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#### Interpretation: Topical affirmatives may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation by governments that The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Appropriation

TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ’13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4]

The issues presented in relation to the nonappropriation article of the Outer Space Treaty should be clear.214 The ITU has, quite blatantly, created something akin to “property interests in outer space.”215 It allows nations to exclude others from their orbital slots, even when the nation is not currently using that slot.216 This is directly in line with at least one definition of outer-space appropriation.217 [\*\*Start Footnote 217\*\*Id. at 236 (“Appropriation of outer space, therefore, is ‘the exercise of exclusive control or exclusive use’ with a sense of permanence, which limits other nations’ access to it.”) (quoting Milton L. Smith, The Role of the ITU in the Development of Space Law, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 157, 165 (1992)). \*\*End Footnote 217\*\*]The ITU even allows nations with unused slots to devise them to other entities, creating a market for the property rights set up by this regulation.218 In some aspects, this seems to effect exactly what those signatory nations of the Bogotá Declaration were trying to accomplish, albeit through different means.219

Topicality is key to limits and ground---redefining portions of the resolution permits endless reclarification AND creates incentives for avoidance---only aligning research with agent and mechanism solves.

#### Two impacts:

#### 1---Fairness---an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative -- treat this is a sufficient win condition because fairness is the logical structure that undergirds all impacts AND controls any benefit to debate.

**Dascal and Knoll** ’**11** [Marcelo and Amnon; May 18th; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University, B.A. in Philosophy from the University of Sao Paulo; former Professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University; Argumentation: Cognition and Community, "'Cognitive systemic dichotomization' in public argumentation and controversies," p. 20-25]

He opposes positions whose ‘exclusionist’ outlook rejects the normative approach to the political sphere on the grounds that “normative statements can never be subjected to a reasonable discussion” (ibid.: 2), because—he argues—the discussion of politics “is an area of vital interest to all of us and should clearly not be excluded from argumentative reasonableness” (ibid.: 3)—a view with which we are prone to agree. Nevertheless, he admits that in the present situation critical discussion is far from being systematically and successfully applied to that vital area: “In representative democracies, however, the out-comes of the political process tend to be predominantly the product of negotiations be-tween political leaders rather than the result of a universal and mutual process of deliberative disputation” (ibid.). Political debates, therefore, are ‘quasi-discussions’, i.e., “monologues calculated only to win the audience’s consent to one’s own views”, rather than ‘genuine discussions’, i.e., serious attempts to have an intellectual exchange, which is typical of critical discussions (ibid.). In order to overcome this situation, “democracy should always have promoted such a critical discussion of standpoints as a central aim. Only if this is the case can stimulating participation in political discourse enhance the quality of democracy" (ibid.). This can be achieved, however, only by following “the dialectical rules for argumentative discourse that make up a code of conduct for political discourse [and] are therefore of crucial importance to giving substance to the ideal of participatory democracy” (ibid.: 4); thereby fully acknowledging that “education in processing argumentation in a critical discussion is indispensable for a democratic society (van Eemeren 1995: 145-146).

The reasons provided for the failure of the adoption of the critical discussion model in reality ranges from a general allusion to human nature (“in real-life contexts, it has to be taken into account that human interaction is not always automatically 'naturally' and fully oriented toward the ideal of dialectical reasonableness "; van Eemeren 2010: 4) to specific political sphere argumentation handicaps (unwillingness of people “to subject their thinking to critical scrutiny”; “vested interest in particular outcome”; “inequality in power and resources; “different levels of critical skills”; and “a practical demand for an immediate settlement”; van Eemeren 2010: 4). Although these causes may have some explanatory value in some cases, in our opinion their modus operandi is not accounted for and, what is more important, they do not cover the full spectrum of challenges that the successful use of critical discussion in the public and political spheres must face, as we have seen (cf. sections 2 and 3).

No wonder that van Eemeren himself raises the question “whether maintaining the dialectical ideal of critical discussion in political and other real-life contexts is not utopian” (ibid.), to which he replies by admitting that "[t]he ideal of a critical discussion is by definition not a description of any kind of reality but sets a theoretical standard that can be used for heuristic, analytic and evaluative purpose” (ibid.). This ideal seems to be so inspiring that it remains valid as a pure theoretical ideal, “even if the argumentative discourse falls short of the dialectical ideal” (ibid.).

In the light of the substantial gap between the normative ideal and the actual practices of public and political argumentation that PD’s description and explanation provides, a number of doubts arise: Are there structural, rather than merely contingent obstacles in idealized critical discussion that prevents even its approximate use in the public sphere? Can a theory that claims to be a praxis based normative system fulfill its promise if it sets up a threshold that no one who tries to apply it to the public sphere can reach? Doesn’t the very fact that argumentation is excessively idealized in the model PD proposes cause the gap by distancing people concerned by public issues from argumentation at all? All these doubts suggest that a powerful structural phenomenon like the existence of CSDs in the public sphere is perhaps overlooked by PD and requires, for its overcoming, a radically different approach.

4.2 Discrepancies between the PD approach and reasonable argumentation in the public sphere

The discrepancies in question have to do with basic parameters relevant to every argumentative process, namely:

(A) The discussants’ goals and targets: what do they expect to achieve through the argumentation process and what is it capable of providing.

(B) The preconditions for initiating a critical discussion: what are the discussants presumed to know and accept of these preconditions.

(C) The argumentative process that is supposed to lead to the achievement of the discussants’ goals.

(D) The influence of context and agents on the argumentative process.

4.2.1 Goals

Assuming that argumentation is a voluntary endeavor, the parties are presumed to engage in it if and only if: (i) the process will serve their goals; (ii) these goals cannot be achieved by different, better means.

PD describes as follows the aim of engaging in an argumentative process:

Argumentation is basically aimed at resolving a difference of opinion about the acceptability of a standpoint by making an appeal to the other party's reasonableness. (van Eemeren 2010: 1, with reference to van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004: 11-18)

The difference of opinion is resolved when the antagonist accepts the protagonist's viewpoint on the basis of the arguments advanced or when the protagonist abandons his viewpoint as a result of the critical responses of the antagonist. (van Eemeren 2010: 33)

Simply put, the basic assumption is that a critical discussion’s aim consists in putting forth a certain position by one of the parties for the critical examination of the other, who calls it into question. The latter undertakes to refute the former’s position, while its proponent is committed to defend it. Four stages (see below) are supposed to ensure a valid performance of the refutation and defense tasks. The essential point is that at the end of the four stages the parties clearly agree whether the proponent’s position has been refuted or not and, accordingly, change their position (either retracting it or withdrawing from his questioning). In ‘mixed’ disagreements, in which the antagonist not only questions but also puts forth an opposed position, the same process takes place sequentially, i.e., at first one side (A) attacks trying to refute the other’s (B) position, and after this stage is concluded, they switch roles and the second side (B) proceeds to attack the first (A) in the same fashion.

Regardless of whether the described process is indeed capable to yield a conclusive decision about the refutation of a position, and of whether the linearity of the refutation process makes sense, it is obvious that debates in the public sphere are for the most part ‘mixed’. Furthermore, in so far as these debates involve dichotomous positions (rather than just opposed ones), it is necessary that at the end of the PD process one of the parties accept the position of the other.

It is also worth noticing that, contrary to deliberative democracy approaches, which in some cases approve the attempt to reach agreement in a (public) debate as a form of justification of political systems, PD claims that it is not a consensus theory at all. Instead, it conceives itself as a theory based on Popper’s critical rationality, i.e., as having as its principal goal to provide each party with the means—i.e., refutation attempts—to test critically its position:

[T]he conception of reasonableness upheld in pragma-dialectics insights from critical rationalist epistemology and utilitarian ethics conjoin … The intersubjective acceptability we attribute to the procedure, which is eventually expected to lend conventional validity to the procedure, is primarily based on its instrumentality in doing the job it is intended to do: re-solving a difference of opinion. … This means that, philosophically speaking, the rationale for accepting the pragma-dialectical procedure is pragmatic—more precisely, utilitarian [italics in quoted text]. … However, based on Popper's falsification idea, this is a ‘negative’ and not ‘positive’, utilitarianism. … Rather than maximization of agreement, minimization of disagreement is to be aimed for. (van Eemeren 2010: 34)

The distinction between maximization of agreement and minimization of disagreement purports to stress that PD doesn’t view agreement as the suitable end of the process, but just as “an intermediate step on the way to new, and more advanced, disagreements” (van Eemeren 2010: 26n). Nevertheless, no explanation is given of how these “more advanced disagreements” are engendered as a part of the dynamics of the critical process, nor what is the role or value of such disagreements in the public sphere or elsewhere. This may be due to the fact that PD’s ‘critical discussion’ is not tuned to the generation of new positions or ideas but only to the testing of extant ones, thus echoing once again Popper, now in his focus on the justification rather than on the discovery of theories (see sections 4.2.4 and 5).

In any case, it is quite clear that the only practical result of the critical discussion à la PD of opposed positions on a public issue is to determine whether one discussant succeeded in refuting the other’s position, thus obtaining the adversary’s agreement, who will then share his/her position, at least for some time. In this respect, PD’s critical discussion is close to Habermas’s ‘reasonable argumentation’, whose aim is to reach consensus.15 In spite of the apparent difference between a critical examination of a position aiming at its refutation or at its acceptance, even van Eemeren admits, to some extent, their similarity. He points out that “the pragma-dialectical procedure deals only with ‘first order’ conditions for resolving differences of opinion on the merits by means of critical discussion” (van Eemeren 2010: 34), and stresses that there are ‘higher order’ conditions, ‘internal’ and ‘external’, that are “beyond the agent’s control”, conditions that are similar to Habermas’s “ideal speech conditions” (van Eemeren 2010: 35n). Anyhow, whether according to PD the main goal of the critical discussion process in the public alliance is to create the opportunity for refutation or for agreement (meaning that one of the discussants acknowledges that his position is wrong), the essential assumption of this process is that the participants in it in the public sphere (or elsewhere) must be aware that one of them holds a wrong position and will have to explicitly acknowledge this.

Is such a goal, especially when conceived as the ultimate aim of the proposed argumentative process, feasible and acceptable in the public sphere?

In our opinion, there are at least four reasons for arguing that it is a utopian, hence unacceptable goal, if one takes seriously what should be expected from argumentative practice and theory in the public sphere. First, because PD deserves a critique similar to the one leveled against the Popperian version of critical rationalism it espouses,16 which defends a theory of knowledge “without a knowing subject” (Popper 1972); obviously, such a-contextual position becomes even more problematic if applied to the public and political spheres, where it must operate in a context essentially involved with practical rationality. Second, due to its analogy with theories such as Habermas’s that were discussed in this section as well as in 2.2—an analogy that deserves additional criticism because, unlike Habermasianism, PD overlooks the relationship between the political and public context and argumentative practice. Third, because of PD’s total overlooking of the role of CSDs in public argumentation (cf. 4.2.2). And fourth, due to unilateral value judgments of positions in the public sphere, which lead to simplistic criteria of refutation or acceptance in a domain where complexity is the rule (cf. 2.1.1 and 4.2.3).

(ii) Let us admit, for the sake of argument, that the refutation goal as claimed by PD is central, feasible, acceptable, and useful in public argumentation. Aren’t there better ways to achieve this goal?

The refutation and defense moves stipulated by the PD critical discussion model include, on the one side, the antagonist’s critical remarks or demands and on the other, the proponent’s replies. We believe that it must be assumed that neither the critique nor the replies are previously known to the contenders, which is why they have an interest in engage in the argumentation process: presumably, the expression of both, counter-arguments and defensive-arguments, is good to both sides. In spite of its usefulness in certain situations, this kind of exchange does not amount to the full manifestation of the dialectical critical process, wherein the context and co-text of the dialectical exchange, as well as the cognitive interaction that takes place and evolves throughout the exchange, play a decisive role in the design and ‘inner’ justification of each of the participants’ moves. Argumentation strategies that take into account these resources and make full use of their potential are no doubt setting up another, broader span of goals for the argumentative process, and are more likely to achieve these goals more effectively than they certainly would achieve their PD more limited counterparts (cf. 4.2.4 and 5).

4.2.2 Preconditions

The ideal PD critical discussion can only be realized if some preconditions are satisfied. The most important ones are a) a clear-cut identification of the standpoint that provokes the disagreement, b) the decision of the parties to engage in a discussion, and c) the participants’ commitment to obey the procedural rules. As we shall see, these preconditions share a common assumption, which calls into question the feasibility of using critical discussion in the public sphere.

(A) This precondition assumes that it is possible to isolate rigorously the subject matter of a critical discussion, so as to conduct a focused discussion that makes use only of relevant arguments. This precondition is quite strict, for whenever both discussants defend contrary standpoints, their disagreement should be treated as two separate fully fledged discussions: “… if another discussion begins, it must go through the same stages again—from confrontation stage to concluding stage” (van Eemeren 2010: 10n).

(B) This precondition subordinates the decision to engage in the discussion to the evaluation that the discussants share enough common ground to pursue it adequately: “After the parties have decided that there is enough common ground to conduct a discussion …” (van Eemeren 2010: 33).

(C) This precondition stresses the ‘contractual’ character of a critical discussion, which requires explicit mutual commitments by the discussants. Its rationale is that without such commitments the aim of the critical discussion, i.e., the resolution of the difference of opinions, will not be achieved, which makes engaging in the discussion pointless: “There is no point in venturing to resolve a difference … if there is no mutual commitment to a common starting point, which may include procedural commitments as well as substantive agreement” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 60).

These ‘first order’ preconditions, as they are labeled in PD (cf. van Eemeren 2010: 33), are the conditions that candidates to participate in a critical discussion must fulfill if they intend to do so and can afford it personally (a ‘second order’ condition) and politically (a ‘third order’ condition).17 In addition, the first order conditions demand from the prospective discussants a clear, distinct, and detailed picture of the scope of the discussion that they are about to engage in. This means not mixing up the various differences of opinion that the discussion may involve, and being able to separate them properly as the subject matter for independent discussions; a further requirement is the anticipated identification of the pieces of the ‘substantive agreement’ forming the starting point in order to ensure that they are sufficient for conducting the discussion up to a satisfactory closure.

2---Clash---forfeiting government action sanctions retreat from controversy and forces the negative to concede solvency before winning a link -- clash is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale -- that jumpstarts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement.

#### 3---Movement Lawyering Skills – contingent, focused debates around locus points of difference are key to develop activists skills for political justice.

Archer 18, Deborah N. "Political Lawyering for the 21st Century." Denv. L. Rev. 96 (2018): 399. (Associate Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law)//Elmer

Political justice lawyers must be able to break apart a systemic problem **into manageable components**. The **complexity** of social problems, can **cause law students, and even experienced political lawyers, to become overwhelmed**. In describing his work challenging United States military and economic interventions abroad, civil rights advocate and law professor Jules Lobel wrote of this process: “Our foreign-policy litigation became a sort of Sisyphean quest as we maneuvered through a hazy maze cluttered with gates. Each gate we unlocked led to yet another that blocked our path, with the elusive goal of judicial relief always shrouded in the twilight mist of the never-ending maze.”144 Pulling apart a larger, systemic problem into its smaller components can help elucidate options for advocacy. An instructive example is the use of excessive force by police officers against people of color. Every week seems to bring a new video featuring graphic police violence against Black men and women. Law students are frequently outraged by these incidents. But the sheer frequency of these videos and lack of repercussions for perpetrators overwhelm those students just as often. What can be done about a problem so big and so pervasive? To move toward justice, advocates must be able to break apart the forces that came together to lead to that moment: intentional discrimination, implicit bias, ineffective training, racial segregation, lack of economic opportunity, the over-policing of minority communities, and the failure to invest in non-criminal justice interventions that adequately respond to homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction. None of these component problems are easily addressed, but breaking them apart is more manageable—and more realistic—than acting as though there is a single lever that will solve the problem. After identifying the component problems, advocates can select one and repeat the process of breaking down that problem until they get to a point of entry for their advocacy. 2. Identifying Advocacy Alternatives As discussed earlier, political justice lawyering embraces litigation, community organizing, interdisciplinary collaboration, legislative reform, public education, direct action, and other forms of advocacy to achieve social change. After parsing the underlying issues, lawyers need to identify what a lawyer can and should do on behalf of impacted communities and individuals, and this includes determining the most effective advocacy approach. Advocates must also strategize about what can be achieved in the short term versus the long term. The fight for justice is a marathon, not a sprint. Many law students experience frustration with advocacy because they expect immediate justice now. They have read the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, but forget that the decision was the result of a decades-long advocacy strategy.145 Indeed, the decision itself was no magic wand, as the country continues to work to give full effect to the decision 70 years hence. Advocates cannot only fight for change they will see in their lifetime, they must also fight for the future.146 Change did not happen over night in Brown and lasting change cannot happen over night today. Small victories can be building blocks for systemic reform, and advocates must learn to see the benefit of short-term responsiveness as a component of long-term advocacy. Many lawyers subscribe to the American culture of success, with its uncompromising focus on immediate accomplishments and victories.147 However, those interested in social justice must adjust their expectations. Many pivotal civil rights victories were made possible by the seemingly hopeless cases that were brought, and lost, before them.148 In the fight for justice, “success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”149 Again, Professor Lobel’s words are instructive: “the current commitment of civil rights groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups to a legal discourse to legal activism to protect their rights stems in part from the willingness of activists in political and social movements in the nineteenth century to fight for rights, even when they realized the courts would be unsympathetic.”150 Professor Lobel also wrote about Helmuth James Von Moltke, who served as legal advisor to the German Armed Services until he was executed in 1945 by Nazis: “In battle after losing legal battle to protect the rights of Poles, to save Jews, and to oppose German troops’ war crimes, he made it clear that he struggled not just to win in the moment but to build a future.”151 3. Creating a Hierarchy of Values Advocates challenging complex social justice problems can find it difficult to identify the correct solution when one of their social justice values is in conflict with another. A simple example: a social justice lawyer’s demands for swift justice for the victim of police brutality may conflict with the lawyer’s belief in the officer’s fundamental right to due process and a fair trial. While social justice lawyers regularly face these dilemmas, law students are not often forced to struggle through them to resolution in real world scenarios—to make difficult decisions and manage the fallout from the choices they make in resolving the conflict. Engaging in complex cases can force students to work through conflicts, helping them to articulate and sharpen their beliefs and goals, forcing them to clearly define what justice means broadly and in the specific context presented. Lawyers advocating in the tradition of political lawyering anticipate the inevitable conflict between rights, and must seek to resolve these conflicts through a “hierarchy of values.”152 Moreover, in creating the hierarchy, the perspectives of those directly impacted and marginalized should be elevated “because it is in listening to and standing with the victims of injustice that the need for critical thinking and action become clear.”153 One articulation of a hierarchy of values asserts “people must be valued more than property. Human rights must be valued more than property rights. Minimum standards of living must be valued more than the privileged liberty of accumulated political, social and economic power. Finally, the goal of increasing the political, social, and economic power of those who are left out of the current arrangements must be valued more than the preservation of the existing order that created and maintains unjust privilege.”154 C. Rethinking the Role of the Clinical Law Professor: Moving From Expert to Colleague Law students can learn a new dimension of lawyering by watching their clinical law professor work through innovative social justice challenges alongside them, as colleagues. This is an opportunity not often presented in work on small cases where the clinical professor is so deeply steeped in the doctrine and process, the case is largely routine to her and she can predict what is to come and adjust supervision strategies accordingly.155 However, when engaged in political lawyering on complex and novel legal issues, both the student and the teacher may be on new ground that transforms the nature of the student-teacher relationship. A colleague often speaks about acknowledging the persona professors take on when they teach and how that persona embodies who they want to be in the classroom—essentially, whenever law professors teach they establish a character. The persona that a clinical professor adopts can have a profound effect on the students, because the character is the means by which the teacher subtly models for the student—without necessarily ever saying so— the professional the teacher holds herself to be and the student may yet become. In working on complex matters where the advocacy strategy is unclear, the clinical professor makes himself vulnerable by inviting students to witness his struggles as they work together to develop the most effective strategy. By making clear that he does not have all of the answers, partnering with his students to discover the answers, and sharing his own missteps along the way, a clinical law professor can reclaim opportunities to model how an experienced attorney acquires new knowledge and takes on new challenges that may be lost in smaller case representation.156 Clinical law faculty who wholeheartedly subscribe to the belief that professors fail to optimize student learning if students do not have primary control of a matter from beginning to end may view a decision to work in true partnership with students on a matter as a failure of clinical legal education. Indeed, this partnership model will inevitably impact student autonomy and ownership of the case.157 But, there is a unique value to a professor working with her student as a colleague and partner to navigate subject matter new to both student and professor.158 In this relationship, the professor can model how to exercise judgment and how to learn from practice: to independently learn new areas of law; to consult with outside colleagues, experts in the field, and community members without divulging confidential information; and to advise a client in the midst of ones own learning process.159 III. A Pedagogical Course Correction “If it offends your sense of justice, there’s a cause of action.” - Florence Roisman, Professor, Indiana University School of Law160 In response to the shifts in my students’ perspectives on racism and systemic discrimination, their reluctance to tackle systemic problems, their conditioned belief that strategic litigation should be a tool of last resort, and my own discomfort with reliance on small cases in my clinical teaching, I took a step back in my own practice. How could I better teach my students to be champions for justice even when they are overwhelmed by society’s injustice; to challenge the complex and systemic discrimination strangling minority communities, and to approach their work in the tradition of political lawyering. I reflected not only on my teaching, but also on my experiences as a civil rights litigator, to focus on what has helped me to continue doing the work despite the frustrations and difficulties. I realized I was spending too much time teaching my students foundational lawyering skills, and too little time focused on the broader array of skills I knew to be critical in the fight for racial justice. We regularly discussed systemic racism during my clinic seminars in order to place the students’ work on behalf of their clients within a larger context. But by relying on carefully curated small cases I was inadvertently desensitizing my students to a lawyer’s responsibility to challenge these systemic problems, and sending the message that the law operates independently from this background and context. I have an obligation to move beyond teaching my students to be “good soldiers for the status quo” to ensuring that the next generation is truly prepared to fight for justice.161 And, if my teaching methods are encouraging the reproduction of the status quo it is my obligation to develop new interventions.162 Jane Aiken’s work on “justice readiness” is instructive on this point. To graduate lawyers who better understand their role in advancing justice, Jane Aiken believes clinics should move beyond providing opportunities for students to have a social justice experience to promoting a desire and ability to do justice.163 She suggests creating disorienting moments by selecting cases where students have no outside authority on which to rely, requiring that they draw from their own knowledge base and values to develop a legal theory.164 Disorienting moments give students: experiences that surprise them because they did not expect to experience what they experienced. This can be as simple as learning that the maximum monthly welfare benefit for a family of four is about $350. Or they can read a [ ] Supreme Court case that upheld Charles Carlisle’s conviction because a wyer missed a deadline by one day even though the district court found there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. These facts are often disorienting. They require the student to step back and examine why they thought that the benefit amount would be so much more, or that innocence would always result in release. That is an amazing teaching moment. It is at this moment that we can ask students to examine their own privilege, how it has made them assume that the world operated differently, allowing them to be oblivious to the indignities and injustices that occur every day.165 Giving students an opportunity to “face the fact that they cannot rely on ‘the way things are’ and meet the needs of their clients” is a powerful approach to teaching and engaging students.166 But, complex problems call for larger and more sustained disorienting moments. Working with students on impact advocacy in the model of political lawyering provides a range of opportunities to immerse students in disorienting moments. A. Immersing Students in “Disorienting Moments”: Race, Poverty, and Pregnancy Today, I try to immerse my students in disorienting moments to make them justice ready and move them in the direction of political lawyering. My clinic docket has always included a small number of impact litigation matters. However, in the past these cases were carefully screened to ensure that they involved discrete legal issues and client groups. In addition, our representation always began after our outside co-counsel had already conducted an initial factual investigation, identified the core legal issues, and developed an overall advocacy strategy, freeing my students from these responsibilities. Now, my clinic takes on impact matters at earlier stages where the strategies are less clear and the legal questions are multifaceted and ill- defined. This mirrors the experiences of practicing social justice lawyers, who faced with an injustice, must discover the facts, identify the legal claims, develop strategy, cultivate allies, and ultimately determine what can be done—with the knowledge that “nothing” is not an option. This approach provides students with the space to wrestle with larger, systemic issues in a structured and supportive educational environment, taking on cases that seem difficult to resolve and working to bring some justice to that situation. They are also gaining experience in many of the fundamentals of political lawyering advocacy. Recently, my students began work on a new case. Several public and private hospitals in low-income New York City neighborhoods are drug testing pregnant women or new mothers without their knowledge or informed consent. This practice reflects a disturbing convergence between racial and economic disparities, and can have a profound impact on the lives of the poor women of color being tested at precisely the time when they are most in need of support. We began our work when a community organization reached out to the clinic and spoke to us about complaints that hospitals around New York City were regularly testing pregnant women—almost exclusively women of color—for drug use during prenatal check ups, during the chaos and stress of labor and delivery, or during post-delivery. The hospitals report positive test results to the City’s Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), which is responsible for protecting children from abuse and neglect, for further action.167 Most of the positive tests are for marijuana use. After a report is made, ACS commences an investigation to determine whether child abuse or neglect has taken place, and these investigations trigger inquiries into every aspect of a family’s life. They can lead to the institution of child neglect proceedings, and potentially to the temporary or permanent removal of children from the household. Even where that extreme result is avoided, an ACS investigation can open the door to the City’s continued, and potentially unwelcome, involvement in the lives of these families. These policies reflect deeply inequitable practices. Investigating a family after a positive drug test is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, ACS offers a number of supportive services that can help stabilize and strengthen vulnerable families. And of course, where children’s safety is at risk, removal may sometimes be the appropriate result. However, hospitals do not conduct regular drug tests of mothers in all New York City communities. Private hospitals in wealthy areas rarely test pregnant women or new mothers for drug misuse. In contrast, at hospitals serving poor women, drug testing is routine. Race and class should not determine whether such testing, and the consequences that result, take place. Investigating the New York City drug-testing program immersed the students in disorienting moments at every stage of their work. During our conversations, the students regularly expressed surprise and discomfort with the hospitals’ practices. They were disturbed that public hospitals— institutions on which poor women and women of color rely for something as essential as health care—would use these women’s pregnancy as a point of entry to control their lives.168 They struggled to explain how the simple act of seeking medical care from a hospital serving predominantly poor communities could deprive patients of the respect, privacy, and legal protections enjoyed by pregnant women in other parts of the City. And, they were shocked by the way institutions conditioned poor women to unquestioningly submit to authority.169 Many of the women did not know that they were drug tested until the hospital told them about the positive result and referred them to ACS. Still, these women were not surprised: that kind of disregard, marginalization, and lack of consent were a regular aspect of their lives as poor women of color. These women were more concerned about not upsetting ACS than they were about the drug testing. That so many of these women could be resigned to such a gross violation of their rights was entirely foreign to most of my students. B. Advocacy in the Face of Systemic Injustice Although the students are still in the early stages of their work, they have already engaged in many aspects of political justice lawyering. They approached their advocacy focused on the essence of political lawyering— enabling poor, pregnant women of color who enjoy little power or respect to claim and enjoy their rights, and altering the allocation of power from government agencies and institutions back into the hands of these women. They questioned whose interests these policies and practices were designed to serve, and have grounded their work in a vision of an alternative societal construct in which their clients and the community are respected and supported. The clinic students were given an opportunity to learn about social, legal, and administrative systems as they simultaneously explored opportunities to change those systems. The students worked to identify the short and long term goals of the impacted women as well the goals of the larger community, and to think strategically about the means best suited to accomplish these goals. And, importantly, while collaborating with partners from the community and legal advocacy organizations, the students always tried to keep these women centered in their advocacy. In breaking down the problem of drug testing poor women of color, the students worked through an issue that lives at the intersection of reproductive freedom, family law, racial justice, economic inequality, access to health care, and the war on drugs. In their factual investigation, which included interviews of impacted women, advocates, and hospital personnel, and the review of records obtained through Freedom of Information Law requests, the students began to break down this complex problem. They explored the disparate treatment of poor women and women of color by health care providers and government entities, implicit and explicit bias in healthcare, the disproportionate referral of women of color to ACS, the challenges of providing medical services to underserved communities, the meaning of informed consent, the diminished rights of people who rely on public services, and the criminalization of poverty. The students found that list almost as overwhelming as the initial problem itself, but identifying the components allowed the students to dig deeper and focus on possible avenues of challenge and advocacy. It was also critically important to make the invisible forces visible, even if the law currently does not provide a remedy. Working on this case also gave the students and me the opportunity to work through more nuanced applications of some of the lawyering concepts that were introduced in their smaller cases, including client-centered lawyering when working on behalf of the community; large-scale fact investigation; transferring their “social justice knowledge” to different contexts; crafting legal and factual narratives that are not only true to the communities’ experience, but can persuade and influence others; and how to develop an integrated advocacy plan. The students frequently asked whether we should even pursue the matter, questioning whether this work was client- centered when it was no longer the most pressing concern for many of the women we met. These doubts opened the door to many rich discussions: can we achieve meaningful social change if we only address immediate crises; can we progress on larger social justice issues without challenging their root causes; how do we recognize and address assumptions advocates may have about what is best for a client; and how can we keep past, present, and future victims centered in our advocacy? The work on the case also forced the clinic students to work through their own understanding of a hierarchy of values. They struggled with their desire to support these community hospitals and the public servants who work there under difficult circumstances on the one hand, and their desire to protect women, potentially through litigation, from discriminatory practices. They also struggled to reconcile their belief that hospitals should take all reasonable steps to protect the health and safety of children, as well as their emotional reaction to pregnant mothers putting their unborn children in harms way by using illegal drugs against the privacy rights of poor and marginalized women. They were forced to pause and think deeply about what justice would look like for those mothers, children, and communities. CONCLUSION America continues to grapple with systemic injustice. Political justice lawyering offers powerful strategies to advance the cause of justice—through integrated advocacy comprising the full array of tools available to social justice advocates, including strategic systemic reform litigation. It is the job of legal education to prepare law students to become effective lawyers. For those aspiring to social justice that should include training students to utilize the tools of political justice lawyers. Clinical legal offers a tremendous opportunity to teach the next generation of racial and social justice advocates how to advance equality in the face of structural inequality, if only it will embrace the full array of available tools to do so. In doing so, clinical legal education will not only prepare lawyers to enact social change, they can inspire lawyers overwhelmed by the challenges of change. In order to provide transformative learning experiences, clinical education must supplement traditional pedagogical tools and should consider political lawyering’s potential to empower law students and communities.

TVA---States ought to ban appropriation of outer space by private actors---Advs about why space col, expansion, and mining is antiblack.

Eric Niiler 19, 7-11-2019, "Why Civil Rights Activists Protested the Moon Landing," HISTORY, <https://www.history.com/news/apollo-11-moon-landing-launch-protests>

More than a million people gathered along Florida’s Space Coast to watch the Apollo 11 lift off from Launchpad 39A on the sunny afternoon of July 16, 1969. The event was the culmination of a technological race started by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 with the goal of beating the Soviet Union to the moon. But not everyone was cheering that summer day. A group of 500 mostly African American protesters led by civil rights leader Ralph Abernathy arrived outside the gates of the Kennedy Space Center a few days before the launch. They brought with them two mules and a wooden wagon to illustrate the contrast between the gleaming white Saturn V rocket and families who couldn’t afford food or a decent place to live. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor People's marchers line up mules near the gates to the Kennedy Space Center on July 15, 1969. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor People's marchers line up mules near the gates to the Kennedy Space Center on July 15, 1969. Bettmann Archive/Getty Images Abernathy was one of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s closest aides. After King’s assassination in April 1968, Abernathy led the Poor People’s March on Washington that summer. A year later, as NASA prepared to launch Apollo 11, the Alabama preacher led a group of mostly Black Americans to show NASA and the assembled media that all was not well in America’s cities. “There was a debate about what America was at the time,” says Neil Maher, author of 2017’s Apollo in the Age of Aquarius, and a professor of history at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Maher says the Apollo space program divided Americans among supporters who thought it would energize a country that had gotten lost, and those who believed that it represented a huge waste of money that instead should go to solving societal problems. “Was it a country to spend $20 billion to land two men on a dead rock in space or try to solve some of the problems closer to home on Earth?” Maher says. “A lot of grass roots movements argued to use the [NASA] money to solve problems here.” The protest began peacefully with Abernathy and the others gathered in front of the NASA gates for a candlelight vigil on the evening of July 14 followed by a march on July 15. As NASA administrator Thomas Paine came out to the NASA perimeter under a lightly falling rain to meet Abernathy and the others in an open field, the group began singing “We Shall Overcome” and media crews recorded the event. Protesters carried signs reading “$12 a day to feed an astronaut, we could feed a child for $8.” Reverend Ralph Abernathy, flanked by associate Hosea Williams stand on steps of a mockup of the lunar module displaying a protest sign while demonstrating at the Apollo 11 moon launch site. Reverend Ralph Abernathy, flanked by associate Hosea Williams stand on steps of a mockup of the lunar module displaying a protest sign while demonstrating at the Apollo 11 moon launch site. The two men—Paine the Stanford-educated engineer, and Abernathy the Alabama-born Baptist preacher (who also earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics)—talked for a while. Paine later recorded his account: “One-fifth of the population lacks adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, [Rev. Abernathy] said. The money for the space program, he stated, should be spent to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, tend the sick, and house the shelterless.” Abernathy told Paine that he had three requests for NASA, that 10 families of his group be allowed to view the launch, that NASA “support the movement to combat the nation’s poverty, hunger and other social problems,” and that NASA technical people work “to tackle the problem of hunger.” “If we could solve the problems of poverty in the United States by not pushing the button to launch men to the moon tomorrow,” Paine said while holding a microphone, “then we would not push that button.” [NASA Administrator] Paine added that he hoped Abernathy would “hitch his wagons to our rocket, using the space program as a spur to the nation to tackle problems boldly in other areas, and using NASA’s space successes as a yardstick by which progress in other areas should be measured.” The meeting ended and the two men shook hands. Paine offered tickets to Abernathy’s group for the VIP viewing area to watch the moonshot on the following day. Abernathy then prayed for the safety of the astronauts and said he was as proud as anyone at the accomplishment. NASA Administrator Thomas Paine wears a miniature "hangman's noose" around his neck with a note that reads "I Helped Hang Poverty,"given to him by Reverend Ralph Abernathy on July 15, 1969. NASA Administrator Thomas Paine wears a miniature "hangman's noose" around his neck with a note that reads "I Helped Hang Poverty,"given to him by Reverend Ralph Abernathy on July 15, 1969. "On the eve of man's noblest venture, I am profoundly moved by the nation's achievements in space and the heroism of the three men embarking for the moon,” he said, according to a UPI report. But, he added, "What we can do for space and exploration we demand that we do for starving people." “The Abernathy protest was an example that Apollo did not happen in bubble,” said Teasel Muir-Harmony, author of Apollo to the Moon: A History in 50 Objects, and curator of space history at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. “It was very connected to everything else that was going on in the country.” In the months and years that followed the meeting, NASA tried to make good on the promises Paine made that day at Cape Canaveral. NASA engineers took sensors initially used to detect contaminants in space capsules and converted them to measure urban air pollution. Another project took spacecraft insulation and made new kinds of walls and windows for public housing. But Maher says the efforts didn’t amount to much. “It was more of an advertising effort,” he said. The Apollo 11 moon landing on July 20, 1969, was for many people the apogee of NASA’s popular support. A year after the Apollo 11, Gil Scott-Heron released a spoken-word critique of the space missions “Whitey on the Moon” (a song featured in the 2018 film First Man.) And, in the months and years following Apollo 11, public and political support for space exploration waned. The nation’s focus had shifted to the Vietnam War, campus protests and movements focused on civil rights, women’s rights and the environment. By 1970, NASA officials scrubbed the final three moon landings and President Richard Nixon rejected a new NASA recommendation to build a station on the moon that could be used as a base for exploration of Mars. “We must build on the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements,” Nixon said on March 7, 1970. “But we must also recognize that many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands on our attention and our resources.”The last astronaut to walk on the moon left in December 1972.’

Switch side debate solves all of their offense—there’s no specific reason why their arguments have to be read on the aff—that solves predictability and accesses their education impact turns because plans on the aff and Ks on the neg can challenge perspectives, stances, representations, and epistemologies

## OFF

### 1NC---Bifo K

Bifo K

#### The University is a site of social death, the mass grave of Western culture and the aff’s fantasy of radicalizing debate plays into the hands of the system by denying the violence innate to the university system itself—only triggering a symbolic collapse can reverse this metastasis as the aff paves over the conditions of violent colonialism which structure debating in the first place

Occupied UC Berkeley 10 (“The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” <http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=20100220181610620>)

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other.  
Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47]  
Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations.  
Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50]  
In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw:  
"at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53]  
In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice:  
"They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### The hyper individualistic politics of neoliberalism has brought the liberal international order to the brink of collapse, but the 1ac simply results in a re-investment in the psychic devastation of contemporary capitalism.

Bifo 17 (Franco Berardi, After the European Union)

There Marx wrote that ‘hitherto the philosophers have interpreted the world, the point is to change it’ – and the philosophers of the last century tried to do so. The results were catastrophic. We can see as much if we look at the panorama of the twenty-first century, which is now deploying its horrible features – features more horrible than we could ever have expected. The philosophers’ task is not to change the world – as the world continually changes. Philosophers’ task is to interpret the world, that is, to capture its tendency and above all enunciate the possibilities inscribed therein. This is philosophers’ primary task because the politician’s eye does not see the possible, instead being attracted by the probable. And the probable is no fand of the possible: the probable is the Gestalt that allows us to see what we know already, and at the same time prevents us from seeing what we do not know and yet is right there, before our very eyes. Grasping the possible means finding within the tangle of the present the thread that will allow us to unravel the knots. If you do not grasp that thread, then the knots will tighten, and sooner or later they will strangle you. We thought that it was more important to change the world than to interpret it. So much so that no one interpreted the tangle that built up starting in the decade of the great revolt. Some did try, minoritarian and almost alone. Some said: the essential thread of the current tangle is the one connecting knowledge, technology and labour. The essential thread is the one that frees time from labour, thanks to the evolution of applied knowledge in the form of technology. The only way to prevent the thread getting so tangled up that it becomes impossible to extricate it again, is to follow the method that Marx suggested in another text (a less-renowned one, but of greater present-day relevance), namely the Fragment on Machines. That method is to transform the tendency toward the reduction in necessary labour-time into an active process of reducing time at work, without loss of wealth. Living-time can be freed from the ties of wages, survival can be unbound from labour, and the central superstition of the modern era, which submits life to labour can be abandoned. In the Fragment Marx does not emphasises change, but interpretation. He simply points to what is possible, reading in the entrails of the relationship between knowledge, technology and labour-time. Faced with the tendency toward the reduction of necessary labour-time, which manifested itself as a tendency of primary importance from the 1980s onward, the workers’ movement thought that only thing to do was to resist. The workers’ movement defended the existing composition and occupation of labour, so that technology appeared as an enemy of the workers. Capital took hold of technology in order to increase exploitation and to submit the wellbeing of society to a now-useless labour. All the world’s governments preached the need to work more, precisely when the moment was ripe to organise the break out of the regime of waged labour. Precisely when the moment was ripe to transfer human time from the sphere of rendering service to the sphere of care for the self. The effect was an enormous stress overload, and an impoverishment of society. With workers no longer needed, labour was cheapened. It cost ever less, and became ever more precarious and wretched. Workers tried, by way of democracy, to stop the liberal laissez-faire offensive. But they only got a measure of the impotence of democracy. For its part, the Left preached competition and privatisation; it promised work, and supplied precarity. Ultimately the workers became enraged. The result was that the impotence took revenge, and is today overturning the liberal order. This is the revenge of those whom neo-liberalism has denied the joy of life. Of those who are compelled to work ever more and to earn ever less, deprived of the time to enjoy life and to know of the tenderness of other human beings in a non-competitive condition, deprived of access to knowledge, compelled to turn to the media agencies that propagate ignorance, and finally, convinced through ignorance that their enemy is the people who are even more impotent than they are. Will this wave of idiocy come to an end? It will not end until it has exhausted the energy it draws from impotence and the rage that begins with impotence. The social class that brought Trump to power as a reaction to the depression will not gain much from this. Something, yes, initially. For example, instead of hiring 2,200 workers in a Mexican factory, Ford has been forced to hire 700 at a factory on US soil. Some gain, that is. But while internationalist workers were capable of solidarity, the impotents do not even know that word exists. At a certain point those who voted for Trump (or for the many Trumps proliferating across Europe) will realise that their wages are not increasing and that the exploitation is becoming more intense. But that does not mean that they will then rebel against their president. On the contrary, they will lay the blame on the Mexicans, or the African-Americans, or the intellectuals of the New York Times. This wave is just beginning, and whoever has delusions of being able to contain it has not understood it very well. This wave is destroying everything: democracy, peace, solidary consciousness, and ultimately survival itself. Should we place our hopes in the Left? Now even those who governed in centre-Left governments are realising what a disaster they have prepared. They are only realising this because the wave is sweeping them away. All of a sudden, as if woken from a dream, the political actors of the governments that reformed the countries of Europe along neoliberal lines, and imposed the cage of the Fiscal Compact, discover the disaster and hurry to catch up with a train that has set off already. What can we expect from the European Left and its development? A fine article by Marco Revelli in the 14 February edition of il manifesto described the crisis of the Italian political situation in terms of psychopathy, or rather, an entropy of meaning. Revelli’s argument should not be understood as a metaphor. Psychopathy is not a metaphor, but the scientific description of the Trumpian wave and (inverse to this) the decomposition of the Left. The parts of society where Trump triumphed in the USA are the same ones where psychic misery is most devastating. The depression epidemic and the deluge of opioids, heroin consumption increasing fivefold in a decade, the spike in suicides: such is the material condition of the so-called American middle class, the workers squeezed like lemons, and the unemployed devastated by their powerlessness. Trumpian fascism emerges as a reaction of the white male unconscious to the sexual and political impotence of the Obama era. America’s first black president appeared on the scene saying: ‘Yes we can’. But experience instead demonstrated that we can no longer do anything: not even close Guantanamo Bay, nor even prevent the unhinged from buying weapons of war from the drugstore on the corner, nor find an exit from Bush’s endless war. The Right feeds on this impotent reaction to impotence. The Left begins to realise the consequences of neoliberalism, but too late. Or perhaps it is not too late. Perhaps it is simply that we are not able to see that the solution to the problem lies in exactly the opposite direction to what laissez-faire liberalism has imposed, with the decisive help of the Left. Where is the solution? It lies in the relationship between knowledge, technology and labour. This is making human labour superfluous, but it does not untie the knot that is wages. The productivity increase long made possible by technologies has driven the erosion of labour-time, and now the insertion of artificial intelligence into the mechanisms of automation will sweep aside the work of millions of people in all spheres of productive life. It is useless to oppose this unstoppable tendency with the defence of jobs. Only a cultural and political offensive to reduce working time and rescind the relation between income and labour can untie this knot. This is not a political problem, but a cognitive and psychological one: it is, properly speaking, a double bind, or a contradictory injunction, however you want to call it. The injunction to which the Left has complied (and which it imposes on all society) is the social obligation to dependent labour, the obligation to exchange living-time for survival. Undoing this epistemic and practical bind is the premise for freely deploying cognitive energies for the benefit of everyone. The European precipice Against this backdrop, the European crisis remains as if suspended on the edge of a precipice. The austerity measures that were meant to stabilise the financial picture have so devastated the social landscape that for the greater part of the European population the EU has become the name for a snare. Democracy has proven powerless to contain the invasiveness of the financial system. This frustration has transformed into a wave of darkness, in which economic competition takes nationalist and racist forms. Since the French-Dutch referendum of 2005, movements have been paralysed, caught in the alternative between liberal, laissez-faire globalism and sovereigntist nationalism. We saw this well enough two summers ago with the humiliation of Greece: there was no European movement, no political solidarity with the Greek people. The leaders of the European Left (beginning with Italy’s Matteo Renzi) have fully shown their weakness. But the silence of society has been even more frightening. The Greek humiliation (and the self-loathing that has afflicted the entire European Left since that moment) has provoked a definitive shift in perceptions. From that point onward the European process has struck fear into people, for it is perceived as a predator from which its prey have to protect themselves. The wholly predictable consequence is the return of nationalist sovereigntism. The nationalism emerging in Europe should, however, be inserted into a global context of a new kind, which Sergei Lavrov has defined as a post-Western order. The Western order (founded on the defence of democracy against Soviet socialism) seems to be dissolving, now that the ideological opposition to Russia has been replaced by a sort of white supremacist pact. In an article published in June 2016 in The American Interest, Zbigniew Brzezinski uses an alarming schema to describe the outlook for the next few years. In this view, Da’esh could be just the first marker of a long-term upheaval, of a terrorist, nationalist, or fascist character: the beginning of a sort of global civil war. The peoples devastated by the violence of colonialism are driving a revolt against white supremacy. In this context Trump’s policy toward Russia reveals a white-supremacist type of strategic design. Trump is proceeding in a contradictory way with regard to Russia, but his strategic design tends in the direction of the unity of Christians, of whites, of the superior warring race. If there is a thread of reasoning in the dystopian nightmare that Trump has in mind, then white supremacism is this thread.

#### Vote neg to endorse a radical passivity – this creates a line of flight away from competition and acceleration, forming the basis of a new solidarity and revolution which will destroy semiocapitalism.

Bifo 17 (Franco “Bifo” Berardi, Professor of Social History of Communication at the Accademia di Belle Arti of Milan, “Futurability: The Age of Impotence and the Horizon of Possibility”, 2017, pg. 68-69)

In their late work What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari reconsider desire from the point of view of ageing. After a discussion of ageing and of friendship in the conclusion of the book, subtitled ‘From Chaos to the Brain’, they say that at a certain moment one perceives the suffering of the universe, chaos, and the surrounding acceleration that blurs perception, attention and understanding. The universe is too fast for the aged brain to elaborate it. This is the dark side of desire: the technical world that we have created in an age of youthful energy is now too fast and too complex for the human mind to control. In his last book, Chaosmosis, Guattari speaks of the chaosmic spasm: the perception that we are no longer able to follow the rhythm of chaosmotic desire. Physical, affective and historical events are slowing the pace of the brain as mind, and in the dissonance between the speed of the world and the slowness of the mind there is a suffering, which is the dark side of desire. But desire is not only energy and speed. It’s also the ability to find another rhythm. Here I am not only contemplating a problem of ageing, I’m talking about the art of politics, about the art of changing our conceptual frame. We must abandon the point of view of productivity, the expectation of acquisition and of control. We must assume, instead, the point of view of laziness and self-care. We must transform impotence into a line of flight away from the universe of competition. We may discover that being exhausted is not so bad. How do we deal with the problem of exhaustion? Inscribing the reality of death in the political agenda. Transforming decline into a lifestyle of solidarity. The senile generation of Europe may become the subject of a cultural revolution aimed to prepare Western society for a redistribution of wealth and resources. Such a cultural revolution should start with a critique of the cult of energetic youth that permeates modern culture. The ideology of unbounded growth and aggressive competition has underpinned the two pillars of capitalist development; they have nourished the romantic and nationalist ideologies that have aggressively mobilized Western society in late modern times. We need a senile approach to the problem of the future. The cult of competition must be replaced by the cult of solidarity and of sharing. I concede that this prospect seems very unlikely at present. The European population seems determined to defend its privilege with all the means at its disposal. However, this stance cannot bring anything good with it and is already bringing a lot of evil. Young people escaping hard conditions are surrounding Fortress Europe. They bear with them the unconscious memory of centuries of exploitation and humiliation, as well as the conscious expectation of those things that advertising and global ideology have lately promised them. Over the past decades, Europe seemed the continent of peace and social justice. Now it is sinking under a wave of sadness and cynicism. Young people seem unable to alter the social conditions and are wandering in a social labyrinth devoid of solidarity or peace. The senile population could, then, be the bearer of a new hope, if they are able to face the inevitable with an easy soul. They may discover something that humankind has never known: the love of the aged, the sensuous slowness of those who no longer expect any good to come from life except wisdom. This is the wisdom of those who have seen much, forgotten nothing, but still look at everything with innocent curiosity.

## OFF

### 1NC---Deterrence DA

#### Space Commercialization is key to Space Deterrence – Commercial Flexibility is key to deterrence by denial.

Klein 19, John J. Understanding space strategy: the art of war in space. Routledge, 2019. (a Senior Fellow and Strategist at Falcon Research, Inc. and Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Space Policy Institute)//Elmer

Recent U.S. space policy initiatives underscore the far-reaching benefits of commercial space activities. The White House revived the National Space Council to foster closer coordination, cooperation, and exchange of technology and information among the civil, national security, and commercial space sectors.1 National Space Policy Directive 2 seeks to promote economic growth by streamlining U.S. regulations on the commercial use of space.2 While the defense community generally appreciates the value of services and capabilities derived from the commercial space sector—including space launch, Earth observation, and satellite communications—it often overlooks one area of strategic importance: deterrence. To address the current shortcoming in understanding, this paper first describes the concept of deterrence, along with how space mission assurance and resilience fit into the framework. After explaining how commercial space capabilities may influence the decision calculus of potential adversaries, this study presents actionable recommendations for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to address current problem areas. Ultimately, DoD—including the soon-to-be reestablished U.S. Space Command and possibly a new U.S. Space Force—should incorporate the benefits and capabilities of the commercial space sector into flexible deterrent options and applicable campaign and contingency plans. Deterrence, Mission Assurance, and Resilience Thomas Schelling, the dean of modern deterrence theory, held that deterrence refers to persuading a potential enemy that it is in its interest to avoid certain courses of activity.3 One component of deterrence theory lies in an understanding that the threat of credible and potentially overwhelming force or other retaliatory action against any would-be adversary is sufficient to deter most potential aggressors from conducting hostile actions. This idea is also referred to as deterrence by punishment.4 The second salient component of deterrence theory is denial. According to Glenn Snyder’s definition, deterrence by denial is “the capability to deny the other party any gains from the move which is to be deterred.”5 The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) highlights deterrence, and specifically deterrence by denial, as a vital component of national security. The NDS notes that the primary objectives of the United States include deterring adversaries from pursuing aggression and preventing hostile actions against vital U.S. interests.6 The strategy also observes that deterring conflict necessitates preparing for war during peacetime.7 For the space domain, the peacetime preparedness needed for deterrence by denial occurs in the context of space mission assurance and resilience. Mission assurance entails “a process to protect or ensure the continued function and resilience of capabilities and assets—including personnel, equipment, facilities, networks, information and information systems, infrastructure, and supply chains—critical to the performance of DoD mission essential functions in any operating environment or condition.”8 Similar to mission assurance but with a different focus, resilience is an architecture’s ability to support mission success with higher probability; shorter periods of reduced capability; and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, despite hostile action or adverse conditions.9 Resilience may leverage cross-domain solutions, along with commercial and international capabilities.10 Space mission assurance and resilience can prevent a potential adversary from achieving its objectives or realizing any benefit from its aggressive action. These facets of U.S. preparedness help convey the futility of conducting a hostile act. Consequently, they enhance deterrence by denial. Commercial Space Enables Deterrence The commercial space sector directly promotes mission assurance and resilience efforts. This is in part due to the distributed and diversified nature of commercial space launch and satellites services. Distribution refers to the use of a number of nodes, working together, to perform the same mission or functions as a single node; diversification describes contributing to the same mission in multiple ways, using different platforms, orbits, or systems and capabilities.11 The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, in noting the benefits derived from the commercial space industry, states that DoD partners with the commercial sector’s capabilities to improve the U.S. space architecture’s resilience.12 Although U.S. policy and joint doctrine frequently acknowledge the role of the commercial space sector in space mission assurance and resilience, there is little recognition that day-to-day contributions from the commercial industry assists in deterring would-be adversaries. The commercial space sector contributes to deterrence by denial through multi-domain solutions that are distributed and diversified. These can deter potential adversaries from pursuing offensive actions against space-related systems. Commercial launch providers enhance deterrence by providing options for getting payloads into orbit. These include diverse space launch capabilities such as small and responsive launch vehicles, along with larger, reusable launch vehicles; launch rideshares for secondary payloads; and government payloads on commercial satellites. Various on-orbit systems also promote deterrence. For example, if an aggressor damages a commercial remote sensing satellite during hostilities, similar commercial satellites in a different orbital regime, or those of the same constellation, may provide the needed imagery. If satellite communications are jammed or degraded, commercial service providers can reroute satellite communications through their own networks, or potentially through the networks of another company using a different portion of the frequency spectrum. Regarding deterrence by punishment efforts, the commercial space sector can play a role, albeit an indirect one, through improved space situational awareness (SSA) and space forensics (including digital forensics and multispectral imagery). The commercial industry may support the attribution process following a hostile or illegal act in space through its increasingly proliferating network of SSA ground telescopes and other terrestrial tracking systems. The DoD may also leverage the commercial space sector’s cyber expertise to support digital forensic efforts to help determine the source of an attack. By supporting a credible and transparent attribution process, commercial partners may cause a would-be adversary to act differently if it perceives that its aggressive, illegal, or otherwise nefarious actions will be disclosed. Doing so can help bolster the perceived ability to conduct a legitimate response following a hostile attack, which may improve deterrence by punishment efforts. Commercial space capabilities may also facilitate the application of force to punish a potential aggressor. In addition to traditional military space systems, commercial satellite imagery and communication capabilities may be used in cueing and targeting for punitive strikes against an aggressor. Although the commercial space sector is not expected to be involved directly in the use of retaliatory force following a hostile act, commercial partners may help in providing the information used to identify those responsible and to facilitate any consequent targeting efforts.

#### Space Deterrence Breakdowns causes War and Extinction.

Parker 17 Clifton Parker 1-24-2017 “Deterrence in space key to U.S. security” <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/deterrence-space-key-us-security> (Policy Analyst at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation)//Elmer

Space is more important than ever for the security of the United States, but it’s almost like the Wild West in terms of behavior, a top general said today. Air Force Gen. [John Hyten](http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/108115/general-john-e-hyten.aspx), commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, spoke Jan. 24 at Stanford’s [Center](http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/) for International Security and Cooperation. His [talk](http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/events/us-strategic-command-perspectives-deterrence-and-assurance) was titled, “U.S. Strategic Command Perspectives on Deterrence and Assurance.” Hyten said, “Space is fundamental to every single military operation that occurs on the planet today.” He added that “there is no such thing as a war in space,” because it would affect all realms of human existence, due to the satellite systems. Hyten advocates “strategic deterrence” and “norms of behavior” across space as well as land, water and cyberspace. Otherwise, rivals like China and Russia will only threaten U.S. interests in space and wreak havoc for humanity below, he said. Most of contemporary life depends on systems connected to space. Hyten also addressed other topics, including recent proposals by some to upgrade the country’s missile defense systems. “You just don’t snap your fingers and build a state-of-the-art anything overnight,” Hyten said, adding that he has not yet spoken to Trump administration officials about the issue. “We need a powerful military,” but a severe budget crunch makes “reasonable solutions” more likely than expensive and unrealistic ones. On the upgrade front, Hyten said he favors a long-range strike missile system to replace existing cruise missiles; a better air-to-air missile for the Air Force; and an improved missile defense ground base interceptor. ‘Critically dependent’ From satellites to global-positioning systems GPS, space has transformed human life – and the military – in the 21st century, Hyten said. In terms of defining "space," the U.S. designates people who travel above an altitude of 50 miles as astronauts. As the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Hyten oversees the control of U.S. strategic forces, providing options for the president and secretary of defense. In particular, this command is charged with space operations (such as military satellites), information operations (such as information warfare), missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, global strike and strategic deterrence (the U.S. nuclear arsenal), and combating weapons of mass destruction. Hyten explained that every drone, fighter jet, bomber, ship and soldier is critically dependent on space to conduct their own operations. All cell phones use space, and the GPS command systems overall are managed at Strategic Command, he said. “No soldier has to worry about what’s over the next hill,” he said, describing GPS capabilities, which have fundamentally transformed humanity’s way of life. Space needs to be available for exploration, he said. “I watch what goes on in space, and I worry about us destroying that environment for future generations.” He said that too many drifting objects and debris exist – about 22,000 right now. A recent Chinese satellite interception created a couple thousand more debris objects that now circle about the Earth at various altitudes and pose the risk of striking satellites. “We track every object in space” now, Hyten said, urging “international norms of behavior in space.” He added, “We have to deter bad behavior on space. We have to deter war in space. It’s bad for everybody. We could trash that forever.” But now rivals like China and Russia are building weapons to deploy in the lower levels of space. “How do we prevent this? It’s bigger than a space problem,” he said. Deterring conflict in the cyber, nuclear and space realms is the strategic deterrence goal of the 21st century, Hyten said. “The best way to prevent war is to be prepared for war,” he said. Hyten believes the U.S. needs a fundamentally different debate about deterrence. And it all starts with nuclear weapons. “In my deepest heart, I wish I didn’t have to worry about nuclear weapons,” he said. Hyten described his job as “pretty sobering, it’s not easy.” But he also noted the mass violence of the world prior to 1945 when the first atomic bomb was used. Roughly 80 million people died from 1939 to 1945 during World War II. Consider that in the 10-plus years of the Vietnam War, 58,000 Americans were killed. That’s equivalent to two days of deaths in WWII, he said. In a world without nuclear weapons, a rise in conventional warfare would produce great numbers of mass casualties, Hyten said. About war, he said, “Once you see it up close, no human will ever want to experience it.” Though America has “crazy enemies” right now, in many ways the world is more safe than during WWII, Hyten said. The irony is that nuclear weapons deterrence has kept us from the type of mass killings known in events like WWII. But the U.S. must know how to use its nuclear deterrence effectively. Looking ahead, Hyten said the U.S. needs to think about space as a potential war environment. An attack in space might not mean a response in space, but on the Earth. Hyten describes space as the domain that people look up at it and still dream about. “I love to look at the stars,” but said he wants to make sure he’s not looking up at junk orbiting in the atmosphere.

## OFF

### 1NC

#### Vote NEG on presumption-

#### Black death- the 1AC speaks on instances of black death and ontological violence without any material ways to solve them- that makes the violence fungible and turns the case

#### Debatability- they provide no concrete or new strategy that hasn’t already been done- that makes them undebatable because we can never predict what the 1AR spin will be

1. Burden of proof---the 1AC is a speech act their mourning happens post-reading of the 1AC if they are right about debate and their method can change that then all their harms have already been solved after presenting the 1AC---no reason advocacy in round 2 of CPS is key or solves any unique harm.

#### We should debate about the practical consequences of accepting ontological truths, not just their descriptive validity. Pre-supposing metaphysical truths makes debates about “where do we go from here” intellectually undecideable. Prefer a meliorist position that assumes improvements are contingently possible—antiblackness is not ontologically locked-in.

Pappas, 18—Professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M University, Distinguished Research Fellow for the Latino Research Initiative at The University of Texas at Austin, not Alexander Diamond (Gregory Fernando, “What Is Going On?: Where Do We Go from Here? Should the Souls of White Folks Be Saved?,” The Pluralist, Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2018, pp. 67-80, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

There is a long history of pessimists in African American thought that would today, more than ever, hold that we just need to give up on the idea that whites can be saved. Scholars like Thandeka must then face these skeptical challenges that use history, sociology, and law to support their pessimistic stance in regard to where we go from here. They have claimed that all the historical evidence warrants giving up on waiting for whites to be reformed. From Frederick Douglass to Tommy Curry, there have been pessimistic critics of “the Black philosopher’s obsessive hope in the redemptive character of white innocence.”11 The stronger pessimists’ challenge argues that historically, groups in power are not likely to give up power easily and the lives of black people are at stake; therefore, we cannot wait until whites have some affective transformation as suggested by Thandeka. Only some political radical action has a chance of bringing about genuine change.

Thandeka is by no means alone in the hope that whites can change. In fact, there is plenty of new and exciting research in support of her side. In her most recent publication, The Future of Whiteness, Linda Alcoff argues that whiteness is not inextricably tied to white supremacy. There are no fixed social categories and therefore no grounds for fatalism. There is hope that white people will face the truths of who they are and how they got here, and will push back on the seductions of white supremacy.12

I am not going to pretend to solve this long-standing debate but will critique the assumption that proper appeal to facts and reason will settle the issue. Often both sides think their side is empirically grounded and the other is ideological. Because of the predominance of white supremacy in US history, the pessimist’s side is the one that usually feels more secure that the facts are on her [their] side. They thus portray those with some hope, like Thandeka, as committed to some value-ethical commitments that blinds one to [obscures] the facts and what they call for. From the pessimist’s standpoint, someone who brings value considerations is another case of moral rhetoric that ends up masking the reality of exploitation, mass incarceration, poverty, and militarized police murdering unarmed black men. For them, it is obvious that efforts to save the whites or forgive them are not warranted by the evidence. However, as sympathetic as I sometimes am to their side, it is clear to me that none of the pessimist’s postures in regard to whites follow from a mere empirical study of the facts (e.g., history, sociology). The notion that the pessimist is the one who is adopting an objective “valueless” Archimedean standpoint in this debate is false. Any posture or resolution such as revenge, separation, resistance, or killing presupposes a value standpoint that goes beyond the facts.

Thandeka and the pessimist may agree about all the historical evidence against whites and still reasonably disagree about where we go from here. If evidence alone does not determine the issue, then what reasons account for the disagreements? Here is my hypothesis: the issue of “Where do we go from here” is one of those “intellectually undecidable” issues presented by William James in The Will to Believe. Even when there is a preponderance of evidence on one side, it cannot be decided on only empirical-theoretical grounds. More importantly, our metaphysical and value-affective commitments play a key role. Let me explain.

In a discussion-debate about where we go from here, we must lay out all the facts or evidence that supports our belief, but we rarely lay out all the operative background assumptions or “put all the cards on the table.” For instance, both sides may appeal to historical evidence, but history is after all just that, history. The issue is about what should be done today, where we should put our hopes, or what we should try now. For instance, at this point in history, should we trust “white” people? “Hope” and “trust” presuppose risk, and the issue of whether something is worth the risk or not is not totally decided by adopting some theoretically detached “objective” study of the facts or history. In disagreements about this sort of issue or belief, there is a lot going on in the background that has nothing to do with the empirical evidence or “facts.”

The Role of Metaphysical13 Assumptions in “Where Do We Go from Here?”

The issue of where we go from here cannot be addressed without assumptions about the reality of the temporal or history. In deciding where we go, one must presuppose a view about the “here” (the present) and how in general it relates to the past and the future. Let me return to debates among black intellectuals to illustrate the profound difference one’s metaphysical beliefs about history make, and in particular black history, in figuring out where we go from here.

A good place to start is a statement by James Baldwin that has received much attention since the release of the film I Am Not Your Negro: “History is not the past. History is the present. We carry our history with us. To think otherwise is criminal.”14 Baldwin is raising a criticism of a certain view of history, one in which the past atrocities suffered by blacks can be forgotten because in reality they do not exist anymore. White ignorance or amnesia may be self-serving and have different causes, but Baldwin is correcting a metaphysical assumption about the past and history here. However, Baldwin’s assertion is ambiguous or can be subjected to different views of history. In a recent article in Slate, 15 Ismail Muhammad notices this ambiguity and argues that we have misunderstood the importance of James Baldwin for today’s black writers. The statement that “we carry history with us” can be interpreted in different ways depending on our views of the past and history (our metaphysics of time).

What is the alternative to the sort of presentism where the past just drops from existence as we move forward in time? What does “we carry our history with us” mean, and what weight does this have for blacks in deciding where we go from here? Muhammad is critical of interpretations of Baldwin and black history that assume that “[b]lack people are merely living through endless repetitions of slavery and Jim Crow, which white supremacists massaged into subtler forms of control. According to this thesis, black Americans exist in a moment of foundational violence—slavery—that repeats ad infinitum.”16 Hence, distinct historical moments can be collapsed into one; Jesmyn Ward, among other African American intellectuals, sees “Trayvon Martin’s death as the latest episode of a recurrent nightmare. Replace ropes with bullets. . . . Nothing is new. . . . [E]very aspect of contemporary life has a corollary in the Jim Crow past. . . . White supremacy might have swapped guises, but its power remains interminable and total.”17 This take on black history cannot help but result in the more pessimistic answers to “Where do we go from here?,” but for Muhammad, this is not Baldwin. On the contrary, Baldwin should be used today to challenge this “logic of perpetual trauma.”18 It is true that “we carry history with us” implies “history’s inescapable purchase upon black life,” but “history is not immutable; . . . it is a practice we always conduct in the present tense, reshaping the past in order to imagine desired futures.”19 This way of understanding black history acknowledges that black history has been traumatic, but also acknowledges “the long shadows that slavery and Jim Crow cast on our present without standing in them.”20 According to this metaphysics or history, racist violence persists, regularity exists, but it is not cyclical. There are no historical necessities and immutable truths. White supremacy continues to generate anxiety, fear, and anger (i.e., it persists), but it makes little sense to claim it is perpetual or has such a grip that there are no felt possibilities beyond it.

Muhammad is pointing to important assumptions that have received little attention in discussions about white supremacy. Scholars like Charles W. Mills have alerted us about not being blind to the legacy of white supremacy in our present society.21 The way he understands the phrase “We carry our history with us” presupposes a historical perspective in which the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. There is nothing problematic about this historical perspective, but is it one that is adopted in the present (as the locus of reality) or from an Archimedean or God’s-eye view of history (in which the past and the present can be gazed upon)? Muhammad interprets Baldwin as assuming the former; when Baldwin says “History is the present” and “We carry our history with us,” he means that to be in history is to be in a present and open situation that is continuous with previous ones and where structures that have persisted weigh heavily in our present memories, bodies, habits, and communities. We can say that the reality of exploitation, mass incarceration, poverty, and militarized police murdering unarmed black men is continuous with previous forms of, or is the legacy of, “white supremacy,” but there is really no white supremacy as a single and fixed evil across history. This is basic to understanding why there is some hope in Baldwin.

Whether Muhammad is correct about Baldwin is secondary to my main point: the role of metaphysical assumptions in debates about where we go from here. Pessimists and optimists have these assumptions, and making them explicit in debates may advance communal inquiry more than pretending that the issue can be decided by being “empirical” and objective about black history. Many blacks would agree that “history is the present” and “we carry our history with us,” but exactly how the horrendous past of whites bears on the present depends in part on the extent to which we believe that what anchors all historical accounts of the past is the present, or if we see the present as just the effect of the past. How open-endedly we conceive the universe bears on having some hope. The Role of Affective-Value Reasons in “Where Do We Go from Here?” There is no sense in denying that personal-idiosyncratic reasons may play a role in deciding where to take a stand on where we go from here, whether we are aware of them or not. What I have in mind are personal experiences or the possible slant or bias as a result of being a member of some social group (class, gender, etc.). However, here, I wish to highlight the role of the affectivevalue dimension in the sense that is emphasized by Thandeka. The fact is that a value slant seems unavoidable since people come from different moral sensitivities and value commitments. James calls some of these hidden reasons “the passional.” This is important in understanding disagreements among thinkers in the black intellectual tradition. The disagreement between Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X cannot be understood unless we consider, for example, the religious-moral background and values that informed each side. Thandeka shares the same Christian value-laden slant of Martin Luther King, Jr., when she proposes to “save” whites. There is nothing inherently problematic about this value commitment, but it needs to be made explicit. Again, not even the most rigorous empirical-scientific pessimist can avoid taking a value standpoint on where we go from here. I can easily imagine someone being in total agreement with Thandeka’s diagnosis of whites in America and still disagree that whites are capable of being saved or that we should try to do something about it. How Should We Approach “Where Do We Go from Here?”: A Proposal

If I am correct, does it mean that discussion on this issue is a waste of time since at the end of the day, it is undecidable, and all a matter of people’s subjectivevalue commitments?22 Does it mean there is just no way to determine better from worse positions in regard to where we go from here? Not at all. Not all views are equally supported or reasonable. Moreover, the lesson of James in regard to genuine options that are “intellectually undecidable” is not to stop serious inquiry about facts and history or the appeal to them as the basis for justification from our stance.23 We should continue to aim at engaging in an open and inclusive communal inquiry about this issue, but ideally all parties must make an honest effort to put all the cards on the table in the discussion. The acknowledgment that there are “affective” commitments that guide our most factual-empirical inquiries is an important step; the alternative is a repression that does not work.

This last proposal is not easy. Our intellectual arrogance often gets in the way, and even under ideal conditions, most of us are not even aware of our deepest affective-value reasons that guide our inquiries. In other words, we resist or are incapable of putting all the cards on the table. However, this is not a good reason to not try, and it points to the importance of trying to have the most inclusive community of inquiry. Finding out what “our cards” are is not a matter of self-introspection of our beliefs or in our minds; it is a matter of social interaction, of being confronted by others. The best way to find out our slant, bias, and blindness is via communication, especially with those we disagree with. There is no Archimedean standpoint that we can appeal to in deciding who is right in the disagreements about where we go from here. The lack of such a standpoint should not be a source of despair. There are better and worse understandings of others and the possibility of learning from them.

More importantly, especially in regard to issues such as where we go from here, all the options on the table have their own risk; there is no certainty or way of really knowing beforehand which is correct. This requires a lot of epistemic humility. All parties should be fully committed to taking a stand, but should be aware of their fallibility. This demands adopting an experimental attitude that is nowhere to be found today in public discourse. The source of this proposal is the shared insights of the American melioristic democratic philosophical tradition—James, Du Bois, Baldwin, Addams, Dewey, Locke. There are important differences between these thinkers, and they do not share a particular answer to the question “Where do we go from here?” that we can recover for today. In fact, if there is one, it is that different times (and contexts) call for us to revisit the question in light of all of the best present intellectual resources we can muster. An intelligent stance requires a serious inquiry into the diagnosis about the proper means relative to the present context. Even if we come to agree that a revolution is called for today, there is still the issue of what particular sort of revolution and what means are needed. To be sure, some of these thinkers defended prima facie reasons for preferring democratic means, but in principle, they are open to any particular means, even killing. I would not be honest or be putting all the cards on the table if I did not disclose the common metaphysical beliefs and the melioristic affective backbone that animate this tradition. This is consistent with my previous analysis on what is operative in the background of “Where do we go from here?” Let me elaborate.

In regard to “Where do we go from here?,” this philosophical tradition resists or is critical of both the optimism of white denial and the pessimism of black despair. Insofar as both assume we live in a “block universe,” there is no basis for such determinism in reality. This philosophical tradition assumes an open nature of a pluralistic cosmos, and this makes a difference in how American philosophers think about and confront evils-injustices as events in life as a present process. For them, the comfort from the certainty of both optimism and pessimism seem shallow and usually lead to total passivity in the form of either waiting for the unavoidable progress to come or pessimistic resignation, despair, and cynism. Injustices are usually events with a history, but in an open and unfinished horizon of a world still in the making; therefore, where we have been does not determine where we should go. More importantly, even our best-grounded optimistic or pessimistic stances are likely to be mistaken and corrected by unexpected events.

The second “metaphysical” background belief or reason that guides this philosophical tradition in answering “where do we go from here?” is that according to their view of reality as lived experience, the stable and the precarious are inseparable aspects.24 This warrants an initial skepticism about any story about events, people, or about entire countries (like the United States) that overaccentuate or eliminate one element over the other. In other words, both a wholesale idealistic optimism and a realistic pessimism about the past and the present have no basis in reality. They are both forms of “blindness” if their position is a result of denying either the stable or the precarious, or the good and the bad of existence. This is not to deny that sometimes evil and precariousness can so pronounced (in comparison to stability, good things, and possibilities) as to make one’s existence unbearable.

While the above metaphysical beliefs are important to understanding the particular stance of this particular American philosophical tradition, it is not sufficient to appreciate where they stand in regard to “Where do we go from here?” What needs to be made explicit is its meliorism. James and Dewey tried to define meliorism. James writes: “Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.”25 However, most definitions have fallen short in describing how meliorism operates. It is neither an idea nor a theory; instead, it has been described as an orientation, a posture or a faith toward the self and the world. This seems correct, but I think it is also an affective orientation toward evil. It is a unique and strange form of sensibility from the point of view of those who do not have it, since it combines what seems to be contradictory or in tension. Melioristic people want to better the world even if it is a matter of degree and even if at the end of the day, there is no final salvation and tragedy is unavoidable. For them, evil must not be forgotten even if it is no longer suffered. Tragic sensibility is not incompatible with present possibilities and ideals.

In the context of the United States, this tradition is an alternative to the optimistic blindness [ignorance] that still operates in regard to the greatness of its past, about living in a democracy, or about the lives of the oppressed. In Damn Great Empires: William James and the Politics of Pragmatism, Alexander Livingston recently argued that in the American philosophical tradition (James, Du Bois, Baldwin, Addams, Dewey, Locke), we find a “meliorism that bears witness to the difference between the ideal and the real” and “may itself be the greatest defense against the deceptive craving for the false and moralistic history of American hope that holds us captive.”26 I agree with Livingston that the best way to understand and reconstruct this tradition today is by appreciating how each of these thinkers has contributed something different to the melioristic philosophy. There are important differences among these thinkers; for instance, some had a more acute tragic sensibility and others were more perceptive about the importance of ideals, but they are all meliorists.

Du Bois is very important in revealing the particular optimistic blindness that has historically been the most common problem in the United States with its exceptionalist narrative myth of the nation’s perpetual progress and the amnesia concerning the nation’s past.27 However, Du Bois, at least in his early works, can also be read as calling for a hope that embraces the history and unavoidable elements of suffering, disappointment, and uncertainty— grief without denial. We must be critical of narratives about perpetual and linear progress in race relations, and not be blind about the darker realities behind our rhetoric of freedom and equality. However, we must also not be blind [ignorant] about present unique possibilities of amelioration and must avoid presupposing essentialist or fixed meaning to “whiteness.”

In sum, if the issue “Where do we go from here?” depends on taking a stand on “Can white souls be saved?,” then the melioristic tradition would take their “salvation as neither inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of salvation become.” This sounds to me like an affective impulse to get to work and try to inquire into the conditions that would improve the souls of whites and, in the process, those of blacks. Meliorism is an affective stance that embraces evil and contingency in an open and pluralistic universe. It is a strange combination of courage and humility. For some, it is too demanding; for others, it is not enough. If I am correct and understand Thandeka’s project, it is consonant with this philosophical tradition.

#### Humanism is Good - Blackness isn’t historically calcified and their reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition – vote Negative to align yourself with Black Humanist Movements.

Kelley 17 Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)//re-cut by Elmer

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of **social formation**, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it **may be structured in dominance** in some ways, **but not defined** by it. And Cedric's **Black Marxism**, you know, really made this point. He **talks about** the **ontological totality**, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, **structured by** white supremacy, structured by **violence**, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, **but** one in **which** western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the **Black radical tradition is** a **refusal to be property**, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so **we** sometimes **give white supremacy** way **too much credit**, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently **treat** **slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration** as a piece, **as** the reinstantiation of **the same thing,** the continuation, that denies the fact that **these** systems **are** actually **distinct**, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re **responses** to, in many ways, **to the weakness of** this as **a racial regime**. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. **Jim Crow** was a **response to** the **Black Democratic**, uh, **upsurge** after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass **incarceration**—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing **has** a lot **to do with**, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the **formation of political prisoners**, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. **Racial regimes** actually are always having to **shore themselves up** precisely **because they're unstable**. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### Hope good - their negativity is fundamentally compatible with political hope---you should vote neg to hope for a racially just world, while acknowledging that it is extremely unlikely---abandoning hope entirely leads to ressentiment but interim hopes like the neg lead to life affirmation – also k2 preventing battle fatigue.

Milona ’18 (Michael Milona – PhD in Philosophy @ USC, Instructor in Philosophy @ Auburn University, former Postdoctoral Fellow in Philosophy @ Cornell University “Finding Hope,” 8 February 2018, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00455091.2018.1435612)

5.2 Hope for Ideals: Lessons from the Depth of Hope

Should we hope for ideals that are extremely unlikely to come about? I address this question through the lens of a specific case, namely that of whether to hope for a racially just society. Martin Luther King Jr. addresses this question in his sermon ‘Shattered Dreams’, observing that while racial justice is of incredible value, it is also incredibly improbable:

What does one do under such circumstances? This is a central question, for we must determine how to live in a world where our highest hopes are not fulfilled. [2007: 518]

He answers:

On the one hand we must accept the finite disappointment, but in spite of this we must maintain the infinite hope. This is the only way that we will be able to live without the fatigue of bitterness and the drain of resentment. [2007: 522]

In this sermon, King says, that ‘our ability to deal creatively with…blasted hopes will be determined by the extent of our faith in God’ [2007: 526]. But must we turn to the divine, or is there also a secular pathway to maintaining hope? In what follows, I explore whether it may be rational to maintain such a hope from within a secular worldview, taking for granted the revised standard theory and, in particular, my defense of it in the face of Martin’s and Pettit’s objections.

To begin, the hope for a racially just world can seem foolish. The United States, for example, remains painfully distant from true racial equality, despite the end of slavery in the 19th century and de jure segregation in the 20th , among a variety of other achievements.16 Today’s United States is witness to the mass incarceration of black males and de facto segregation in schools. If a substantial hope for racial justice involves acting as if these and other obstacles will (likely) be overcome and some ideal of racial harmony realized, then hope can seem a failure to face up to the tragedy of the situation. But this is precisely what some theories – most notably Pettit’s cognitive resolve theory – would require. Given such an account of hope, one might think hopeless resistance would be a more honest and effective (by virtue of being realistic confrontation of the difficulties) approach.17

Yet given the revised standard theory, it seems as if holding onto hope for racial justice can be rational. On this approach, hopes are catalogued in a fine-grained way according to their influence on attention, motivation, and feeling; and hopes do not necessarily involve acting as if the hoped-for outcome will (likely) come about. Some people may be able to harbor idealistic hopes that exert a daily influence on their psyche; perhaps this is a characteristic of some inspirational leaders and activists (e.g., Martin Luther King Jr.). But this can be difficult given a clear-headed awareness of the minimal chances. Oftentimes, emotions such as sadness and grief seem more appropriate to the state of the world. Crucially, on my approach, these emotions are not incompatible with, or even necessarily in tension with, hope. A person can be deeply sad about racial injustice in the world and sad that a racially just world is a distant possibility; yet none of this rules out a deep hope for a morally ideal world. Even when sadness is more salient in one’s experience, there can still be a deep, patient hope for the distant possibility of justice.

There is value in such a hope. It positions one to recognize opportunities to work toward the ideal. After all, on the revised standard theory, hope-constituting desires dispose the hoper to attend to the means to fulfilling the desire. Furthermore, a substantial hope for racial justice can, and I think often does, cultivate and explain “intermediate” hopes for, say, morally superior voting (de-)regulations, voter districting, and allocation of tax payer money. In other words, idealistic hopes can provide an effective psychological breeding ground for many of our more realistic day-to-day ethical hopes to emerge.

By contrast, despairing over the ideal may make the pursuit of such intermediate projects, which ought to be pursued, more difficult. In general, the keys to the rationality of idealistic hopes are as follows: (i) hope is compatible with a variety of negative emotions such as sadness and grief that may also be appropriate to a situation, (ii) idealistic hopes needn’t be especially salient in one’s everyday experience but can be patient, and (iii) deeply rooted idealistic hopes fend off despair and can foster admirable patterns of more realistic socio-political hopes.

There is an additional worry about hoping for racial justice, however. Katie Stockdale [2017] has recently argued, entirely correctly in my view, that bitterness is a justified response to racial injustice. But then what is bitterness? Stockdale defines it as follows:

Bitterness involves anger, but it is, to varying degrees, hopeless anger. In bitterness, we remain committed to the moral expectations others have violated, and at the same time, begin to lose hope that they will attend to the harms about which we’re angry and abide by our moral expectations in the future. [2017: 6; Stockdale’s emphasis]

Thus if we agree that bitterness is a justified response to much of the racial injustice in the world, then given Stockdale’s definition of bitterness, a loss of hope must also be justified. Indeed, Stockdale is explicit that this is her stance. Furthermore, King’s sermon quoted above appears to support Stockdale’s point that there is a choice between hope and bitterness (though King sides with hope).

At least two kinds of solutions are available. The first is to argue that bitterness and hope on the part of the oppressed are compatible because their fitting targets are, upon closer inspection, distinct in key ways. 18 Bitterness is appropriately directed at, say, the current perpetrators (witting or unwitting) of injustice, while idealistic hopes are appropriately directed at those currently working to fix the problems and to future generations. Another response, which is the one that I favor, says that bitterness is not always hopeless anger but may also be pessimistic anger. According to the sense of ‘pessimism’ that I have in mind, one is pessimistic about something when one expects it not to come about. This form of pessimism is compatible with hope, since one can hope that something will occur despite not expecting that it will (cf. Bell [1992: x] on pessimism in the ‘victory sense’). Although I cannot argue for the view in full here, it seems to me that taking bitterness to involve pessimism, rather than hopelessness, better explains why (some) bitter people bother trying to convince the wrongdoers that morality requires that they repair the wronging. At the very least, adopting this alternative account of bitterness seems to be a reasonable move for those who maintain (as I think we should) that hope and bitterness are sometimes jointly appropriate. In general, patient hope, which the revised standard theory makes room for, is a serious form of hoping, yet not one that is psychologically consuming; it can reside alongside profound negative emotions, even bitterness.

#### Universalizing ontological claims are colonialist and delegitimize and pathologize African resistance.

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Thomas 18, Greg. "Afro-blue notes: The death of afro-pessimism (2.0)?." Theory & Event 21.1 (2018): 282-317. (Associate Professor of English at Tufts, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of California, Berkeley, M.A. in Philosophy from State University of New York, Binghamton, B.A. in Philosophy from Randolph-Macon College, 2018)//Elmer

The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of "1865" fundamentally define the discourse of "Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption," like assorted neo-pessimist texts: "The expanding field of Afro-pessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave."25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details "pre-colonial" African languages of "black" self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in "The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate" (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson only the slaver's history of slavery—one slaver's official "national" or state history and discourse. The "expanding field" of "Afro-pessimism" (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson's "slavery" for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson's "Blackness," which is curious. For what he casts as "Black" rather than "black" is more accurately cast as "negro" (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even "Negro," quiet as it's kept—since all of **Africa is flatly foreclosed by** this acutely paradoxical **"Afro-pessimism."** Both **Africa and diasporas eclipsed**, his "Blackness" and "Human Life" turn out to be the blackness and humanism of white Americanism, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or **exceptionalist Americanism** despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its "anti-Black racism" worldwide. What is the "Afro" in "Afro-pessimism," therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the "negro" concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some "Blackness" itself or, rather, the "blackness" of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. **A dominant Anglo-American discourse of** **slavery is all** that **there is** and ever was now when it comes to the Black **and** African, **all** anti-slavery discourses and **counter-discourses** of slavery as well as Blackness somehow **vanished**. A glaring **absence of Black radical** and **revolutionary** intellectual **history** should be expected from any expression of "Afro-pessimism." Indeed, could Afro-pessimism 2.0 take hold as another trend in mainstream academia except in the political void produced after the 1960s and '70s by local as well as global counter-revolution and counter-insurgency? This absence affects the shape and agenda of the critical analysis of "anti-Black racism" in essential ways. Wilderson's critique of the "ruse of analogy" in Red, White & Black becomes a refrain that naturalizes academic approaches to politics now institutionalized with the continued reign of Western bourgeois liberalism. For older and enduring Black radical perspectives, the existence of "anti-Black racism" among non-Black peoples, organizations, and movements is neither a new nor shocking phenomenon. For many Black revolutionary movement logics of the '60s and '70s, for instance, this did not preclude alliance (or the exhaustion of alliances made) or lead to a doctrinaire rejection of "solidarity" work and its international (or "intercommunal") possibilities.27 "Contradictions" were expected, so to speak, in theory and practice, which might be resolved or not, depending on material interest, circumstance, etc. For them, this work was not about gauging identity, or the perfection of a projected analogy, but mobilization for the political accomplishments of revolution—a revolutionism that could or may not work toward the development of a new humanism not white or racist or anti-Black after all. The reach for potential solidarities was not construed as a gift or an act of good-willed benevolence, wise or unwise given the risks. Even solidarity work with obviously problematic, openly enemy forces could be a strategic or tactical mode of advancing Black collective self-interests that might dispense with any alliance at any given moment in time without seeing the relationship as a statement of some total identity or non-identity of condition and interests. The notion of solidarity has nowadays been superficialized, remaining riveted on mere rhetorical proclamation and aesthetic or representational identification in neo-colonial culture industries here and there. An older, praxical approach to alliance, perhaps "analogy," and solidarity is not taken up by current analyses of identity conflicts that prevail with the resurgence of a more academic political-intellectualism and a now much less contested liberalism. This is imperial "multiculturalism" and its malcontents. As much as Afro-pessimism (2.0) may object to certain instances of liberalism, or [End Page 292] regulation white racist liberalism at least, it assumes these Western epistemic frameworks of white academic liberalism all the same, thereby ensconcing the colonialism and neo-colonialism it constantly and symptomatically denegates in text after text. Black anti-colonialism / anti-colonialist Blackness The great anti-colonialist poet of Négritude, Aimé Césaire wrote famously in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party that he wanted Marxism and communism to be placed in the service of Black peoples and not Black peoples in the service of Marxism or communism. He maintained in 1956: "it is clear that our struggle—the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color against racism—is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle."28 As always, he was writing on behalf of Black people who were, proverbially, the only people on the planet who have been excluded from the "human race" by the "modern" history of Western racism and colonialism which obstructs "a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world."29 What is this Négritude if not Blackness, Black anti-colonialism, or anti-colonial Blackness? This tradition is not a tradition in Wilderson who regularly critiques the analogical arrogance of Marxism, feminism, and an academic paradigm of "post-colonialism" with less common reference to "queer" or "gay and lesbian" categories of analysis as well—all in the name of pessimism. For him, none of these political frameworks with their privileged identarian subjects can capture the condition of "Blackness" and "slavery" (or "the Black/Slave"). While that perspective can allow for some insights—ones certainly seen before around the Black world and ones certainly avoided by so much institutional scholarship—it leaves the general categorical grid of established Western political epistemologies intact. The familiar academic terrain of "race, gender, class, and sexuality" frames the critique for "Blackness" of "gender, class, and sexuality" in addition to "post-coloniality" or "post-colonialism." The most conventional US academic categories of identity and analysis are still rendered in full as discrete, monolithic, and monological categories and referents (e.g., workers, women, etc.), like the respective political ideologies based upon them in the traditional ideological history of the white West (e.g., Marxism, feminism, etc.). There are "workers" and then there are "women," generically, and then sometimes there are "gays" by whatever name, not to mention "natives" or the colonized in this culturally specific epistemology of a specific culture of colonialism itself. The upshot is quite conservative, even anachronistically so. This critique is an internal if damning critique embodying and encouraging pessimism largely from within the established order of knowledge that it analytically engages and categorically replenishes and preserves. The grid politics of Wilderson's critique of "the ruse of analogy" leaves all manner of "Blackness" in a wasteland. The routine categorical contrast with "Native Americans" reduces all that and any colonial condition to a startlingly oversimplified matter of "land" (or "land restoration"); and it occludes "Afro-Indian" history as well as "Red-Black" maroonage all across the Americas. The constant generic contrast with "feminism" or "non-Black women" eclipses the more mammoth criticism of "gender" writ large in Diop and Amadiume's Black-African studies of Europe or "Western Civilization" as a "racial patriarchy" of pessimism and "anti-Black" imperialism. The contrast with Marxism and its "workers" never resurrects any issues of "class" or economics from any other perspective to recognize or to resist, for example, the white invention of Black elites as vital instruments of racism, anti-Blackness, and white-supremacism. There never appears a trace of any critique of Black "social class' (or political class) elitism in "Afro-pessimism" (2.0), which is a tell-tale sign of petty-bourgeois or "lumpen-bourgeois" articulations. Lastly, Wilderson's occasional categorical contrast of "Blackness" with Palestinians or al-Nakba (which aligns in Arabic with the Swahili substitution for the term "Middle Passage"—Maafa, the "Catastrophe") comprehends no Blackness in Palestine or among Palestinians. His Afro-pessimism can envision no Afro-Palestinianism, unlike a great tradition of Pan-African discourses that also do not dislocate Palestine from an anti-colonialist mapping of the African continent or the Afro-Asian landmass of a Pan-Africanist and "Bandung" imagination, one powerfully shared by Malcolm X and Fayez A. Sayegh. For "Black Power" internationally, Kwame Ture would refer to Palestine as the "tip of Africa" and uphold Fatima Bernawi, the iconic Black woman who's been named the "first Palestinian female political prisoner," as the paragon of "Black and Palestinian Revolutions."30 She is likewise canonized by other Afro-Palestinian icons themselves, such as Ali Jiddeh and Mahmoud Jiddeh of the African community of the Old City of Jerusalem, for example—or, say, Ahmad and Jumaa Takrouri of Occupied Jericho—who are each among the greatest of all icons across Historic Palestine, a country which has produced multiple Black Panther formations in Hebrew as well as Arabic in the 1970s and the 1980s. Again, Wilderson tacitly "nationalizes" his category of "Blackness" although this is scarcely in the interests of Black people in or outside of the US colonized mainland of Americanism; and so none of the above "Blackness" survives the critical grid of a very Anglo-American (and white racist state-bound) critique of "analogy," regardless of the "Afro-pessimist" text at hand. Do not the vulgar colonial-nativist politics of Incognegro's strangely overlooked comment on "West Indians" go full blown then in Red, White & Black and elsewhere?31 **There is** here a general critical **erasure of the** massive tradition of Black anti-colonialism—or **anti-colonial Black resistance** to "anti-Blackness" and anti-Black colonialism, which transcends nationalization. Wilderson's "**Afro-pessimist"** **rejects** the **anti-colonialist paradigms of supposedly "other" peoples, and** yet in a manner that **reinstates** US **or Western coloniality** nonetheless—a white colonialism that oppresses "the Black" inside and outside the United States's official geopolitical limits. This position can thus make a virtue out of automatic and absolute anti-alliance postures with no further, actual political action then required for Black people, "the Black critic," or any Black liberation struggle on this view. Such chauvinism without political commitment or engagement beyond critique is logically consistent, for pessimism, where mere resentment or ressentiment can masquerade as resistance or "pro-Black" "radicalism." After all, Afro-pessimism (2.0) begins with a proud suspicion of Black liberation or Black liberation movement, itself, no less than of its potentially "anti-racist" or "anti-Black" political alliances. This provincial "American" pessimism reveals more affinities with Créolite in the Caribbean than Césaire's anti-colonialist eruption of Pan-African Négritude, in reality, its narrowly and negatively delimited rhetoric of the "Blackness" of "the Black" (as "Slave," of course) notwithstanding. As if this too is a virtue, pessimism is not just suspicious of power but possibility—while, upholding dystopia, it is casually dismissive of all historical actuality that does not support a pessimist paradigm, orientation or sensibility. Analytically, moreover, there is somehow no white colonialism for Blacks to fight in Africa or Black countries of Black people anywhere and no terrible landlessness that afflicts the African diasporas of Blackness captive within white settler and/or imperial state formations, for Wilderson and Afro-pessimism (2.0).