manner it did in June 2014. In Syria, the civil war has shattered formal governing structures, and the Assad regime and Russia have moved to obliterate hospitals from the outset of the nine-year conflict. Syria is effectively three countries: regime-controlled territories, the Kurdish northeast, and Idlib in the northwest, which has 1.4 doctors per 10,000 people and only 100 ventilators. COVID-19 increases the prospects of another refugee wave that stretches the capacity of neighboring countries like Turkey and Lebanon to meet the humanitarian needs of these refugees. It also puts increased pressure on Western-aligned groups like the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), on which the West depends to maintain combat operations against ISIS and manage prison cells for detained ISIS combatants. The SDF also hosts refugee camps like Al-Hol, which houses 70,000 refugees, including ISIS combatants and their families.

#### AT Silverstein –

#### 2] It’s about Israel-Iran miscalc – an internal link the Aff doesn’t resolve since it’s structural past pandemics.

#### 3] Says Netanyahu treats Iran as existential – makes Middle East War instability and escalation either a] inevitable or b] all-hype so no impact.

#### AT Hour – No Mid East escalation

Imran 19 2/6/19 [Myra Imran, writer for The News International. Citing the international seminar on “Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East”. Seminar on ‘Strategic dimensions of peace and conflict in South Asia, Middle East’. 2/6/19, https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428298-seminar-on-strategic-dimensions-of-peace-and-conflict-in-south-asia-middle-east]

Islamabad : There is a need to study the causes of proxy wars, and what are the potential impacts of such wars on the overall conflict. These thoughts in a daylong international seminar on ‘Strategic Dimensions of Peace and Conflict in South Asia and the Middle East,’ organised by Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, participated by prominent national and international scholars. Prof. Shahram Akbarzadeh, Deakin University, Australia, argued there is significant gap in the literature on non-state actors. He called for empirical research, along with concrete policy suggestions, on the topic, so as to mitigate the conflicts in the region, in particular South Asia and Middle East. Speakers grappled at the notion of non-state actors and proxy wars: PIPS director Muhammad Amir Rana said non-state actors often evoke memories of violent elements. This despite that as per definition, non-state actors include organizations working for human rights. Prof. Syed Rifaat Hussain, Department of Government and Public Policy, NUST, said the term “proxy wars” is a contested notion. There is no universal agreement on its definition, nor on the set of circumstances behind such wars. Interestingly, he said, proxy wars are as old as the phenomena of conventional war itself. Speakers noted proxy wars are instruments of state power. As to why states go for it, it was argued, it is because they are often cheap undertaking to change the status quo. Participants noted over the decades, much of the conflict involves non-state actors. Interstate conflict, on the other hand, has declined. In recent times, he said tit-for-tat tactics on behalf of such actors have reduced their appeal.