## OFF

### 1NC---OUF PIC

#### CP Text – The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space should enforce that the appropriation of outer space through the production of space debris by private entities is unjust without the endorsement or the usage of an Orbital Use Fee.

#### The CP is competitive – you should give us Normal Means Competition – it was clearly flagged in the 1AC and actively defended as how the Plan would be implemented, meaning the CP is a distinct Policy Option. Specification PICs are best for in-depth, nuanced, and detailed debates by holding Affs accountable which is better for Topic Ed and Real-World Policy Education.

#### The 1AC Runnels Normal Means Card about Orbital Use Fees says it would be used to fund ADR – here’s a re-cutting. Hold them to it – it was highlighted in their evidence as what an OUF would be – anything else encourages poor 1AC construction.

Runnels 22. Michael is a professor and writer for the American Bar Association. 1/13/22. [American Bar Association “On Clearing Earth’s Orbital Debris & Enforcing the Outer Space Treaty in the U.S.” <https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2022/01/orbital-debris/>] Justin //re-cut by Elmer \*\*OUF: Proportional fee for amount of debris put into Space

A number of technological and regulatory solutions, such as active debris removal[119] and voluntary orbital debris mitigation guidelines,[120] are currently being explored by regulatory authorities.[121] While these efforts are important in ensuring the sustainable use of LEO orbits, they do not address the underlying incentive problem for satellite operators. Namely, they are incentivized to view both their orbital debris and the costs that it imposes on others as externalities.[122] As such, without the internalization of these externalities, efforts to fully address the orbital debris problem will likely be ineffective.[123] Notably, a National Academy of Sciences study found that orbital debris removal may worsen the economic damages from congestion by increasing incentives to launch.[124] As satellite operators are prohibited from securing exclusive property rights to orbital shells under the OST,[125] and are unlikely to recover economic damages resulting from orbital debris collisions under the Liability Convention,[126] prospective operators “face a choice between launching profitable satellites, thereby imposing current and future collision risk on others, or not launching and leaving those profits to competitors.”[127] This dynamic represents a classic tragedy of the commons problem.[128] However, under Article VI of the OST,[129] this problem can be partially solved through an OUF[130] levied by the FCC. The monies received from this fee would then be used to fund private orbital debris clearing projects[131] and research related to orbital debris removal.

Though such an OUF may be seen as an unreasonable growth restraint on the nascent space industry,[132] a Pew study found that in the case of nearly a dozen industries, the costs of implementing new regulations were less than estimated while the economic benefits were greater than estimated.[133] Moreover, these regulations did not significantly impede the economic competitiveness of the industry.[134] An OUF consistent with what this article proposes would even the playing field for commercial-satellite operators in a manner consistent with OST principles[135] and, as OneWeb’s founder argued, while “thoughtful, common-sense rules” likely increase operating costs for commercial-satellite operators, they protect the environment and ensure that the U.S. commercial satellite industry continues to grow.[136] While the U.S. cannot address the issue of reducing orbital debris on its own, it can make a substantial contribution through demonstrating responsible orbital debris mitigation measures, such as those advocated in this article. In support of the aforementioned OST language,[137] this article’s second proposed amendment to Title 51 of United States Code would read: Title 51, of the United States Code, is further amended by adding at the end the following: CHAPTER 802—ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATED TO CERTIFICATION AND PERMITTING § 802XX. Orbital use fee purpose The Administrator, in conjunction with the heads of other Federal agencies, shall take steps to fund orbital debris removal projects, technologies, and research that will enable the Administration to decrease the risks associated with orbital debris. § 802XX. Administrative authority In order to carry out the responsibilities specified in this subtitle, the Secretary may impose an orbital use fee for the placement of objects in low Earth orbits on a nongovernmental entity holder of, or applicant for: (1) a certification under chapter 801; or (2) a permit under chapter 802. V. Conclusion The OST establishes space as the “province of all mankind”[138] and promotes its peaceful use and exploration for the “benefit and in the interests of all mankind.”[139] The OST further requires that “Parties to the Treaty … bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space … whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities,”[140] and requires that each “Party to the treaty … [be] internationally liable” for damages caused by an object launched into outer space.[141] Finally, the OST prohibits claims of “national appropriation” of both outer space and celestial bodies “by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by other means.”[142] The Space Act “facilitate[s] commercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources by [U.S.] citizens … ”[143] and exempts companies from regulatory oversight until 2023.[144] However, the FCC’s laissez-faire enforcement of satellite mega-constellation projects is arguably in violation of the OST[145] due to the saturation of these mega-constellations in LEO and their likely resulting orbital debris.[146]

#### ADR cause “grey zones” of military ambiguity

Seidel, 19 (Jamie Seidel, cites Todd Harrison, Centre for Strategic and International Studies Aerospace Security Project head “Space junk or sabotage? Space clean-up drones could have military implications” accessed online 8/15/19 <https://www.news.com.au/technology/science/space/space-junk-or-sabotage-space-cleanup-drones-could-have-military-implications/news-story/e2cbbb479ea620a64a43ddc0d860c30c>)

China calls them scavengers, Russia calls them inspectors and the US calls them threats. The race is on to clean up the space junk orbiting above our heads. But fears are these trash collectors are really killer “gremlins”. Touted as space-junk clean-up drones, they also have the potential to grab vital GPS, communications and surveillance satellites — and send them hurtling towards the ground. And strange things are already happening in orbit. Analysts are asking: is it space junk, or sabotage? Several critical geostationary orbit satellites have been reporting anomalies. Most recently, Intelsat 29e — which provided communication and navigation services to the Caribbean and North Atlantic — “experienced damage that caused a leak of the propellant on board the satellite”. Nobody is yet suggesting sabotage. Space junk remains the number one suspect. But as the satellite was only three-years-old, and joins five other major satellite malfunctions in the past two years, the incident has started analysts talking. Is space junk already getting out of control? Or is something more sinister at play? According to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), attacks against satellites may have already happened. COLLISION COURSE Last year, fears Moscow was developing a secret satellite saboteur were renewed when what was initially believed to be a piece of space junk left over from a rocket launch began to behave abnormally. It was changing course and speed under its own power. And it was doing so just days after US Vice-President Mike Pence formally announced plans to create a new Space Force. Why would it do this? Why the secrecy? Was it some sort of message? Now, Beijing has declassified tantalising details of what it calls an artificial-intelligence controlled space clean-up project. The so-called scavenger program was confirmed in state-controlled media by Luo Jianjun, deputy director of the National Laboratory of Space Flight Dynamics Technology at Northwestern Polytechnical University in Xian. “We prefer not to talk about it publicly,” he said. But talk about it he did. ORBITAL PICK-UP Referring to the uncontrolled crash of the Tiangong-1 experimental space station last year, Mr Luo said the use of newly developed technology could guide such craft to burn up in the Earth’s atmosphere safely. According to the South China Morning Post, he said the project was still experimental and that there had been no large-scale deployment of such orbital robots. The project involves small satellites — some weighing less than 10kg — with robotic arms and small thrusters. Their sensors and thrusters enable them to approach within 20cm of an object before reaching out and grabbing it. This could be a cast-off rocket casing. An old satellite with a dead power source. Or a fully-functional military or commercial device. Once attached, the scavenger can then set about pushing it towards the Earth’s atmosphere — and a fiery fate. “Most details remain secret because of the technology’s potential military applications,” Mr Luo states. WEAPONISED GARBAGE TRUCKS? The Morning Post also quoted a recently declassified Communist Party document as saying the concept of orbital drones had been under development since 2008. “The project has not only found applications in more than 10 satellite models … but also drones, smart weapons and robots,” the document reads. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) states in its 2019 Space Threat Assessment that a Chinese experimental satellite, designated SJ-17, circled a Chinese communications satellite several times in 2017 and 2018. Any military objective could be similar to that of Russia. The small robotic devices hide among space junk — or even attached to a bigger object. Here they remain, powered down until awoken by a coded call. This is because every rocket launch is carefully observed by competing governments and corporations. Whatever ends up in orbit is accurately tracked and recorded — not least to determine if it could end up hitting some high-value target, such as the International Space Station. But only the most sensitive and comprehensive space junk tracking systems would be capable of detecting the strange appearance or shift in the course of an object so small. These grapple-equipped gremlins can then pass close to a satellite of interest, photographing and scanning its make-up, or even intercepting its signals. They can also tear away at its surface, damaging sensitive equipment and rendering the satellite useless. Or, they could grab a dead satellite and propel the junk out of orbit. BATTLESPACE In March last year, India launched a missile that successfully destroyed a satellite already in orbit. It is only the fourth nation to do so. But there was fallout: a great cloud of metallic debris cannoning through space. Some pieces are just millimetres across. Others, tens of centimetres. All can rip holes in propellant tanks, depressurise a spacecraft — or smash another satellite, causing yet another cloud of debris to erupt It joins a hail of some 3000 high-velocity fragments — all of which are being tracked — caused when China conducted a similar ‘kinetic-kill’ test in 2007. It’s estimated a total of more than 600,000 pieces are cannoning about up there. The risk is, such debris could initiate a runaway chain reaction. It’s called the Kessler Syndrome, after the researcher who first predicted it. And, some academics are warning it could soon close access to high orbit within as little as 20 years. “If the useful orbits around Earth become too full of rubbish, and our satellites can’t operate safely, it will have serious implications,” the Australian Academy of Science warns. And space agencies around the world, including Australia, are racing to find ways to mitigate the problem. Some, such as the space nets being tested by Britain and repair robots proposed by the US, could also be construed as weapons. ‘SOFT’ OPTIONS There’s no point winning an orbital war if nobody could ever leave the surface of the Earth again for several thousand years. Which is why the militaries of such nations such as China, Russia and the United States are looking for less destructive ways to dominate space — including gremlin satellites. Militaries are exploring other options, such as Russia’s recent controversial jamming of GPS satellites operating above Norway and Sweden. And then there are lasers. While not yet capable of shooting an object out of space, they can damage or blind the sensors they carry. “It’s happening all the time at this low level,” Centre for Strategic and International Studies Aerospace Security Project head Todd Harrison told MIT Technology Review. “It’s more grey-zone aggression. Countries are pushing the limits of accepted behaviour and challenging norms. They’re staying below the threshold of conflict.”

#### Dual-use ambiguity guarantees miscalculation that escalates

Bragg et. al, 18 —- Dr. Allison Astorino-Courtois (NSI’s Chief Analytics Officer (CAO) and Executive Vice President, PhD in IR @ NYU); Dr. Robert Elder (PhD @ Emory, BA @ Clemson, Assistant prof of History @ Baylor); Dr. Belinda Bragg (principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in political science @ Texas A&M); July 2018, “Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf

Space is the ultimate gray zone

The nature of the space environment itself—and how humans tend to relate to it—can pose risks to stable governance and crisis management in the space domain (Wright; ViTTa Q16; Q19/23). Specifically, cognitive science tells us that ambiguous and high-stakes environments create significant potential for misperception and miscommunication (Wright). Physical and technical limitations on direct observation of events in space limit space situational awareness and increase the difficulty of distinguishing between intentional acts, unintentional events, and natural events. As a result, actors rely on other methods for understanding the nature and causes of events in space. Misperception, mistakes, and/or miscommunication can lead to incorrect inferences and either unintended escalation or unaddressed security threats. Managing escalation requires manipulating an adversary’s perception of the risks inherent in that escalation. However, the inherent ambiguity of the space domain makes effective communication of that risk more complicated (Wright). The “grayness” of the space domain is intensified by the increase in dual-use (military/civilian) technologies (Wright). For example, as a number of contributors pointed out, the same rocket engines used to boost satellites into orbit can be used to deliver conventional or nuclear warheads (ViTTa Q8; Q9: Q19/23). Partly in response to increasingly unstable regional security environments, more and more actors are starting to think about the national security applications of dual-use aspects of space technologies. Unlike the US, where there has traditionally been a clear division between civil, military, and commercial space industries, in most countries active in space, there is a more permeable division between government and commercial space. This creates fewer institutional barriers to military use of civil capabilities. In many non-Western states, commercial space enterprises are partially or even wholly state-owned (ViTTa Q2).

#### Orbital use fees fail

Stilwell 20, Ruth [Dr. Ruth Stilwell is a Senior Non-Resident Scholar at the Space Policy Institute of George Washington University and Adjunct Professor at Norwich University.] Orbital use fees won’t solve the space debris problem. Jun 22, 2020, <https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3971/1> TG

State, commercial, and non-government users of space have a shared interest in creating the long-term sustainability of space operations, and global progress requires international agreement. Proposers for an orbital use tax mention that it would need to be globally harmonized but fail to recognize the difficulty in reaching such an agreement—if such an agreement is even possible. The recent collapse of the OPEC pact and the subsequent oil price war illustrates the fragility of international economic collaboration. By contrast, international agreements on standards and regulation for international operators, as we see in the maritime and aviation industries, tend to endure. It is important to recognize that diplomatic resources are limited and efforts to reach international agreement should focus on areas that can provide the most benefit and have the greatest chance for success. For the long-term sustainability of space, the answer is not to make space more expensive to use, but rather to ask the users, both civilian and military, to be responsible to the goal of sustainable use. This requires a focus in three critical areas: collision avoidance, limiting debris-generating behaviors, and debris removal. As we ask the space community to be more responsible, it is important to define what that means. As illustrated by recent anti-satellite missile tests, the community can be alarmed, but we are functionally unable to hold each other to standards of behavior if those standards do not exist. Efforts at international agreement should be focused on reaching agreement in these areas if we are to have a sustainable and accountable orbital domain. The space debris problem is complex and will not be solved by targeting one section of the industry. It is important to look at primary contributors to the problem. Leaving non-maneuverable objects in orbit creates an unresolvable collision risk as illustrated in January, when two intact satellites that had been in orbit for decades came within meters of colliding (see [“Will we hit the snooze button on an orbital debris wakeup call?”](https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3885/1), The Space Review, February 17, 2020). By contrast, days before the potential collision, a damaged DirecTV satellite at risk of exploding was maneuvered to a graveyard orbit where it did not pose a debris hazard to other operators. An orbital use tax would put an additional financial penalty on the user that is able to prevent the collision risk but do nothing to change the behavior that created the collision risk. The orbital fees not only don’t solve the problem but, by and large, they are asking the commercial sector to pay for the pollution that was created by legacy users who were largely governments.

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### 1NC---Space Elevators PIC

#### Text – Private Appropriation of Outer Space except for Space Elevators is Unjust.

#### It Competes:

#### 1] Space Elevators constitute Appropriation – they impede orbits.

Matignon 19 Louis de Gouyon Matignon 3-3-2019 "LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPACE ELEVATOR TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM" <https://www.spacelegalissues.com/space-law-legal-aspects-of-the-space-elevator-transportation-system/> [PhD in space law (co-supervised by both Philippe Delebecque, from Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, France, and Christopher D. Johnson, from Georgetown University || regularly write articles on the website Space Legal Issues so as to popularise space law and public international law]//Elmer

An Earth-based space elevator would consist of a cable with one end attached to the surface near the equator and the other end in space beyond geostationary orbit. An orbit is the curved path through which objects in space move around a planet or a star. The 1967 Treaty’s regime and customary law enshrine the principle of non-appropriation and freedom of access to orbital positions. Space Law and International Telecommunication Laws combined to protect this use against any interference. The majority of space-launched objects are satellites that are launched in Earth’s orbit (a very small part of space objects – scientific objects for space exploration – are launched into outer space beyond terrestrial orbits). It is important to precise that an orbit does not exist: satellites describe orbits by obeying the general laws of universal attraction. Depending on the launching techniques and parameters, the orbital trajectory of a satellite may vary. Sun-synchronous satellites fly over a given location constantly at the same time in local civil time: they are used for remote sensing, meteorology or the study of the atmosphere. Geostationary satellites are placed in a very high orbit; they give an impression of immobility because they remain permanently at the same vertical point of a terrestrial point (they are mainly used for telecommunications and television broadcasting). A geocentric orbit or Earth orbit involves any object orbiting Planet Earth, such as the Moon or artificial satellites. Geocentric (having the Earth as its centre) orbits are organised as follow: 1) Low Earth orbit (LEO): geocentric orbits with altitudes (the height of an object above the average surface of the Earth’s oceans) from 100 to 2 000 kilometres. Satellites in LEO have a small momentary field of view, only able to observe and communicate with a fraction of the Earth at a time, meaning a network or constellation of satellites is required in order to provide continuous coverage. Satellites in lower regions of LEO also suffer from fast orbital decay (in orbital mechanics, decay is a gradual decrease of the distance between two orbiting bodies at their closest approach, the periapsis, over many orbital periods), requiring either periodic reboosting to maintain a stable orbit, or launching replacement satellites when old ones re-enter. 2) Medium Earth orbit (MEO), also known as an intermediate circular orbit: geocentric orbits ranging in altitude from 2 000 kilometres to just below geosynchronous orbit at 35 786 kilometres. The most common use for satellites in this region is for navigation, communication, and geodetic/space environment science. The most common altitude is approximately 20 000 kilometres which yields an orbital period of twelve hours. 3) Geosynchronous orbit (GSO) and geostationary orbit (GEO) are orbits around Earth at an altitude of 35 786 kilometres matching Earth’s sidereal rotation period. All geosynchronous and geostationary orbits have a semi-major axis of 42 164 kilometres. A geostationary orbit stays exactly above the equator, whereas a geosynchronous orbit may swing north and south to cover more of the Earth’s surface. Communications satellites and weather satellites are often placed in geostationary orbits, so that the satellite antennae (located on Earth) that communicate with them do not have to rotate to track them, but can be pointed permanently at the position in the sky where the satellites are located. 4) High Earth orbit: geocentric orbits above the altitude of 35 786 kilometres. The competing forces of gravity, which is stronger at the lower end, and the outward/upward centrifugal force, which is stronger at the upper end, would result in the cable being held up, under tension, and stationary over a single position on Earth. With the tether deployed, climbers could repeatedly climb the tether to space by mechanical means, releasing their cargo to orbit. Climbers could also descend the tether to return cargo to the surface from orbit.

#### 2] Everything “produces debris” - launches produce dust, paint falls off from materials, etc. – the 1AC hasn’t defined “debris” or anything that “constitutes Debris” so default Negative on Competition – anything else incentivizes Aff vagueness to spike Neg Ground.

#### Private Companies are pursuing Space Elevators.

Alfano 15 Andrea Alfano 8-18-2015 “All Of These Companies Are Working On A Space Elevator” <https://www.techtimes.com/articles/77612/20150818/companies-working-space-elevator.htm> (Writer at the Tech Times)//Elmer

Space elevators are solid proof that any mundane object sounds way cooler if you stick the word "space" in front of it. But there's much more than coolness at stake when building a space elevator – this technology has the potential to revolutionize space transportation, and the Canadian private space company Thoth Technology that was recently awarded a patent for its space elevator design isn't the only company in the game. One of the other major players is a U.S.-based company called LiftPort Group, founded by space entrepreneur Michael Laine in 2003. Its plan for a space elevator is vastly different from the one for which Thoth received a patent, however. Whereas Thoth's plans entail tethering a 12-mile-high inflatable space elevator to the Earth, LiftPort is shooting for the moon. Originally, LiftPort had planned to build an Earth elevator, too, but it abandoned the idea in 2007 in favor of building a lunar elevator. The basic design for a lunar elevator is an anchor in the moon that is attached to a cable that extends to a space station situated at a very special point. Known as a Lagrange Point, this is the gravitational tipping point between the Earth and the moon, where their gravitational pulls essentially cancel one another out. A robot could then travel up and down the tether, ferrying cargo between the moon and the station. Out farther in space, a counterweight would balance out the system. Both types of space elevator are intended to increase space access, but in very different ways. Thoth's Earth elevator aims to make launches easier by starting off 12 miles above the Earth's surface. LiftPort's space elevator aims to increase access to the moon in particular, because it is much easier to launch a rocket to the Lagrange Point and dock it at a space station than it is to get to the moon directly. There's a third major company based in Japan called Obayashi Corp. whose plans look like a hybrid of Thoth's and LiftPort's. Obayashi is not a space company, however – it's actually a construction company. Like Thoth, Obayashi plans to build an Earth elevator. But its Earth elevator would consist of a cable tethered to the blue planet, a robotic cargo-carrier, a space station, and a counterweight. It essentially looks like LiftPort's plans, but stuck to the Earth instead of to the moon.

#### Yes Space Elevators – NASA confirms.

Snowden 18 Scott Snowden 10-2-2018 "A colossal elevator to space could be going up sooner than you ever imagined" <https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/colossal-elevator-space-could-be-going-sooner-you-ever-imagined-ncna915421> (Scott has written about science and technology for 20 years for publications around the world. He covers environmental technology for Forbes.)//Elmer

For more than half a century, rockets have been the only way to go to space. But in the not-too-distant future, we may have another option for sending up people and payloads: a colossal elevator extending from Earth’s surface up to an altitude of 22,000 miles, where geosynchronous satellites orbit. NASA says the basic concept of a space elevator is sound, and researchers around the world are optimistic that one can be built. The Obayashi Corp., a global construction firm based in Tokyo, has said it will build one by 2050, and China wants to build one as soon as 2045. Now an experiment to be conducted soon aboard the International Space Station will help determine the real-world feasibility of a space elevator. “The space elevator is the Holy Grail of space exploration,” says Michio Kaku, a professor of physics at City College of New York and a noted futurist. “Imagine pushing the ‘up’ button of an elevator and taking a ride into the heavens. It could open up space to the average person.”

#### Regardless of completion, Elevators spur investment in Nanotechnology

Liam O’Brien 16. University of Wollongong. 07/2016. “Nanotechnology in Space.” Young Scientists Journal; Canterbury, no. 19, p. 22.

Nanotechnology is at the forefront of scientific development, continuing to astound and innovate. Likewise, the space industry is rapidly increasing in sophistication and competition, with companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic becoming increasingly prevalent in what could become a new commercial space race. The various space programs over the past 60 years have led to a multitude of beneficial impacts for everyday society. Nanotechnology, through research and development in space has the potential to do the same. Potential applications of nanotechnology in space are numerous, many of them have the potential to capture and inspire generations to come. One of these applications is the space elevator. By using carbon nanotubes, a super light yet strong material, this concept would be an actual physical structure from the surface of the Earth to an altitude of approximately 36 000 km. The tallest building in the world would fit into this elevator over 42 000 times. The counterweight, used to keep the elevator taught, is proposed to be an asteroid. This would need to be at a distance of 100 000 km, a quarter of the distance to the moon. The benefits of such a structure would be enormous. 95% of a space shuttle's weight at take-off is fuel, costing US$ 20 000 per kilogram to send something into space. However, with a space elevator the cost per kilogram can be reduced to as little as US$ 200. Exploration to other planets can begin at the tower, and travel to and from the moon could become as simple as a morning commute to work. Solar sails provide the means to travel large distances and incredible speeds. Much like sails on a boat use wind, the solar sail uses light as a source of propulsion. Ideally these sails would be kilometres in length and only a few micrometres in thickness. This provides us with the ability to travel at speeds previously unheard of. Using carbon nanotubes once again, a solar sail has the capability to travel at 39 756 km/s which is 13% of the speed of light! This sail could reach Pluto in an astonishing 1.7 days, and Alpha Centauri in just 32 years. Space travel to other planets, other stars, could be possible with solar sails. The Planetary Society is funding for a space sail of itself, and has successfully launched one into orbit. NASA has also sent a sail into orbit, allowing it to burn up in the atmosphere after 240 days. Investing time and resources into nanotechnology for space exploration has benefits for society today. Materials such as graphene are being used in modern manufacturing at an increasing rate as the applications become utilised. Carbon nanotubes will change the way we think about materials and their strength. These nanotubes have a tensile strength one hundred times that of steel, yet are only a sixth of the weight. Imagine light weight vehicles using less petrol and energy as well as being just as strong as regular vehicles. With potentials to revolutionize the way we think about space travel, nanotechnology has a bright future. As a new field of science, it has the capability to push the human race to the outer reaches of our galaxy and hopefully one day to other stars. It will inspire generations of explorers and dreamers to challenge themselves and advance the human race into the next era. As Richard Feynman said in his 1959 talk 'There's Plenty of Room at the Bottom' "A field in which little has been done, but in which an enormous amount can be done. There is still plenty more to achieve.

#### Nanotech every existential threat

**Miller 17,** Gina Miller, She has written articles and provided interviews on the subject of nanotechnology and created digital artwork, videos and animations to illustrate future applications. Her work has been featured in various media including the History Channel, Japanese television, international documentaries, Wired, PC Magazine, Fast Company, and various books such as “Nanofuture” by J. Storrs Hall, the inventor of the “utility fog” concept. Miller has collaborated with other nanotechnology pioneers such as Robert A. Freitas Jr., author of “Nanomedicine,” and is a frequent collaborator of the Foresight Institute co-founded by K. Eric Drexler the “founding father of nanotechnology”.. 2-26-2017, accessed on 1-28-2021, Nanotechnology Industries, "Nanotechnology, the real science of miracles, the end of disease, aging, poverty and pollution - Nanotechnology Industries", http://nanoindustries.com/nanotechnology\_science\_of\_miracles/ //Adam

The current status of disease and death is staggering. We do know that in the documented world 56 million people die every year. Dissecting the statistics of disease provided by the World Health Organization is overwhelming to weed through. There is a solution. Or there may be in the future. One day there could be a cure for all disease, and you may be able to live forever, in a healthy youthful state. One day it may be possible that scientists will be able to create nanorobots using nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is the ability to see and move atoms around. Everything is made of atoms, the chair you are sitting in, your food, your body, the air we breathe, everything. Atoms are so small they cannot be seen by the human eye. Atoms are on the nanoscale, that's a teeny, tiny size. There are 25,400,000 nanometers in an inch, a sheet of newspaper is 100,000 nanometers thick, human hair is about 80,000 nanometers in diameter. Atoms are the building blocks. Different atoms, arranged in different ways, make molecules that make the different things you see and experience. In the human body atoms come together to make many things, for example water, fats, hair, bones, and DNA. DNA and other molecules build cells; sometimes cells malfunction and cause disease. Where does nanotechnology fit in? That's a self realizing question, that's how, it fits in! Think of it this way, if you were King Kong, could you grab one grain of sand easily? Your hands would be too big. That's how medicine is currently treating disease. Nanotechnology is on the same size and scale as disease. A nanorobot can grab a cell and repair it. This will allow us to cure diseases that have never been cured before. Nanorobots could be released into the blood stream via pill or injection to find and repair damage and then break down and disintegrate. Or nanorobots could remain in the body at all times, perpetually monitoring, identifying and repairing problems immediately, without any external treatment. Nanorobots would cure the aliment so early on that you would never even know you were going to get sick. Chemotherapy releases toxic chemicals throughout the entire body rather than just the affected area, such as a tumor. This process destroys the cancer but also the immune system. Chemotherapy makes patients very sick, and there is risk of permanent damage or death from the treatment itself. There is also a risk of the cancer returning. A nanorobot could have radiation inside of it, locate the tumor, inject it and destroy it directly. Molecular nanorobots wouldn't leave one cancerous cell behind. That's one of the benefits of getting down to the molecular level. Doctors cannot see on the molecular level and could easily miss some cancer cells, which is often the case and the cancer returns. A nanotech gene therapy has successfully killed ovarian cancer in mice; if successful in human clinical trials it could save the lives of 15000 women a year. But it doesn't stop with cancer. Every disease is made out of the same atoms that everything else is. All medical conditions are a result of atoms being out of place; a nanorobot could put them back where they belong, thus immediately alleviating the problem without the side effects that current day medication and treatments cause. What else can be repaired in the human body? EVERYTHING. From cancer to the common cold. There is nothing that nanotechnology could not repair. The injuries or illnesses you have right now will have the capability to be repaired or cured by nanotechnology. Nanotechnology could eliminate diseases, disabilities, and illnesses such as diabetes, malaria, HIV, cardiovascular disease, damage from injuries and accidents, heal wounds, reduce child mortality, regenerate limbs and organs, eliminate inflammatory/infectious diseases, and so on and so forth. Nanotechnology offers hope to people suffering from Alzheimer’s, Parkinson's, brain injuries, tumors and neurological disorders. Nanoconstructs could deliver neuroprotective molecules directly to the brain to recover or protect nerve cells from damage or degeneration. Nanotechnology has been emerging in this field in the form of nanoengineered scaffolds that could one day result in a tool for rewiring the intricate neuronal network. Research by Dr. Samuel I. Stupp designed molecules using nanomaterials and injected them into mice who were paralyzed due to spinal cord injury. After 6 weeks the mice regained the ability to walk. Research like this could one day evolve into real cures for people. 65 billion dollars is wasted every year due to low bioavailability. Meaning that the drug or treatment used is not absorbed into or accessed by the body properly due to a multitude of reasons. For example drug interactions, different molecular arrangements and manufacturing processes by different brands. Drugs with more moisture may form lumps in the stomach which decreases absorption, and a highly compressed pill will slow absorption. Different level changes in the body at any given time may cause drug toxicity. Metabolism, age, activity, stress, previous surgery and syndromes are also factors. These are huge challenges that can be alleviated by using nanotechnology to target the specific areas. Nanorobots can take their cues from mother nature; she is the first nanotechnologist. She is an expert at creating molecular machines. Geneticists have been taking advantage of viruses for use in gene therapy for some time. They modify a virus by removing the viral gene so it doesn't cause disease. They replace it with healthy genes to transport to the faulty cell and cure diseases. This strategy of hacking viruses could be exploited by nanotech. Viruses are biological molecular machines that could be modified into becoming nanorobots or they could become transportation for a nanorobot. Another means is a nanorobot could attach itself to a traveling white blood cell and ride shotgun to assist in the tissue repair of injured tissue. Nanotechnology could even be involved in tissue engineering, creating scaffolds for artificial organs and implants. Tissue from your own body could be used to make new tissue, which assures that your body doesn't reject it. The surgeries of today are painful, costly, can leave scars and can even be life threatening. Repairing nanorobots would eliminate the need for surgeries, incisions, side effects and recovery time. According to the American Academy of Periodontology there are links to poor dental health and stroke, heart disease, respiratory disease, osteoporosis, some cancers and diabetes. Nanorobots as nanodentistry could repair damage without large needles or drills. Nanorobots could also constantly and invisibly maintain and clean your teeth to avoid any dental problems. Hygiene is important for good health; your skin and hair could be cleaned by nanorobots eliminating the need for showers. Spider bites and ticks carrying lyme disease would be detected by nanorobots, blocking penetration. Other skin problems such as eczema would be repaired by dermal nanorobots. Is aging a disease? Could aging be cured? Yes. Since nanorobots would be able to repair single cells on the molecular level they would be able to repair damages created by aging. It's all the same to a nanorobot. Nanotechnology could repair damaged cells. Dead cells are the primary reason for aging and death; nanorobots could replace senescent (old) cells with non-senescent cells, or reprogram cells so they do not senescensce, which would keep the body from aging. Not only would the inside of your body never get sick or age, but neither will the outside. Your skin will be young, elastic, dewy and wrinkle-free. Your hair will be thick, without gray, and intact. Your hearing, your eyesight and memory will be in perfect shape. You wouldn't get arthritis, turkey neck, or saggy parts. You could go out dancing when you are 93 and not worry about sore feet, low energy or suffering any consequences. Unless you party too hard, but that's on you, not the nano. So if you never get sick and never get old could you live forever? Yes. nanorobots could be programmed to rebuild older cells into younger copies on a regular basis thereby the human body could become immortal. You could live a disease-free youthful life, forever. Of course immortality isn't for everyone and everyone should have the right to decide what they want or don't want for their own body. Death will be a choice rather than a requirement. There are well funded countries that have access to researchers and high tech equipment that would love to figure out how to create the nanotechnology that will repair bodies and end disease. In the US despite having a lot of financial resources it's not always easy to get funding. If you are at a university, you need to write a grant, go through a lot of red tape, and there are a lot more near-term projects that seem to get prioritized when it comes to funding. For companies looking for investors, unfortunately not all investors can foresee the amazing future that nano will have because they are used to funding things they can see. For example a company that makes desks seeking an investor can show the investor the money they need for each piece of wood, bolt, and the quantity of desks that will be manufactured within a specific time frame. Nanotechnology is in development and isn't readily available like a piece of wood, the piece of wood has to be built. And the individual processes of each emerging development will have their own variables. Once the recipe has been figured out and formulated, the investment we have made will then be very inexpensive and easy to reproduce. Third world countries would have easy access to nanomedicine. Mother nature puts atoms together all the time and it doesn't cost her anything. The raw materials for making nanorobots would be essentially cost-free because they will be made mostly of carbon. Because nanotechnology would be created on the very small atomic level, traveling to provide treatment would not require large equipment. The size and portability would make treatment easily accessible across the world. The environment and living conditions also impact health. Since nanotechnology is on the atomic level and atoms are everywhere, it can be beneficial to the world all around us, as well as our bodies. Nanotechnology could enrich depleted soil in places like Africa, which is currently facing a food crisis. Vitamins, nutrients and minerals could be delivered to rebuild soil to a fertile state and thus have the ability to grow food. Hunger could one day be a solvable problem. Nanotechnology would make it possible to provide meat and animal products inexpensively without killing animals. E.coli and other pathogens could be detected in soil and eliminated so that food is not harmful. Currently nanomaterials are in development to release fertilizers for plants and nutrients for livestock, nano sensors for monitoring the health of crops and farm animals, and magnetic nanoparticles to remove soil contaminants. According to water.org 750 million people around the world lack access to safe water; approximately one in nine people. 840,000 people die each year from water-related disease. A portable non-chemical nano-filtration water purification device has been developed by Micheal Pritchard. It creates safe and sterile water out of dirty water and would make the cost of water per household an estimated 3 dollars a year. His company has provided clean water to countries who have gone through natural disasters, such as Haiti and the Philippines. In the future nanotechnology particles could destroy bacteria that often cause fatal disease. Pollution in general, global warming, nuclear waste, oil spills, smog, and acid rain, could be remedied and prevented by nanotechnological advances. Large quantities of nanorobots could come together to remove pollutant atoms from the atmosphere, earth and water. These groups of nanorobots could swim in contaminated waters and be released into the polluted atmosphere to destroy or remove contaminating molecules. Nanorobots could pull apart the bad molecules and reassemble the atoms into good molecules for other positive purposes. As a first indicator of the possibility, Brian Mercer created a new pollution control technology using nanofibres that greatly reduce industrial pollution by trapping and removing the pollutants. Currently nanotech is being used to reduce emissions from car fuels. Since nanotechnology builds atom by atom; the process is pollution free. Nanotechnology will not be manufactured in the way we use manufacturing plants today. There will be no chemical by product, no emission, hazardous waste and no pollution.

#### Counterplan solves the Case - Space Elevators solve Space Debris – reduces Rocket Launches.

Forgan 19, Duncan H. Solving Fermi's Paradox. Vol. 10. Cambridge University Press, 2019. (Associate Lecturer at the Centre for Exoplanet Science at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, founding member of the UK Search for Extra-terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) research network and leads UK research efforts into the search)//Elmer

All objects in HEO reside beyond the geostationary orbit (GEO). The orbital period at GEO (w'hich is aligned with the Earth's equator) is equal to the Earth’s rotational period. As a result, from a ground observer’s perspective the satellite resides at a fixed point in the sky, with clear advantages for uses such as global communication. Activities at HEO are considerably less than at LEO and MEO. Earth's orbital environment does contain a natural component - the meteoroids. These pose little to no threat to space operations - the true threat is self-derived. The current limitations of spacefaring technology ensure that every launch is accompanied by substantial amounts of space debris. This debris ranges in size from dust grains to paint flecks to large derelict spacecraft and satellites. According to NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office, some 21.000 objects greater than 10 cm in size are currently being tracked in LEO. with the population below 10 cm substantially higher. Most debris produced at launch tends to be deposited with no supplemental velocity - hence these objects tend to follow the initial launch trajectory, which often orbits with high eccentricity and inclination. However, these orbits do intersect with the orbits of Earth’s artificial satellite population, resulting in impacts w'hich tend to produce further debris. The vast majority of the low-size debris population is so-called fragmentation debris. This is produced during spacecraft deterioration, and in the most abun- dance during spacecraft break-up and impacts. The first satellite-satellite collision occurred in 1961. resulting in a 400% increase in fragmentation debris (Johnson et al.. 2008). Most notably, a substantial source of fragmentation debris was the deliberate destruction of the Fengyun 1C satellite by the People’s Republic of China, which created approximately 2.000 debris fragments. As with collisions of ‘natural debris’, debris-debris collisions tend to result in an increased count of debris fragments. Since the late 1970s, it has been understood that man-made debris could pose an existential risk to space operations. Kessler and Cour-Palais (1978) worked from the then-population of satellites to extrapolate the debris production rate over the next 30 years. Impact rates on spacecraft at any location. /, can be calculated if one knows the local density of debris p, the mean relative velocity vrei\* and the cross-sectional area ct: [[EQUATION 13.5 OMITTED]] Each impact increases p without substantially altering vrel or o. We should there- fore expect the impact rate (and hence the density of objects) to continue growing at an exponential rate: [[EQUATION 13.6 OMITTED]] Kessler and Cour-Palais (1978) predicted that by the year 2000, p would have increased beyond the critical value for generating a collisional cascade. As new collisions occur, these begin to increase ^jjp, which in turn increases resulting in a rapid positive feedback, with p and I reaching such large values that LEO is rendered completely unnavigable. This has not come to pass - LEO remains navigable, partially due to a slight overprediction of debris produced by individual launches. The spectre of a collisional cascade (often referred to as Kessler syndrome) still looms over human space exploration, as debris counts continue to rise. Without a corresponding dedicated effort to reduce these counts, either through mitigating strategies to reduce the production of debris during launches, or through removal of debris fragments from LEO. we cannot guarantee the protection of the current flotilla of satellites, leaving our highly satellite-dependent society at deep risk. What strategies can be deployed to remove space debris? Almost all debris removal techniques rely on using the Earth’s atmosphere as a waste disposal sys- tem. Most debris is sufficiently small that atmospheric entry would result in its complete destruction, with no appreciable polluting effects. Atmospheric entry requires the debris fragments to be decelerated so that their orbits begin to intersect with lower atmospheric altitudes. Once a critical altitude is reached, atmospheric drag is sufficiently strong that the debris undergoes runaway deceleration and ultimately destruction. There are multiple proposed techniques for decelerating debris. Some mechani- cal methods include capturing the debris using either a net or harpoon, and applying a modest level of reverse thrust. These are most effective for larger fragments, and especially intact satellites (Forshaw et al., 2015). Attaching sails to the debris is also a possibility if the orbit is sufficiently low for weak atmospheric drag. The Japanese space agency JAXA’s Kounotori Integrated Tether Experiment (KITE) will trail a long conductive cable. As a current is passed through the cable, and the cable traverses the Earth’s magnetic field, the cable experiences a magnetic drag force that will de-orbit the spacecraft. Orbiting and ground-based lasers can decelerate the debris through a variety of means. For small debris fragments, the radiation pressure produced by the laser can provide drag. A more powerful laser can act on larger debris fragments through ablation. As the laser ablates the debris, the resulting recoil generated by the escaping material produces drag and encourages de-orbit. A more lateral solution is to ensure that launches and general space-based activity no longer generate debris. These approaches advocate lower-energy launch mechanisms that do not rely on powerful combustion. The most famous is the space elevator (see Aravind. 2007). Originally conceived by Tsiolkovsky, the ele- vator consists of an extremely durable cable extended from a point near the Earth’s equator, up to an anchor point located at GEO (most conceptions of the anchor point envision an asteroid parked in GEO). ‘Climber’ cars can then be attached to the cable and lifted to LEO, MEO and even GEO by a variety of propulsion methods. Most notably, the cars can be driven to GEO without the need for chemical rockets or nuclear explosions - indeed, a great deal of energy can be saved by having coupled cars, one ascending and one descending. Space elevators would solve a great number of problems relating to entering (and leaving) Earth orbit, substantially reducing the cost of delivering payload out of the Earth's atmosphere. The technical challenges involved in deploying a cable tens of thousands of kilometres long are enormous, not to mention the material science required to produce a cable of sufficient tensile strength and flexibility in the first place. The gravitational force (and centrifugal force) felt by the cable will vary significantly along its length. As cars climb the cable, the Coriolis force will move the car (and cable) horizontally also, providing further strain on the cable material. The relatively slow traversal of the biologically hazardous Van Allen Belt on the route to GEO is also a potential concern for crewed space travel. Whatever the means, a spacefaring civilisation (or at least, a civilisation that utilises its local orbital environment as we do) must develop a non-polluting solution to space travel, whether that is via the construction of a space elevator, a maglev launch loop, rail gun, or some other form of non-rocket acceleration. If it cannot perform pollution-free spacecraft launches (or fully clean up its pollution), then it will eventually succumb to Kessler syndrome, with potentially drastic consequences for future space use, with likely civilisation-ending effects (Solution C.13).

## Debris ADV

### 1NC---Squo Thumps

#### Squo debris thumps

**Wall 21** [Mike Wall, Michael Wall is a Senior Space Writer with [Space.com](http://space.com/) and joined the team in 2010. He primarily covers exoplanets, spaceflight and military space. He has a Ph.D. in evolutionary biology from the University of Sydney, Australia, a bachelor's degree from the University of Arizona, and a graduate certificate in science writing from the University of California, Santa Cruz. 11/15/21, "Kessler Syndrome and the space debris problem," Space, [https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris accessed 12/10/21](https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris%20accessed%2012/10/21)] Adam

Earth orbit is getting more and more crowded as the years go by. Humanity has launched about 12,170 satellites since the dawn of the space age in 1957, [according to the European Space Agency](https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/Space_debris_by_the_numbers) (ESA), and 7,630 of them remain in orbit today — but only about 4,700 are still operational. That means there are nearly 3,000 defunct spacecraft zooming around Earth at tremendous speeds, along with other big, dangerous pieces of debris like upper-stage rocket bodies. For example, orbital velocity at 250 miles (400 kilometers) up, the altitude at which the ISS flies, is about 17,100 mph (27,500 kph). At such speeds, even a tiny shard of debris can do serious damage to a spacecraft — and there are huge numbers of such fragmentary bullets zipping around our planet. ESA estimates that Earth orbit harbors at least 36,500 debris objects that are more than 4 inches (10 centimeters) wide, 1 million between 0.4 inches and 4 inches (1 to 10 cm) across, and a staggering 330 million that are smaller than 0.4 inches (1 cm) but bigger than 0.04 inches (1 millimeter). These objects pose more than just a hypothetical threat. From 1999 to May 2021, for example, the ISS conducted 29 debris-avoiding maneuvers, including three in 2020 alone, [according to NASA officials](https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html). And that number continues to grow; the station performed [another such move in November 2021](https://www.space.com/space-station-dodging-chinese-space-junk-spacex-crew-3), for example. Many of the smaller pieces of space junk were spawned by the explosion of spent rocket bodies in orbit, but others were more actively emplaced. In January 2007, for instance, China intentionally destroyed one of its defunct weather satellites in a much-criticized test of anti-satellite technology that generated [more than 3,000 tracked debris objects](https://swfound.org/media/9550/chinese_asat_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) and perhaps 32,000 others too small to be detected. The vast majority of that junk remains in orbit today, experts say. Spacecraft have also collided with each other on orbit. The most famous such incident occurred in February 2009, when Russia's defunct Kosmos 2251 satellite slammed into the operational communications craft Iridium 33, producing [nearly 2,000 pieces of debris](https://swfound.org/media/6575/swf_iridium_cosmos_collision_fact_sheet_updated_2012.pdf) bigger than a softball. That 2009 smashup might be evidence that the Kessler Syndrome is already upon us, though a cataclysm of "Gravity" proportions is still a long way off. "The cascade process can be more accurately thought of as continuous and as already started, where each collision or explosion in orbit slowly results in an increase in the frequency of future collisions," [Kessler told Space Safety Magazine in 2012](http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/don-kessler-envisat-kessler-syndrome/).

### 1NC---Debris D

#### Even in the worst case collision risk is tiny.

Fange 17 Daniel Von Fange 17, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions. Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over. High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue. Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here. GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here. How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be? Let’s imagine a worst case scenario. An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space? I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

### 1NC---Climate D

#### Warming doesn’t cause extinction---new studies.

**Nordhaus 20** Ted Nordhaus, an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts. [Ignore the Fake Climate Debate, 1-23-2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816]//BPS

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.

#### No impact, adaptation solves, and alt causes

**Shani 15** (Amir Shani – PhD @ the University of Central Florida, researches ecotourism and ethics at the University of the Negev, Eilat Campus. Boaz Arad – spokesman in the Public Policy Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies, “There is always time for rational skepticism: Reply to Hall et al,” April 2015, ScienceDirect)

The uncertainty that encompasses current climate change assessments is strengthened in light of the studies indicating that over earth's history there have been **distinct warm periods** with temperatures **exceeding the current ones** (Esper et al., 2012, McIntyre and McKittrick, 2003 and Soon and Baliunas, 2003). Reviewing the relevant scientific literature, Khandekar, Murty, and Chittibabu (2005) concluded that “in the context of the earth's climate through the last 500 million years, the recent (1975–2000) increase in the earth's mean temperature does not appear to be **unusual** or **unprecedented** as claimed by IPCC and many supporters of the global warming hypothesis” (p. 1568). Other studies challenged the mainstream climate change narrative, according to which CO2 levels in the earth's atmosphere play a prominent role in rising temperatures. One notable example is the research by Shaviv and Veizer (2003), which demonstrates that the earth's temperature correlates well with variations in cosmic ray flux, rather than changes in atmospheric CO2. These findings and others stir contentious debates within the climate scientific community, but are nevertheless largely overlooked by the IPCC, which ignores alternative explanations for climate change. Regrettably, Hall et al. scornfully dismiss this evidence, presented in our research note, based on cherry-picking of a few “non-peer-reviewed” references that were cited, some vague claims about “misreading” and “selective citing,” as well as other semantic nitpicking. 4. Impacts of climate change The IPCC warns that climate change is likely to have severe consequences, particularly for poor countries, such as increased hunger, water shortages, vulnerability to extreme weather events and debilitating diseases. **However**, these estimations have been **heavily criticized** for failing to properly account for **substantial improvements in adaptive capacity** (i.e., the capability of coping with the impact of global warming) that are likely to occur due to advances in **economic development**, **technological change** and **human capital** over the next century (Goklany, 2007). Fostering economic growth and technological development, largely achievable through the use of fossil fuels, will strengthen both industrialized and developing countries' **adaptive capacity** to deal not just with possible future climate change consequences, but also with other environmental and public health problems. Such policy will **provide greater benefits** at lower costs than drastic climate change mitigation efforts involving substantially cutting greenhouse gas emissions (Goklany, 2004 and Goklany, 2012). Furthermore, the analyses of Galiana and Green (2009) exemplify that in the current state of energy technologies, the suggested plans for ambitious emission reductions will likely severely clobber the global economy, especially in view of present economic conditions. In order to stabilize atmospheric CO2 at accepted levels, there is a need for enormous advances in efficient energy technology, which is currently missing (Pielke, Wigley & Green, 2008). In any case, **even if** every industrialized nation meets the most ambitious emissions targets set by the Kyoto Protocol, such efforts are likely to have **little effect**, particularly in the light of the considerable increases in greenhouse gas emissions by rising economic superpowers as **China** and **India**, as well as the **remaining developing world** (Wigley, 1998). Hall et al. criticized us for choosing “selective citations…that discuss natural processes potentially affect climate in specific locations and times.” Yet the purpose of referring to such studies was to refute the claims made by the IPCC and other climate change alarmists to the effect that recent extreme weather events (e.g., floods, droughts and storms) are the consequences of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. Moreover, data shows that despite claims that the number and intensity of extreme weather has increased, between 1900 and 2010 the average annual death and death rates from extreme weather events has declined by 93% and 98%, respectively (Goklany, 2009). This is mostly due to economic and technological factors, such as improved global food production, increase globalized food trade and better disaster preparedness. IPCC's exaggerated estimations of climate change impacts were also noted in an op-ed in Financial Times written by climate economist Richard Tol (2014), a week following his demand that his name as one of the leading authors be removed from the IPCC's AR5 due to its over alarmist assessments of the impacts of AGW and underestimation of humanity's adaptive capacity. As concluded by Tol, “Humans are a **tough** and **adaptable** species. People live on the equator and in the Arctic, in the desert and in the rainforest. **We survived ice ages** with **primitive technologies**. The idea that climate change poses an existential threat to humankind is **laughable**” (2014, para 1).

#### Overwhelming literature consensus

**Seidov 14**—Researcher at NOAA and PhD in Geophysics, Fluid Dynamics, and Thermodynamics [Dan, “Are you aware of any peer-reviewed paper that explicitly classifies current global climate change as an existential risk (risk of human extinction)?” Research Gate, 4 Nov 2014, http://tinyurl.com/jrnfafu, accessed 6 Sep 2016]

The current global climate change **does not have a potential to cause human extinction**. Past severe climate changes were critical for many ancient civilizations, yet our existence proofs that they were not potent enough to cause entire termination of the humankind. The projected changes, even in the worst case scenarios, can cause many dramatic local changes. For example, change in rainfall patterns in agricultural countries may lead to possible famine and other dramatic events. However, any imaginable climate changes based on modern climate science **cannot generate existential risks for the entire human civilization**. In my view, a paper predicting such a catastrophe in any foreseeable future, at least on the time scale of human civilization, that is, thousands of years, has no chance of being published in any serious research journal.

#### Rising CO2 solves impending food crises

**Curtin 09** – (2009, Tim, not an Idso, economist, and a former advisor to the EU, World Bank, and an emeritus faculty member of Australian National University, “Climate Change and Food Production,” Energy & Environment (a super qualled peer reviewed journal), Vol 20, No 7, 2009, google scholar)

The availability of atmospheric carbon dioxide is the sine qua non for all plant growth and thence for all **marine and terrestrial life forms**. The purpose of this paper is to show that proposed reductions in anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) to below the level of observed annual incremental biospheric absorption of those emissions would reduce the growth of the basic feedstock of all life forms. Agronomists have for long known and demonstrated in controlled experiments both in greenhouses and in **field studies** the dramatic impact of increases in its level on crop yields. These studies have all been local. The regression analysis here of historic data on global food production shows it may well be more dependent on increases in the availability of atmospheric carbon dioxide (henceforth written as [CO2]) than on changes in fertilizer consumption and global mean temperature (GMT). This implies that if the drastic reductions in total anthropogenic emissions of CO2 to be sought at Copenhagen (December 2009) are adopted and applied, they will, even if they aim at only a 60% reduction on the 2000 global level by 2050, bring emissions to below the incremental volume of their biospheric absorption. **That could seriously imperil growth of global food production**. We show how in its role as a fertilizer that raises global Net Primary Productivity (NPP), increases in [CO2] have a natural negative feedback mechanism that offsets a large proportion of growing emissions: more [CO2] causes more plant growth, but more plant growth takes up more CO2 thus limiting the further rise. This contrasts with the unproven positive feedback assumed in all models deployed by the IPCC whereby, allegedly, rising [CO2] will result in falling biospheric absorption and ever larger increases in [CO2]. We show there is no sign in the observations since 1958 of “saturation” of the capacity of the planet to continue absorbing more than half of all anthropogenic emissions of CO2, so there is no evidence for the IPCC’s positive feedback. Biospheric absorption of increases in anthropogenic CO2 emissions would only have to increase from the average 57% of all anthropogenic emissions from 1958 to 2008 to 60% to achieve the likely Copenhagen 60% emissions reduction target. The rapid growth of absorption of total anthropogenic emissions to over 6% p.a. between 1997 and 2006 relative to total emissions growth at 2.6% p.a. over that period (Le Quéré 2008) confirms this manner of attaining the Copenhagen target is easily attainable—and helps to explain the growth of food production at rates in excess of global population growth. It also limited the growth rate of aggregate [CO2] between 1099 1958 and 2008 to only 0.41% p.a. Our results show that with warming in the absence of growing carbon fertilization, agricultural production could be less by more than 10% by 2080 than at present (2007:Table 5.8). That means starvation for most of a global population likely then to be at least 50% larger than now.

#### Most likely cause of global conflict, but solving it is a dampener, and the aff can’t turn it

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In his book, The Coming Famine, Julian Cribb writes that the wars of the 21st century will involve failed states, rebellions, civil conflict, insurgencies and terrorism. All of these elements will be triggered by competition over dwindling resources, rather than global conflicts with clearly defined sides.

More than 40 countries experienced civil unrest following the food price crisis in 2008. The rapid increase in grain prices and prevailing food insecurity in many states is linked to the outbreak of protests, food riots and the breakdown of governance. Widespread food insecurity is a driving factor in creating a disaffected population ripe for rebellion. Given the interconnectivity of food security and political stability, it is likely food will continue to act as a political stressor on regimes in the Middle East and elsewhere.

Addressing Insecurity

Improving food and water security and encouraging resource sharing is critical to creating a stable and secure global environment. While food and water shortages contribute to a rising cycle of violence, improving food and water security outcomes can trigger the opposite and reduce the potential for conflict.

With the global population expected to reach 9 billion by 2040, the likelihood of conflict exacerbated by scarcity over the next century is growing. Conflict is likely to be driven by a number of factors and difficult to address through diplomacy or military force. Population pressures, changing weather, urbanization, migration, a loss of arable land and freshwater resources are just some of the multi-layered stressors present in many states. Future inter-state conflict will move further away from the traditional, clear lines of military conflict and more towards economic control and influence.

### 1NC---Cyber D

#### Attacks won’t escalate

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We agree. However, our research suggests that, although states like Russia will continue to engage in cyberattacks against the foundations of democracy (a serious threat indeed), states are less likely to engage in destructive “doomsday” attacks against each other in cyberspace. Using a series of war games and survey experiments, we found that cyber operations may in fact produce a moderating influence on international crises. Here’s why: Cyberspace offers states a way to manage escalation in the shadows. Thus, cyber operations are more akin to the Cold War-era political warfare than a military revolution. Would you like to play a game? To understand how actors use cyber operations to achieve a position of relative advantage, we designed a series of analytical war games. This methodology lets us assess how multiple factors could combine in a competitive environment, and helps identify recurrent strategic preferences associated with cyber operations. We ran military officers and university students through these war games. Next, we turned the war games into survey experiments via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) — so randomized respondents answered questions about how to respond to an international crisis. War games offer a time-tested means of assessing the changing character of crisis and competition. Following scripted scenarios, players are assigned to different “teams” and armed with resources to meet their objectives. They earn points based on their choices, with referees guiding the play and military/security analysts interpreting the results. [There’s more to Russia’s cyber interference than the Mueller probe suggests] As players seek to win the game, they may choose previously unconsidered options or draw on or combine resources in unexpected ways. By observing these games, recording their results, repeating the plays and redesigning the scenarios, analysts can understand the nature of the complex and highly contingent problems the scenarios represent. And political scientists use war games to create survey experiments to test hypotheses about strategic preferences. Our study of over 100 military officers and students, for instance, gave players a crisis scenario and a range of response options, all of which included the ability to escalate in cyberspace — as well as more traditional diplomatic, economic and military instruments. Players could also choose to de-escalate. What would a great power cyber crisis in East Asia look like? In our first round, “Island Intercept,” we sought to identify whether states escalated using cyber capabilities. Players took on the role of China or the United States in an escalating dispute in the South China Sea. Over the course of multiple war games, we found our mix of military officers and university students often sought to de-escalate the crisis and rarely used offensive cyber operations. Players assigned to the Chinese side often combined cyber espionage and more traditional intelligence activities to identify the U.S. players’ intentions and capabilities. Players replicating strategic decision-making in Beijing seemed to prefer a “wait and see” approach involving increased intelligence and diplomatic lobbying, rather than escalatory offensive cyber operations. [Did the U.S. ‘hack back’ at Russia? Here’s why this matters in cyber warfare.] The broader survey experiment replicated these findings. The 800 MTurk respondents revealed a bias toward not escalating into the cyber domain. Specifically, about 52 percent chose to de-escalate while 30 percent opted for minor escalation in the diplomatic or economic arena. Only 18 percent of respondents preferred escalatory offensive cyber operations. These findings support other studies demonstrating that states do not prefer escalatory responses to cyber intrusions. How will states employ cyber capabilities against their domestic populations? In a second round, we shifted to examine intrastate conflicts. In our “Netwar” game, players took on the role of either the government, a paramilitary organization, a multinational company or a transnational group of hackers and activists, all attempting to achieve their interests in a weak and corrupt state. This scenario sought to replicate the complex, often proxy, multiparty competition in cyberspace. In these games, the results were more mixed. Players replicating the state tended to use offensive cyber operations as a means of targeting domestic opposition groups — while opposition groups used cyber to blackmail the state by leaking sensitive information. In an MTurk survey experiment involving 800 respondents, we found that states still preferred not to jump into the cyber domain, opting about 43 percent of the time to limit escalation. Yet these results appeared to be a function of regime type. When we controlled for regime type in a second round of surveys involving 800 respondents, we found that democracies had a higher than expected count of de-escalatory measures (53 percent). But authoritarian regimes escalated to cyber measures 35 percent of the time, vs. 18 percent for democracies. Where is the escalation? [The Netherlands just revealed its cybercapacity. So what does that mean?] Our findings suggest that cyber weapons may be far less destabilizing than many assume. First, we found that actors in crisis situations were restrained in their use of cyber weapons. Indeed, actors were more likely to use military, economic or diplomatic alternatives before escalating into the cyber domain. How might this work in the real world? We might interpret the Russian shift to cyber operations to be one of desperation, rather than evidence of a calculated strategy. Our findings suggest that actors are uncomfortable in the cyber domain and only operate there when they lack relative influence in other areas — or seek to limit the risk of escalation, likely due to attribution issues associated with cyber operations. Second, fears of large-scale cyber operations are likely overblown due to cyber’s unique “use it and lose it” character. Individual cyberattacks could potentially wreak considerable damage, but any such exploits could — once deployed — be quickly reverse-engineered and the vulnerability in target networks patched. Here’s the catch: Once you convert network access and cyber espionage into an attack payload, you signal your capabilities and lose the ability to conduct similar attacks. There is a unique shadow of the future in cyber statecraft. States have to assess whether they want to jeopardize an exploit in the short term — and lose long-term coercive options against rivals.

### 1NC---Astronomy D

#### Two Thumpers:

#### 1] Status Quo Debris thumps – 1AC Turner is about the 9,300 tons of “shiny satellites” and “junk” that already exist – saying it could get worse w/ Mega-Constellations doesn’t mean a world without Commercial Appropriation would be conducive for Astronomy.

#### 2] Light Pollution –

Vaonis 19 "Why do the Stars Disappear?" <https://vaonis.com/light-pollution-astronomy> //Elmer

What are the effects of light pollution on astronomy? The light throughput generated by a city or a town does not spread itself exactly where it is meant to. An excessive amount of that light is projected towards the sky, forming a huge diffusive orange or blue halo depending on the primary type of light source used within the area. Whether inside these urban areas or in suburbs, the adjective “dark sky” seems to be obsolete, on grounds of this blurred veil disabling any contrasted view of the stars. Consequently, it becomes pretty hard to spot the stars and the constellations since the cities’ glow are decreasing the luminosity threshold – called magnitude – our eyes are capable of reaching. In a totally light-pollution-free sky, 6.5 is the limit magnitude our eyes can detect without help of any sorts of optical instruments. In other words, theoretically 2 500 stars of our sky would be accessible to the naked eye. In most of the cities, though, the magnitude over the one stars are being hidden because of light pollution drops down to 4.0 or 3.0. In these harsh conditions, only 300 or 200 stars are visible except in the heavy populated urban areas like Paris, London, New York, Hong Kong where around 30 stars and less are still shining. Keen amateur astronomers are the main victims of the rise of light pollution. Even today, professional astronomers observing through state-of-the-art telescopes are concerned by the over use of lighting, like in Chile.

#### 1AC Green isn’t about Astronomy…

Green 21. Brian Patrick Green, director of technology ethics @ Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, Santa Clara University, “Space Ethics,” 2021, Rowman, pp. 5 //re-cut by Elmer

In favor of going into space are such basics as gaining scientific knowledge and developing beneficial new technologies, both of which space exploration and use have already begun to accomplish with dramatic and sometimes unexpected effects for humankind. Scientific advancements include astronomical and cosmological knowledge from various orbiting experiments and telescopes that have let us gain unprecedented understanding about our universe. But space activities have also contributed to a great deal of scientific knowledge about our Earth, including measurements of environmental status, habitat conversion and destruction, detailed knowledge of anthropogenic climate change, and much about Earth’s chemistry and geology. We have also learned a great deal about our local planets, for example, that a runaway “greenhouse effect” in the atmosphere of Venus makes the surface scorchingly hot, while too little greenhouse effect on Mars leaves the surface quite cold. There have also been significant contributions made to medical science, especially concerning the behavior of the human body when subjected to radiation, microgravity, nutritional restrictions, and so on.

### 1NC---Sat War D

#### Uncertainty from debris collisions creates restraint not instability.

MacDonald 16, B., et al. "Crisis stability in space: China and other challenges." Foreign Policy Institute. Washington, DC (2016). (senior director of the Nonproliferation and Arms Control Project with the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention)//Elmer

In any crisis that threatens to escalate into major power conflict, political and military leaders will face uncertainty about the effectiveness of their plans and decisions. This uncertainty will be compounded when potential conflict extends to the space and cyber domains, where weapon effectiveness is largely untested and uncertain, infrastructure interdependencies are unclear, and damaging an adversary could also harm oneself or one’s allies. Unless the stakes become very high, no country will likely want to gamble its well-being in a “single cosmic throw of the dice,” in Harold Brown’s memorable phrase. 96 The novelty of space and cyber warfare, coupled with risk aversion and worst-case assessments, could lead space adversaries into a situation of what can be called “hysteresis,” where each adversary is restrained by its own uncertainty of success. This is conceptually shown in Figures 1 and 2 for offensive counter-space capabilities, though it applies more generally. 97 These graphs portray the hypothetical differences between perceived and actual performance capabilities of offensive counter-space weapons, on a scale from zero to one hundred percent effectiveness. Where uncertainty and risk aversion are absent for two adversaries, no difference would exist between the likely performance of their offensive counter-space assets and their confidence in the performance of those weapons: a simple, straight-line correlation would exist, as in Figure 1. The more interesting, and more realistic, case is notionally presented in Figure 2, which assumes for simplicity that the offensive capabilities of each adversary are comparable. In stark contrast to the case of Figure 1, uncertainty and risk aversion are present and become important factors. Given the high stakes involved in a possible large-scale attack against adversary space assets, a cautious adversary is more likely to be conservative in estimating the effectiveness of its offensive capabilities, while more generously assessing the capabilities of its adversary. Thus, if both side’s weapons were 50% effective and each side had a similar level of risk aversion, each may conservatively assess its own capabilities to be 30% effective and its adversary’s weapons to be 70% effective. Likewise, if each side’s weapons were 25% effective in reality, each would estimate its own capabilities to be less than 25% effective and its adversary’s to be more than 25% effective, and so on. In Figure 2, this difference appears, in oversimplified fashion, as a gap that represents the realistic worry that a country’s own weapons will under-perform while its adversary’s weapons will over-perform in terms of effectiveness. If both countries face comparable uncertainty and exhibit comparable risk aversion, each may be deterred from initiating an attack by its unwillingness to accept the necessary risks. This gap could represent an “island of stability,” as shown in Figure 2. In essence, given the enormous stakes involved in a major strike against the adversary’s space assets, a potential attacker will likely demonstrate some risk aversion, possessing less confidence in an attack’s effectiveness. It is uncertain how robust this hysteresis may prove to be, but the phenomenon may provide at least some stabilizing influence in a crisis. In the nuclear domain, the immediate, direct consequences of military use, including blast, fire, and direct radiation effects, were appreciated at the outset. Nonetheless, significant uncertainty and under-appreciation persisted with regard to the collateral, indirect, and climatological effects of using such weapons on a large scale. In contrast, the immediate, direct effects of major space conflict are not well understood, and potential indirect and interdependent effects are even less understood. Indirect effects of large-scale space and cyber warfare would be virtually impossible to confidently calculate, as the infrastructures such warfare would affect are constantly changing in design and technology. Added to this is a likely anxiety that if an attack were less successful than planned, a highly aggrieved and powerful adversary could retaliate in unanticipated ways, possibly with highly destructive consequences. As a result, two adversaries facing potential conflict may lack confidence both in the potential effectiveness of their own attacks and in the ineffectiveness of any subsequent retaliation. Such mutual uncertainty would ultimately be stabilizing, though probably not particularly robust. This is reflected in Figure 2, where each side shows more caution than the technical effectiveness of its systems may suggest. Each curve notionally represents one state’s confidence in its offensive counter-space effectiveness relative to their actual effectiveness. Until true space asset resilience becomes a trusted feature of space architectures, deterrence by risk aversion, and cross-domain deterrence, may be the only means for deterrence to function in space.

#### No Escalation over Satellites:

#### 1] Planning Priorities

Bowen 18 Bleddyn Bowen 2-20-2018 “The Art of Space Deterrence” <https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/> (Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester)//Elmer

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### 2] Military Precedent

Zarybnisky 18, Eric J. Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space. Naval War College Newport United States, 2018. (Senior Materiel Leader at United States Air Force)//Elmer

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F 6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F 7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used highpowered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F 8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

#### 3] Models

**Drmola and Hubik 18** [Jakub Drmola, Division of Security and Strategic Studies, Department of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Masaryk University, AND Tomas Hubik, Department of Theoretical Computer Science and Mathematical Logic, Faculty of Mathematics and Physics, Charles University, Kessler Syndrome: System Dynamics Model. Space Policy Volumes 44–45, August 2018, <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0265964617300966?via%3Dihub>]

The probabilities and rates of collisions of objects from different groups were calculated using a coefficient converting the rate of collisions between objects from one group to the rate of collisions between objects from another group. The initial base rate was estimated using iterative simulations and comparison of the resulting runs with real data and outputs from other models. Detailed model built by a group of researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was used as a base for the calibration [see 9]. As the major factor influencing collision probability is size, the probability increases with square of the diameter representing bigger area for possible impact. Speed would be another factor influencing the probability of impacts, but the speed depends on the distance from the Earth and is not influenced by debris size. It means that it will not vary between different debris groups and thus will not influence the collision probability conversion parameters in our model. One the most important limitations and simplifications of the model is the uncertainty of size, structure, and composition of the satellites—i.e. what debris the satellite will disintegrate into in case of a collision. Perhaps even more crucially, the rate of orbital decay changes significantly with the altitude and eccentricity of the trajectory. The lower the orbital altitude is or the more eccentric it is, the more drag the object experiences as it passes through the last vestiges of our atmosphere. Therefore, objects in the lower or more eccentric orbit will decay significantly faster. Thus, the actual lifetime of a piece of debris can easily vary from days to centuries. It also needs to be noted that while it may take many decades for a satellite to decay (especially from the popular orbits between 500 km and 800 km), we cannot assume the same about debris. That is because while satellite orbits typically have very low eccentricity, collisions result in fragments with velocities and trajectories that vary and differ from the original intact satellite (i.e. are more eccentric and decay faster). This makes estimating rate of orbital decay of debris quite difficult, especially when combined with the ongoing laudable efforts by Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) to shorten the lifetime of satellites after they cease planned operations [14], [15]. Therefore, both the orbital and structural parameters used here are (and must be) overall averages designed to represent a “general LEO satellite” and are based on previous fragmentations, of which there are but few. Furthermore, this is getting increasingly more difficult as satellites are getting progressively more diverse, especially with the ongoing boom of the miniaturized CubeSats [16]. This leads to a relatively wide and heterogeneous population of real satellites being represented by a single, homogenized stock of simulated satellites in the model. It is also uncertain and difficult to predict how exactly is this going to evolve in the far future, what proportion of launched satellites will be of which size, and into which orbit they will be placed. Lacking precise information, we simply extrapolate current and expected trends. 5. Scenarios and simulation results 5.1. Business as usual and beyond The baseline scenario represents a continuation of the current trends, which are simply extended into the future. An average 1% growth rate of yearly launches of new satellites (starting at 89) is assumed, together with constant success rate in satellites’ ability to actively avoid collisions with debris and other satellites, constant lifetime, and failure rate. This basic model lacks any sudden events or major policy changes that would markedly influence the debris propagation. However, it serves both as a foundation for all the following scenarios and as a basis of comparison to see what the impact would be. Given high uncertainty regarding future state of the satellite industry (how many satellites will be launched per year, of what type and size, etc.), we elected to limit our simulations to 50 years. The model can certainly continue beyond this point, but the associated unknowns make the simulations progressively less useful. Running this model for its full 50 years (2016–2066) yields the expected result of perpetually growing amount of debris in the LEO. One can observe nearly 2-fold increase in the large debris (over 10 cm) and 3-fold increase in small debris (less than 1 cm) quantities (Fig. 5). The oscillations visible in the graph are caused by the aforementioned solar cycles which influence the rate of reentry for all simulated populations except the still active (i.e. powered) satellites. Also please note that throughout the article, the graphs use quite different scales for debris populations because of the considerable variations between scenarios. Using any single scale for all graphs would render some of them unintelligible. We can see that this increase in numbers still does not result in realization of the Kessler syndrome as most of the satellites being launched remain intact for their full expected service life. However, it comes with a considerable increase in risk to satellites, which is manifested by their higher yearly losses, making satellites operations riskier and more expensive for governments and private companies alike. This increased amount of debris in LEO combined with the larger number of active satellites makes it approximately twice as likely that an active satellite will suffer a disabling hit or a total disintegration during its lifetime. It should be noted that this risk might possibly be offset by future improvements in satellite reliability, debris tracking, and navigation [17]. This negative development of increasingly risky and costly operation of satellites can also be highlighted and visualized in a graph by comparing the number of satellites launched to the number of satellites lost (to collisions as well as malfunctions) in each given year (Fig. 6). This ratio shows diminishing efficiency of the system, where number of losses per launch increases. After fully acknowledging limitations stemming from inherent uncertainties, we can also try to “make things expectedly worse” by doubling the growth rate of yearly launches (to what it perhaps might end up being because of the boom in satellites industry because of increasing privatization of space, growing demand for communication satellites, etc.) and also extending the simulation timeframe to 200 years (Fig. 7). It must be stressed that the model was not designed with such long outlooks in mind, and many of the assumptions will certainly not hold over the next 200 years (such as static launch rate growth, size, and structure of the satellites, their lifetime, evasion rates, lack of mitigation, and many others). But in the overwhelmingly unlikely case that these assumptions stay true, the simulated outcome seems to suggest a collapse of sorts around the year 2163. However, it does not look like a suddenly triggered chain reaction leading to widespread fragmentation of the entire LEO but rather like a gradually reached point at which LEO is so full of debris, and the rate of active satellite fragmentation is so high (almost one every day) that the launches cannot keep up anymore. This is consistent with the findings reported by LaFleur and Finkelman, who found the debris system to be unconditionally stable [18], [19], [27]. 5.2. Antisatellite weapon system scenario Apart from the usual collisional risks that satellites face in the LEO, there has been growing concern regarding the development of antisatellite weapon systems (ASATs) by several world powers (namely China, Russian Federation, and the United States). These weapons are designed to intercept and destroy orbiting satellites and are, for the most part, descended from the antiballistic missile defense systems. While there are some alternative designs under development, the current generation mostly takes form of a boosted missile with a kinetic kill vehicle. This method of destruction (a collision of a missile with a satellite) leads to extensive fragmentation and creation of large debris clouds. A prime example of this was the Chinese 2007 ASAT test which destroyed China's own decommissioned weather satellite FengYun-1C. This hypervelocity collision created around 3000 pieces of medium to large debris and tens of thousands of smaller pieces, most of which will remain in orbit for decades, thus considerably contributing to overall risk of future orbital collisions [20]. As much as occasional tests of ASATs are increasing the amount of debris in the LEO, a greater danger by far is the possibility of a large-scale ASAT deployment during an armed conflict between two or more major, technologically advanced powers. Given the reliance of modern militaries on satellites for intelligence, communication, and navigation, it is generally presumed that the initial phase of any such conflict would involve mutual destruction of each other's satellites to blind the enemy and hinder their offensive operations [21], [22]. Such opening salvos could involve immediate destruction of dozens of satellites, thus creating massive clouds of debris threatening the remaining satellites and possibly leading to cascading disintegration across the entire orbit. This kind of hypothetical event is simulated in the second scenario, where an imaginary major military conflict erupts in the year 2040, during which roughly half of all military satellites are destroyed by intentional kinetic impacts using antisatellite weapons. With military and dual-use satellites generally representing a little over one-third of all satellites [23] (depending on criteria and the operating country), this results in some 200 satellites destroyed by ASATs in 2040 (Fig. 8). However, even this sudden event is not enough to trigger a chain reaction of satellites disintegrating in LEO, at least according to this model. Nevertheless, the number of collisions with active satellites ends up nearly twice as high at the end of the simulation (i.e. 25 years after the conflict and ASAT strikes) when compared to the previous run. This shows that the damage would be long-term and would negatively affect satellite operations (including commercial and scientific ones) for many years after any conflict involving ASATs.