### 1AC---Plan

#### Plan: The Republic of Korea should ban the appropriation of outer space by private entities.

#### South Korea’s space industry is fueled by the private sector – tech transfers and official statements.

**Si-Soo 21** [Park Si-Soo, 9-8-2021, Park Si-soo covers space industries in South Korea, Japan and other Asian countries. Park worked at The Korea Times — South Korea's leading English language newspaper — from 2007 to 2020. He earned a master’s degree in science journalism from Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology and a bachelor’s degree in business from Hanyang University. "South Korea to spend $593 million on public-to-private transfer of rocket technologies," SpaceNews, <https://spacenews.com/south-korea-to-spend-593-million-on-public-to-private-transfer-of-rocket-technologies/> accessed 1/12/2022] Adam

SEOUL, South Korea – Starting next year, South Korea’s government will transfer state-owned space launch vehicle technologies to domestic aerospace companies in a move to help them penetrate an expanding global space launch market. To that end, the government will spend 687 billion won ($593 million) from 2022 through 2027, [said the Ministry of Science and ICT, Sept. 7.](https://www.msit.go.kr/bbs/view.do?sCode=user&mId=113&mPid=112&pageIndex=&bbsSeqNo=94&nttSeqNo=3180691&searchOpt=ALL&searchTxt=)

Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) — a state-run space technology developer that has played a central role in developing the nation’s first domestic space launch vehicle, KSLV-2 — will be responsible for the public-to-private transfer, according to the ministry. KSLV-2, nicknamed Nuri, is a three-stage liquid-propellant rocket capable of sending a 1.5-ton satellite into low Earth orbit. The rocket is set to make its first demonstration flight in October from Naro Space Center in Goheung, the only launch site in South Korea.

The transfer will be done in a way KARI and selected companies do joint development and launch tests.

“The time has come to make a departure from state-led development of space launch vehicles toward one in which the private sector plays an expanded and more active role,” said [Yong Hong-taek, the science ministry’s vice minister,](https://english.msit.go.kr/eng/contents/cont.do?sCode=eng&mPid=19&mId=22) in the statement.

The policy reconfirms the government’s commitment to accelerating public-to-private transfer of space technologies. It comes as SpaceX and other innovative private companies play increasingly important roles in the global space industry. In the first move of this kind, since May, KARI and Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) have transferred their satellite-manufacturing technologies to a handful of major aerospace companies here.

While the science ministry didn’t  identify the companies that would benefit from the latest tech transfer, the most likely beneficiaries include [Hanwha Aerospace](https://spacenews.com/hanwha-aerospace-bets-big-on-space-business/), [Innospace](https://biz.chosun.com/industry/company/2021/08/26/B73DAPWKMBFAHCPFK2ME6NM6H4/?utm_source=naver&utm_medium=original&utm_campaign=biz), [Perigee Aerospace](https://spacenews.com/backed-by-samsung-south-korean-startup-perigee-aims-for-2020-maiden-launch/) and [Korean Air](https://spacenews.com/south-koreas-top-airline-to-develop-propellant-tank-for-smallsat-launcher/).

Hanwha is a major rocket engine developer here, which contributed to KSLV-2’s development with engine assembly and supply of key components. Innospace is a hybrid rocket startup, and Perigee is developing a methane-fueled smallsat launcher. Korea Air, South Korea’s biggest airline, is developing technologies to launch small satellites from its Boeing 747-400 cargo planes — the same way Virgin Orbit launches customers’ satellites into orbit.

### 1AC---Tensions ADV

#### Soko complicates the space race---sends a signal to noko and allies.

Clarke et al. 21 (, C., Lee, S. and Woolnough, M., 2021. China isn't the only nation preparing for war in space. A small neighbour flew 'under the radar'. [online] Abc.net.au. Available at: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-22/korea-china-india-space-race-military-flex/100547832> [Accessed 12 January 2022] Carrington Clarke is the ABC's Seoul Correspondent, covering East Asia for the network. He works across digital, television and radio. He's held a range of roles at the ABC including as a reporter with ABC Investigations, the flagship current affairs television program 7.30 and as a reporter and presenter with The Business. He previously worked at SKY News as a reporter and presenter. Before making the transition to journalism he worked as an economist.)-rahulpenu

Asia is in the midst of a space race, but it's not just about exploration. It's also a military flex

The space race has never purely been about planting a nation's flag on an object in space or benign scientific discovery. It's always had a military and strategic dimension. For almost half a century, as the US and Russia competed for dominance above Earth, both superpowers spent billions exploring space weapons, like death rays fired from rocket ships. Yet while the cold war ended some 30 years ago, some fear that a new space race may be a sign the world is poised to enter another arms race too. This time, however, it won't just be limited to global superpowers. "The reality is that militarisation — and, if you like, democratisation — of space technologies, means that there are going to be more and more entrants into the area," said Brett Biddington, a space policy expert based in Canberra. "The rocket that can launch a nuclear weapon is very, very similar to the rocket that can launch a satellite to do observations for weather." Today, the pool of countries deploying huge amounts of cash to stake out their claims in the skies above is growing larger. China, India and Japan have already started to demonstrate both the ambition and technological skills necessary to be considered space powers. This week, **South** **Korea** revealed that it too wants to be taken seriously on the global stage, **refusing** **to** **be** **left** behind in the race to space. The launch of the gleaming South Korean space rocket Nuri, the first fully domestically produced space launch vehicle, was supposed to be a moment of national pride for the country. The result was mixed. The rocket launched successfully but the dummy satellite it carried didn't make it into orbit. Still, South Korean President Moon Jae-in promised a "**Korea** **space** **age**" and said his country's ambitions would not be thwarted. How South Korea 'flew under the radar' While its neighbour North Korea is more widely known for its nuclear weaponry, South Korea has been quietly working on **developing** its own **military** **capability**. In recent years, the country has increased its military spending, earmarking roughly $US85 billion ($113 billion) in funding for arms improvements between 2020 and 2024. But Dr Biddington said the launch of Nuri was a significant milestone for South Korea because "launching a launch vehicle is a really difficult thing to do". "South Korea has a long and quite distinguished space heritage. It set up its space agency in 1989," he said. "I feel like it's been flown under the radar, so to speak. "It's just quietly developed capabilities and used those capabilities without wanting to unduly upset any of its neighbours." Dr Biddington suggested the launch was also a sign that **South** **Korea** **now** wants to **assert** its **independence** not only **to** its **rivals** but also to its **allies**. "It's also a **message** **to** the neighbours of Korea, maybe **North** **Korea** especially," he said. "But also it's a comment to Japan and to China and to Russia, and even the United States that Korea has quietly and patiently developed capabilities that allow it to stand on its own two feet when it comes to its interest in outer space."

The space race and the arms race

**Nuri's** launch comes at a **time** **of** **heightened** tensions **in** the region with a full-blown arms race in action. Koreans have become accustomed to projectiles being launched from their peninsula. On Thursday, North Korea showed off its new Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) only a month after South Korea had shown off its own version. But it's not just confined to the peninsula, with reports this week suggesting China had tested a new 'hypersonic missile' that utilises space rocket technology to create a potentially devastating weapon. China dismissed the reports but Chang Young-keun, a missile expert at the Korea Aerospace University, said it was almost certain what China deployed was a weapon. "They definitely tested a hypersonic vehicle, not a space rocket," he said. Against such a backdrop, South Korea is not hiding that its space program has major military implications. "When we improve our civilian space technology, we also improve our military space technology," said Professor Chang. This week the country welcomed hundreds of international delegates to its major arms fair, the Aerospace and Defence Expo or ADEX. It was jam-packed with theatrics: Fighter jets manoeuvring overhead, drawing giant love hearts in the sky with their contrails as delegates below chowed down on **smoky** **Texas** **grill** and **burgers**. South Korean President Moon Jae-in made his own surprise visit to the event in the back of a fighter jet, urging the country to redouble its efforts to become a global defence leader. "The goal of building strong defence power is always to foster peace," he told the crowd.

The benefit of a space race

South Korea may not yet have its own dedicated 'Space Force' like the US, but it has made clear that **space** is **crucial** **to** its **defence**. However, there are also legitimate civilian and scientific motivations for its ambitions for a space industry. South Korea's capacity to launch its own rockets is a critical step for reaching goals like a national 6G cellular network and a sovereign radio navigation system like the American GPS. Lee Hyung-mok, who is a professor emeritus in physics and astronomy at Korea National University, said he and his fellow scientists were excited about the opportunity to use these rockets. He said they will help transport observation equipment outside the earth's atmosphere, allowing them to better understand our universe. Such a discovery doesn't come cheap and Professor Lee said he recognises that space travel can be expensive. He also said he knows that national defence is often an easier way to get the government to loosen the public purse strings. "Maybe the government decided to spend a huge amount of money because of the military importance," he said. Although competition might be spurring further investment in space, he still worries about where it might lead. "What I really hope is that instead of competing too much, it's better to collaborate," he said. "So in many areas, they try to work together." But he said within Asia, no-one is in that "mood" yet.

#### Space is the linchpin for Seoul’s missile development---targets Noko, severs US allied-interdependence, raises serious nuclearization concerns, and modernizes the entire missile force.

---guideline revision has made development possible for the first time, specifically entities

---they target noko

---tech becomes v good

---empirics---soko did the same thing in the 2017 guideline revision but the revision was a lot less major

---destroys the alliance

Panda 20 (, A., 2020. Solid Ambitions: The U.S.–South Korea Missile Guidelines and Space Launchers. [online] Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Available at: <https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/25/solid-ambitions-u.s.-south-korea-missile-guidelines-and-space-launchers-pub-82557> [Accessed 13 January 2022] Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on the Asia-Pacific region, his research interests range from nuclear strategy, arms control, missile defense, nonproliferation, emerging technologies, and U.S. extended deterrence. He is the author of Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Hurst Publishers/Oxford University Press, 2020). Panda was previously an adjunct senior fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and a member of the 2019 FAS International Study Group on North Korea Policy. He has consulted for the United Nations in New York and Geneva on nonproliferation and disarmament matters, and has testified on security topics related to South Korea and Japan before the congressionally chartered U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Panda was a Korea Society Kim Koo Fellow, a German Marshall Fund Young Strategist, an International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La Dialogue Young Leader, and a Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs New Leader. He has worked at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs. A widely published writer, Panda’s work has appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the Diplomat, the Atlantic, the New Republic, the South China Morning Post, War on the Rocks, Politico, and the National Interest. Panda has also published in scholarly journals, including Survival, the Washington Quarterly, and India Review, and has contributed to the IISS Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment and Strategic Survey. He is editor-at-large at the Diplomat, where he hosts the Asia Geopolitics podcast, and a contributing editor at War on the Rocks.)-rahulpenu

Solid Ambitions: The U.S.–South Korea Missile Guidelines and Space Launchers

Seoul’s missile activities have long been constrained by decades-old limits that South Korea agreed on with its longtime ally, the United States. At various junctures, these limits have gradually been loosened, though the latest such change may not upset the regional security balance as much as it may appear to at first blush.

Most recently, following nine months of negotiations, the United States and South Korea agreed to further revise these bilateral missile guidelines in the summer of 2020. On July 28, 2020, South Korean Deputy National Security Adviser Kim Hyun-chong announced that, pursuant to the **newly** **agreed** **revisions**, South Korean individuals and **entities** will **be**, **for** the **first** **time**, **capable** **of** “developing, producing, and possessing” space launch vehicles (**SLVs**) making use of solid rocket motors **without** **restrictions**. Kim went on to announce, “As of July 28, 2020, limits on the use of solid fuel in space launch vehicles are completely removed.”

The decision opens a new era for South Korean space launch activities and has raised questions about possible **military** **applications** for large-diameter solid rocket boosters. While these technologies hold economic promise for a country that seeks to scale its space program quickly, they can also contribute to a long-range **missile** **program**. Ballistic missiles that use solid propellants are generally more operationally nimble than their liquid-propellant counterparts and, as a result, can be more militarily useful.

The revised guidelines were announced during the start of a new era of possible missile proliferation in the Asia-Pacific region, and these revisions coincide with a deteriorating geopolitical environment amid growing U.S.-China frictions. Moscow’s and Washington’s scrapping of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 has introduced the possibility of new U.S. short- and intermediate-range conventional missile deployments in Asia.[1] Meanwhile, Japan and Australia are both exploring standoff strike capabilities to better deter perceived threats, China continues to expand its large arsenal of conventional and dual-capable missiles, and North Korea keeps on qualitatively refining and quantitatively expanding its missile capabilities. The revised U.S.–South Korea guidelines have sparked some concerns that Seoul may harbor other motives beyond facilitating civilian spacefaring activities and that this revision may ultimately set up Seoul for a longer-range, more capable missile **arsenal**.

But a closer look at South Korea’s objectives suggests the July 2020 guideline revisions are not what should really draw attention. Instead, Seoul’s **indigenous** ballistic missile **programs**, which have continued apace under gradually slackening bilateral guidelines over the years, should be the primary focus. South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development (ADD) is already pursuing capabilities, within the confines of a prior revision to the guidelines, that open up new missile possibilities for Seoul and that may **heighten** the odds of **misperceptions** in the region.

EARLIER REVISIONS TO THE GUIDELINES

The U.S.–South Korea missile guidelines have been revised before. The July 2020 decision represents the third significant revision to the forty-one-year-old guidelines—originally agreed upon in a classified 1979 bilateral understanding—in the last decade. In 2012, a previous conservative South Korean government, led by then president Lee Myung-bak, clinched an agreement allowing Seoul to develop ballistic missiles capable of delivering 500-kilogram payloads to ranges of up to 800 kilometers (sufficient to strike all of North Korea from Daegu, a southern city in South Korea). Seoul had requested the range extension to augment its autonomous strike capabilities following twin provocations in 2010: a North Korean torpedo sunk a South Korean corvette, ROKS Cheonan, and North Korean artillery shelled the South Korean–controlled Yeonpyeong Island.

The 2012 revision followed a 2001 extension of the original 180-kilometer range limit to 300 kilometers. This earlier revision was linked to Seoul’s accession to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a cartel of states capable of producing technologies necessary for manufacturing advanced ballistic missiles; at that time, this revised limit matched the regime’s Category I range and payload limits.

Fast-forwarding to the near present, in 2017, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump, amid breakneck North Korean qualitative advances in missile technology, reached an agreement with South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s administration to eliminate the payload weight limit entirely while maintaining the 800-kilometer missile range restriction. Yet none of these revisions had affected South Korea’s space launch technologies—until the July 2020 announcement.

SOUTH KOREAN SOLID PROPELLANTS

Until now, South Korean indigenous SLVs have relied on liquid-bipropellant combinations that would be poorly suited for anything but orbital launches. For instance, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute’s (KARI) Nuri, also known as Korea Satellite Launch Vehicle-II (KSLV-II), employs liquid oxygen (LOX) and a kerosene variant as its oxidizer-fuel combination across all three missile stages. Cryogenic liquid oxidizers, like LOX, have several advantages, but major operational drawbacks in terms of their handling and storage have kept them from being used in modern ballistic missiles. First-generation U.S. and Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—like the Atlas and the R-7, for instance—employed LOX, but their successors quickly moved to noncryogenic hypergolic liquid bipropellants before eventually settling on solid propellants.

**Solid** **propellants** for long-range, large-diameter rockets have a similar **appeal** when used for **orbital** and suborbital applications whether they are employed for civilian or military purposes. With the fuel cast directly into their airframes, solid rocket motors can be readied for use with considerably less pre-launch preparation, assuming proper handling and storage. (Proper storage and transportation of solid rocket motors are nontrivial considerations.) This characteristic makes solid propellants often preferable for **military** **applications**—especially for small-diameter missiles.

Solid fuels do have their drawbacks, however. For instance—unlike liquid-propellant engines, which can be remotely shut off—once ignited, solid-fuel engines will burn until all available fuel is consumed. Seoul’s presented rationale for pursuing solid-propellant SLVs does not rule out the possibility that new solid boosters may eventually be used as ballistic missiles, but the main focus for now is on enabling cheaper surveillance satellite launches.

Kim, South Korea’s deputy national security adviser, was quite open in his July press conference that Seoul envisages potentially using new, solid-propellant orbital launchers to send observation satellites into low-Earth orbit. “Theoretically, we can launch a low-Earth orbit satellite via liquid-fuel rockets, but it’s like delivering a dish of jjajangmyeon [a Korean noodle dish] by [way of] a 10-ton truck,” he added, apparently seeking to make the case for the economical nature of delivering smaller payloads in this manner.

This point bears emphasizing: it can be more economical for a space program to scale around solid rocket boosters, depending on the types of payloads and desired orbits. As South Korea looks to improve its indigenous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities against North Korea in the coming years, military surveillance satellites will come to play a more important role in South Korean military planning.

Such capabilities are also an important barometer for facilitating larger alliance goals, namely the transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the U.S. military to South Korea’s own forces. The South Korean forces under the alliance’s Combined Forces Command have been led by U.S. military generals for some time, but Seoul has long aspired to regain the operational prerogative to lead these forces on South Korean soil in wartime. One of the conditions for such a transfer is that the South Korean military meet certain benchmarks when it comes to its military capabilities.

Addressing this point, Kim was open about Seoul’s desire to deploy such satellites into low-Earth orbit, but he also made clear that existing liquid propellant–based launch vehicles are uneconomical for this application. South Korea’s strategic goal, per Kim, is to realize persistent space-based surveillance of North Korea, granting Seoul what he referred to as an “unblinking eye.” In July 2020, the commercial firm SpaceX launched South Korea’s first exclusive military communications satellite, the Army Navy Air Force Satellite Information System-II (ANASIS-II).

Other countries make varied use of solid-propellant SLVs for varied payload delivery to low-Earth orbit when conducting commercial and state-run space activities. Liquid-propellant boosters can be more energetic and efficient, so they tend to be favored for most missions. In the United States, repurposed solid-fueled LGM-118 Peacekeeper ICBMs are used for delivering certain government payloads to low-Earth orbit. Similarly, China’s Kuaizhou-11 program is somewhat unique in how it uses a vehicle called a transporter erector launcher to facilitate mobile launches of light satellites (an approach that could be employed for purposes such as enabling the rapid replacement of satellites that may be lost to anti-satellite weapons during a conflict).

Future **launches** of surveillance satellites would **reduce** **Seoul’s** **dependence** on U.S. technical surveillance capabilities to monitor North Korean activities and help the South Korean military achieve conditions-based OPCON transfer.[2] (After several delays, the current timeline for such a transfer is set for 2022.) Shortly before the announcement of the updated guidelines, U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and his South Korean counterpart Jeong Kyeong-doo “expressed their unwavering support for a conditions-based OPCON transition, consistent with the bilaterally-agreed Conditions-Based OPCON Transition Plan,” according to a Pentagon statement.

The latest July 2020 revision to the guidelines will facilitate these goals and was largely driven by Seoul’s space-based ISR ambitions. However, some analysis on the latest revision suggests that Seoul may now seek to build larger-diameter, longer-range solid-propellant **rockets** to possibly hold at risk **targets** in **North** **Korea** and perhaps even in **China**. North Korea historically has been and continues to be the primary driver of South Korea’s missile program.

During previous rounds of bilateral consultations with the United States, South Korean officials sought to ideally win approval to possess 1,000-kilometer-range missiles—capable of reaching almost all of North Korea from the island of Jeju off the southernmost tip of South Korea. New, heavy-payload ballistic missiles already in development could range much farther than 800 kilometers with a lighter payload, so South Korea already technically possesses the capability to reach all of North Korea with a 500-kilogram payload. The chief constraint preventing Seoul from officially unveiling and deploying this capability remains the bilateral missile guidelines. Although Seoul could repurpose these capabilities to hold at risk targets in northern China and parts of eastern China, South Korea holds quite nuanced views of China and does not view it as a major categorical threat, making this outcome unlikely.

NEW SOUTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS

What should moderate any immediate concerns on the possible consequences of South Korea’s shift to solid-propellant SLVs is the primary concern **hiding** **in** **plain** **sight**. South Korea continues to develop solid-propellant ballistic missiles that are already capable of not only reaching all of North Korea but of doing so with **heavy** conventional **payloads**. The Hyunmoo-4 is an 800-kilometer-range system that entered testing for the first time earlier in 2020. Moon applauded it recently for exhibiting “close to the world’s heaviest warhead weight,” making full use of the 2017 update to the missile guidelines. While this missile is thought to feature a 2,000-kilogram payload, if it were to be launched with a payload half that weight, the Hyunmoo-4 would perform as a medium-range missile (using the U.S. government definition of missiles with ranges between 1,000 and 3,000 kilometers).

Little is known authoritatively about the Hyunmoo-4 beyond the fact that it entered testing this year. Its reported payload weight has appeared in multiple South Korean press reports and is consistent with the general direction of the Hyunmoo program under ADD’s auspices. For instance, the Hyunmoo-2C—also an 800-kilometer-range system, but with a smaller payload—was publicized during testing in 2017 at the height of tensions on the Korean Peninsula.

ADD emphasized the system’s earth-penetrating warhead and its **precision**. The suggestion was that this capability would be useful in striking tunnel-based missile launchers, hardened command-and-control targets in North Korea, or perhaps even Kim Jong Un himself. The Hyunmoo-4 appears to be a bigger and more explosive version of the Hyunmoo-2C: this new model is capable of executing that same mission against ever-harder targets that would necessitate more explosive power.

In the near term, South Korea is likely to continue investing in the **Hyunmoo**-4 program. This system represents the most **serious** **challenge** to the spirit of the principles that drove the missile guidelines, which were first implemented in 1979 and were primarily concerned with building confidence that South Korea could not build plausible nuclear-delivery systems. (Seoul’s indigenous nuclear weapons program had ended in the mid-1970s.)

The guidelines were designed—and updated in 2001 and 2012—with the understanding that it is reasonable to control missile capabilities by manipulating either payload or range limits. For a given payload constraint (500 kilograms, for example), extending range limits would allow Seoul to develop new boosters, but only to a point. With the scrapping of payload limits altogether in 2017, the Hyunmoo-4 was allowed to surface, raising the specter of possible longer-range South Korean systems. Seoul’s apparent acquisition of some components from older Russian ICBMs has left lingering concerns that South Korea may seek longer-range missile capabilities.

In today’s context, these concerns deserve to be taken seriously. Although South Korea continues to abide by its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and though its government leaders do not seek nuclear weapons, the growth of North Korean nuclear capabilities in the last five years combined with growing unease about the credibility of U.S. alliance assurances in the Trump era have renewed debates in **Seoul** on **pursuing** **nuclear** **weapons** capabilities in the future.

The **military** **balance** on the Korean Peninsula has **changed** **dramatically** since 1979, when South Korea’s missile ambitions outranged those of North Korea, which at the time had yet to flight-test its first Scud missiles. Despite this—in the spirit of the original 1979 guidelines, which sought to assuage concerns about South Korean nuclearization in the 1970s—Seoul should transparently help build confidence that its existing missile programs are no cause for concern beyond contributing to necessary conventional deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. This confidence building would have salutary effects on regional stability amid intensifying geopolitical competition between the United States and China.

NEXT STEPS

South Korea’s expanding space launch ambitions, sealed by the July 2020 revisions to the bilateral missile guidelines, need not heighten Northeast Asian insecurity. Seoul’s interest in more economical space launch activities and an expanded space-based layer of military surveillance is understandable. South Korean measures to increase transparency, however, could reduce the chance of misperceptions about Seoul’s intentions. Similarly, South Korea could help build confidence around its ongoing missile programs.

To mitigate a worsening security dilemma with Pyongyang and potentially Beijing, Seoul should declare the scope of applications for government-sponsored research and development in larger solid rocket boosters. While publicizing existing capabilities, like the Hyunmoo-4, may be undesirable due to the current South Korean government’s inter-Korean diplomatic efforts, Seoul can do so without provocative messaging (such as threatening North Korea with decapitation attacks or strikes on hardened military sites).

Beyond this, South Korea should also transparently release plans for specific KARI-led civilian spacefaring projects and military satellites that may make use of larger solid-propellant boosters. Such transparency would reinforce Seoul’s stated plans and build confidence. At a higher level, the South Korean government should take steps to clarify its ongoing commitment to the terms of the MTCR and the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

Meanwhile, as testing of the Hyunmoo-4 continues, South Korea should limit development on larger payload conventional missiles that could technically be compliant with the 800-kilometer-range restriction in the bilateral missile guidelines.

Separately, the United States and South Korea should work to build confidence in the region that the 2017 and 2020 changes to the guidelines will not adversely affect regional stability. To this end, they should open an ongoing bilateral consultative review of the missile guidelines. While Seoul is not seeking further changes to the guidelines, it would be productive for the allies to establish a semiannual or quarterly review of the guidelines and discuss related matters, including any issues of concern stemming from South Korean missile activities and civilian rocket research.

**South** **Korea** has seen its **security** **environment** **deteriorate** **sharply** over the last decade as its northern neighbor has reached significant missile and nuclear milestones. Meanwhile, political malaise over cost-sharing has begun to **seep** into the **foundations** **of** the bilateral **alliance** **with** the **U**nited **St**ates since 2017. In this environment, precision strike missiles and a robust, indigenous space-based constellation of military surveillance satellites can plug important perceived gaps in conventional deterrence and even hedge against plausible shifts in how the United States postures its forces on the Korean Peninsula.

But Seoul’s ability to now use solid-propellant boosters to deliver satellite payloads to low-Earth orbit should not be the primary concern in the short term. Given the already impressive capabilities embodied in the Hyunmoo-4 and its predecessor, South Korea has already made itself stand out as a leader in missile technology. But as Seoul embarks into a **new** **era** as a spacefaring nation, it should take precautions to dispel concerns about its intentions and work to build confidence while practicing effective deterrence against North Korea.

**North Korea sees the South’s launches as a double standard – that emboldens the regime and increases aggression.**

**Parry 21** [Richard Lloyd Parry, Richard Lloyd Parry has lived since 1995 in Tokyo, where he is the Asia editor of The Times. He has reported from 29 countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq and North Korea, and has been named Foreign Correspondent of the Year Asia Editor, 10-21-2021, "South Korea heightens tensions with space launch," The Times, [https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/south-korea-heightens-tensions-with-space-launch-jb8mnwwdp accessed 1/12/2022](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/south-korea-heightens-tensions-with-space-launch-jb8mnwwdp%20accessed%201/12/2022)] Adam

South Korea launched a domestically built rocket into space today in a breakthrough that will embolden North Korean accusations of hypocrisy. The three-stage KSLV-II Nuri entered orbit after being launched from the Naro Space Centre on a small island off the country’s southwest coast, although it failed in its final task — putting into orbit a dummy satellite. Even so, it was a welcome half-success after years of setbacks and failures. The mission is likely to be seized upon by [North Korea](https://archive.is/o/a0crs/https:/www.thetimes.co.uk/article/north-korea-demands-end-to-joint-military-exercises-amid-further-missile-tests-hgwhg3jwf) as an example of double standards. Beginning in 1998 the North fired off a series of what it called civilian rockets, which were denounced by the US and South Korea as a front for developing long-range missiles. These predictions turned out to be correct and North Korea now has an arsenal of ballistic missiles, including weapons with the range to potentially strike the mainland United States. South Korea says its programme is intended for nothing more than launching civilian satellites. It was a nervous day for South Korea. In 2010 an earlier version of the Nuri exploded two minutes after take off, and until this afternoon the failure rate for the country’s rockets was 70 per cent. The launch was postponed by an hour as engineers checked valves in the rocket — among its three million separate parts. But just after 5pm local time the Nuri lifted off smoothly into clear skies and jettisoned its first and second stages on schedule. The launch confirms South Korea as only the seventh country in the world to have developed a domestic space vehicle that can carry a payload heavier than a tonne, after China, France, India, Japan, Russia and the United States. However, Nuri failed to launch its 1.5-tonne dummy satellite of steel and aluminium, which was supposed to have been placed into a low earth orbit of 600km to 800km. “It’s very difficult for newcomers to achieve this,” President Moon said at the Space Centre after the launch. “But we achieved it, with no help from other countries.” A version of the Nuri was successfully launched in 2013, though its first stage was manufactured in Russia. There is no immediate prospect that South Korea will convert its rocket technology to military use. It already has short and medium-range ballistic missiles although it is bound by an agreement with its US ally to limit these in range to 800km. Last month South Korea joined the small group of countries able to fire ballistic missiles from a submarine. With a range of 500km, the Hyunmoo 4-4 missile fired from a 3,000-tonne Dosan Ahn Chang-ho class submarine has all of North Korea within its range. But when North Korea carried out its [own submarine missile launch](https://archive.is/o/a0crs/https:/www.thetimes.co.uk/article/north-korea-tests-unidentifed-ballistic-missile-lw5fh0t8k) this week, the South expressed its “regret” and the US condemned the action. “To criticise [North Korea] for developing and test-firing the same weapon system as the one the US possesses or is developing is a clear expression of double standards and it only excites our suspicion about the ‘authenticity’ of its statement that it does not antagonise [North Korea],” a spokesman in Pyongyang said.

**Noko tensions in space spill over to war---emp, van allen, nukes, and turns every impact**

**Davis 17** (, M., 2017. North Korean nukes and space war | The Strategist. [online] The Strategist. Available at: <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/north-korean-nukes-space-war/> [Accessed 12 January 2022] Dr Malcolm Davis Senior Analyst Contact information Contact information EXPERTISE Space Policy, Space Security, Strategy & capability development, future warfare and military technology & Chinese military modernisation.)-rahulpenu

North Korean nukes and space war

North Korea’s launch of a Hwasong-12 IRBM over Japan on 28 August, a second launch on 15 September (once again overflying Japan), and its test of what is either a boosted fission weapon or an early generation thermonuclear weapon on 3 September have accelerated the rush towards a major military crisis on the Korean peninsula. One aspect of North Korea’s nuclear developments that warrants closer attention is its ability to use nuclear weapons to generate electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks, or threaten low-Earth orbiting satellites in space.

The testing of higher yield nuclear weapons gives North Korea the ability to attack electrical and electronic systems over a wide area. Detonating a nuclear weapon at high altitude, such as in low-Earth orbit (LEO), would generate EMP, which would fry electrical and electronic circuits over a large geographic area.

EMP isn’t new; we’ve known about it since the Cold War, as a result of high-altitude nuclear testing such as the ‘Starfish Prime’ test in 1962. The effects of that test on terrestrial electrical systems generated concerns that the Soviet Union could blanket the US or NATO with sufficient EMP to burn out critical command and control networks and disrupt Washington’s nuclear retaliatory capability in the opening stages of a nuclear first strike. Such an attack would have had an even more devastating effect on non-hardened civilian infrastructure.

Earlier this year, North Korea’s testing of ICBMs included trajectories lofted to very high altitudes, which allowed Pyongyang to test warhead re-entry survivability, and minimised the risk of US military retaliation. The tests also demonstrated North Korea’s ability to detonate a nuclear weapon at high altitudes to generate EMP. Carrying out such an attack wouldn’t require accurate guidance, or high-yield warheads that are capable of surviving the heat of atmospheric re-entry, or even ICBMs.

A 2008 EMP Commission report (PDF) found that **exo**-**atmospheric** **detonations** of nuclear weapons would directly **affect** critical civilian **infrastructure**, most notably for power generation, telecommunications and data networks, as well as robotic industrial and manufacturing infrastructure. Analysis in June of this year on 38 North suggests that North Korea is already well placed to cause substantial damage to unprotected civilian networks using such attacks. That would hold true against the US, as well as its allies such as Japan and South Korea, or even Australia.

Evidence given by Peter Vincent Pry to the 2004 EMP Commission suggested that (PDF, p. 5) North Korea, with Russian assistance, was developing a ‘super-EMP’ weapon designed to affect a broad range of electronic systems. Such a weapon could be delivered by a missile, or it could be deployed in a satellite in a manner similar to the Soviet-era Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS).

If North Korea could detonate a nuclear weapon in space, it could also undertake a ‘**Van** **Allen’** attack that would be designed to excite and **expand** the lower Van Allen **radiation** **belt** around Earth, exposing up to 803 satellites in LEO to high levels of radiation. US Defense Threat Reduction Agency analysis in 2010 suggested that satellites in LEO, which are not hardened against radiation found in higher orbits, would be vulnerable to nuclear detonations that ‘**pumped’** the intensity of the Van Allen belts. Weeks or months of cumulative damage generated by passing through the zones of radiation would **cause** those **satellites** **to** **fail**. A Van Allen attack is highly indiscriminate: any satellite passing through the excited lower belt would be damaged. US satellites would be just as defenceless as those belonging to China, Russia or other states.

Certainly satellites could be replaced, but it would take years to completely restore the lost capability. The requirement to wait until Van Allen belts returned to normal levels of radiation, limited launch capability, long production queues, and the high cost for new satellites would slow the process down. If a combined Van Allen and EMP attack was effectively carried out, the ability to re-establish space systems could be at risk if satellite production facilities were damaged. In the interim, global economic systems would fall apart as the vital communications links for stock markets collapsed.

The Trump administration is maintaining that ‘all options are on the table’ for dealing with North Korea’s growing nuclear threat. The prospects for war on the peninsula are bad enough, with massed North Korean artillery attacks on Seoul a leading concern as well as the prospect of a general North Korean offensive into South Korea. The risk of a war escalating across the nuclear threshold raises the spectre of the first use of nuclear weapons in anger since Nagasaki—against South Korea, Japan or US territory—and the possibility that **Pyongyang** could **devastate** its **opponents’** economies with EMP and destroy vital space infrastructure with Van Allen attacks. In any war, North Korea would certainly face defeat and, with it, the end of Kim Jong-un’s regime. In confronting his fate, Kim Jong-un would have everything to gain and little to lose by employing such a devastating tactic.

**Conflict spills over to cascading debris and decks access---especially with missile development.**

**Skibba 20** (, R., 2020. The Ripple Effects of a Space Skirmish. [online] The Atlantic. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2020/07/space-warfare-unregulated/614059/> [Accessed 12 January 2022] Ramin Skibba is a San Diego-based astrophysicist turned science writer. His work has appeared in Undark magazine, New Scientist, and Nature.)-rahulpenu

The **Ripple** **Effects** of a Space Skirmish

If a conflict breaks out between countries with weapons in orbit, it could **threaten** space **access** for everyone.

On April 22, after several failed attempts, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps announced a successful launch of what it described as a military reconnaissance satellite. That satellite joined a growing list of weapons and military systems in orbit, including those from Russia (which in April tested a missile program designed to destroy satellites) and India (which launched an anti-satellite weapon in March 2019).

Experts like Brian Weeden, director of program planning at the Secure World Foundation (SWF), a nonpartisan think tank based in Broomfield, Colorado, worry that these developments—all confirmed by the newly rebranded United States Space Force—threaten to lift earthly conflicts to new heights and put all space activities, peaceful and military alike, at risk. Researchers at SWF and at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a nonpartisan think tank in Washington, D.C., both released reports this year on the rapidly evolving state of affairs. The reports suggest that the biggest players in space have upgraded their military abilities, including satellite-destroying weapons and technologies that disrupt spacecraft, by, for instance, blocking data collection or transmission.

Many of these technologies, if deployed, could ratchet up an **arms** **race** and even spark a skirmish in space, the SWF and CSIS researchers caution. Blowing up a single satellite scatters debris throughout the atmosphere, said Weeden, co-editor of the SWF report. Such an explosion could hurl projectiles in the paths of other spacecraft and threaten the accessibility of space for everyone.

“Those are absolutely the two best reports to be looking at to get a sense of what’s going on in the space community,” said David Burbach, a national security affairs expert at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, who was not involved in the new research.

Today, Burbach added, the world is very different compared with the Cold War era, when access to space was essentially limited to the United States and the Soviet Union. Many more countries now have space programs, including India, Iran, North Korea, France, Japan, and Israel.

Despite this expansion—and the array of new space weapons—relevant policies and regulatory bodies have remained stagnant. “What worries us in the international community is that there aren’t necessarily any guardrails for how people are going to start interfering with others’ space systems,” said Daniel Porras, a space security fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva. “There are **no** **rules** **of** **engagement**.”

The new reports use available evidence and intelligence to explore a range of weapons that various countries’ militaries are developing or testing—or already have operational. (Notably, CSIS’s report doesn’t include the American military.) Each nation has unique abilities and characteristics. For example, India has invested heavily in space infrastructure and capabilities, while Japan’s post–World War II space activities were limited until a recent change to its constitution. For Israel’s space program, Weeden said, little good data is available.

Potential missile attacks on military satellites “tend to get most of the attention, but that is not all that we see happening around the world,” said Todd Harrison, director of the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS and a principal author of its report, during an April 6 livestream.

For example, the thousands of everyday satellites that already circle **low**-**Earth** **orbit**, below an altitude of 1,200 miles, could potentially **suffer** **collateral** **damage**. More than half of those satellites are from the U.S.; many of the rest are from China and Russia. They provide key services like internet access, GPS signals, long-distance communications, and weather information. Any missile that smashes into a satellite—either as an attack or during a test—would disperse thousands of bits of debris. Any one of those pieces, still hurtling at orbital speeds, could take out another spacecraft and create yet more debris.

“It’s **very** **easy** **to** **pollute** space,” Burbach said. “The debris doesn’t discriminate. If you create debris, it might just as well come back and hit one of your own satellites. So I think we’re pretty unlikely to see countries actually use those capabilities.” Still, he said, “it would be worrying to see countries showing off that [they] can do it and start testing.”

When China conducted an anti-satellite missile test in 2007, it created a massive cloud of space junk that drew international condemnation. India’s engineers tried to limit debris from their recent test by conducting it at a low altitude, so that Earth’s gravity would pull the pieces down and they would burn up on descent. But some pieces were flung up to the International Space Station’s orbit. There were no collisions; as of February, only 15 trackable pieces of debris remained in orbit, said Victoria Samson, director of the Secure World Foundation’s Washington office, during the CSIS livestream in April.

A number of countries are developing new military technologies for space. France, for instance, is working on laser beams that could dazzle another country’s satellite, preventing it from taking pictures of classified targets. North Korea is studying how to jam radio frequency signals sent to or from a satellite, and Iran is devising cyberattacks that could interfere with satellite systems. Meanwhile, the big three space heavyweights—the U.S., Russia, and China—are already capable of all three approaches, according to the SWF report.

The big three have also begun to master what the reports call “rendezvous and proximity operations,” which involve using satellites as surveillance devices or weapons. A satellite could maneuver within miles of a rival’s classified satellite, snap photos of equipment, and transmit the pictures down to Earth. Or a satellite could sidle up to another and spray its counterpart’s lenses or cover its solar panels, cutting off power and rendering it useless. Russia may be ahead with this technology, having already launched a series of small “inspector satellites,” as the Russian government calls them. Last fall, according to Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force, one crept near a U.S. spy satellite, which he called a “potentially threatening behavior.”

So far, there are relatively few international policies or norms about what’s allowed in modern-day space and what’s not. The SWF report notes that an incident or misunderstanding could escalate tensions if it’s perceived as an attack.

The lack of guidance has left room for a range of activities. Weeden said that in December 2019, the Trump administration signaled its intention to strengthen the United States’ space weaponry and protect its spacecraft from possible attacks by Russia and China by transforming the Air Force Space Command into the U.S. Space Force. That shift “brought a full-time operational focus to the space domain, which was a needed change,” wrote Lieutenant Colonel Christina Hoggatt, a Space Force spokesperson, in a statement to Undark. With these forces, the Defense Department seeks to “strengthen deterrence” and improve capabilities to “defend our vital assets in space,” she wrote. This emphasis, Burbach said, likely means that the U.S. military will focus on making satellites more resilient to attack, rather than developing offensive weapons.

David A. Graham: Why the Space Force is just like Trump University

Compared with the U.S., smaller space powers have fewer satellites and therefore less to lose, the U.N.’s Porras said. He argues that tense **regional** **relationships** could be particularly **unpredictable**. For example, he said, if North Korean leaders found themselves in a standoff with South Korea and the U.S., they might launch and detonate a nuclear weapon in space; its **dangerous** **radiation** would **disable** most **satellites**.

The U.N. and other international groups—including SWF and the Outer Space Institute, a global research organization based in British Columbia—are working to avoid such scenarios. Weeden said that as long as countries don’t launch destructive space weapons near other countries’ spacecraft, conduct overtly provocative tests, or disable critical satellites, peaceful space activities should continue. For now, he points out, countries have only tested missiles on their own defunct satellites, and exercises against other nations’ spacecraft have remained nondestructive.

Existing international laws offer little guidance for modern military technology in space. While these rules—including the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the U.N.’s Outer Space Treaty of 1967—prohibit weapons of mass destruction in space, they don’t explicitly limit other kinds of space weapons, tests, or military space forces.

Weeden points out that space diplomats could create new guidelines by developing something like the Incidents at Sea agreement, which the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed during the Cold War to maintain safe distances between ships and avoid maneuvers in heavy traffic. But until similar rules involving space weaponry are hammered out, he said, unexpected satellite tests will inevitably fuel speculation and paranoia.

“Any time you have militaries operating near each other without a lot of transparency or clarity,” he added, “you always have the opportunity for misperceptions that could lead to something very bad.”

#### Independently causes extinction.

George Dvorsky 15. Senior Staff reporter at Gizmodo. "What Would Happen If All Our Satellites Were Suddenly Destroyed?" <https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-d-1709006681>.

Lastly, there’s the [Kessler Syndrome](http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/space-debris/kessler-syndrome/) to consider. This scenario was portrayed in the 2013 film Gravity. In the movie, a Russian missile strike on a defunct satellite inadvertently causes a cascading chain reaction that formed an ever-growing cloud of orbiting space debris. Anything in the cloud’s wake — including satellites, space stations, and astronauts — gets annihilated. Disturbingly, the Kessler Syndrome is a very real possibility, and the likelihood of it happening [is steadily increasing as more stuff gets thrown into space](http://io9.com/how-to-clean-up-deadly-space-junk-before-disaster-strik-1443463338). Given these grim prospects, it’s fair to ask what might happen to our civilization if any of these things happened. At the risk of gross understatement, the complete loss of our satellite fleet would instigate a tremendous disruption to our current mode of technological existence — disruptions that would be experienced in the short, medium, and long term, and across multiple [domains](https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-d-1709006681). Compromised Communications Almost immediately we’d notice a dramatic reduction in our ability to communicate, share information, and conduct transactions. “If our communications satellites are lost, then bandwidth is also lost,” [Jonathan McDowell](http://planet4589.org/) tells io9. He’s an astrophysicists and Chandra Observatory scientist who works out of the [Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics](http://planet4589.org/jcm/cfa-www.harvard.edu). McDowell says that, with telecommunication satellites wiped out, the burden of telecommunications would fall upon undersea cables and ground-based communication systems. But while many forms of communication would disappear in an [instant](https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-d-1709006681), others would remain. All international calls and data traffic would have to be re-routed, placing tremendous pressure on terrestrial and undersea lines. Oversaturation would stretch the capacity of these systems to the limit, preventing many calls from going through. Hundreds of millions of Internet connections would vanish, or be severely overloaded. A similar number of cell phones would be rendered useless. In remote areas, people dependent on satellite for television, Internet, and radio would practically lose all service. “Indeed, a lot of television would suddenly disappear,” says McDowell. “A sizable portion of TV comes from cable whose companies relay programming from satellites to their hubs.” It’s important to note that we actually have a precedent for a dramatic — albeit brief — disruption in com-sat capability. Back in 1998, [there was a day in which a single satellite failed and all the world’s pagers stopped working](http://articles.latimes.com/1998/may/21/news/mn-52190). Get Out Your Paper Maps We would also lose the Global Positioning System. In the years since its inception, GPS has become ubiquitous, and a surprising number of systems have become reliant on it. “Apart from the fact that everyone has forgotten to navigate without GPS in their cars, many airplanes use GPS as well,” says McDowell. Though backup systems exist, airlines use GPS to chart the most fuel-efficient and expeditious routes. Without GPS and telecomm-sats, aircraft controllers would have tremendous difficulty communicating with and routing airplanes. Airlines would have to fall back to legacy systems and procedures. Given the sheer volume of airline traffic today, accidents would be all but guaranteed. Other affected navigation systems would include those aboard cargo vessels, supply-chain management systems, and transportation hubs driven by GPS. But GPS does more than just provide positioning — it also provides for timing. Ground-based atomic clocks can perform the same function, but GPS is increasingly being used to distribute the universal time standard via satellites. Within hours of a terminated service, any distributing networks requiring tight synchronization would start to suffer from “clock drift,” leading to serious performance issues and outright service outages. Such disruptions could affect everything from the power grid through to the financial sector. In the report, “[A Day Without Space: Economic and National Security Ramifications](http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Day-without-Space-Oct-16-2008.pdf),” Ed Morris, the Executive Director of the Office of Space Commerce at the Department of Commerce, writes: If you think it is hard to get work done when your internet connection goes out at the office, imagine losing that plus your cell [phone](https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-d-1709006681), TV, radio, ATM access, [credit cards](https://io9.gizmodo.com/what-would-happen-if-all-our-satellites-were-suddenly-d-1709006681), and possibly even your electricity. [...] Wireless services, especially those built to [CDMA standard](http://www.protocols.com/pbook/cellular.htm), would fail to hand off calls from one cell to the next, leading to dropped connections. Computer networks would experience slowdowns as data is pushed through finite pipelines at reduced bit rates. The same would be true for major networks for communication and entertainment, since they are all IP-based today and require ultra-precise timing to ensure digital traffic reaches its destination. The lack of effective synch would hit especially hard in banking, where the timing of transactions needs to be recorded. Credit card payments and bank accounts would likely freeze, as billions of dollars could be sucked away from businesses. A financial crash is not out of the question. The Loss of Military Capability The sudden loss of satellite capability would have a profound effect on the military. The Marshall Institute puts it this way: “Space is a critical enabler to all U.S. warfare domains,” including intelligence, navigation, communications, weather prediction, and warfare. McDowell describes satellite capability as as the “backbone” of the U.S. military. And as 21st century warfare expert [Peter W. Singer](http://www.pwsinger.com/biography.html) from [New America Foundation](https://www.newamerica.org/) tells io9, “He who controls the heavens will control what happens in the battles of Earth.” Singer summarized the military consequences of losing satellites in an email to us: Today there are some 1,100 active satellites which act as the nervous system of not just our economy, but also our military. Everything from communications to GPS to intelligence all depend on it. Potential foes have noticed, which is why Russia and China have recently begun testing a new generation of anti-satellite weapons, which in turn has sparked the U.S. military to recently budget $5 billion for various space warfare systems. What would happen if we lost access to space? Well, the battles would, as one U.S. military officer put it, take us back to the “pre digital age.” Our drones, our missiles, even our ground units wouldn’t be able to operate the way we plan. It would force a rewrite of all our assumptions of 21st century high tech war. We might have a new generation of stealthy battleships...but the loss of space would mean naval battles would in many ways be like the game of Battleship, where the two sides would struggle to even find each other. Moreover, and as McDowell explains to io9, the loss of satellite capability would have a profound effect on arms control capabilities. Space systems can monitor compliance; without them, we’d be running blind. “The overarching consideration is that you wouldn’t really know what’s going on,” says McDowell. “Satellites provide for both global and local views of what’s happening. We would be less connected, less informed — and with considerably degraded situational awareness.” Compromised Weather Prediction and Climate Science One great thing satellites have done for us is improve our ability to forecast weather. Predicting a slight chance of cloudiness is all well and good, but some areas, like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, are dependent on such systems to predict potentially hazardous monsoons. And in the U.S., the NOAA has estimated that, during a typical hurricane season, weather satellites save as much as $3 billion in lives and property damage. There’s also the effect on science to consider. Much of what we know about climate change comes from satellites. As McDowell explains, the first couple of weeks without satellites wouldn’t make much of a difference. But over a ten-year span, the lack of satellites would preclude our ability to understand and monitor such things as the ozone layer, carbon dioxide levels, and the distribution of polar ice. Ground-based and balloon-driven systems would help, but much of the data we’re currently tracking would suddenly become much spottier. “We’re quite dependent on satellites for a global view of what’s happening on our planet — and at a time when we really, really need to know what’s happening,” says McDowell. It’s also worth pointing out that, without satellites, we also wouldn’t be able to monitor space weather, such as incoming space storms. Time to Recover With all the satellites gone, both governmental and private interests would work feverishly to restore space-based capabilities. Depending on the nature of the satellite-destroying event, it could take decades or more to get ourselves back to current operational standards. It would take a particularly long time to recover from a Carrington Event, which would zap many ground-based electronic systems as well. The U.S. military is already thinking along these lines, which is why it’s working on the ability to quickly send up emergency assets, such as small satellites parked in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Cube satellites are increasingly favored, as an easy-to-launch, affordable, and effective solution — albeit a short-term one. The U.S. Operationally Responsive State Office is currently working on the concept of emergency replenishment and the ability to “rapidly deploy capabilities that are good enough to satisfy warfighter needs across the entire spectrum of operations, from peacetime through conflict.” As for getting full-sized, geostationary satellites back into orbit, that would prove to be a greater challenge. It can take years to built a new satellite, which typically requires a big, costly rocket to get it into space. Lastly, if a Kessler Syndrome wipes out the satellites, that would present an entirely different recovery scenario. According to McDowell, it would take a minimum of 11 years for LEO to clear itself of the debris cloud; any objects below 500 km (310 miles) would eventually fall back to Earth. Thus, we would only be able to start re-seeding LEO in a little over a decade following a Kessler event. Unfortunately, the area above 600 km (372 miles) would remain out of touch for a practically indefinite period of time; objects orbiting at that height tend to stay there for a long, long time. We’d probably lose this band for good — unless we manually removed the debris field, using clean-up satellites or other techniques. It’s worth noting that a single Kessler event could hit the LEO zone or the GEO zone (geosynchronous orbit) but realistically not both; LEO debris could never reach GEO, and vice versa — though a spent rocket in GTO (geosynchronous transfer orbit) or SSTO (supersynchronous transfer orbit) passes through or near both zones and could potentially affect either of them. The spent rockets in GTO do not stay too close to the GEO arc for long due to orbital perturbations, so a GEO Kessler event is very unlikely to be triggered by one of them. Suffice to say, we should probably take the prospect of a Kessler Syndrome more seriously, and be aware of what could happen if we’re no longer able to use these spaces.

#### Noko uses even more capabilities on the US---ensures escalation.

Harrison et al. 18 (, T., Johnson, K. and Roberts, T., 2018. A REPORT OF THE CSIS AEROSPACE SECURITY PROJECT. [online] Aerospace.csis.org. Available at: <https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Harrison\_SpaceThreatAssessment\_FULL\_WEB.pdf> [Accessed 13 January 2022] Todd Harrison is the director of Defense Budget Analysis and director of the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS. As a senior fellow in the International Security Program, he leads the Center’s efforts to provide in-depth, nonpartisan research and analysis of defense funding, space security, and air power issues. He has authored publications on trends in the defense budget, military space systems, threats to space systems, civil space exploration, defense acquisitions, military compensation and readiness, and military force structure, among other topics. He teaches classes on military space systems and the defense budget at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Kaitlyn Johnson is deputy director and fellow of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Ms. Johnson supports the team’s strategic planning and research agenda. Her research specializes in topics such as space security, military space systems, and commercial and civil space policy. Ms. Johnson has written on national security space reorganization, threats against space assets, the commercialization of space, escalation and deterrence dynamics, and defense acquisition trends. She is also a cohost of the CSIS podcast Tech Unmanned, which features guests with both policy expertise and technical expertise in order to break through the national security jargon and technology hand-waving to get to the core of the technical realities of these emerging capabilities, benefits to development, and the barriers to success. Ms. Johnson holds an MA from American University in U.S. foreign policy and national security studies, with a concentration in defense and space security, and a BS from the Georgia Institute of Technology in international affairs. Thomas G. Roberts is an adjunct fellow with the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. His research interests include civil and commercial space policy, space security, and orbital mechanics. Previously, Mr. Roberts has written on threats against space systems, space object behavior, and international relations in space. His work has appeared in The Atlantic, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, War on the Rocks, and other publications. Mr. Roberts is currently a graduate research fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Astrodynamics, Space Robotics, and Controls Laboratory and a PhD student in the institute’s Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics. He holds an MS in aeronautics and astronautics and an MS in technology and policy from MIT and a BA in astrophysical sciences from Princeton University. In 2015, Mr. Roberts was named a Harry S. Truman scholar. In 2021, he was awarded the National Science Foundation’s Graduate Research Fellowship in support of his doctoral research in computational astrodynamics at MIT.)-rahulpenu

NORTH KOREA

North Korea is a critical threat to the United States and our allies in Northeast Asia and is our hardest intelligence collection target.

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NORTH KOREA HAS AN ACTIVE SPACE PROGRAM that is closely related to its missile program, which has made significant progress in recent years. Still, many experts doubt that the few satellites launched by North Korea perform all of the functions that the North Korean government claims.162 There is little indication that North Korea is making substantial efforts to build or sustain a space industrial base, but its missile program is growing and many believe that it is aided by technology from China, Iran, and/or Pakistan.163 North Korea successfully orbited its first satellite in December 2012 after three failed attempts in July 2006, April 2009, and April 2012. The successful launch used the Unha-3, a launch vehicle believed to be a variant of the Taepodong-2 ICBM. In its fifth test in February 2016, it successfully placed a second satellite in orbit.164 While the space capabilities provided by these two satellites have little if any military significance, it demonstrates that the nation has the capability of placing an object into orbit. Moreover, North Korea has publicly stated its intent to continue launching remote sensing satellites and to send an unmanned mission to the moon within a decade.165

In parallel with its space program, North Korea has also made significant progress in developing and testing ballistic missiles. Under the Kim JongUn regime, it has ramped up its missile test program from 6 ballistic missile launches in 2012 to 25 launches in 2017.166 Its November 2017 test of the Hwasong-15 ICBM followed a lofted trajectory to reach an apogee of 4,475 km and a range of 950 km. If the same vehicle with the same payload were launched on a range-maximizing trajectory, it could reach virtually any location in the United States.167 Based on publicly available information, however, it is not clear whether North Korea has developed the re-entry vehicle technology that would be necessary to deploy a conventional or nuclear warhead on its long-range missiles.

SPACE ORGANIZATION AND DOCTRINE LITTLE IS KNOWN ABOUT NORTH KOREA’S DOCTRINE or operational concepts for the use of space and counterspace capabilities. Most of the country’s military capabilities appear to be focused on ensuring the survival of the regime and deterring foreign aggression, and it maintains “a stridently confrontational posture against the United States.”168 When the regime speaks publicly about space, it is usually in the context of peaceful programs and its right to be a space power. It has been noted that the absence of discussion about counterspace capabilities that could threaten the U.S. military is curious given the aggressive rhetoric used by the regime in touting its nuclear and missile programs.169

COUNTERSPACE WEAPONS Kinetic Physical To da  
te North Korea has not tested, or indicated that it is attempting to develop, a direct-ascent or co-orbital ASAT capability. The space launch and ballistic missile technology demonstrated by North Korea could serve as the basis for a kinetic ASAT capability, but many technological hurdles remain. An effective directascent or co-orbital ASAT weapon would require various onboard sensors—optical, infrared, radar, etc.—and a guidance system to steer the warhead into a target satellite. There are no indications that North Korea has or is attempting to acquire the technology needed for this.170 Like Iran, it is conceivable that North Korea could field a crude direct-ascent ASAT capability in the near-term by adapting a ballistic missile to launch an unguided warhead to detonate in the vicinity of a target satellite. Such a weapon would be unlikely to directly strike a satellite, but could create a debris field that complicates future operations for the target satellite and any other satellites in a similar orbit.

Non-Kinetic Physical

There is some evidence that North Korea may be developing or has already acquired non-kinetic physical counterspace weapons such as a nuclear EMP device.171 However, the technology necessary for more sophisticated directed-energy weapons, such as lasers that can dazzle or blind the sensors on satellites, requires a level of technology that North Korea is unlikely to possess anytime soon.172 Another country, particularly China or Russia, could provide such capabilities to North Korea, but there is no publicly available evidence to suggest this has occurred. Given its existing ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities, North Korea could theoretically launch a nuclear weapon into space and detonate it.173 Using a nuclear weapon in this manner does not require re-entry vehicle technology like a nuclear-armed ICBM would. Tests of nuclear weapons in space were banned by the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, but North Korea is not a signatory to this treaty.174 In a written statement to Congress in 2017, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (the EMP Commission) offered evidence that North Korea may be developing an EMP weapon. The EMP Commission notes that in 2004 two Russian generals warned the commission that the design for a Russian EMP warhead was unintentionally transferred to North Korea. South Korean intelligence officials told the press in 2009 that Russian scientists were in North Korea helping to develop an EMP weapon. Moreover, the commission notes that in 2013 a Chinese military commentator indicated that North Korea already has “Super-EMP nuclear weapons.”175

Electronic North Korea has acquired and is actively using electronic forms of attack against U.S. space systems. In 2010, the South Korean Defense Minister, Kim Tae-young, said in a speech to parliament that “North Korea has imported vehicle-mountable devices capable of jamming GPS signals from Russia.”176 These downlink jamming systems reportedly have an effective radius of 50 to 100 km. North Korea began using this jamming equipment against South Korea in August 2010, but South Korean forces could not pinpoint the location of the jammers at that time because the jamming lasted just 10 minutes in each instance.177 In the years since, North Korea has repeatedly used its GPS jamming capabilities against South Korea. More GPS jamming occurred in December 2010 and again in March 2011. The 2011 incident lasted 10 days and coincided with an annual U.S.-Korean military exercise.178 Jamming occurred again in April 2012, disrupting air traffic at Incheon and Gimpo International Airports, and forcing flights to use alternative navigation systems.179 In 2016, South Korea complained to the United Nations Security Council that the North was again jamming GPS signals across the border, with the jamming coming from five areas in North Korea: Pyongyang, Kaesong, Haeju, Yonan county, and Mount Kumgang.180 The South Korean Defense Ministry has said it believes the jamming attacks originate from “a regiment-sized electronic warfare unit near the North Korean capital Pyongyang, and battalion-sized units closer to the inter-Korean border.”181 The jammers are mounted on mobile platforms and are operated intermittently, and they could be difficult to locate and neutralize in a conflict. North Korea appears to be gaining operational experience using these systems in peacetime. To what extent these capabilities are integrated into its overall military operations remains unknown. Since the GPS jammers were acquired from Russia, it is possible that North Korea could also have acquired other types of jamming capabilities that can target different satellite systems, such as uplink jammers that can disrupt military satellite communications. Despite South Korean protests to the United Nations that the North’s GPS jamming is a violation of the 1953 armistice agreement,182 no effective measures have been undertaken to date to curb this activity.

NORTH KOREA HAS ACQUIRED AND IS ACTIVELY USING ELECTRONIC FORMS OF ATTACK AGAINST U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS.

Cyber

General Vincent Brooks, commander of United States Forces Korea, noted in congressional testimony that North Korea’s well-organized and advanced cyber forces are perhaps among the best in the world.183 Under the Kim Jong-Un regime, North Korea has exercised these cyber forces frequently, launching attacks on South Korea, the United States, and others. In one of the most widely reported incidents, North Korea launched a cyberattack against Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014.184 The following month, in a move that may have been intended to demonstrate the capability to damage physical infrastructure through cyberspace, North Korea conducted a cyberattack on a South Korean nuclear power plant.185 Given its demonstrated cyber capabilities, it is conceivable that North Korea could initiate a cyberattack against U.S. space systems to intercept information, as it did in the Sony attack, or to inject corrupt information that could cause physical damage to U.S. satellites or the forces that depend on them.

**Escalation ladder ensures nuke war---alliance and strategy cohesion is key.**

Bush 17 (, R., 2017. The real reason a North Korean nuclear weapon is so terrifying—and it’s not what you think. [online] Brookings. Available at: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/08/09/the-real-reason-a-north-korean-nuclear-weapon-is-so-terrifying-and-its-not-what-you-think/> [Accessed 12 January 2022] Richard C. Bush III is an American expert on China affairs. Since 2002, he has served as the director of Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies of the Brookings Institution, and concurrently as the inaugural Michael H. Armacost Chair in Foreign Policy Studies. Bush is also a senior fellow of foreign policy.)-recut rahulpenu

There is general agreement in Washington—and Seoul and Tokyo—that East Asia and the world will be a more dangerous place once **No**rth **Ko**rea achieves its declared goal of being able to hit the continental **U**nited **S**tates with nuclear weapons. But what is the danger, specifically? Many people aren’t clear. In my view, it’s less about the actual ability of North Korea to hit the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. Rather, the real danger stems from the possibility of **weakened alliances** and unchecked escalation in the Korean Peninsula that could spiral out of control. DETER AND PROTECT, CALLED INTO QUESTIONThe Trump administration seems to believe that even North Korea’s ability to reliably hit the United States with nuclear weapons is so dangerous that it must prevent that from happening. Yet how it intends to do that is unclear. On August 8, President Trump threatened strong military action, but he seemed to forget the almost certain North Korean retaliation against South Korea, our ally, if we took such actions. Then there is the belief that “maximum pressure” by the United States, China, and others will bring North Korea to the negotiating table, where it will be willing to trade away or at least freeze its nuclear and missile programs. That ignores the reality that the Kim Jong-un regime wants to achieve the ability to hit the United States with nuclear weapons so badly, there is no package of incentives that would be acceptable to Washington and Seoul that would lead Pyongyang to abandon its goal. But even when—not if—North Korea has the ability to strike the United States, that does not mean it will use that capability against us. Indeed, in my view, the danger that North Korea would launch a nuclear first strike against the United States or its allies—Japan or South Korea—is relatively small. Pyongyang says that it is going nuclear in order to deter the more powerful United States from launching a nuclear or conventional war against it. Although North Korea is actually wrong in its assessment of the threat the United States poses, its desire to enhance its security by being able to retaliate after such an imagined attack is understandable. It would not be the first country to employ that deterrence logic. **So**uth **Ko**rean and Japanese **security** specialists point to a more serious danger. They remind us, correctly, that their countries have depended for their own security on the credible commitment of the **U**nited **S**tates to use **all available means** to defend them from attack by **No**rth **Ko**rea, including retaliation with nuclear weapons if necessary. Among other things, Japan and South Korea have chosen not to acquire nuclear weapons themselves because they believe in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. (South Korea had started on a nuclear program in the 1970s but the Ford administration shut it down. Japan has considered starting a program at various times but in the end never wished to risk the U.S.-Japan alliance.). As North Korea’s quest is getting closer to success, **skepticism in Seoul** and Tokyo **about** credibility of the American commitment is increasing. Reasonably, the skeptics ask, if North Korea attacked them, would Washington be willing to retaliate with nuclear weapons when North Korea would be able and probably willing to counter-retaliate by hitting America? Would Washington be willing to risk San Francisco in order to save Seoul or Tokyo? The United States faced this fear of “de-coupling” in Europe during the Cold War. Britain and France, knowing that nothing could match the conventional forces of the Soviet Union in Western Europe, each preferred to have their own independent nuclear deterrent as a hedge against a U.S. loss of nerve. On the other hand, Washington was able to convince West Germany to remain nuclear-free but it required a lot of effort. **Thinking ahead**, the Obama administration began a campaign to persuade Japanese and South Korean leaders to follow the path of Germany and rely on their U.S. alliances. But that job will only get harder as North Korea gets closer to its goal. THE ESCALATION SPIRAL North Korea’s nuclear program poses another danger, perhaps the greatest one. Pyongyang may soon assume that it can **now** act more recklessly vis-à-vis South Korea **at the conventional level** and well short of a major attack because it can hypothetically counter the United States at the nuclear level. **The scenario I have in mind is one in which** North Korea starts at a relatively low rung of the escalation ladder: sinking a **South Korean naval** vessel, bombarding South Korean-controlled islands in the West Sea, or creating trouble in the **d**e**m**ilitarized **z**one. It has done all of these things **in the last seven years** but then backed off from further conflict. Once Pyongyang can target the continental **U**nited **S**tates, it will likely take **bigger risks** t

han it has **to date**. It would undertake such **limited-war** actions as much to achieve political gains as military ones. It would hope test South Korean intentions and try to drive wedges within South Korean society: between the military on the one hand and President Moon’s dovish advisers on the other; between conservative parties and progressive ones; between segments of the public that don’t want to see their country pushed around and those who worry about Seoul’s vulnerability. Where President Moon would come out is anybody’s guess. A second purpose would be to provoke tensions within the **U.S.-ROK** alliance. In such a crisis, there might be disagreements on how severely the South Korean armed forces should retaliate against North Korean aggression. South Korea might not wish to appear weak, in order to deter future humiliations. The United States might fear that things would get out of hand and urge restraint. The safety of the residents of Seoul, which is within range of North Korean artillery close to the DMZ, would rightly be a fundamental concern. But **it is neither in South Korea’s interest or ours to give Pyongyang reason to think** that **the U**nited **S**tates **has lost confidence in our ally. In this situation,** the danger of reciprocal escalation even as far as the use of nuclear weapons would be real. We lack understandings with Pyongyang of the sort we had with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, such as **communications channels** to reduce the risk of **misperception** and **miscalc**ulation. But even if escalation were controlled and Pyongyang didn’t get close to using nuclear weapons, the very existence of those weapons would weigh on the minds of South Korean leaders and citizens and U.S. decisionmakers. Again, North Korea’s goal here would be political. Pyongyang would hope that the Moon administration would opt for a weak response rather than a tough one—in that case, North Korea would have humiliated South Korea and won a political victory. If Moon chose a tough response, North Korea could back down, not having lost very much, or it could escalate one round, again to see what South Korea does in response. But it would **believe** that **it controls the escalation ladder** and assume that **at some point,** Seoul would choose **appease**ment. The United States would likely end up in a no-win situation as a result of these episodes. Even if coordination with the South Korean military were smooth, some parts of the South Korean society would be unhappy. Either conservatives in Korea would conclude that we haven’t been tough enough and so doubt our resolve in the future, or progressives would conclude that we have been too assertive and that their country needs to move to a more autonomous defense. Whatever happens, it’s probably a political win for North Korea. Pyongyang could well believe that it has nothing to lose by testing South Korean resolve and ours. **How we respond to** these **low-level probes will** cumulatively **shape** South Korean **confidence** in the United States, **for good or ill.** Even though these crises stay in the conventional realm, they will affect South Korean thinking about what we would do if another crisis escalated **toward the nuclear level.** In addition, how Washington and Seoul respond **at low levels** will also cumulatively **shape the risks that North Korea is willing to run**. The **U**nited **S**tates **needs to assume that North Korean conventional probes will come**, sooner or later. It is far better Washington to formulate our responses **in advance** and urge the South Koreans to do the same, in order to reduce the chances that we will bungle our reaction when these more aggressive provocations occur.

**Nuclear war causes extinction -- counter-forcing is impossible**

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Nuclear war has no winner. Beginning in 2006, several of the world’s leading climatologists (at Rutgers, UCLA, John Hopkins University, and the University of Colorado-Boulder) published a series of studies that evaluated the long-term environmental consequences of a nuclear war, including baseline scenarios fought with **merely 1% of the explosive** power in the US and/or Russian launch-ready nuclear arsenals. They concluded that the consequences of **even a “small” nuclear war would include catastrophic disruptions of global climate** and massive destruction of Earth’s protective ozone layer. These and more recent studies predict that global agriculture would be so negatively affected by such a war, a global famine would result, which would cause up to 2 billion people to starve to death. These peer-reviewed studies – which were analyzed by the best scientists in the world and found to be without error – also predict that a war fought with less than half of US or Russian strategic nuclear weapons would destroy the human race. In other words, a US-Russian nuclear war would create such extreme long-term damage to the global environment that it would leave the Earth uninhabitable for humans and most animal forms of life. A recent article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Self-assured destruction: The climate impacts of nuclear war,” begins by stating: “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self-assured destruction.” In 2009, I wrote “Catastrophic Climatic Consequences of Nuclear Conflicts” for the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The article summarizes the findings of these studies. It explains that nuclear firestorms would produce millions of tons of smoke, which would rise above cloud level and form a global stratospheric smoke layer that would rapidly encircle the Earth. The smoke layer would remain for at least a decade, and it would act to destroy the protective ozone layer (vastly increasing the UV-B reaching Earth) as well as block warming sunlight, thus creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last 10 years or longer. Following a US-Russian nuclear war, temperatures in the central US and Eurasia would fall below freezing every day for one to three years; the intense cold would completely eliminate growing seasons for a decade or longer. No crops could be grown, leading to a famine that would kill most humans and large animal populations. **E**lectro**m**agnetic **p**ulse from high-altitude nuclear detonations would destroy the integrated circuits in all modern electronic devices, including those in commercial nuclear power plants. Every nuclear reactor would almost **instantly meltdown**; every nuclear spent fuel pool (which contain many times more radioactivity than found in the reactors) would boil off, releasing vast amounts of long-lived radioactivity. The fallout would make most of the US and Europe **uninhabitable**. Of course, the survivors of the nuclear war would be starving to death anyway. Once nuclear weapons were introduced into a US-Russian conflict, there would be little chance that a nuclear holocaust could be avoided. Theories of “limited nuclear war” and “nuclear de-escalation” are unrealistic. In 2002 the Bush administration modified US strategic doctrine from a retaliatory role to permit preemptive nuclear attack; in 2010, the Obama administration made only incremental and miniscule changes to this doctrine, leaving it essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Counterforce doctrine – used by both the US and Russian military – emphasizes the need for preemptive strikes once nuclear war begins. Both sides would be under immense pressure to launch a preemptive nuclear first-strike once military hostilities had commenced, especially if nuclear weapons had already been used on the battlefield. Both the US and Russia each have 400 to 500 launch-ready ballistic missiles armed with a total of at least 1800 strategic nuclear warheads, which can be launched with only a few minutes warning. Both the US and Russian Presidents are accompanied 24/7 by military officers carrying a “nuclear briefcase,” which allows them to transmit the permission order to launch in a matter of seconds. Yet top political leaders and policymakers of both the US and Russia seem to be unaware that their launch-ready nuclear weapons represent a self-destruct mechanism for the human race. For example, in 2010, I was able to publicly question the chief negotiators of the New START treaty, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov and (then) US Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, during their joint briefing at the UN (during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference). I asked them if they were familiar with the recent peer-reviewed studies that predicted the detonation of less than 1% of the explosive power contained in the operational and deployed US and Russian nuclear forces would cause catastrophic changes in the global climate, and that a nuclear war fought with their strategic nuclear weapons would kill most people on Earth. They both answered “no.” More recently, on April 20, 2014, I asked the same question and received the same answer from the US officials sent to brief representatives of the NGOS at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting at the UN. None of the US officials at the briefing were aware of the studies. Those present included top officials of the National Security Council. It is frightening that President Obama and his administration appear unaware that the world’s leading scientists have for years predicted that a nuclear war fought with the US and/or Russian strategic nuclear arsenal means the end of human history. Do they not know of the existential threat these arsenals pose to the human race . . . or do they choose to remain silent because this fact doesn’t fit into their official narratives? We hear only about terrorist threats that could destroy a city with an atomic bomb, while the threat of human extinction from nuclear war is never mentioned – even when the US and Russia are each running huge nuclear war games in preparation for a US-Russian war. Even more frightening is the fact that the neocons running US foreign policy believe that the US has “nuclear primacy” over Russia; that is, the US could successfully launch a nuclear sneak attack against Russian (and Chinese) nuclear forces and completely destroy them. This theory was articulated in 2006 in “The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy,” which was published in Foreign Affairs by the Council on Foreign Relations. By concluding that the Russians and Chinese would be unable to retaliate, or if some small part of their forces remained, would not risk a second US attack by retaliating, the article invites nuclear war. Colonel Valery Yarynich (who was in charge of security of the Soviet/Russian nuclear command and control systems for 7 years) asked me to help him write a rebuttal, which was titled “**Nuclear Primacy is a Fallacy**.” Colonel Yarynich, who was on the Soviet General Staff and did war planning for the USSR, concluded that the “Primacy” article used faulty methodology and erroneous assumptions, thus invalidating its conclusions. My contribution lay in my knowledge of the recently published (in 2006) studies, which predicted **even a “successful” nuclear first-strike**, which destroyed 100% of the opposing side’s nuclear weapons, would cause the citizens of the side that “won” the nuclear war to perish from nuclear famine, just as would the rest of humanity.

### 1AC---Framework

#### Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10].

Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14].

Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals.

Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D

Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it.

It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring.

Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding.

There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health.

Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage.

Finding happiness is different between apes and humans

As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure.

Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered.

Desire and reward centers

It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation.

In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41].

Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42].

Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans.

In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45].

Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations.

Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50]

In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders.

In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS.

Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Extinction outweighs

1] Objectivity – body count obective anythign else is subjective and invites isms

2] Sequencing – k2 resolving future issues

### UV

#### Making impactful contributions demands causal policy relevance AND methodological pluralism---that is the only way to draw accurate contextual conclusions and prevent violent, imprecise reification.

Michael C. Desch 19. Packey J. Dee Professor of International Relations at Notre Dame and founding director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, former Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, #gocats. 2019. “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations.” Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security, Princeton University Press.

I want to reiterate that I am not arguing that scholarship that is formal or quantitative is by definition irrelevant. Indeed, one can point to examples of both that are. When applied to economic issues, the discipline of economics has managed to be both highly “scientific” and, at times, quite relevant, though for both good and ill. Likewise, there are examples of highly quantitative political science that policymakers have found useful.1 Finally, there is much nonquantitative scholarship, particularly but not exclusively in the humanities that, is jargon laden and otherwise inaccessible to a wider audience, including government policymakers.2 This is by no means an anti-social science methods screed, just a reminder of the tensions between rigor and relevance that need to managed rather than assumed away. Nor is this in any way a brief against theory. Former State Department official Roger Hilsman reminded us that everyone, including policymakers, uses theory. Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes, he concluded that “it seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. Even the ‘practical’ man who despises theory has a number of assumptions and expectations which lead him to believe that when certain things are done, certain results follow.. . .It is this ‘theory’ that helps a problem solver select from the mass of facts surrounding him those which he hopes are relevant.”3 Given that, I fully associate myself with Hans Morgenthau’s balanced view that “theory without verification is metaphysics, but empiricism without theory is aimless.”4 Since policymakers implicitly use theory in analyzing situations and assessing their alternatives, such theories should be stated explicitly and analyzed systematically, which is a comparative advantage of the scholars. Instead, what I offer is simply a critique of the increasing tendency of many social scientists to embrace methods and models for their own sake rather than because they can help us answer substantively important questions. This inclination is in part the result of the otherwise normal and productive workings of science, but is also reinforced by less positive factors such as organizational self-interest and intellectual culture. As a result of the latter, many political scientists have committed themselves to particular social science methods not so much because they believe they will illuminate real-world policy problems but because they serve a vested interest in disciplinary autonomy and dovetail with a particular image (mathematized and model-based) of what a “science” of politics should look like. In other words, the professionalization of social science is the root of the enduring relevance question. This tendency to equate rigor with technique imposes costs on the rest of society as well as the discipline, especially when it excludes a more balanced approach to rigor and relevance of the sort that characterized the subfield of security studies in the past. On the former, as diplomat George Kennan rightly observed, policymakers need academic expertise because they have to make decisions about issues and areas of the world “about which they cannot be expert and learned.”5 They depend on the academy for the raw data—whether quantitative or historical—that they use in decision making. They also rely on the social sciences for the theories they use to analyze and make sense of this data. The problem with relying exclusively on in-house government research to make up for the lack of policy-relevant academic research is that it is often of low quality. The role of the “independent policy analyst” is essential for three reasons: 6 He or she can challenge basic policy assumptions. As RAND’s Hans Spier put it, they can undertake “research which does not necessarily take the mission of the military for granted and admits the possibility U.S. may be wrong”7 And academic social scientists are particularly well suited to this role by virtue of the fact that they both conduct research and also teach future policymakers. Academics have some other advantages over policymakers. They have the time to develop greater depth of knowledge on issues and regions than most policymakers can. The institution of tenure also gives them, at least in theory, the freedom to explore controversial issues and take unpopular stands. And while peer review can homogenize and narrow scholarship, it also plays an indisputably positive role in advancing it. Finally, university-based scholars have less of a vested interest in certain policies and programs than do policymakers, though of course that is not to deny that they have their own institutional interests and biases.9 I am not suggesting, of course, that scholars would make better policy than bureaucrats and elected officials. They lack inside knowledge, have little actual power, and are often politically out of step with the rest of American society.10 They also come to policy issues with a markedly different intellectual orientation than policymakers.11 Rather, my point is simply that our democratic political system depends on the successful functioning of the marketplace of ideas and checks and balances in which individuals and groups with various strengths and weaknesses and offsetting biases participate in the larger policy debate, thereby compensating for each other’s limitations.12 We run into trouble when we lack one of these perspectives in policy debates. Indeed, there are instances—the war in Vietnam and the recent Iraq War—in which had the majority consensus of scholars in academia influenced policy, the country’s national interest would have been better served. As the flawed Iraq War debate demonstrates, our nation’s marketplace of ideas is bankrupt, particularly in national security affairs.13 Of course, our political problems run much deeper than just the Beltway/Ivory Tower gap, but closing it would represent an important step in the country’s intellectual recapitalization. This nation’s universities need to reclaim their place as one of society’s main sources of independent ideas about the problems that it faces.14 Less widely recognized, and perhaps more controversial given the prevailing sentiments in the Academy for a sharp distinction between “science” and “policy,” is my contention that the growing gap is ultimately bad for the generation of new knowledge. There are at least two reasons why greater attention to policy relevance produces better scholarship. First, it leads to more realistic theorizing. As John Kenneth Galbraith warned his economics colleagues nearly forty years ago, “No arrangement for the perpetuation of thought is secure if that thought does not make contact with the problems that it is presumed to solve.”15 Second, a focus on manipulatable variables makes it more likely that they are testable because the analyst can ensure variation on them. Also, the hyperspecialization of knowledge today makes it difficult for even scholars in related disciplines to understand each other, much less the general public. Such intellectual fragmentation makes the application of scholarly knowledge to policymaking extremely difficult. Therefore, a deeper and more regular engagement between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway will be mutually beneficial for both sides.16 Ultimately, even the most sophisticated social science will be judged by what it tells us about things that affect the lives of large numbers of people and which policymakers therefore seek to influence and control.17 The recurrent congressional debates about National Science Foundation funding for political science highlight the direct costs to the discipline of not being able to justify itself in terms of broader impact on the rest of society. Harkening back to the debate about the Mansfield Amendment, an article in Science cautioned that “to the extent that the research community disdains work on major national missions or behaves self-servingly in mission-oriented work, anti-intellectualism will increase its influence on the fate of American science.”18 Also, public and philanthropic community support for investment in academia generally reflects the belief that it will produce work that will speak to problems of broader importance. When the academy fails on that score, it can undermine that support.19 Political science’s subfield of international security studies can plausibly claim to save large amounts of money and even lives and so its increasing marginalization is a self-inflicted wound on the discipline. Response to Objections There are at least eight reasonable, though ultimately unpersuasive, objections to my argument that we should consider. First, some point to the influence of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) on the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations as evidence that one of the most scientific of social science theories in international relations was both useful and influential among policymakers.20 The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other gained currency among social scientists based on statistical analysis of every major interstate war since 1815. In the words of Rutgers political scientist Jack Levy, the Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”21 Two scholars argued that the theory became relevant outside of the academy precisely “because of the law-like status of a particular empirical finding.”22 Others hold it up as a model of how basic research in political science can contribute to policymakers.23 It is not clear, though, that the influence of the DPT on recent U.S. foreign policy was due to its unassailable social scientific standing. While former Defense Department official and Ohio State political scientist Joseph Kruzel conceded that DPT “had substantial impact on public policy,” he attributed its attractiveness to policymakers to its simplicity rather than its social scientific rigor.24 It clearly identifies America’s enemies (nondemocratic states) and prescribed a simple response to them (make them democratic). It is also likely that the much less methodologically sophisticated articulation of the theory in the work of Michael Doyle was far more influential.25 And the process by which DPT entered the Clinton White House did not involve sophisticated social science. Rather, the key administration proponent of the democratic peace was National Security Advisor (and former college professor) Anthony Lake.26 It is clear, however, that to the extent that Lake was drawing support for the democratic peace from academic sources, it was not from statistically based research, but rather from the qualitative work of scholars like Harvard’s Samuel Huntington.27 The results of a survey of senior national security policymakers found that more than half of those familiar with the methodologically sophisticated democratic peace theory reported not being influenced by it in their government work.28 Finally, one could argue that U.S. policymakers have embraced the democratic peace because of its compatibility with our political culture rather than its scientific standing.29 A second, and in some ways, flip side of the first critique, is that the relevance problem with contemporary security studies is the result of the subfield’s domination by realism, and particularly its most abstruse and theoretical manifestation, neorealism.30 Critics point particularly to neorealist arguments that tout the virtues of nuclear proliferation as examples of theoretically elegant but politically unacceptable social science.31 Despite its respectability among scholars, neorealist proliferation optimism has reportedly had little influence on actual policy.32 While that particular policy issue may not have been influenced by realist thinking, as this book has shown realists have remained committed to policy relevance at times when the rest of the discipline has eschewed it. And they have more often been on the right side of policy debates as well.33 A third potential challenge to my argument is that many social scientists believe that they should avoid offering policy recommendations in favoring of focusing on basic research tasks such as identifying empirical regularities and offering generalizations to explain them.34 As Dartmouth political scientist Kalman Silvert warned, “It is not the legitimate role of the social scientist as scholar to advocate specific courses of governmental action or to act as implementer of government decisions.”35 Another rationale is that doing so is unnecessary given that the applied implications of basic research tend to trickle down by themselves.36 Policy engagement—particularly offering explicit policy recommendations—is both unwise and unnecessary in the view of many social scientists. Neither of these views, however, are shared by policymakers. Most believe that in addition to providing basic research findings, “scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.”37 Nor are current and former policymakers sanguine about the trickle-down (or bubble-up in which senior policymakers get the results of scholarly work through their methodologically savvy staffs) process. As John K. Plank of the Brookings Institution, a former DoD official, recollected, “There is presumably a process whereby the research product is filtered up to [senior policymakers], but in point of fact very little of operational usefulness is transmitted.”38 Fourth, some political scientists believe that there are now so many new outlets for scholars to engage in the policy debate, it is both easier for them to do so and also unnecessary for them to concern themselves with doing so in their scholarship.39 Academics can now publish basic research in scholarly venues and then disseminate its applied implications through the new media. George Washington political scientist and blogger Marc Lynch effused that with the rise of the new media “this is in most ways a golden age for policy-relevant public spheres.”40 Indeed, many see the proliferation of new media outlets as the answer to political science’s perennial problem: its diminished public profile.41 The assumption here is that political scientists are simply not communicating their results effectively. There are three problems with these arguments: Until recently, we had no idea whether blogs and other new media reached policymakers. As one optimist conceded, we have “no solid statistics” on our impact.42 But we do now and it suggests that blogs and other new media are in fact not an important source of information for policymakers and therefore are unlikely to effectively convey the implications of basic research to policymakers, the media, or the general public.43 Moreover, even if a few blogs get some attention, many others do not, simply making more noise in an already cacophonous marketplace of ideas.44 And suggesting that the failure of communication argument misses the mark, Social Science Research Council president Craig Calhoun noted that scholarly “engagement with public constituencies must move beyond a dissemination model” that assumes that “pure research” will naturally triclde down, even with better communication.45 In other words, it is not the medium that matters as much as the message. And the message must be made more intelligible and useful to policymakers and the general public. Finally, there is systematic evidence that academic bloggers and scholars who utilize other new media venues receive little professional credit for them in the critical areas of promotion and tenure.46 In short, despite the explosive growth of new media outlets, professional incentives still do not encourage scholars to use them. A fifth conceivable objection is that advanced social science techniques and basic research will eventually become more useful to policymakers as they (or at least their staffs) become more sophisticated in their understanding of them. One optimist, for example, noted that most graduate public policy schools now include one or two required courses in economics and social science methods in their curricula. As these increasingly methodologically savvy young bureaucrats become senior policymakers, so this argument goes, they will be more adept at using them and more appreciative of their policy relevance.47 However, this argument assumes that training in advanced research techniques is a recent development. Policy schools, however, have long had methods courses as part of their required curriculum. Even prior to this, many national security policymakers came out of academic Ph.D. programs in which they were exposed to the latest innovations in social science methodology. It also ignores that the security studies subfield played a leading role in developing many of these sophisticated social science techniques, particularly at RAND in the 1950s.48 An example of the reverse flow of ideas from the policy world to the Academy was the “unquestionably” leading role that RAND mathematicians and other social scientists played in the development of game theory, a mathematical framework for strategizing under uncertainty.49 Despite early enthusiasm, many at RAND concluded that game theory had an Achilles Heel in its application to national security policy: how to assign the numerical values that were to be plugged into its formulas. That was not a trivial limitation, which led Hitch to confess that “for our purposes, Game Theory has been quite disappointing.”50 It also assumes that today’s aspiring policymakers come away from these methods courses with an unqualified appreciation of their usefulness. My experience after ten years in teaching in such schools, and familiarity with the evaluations students give these courses, leaves me skeptical. They often do not see the usefulness of such courses and suspect they are being forced to take them for academic, not professional, reasons.51 Other colleagues at professional schools share this impression.52 Finally, an earlier survey of current and former national security policymakers reveals that the more highly educated the policymaker, the greater the skepticism about their utility.53 This is consistent with the argument that familiarity with advanced techniques instills greater appreciation not only for their promise but also their limits. Even proponents of modern social science methods in international relations concede that “the emerging science of international relations has a long way to go before it can be of direct use to policy makers.”54 It is hard to find much evidence that the most sophisticated approaches to international relations are of much direct use to policymakers, and there are ample reasons for caution about how much of the discipline’s “basic” research is really trickling down to indirectly influence policymakers. Sixth, some point to the post-9 /11 resurgence of interest among younger social scientists as a harbinger of another renaissance of interest in policy relevance. Others suggest that changes in the nature of the “new paradigm of knowledge production,” which is “socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities” constitute grounds for optimism about a broader return to relevance among the social sciences.55 To be sure, there are reasons for optimism on this score but also for continuing caution. As we have seen, previous periods of optimism about answering the relevance question have given way to disappointment. Moreover, many scholars have claimed to be policy relevant even though policymakers did not find them so.56 As one CIA analyst warned, “Social scientists commonly define policy-relevant research far more broadly than the foreign policy community does.”57 A seventh potential criticism of my argument is there are other forms of “relevance” beyond just influencing government policymakers by offering policy recommendations to which scholars should aspire.58 Especially in a democratic political system, a scholar’s vocation for politics can also involve educating students and informing the wider public about pressing issues of policy. Moreover, an engaged scholar could serve with nongovernmental and private organizations rather than just through government service. While there is no doubt that policy influence is broader than just affecting government policy, that is ultimately the goal of the enterprise, either directly through policymakers or indirectly through the media or the public. Moreover, it is the clearest and most demanding standard of relevance available. So if we want to understand when and how social science matters to policymakers that is the most important, if not the only, aspect of it to consider.59 Finally, many political scientists share Daniel Drezner’s view that economics has solved the relevance question in being both rigorous and relevant. 60 The logical implication of such a belief is that the rest of social sciences should follow that discipline’s lead in terms of its approach and methodology. This economics envy is based on a misapprehension that academic trends in economics have not also created a relevance problem. For example, a recent review of research at the World Bank by leading academic economists raised questions about how much of the scholarship of bank analysts that was written for publication in academic journals was of any use to the bank.61 Their answer was not much. They blamed intellectual trends in the discipline because it encouraged research that was “too academic, too focused toward the previously existing academic agenda, and too directed towards technical rather than pressing policy issues.”62 Behind this economics envy lies an even deeper inferiority complex visa- vis the natural sciences. Many social scientists believe that the physical sciences have two advantages over the “softer” social sciences: more reliable data and a consensus on how to analyze it. Quantifiable data, in this view, is more persuasive, because it is clearer and less subject to dispute.63 This view of the superiority of the physical over the social sciences is widespread, with many of the former reveling in their preeminence and some of the latter manifesting two classic symptoms of an inferiority complex: resentment or reflexive emulation. Neither of these responses is healthy. It is simply not true that expressing propositions mathematically ensures that they are clearer and more transparent than conveying them in English. Economist Paul Romer admitted that “with enough math, an author can be confident that most readers will never figure out where FWUTV [facts with unknown truth values] is buried. A discussant or referee cannot say that an identification assumption is not credible if they cannot figure out what it is and are too embarrassed to ask.”64 On the latter, one would think that the 2008 Great Recession, in which the misguided belief that quantitative models of the economy could be used to guide investment decisions on the grounds they could reveal “the truth” about what drives the market, would temper confidence that such scientific approaches could ensure effective policy.65 In a much discussed essay in the New York Times Magazine, Princeton economist Paul Krugman concluded that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.. . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.”66 It is not even clear that natural scientists have been most influential when they have employed their most rigorous and mathematically sophisticated approaches, at least in the national security realm. Indeed, there is more evidence that they have been most influential when they have offered practical solutions to real-world problems. These solutions have often come from scientifically uncertain and incomplete data.67 These are the hallmarks of much of the best of qualitative social science. Social scientists also ought to take heart that they not only can make an important contribution using their own distinct approaches, but also that in some instances they might even be superior to those of the physical scientists. For example, many of the nuclear scientists involved in the Manhattan Project soon came to regret their role in the escalating nuclear arms race of the Cold War. Reflecting a collective sense of guilt, chemist and peace activist Linus Pauling got almost nine thousand scientists to sign a January 1958 petition to end nuclear testing as first step toward universal disarmament.68 Talcing an equally impractical tack, Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard wrote to Franldin Delano Roosevelt’s science adviser Vannevar Bush in January 1944, “This weapon is so powerful that there can be no peace if it is simultaneously in the possession of any two powers unless these two powers are bound by an indissoluble political union.”69 While not all of the atomic scientists harbored doubts—recall the famous debates between Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller—the majority became advocates of international control of nuclear weapons, a policy that in retrospect was politically unrealistic. In comparing the assessments and policy recommendations of the physical scientists in the Golden Age, with those of social scientists like Jacob Viner, Bernard Brodie, and William T. R Fox, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the latter’s views of the nuclear problem (that the genie of nuclear weapons could not be stuffed back in the bottle), and their recommendations for dealing with that situation (nuclear deterrence), were far more “realistic” than those of the nuclear “one world” physical scientists. What Is to Be Done? There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71 There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, political science needs to rethink how it balances scholarly rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism, on one side, and scholastic irrelevance on the other.73 The best approach to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method (or all of them) but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these two principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can not only survive, but thrive, in political science.75 Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policyrelevant security studies scholarship. While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much of it can be a bad thing. In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 Theory is a powerful tool of statecraft, but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse. Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue. While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. In addition to doing these things, scholars should address pressing real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80 The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible. Academics also need to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the various influences on policy. Many, even in democratic political systems, tend to have an unrealistically “technocratic” attitude toward policymaking. 84 They often underestimate the role of politics in government decision making. Scholars must therefore understand that the policymaking process is inherently political and that without such an appreciation of the political considerations associated with any policy choice, even a good one may not be implemented.85

**Debate SOLVES collapse and oversaturation of meaning—net benefit is our offense about scenario analysis**

Bryan S. **Turner 4**, Dean of Social Sciences at Deakin University, Australia, “Baudrillard for Sociologists,” in Forget Baudrillard?, 2004 edition, p. 80-83While, as far as one can tell, Baudrillard was not influenced by Bell’s vision of the role of technology and the media in shaping postindustrialism, he was influenced by Marshall McLuhan’s analysis (Gane 1991b:48) of the impact of new media on the transformation of modern culture, especially in The Gutenberg Galaxy (McLuhan 1967). McLuhan was particularly sensitive to the idea that we live in a processed social world where human beings live in a complete technostructure. This technological environment is carried with us as extensions of our own bodies, but McLuhan did not adopt a pessimistic view of the age of anxiety, because his ‘technological humanism’ (Kroker et al. 1984) and Catholic values committed him to the idea of the immanence of reason and the hope of an escape from the labyrinth. Indeed, a global technological system could become the basis of a universalistic culture. Although he was fully aware of the sensory deprivation which he associated with the impact of the mass media, he none the less remained committed to the hope that these negative effects were not fatal. Baudrillard, who as we have noted was deeply influenced by McLuhan’s idea that **the content of messages was** relatively **unimportant in relation to their form**, has embraced a very **nihilistic position** with respect to our **processed environment**.¶ Baudrillard’s pessimistic view of the fissure in the historical development of the modern is based on his view of the masses. Baudrillard’s analysis of the masses is a product of the Situationist responses to the May events of 1968, when it became increasingly obvious that the critical social movements of modern society would not be dominated by Marxist theory or directed by a vanguard of the working class. The crisis of May 1968 had not been predicted by Marxism or by mainstream sociology, but they did validate the claims of Situationists like Guy Debord in the journal Internationale Situationiste. However, if the crisis had been unanticipated by conventional political analysis, then the sudden collapse of the students’ and workers’ movements of 1968 found no easy explanation in the framework of mainstream social sciences.¶ Baudrillard’s concept of the inexplicable nature of the mass depend a great deal on the unusual circumstances surrounding the May events. By 1973 with the publication of The Mirror of Production (Baudrillard 1975), Baudrillard was already moving away from an orthodox Marxist view of production, arguing that Marxism, far from being an external critique of capitalism, was merely a reflection or mirror of the principal economistic values of capitalism. **Instead of engaging in the production of meaning**, a subversive, oppositional movement would have to challenge the system from the point of view of **meaninglessness**. Subversion would have to rob the social system of significance. In taking this stand, Baudrillard followed the Situationist claim that whatever can be represented can be controlled (Plant 1992:137). The mass events of 1968 offered a promise of the nonrepresentational moment, the pure event of authenticity, which could not be explained, and therefore could not be manipulated. Baudrillard, in dismissing Marxist theory as a means of representing events, sought to replace the idea of a mode of production with a mode of disappearance.¶ In taking this attitude towards modern social movements, Baudrillard’s argument also rests on the various meanings of the word ‘mass’. Baudrillard is thus able to make allusions to the idea of physical substance, matter, the majority and the electrical meaning of earth. The translator’s note to In the Shadow of the Silent Majority points out that faire masse can mean to form a majority and to form an earth. Baudrillard argues by allusion that the mass absorbs the electrical charges of social and political movements; the mass thus neutralizes the electrical charge of society. This use of allusion, parody and irony is typical of Baudrillard’s mode of analysis, which is a type of sociological poetics, a style which is likely to make sociologists feel uncomfortable (Gane 199la:193). There is here also a continuity with the style of Dada and the Situationists. The poetic and striking character of Baudrillard’s style **has no counterpart in professional social science**, least of all in the British context.¶ Baudrillard’s ‘sociological fictions’ (1990a:15) are striking and challenging, but they **are not** ultimately **convincing**. Arguments which depend on allusion, allegory and similar rhetorical devices are decorative but they are **not** necessarily **powerful**. The notion of ‘mass society’ already has a clearly worked out sociological critique. The idea of ‘mass society’ might have been relevant in describing the new markets which were created in the post-war period with the advent of innovative technologies, which had the immediate effect of lowering prices and making commodities available to a mass audience. However, the trend of sociological analysis in the last two decades has been to assert that mass audiences have been broken down into more selectively constructed niches for more individualized products. It is controversial to argue that industrialization necessarily produces a mass society, characterized by a common culture, uniform sentiments or an integrated outlook. The idea of a mass society was often associated with the notion that the decline of individualism would produce a directionless mass as the modern equivalent of the eighteenthcentury mob. Critical theorists like Adorno and Marcuse associated the massification of society with authoritarianism and a potential for fascism. Of course, Baudrillard’s version of mass society is based on a particular **view of the mass media creating a hyperreality** in which the real has been absorbed by the hyperreal; **meaning has imploded on itself**. Although Baudrillard’s analysis of hyperreality is postcritical (Chen 1987), he does adopt in practice a critical position towards American civilization, which is the extreme example of massification. Rather like critical theorists, Baudrillard believes that the (bourgeois) individual has been sucked into the negative electrical mass of the media age. However, **sociological research** on mass audiences shows that **there is no ground for believing that media messages are received, consumed or used in any standardized manner**, and the majority of social scientists working on culture have attempted to argue that cultural objects in the age of the mass media are appropriated, transformed and consumed **in diverse forms and according to various practices** (de Certeau 1984). In fact, sociologists, largely inspired by the Situationists, have argued that everyday life is resistant to massification and that the concrete reality of everyday life-situations is the principal arena within which opposition to massification can be expected. Everyday life was regarded by both Guy Debord and Henri Lefebvre (1991) as the foundation of authenticity. **Baudrillard**, by arguing that criticism belongs to the period of modernism and not to the age of hyperreality, has **ruled out opposition to the system**, at least **at the level of public debate and formal politics.**