## OFF

### 1NC---Econ DA

#### Long term econ collapse is coming.

Conerly 11-2 (, B., 2021. No Recession In 2022—But Watch Out In 2023. [online] Forbes. Available at: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/billconerly/2021/11/02/no-recession-in-2022-but-watch-out-in-2023/?sh=5e3b27d33555> [Accessed 24 December 2021] Dr. Bill Conerly connects the dots between the economy and business decisions. He has the unique combination of a Ph.D. in economics from Duke University and over 30 years’ experience helping companies adapt to changing economic conditions. He was formerly Senior Vice President at a major bank and held positions in economics and corporate planning at two Fortune 500 corporations. Dr. Conerly has earned the Chartered Financial Analyst designation.)-rahulpenu

No Recession In 2022—But Watch Out In 2023

A **recession** **will** **come** to the United States economy, but not in 2022. Federal Reserve policy will lead to more business cycles, which many businesses are not well prepared for. The downturn won’t come in 2022, but could arrive as early as 2023. If the Fed avoids recession in 2023, then look for a more severe slump in 2024 or 2025.

Recessions usually come from demand weakness, but **supply** **problems** can also trigger a downturn. In 2022 demand for goods and services will be strong. Consumers have plenty of money, thanks to past earnings, stimulus payments and extra unemployment insurance. They have paid down their credit card balances. Even though they also increased their car loans outstanding as they upgraded their rides, their general condition is good. Employment will increase thanks to the spending, reinforcing the income gains that enable expenditures.

Businesses, too, have plenty of cash on hand. Not only have profits been good, but the Paycheck Protection Program gave nearly $800 billion to businesses. Companies want to buy computers, equipment and machinery to substitute for the workers they cannot find, and this spending will help manufacturers of the equipment.

Homebuilders will construct as many homes as they can, though that will be limited by buildable lots, skilled labor and building materials. Non-residential construction will slowly gain ground, especially in warehouse space and suburban offices.

The government will spend, not only at the federal level but also among state and local entities. The federal government has no worries about deficits, while state and local governments are flush with federal money.

Exports should grow slowly, thanks to improving world economies.

The **spending** side of the economy has **little** **risk** of recession in 2022, but could supply problems trigger a recession?

Supply chain problems can have negative impacts when factories have to shut down for lack of parts, as happened in the **automobile** industry. Recently Ford Europe’s Gunnar Herrmann told CNBC, “It’s not only semiconductors. You find shortages or constraints all over the place,” mentioning **lithium**, **plastics** and **steel** in particular. The automobile industry has laid off workers at multiple plants, mostly for a few weeks, but some long term. When workers are laid off for lack of materials to assemble, then the economy suffers. Most of the shortages under discussion, however, are **limiting** **growth** rather than cutting back on current production.

So the supply challenge we have is not an actual reduction in materials available, just **insufficient** **materials** to meet the stronger demand. Despite the snarls at the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles, more inbound containers are hitting the docks than in 2019. Mostly we are seeing supply as a limit on growth rather than a cause of recession.

Much of the supply limitation prevents growth, but does not push spending downward. Businesses are cutting back on variety. A shirt in a particular size may only be available in a few colors, not 16. That is unfortunate, and may discourage a few shoppers, but for the most part we’ll still be buying goods.

**Job** **losses** from vaccine mandate layoffs could push the economy toward recession, given that 31% of people over age 18 are not fully vaccinated. The various mandates cover about 100 million workers. Some of those 31 million unvaccinated workers subject to mandates will get their shots, but others certainly won’t. In the worst of the pandemic recession, the country lost 22 million jobs. Losing 31 million jobs because of vaccine mandates—or even half that number—would be disastrous. And because it would be disastrous, it will not happen. The Biden administration almost certainly will pull back the mandate before accepting such a harsh result rise in unemployment.

Though 2022 is unlikely to host a recession, 2023 and 2024 are extremely risky. The Federal Reserve will start tapering its quantitative stimulus soon, and sometime in mid-2022 it will begin raising short-term interest rates. The economy reacts with a **time** **lag** of about one year, plus or minus. The **greatest** **risk** in the near term is that the Fed realizes that much of the recent inflation is long-lasting rather than transitory. They will then hit the brakes. Because of the time lag, the Fed may decide to stomp down harder on the brakes, triggering a recession.

If the Fed avoids an over-reaction recession, it risks not bringing inflation down at all. The longer the Fed waits, the more work they will need to do later. We’ll still have massive fiscal stimulus plus the lagged effects of past monetary stimulus. Public anger over inflation will provoke a stronger Fed response by 2025 at the latest, but probably earlier.

Can a recession be completely avoided in the next few years? Theoretically it’s possible. The Fed would have to tighten at just the right time, in just the right magnitude, then return to neutral at just the right time. It could happen, but the odds are very, very slim. The people at the Fed are smart and knowledgeable, but the task is too difficult for mere mortals. So businesses should enjoy their gains in 2022 while developing contingency plans to be ready for the nearly-inevitable recession.

#### Private appropriation saves econ growth and innovation in the long run---the plan flips it and saps resources that spills over.

Clark 20 (, S., 2020. Opinion: Space is our new economic frontier. The US can't afford to lose out. [online] CNN. Available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/02/perspectives/space-economic-frontier/index.html> [Accessed 24 December 2021] Suzanne Clark is president and chief executive officer of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a director on two corporate boards, a former business owner, and an entrepreneur at heart. With a global perspective and a fierce commitment to free enterprise, Clark’s experience in the private sector deeply informs her leadership of the U.S. Chamber—the world’s largest business organization representing employers of every size and sector in Washington, D.C., across the country, and around the globe. Clark has led a multiyear effort to strengthen the Chamber’s well-known influence, advocacy, and impact, while modernizing its work and attracting new members from the fastest-growing and most innovative sectors of the U.S. economy. These efforts to invest in the Chamber’s future proved prescient when the COVID-19 pandemic hit in 2020, enabling the organization to quickly pivot to new ways of working and successfully advocate for businesses in the midst of the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression. Clark has also helped drive the national conversation on issues central to managing and recovering from the pandemic through the U.S. Chamber Foundation’s Path Forward program. In interviews with dozens of thought leaders and experts such as Dr. Anthony Fauci, former CDC Director Dr. Robert Redfield, Bill and Melinda Gates, Carlyle Group Founder David Rubenstein, and former U.S. Surgeon General Jerome Adams, Path Forward has reached an audience of millions of viewers with practical information, insightful guidance, and forward-looking strategies.)-rahulpenu

**Space** is our **new** economic **frontier**. The US can't afford to lose out

President Trump's budget, which was released last month, outlines several moonshots that are unlikely to pass a divided Congress. But there's one in particular that both Republicans and Democrats should support wholeheartedly: the $25.2 billion request to fund NASA, a 12% boost over the prior year.

The **future** **of** our **economy** **depends** **on** the **vigorous** **pursuit** **of** **space** exploration. And with NASA leading the way, the potential for **growth** — like space itself — **has** **no** **limits**.

Since NASA's launch, American space exploration has always been a bipartisan venture. It was President Kennedy who announced our goal of going to the moon, but it was President Nixon who brought that goal to fruition. Reaching the next milestone in interplanetary travel requires a commitment from our leaders that spans political parties and administrations. And with a new space race getting underway — one that could prove even more consequential than the last — NASA needs bipartisan support from Congress today more than ever.

**Space** is the **most** **promising** **industry** to arise since the birth of the tech sector, with **growth** projected to **skyrocket** in the coming years **led** **by** companies such as **Boeing** and **Northrop** **Grumman**, and new entrants, such as Virgin **Galactic**, **SpaceX** and **Blue** **Origin**. According to US Chamber of Commerce economists, the industry will be worth at least $1.5 trillion by 2040. While no one can fully grasp what our economy will look like 20 years from now, one thing is certain: the **private** **sector** space **industry** will **transform** how societies across the **globe** **live**, **communicate** and do **business**. In fact, it already has.

Nearly **every** **company** **depends** **on** **space**-enabled **tech**nologies **for** **day**-**to**-**day** **op**eration**s** — whether they use satellite **communications**, **remote** **sensing** or **location**-based **services**. **Businesses** across multiple sectors are **leveraging** these and other **tech**nologies to **stake** their **claim** **in** this new economic **frontier**.

Pharmaceutical companies such as Merck and Sanofi, for example, are conducting experiments in low-Earth orbit aboard the International Space Station to evaluate the potential advantages of microgravity in developing new drug treatments that will help people live longer, healthier lives. Companies, such as Bigelow, are committed to making off-Earth habitation a reality. Even retailers are getting in on the action, with companies like Target funding research on the International Space Station to produce more sustainable forms of cotton.

Lunar colonies, asteroid mining and interplanetary travel — once the stuff of science fiction — could become a reality. But for any of that to happen, we need sustained and meaningful action from members of Congress.

They can start by meeting the president's request for NASA funding. Included in the White House budget is $12.4 billion specifically for lunar exploration that would include landing systems, continued development of the Space Launch System (SLS) and the Orion crew module. These spacecraft will allow us to shuttle people and equipment to the moon and back. They will take us not only beyond Earth's orbit but also into the **next** **phase** **of** **commercial** **space** **development**. Most importantly, they will **ensure** that the **U**nited **S**tates continues to **outpace** **competitors** like China and Russia in the space race. Our country must be the vanguard in exploring these new economic frontiers. **Planting** the **American** **flag** **in** the **private** **sector** space **industry** will help **create** the **jobs** of the future and **allow** the **U**nited **S**tates **to** **lead** the **formation** of best practices **that** **will** **govern** the **industry** for decades to come.

Some might ask if returning to the moon is worth the expense. The answer is undeniably yes. Providing NASA with the resources it needs to succeed is a small investment that will yield tremendous dividends over time.

To start, it would help **secure** American **commercial** **dominance** in a fast-growing industry. It also would be a **catalyst** **for** **innovation** and scientific discovery, with **salutary** **effects** that would **benefit** the **entire** **economy**.

#### Decline causes nuclear war via hotspot escalation---accelerates tech shift and warming.

Oppenheimer 21 (, M., 2021. 2. The Turbulent Future of International Relations. The Future of Global Affairs - Springer International Publishing, 1(1), p.Chapter 2. Michael Oppenheimer leads the IR Futures concentration at CGA, teaching courses on International Relations (core course), The Future of International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy. He also oversees an ongoing research and consulting project for the UN Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, which involves students directly in advising the UN system on counter terrorism policies and practices. He writes and speaks publicly on U.S foreign policy and on the future of international relations. He has had a varied career, beginning with several years with the U.S. government, then in strategic consulting for government policy makers and private firms, and-since 2005-teaching and research at CGA. His particular specialty is the cognition and methods of thinking about the future, and how perceptions of future change can be incorporated into the foreign policy process, in order to improve foresight and agility. He has applied his skills in research and consulting for the US intelligence community, the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the UN, and many others. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and is actively involved (and involves his students) in the foreign policy/IR community.)-re-cut rahulpenu

Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president. 7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9

But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10

Secular Stagnation

This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains:

…rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result.

Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth…

This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible.

…in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development.

Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12

The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates.

Illiberal Globalization

Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically pro- Trump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them.

What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18

As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end.

Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods:

We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20

The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the pre- World War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present:

Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago.

…In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports.

…The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable.

…the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry.

## OFF

### 1NC---Ev Ethics Shell

#### Evidence ethics- Full paragraphs must be cut properly and not conceal information, regardless of perceived relevancy. Cutting cards in the middle of a paragraph allows debaters to manipulate evidence and strategically leave out what contradicts with their arguments – putting rest of the uncut paragraph in the doc solves all your offense unless your intent was to cheat which is even worse. This is a reason to reject the team—miscutting evidence is academic misconduct that should disqualify any other argument they make in the debate from counting on the record—a brilliant plagiarized paper or speech would still get a zero.

#### Violation---Insert SS

http://profs-polisci.mcgill.ca/muniz/intergen/Bickham%20-%20Future%20generations%20and%20contemporary%20ethical%20theory.pdf

Text

Description automatically generated

Text

Description automatically generated

## Case

**Framework**

**The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing.**

**1] Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue**

Ole Martin **Moen**, 9/12/**15** (a researcher in ethics at the University of Oslo and he is associate professor of teacher education at the University of Southeast Norway, [www.olemartinmoen.com/wp-content/uploads/AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf](http://www.olemartinmoen.com/wp-content/uploads/AnArgumentForHedonism.pdf)) Ngong

‌Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**2] Extinction outweighs**

**a] Forecloses improvement – we can never improve society because our impact is irreversible**

**b] Turns suffering – mass death causes suffering because people can’t get access to food and water**

**c] Moral obligation – allowing people to die is unethical and should be prevented because it creates ethics towards other people**

**d] Objectivity – body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical**

**e] Moral uncertainty – if we’re unsure about which interpretation of the world is true – we ought to preserve the world to keep debating about it**

**3] Actor specificity: A] Governments must aggregate since every policy benefits some and harms others, which also means side constraints freeze action. B] States lack wills or intentions since policies are collective actions. Actor-specificity comes first since different agents have different ethical standings. Link turns calc indites because the alt would be *no* action.**

**4] Biological death is the worst evil – allowing it to happen is morally repugnant**

Craig **Paterson,** 20**03** (Educated at Glasgow Caledonian University, Scotland; University of Edinburgh, Scotland; University of York, England; Saint Louis University, USA. He has previously held teaching appointments at Saint Louis University, USA and Providence College, USA, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, https://drive.google.com/file/d/10Om-ayhLSzyzuBSkZ-dW0L6JXCeR6pbc/view?usp=sharing)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

**5] Death comes before value-to-life.**

**Tännsjö 11** (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Taking Life: Three Theories on the Ethics of Killing” https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Qp0n01goTodsQTXcgR6pW9618P8BHs\_U/view?usp=sharing)

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism **we should all [die]** commit suicide and **put an end to humanity**. But this **does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide**. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people **lead lives not worth living**, they **believe they do**. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their **future lives will be better**. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us **live lives worth living**. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. **If I [die]** kill myself, many people will **suffer**. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to **rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind**. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶

**6] Use epistemic modesty for evaluating the framework debate: that means compare the probability of the framework times the magnitude of the impact under a framework. A] Clash— we don’t know if our frameworks are true, but we can debate the topical question. That incentivizes debating both layers instead of solely focusing on framework. B] Action under one framework doesn’t preclude action under another. For example, if I am a Utilitarian I can still have an obligation under util, even if the aff is bad under Locke. This means that winning a framing issue doesn’t exclude my offense.**

### Underview