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#### Logistics and Media Flows are intrinsically entangled – Supply Chain Networks require communication to circulate culture and knowledge to coordinate and quell threats to Logistical Infrastructures.

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media and logistics are global operating systems. They set conditions for the circulation of information and culture. They activate inventories of materials and networks of infrastructure. They coordinate interfaces between bodies, objects, and environments. Deployed in ongoing projects of capitalization and exploitation, often in the name of global connection, consumption, and security, they affect the day-to-day lives of people around the world. And they are inextricably entangled with one another. Even the text of this book has been enclosed in packets, transmitted, and reassembled innumerable times—a process guided by logistical principles. The materials that constitute it, whether printed on paper or housed in Amazon’s cloud storage, were transmitted via trucks, containers, pallets, and hands, their movement likely managed using logistical software. Logistics—the organization and coordination of resources to manufacture and distribute global commodities—depends not only on software and data infrastructures but on a mass of screens, communications devices, and paperwork. Assembly Codes is the first collection to critically interrogate the specific points of contact, dependence, and friction between media and logistics. We argue that the fundamental interconnections between these two systems are essential not only to understanding both of their operations but to the contemporary circulation of culture on a global scale. To describe the dynamics of media today—its production and industries, its vast infrastructures, its material forms, and its global movements—a basic conception of the supply chain and the science of coordinating techniques is necessary. For the operations of global logistics, a focus on media, whether in the circulation of internet traffic or on the devices that coordinate their commands, reveals crucial links, choke points, and dependencies. Media and logistics are interoperable systems, and the activities of one hinge on the smooth operation of the other. This collection builds on an exciting field of logistical study that has emerged over the past several decades. In geography, sociology, cultural studies, anthropology, science and technology studies, and history, among other fields, scholars have documented how logistics has been instrumental to warfare and capitalism, as well as to their attendant imperial projects. The idea of logistics was first articulated in the study of warfare, where its theorization elevated it to the same prominence as that of strategy and tactics, but recent work has focused on its adaptation into commerce, especially the impact of the logistics revolution in the early 1960s that cemented logistical operations as a cornerstone of neoliberal economics and politics.1 In economics, Peter Drucker famously declared logistics the “last dark continent” for commerce left to conquer, and scholars have documented this transition from the more constrained study of “physical distribution management” to the recognition of logistics as “the most encompassing term that describes the management of firms’ acquiring and distributing activities over space.”2 Collectively, this work reveals that, as the science of moving goods, people, and information as efficiently as possible to meet the global demands of capital, logistics has been the engineer of the mid-twentieth century. In the subsequent drama of globalization, in which factories have moved to the Global South to exploit cheap labor, and goods are shipped back to the Global North for consumption, logistics has been the star. In critical logistics studies—a field that coalesced from these inquiries to describe the conditions of logistics, the abstract structures of the supply chain, and their impact on modern life—media is ever-present, even if often in the background.3 In The Deadly Life of Logistics, Deborah Cowen explains that with the expansion of global supply chains, commodities are not produced in conventional geography, but “across logistics space.”4 Logistics space is mediated in a multitude of ways: through process maps, enterprise resource planning software, worker surveillance, the capture of biometric data, and satellite tracking. Logistics, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson argue, fundamentally “involves the algorithmic coordination of productive processes in space and time.”5 Analyzing these algorithmic architectures, Ned Rossiter calls for a logistical media theory that grasps these technologies’ primary function: “to extract value by optimizing the efficiency of living labor and supply chain operations.”6 These accounts recognize that media are integral to the conceptualization and spread of logistics. **Supply chains are defined as much by their communications networks and media technologies as they are by their containers and pallets**. As logistics has become a topic in media and communications studies, scholars have expanded beyond the domain of supply chain management to address its broader conceptualization as a set of coordinating techniques. Paul Virilio’s “logistics of perception” places cinematic sounds and images alongside accounts of weapons, people, and materials.7 Media scholars, including Ned Rossiter, John Durham Peters, and Judd Case, argue that the study of “logistical media” does not simply involve analysis of the visual and computational dimensions of Walmart’s or Amazon’s operations but a recognition of media’s capacity to process data, coordinate movement, and more widely orient sociality.8 Logistical media, Peters writes, are the media of “orientation,” devices of cognitive, social, and political organization and control. They are clocks, maps, and calendars; positioning technologies such as radar; managerial forms such as lists; and commercial codes such as stamps. Due to their ability to organize storage and transmission, and their capacity to locate, arrange, and distribute, all media possess this logistical dimension. **Media, in other words, are not simply conduits through which global logistics emerges but exist “prior to and from the grid” through which such operations can be constituted**.9 They are not logistics’ black box. They are the instructions for its assembly. Assembly Codes enters into this conversation about the techniques of global logistics and the operative logics of media with three specific interventions. **First, it describes what we call the** logistical imagination. Logistical technologies have always been accompanied by new ways of seeing and listening, reading and knowing, thinking and moving—which have themselves catalyzed crucial shifts in our modes of communication. To unpack the logistical imagination is to trace the representational and imaginative modes of logistical activity, as well as the aesthetic and performative practices that have emerged to grapple with logistical transformations. **Second, the essays here illustrate what we call logistical instruments**: the extensive array of media techniques, technologies, and forms that are essential to the operation of global logistics. The collection’s essays demonstrate that media’s operative logics—their logistical capacity to orient, arrange, and sort—are deeply connected to the ways in which they have been instrumentalized in histories of militarism, commerce, and empire. As a result, the media technologies that hold these projects together necessarily advance the trajectories of capitalism, settler colonialism, and biopolitical management. Logistics invests these linked projects with their own seemingly organic and inevitable sense of life, what Cowen describes as an abstract vitalism, at the expense of the human lives of laborers and migrants, and several of our essays touch on these stakes.10 Finally, the essays reveal how the industrial processes of traditional media production—from cinema to sound recording—are being reshaped as supply chain media by logistical technologies and practices. While the processes of sourcing and assembly have always had a substantial effect on how media is produced, distributed, and consumed, contemporary media are being crafted in relation to what Anna Tsing has named “supply chain capitalism.”11 The elements of supply chain capitalism that Tsing documents—actual precarity, collaboration, nonscalability, and translation—are central concerns many of our essays also take up.12 While these interventions build across the collection, we have organized Assembly Codes into sections that foreground these three ways of rethinking media: as sites of logistical imagination, as instruments of logistical operations, and as products of global supply chains. In the remainder of the introduction, we chart the stakes, contexts, and future directions of these avenues of inquiry, as well as the ties between individual essays and our shared interventions. The authors assembled draw together a diverse set of objects as well as a range of theoretical and conceptual orientations: Black and Indigenous studies, German media theory and sound studies, and the analysis of media industries and production cultures. Their essays foreground the contiguity of production and distribution, the messy relationship between base and superstructure, and most importantly, the continuities between contemporary and historical forms of logistical mediation. They expose the way economic, political, and social power consolidates in and through logistical operations and acts of assembly. Through their careful analyses, the book reveals how contemporary mediation is haunted by its logistical substructures, from the slave ship to the supply chain.

#### Logistics is structured via Logistical Imaginations that control every-day life and are critical to the life-blood of Supply Chains which means interrogation of the Aff’s Knowledge Structure come over Materiality. Thus, the Role of the Ballot is to endorse Imagination and Subject Formation that exist outside Logistics.

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The Logistical Imagination How did the imagination of the world change once it expanded to include logistical ways of thinking? When did thoughts of logistical operations begin to hold sway over the details of daily lives? How can one represent the expansive system of global logistics? To answer these questions is to unpack the logistical imagination: the new ways of seeing and imagining the world brought about by logistics and the new forms of mediation, philosophy, politics, and aesthetics that have emerged to confront it. To analyze the logistical imagination is to understand what it means to see like a supply chain, to comprehend the conditions that make one feel like cargo, or to explore logistics’ racialized and gendered aesthetics. It is to document how the subject of Western individualism is, fundamentally, a logistical one, and to interrogate how the historical emergence of logistics in commerce and warfare reshaped everyday life for workers, consumers, and citizens. It is also, we suggest, to imagine how the vast contours of logistical systems elide the faults and friction of their diverse and often divergent operations.13 To do so involves charting how these underlying instabilities, where “capital hits the ground,” may elicit new political potentials and subjective possibilities.14 Critiques of capitalism often construe logistics as something simultaneously monumental and microscopic. It is always present but nowhere to be seen. Increasingly automated and algorithmic, it is, like capital itself, an inhuman, unknowable thing.15 Its representations in texts, photographs, and films are almost always defined by the enormous structures erected in pursuit of global trade. Capable of transporting more than ten thousand containers per trip, megaships, for example, are vessels so massive that they are unable to sail through the expanded Panama Canal locks, their decks unreachable by most North American cranes.16 The mind-boggling scale of these technologies and of the systems that manage their movements are defined by the dark dreams of the “logistical sublime,” where global trade flows are ever more precisely patterned in a nightmare of unending rationalization.17 Researchers have described how logistics is inextricable from other global phenomena, including the conditions of late capitalism and the politics of neoliberalism. Jasper Bernes has argued that “the totality of the logistics system belongs to capital,” and as such, it remains cognitively and materially impregnable by traditional revolutionary means.18 While the logistical sublime is the dominant form of the logistical imagination, mobilized by capitalists and critics alike, it is not the only representational possibility. As a means of opening up the analysis of the logistical imagination, the authors in Assembly Codes delve into the many ways that humans have engaged with and envisioned logistics. A study of these cases reveals that the logistical imagination is always refractive, embodied in the particular moments and media of their production. This is true when workers slow down or speed up to control the fluctuation of logistical time and speed; when protestors blockade ports to limit the movement of materials across logistical space; and when undocumented migrants and fugitive slaves seize opportunities to travel outside the well-ordered regimes of logistical control. But it is also true when middle-class people use locationbased apps to hook up, request a car to the airport, or arrange for a next-day delivery in a single click. The logistical imagination not only drives forces of oppression, it ignites resistance and lubricates banal normativity. Our aim is to understand the specific differences that these representations, aesthetic practices, and modes of thinking make to larger logistical projects. We are motivated by the recognition that new imaginations can catalyze systemic shifts. Indeed, the contemporary concern with logistics—which has culminated in academia in fields such as critical logistics studies—was sparked by the dissemination of new logistical imaginations and representations. It was in part through media coverage of the impacts of globalization, including its supply chains, workers’ rights, and environmental impact, that middle-class people in the Global North began to grapple with logistics. The anti-sweatshop campaigns of the 1990s that stemmed from Nike’s disastrous “sweatshop summer” gave rise to a new discourse of ethical consumerism, one that expanded to encompass concerns for human rights and worker welfare, the ethical treatment of animals, environmental contamination, and global climate change.19 Recent conceptions of corporate social responsibility, the connection between local sourcing and consumption, and assessment methodologies like carbon footprinting all bring to light the journeys commodities make as, driven by logistics, they are assembled and distributed around the world. At the same time, the meteoric rise of private carriers like FedEx, ups, and dhl made delivery trucks and logistical laborers familiar figures, so much so that the 2000 film Castaway could reimagine Robinson Crusoe as a narrative about a FedEx logistician stranded on a desert island in the crash of a cargo plane. It is precisely because of logistics’ extraordinary scale and apparent unknowability that media play such a critical role in shaping our knowledge of these systems and afford the potential for collective forms of resistance. An attention to forms of mediation reveals the language and iconography of logistics as a potential site for intervention. Marc Levinson’s The Box (2006) and Alexander Klose’s The Container Principle (2009), for example, both figure the container as the emblem of globalization and the originary sign of modern logistics.20 Carried by cranes between ship holds and truck beds, this intermodal innovation accelerated shipping times, ending the era of arduous and time-consuming break-bulk unloading, and the work of longshoremen who labored on the docks. By the turn of the century, the box was ubiquitous both in distribution, where the teu, or twenty-foot equivalent unit, had become the standard object of operational consideration, and in the public imagination, as developers repurposed it for the architecture of everything from modular housing to shopping malls. Sites like Box Park in London, Tolchok near Odessa, and Common Ground in Seoul reveal a logistical imagination at play, one that places global transportation in a local context of commodity display and retail consumption. The shipping container not only infiltrated the visual and architectural landscape, it was remediated in films (such as Allan Sekula’s 2010 The Forgotten Space), art installations (such as Gabby Miller’s 2015 Turquoise Wake), and podcasts (such as Alexis Madrigal’s 2017 Containers). Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle identify a “poetics of containerization,” noting the form’s mesmerizing power as an icon of capitalist abstraction, especially to visual artists.21 Engaging with this form, activists, workers, and scholars have attempted to transform its meaning and leverage the logistical imagination in pursuit of progressive political causes.

#### Desire for Objectivity is a form of Logistical Rationality that aims to control space, bodies, and subjectivities which undergirds political and economic spheres that cement Logistical control.

Archer 20, Megan. Logistics as Rationality: Excavating the Coloniality of Contemporary Logistical Formations. Diss. University of Brighton, 2020. (PhD in Philosophy at University of Brighton)//Elmer

LOGISTICAL RATIONALITY I deploy the term logistical rationality in order to describe the way in which the above set of logics structure political and economic possibilities, but further, constructs a regime that attempts to delineate and control space, time, bodies, materials, and subjectivities. This amounts to a necessary extension of the notion of political rationality as a product of modernity which fails to recognise the constitutive nature of colonialism and imperialism in its production.10 As such, logistical rationality recognises that the epistemic grounding of these logics has a longer history of violence that must be centred in any analysis of their contemporary manifestations, not only for reasons of analytic potency and clarity, but for reasons of epistemic justice. What I am terming logistical rationality is then also an intervention in a long history of writers thinking about rationality under modernity. Weber gave us an understanding of instrumental reason that recognised the increasing tendency to convert action-as-means to a permanent state of action-as-end. In other words, the tendency for rationality to mean a logic of pure means – with the end objectives irrelevant so long as the method itself is rational and rationalising. Wendy Brown knits this together with Frankfurt School developments of Weber’s theory of rationalisation to ground her deployment of Foucault’s understanding of political rationality. The Frankfurt School (broadly speaking) argued that instrumental reason had become ‘suffused with the norms and imperatives of capitalism to generate a rationality that saturated society and secured capitalism in ways Marx and Marxism could not fathom or explain’. 11 Brown extends this as a grounding for her account of neoliberal rationality. For her (and from Foucault), political rationality is not merely an instrument of governmental practice, but the condition of possibility of its instruments – it is the ‘field of normative reason from which governing is forged’.12 She writes, it could be said to signify the becoming actual of a specific normative form of reason; it designates such a form as both a historical force generating and relating specific kinds of subject, society, and state and as establishing an order of truth by which conduct is both governed and measured.13 I would venture that logistical rationality signifies the becoming-actual, or rather, becominginfrastructural of a specific normative form of reason, and one that establishes or maintains an order of truth through which conduct is governed. How logistical rationality goes beyond Brown’s account is in its insistence on tracing the connections between material rationalisation and logistical infrastructures; its deep influence throughout political and economic spheres; and the epistemic violence and specifically, the coloniality it is continuous with and continues to manifest. It is also not the case that this rationality emanates out of a specific state rationality, nor does it belong solely to the realm of the market or the governance of subjects bound by a nation-state. Rather, it continues a project of power and domination – Western modernity – that it simultaneously constructs and is constructed by. Thinking in this way, it becomes clear that the notion of a logistical rationality allows us to conduct this necessary intervention in teasing out the operative and epistemic dimensions of these logics, and allows us to think across the multiple registers that logistics intersects and organises. Logistics is of course the technologies, infrastructures and territories it shapes, it is protocol and extraction, and it is the logics and epistemic grounding of these technologies and physical manifestations. It is the rationality that, incorporating, extending and reworking a coloniality of power, animates logistical organisation, and further, allows logistical organisation to become seen as something like a universal model that can be applied to almost anything. From global supply chains to anthropological studies – from extractive debt architectures to microtargeting in political campaigns, logistical rationality appears to obscure the coloniality of power deeply implicated in its operations. To think logistics and logistics as rationality together is to consider both the materialinfrastructural and political-epistemic foundations of logistics and the ways in which these intertwine to contribute to the contemporary shape of modernity. It allows us to get underneath the neutral veneer of scientific objectivity and efficiency that envelopes the general discourse of logistics, and to begin to excavate the colonial logics that animate its organisation of the world. In considering logistics as a form of rationality and its epistemic foundations as a continuation of logics of coloniality, we can bring into relief the ways in which logistical organisation relies on and recalibrates structures that determine what counts as knowledge and what counts as being, and as a result can unearth its more violent tendencies of exclusion and erasure. Ultimately, logistical rationality advances an (impossible) attempt at a near-total control. As outlined above, the techniques and logics through which it attempts this include modelling, calculation and prediction; extraction, expropriation and standardisation; translation, erasure and the variability of inclusion & exclusion; and ever-increasing efficiencies, valorization and commodification, with a view to extending rational control over time and space, capital and materials, and bodies and subjectivities. In reaching back to think about how techniques and logics of domination inaugurated during this construction continue to shape our present, we can understand how logistics contributes to the maintenance and recalibration of these forms of domination in their interrelated epistemic, social and structural dimensions. This framework allows us to reckon with the forms of violence, structural, physical and epistemic, that lay the groundwork for processes of domination in the contemporary world. It re-politicises logistics, putting Empire back into its history and its contemporary operations. LOGISTICS, TOTALITY AND TRUTH NARRATIVES Mignolo argues that Western conceptions of rationality (at least prior to postmodernism) advance an ‘exclusionary and totalitarian notion of Totality … that is a Totality that negates, exclude, occlude the difference and the possibilities of other totalities’. 14 The project that I advance here does not attempt to write yet another totalizing grand narrative. Throughout my academic career I have struggled with the form and style of academic writing that neatly separates sets of ideas into distinct disciplines, themes and theoretical frameworks, and in particular, against myself in the habituated style of writing in the Western university that has led me at times to inadvertently erase the epistemic position from which I speak. As Grosfoguel reminds us, Western philosophy and sciences, in concealing the locus of enunciation, ‘are able to produce a myth about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks’.15 Further, in decolonial thought this concealment and the “Truthfulness” it affords is understood as an epistemic strategy which enabled ‘European/Euro-American colonial expansion and domination … to construct a hierarchy of superior and inferior knowledge and, thus, of superior and inferior people around the world’.16 This epistemic violence is the ground upon which European imperialism and colonialism was built. Gayatri Spivak is credited with coining the term in the seminal text ’Can the subaltern speak?’; in which she argues that epistemic violence is the active obstruction of non-Western approaches to knowledge production. 17 This process instantiates the active erasure of these knowledges and the attempt to overwrite them, and through this process the West becomes the legitimate epistemic subject and knowledge producer. Spivak argues that this movement establishes and generates an epistemic Other, through the ‘assumption and construction of a consciousness or subject’ that ‘cohere[s] with the work of imperialist subject-constitution, mingling epistemic violence with the advancement of learning and civilization.’18 Where the collectively and externally described and delimited non-Western subject-as-object or Other is defined against the rational subject of the West, they are constituted as lacking reason, subjecthood, and thus of the rights to self-determination and freedom from colonization. The epistemic violence then, the violent imposition and delimitation of ways of being, knowing and feeling provides the legitimating groundwork for violent interventions – as Grosfoguel writes succinctly, We went from the sixteenth century characterization of “people without writing” to the eighteenth and nineteenth century characterization of “people without history” to the twentieth century characterization of “people without development” and more recently to the early twenty-first century of “people without democracy”19 We can see the continuity of this logic with the movement and logics of logistical rationality animating the turn toward Big Data, behavioural management & modification, and the experimental governance of “nudge” and “libertarian paternalism” that we come to in the final chapter of this thesis. This replays a similarly interventionist characterization of “people without rationality”. We can think of the corollary shifts in the coloniality of modes of governance a number of ways. Kwame Nkrumah in 1966 writes powerfully on what he understands as the phenomenon of neocolonialism – the continuation of colonialism by other means. This involves economic domination and exploitation without the expense of maintaining governmental administrations. This ostensibly materialist assessment has been vital in informing the position of this thesis, paying attention to the economic structures put in place to maintain forms of domination and control over former colonies or large parts of the Global South without direct rule. Deploying a primarily Marxist anti-capitalist perspective, Nkrumah understands neocolonialism as a kind of ‘collective imperialism’, interrogating the international character of the agencies employed: financial and industrial consortia, assistance organisations, financial aid bodies, and the like. Friendly cooperation is offered in the educational, cultural and social domains, aimed at subverting the desirable patterns of indigenous progress to the imperialist objectives of the financial monopolists. These are the real methods of holding back the real development of the new countries. These are the paraphernalia of neocolonialism, superficially proffering aid and guidance; subterraneously benefiting the interested donors and their countries in old and new ways.20 This thesis attends to some of these questions in Chapters 1-3. This more historical section discusses the institutional advancement of development doctrines as irrevocably linked to logistical infrastructure building, as well as rational modelling and systems thinking; applied anthropology as both counterinsurgency and the extraction of knowledge about indigenous and national populations; and extractive mechanisms of debt and dependency as related to development and global structures of power and capital. Mignolo notes that critiques of modernity are currently centred on 3 distinct types – one, immanent to Europe, is a Euro-centric critique and internal to the history of Europe itself. The other two, he argues, emerged out of non-European histories and their entanglement with Western modernity; one with a focus on Western civilization, and the other on coloniality. Though my work takes elements of all three of these avenues of critique, the concept of coloniality is most useful in describing the trajectory and dissemination of logistical rationality and its epistemologies. The concept of coloniality is understood as a model of power which integrates the legacies and practices of European colonialism in social orders and ways of knowing. First used by Quijano and developed by Lugones and Mignolo amongst others, it refers to the way in which the concepts of modernity and coloniality are inseparable – that ‘the modernity that Europe takes as the context for its own being is, in fact, so deeply imbricated in the structures of European colonial domination over the rest of the world that it is impossible to separate the two: hence, modernity/coloniality’.21 As part of a broader project, the concept of coloniality seeks to decentre the geographical determinism and historical internalism often present in critiques of Eurocentrism, toward an epistemic critique that allows us to look at various forms of epistemic violence and how they are present across geographical locations.22 This thesis thus decentres the narrative of modernization that many contemporary, even critical accounts of logistics rest on – logistical globalisation presented as a result of technical developments in the 1950’s and 60’s elides accounts of Empire as a violent globalising force, and is commensurate with a conception of linear and homogenous time that anti- post- and decolonial accounts of modernity trouble as part of the construction of modernity itself. Deborah Cowen in The Deadly Life of Logistics, links anti-imperial piracy of the 17th Century to its contemporary forms and sees the 1950’s and 60’s as a threshold of contemporary globalisation and logistical organisation. She writes a convincing and situated analysis of logistics as an inherently spatial phenomenon, arguing that it represents a new ‘imperial imaginary’, with a distinct emphasis on the materialities of logistics.23 This is because logistics is concerned with the reworking of sovereignty through the production of ‘space’ beyond ‘territory’. She is one of the first writers, to my knowledge, explicitly connecting the contemporary operations of logistics with imperialism. Cowen traces the development of logistics, from its initial conception as a banal, subsidiary form of military art or strategy to its rise as a global business science. She specifically interrogates the way in which contemporary logistics transforms the ‘geographies of production and distribution and of security and war’, as well as ‘political relations to the world and ourselves, and thus practices of citizenship too’.24 For Cowen, logistics represents ‘a profoundly imperial cartography’, in which the production and contestation of logistics spaces and circulation refigures territory and sovereignty in the service of the protection of trade flows25. She writes that [f]rom its history as a military art in service of the national, territorial, geopolitical state, logistics became a technology of supranational firms operating in relational geoeconomic space. In contrast to the absolute territory of geopolitical calculation associated with colonial rule, geo-economics relies on the unimpeded flows of goods, capital and information across territorial boundaries.26 She thus figures logistics as a new imperial imaginary that fosters economic flows and produces ‘space beyond territory’.27 This production of space sees the reworking of national borders and trade routes as corridors and pathways, where “networked” and “systems” security reconstitute the border as an exceptional space of government, subject to different laws, trade agreements, tax breaks, and different levels of securitisation and labour rights. Put differently, logistics as a business science has come to ‘drive geo-economic logics and authority, where geo-economics emphasizes the recalibration of international space by globalized market logics, transnational actors (corporate, non-profit, and state), and a networked geography of capital, goods and human flows.’28 Her work demonstrates the necessity of a more theoretically informed interrogation of what it means that logistics reworks imperial power. As demonstrated above, there is a wealth of postand decolonial theory that shows the irreducibility of the construction of modernity and its political categories to the project of colonialism and vice-versa. For example, Mitchell shows us that an integral part of this construction is the production of what he understands as homogenous time and homogenous space. The organisation of time and space, in his account, is intimately tied to the project of Western modernity, as it is organised to produce a unified, coherent historical time that centres the West as the locus of its enunciation. Mitchell writes that ‘to disrupt the powerful story of modernity, rather than contribute to its globalization, it is not enough to question simply its location. One also has to question its temporality.’ 29 While Cowen does reference David Harvey on time-space compression and the importance of speed with regards to logistical circulation, we must interrogate this concept and the linear account of the temporality of globalization processes that still focus on the West as the centre from which they emanate. My thesis attempts to go further in arguing that logistics and the rationality that underpins it is a continuation of logics from as early as the 15th century, and that we can detail diverse genealogies that complicate this notion of a singular history and as a result, complicate the world-making representations of logistics.

#### Objectivity’s demand for Journalist Ethics of Individual Detachment fractures horizontal coalitions and solidarity.

Dickinson 21 Kay Dickinson “Supply Chain Cinema, Supply Chain Education: Training Creative Wizardry for Offshored Exploitation” (works in the University of Glasgow Film and Television department)//Elmer

In 2017, the Precarious Workers Brigade published its free-to-download Training for Exploitation? Politicising Employability and Reclaiming Education, a tool kit for those requested to oversee such professionalization, often themselves either career advisors detached from the daily unfurling of critical scholarship, or colleagues in the most casualized and vulnerable positions within their departments and consequently in serious need of shared materials to lessen their own heavy workloads. Stressing the unevenness of access to employment, disabusing the promise that such training safeguards against joblessness, and exposing the lack of “neutrality” of the attributes ascribed to being “employable,” the resources collected within include bibliographies and statistics that support the critique of the current engineering of the labor force. Drawing on a host of radical pedagogies, Training for Exploitation? provides ready-made possible templates and exercises that range from manifesto writing, forum theater, and photo romance creation to how to devise open letters and “ethical internship” contracts or convert industry placements into militant worker inquiry. These activities invite students to question their positions as laborers, past, present, and future. The publication provides advice on how to involve oneself in or initiate worker cooperatives and time banks, alerting students to genuine economic alternatives. Throughout Training for Exploitation? solidarity takes center stage. The Precarious Workers Brigade’s stance is worth quoting at length: To re-introduce solidarity into educational conversations about work is to offer an alternative that does not otherwise seem to exist. Under the neoliberal logic, anyone you meet, including a co-worker, is largely understood as another networking opportunity. Yet, it should be clear that competition is not the only way of us relating to each other; self-reliance is neither something desirable, nor possible to achieve. . . . Solidarity is a very dif­ferent kind of relating to and helping one another, of improving one’s work and life. It is fundamentally linked to justice and ethics. It calls for standing together with other people. Solidarity becomes concrete when we consider how we think about our career dreams. How can we “get there” differently? Do we actually like the way the “there” operates? Since competition produces anxiety and stress, it can be a relief when the classroom becomes a space where it is possible to deconstruct this narrative and make room to explore more co-operative economies and goals. This process of addressing individualised competitiveness builds solidarities between students—and opens teaching to collective transformation.32 Paradoxically, and generatively, such solidarity might now seem more obtainable, given that the division between an “us” (in education) and a “them” (in the creative industries) no longer remains so clear-cut. As an academic, I too convince myself into intensive work schedules that a similarly compromised “commitment” persuades me to tolerate. I too could joke about needing a courtesy bot to sustain my friendships or ask myself the question, “Alive?” But to connect beyond simply commiserating? To start, it would be beholden on all of us not to convert the animosity generated by one side dictating the terms the other must follow into a breach that segregates workers. For certain, both sectors are independently arranged in ways that complicate collectivism. Each film project contracts a dif­ferent composition of crew members; workers are fragmented through casualization. Academics tend toward lone, often competitive research ventures; they often study contexts with a projected objectivity that can preclude them from horizontal political organizing. Nonetheless, we carry distinct skills and tactics to offer each other within an ultimately shared strug­gle against how transnationalized, competitive capitalism drives down wages, conditions, and securities. If the supply chain capitalizes on the fleet flow between our sectors, then we must try to move through our circuitries differently. For this, we might take some cues from the tradition of conricerca, coor militant research.33 Conricerca derives from deep alliances between community members, who need not all be researchers in the textbook sense, working together to realize radical and situated change. Militant research is expressly motivated by the needs and priorities of those involved and looks to acknowledge their labor and ideas squarely. It does not apologize for its partiality, amass research to then transfer it out of the immediate, or pass on the baton of responsibility. Unlike much conventional academic research, conricerca refuses the extractive impulse. Rather, it interrogates, often upends, its conditions and prejudices of production, here offering something closer to political transformation than a reinvestment back into human capital for the researcher. In all this, conricerca seeks to take seriously the restrictions encircling its communities, along with broader political and social ones, to better enact whatever action is deemed necessary. The work conducted aspires to communality rather than stratified pecking orders of labor or outcome and, in so doing, contravenes the weighted priorities of interaction insisted by the likes of ScreenSkills. As the global supply chain and its governmental agents close the gap between academy and industry for their own ends, the resulting proximity renders conricerca more possible. The supply chain has forced us to learn each other’s languages, through which we might now communicate and invent better idioms and praxes. Our shared encounters—the work placements, internships, guest visits to professionalization seminars, the growing trend in universities to hire practitioner-theorists (admittedly to save money), as well as the continuities fostered through the application of training—offer sustained potential for co-research and collective strug­gle. To do so, they must be redirected away from hierarchized master classes, tips on how to succeed, unique salable insight, a foot in the door, or an individualized yet highly ideologically confected “lucky break.” Rather than peddling “professionalization,” these congregations bear the potential to undo that very notion and its biopolitical lockstep with the supply chain’s demands. There is scope to transform the wonder at expertise into a “you too can” (as the Harry Potter Studio Tour does for other ends) that assumes a much more politically emancipating application of creativity.

#### The Impact is Global Civil War.

Cowen 14, Deborah. The deadly life of logistics: Mapping violence in global trade. U of Minnesota Press, 2014. Pgs 1-5 (PhD in Geography from the University of Toronto)//Elmer

Sneakers may still be easier to order online than smart bombs, but the industry that brings us both is making it increasingly difficult to discern the art of war from the science of business. Today, war and trade are **both animated by the supply chain**—they are organized by it and take its form. At stake is not simply the privatization of warfare or the militarization of corporate supply chains. With logistics **comes new kinds of crises**, **new paradigms of security**, new uses of **law, new logics of killing**, and a new map of the world. For many, logistics may only register as a word on the side of the trucks that magically bring online orders only hours after purchase or that circulate incessantly to and from big-box stores at local power centers. The entire network of infrastructures, technologies, spaces, workers, and violence that makes the circulation of stuff possible remains tucked out of sight for those who engage with logistics only as consumers. Yet, alongside billions of commodities, the management of global supply chains imports elaborate transactions into the socius—transactions that are political, financial, legal, and often martial. With the rise of global supply chains, even the simplest purchase relies on the calibration of an astonishing cast of characters, multiple circulations of capital, and complex movements across great distances. Take the seeming simplicity of a child’s doll purchased at a suburban shopping mall. We can trace its production to places like Guangdong, China, where dolls are packed into containers in large numbers, loaded onto trucks in the local Industrial Development Area, and transferred onto ships in the port of Zhongshan. Many of these dolls make the trek across the Pacific—6,401 nautical miles—via Hong Kong by sea to arrive at the Port of Long Beach approximately nineteen days and one hour later. Two days later the ships are unloaded, three days later they clear customs, and then our containers full of dolls are transferred to a set of trucks and delivered 50 miles east to a distribution center in Mira Loma, California. Here the containers are opened and the boxes are unloaded, sorted, and repacked before being loaded again onto any one of the 800 diesel trucks that pick up and drop off cargo every hour in that town. Some of these trucks travel as far as 800 miles or more to a regional distribution center before their cargo is unloaded, sorted, and reloaded onto a final truck and sent to one of Wal-Mart’s 4,000 American outlets. If this set of movements seems elaborate, this is in fact a heavily simplified and sanitized account of the circulation of stuff. First, it is misleading to think about a singular site of production. Commodities today are manufactured across logistics space rather than in a singular place. This point is highlighted if we account for “inbound logistics”— the production processes of component parts that make the manufacture of a commodity possible—and if we recognize transportation as an element of production rather than merely a service that follows production. The complexity would be enhanced dramatically if we took stock of all the ways that capital circulates through its different forms during this physical circulation of commodity to market. A more nuanced narrative would especially start to surface if we were to highlight the frequent disruptions that characterize supply chains and the violent and contested human relations that constitute the global logistics industry. To the everyday delays of bad weather, flat tires, failed engines, missed connections, traffic jams, and road closures, we would also need to add more deliberate interruptions. Just-in-time transport systems can be disrupted by the labor actions of transport workers at any one of the multiple links along the way. Workers, organized or not, may interfere with the packing and repacking of cargo at any of the transshipment sites. Ships are frequently hijacked by pirates in key zones on open waters, and truck and rail routes are sometimes blockaded—in response to both long histories of colonial occupation and current practices of imperial expansion. Even national borders, with the unpredictable delays of customs and security checks, challenge the fast flow of goods. The threat of disruption to the circulation of stuff has become such a profound concern to governments and corporations in recent years that it **has prompted the creation of an entire architecture of security that aims to govern global spaces of flow.** This new framework of security—supply chain security—relies on a range of new forms of transnational regulation, border management, data collection, surveillance, and labor discipline, as well as naval missions and aerial bombing. In fact, to meaningfully capture the social life of circulation, we would have to consider not only disruption to the system but the assembly of infrastructure and architecture achieved through land grabs, military actions, and dispossessions that are often the literal and figurative grounds **for new logistics spaces**. Corporate and military logistics are increasingly entangled; this is a matter of not only military forces clearing the way for corporate trade but corporations actively supporting militaries as well. Logistics are one of the most heavily privatized areas of contemporary warfare. This is nowhere more the case than in the U.S. military bases in Iraq and Afghanistan, where private companies are contracted to do much of the feeding and housing of troops. “Public” military logisticians rapidly cycle into the private sector, often precisely to facilitate the shifting of logistics contracts to private military companies. The entanglement of military and corporate logistics may be deepening and changing form, but logistics was never a stranger to the world of warfare. The language of the supply chain (its recent corporate management speak) would have us believe that logistics emerged out of the brave new world of business to only recently colonize the old institution of the military. And yet, while national militaries have indeed been taken over by a new kind of corporate calculation, it was historically the military and warfare that gave the gift of logistics (De Landa 1991; Shoenberger 2008). Logistics was dedicated to the art of war for millennia only to be adopted into the corporate world of management in the wake of World War II. For most of its martial life, logistics played a subservient role, enabling rather than defining military strategy. But things began to change with the rise of modern states and then petroleum warfare. The logistical complexity of mobilization in this context meant that the success or failure of campaigns came to rely on logistics. Over the course of the twentieth century, a reversal of sorts took place, and logistics began to lead strategy rather than serve it. This military history reminds us that logistics is not only about circulating stuff but about sustaining life. It is easy today to associate logistics with the myriad inanimate objects that it manages, but the very sustenance of populations is a key stake in the game. Indeed—the definitive role of the military art of logistics was in fueling the battlefield, and this entailed feeding men as well as machines. More recently, we see logistics conceptualized not only as a means to sustain life but as a lively system in itself. Contemporary efforts to protect supply chains invest logistical systems with biological **imperatives to flow** **and prescribe “resilience**” as a means of sustaining not only human life but the system itself. In this context, threats to circulation are treated not only as criminal acts but as **profound threats to the life of trade**. As I argue in the pages that follow, new boundaries of belonging are being drawn around spaces of circulation. These “pipelines” of flow are not only displacing the borders of national territoriality but also recasting **the geographies of law and violence** that were organized by the inside/outside of state space. Those on the outside of the system, who aim to contest its flows, face the raw force of rough trade without recourse to normal laws and protections. Logistics is no simple story of securitization or of distribution; it is an industry and assemblage that is at once bio-, necro-, and antipolitical. The Deadly Life of Logistics is concerned with how the seemingly banal and technocratic management of the movement of stuff through space has become a driving force of war and trade. This book examines how the military art of moving stuff gradually became not only the “umbrella science” of business management but, in Nigel Thrift’s (2007, 95) words, “perhaps **the central discipline of the contemporary world**.” But this book considers logistics as a project and not an achievement. Logistics is profoundly political and so contested in all its iterations—on the oceans, in cities, on road and rail corridors, and in the visual and cartographic images that are also part of its assemblage. This book explores how the art and then the science of logistics continue to transform not only the geographies of production and distribution and of security and war but also our political relations to our world and ourselves, and thus practices of citizenship, too. The third intervention is related to the first and second; it highlights questions of violence and calculation specifically by interrogating the shifting boundaries between “civilian” and “military” domains. These boundaries are not only conceptual and legal; they are also geographical (Mbembe 2003). As many scholars have outlined, the architecture of modern war was also a map of the modern state. War “faces out” from national territory, whereas the civilian was said to occupy domestic space (Giddens 1985, 192; Foucault [1997] 2003, 49). In the context of modernity, war designated “a conflict in some sense external to the structures of **sovereignty and civil war a conflict internal to them**” (Evans and Hardt 2010). But these boundaries are in significant flux. If **we are living in an era of “global civil war**” (Hardt and Negri 2002), wherein the national territorial framework that underpinned modern war erodes, then we are also seeing a corresponding “shift from the external to the internal use of force,” with armed conflicts administered not “as military campaigns but police actions” (Evans and Hardt 2010). And yet, this shift takes on a much more specific spatiality; the networked infrastructure and architecture of the supply chain animates both war and trade. This book insists that any serious engagement with contemporary political life must think through the violent economies of space. Our theory needs to engage our present as fundamentally a time of logistics space.

#### Their calls for progress are an algorithmic drive for improvement that hardens logistical control over bodies in a rush for productivity which results in land conflicts, ecocide, poverty, war and turns the aff.

Moten and Harney 17 (Fred Moten – Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside. Stefano Harney – Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University. Edited by Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin. "Improvement and Preservation Or, Usufruct and Use" Futures of Black Radicalism, pgs. 83-91, DOA: 7-4-2020, jzn) recut //Jay

Exception is a categorization one grants oneself only at the price of imagining that it has been granted by an Other. To declare one'; exceptionalism is not a matter of exempting. or excluding. or excusing oneself, all of which are transitive. Exceptionalism imagines the intransitive and attributes action to Others and, more importantly. an originary kind of power to someone else. And it is here that we see how the pre-text Serequeberhan identifies is in fact pre-given in a double sense, it must be given but in order to be given it must also haw: been granted. there is no dialectic here. Rather we might say it is only the European who has ever been both master and slave. This is his drama, held in the body. and enacted in the world. He has to have. The exception will have been a power given by an Other to selves who, in taking it and its accompanying knowledge on, are supposed to have been provided. in this give and take, their own confirmation. But the pre-text is never truly grounded. never truly granted. never truly given. Europe is constantly disestablished by what it seeks to envelop. which, in and out of turn. envelops it. What surrounds the European even in his midst is the native informant Gayatri Spivak identifies as a creation text for a world of exception. against, but nonetheless within. the general antagonism of earthly anarrhythmia and displacement. The paradox of the pre-text is thus that being exceptional can no more be taken than it can be given and can no more be claimed than it can be granted. This simultaneity of being-master and being- slave is sovereignty's static, omnicidal decline. This is what it is to be chained to the struggle for freedom, a "rational" instrument run amok in place. as man's perpetually stilled motion. What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what busi- ness calls a "commitment to continuous improvement"? It means to stand for the brutal speciation of all. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a diabol- ical usufruct. Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure, where individuated ownership; derived from increasing the lands productivity. is given in the perpetual. and thus arrested. becoming of exception': miniature. 'This is to say that from the outset. the ability to own-and that abillty's first deriv- ative, self-possession-is entwined with the ability to make more productive. in order to be improved. to be rendered more productive, land must be violently reduced to its productivity; which is the regulatory diminishment and manage- ment of earthly generativity. Speciation is this general reduction of the earth to \_productivity and submission of the earth to techniques of domination that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of productivity. In this regard. (necessarily European) man. in and as the exception. imposes speciation upon himself. in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must he forcefully speciated to he possessed. man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and. especially and most vividly, Cedric Robinson identify in medieval Europe become usufructcd with modern posses- sion through improvement. Speciated humans are endlessly improved through the endless work they do on their endless way to becoming Man. This is the usufruct of man. in early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant eliminating biodiversity and isolating and breeding in species-barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively trans- formed so that monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity. The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser. possession is established through improvement--this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. The Enlightenment is the universalization/globalization of the imperative to possess and its corol- lary, the imperative to improve. However. this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the destruction of its biosphere and its estrangement in. if not from. entanglement. both of which combine to ensure the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man. the exception. To stand for such improvement is to invoke policy, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, whose simulta- neous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize. This attri- bution of a supposedly essential lack. an inevitable and supposedly natural dimi- nution, is achieved alongside the imposition of possession-by-improvement. To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything. to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement. to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man. in this context. continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antag- onism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### The alternative is the undercommons as a nonplace that refuses the call to order, and engages in haptic love against the violent corrective of logistics and planning against policy.

Harney and Moten 13 (Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. "The undercommons: Fugitive planning and black study." (2013): 1. Pgs 87-91 (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer

Never being on the right side of the Atlantic is an unsettled feeling, the feeling of a thing that unsettles with others. It’s a feeling, if you ride with it, that produces a certain distance from the settled, from those who determine themselves in space and time, who locate themselves in a determined history. To have been shipped **is to have been moved** **by others, with others**. It is to feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursued, at rest with the ones who consent not to be one. Outlawed, interdicted, intimate things of the hold, containerized contagion, logistics externalizes logic itself to reach you, but this is not enough to get at the social logics, the social poesis, **running through logisticality**. Because while certain abilities – to connect, to translate, to adapt, to travel – were forged in the experiment of hold, they were not the point. As David Rudder sings, “how we vote is not how we party.” The hold’s terrible gift was to gather dispossessed feelings in common, to create a new feel in the undercommons. Previously, this kind of feel was only an exception, **an aberration, a shaman, a witch, a seer, a poet amongst others**, who felt through others, through other things. Previously, except in these instances, feeling was mine or it was ours. But in the hold, in the undercommons of a new feel, another kind of feeling became common. Tis form of feeling was not collective, not given to decision, not adhering or reattaching to settlement, nation, state, territory or historical story; nor was it repossessed by the group, which could not now feel as one, reunified in time and space. No, when Black Shadow sings “are you feelin’ the feelin?’’ he is asking about something else. He is asking about a way of feeling through others, a **feel for feeling others feeling you**. Tis is modernity’s insurgent feel, its inherited caress, its skin talk, tongue touch, breath speech, hand laugh. Tis is the feel that no individual can stand, and no state abide. This is the feel we might call hapticality. Hapticality, the touch of the undercommons, the interiority of sentiment, the feel that what is to come is here. Hapticality, the capacity to feel though others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you, this feel of the shipped is not regulated, at least not successfully, by a state, a religion, a people, an empire, a piece of land, a totem. Or perhaps we could say these are now recomposed in the wake of the shipped. To feel others is unmediated, immediately social, amongst us, our thing, and even when we recompose religion, it comes from us, and even when we recompose race, we do it as race women and men. Refused these things, we first refuse them, in the contained, amongst the contained, lying together in the ship, the boxcar, the prison, the hostel. Skin, against epidermalisation, senses touching. Thrown together touching each other we were denied all sentiment, denied all the things that were supposed to produce sentiment, family, nation, language, religion, place, home. Tough forced to touch and be touched, to sense and be sensed in that space of no space, though refused sentiment, history and home, we feel (for) each other. A feel, a sentiment with its own interiority, there on skin, soul no longer inside but there for all to hear, for all to move. **Soul music is a medium of this interiority on the skin, its regret the lament for broken hapticality, its self-regulatory powers the invitation to build sentimentality together again, feeling each other again, how we party**. This is our hapticality, our love. This is love for the shipped, love as the shipped. There’s a touch, a feel you want more of, which releases you. The closest Marx ever got to the general antagonism was when he said “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need” but we have read this as the possession of ability and the possession of need. What if we thought of the experiment of the hold as the absolute fluidity, the informality, of this condition of need and ability? What if ability and need were in constant play and we found someone who dispossessed us so that this movement was our inheritance. Your love makes me strong, your love makes me weak. What if “the between the two,” the lost desire, the articulation, was this rhythm, this inherited experiment of the shipped in the churning waters of flesh and expression that could **grasp by letting go ability** and need in constant recombination. If he moves me, sends me, sets me adrift in this way, amongst us in the undercommons. So long as she does this, she does not have to be.

#### Supply Chains drive for infinite interdependence are terminally unsustainable.

Rao 21 V Venkateswara Rao 10-20-2021 "Global supply chains are 'close to collapse'" <https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/global-supply-chains-are-close-to-collapse> (Leadership in Physics of Failure, Vibration Analytics)//Elmer

The UK government embarked on emergency efforts to rescue the country from supply chain chaos by offering European truckers 5,000 short-term visas. Britain's trucking industry relied on thousands of drivers from the EU, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, who went home during the pandemic and many haven't been able to get back into a post-Brexit UK. Shortage of truck drivers caused fuel stations across the UK running out of stocks and in turn leading to empty supermarket shelves. Pandemic forced the EU truck drivers to leave UK and Brexit barred their re-entry into UK. Today, millions of products - cars, washing machines, smartphones, and more - rely on computer chips, also known as semiconductors. And right now, there just aren't enough of them to meet industry demand. Global chip industry is now facing both demand pressures as well as supply constraints. The rise of 5G increased the demand, and the decision by the US to prevent the sale of semiconductors and other technology to Huawei accentuated supply constraints. The US restrictions prohibit foreign semiconductor manufacturers whose operations use the US technology from shipping products to Huawei without first getting a license from the American officials. And these US restrictions caused immense damage to the global supply chains of semiconductor industry. Disruptions in the supply chain, political strains between the West and China, and the crackdown in Hong Kong, the home of the toy industry, are particularly challenging for the US toy industry, which relies upon China for 86% of its toys. Analysts anticipate global retail prices of toys to increase in the range of 25% during the current year, while supply chain challenges will continue through 2021. The electronic giant, Apple was expected to make 90 million iPhones in the last quarter of 2021. However, Apple was now having to tell its stakeholders that the total production will be lower by as many as 10 million units in the quarter, reported Bloomberg. Smartphone makers like Apple - one of the biggest chip consumers in the world - has been severely impacted due to semiconductor shortage. Ikea stores are experiencing product availability disruptions on both sides of the Atlantic, with some product lines out of stock. The ready-to-assemble furniture maker refers to 'supply delays due to COVID-19' as the reason for any product availability disruptions, on its US website. Major ports around the US are struggling with queues of anchored ships and yards of containers piled as high as local fire departments will allow, as per an article published by Bloomberg in September. Typhoons and Covid outbreaks have worsened major congestion in the global supply-chain networks, as container boxes have been lying at ports, railyards and in warehouses from the US to Sudan to China. This has lessons in the ripple effects across global supply chains, showing the limits of diversification as global value networks are closely interdependent. Food grade CO2 is used for hundreds of products. Agricultural chemicals industry produces CO2 as a by-product of its main product, fertiliser. As some UK fertiliser factories stopped working because of extreme rise in wholesale gas prices, there had been a cut of 60% of the UK's food-grade carbon dioxide supply. The UK poultry and meat producers said that the shortage of carbon dioxide "threatens national food security". Will these supply shocks prove merely a temporary disruption as the global economy recovers from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic? Or instead, will we face a meltdown of the global production system? Certain shortages such as those of truck drivers and shipping containers, or gasoline in the United Kingdom directly affect the logistics connecting the links in supply chains. Pandemic ensued border restrictions, distancing requirements and factory closures have all wreaked havoc on traditional supply chains, leading to congestion at ports, delivery delays and soaring freight rates on the main shipping routes between China, the US and Europe. As a result, supply-chain vulnerabilities have rapidly become mutually reinforcing and self-amplifying. Heavy rains have forced the closures of 60 coal mines in Shanxi province, the largest coal mining hub in China. China’s critical electricity shortage is the result of draconian regulation of coal mining, exacerbated by Beijing's punitive ban on Australian coal imports. Geopolitics, climate catastrophes and trade wars have also disrupted the global supply chains. The highly specialised and inter-dependent global production system has delivered substantial benefits in the past, but its weaknesses are now clearly visible.

### 2

#### Dems win Midterms now – Advocacy Media shifts negative sentiment away and cultivate media appeal from the GOP sharpens their image.

Bunch 3-3 [Will, national columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer, Here’s the message that wins the midterms for Democrats, if they’re not afraid | Will Bunch”, 03-03-2022, https://www.inquirer.com/opinion/democrats-midterms-pro-democracy-message-20220303.html]//pranav

It hasn’t aired yet, but I want to share with you the political ad that could win the 2022 midterm elections for the Democrats — even with all the doom and gloom about President Biden’s approval rating and all the historical trends that favor the GOP. For reasons that will be clear in a minute, I’m not using the candidate’s name. The TV spot starts with one of the most dramatic and best-known soundbites in American history: the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. at the Lincoln Memorial in 1963, proclaiming, “I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.” The ad then switches to the candidate, dressed smartly but casually — not in a fleece vest, though! — and sitting in front of a blackboard in a school classroom. He looks into the camera. “I want an America where every child learns those words and what they mean,” the candidate says. “That’s why I was shocked when my opponent and other Republicans in our state voted for a bill that would keep American heroes like Martin Luther King [picture of King on the Selma-to-Montgomery march] and Rosa Parks [shot of Parks, sitting on a city bus] out of our schoolhouses. I’m sick and tired of the politicians trying to ban books from our libraries and gag our teachers in their classrooms. That’s not just wrong — it’s straight-up un-American.” Then, a tone shift as images from the war in Ukraine, including everyday citizens defending their homeland against Russian invaders, fill the screen. “We are all inspired by people around the globe, fighting for their freedom. It’s time we fight for democracy here in the United States. I want to make it easier for you to vote, not harder. Let’s make our schools about learning, not censorship.” The music begins to swell, with emotional frames of voters, kids in classrooms. “I’m running for Congress to fight to protect the American way.” There’s a reason you haven’t seen this TV spot yet, even if you’re a political obsessive like me. It hasn’t been filmed, and — given the tortured history of Democratic Party political thinking and strategy over the last 40 years — it might never be. I made it up, because I think the political party that — for all its well-documented flaws — wants to take the United States forward instead of backward into some Stone Age of white supremacy is missing a golden opportunity to push a message that connects with a majority of Americans. We all know the conventional wisdom about what is certain to happen when the nation votes in November. The historical precedent is that the party holding the White House gets clobbered, as happened to Donald Trump in 2018 and Barack Obama in 2010 — a notion now cemented by President Biden’s low approval rating and voter unease over high levels of inflation. Yet often the lofty conventional wisdom fails to notice changes at ground level.The post-2020 Census reapportionment process that was supposed to give an added edge to Republicans didnt actually do that. More important, the current political zeitgeist is radically different than it was during 2021’s off-year elections in Virginia, Florida, and other states. For one thing, the news is dominated by shock and outrage over Vladimir Putin’s barbaric invasion of Ukraine — a constant reminder of Donald Trump and other top Republicans who spent years as Putin apologists, or worse, as well as the risks of authoritarianism over democracy. But perhaps more important, Republicans who saw some gains last year running against education that addresses racism or LGBTQ rights now seem guilty of a major overreach. The extent of that GOP overreach can be seen both in the sheer number of bills that Republicans are introducing in statehouses across America — so-called gag orders about what teachers can say in their classrooms — at a rate of roughly three a day, according to PEN America, as well as outrageous local examples, like the Tennessee school board that pulled the anti-Holocaust graphic novel Maus out of the curriculum. Now, there is polling evidence that most Americans don’t like what they are seeing.Last month, a CBS News poll found resounding majorities of voters oppose any kind of book bans — for example, 83% say that books should never be banned for criticizing U.S. history — and also support classroom teaching about racism or other historical topics, even those with the potential to make some students uncomfortable. Basically, the CBS News respondents acknowledged that America has made some progress on racial issues but also believe that racism persists and that these issues should be discussed in classrooms. That’s very much the opposite of what TV pundits are saying, as well as the trend of GOP governing in the nation’s red states. There is a tendency, or course, to write off polling data on sensitive topics around race. Aren’t there some voters who say one thing to a pollster and behave differently in the voting booth? But let’s look at the politician who in 2021 became the avatar of the fight over antiracism education, Virginia’s new Republican governor, Glenn Youngkin. Taking office in January, Youngkin surprised voters with some of his extreme actions, which including a Day One executive order aimed at eliminating “divisive concepts” from classrooms, and even a tip line for parents to report on their kids’ teachers. The result? After little more than a month in office, Youngkin is already under water, with just 41% of Virginians approving of his performance and 43% disapproving. Clearly, there’s an opportunity here for Democrats. The party’s inclination in recent times is to go after voters with a rational appeal rather than an emotional one. In 2022, Democrats’ conundrum is that despite a slew of positive data around job creation and the broad economy, most voters say they aren’t feeling it, and they’re concerned about inflation and high gas prices. In today’s climate, the best pitch for Democrats is an emotional one — that the Republicans are the party of banning books and gagging teachers. Could anything be more against American values, the ones our grandfathers fought for in World War II?

#### Their consolidation of news into large swaths of objective reporting destroys local sense of community and increases partisan influence which ensures Republican wins.

Opoien 20 [Jessica, opinion editor of the Capital Times—a digital-first news publication with a weekly print edition. In addition to editing the century-old newspaper’s opinion section, Opoien writes a weekly column and hosts a podcast about Wisconsin politics called Wedge Issues. Prior to her move to opinion journalism, she was the Capital Times’ state government reporter, based in the state capitol, for several years. She has appeared on local, national, and international media as an expert on Wisconsin politics, discussing the Badger State on television stations including BBC World News, CNN, MSNBC, Bloomberg, Fox News, Fox Business News, and Sky News; and on radio stations including BBC Radio, Wisconsin Public Radio, WMTJ, and WHBY. In 2020, she was named one of New York Magazine’s 17 “swing state experts to follow on election night.” Opoien’s work has been honored by the Wisconsin Newspaper Association and the Milwaukee Press Club, “LAPDOGS, ATTACK DOGS, OR WATCHDOGS? NEWS MEDIA’S ROLE IN STATE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS”, December 2020, https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/63834/OPOIEN-THESIS-2020.pdf?sequence=1]//pranav

It is difficult to isolate the role of the news media in Wisconsin’s severely polarized political environment, but its presence is clear. Even in measures of geographic divisions, media emerges as a factor as rural residents increasingly feel as if institutions such as government and the news media are out of touch with their lives. While local news coverage can lead to increased civic participation, consolidation of media ownership appears to affect perceptions of one’s local news sources. Chipping away at the “local” element of local news erodes readers’ shared sense of community. Additionally, consolidation raises issues of trust among most people, and as people lose trust in news media, they become increasingly guided by partisan influence when making political decisions like voting.

The influence of conservative talk radio

is mostly documented with anecdotes, which suggest that, at its strongest point, it served to foment mistrust of mainstream media and to reinforce perspectives favored by conservatives and Republicans. Additional research should seek to quantify these observations with polling, interviews, and more extensive listenership data.

#### Stopping a GOP wave preserves Democracy.

Kondracke 21 Morton Kondracke 8-4-2021 “Why Democrats Must Retain Control of Congress in 2022” <https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/08/04/why_democrats_must_retain_control_of_congress_in_2022_146189.html> (Retired executive editor of Roll Call, a former "McLaughlin Group" and Fox News commentator and co-author, with Fred Barnes, of Jack Kemp: The Bleeding Heart Conservative Who Changed America)//Elmer

The 2020 election demonstrated how fragile our democracy is. As Donald Trump tried, [by means both legal and illegal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attempts_to_overturn_the_2020_United_States_presidential_election), to overturn the results of a free and fair election, only the [courts and a thin line of courageous Republican election officials](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/its-official-election-was-secure) guaranteed that the peoples’ choice prevailed. But the safeguards are weaker. Although the Supreme Court [upheld](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/supreme-court-rejects-final-trump-election-challenge-n1260023) the last lower-court dismissal of multiple Trump-inspired lawsuits charging election fraud, in July the court [upheld new voting restrictions](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/voting-rights-breyers-future-spotlight-us-supreme-court-2021-07-01/https:/www.reuters.com/world/us/voting-rights-breyers-future-spotlight-us-supreme-court-2021-07-01/) enacted in Arizona. And many of the [Republican election officials](https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/565657-new-spotlight-on-secretaries-of-state-as-electoral-battlegrounds) who refused to back up Trump’s bogus fraud charges have been [threatened](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-officials-under-attack), [fired, or are being challenged for reelection by Trump followers](https://www.economist.com/united-states/2021/07/03/state-level-republicans-are-reforming-how-elections-are-administered). Meanwhile, [17 Republican-controlled state legislatures](https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-july-2021) have joined Arizona in making voting more difficult: In several of them, legislators are trying to [seize control of election management](https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jul/14/are-state-legislators-really-seeking-power-overrul/), including power to replace county election officials or even decide how a state’s election results should be certified, regardless of the popular vote. Republicans claim they are acting restore faith in elections, but—with fraud repeatedly shown to be rare and of no effect in in 2020—Trump and his followers are really [undermining faith](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/24/2020-election-republican-official-races-490458) in American elections. The result of this frenzy of activity in furtherance of Trump’s “Big Lie”—that he won the 2020 election (and that he won in a “landslide,” no less) —is that the preservation of American-style self-government depends on Democrats retaining control of Congress in 2022. Republicans have shown that they simply can’t be trusted to safeguard democracy. Donald Trump now [owns the Republican Party](https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/11/how-republican-party-became-party-trump/) as GOP politicians up and down the line do his bidding, out of fear or belief. Even after a mob of Trump supporters invaded the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, Republicans in Congress voted overwhelmingly against [impeaching](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/trump-second-impeachment-vote-count-house-results-list/) and [convicting](https://www.politico.com/interactives/2021/trump-second-impeachment-senate-vote/) him for his actions and inaction. Eight GOP senators and 147 representatives [voted not to certify](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.htmlhttps:/www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.htmlhttps:/www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/politics/republicans-against-certification.html) Electoral College counts submitted by two states (had they prevailed, there would have more). Then only six GOP senators voted in favor of forming a truly bipartisan 9/11-style commission to investigate the insurrection, [killing the proposal by filibuster](https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/january-6-commission-senate/2021/05/28/54e9f692-bf27-11eb-b26e-53663e6be6ff_story.htmlhttps:/www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/january-6-commission-senate/2021/05/28/54e9f692-bf27-11eb-b26e-53663e6be6ff_story.html). After Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi established a select committee to conduct an investigation, Republican leaders attacked her as responsible for the riot, [falsely claiming](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/27/us/insurrection-pelosi-claims-fact-check.html) she is in charge of security at the Capitol. Republicans who voted against Trump on any issue relating to Jan. 6 now face [primary opponents](https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/28/cpac-donald-trump-expected-claim-leadership-republican-party/6843815002/https:/www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2021/02/28/cpac-donald-trump-expected-claim-leadership-republican-party/6843815002/) backed by him and [censure](https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-politics/republican-groups-censure-party-lawmakers-who-voted-impeach-convict-trump) by their state parties. Rep. Liz Cheney, the most vocal Trump critic in the GOP, lost her House leadership post. Trump has even [attacked Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/16/trump-attacks-mcconnell-in-fiery-statement-469150https:/www.politico.com/news/2021/02/16/trump-attacks-mcconnell-in-fiery-statement-469150), who criticized him after Jan. 6 but also blocked creation of the 9/11 commission. It’s classic authoritarian behavior—demanding [total loyalty](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/22/us/politics/trump-disloyalty-turnover.html) from his followers and total control of his faction, and assailing any rivals in power. Lately, Trump [reportedly](https://www.forbes.com/sites/markjoyella/2021/06/01/maggie-haberman-trump-telling-people-he-expects-to-be-reinstated-as-president-by-august/) has encouraged his followers to believe he can some

how be reinstated as president later this month, and the Department of Homeland Security is [concerned](https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/30/politics/dhs-summer-violence-warnings-conspiracy/index.html) that the violent acts of Jan. 6 may be repeated when he’s not. The sad, but inevitable conclusion is that if Republicans take control of either chamber in Congress, they will not try to do what’s best for America as a whole. They will do what Trump tells them to do, probably starting with trying to undo everything President Biden and the Democrats in Congress have done during the previous two years. For starters, if Democrats are to prevail next November, Biden must be seen as a successful moderate-progressive president—one who can defy the historical pattern that presidential parties [almost invariably](https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/vitalstats_ch2_tbl4.pdf) lose seats in their first midterm election. The last two Democratic presidents s who launched major initiatives without GOP support, Bill Clinton (tax increases and health care reform) and Barack Obama (Obamacare and anti-recession stimulus spending), suffered historic shellackings in the ensuing midterms—54 House seats and eight Senate seats in 1994, and 63 House and six Senate seats in 2010. Biden, who has multiple big programs in his policy agenda, has smaller Democratic margins in Congress than Clinton and Obama. In other words, the Democrats must hang on to almost all of their contested districts and states. McConnell, who earned the moniker [“grim reaper”](https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaperhttps:/thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaperhttps:/thehill.com/homenews/senate/555877-mcconnell-returns-as-senate-grim-reaper) for blocking Obama, was supposed to be a willing negotiating partner for Biden. Instead, the Senate Republican leader has pronounced himself [“100% focused”](https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/joe-biden/mcconnell-says-he-s-100-percent-focused-stopping-biden-s-n1266443) on defeating Biden’s legislative agenda. So far, Biden has succeeded in passing a $1.9 trillion COVID relief package (with no Republican votes). He is trying to work out a bipartisan $1 trillion [“physical infrastructure”](https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/28/politics/infrastructure-bill-explained/index.html) package. McConnell isn’t the obstruction with this legislation, as Senate negotiators and the White House [sound optimistic](https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senators-move-forward-with-infrastructure-bill-sunday-2021-08-01/). But with Rep. Kevin McCarthy openly angling for Pelosi’s job, nothing is certain in the House. Trump is actively trying to scuttle infrastructure spending. He’s telling Republicans to oppose it, saying passage means letting “the Radical Left play you for weak fools and losers,” and he has [threatened primary challenges](https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewsolender/2021/07/28/trump-threatens-lots-of-primaries-for-gop-senators-over-infrastructure-deal/?sh=4be66d98276b) against GOP legislators who support it. This, despite his promising to pass a [$2 trillion bill](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/28/infrastructure-deal-trump-501287) while president (then never delivering). Republicans who support it obviously want money for roads, bridges and broadband for their constituents. But they don’t like the contents of Biden’s follow-up proposal—a $3.5 trillion “human infrastructure” program, which would expand Medicare, caregiving for the disabled and elderly, and child care, while funding universal pre-kindergarten, free community college, national paid family leave, and extended child tax credits. And they don’t like the corporate and capital gains tax increases Democrats propose to pay for it all. So the Democratic plan is to pass it as a “budget reconciliation” measure requiring only Democratic votes. If, next November, the GOP captures one chamber—most likely, the [House](https://centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/forecasting-the-2022-midterm-election-with-the-generic-ballot/)—whatever Biden can get done in his first two years can’t be easily undone, but he will get nothing more passed. If the GOP gets control of both chambers, Republicans will try to reverse anything he has accomplished. He’ll have only his veto pen as protection. Stalemate from 2023 through 2024—and an unsuccessful-seeming Biden presidency—could reelect Trump (or someone backed by him), in which case constitutional norms and respect for election results and the rule of law would again be in peril.

#### Democratic governance solves Existential Threats – climate change, economic crises, and nuclear war are all exacerbated in an autocratic world.

Kolodziej 17, Edward A. "Challenges to the Democratic Project for Governing Globalization." Policy Insights, Special Issue (2017). (Emeritus Research Professor of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)//Re-cut by Elmer

The Rise of a Global Society Let me first sketch the global democratic project for global governance as a point of reference. We must first recognize that globalization has given rise to a global society for the first time in the evolution of the human species. We are now stuck with each other; seven and half billion people today — nine to ten by 2050: all super connected and interdependent. In greater or lesser measure, humans are mutually dependent on each other in the pursuit of their most salient values, interests, needs, and preferences — concerns about personal, community, and national security, sustainable economic growth, protection of the environment, the equitable distribution of the globe’s material wealth, human rights, and even the validation of their personal and social identities by others. Global warming is a metaphor of this morphological social change in the human condition. All humans are implicated in this looming Anthropogenic-induced disaster — the exhausts of billions of automobiles, the methane released in fracking for natural gas, outdated U.S. coal-fired power plants and newly constructed ones in China. Even the poor farmer burning charcoal to warm his dinner is complicit. Since interdependence surrounds, ensnares, and binds us as a human society, the dilemma confronting the world’s diverse and divided populations is evident: the expanding scope as well as the deepening, accumulating, and thickening interdependencies of globalization urge global government. But the Kantian ideal of universal governance is beyond the reach of the world’s disparate peoples. They are profoundly divided by religion, culture, language, tribal, ethnic and national loyalties as well as by class, social status, race, gender, and sexual orientation. How have the democracies responded to this dilemma? How have they attempted to reconcile the growing interdependence of the world’s disputing peoples and need for global governance? What do we mean by the governance of a human society? A working, legitimate government of a human society requires simultaneous responses to three competing imperatives: Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy. While the forms of these OWL imperatives have differed radically over the course of human societal evolution, these constraints remain predicable of all human societies if they are to replicate themselves and flourish over time. The OWL imperatives are no less applicable to a global society. 1. Order refers to a society’s investment of awesome material power in an individual or body to arbitrate and resolve value, interest, and preference conflicts, which cannot be otherwise resolved by non-violent means — the Hobbesian problematic. 2. The Welfare imperative refers to the necessity of humans to eat, drink, clothe, and shelter themselves and to pursue the full-range of their seemingly limitless acquisitive appetites. Responses to the Welfare imperative, like that of Order, constitute a distinct form of governing power and authority with its own decisional processes and actors principally associated either with the Welfare or the Order imperative. Hence we have the Marxian-Adam Smith problematic. 3. Legitimacy is no less a form of governing power and authority, independent of the Order and Welfare imperatives. Either by choice, socialization, or coerced acquiescence, populations acknowledge a regime’s governing authority and their obligation to submit to its rule. Here arises the Rousseaunian problematic. The government of a human society emerges then as an evolving, precarious balance and compromise of the ceaseless struggle of these competing OWL power domains for ascendancy of one of these imperatives over the others. It is against the backdrop of these OWL imperatives — Order, Welfare, and Legitimacy — that we are brought to the democratic project for global governance. The Democratic Project For Order, open societies constructed the global democratic state and, in alliance, the democratic global-state system. Collectively these initiatives led to the creation of the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, and the European Union to implement the democratic project’s system of global governance. The democratic global state assumed all of the functions of the Hobbesian Westphalian security state — but a lot more. The global state became a Trading, Banking, Market, and Entrepreneurial state. To these functions were added those of the Science, Technology and the Economic Growth state. How else would we be able to enjoy the Internet, cell phones and iPhones, or miracle cures? These are the products of the iron triangle of the global democratic state, academic and non-profit research centers, and corporations. It is a myth that the Market System did all this alone. Fueled by increasing material wealth, the democratic global state was afforded the means to become the Safety Net state, providing education, health, social security, leisure and recreation for its population. And as the global state’s power expanded across this broad and enlarging spectrum of functions and roles, the global state was also constrained by the social compacts of the democracies to be bound by popular rule. The ironic result of the expansion of the global state’s power and social functions and its obligation to accede to popular will was a Security state and global state-system that vastly outperformed its principal authoritarian rivals in the Cold War. So much briefly is the democratic project’s response to the Order imperative. Now let’s look at the democratic project’s response to the Welfare imperative. The democracies institutionalized Adam Smith’s vision of a global Market System. The Market System trucks and barters, Smith’s understanding of what it means to be human. But it does a lot more. The Market System facilitates and fosters the free movement of people, goods and services, capital, ideas, values, scientific discoveries, and best technological practices. Created is a vibrant global civil society oblivious to state boundaries. What we now experience is De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America on global steroids. As for the imperative of Legitimacy, the social compacts of the democracies affirmed Rousseau’s conjecture that all humans are free and therefore equal. Applied to elections each citizen has one vote. Democratic regimes are also obliged to submit to the rule of law, to conduct free and fair elections, to honor majority rule while protecting minority rights, and to promote human rights at home and abroad. The Authoritarian Threat to the Democratic Project The democratic project for global governance is now at risk. Let’s start with the challenges posed by authoritarian regimes, with Russia and China in the lead. Both Russia and China would rest global governance on Big Power spheres of influence. Both would assume hegemonic status in their respective regions, asserting their versions of the Monroe Doctrine. Their regional hegemony would then leverage their claim to be global Big Powers. Moscow and Beijing would then have an equal say with the United States and the West in sharing and shaping global governance. The Russo-Chinese global system of Order would ascribe to Russia and China governing privileges not accorded to the states both aspire to dominate. Moscow and Beijing would enjoy unconditional recognition of their state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in their domestic affairs, but they would reserve to themselves the right to intervene in the domestic and foreign affairs of the states and peoples under their tutelage in pursuit of their hegemonic interests. President Putin has announced that Russia’s imperialism encompasses the millions of Russians living in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Russia contends that Ukraine and Belarus also fall under Moscow’s purported claim to historical sovereignty over these states. Forceful re-absorption of Crimea and control over eastern Ukraine are viewed by President Putin as Russia’s historical inheritances. Self-determination is not extended to these states or to other states and peoples of the former Soviet Union. Moscow rejects their right to freely align, say, with the European Union or, god forbid, with NATO. In contrast to the democratic project, universal in its reach, the Russo-Chinese conception of a stable global order rests on more tenuous and conflict-prone ethno-national foundations. Russia’s proclaimed enemies are the United States and the European Union. Any means that undermines the unity of these entities is viewed by Moscow as a gain. The endgame is a poly-anarchical interstate system, potentially as war-prone as the Eurocentric system before and after World War I, but now populated by states with nuclear weapons.

### FWK

#### Conceded cfw collapses to consqeuencesonsequences -- reject any framework that arbitrariliy puts press freedom first

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The 2nr gets new weighing arguments as to how offense should function in terms of onsequences

### C1

#### Media bias is good, locks in public trust

Robinson 2019. Nathan Robinson. Tue 10 Sep 2019. Media bias is OK – if it's honest. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/sep/10/media-bias-is-ok-if-its-honest> [Nathan Robinson is the editor of Current Affairs and a Guardian US columnist]

Most people distrust the media, and most people are right. It’s healthy to question what you’re being told – that’s the mark of an intelligent and independent populace. And the media in the United States are, in fact, “biased” in many ways. Not always toward the left or right, but frequently toward reaffirming the worldview of an insular establishment, as Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky pointed out years ago in Manufacturing Consent. It should be obvious that there can’t be such a thing as a neutral journalist. We all have moral instincts and points of view. Those points of view will color our interpretations of the facts. The best course of action is to acknowledge where we’re coming from. If we show an awareness of our own political leanings, it actually makes us more trustworthy than if we’re in denial about them. Two recent controversies show how supposedly neutral journalists deny their biases. The Washington Post’s factchecker gave Bernie Sanders a “mostly false” rating for claiming that there are half a million medical-related bankruptcies a year. It was quite obvious that Sanders was relying on published research, and the claim was not in fact “mostly false”. But the Post has a history of these sorts of fact-free “factchecks” – when Sanders claimed that “millions of Americans” work multiple jobs, Glenn Kessler labeled the statement “misleading”, even though it was completely true. Ryan Grim has compiled a list of the appalling record of the Post’s unfair attacks on claims from the political left. Whatever this is, it isn’t factchecking. It’s not just an anti-Sanders bias. Donald Trump has some legitimate complaints about the press, too. Because he tells whopping lies all the time, journalists are predisposed to believe the worst about him and his administration. Recently, a Bloomberg Law reporter accused a labor department official of antisemitic Facebook posts. It was obvious the posts were sarcastic, and the reporter’s work was heavily criticized and the coverage amended. Because of past stories involving administration ties to antisemites, and Trump’s own use of language about Jewish people that would be considered scandalous if it came from Ilhan Omar, the reporter was inclined to think the worst. But if we automatically assume that Trump is the one in the wrong, we may end up with egg our faces. For example, when Trump claimed that millions of non-citizens voted illegally in the 2016 election, the Washington Post called him out in a “factcheck”. But it turned out the Washington Post itself had published an article making this very same claim. The factcheckers were so sure Trump invented the lie that they didn’t notice they had spread it themselves. I’m not inclined to defend Trump – I wrote a whole book about him called Anatomy of a Monstrosity that accused him of being one of the worst people in the world. But I also know that if my feelings about Trump lead to my making factual misstatements about him, his supporters will pounce, and claim that my bias destroys my credibility. If I state my prejudices up front, people will see me as more honest than if I pretend to be a mere “fact checker” when I’m clearly an opinion writer. My personal experience is that conservatives are far more open to leftwing arguments when they come from people who are honest about their politics, and don’t pretend not to have a point of view. I run a small mag

azine called Current Affairs, which operates from an unabashedly leftwing perspective. The letters we get from conservative readers indicate that many of them find the honesty refreshing, and it makes them more likely to hear us out. One reason conservatives hate the “mainstream media” is that it pretends to be something it isn’t. Conservatives think the press has a “liberal” bias; I tend to agree with Herman and Chomsky that it would be better described as a “corporate” bias reflecting the elitist centrism that has come to dominate the Democratic party. But few at MSNBC or CNN would admit that they’re partisan networks. That’s what they do in Great Britain, though – the major newspapers are open about having a political leaning. The Guardian, for example, is an explicitly left-leaning paper and everybody knows it. By contrast, the New York Times is clearly inclined toward Democratic centrism, but it won’t admit it. The editor of the op-ed page says that they strive for “viewpoint diversity”, but it’s clear that he doesn’t mean it. After all, they don’t have columnists from the far right, and they don’t have Marxist columnists. At least Fox News has been honest enough drop its old “Fair and Balanced” motto. If your paper is liberal, just embrace it – and then you can fire “viewpoint diversity” conservatives like Bret Stephens. Paradoxically, rebuilding trust requires embracing bias. Not embracing untruthfulness, but admitting your politics so that both writer and audience can be critical. I think the hope for media is in outlets like the Intercept, Jacobin and my own little magazine, because readers like transparency. (This is also one reason why people respect Bernie Sanders even when they disagree with him: they don’t think he’s trying to appear to be something he isn’t.) The salesman who tells you what he wants you to buy is more trustworthy than the one who insists he isn’t trying to sell you anything at all. It’s a perilous time for journalism, and small outlets need all the help we can get in order to survive. Corporate owners are shuttering great outlets all the time, and the only way we’re going to have viable media institutions is through an outpouring of popular support. Unfortunately, the public doesn’t trust us, and we need to think about how to slowly get people to see journalists as their allies instead of as duplicitous, faux-neutral propagandists. The first step is to be up front about where we’re coming from and how we see things. We’ve got to acknowledge that everyone is biased, and that it’s OK.

#### “Bias” is inevitable – it’s a question of its hidden under “false Objectivity” – that turns Media Credibility.

Taibbi 15 Matt Taibbi, 8-6-2015, "’Objective Journalism’ Is an Illusion", The New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/08/06/did-jon-stewart-have-a-serious-lesson-for-journalists/objective-journalism-is-an-illusion, (A journalist and writer for Rolling Stone magazine, is the author, most recently, of "The Divide: American Injustice in the Age of the Wealth Gap.") //Miller

Jon Stewart started sixteen years ago as the host of a comedy talk show, and he walks away this week as maybe the most trusted news reporter in America. His success in stealing the thunder away from what we used to call the “straight news” business is the greatest and funniest joke he ever pulled off. Some object to the characterization of Stewart as a journalist, because he “has opinions” and “isn’t objective,” but those people aren’t to be taken seriously. Opinion can’t be extracted from reporting. The only question is whether or not it’s hidden. Everything journalists do is a subjective editorial choice, from the size of headlines to the placement of quotes and illustrations. Stewart kicked off "The Daily Show" just as Americans on both sides of the political aisle were becoming more conscious of editorial bias. Conservatives focused on who was doing the reporting (largely a blue-state bunch), while progressives focused on who owned the reporting (nihilistic profit-seeking corporations, mainly). Both audiences got tired of trying to sift through hidden biases. So they searched for new and more dependable sources in the hundreds of new cable channels and the millions of new web sites that were appearing at the time. Stewart told you who he was up front. And it wasn’t hard to figure out whether he was being honest. Jokes don’t lie. They’re either funny or they’re not. He was consistently funny, which meant he was consistently true. In an increasingly ridiculous world, that was something to hold onto. While the commercial media responded to the fracturing news landscape by creating ideologically slanted television channels like Fox and MSNBC that were designed to capture left or right demographics for profit, Stewart remained his own person, ripping both parties. He hit the Republicans more, but only because they were more entertainingly ridiculous. He attacked the less cinematic cynicism of the Democrats regularly, too. We live in a society now where people want to know who a journalist is before they decide whether or not to believe his or her reporting. Americans got to know Jon Stewart quickly and quickly learned to trust him even though he clearly had a point of view. It’s the highest praise a journalist can get, and he deserved all of it.

#### More media “bias” doesn’t exist or its embedded in journalism

Hershey 2020. Marjorie Hershey. October 15, 2020. Political bias in media doesn’t threaten democracy — other, less visible biases do. <https://theconversation.com/political-bias-in-media-doesnt-threaten-democracy-other-less-visible-biases-do-144844> [Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Indiana University]

First, media bias is in the eye of the beholder. Communications scholars have found that if you ask people in any community, using scientific polling methods, whether their local media are biased, you’ll find that about half say yes. But of that half, typically a little more than a quarter say that their local media are biased against Republicans, and a little less than a quarter say the same local media are biased against Democrats. Research shows that Republicans and Democrats spot bias only in articles that clearly favor the other party. If an article tilts in favor of their own party, they tend to see it as unbiased. Many people, then, define “bias” as “anything that doesn’t agree with me.” It’s not hard to see why. ‘Media’ is a plural word American party politics has become increasingly polarized in recent decades. Republicans have become more consistently conservative, and Democrats have become more consistently liberal to moderate. As the lines have been drawn more clearly, many people have developed hostile feelings toward the opposition party. In a 2016 Pew Research Center poll, 45% of Republicans said the Democratic Party’s policies are “so misguided that they threaten the nation’s well-being,” and 41% of Democrats said the same about Republicans. Not surprisingly, media outlets have arisen to appeal primarily to people who share a conservative view, or people who share a liberal view. That doesn’t mean that “the media” are biased. There are hundreds of thousands of media outlets in the U.S. – newspapers, radio, network TV, cable TV, blogs, websites and social media. These news outlets don’t all take the same perspective on any given issue. If you want a very conservative news site, it is not hard to find one, and the same with a very liberal news site. First Amendment rules “The media,” then, present a variety of different perspectives. That’s the way a free press works. The Constitution’s First Amendment says Congress shall make no law limiting the freedom of the press. It doesn’t say that Congress shall require all media sources to be “unbiased.” Rather, it implies that as long as Congress does not systematically suppress any particular point of view, then the free press can do its job as one of the primary checks on a powerful government. When the Constitution was written and for most of U.S. history, the major news sources – newspapers, for most of that time – were explicitly biased. Most were sponsored by a political party or a partisan individual. The notion of objective journalism – that media must report both sides of every issue in every story – barely existed until the late 1800s. It reached full flower only in the few decades when broadcast television, limited to three major networks, was the primary source of political information. Since that time, the media universe has expanded to include huge numbers of internet news sites, cable channels and social media posts. So if you feel that the media sources you’re reading or watching are biased, you can read a wider variety of media sources. If it bleeds, it leads There is one form of actual media bias. Almost all media outlets need audiences in order to exist. Some can’t survive financially without an audience; others want the prestige that comes from attracting a big audience. Thus, the media define as “news” the kinds of stories that will attract an audience: those that feature drama, conflict, engaging pictures and immediacy. That’s what most people find interesting. They don’t want to read a story headlined “Dog bites man.” They want “Man bites dog.” The problem is that a focus on such stories crowds out what we need to know to protect our democracy, such as: How do the workings of American institutions benefit some groups and disadvantage others? In what ways do our major systems – education, health care, national defense and others – function effectively or less effectively? These analyses are vital to us as citizens – if we fail to protect our democracy, our lives will be changed forever – but they aren’t always fun to read. So they get covered much less than celebrity scandals or murder cases – which, while compelling, don’t really affect our ability to sustain a democratic system.

### C2/ C3

#### Fake news is overhyped- it has a small audience, is regulated during elections, and doesn’t change perspectives

Ingram 19 [Mathew Ingram, FEBRUARY 7, 2019, Researchers say fears about ‘fake news’ are exaggerated, <https://www.cjr.org/the_media_today/researchers-fake-news-exaggerated.php>, Mathew Ingram is CJR’s chief digital writer. Previously, he was a senior writer with Fortune magazine. He has written about the intersection between media and technology since the earliest days of the commercial internet. His writing has been published in the Washington Post and the Financial Times as well as by Reuters and Bloomberg.]

IT’S SO WIDELY ACCEPTED that it’s verging on conventional wisdom: misinformation, or “fake news,” spread primarily by Facebook to hundreds of millions of people (and created by Russian agents), helped distort the political landscape before and during the 2016 US presidential election, and this resulted in Donald Trump becoming president. But is it really that cut and dried? Not according to Brendan Nyhan, a political scientist and professor of public policy at the University of Michigan. He and several colleagues have been researching this question since the election, and have come to a very different conclusion. Fears about the spread and influence of fake news have been over-hyped, Nyhan says, and many of the initial conclusions about the scope of the problem and its effect on US politics were exaggerated or just plain wrong. Nyhan says his data shows so-called “fake news” reached only a tiny proportion of the population before and during the 2016 election. In most cases, misinformation from a range of fake news sites made up just 2 percent or less of the average person’s online news consumption, and even among the group of older conservatives who were most likely to consume fake news, it only made up about 8 percent. Not only that, but the University of Michigan researcher says a new paper he and his colleagues recently published shows the reach of fake news actually fell significantly between the 2016 election and the midterm elections last year, which suggests Facebook has cracked down on the problem. Nyhan also says “no credible evidence exists that exposure to fake news changed the outcome of the 2016 election.” This might come as a surprise to Kathleen Hall Jamieson. She’s a veteran public policy researcher who published a book last year entitled Cyberwar: How Russian Hackers and Trolls Helped Elect a President. Jamieson, whose colleagues call her “the Drill Sergeant” for her no-nonsense attitude, has more 40 years of studying human behavior under her belt. In the book, she says the evidence suggests misinformation propagated by Russian trolls likely influenced the outcome of the election, in part because of the number of “swing” or undecided voters who were susceptible to those kinds of tactics. Jamieson also notes th

at the traditional news media played a key role in spreading this fake news and propaganda, by writing innumerable articles about Hillary Clinton’s emails. And she argues fake news wouldn’t have had to make much of an impact to influence the election, since a fairly small number of votes gave Trump the electoral college wins he needed. Nyhan and his fellow researchers, however, including Princeton political scientist Andrew Guess, say their study looked at the actual behavior of a large sample of users who consented to have their online activity tracked and recorded in real time, and then followed up with interviews about their perceptions of the content. Not only was the amount of actual fake news they encountered incredibly tiny, Guess told CJR this past fall, but the idea that this would influence their behavior is also a bit of a stretch (something Nyhan wrote about for The New York Times last year). “It’s predominantly people who are inclined to believe the conclusions that are being made in this content, not so much swaying them to believe something,” Guess said. “In other words, it’s more or less just confirmation bias.” So why has this myth of fake news swinging the election persisted despite a lack of evidence to support it? Nyhan’s theory is that it’s a little like the myth that Orson Welles’s radio play “War of the Worlds” caused widespread panic among the US population when it was aired in 1938. The play was likely only heard by a tiny number of people, and there’s no actual evidence that it caused any kind of panic, and yet the myth persists—in part because newspapers at the time played up the idea, as a way of discrediting radio (a relatively new competitor) as a source of news. In the same way, Nyhan argues, concerns about fake news being spread by Russian agents on Facebook are fueled by broader concerns about the influence of social networks on society.

#### Fake news has no political impact and is declining- empirics confirm

Nyhan 19 [Brendan Nyhan, Feb 4, 2019, Why Fears of Fake News Are Overhyped, <https://gen.medium.com/why-fears-of-fake-news-are-overhyped-2ed9ca0a52c9>, Professor of Public Policy, University of Michigan]

After the shock of the 2016 presidential election, many Americans found psychological refuge in a simple explanation for why Donald Trump won: “fake news.” False or misleading information published by dubious for-profit websites had spread widely on Facebook, reaching millions of people in the final months of the campaign. This development provided a tidy narrative that resonated with concerns about potential online echo chambers. More than two years later, we can now evaluate these claims. And it turns out that many of the initial conclusions that observers reached about the scope of fake news consumption, and its effects on our politics, were exaggerated or incorrect. Relatively few people consumed this form of content directly during the 2016 campaign, and even fewer did so before the 2018 election. Fake news consumption is concentrated among a narrow subset of Americans with the most conservative news diets. And, most notably, no credible evidence exists that exposure to fake news changed the outcome of the 2016 election. The fake news panic echoes fears that prior forms of communication would brainwash the public. Just as exaggerated accounts of hysteria over Orson Welles’ War of the Worlds broadcast took advantage of doubts about radio, claims about the reach and influence of fake news express people’s broader concerns about social media and the internet. Many important concerns about online misinformation still remain, including the influence of the fake news audience, the difficulty of countering fake news at scale, the dangers of Facebook’s size, and the threat of YouTube-based radicalization. But none of these questions can be adequately addressed without creating a reality-based debate that puts fake news in context as just one of the many sources of misinformation in our politics. Real data about fake news Any conversation about fake news has to start with hard data on the extent of the problem. Unfortunately, these data are lacking. Most discussions of fake news exposure rely on simple counts of views or readers that lack essential context on who was exposed to the content and how frequently and what other information they also consume. By contrast, a study I conducted with political scientists Andrew Guess and Jason Reifler drew on nationally representative laptop/desktop web traffic data from an online panel, allowing us to measure who visited fake news sites before the 2016 election with unprecedented precision. We found that the reach of fake news declined dramatically in the period before the 2018 midterm elections. We find that only 27 percent of Americans visited fake news websites, which we define as recently created sites that frequently published false or misleading claims that overwhelmingly favor one of the presidential candidates, in the weeks before the 2016 election. These visits show the expected political skew — Clinton and Trump supporters tended to prefer pro-Clinton and pro-Trump sites, respectively — but made up only about 2 percent of the information people consumed from websites focusing on hard news topics. Consistent with behavioral evidence showing that online echo chambers are relatively rare, fake news consumption was concentrated among the 10 percent of Americans with the most conservative news diets, who were responsible for approximately six in 10 visits to fake news websites during this period. Even in that group, however, fake news made up less than 8 percent of their total news diet. Finally, people ages 60 and over consumed more fake news than other cohorts, which may reflect a lack of digital literacy or simply having more time to read news. (Other scholars have found similar patterns in Facebook sharing and Twitter sharing and consumption of fake news.) Moreover, the reach of fake news declined dramatically in the period before the 2018 midterm elections. In a new report co-authored with Benjamin Lyons and Jacob Montgomery, Guess, Reifler, and I found that just 7 percent of Americans visited one of the fake news sites that we previously identified in 2018 — a decline of approximately 75 percent in relative terms. (Consumption differences between groups by age, partisanship, and news diets remained similar to 2016.) Moreover, the role of Facebook in the spread of fake news appears to have changed. In 2016, the site differentially appeared in web traffic just before visits to fake news sites, suggesting it played a key role in enabling the spread of fake news. No such pattern is apparent in the 2018 data. This result, which echoes findings from other studies and holds with an updated set of websites we compiled before the 2018 study, suggests that the platform’s efforts to limit the reach of fake news are having some impact. (Such inferences are necessarily indirect because Facebook remains largely closed to outside research for now.) Research is also providing new insights into another limitation on the effects of fake news: who believes it. One key factor is directionally motivated reasoning — people’s increased willingness to accept dubious claims that are consistent with their partisan or candidate preferences. When my co-authors and I tested the perceived accuracy of a number of fake news headlines, belief in the accuracy of headlines that favored respondents’ preferred party (17 to 48 percent) was much higher than headlines that favored the opposition party (10 to 22 percent). Another important element, as psychologists Gordon Pennycook and David Rand emphasize, is analytical thinking ability. People who score low on this measure are especially prone to endorse false headlines. By contrast, those who score high are more likely to reject fake news even when it supports their political viewpoint. Finally, there remains no evidence that fake news changed the result of the 2016 election. Any such claim must take into account not just the reach of fake news but also the proportion of those exposed to it whose behavior could be changed. As noted above, approximately six in 10 visits to fake news websites came from the 10 percent of Americans with the most conservative news diets — a group that was already especially likely to vote and to support Donald Trump. Accordingly, my colleagues and I find no association between pro-Trump fake news exposure and differential shifts in candidate support or voter turnout.