## 1AC

#### WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF A RACE WAR- The labelling of BLM protests and disorganized rioting and white nationalists like Dylan Roof confessing to “trying to start a race war.” The 21st century wave of racialized white nationalist violence has solidified the race war and we need to fight back.

#### **Narratives of racial progress ignore the pre-established template for progress that’s inextricably tied to white humanity. Reforms are encapsulated within the order, fluctuating between waves and retreats with White Supremacy as the backdrop – the “***theatre of racial nation-building with vacillating movements and subtitles: post-civil rights multiculturalism, resurgent white nationalism, post-racial liberalism, law-and-order, the War on Drugs, the War on Terror and the infrastructures of tolerance and repression are never finally separable***”1. All prove inseparability from the race war.**

1Rodriguez 19 – Dylan Rodriguez, Dylan Rodríguez is Professor and Chair of the Department of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. degrees in Ethnic Studies from the University of California, Berkeley (2001), and earned two B.A. degrees and a Concentration degree from Cornell University (1995). “Insult/Internal Debate/Echo”, Propter Nos Volume 3, 2019, pp. 129-130)//Shreyas

#### The race war is inseparable from and marks the birth of modern logistics – the code of modernity that sanctions the killing of innocent black and brown people. Governmentality forms coercive touch that seeks to perfect logistical order.

Harney et. al. 18 – Stefano Harney, professor at Singapore Management University, Niccolò Cuppini and Mattia Frapporti, Department Member of Independent Researcher & Department Member of Universitá di Bologna, “Logistics Genealogies: a dialogue with Stefano Harney”, September 2018, <http://www.intotheblackbox.com/articoli/logistics-genealogies-a-dialogue-with-stefano-harney/>, DOA: 11/15/2019)//shreyas

Answer 1: Modern logistics is a commercial logistics, with all the multiple sources that feed what Cedric Robinson calls racial capitalism. And it’s a capitalist science. Even today’s military logistics is most commonly outsourced to commercial firms, who make huge profits off the logistics of contemporary permanent war. As a commercial logistics, as a capitalist science, it can be traced directly and emphatically to the Atlantic slave trade. The Atlantic slave trade was the birth of modern logistics, as it was also the birth of a new kind of war on the human species, and of racial capitalism, which amounts to saying the same thing. This trade entailed the first global movement of mass commodities, voluminous and grotesque. Moreover these humans were also perishable and volatile commodities that could ‘go missing’ and were hard ‘to extract’ requiring cdeomplex, even diabolical, logistical technologies, supported by finance, insurance, law, and of course state and extra state violence. Ian Baucom locates the origins of modern insurance in the Atlantic slave trade in his important work Spectres of the Altantic. We know from Sergio Bologna how much contemporary finance and logistics are entwined in today’s over-leveraged global shipping industry, but this was true of the Atlantic slave trade too, where speculative finance was already at work. The story of the Zong slave ship is central to Baucom’s account, and is also beautifully, unbearably rendered by M. NorbeSe Philip in her book-length poem Zong!, capturing what the birth of modern logistics did to any possible project of the human by bringing finance and logistics together in a devilish alliance over the commodity that really ‘could speak,’ the ‘thing’ that talks or is somehow in-touch, neither subject nor proper object, a massive, subterranean, ethereal, undercommon threat to the individuation of modern ‘Man’ emerging at the same time. But the Atlantic slave trade was also the birth of modern logistics because modern logistics is not just about how to transport large amounts of commodities or information or energy, nor even how to move these efficiently, but also about the sociopathic demand for access: topographical, jurisdictional, but as importantly bodily and social access. The nearly complete access that was imposed upon the African enslaved, upon the African continent, and upon the lands and indigenous peoples settled for plantations, this kind of access remains the ambition of logistics today, and it is for this reason that the slave trade remains so contemporary, that abolition as Jared Sexton rightly says is yet to come. And we might add this abolition requires the abolishment of logistics which in its flows created a people without standing anywhere. We act in abolition not for a ground to stand on but for groundations beyond standing. Modern logistics, with its warehousing and its containers is as much about controlling the flow as ensuring the flow, as much about the interface of movement of commodities and financialisation of commodities as it is about just getting goods somewhere. That interface is an opportunity for speculation and today the line itself, the supply line and the assembly line, their speed, efficiency and metrics are source of massive financial speculation. This is also the horrific legacy of the Atlantic slave trade, the containerisation of people, of the sociopathic access demanded to labour and sex, and the storage, in forts, in the hold. And even more murderously, the elimination of goods, of cargo, when the price falls, or considerations of finance as in the incident of the slave ship the Zong, in which 133 enslaved persons were thrown overboard for insurance purposes during a logistical operation. In short, this aggregated access allowed for the most evil calculations about the perishability of goods, the planned obsolesence of products, and the cost of replacement, in a word financial speculation on the supply line that was in the case of the African enslaved in the Atlantic trade often indistinguishable from the assembly line. Marx said the first thing the worker makes is himself. The slave was worker on the line and at the same time the supply coming off the line and into the line. The same concerns with speculation on the line, the line as a modulation of investment and exploitation of labour are still found today at Walmart or Starbuck’s, not so far from their origins, at least for the most part. As Susan Zieger reminds us in her study of ‘Box’ Brown and logistics – he was the slave who mailed himself in a box to ‘freedom’ from the slave-plantation South to the slave-dependent North in the United States – logistics incorporates loss in its logics. As Fred Moten and I say logistics tracks us because it assumes fugitivity. Indeed what is called surveillance might also be called preemptive logistics. It is possible that all we know of surveillance studies, including its most incisive work in black surveillance like Simone Browne’s, could also go under the name preemptive logistics, even predictive logistics, the anticipation not of resistance but of a kind of impenetrability even in the give. In other words, our entangled, indeterminate, undercommon, rub-up of curvy lines, kinks, loops, and crooked lines summon logistics. It reacts to our sumptuous tangle. Our entanglement requires them to draw up contingency plans which are plans to make our indeterminacy mere contingency, to account for what goes missing. Logistics is the science of loss, the science of their lost means, which is to say it will always be the white science and the science of being white. Logistics is the science of their loss, not ours, though we, and those closest to blackness in particular, suffer horrific losses from their loss.

#### The Race War is not just “out there” but in here – LD debate is a microcosm of the race war, the way debaters are surveilled into rounds, judgement of social relationships of black and brown debaters over Facebook, the refusal to invite teams to round robins, black debaters being told to calm down for being too ratchet and getting cops called on them for playing their music too loud and DEBATERS LEVERAGING RACIAL SLURS FOR BALLOTS all prove the uniqueness question. The seeming neutrality of fairness, limits, predictability, and clash are not pre-determined by a resolutional stasis but an internal drive to quash militant skills against the race war. Ask yourself why positions like the Phil affs are deemed predictable but insurgent strategies like the aff aren’t.

#### The way that we discuss the resolution matters. Logistics is a two-way street – it is always vulnerable to the system glitch.

Beller 2017 (Jonathan Beller – director of the Graduate Program in Media Studies, Pratt Institute, and the author of The Cinematic Mode of Production (2006) and The Message is Murder: Substrates of Computational Capital (2017). “The Fourth Determination”, *e-flux* Journal #85 – October 2017 – ERW)

Analogous to the land- and water-based commons that was planet earth, the cognitive-linguistic, the visual-poetic, and the imagination have undergone massive colonial expropriations, following immediately upon their separation and “liberation” from traditional ties to the body, and have entered directly into capitalist servitude. Bernard Stiegler refers to this phenomenon of cognitive collapse and short-termist thinking, organized by what he refers to as mnemotechnologies (technologies of memory that include print, cinema, and computation), as the “proletarianization of the senses.” This follows upon and overlaps with the proletarianization of the masses by the long industrial revolution and the capture and unspeakable violation of designated bodies by the slave trade. These aggressive and oftentimes annihilating encroachments on corporality, the senses, and the linguistic commons, achieved by cybernetic means, are mediological and technical phenomena as much as they are sociopolitical ones. Put another way, the mediological and the technical have been sociopolitical all along—to such an extent that with the level of technical saturation present today, “the political” has been lost. The “loss of the political” is an acknowledgement of the subsumption of policies and programs by capitalized financial calculus that chains representation to the process of accumulation. What indeed can “political” mean in a world increasingly characterized by algorithmic governance and platform sovereignty, that is, where capitalist power is increasingly automated, and discursive and affective labor is posited as a mere subroutine of capitalized computational processes—as engines of value creation? What of the political when “politics” has become a subroutine of computational capital and its discourses and actions are a modality of value extraction? It is an old lesson but it still applies (and we can see it from Israel to Burma): if subalterns use the same media and therefore modes of value extraction as oppressors in their struggles, then politics is simply a war over who will get the spoils of exploitation. The expropriation of the cognitive-linguistic by capital reduces discursive production—including the discourse of politics—to the subroutine of an abstract machine. This “machine,” though abstract, is nonetheless functional and material—we recognize it as the increasingly ubiquitous, increasingly networked computer or discrete state machine, but we must not see it as mere technology. The universal Turing machine, which when unified posits what I call the World Computer (“the invisible hand” codified as AI), has become the preeminent form of fixed capital. Machinic enslavement, whether to the assembly line, to the “media,” or to the computer, is indeed enslavement by other means, though we must insist that many of the “older” methods of extraordinary servitude stubbornly persist and the pain, like the profit, remains unevenly distributed. Following a backlash, in August 2017 the popular “FaceApp” removed a series of racially themed filters it had issued. The app had allowed digital blackface, yellowface, brownface, and a Caucasian setting to be added to selfies. Inequality, now sedimented into institutions and machines as materialized abstractions and designed into apparatuses, operationalizes historically variegated injustice, to produce and reproduce a planetary culture that at bottom is founded upon racism, gender inequality, national and cultural codifications, modern slavery, and a near total dispossession for billions. Machines, too, must be understood as racial formations. Given the data-logical nature of financialized systems underpinning “cultural” expression and iterated in and as machines, it is no surprise that Facebook’s machine-learning algorithm “Deep Face” imaged the minimally recognizable human face as that of a white man. Converting social life and social history into digital information and digital machines facilitates the as yet un-transcendable program of quantification that runs parallel to social-historical processes of social differentiation for the purpose of accumulation. The social emerges not as an abstract idea, but as a concrete substrate of computation. Sociality is posited then programmed as a series of leveraged accumulation strategies operating above or below or explicitly in and through everyday consciousness. Public faces are forms of data visualization and, circulating as images, are both programs and programmable. Bodies become “necessary media” of machinic digital operations that require from us (us bodies) attention, cognition, neuro-power, virtuosity, and sheer survival. As the auto-enthnography that is critical theory in the West might indicate, the remainders—interiorities and isles of awareness that fall away from informatic throughput—are in large part melancholic, cynical, disaffected, and abject laments. The rise of actually existing digitality thus appears as inseparable from the development and intensification of capitalism, that is, of media technologies as media of capital, which is also to say as media for the leveraging of agency and representation, such that decisions are made hierarchically and systemically while many aspects of life become almost unrepresentable and thus also unknown and unknowable. The ordinary taxonomies of social history continue to index zones and inflection points of this total and in certain definitive respects totalitarian process of digital enclosure. Our situation is effectively one of platform totalitarianism in which (the social) metabolism itself is captured by a leveraged exchange with capital and our media and machines are not only social relations but racial formations. This leveraged exchange of metabolism for forms of currency at rates set by platform capitalism is managed by ambient and ubiquitous computation, an electro-mechanical network that is composed primarily of fixed capital. The skeins of accumulation by means of informatic uptake lay closely upon body, mind, and time, and what value is extracted are the products of these. Thought and feeling are rendered quantifiable, computable, and indeed programmable. However, it is always a mistake to imagine that the impact of technology flows only in one direction: technical form emerges in a dialectics of domination and struggle. The global, technical evolution in the scale and granularity of the metabolic capture of what was once called labor power and social cooperation—a capture that fragments and cellularizes populations as well as bodies, minds, and neural networks—is not without its emancipatory potentials, as a Benjamin or a Brecht might remind us were they alive today. “The bad new things” are built out of and in response to new forms of struggle, and as Antonio Negri has always emphasized, the innovations of capitalist techné come from below, from the ways that the oppressed outflank domination and persist in living. A survey machine for customer feedback on the "immigration experience"—as long as the feedback is expressed in the form of smiley or frowny emojis. Towards a Reclamation of Value How then to investigate the capture and neutralization of the political domain and its uncountable longings by media-interfaced Computational Capitalism? How to transform and reprogram the failing powers of analysis, sensibility, and action such that they may function beyond the horizon of capitalist control? Four main hypothesis can guide us: 1) Computational Capitalism is an ambient financial calculus of value extraction working through any and all media. 2) Computational Capitalism is a development of Racial Capitalism and is thus also Computational Colonialism: vectors of race, gender, nation, sexuality, and other forms of social difference have been configured by and as strategies of value extraction and, like “structural racism,” have been sedimented into the operating systems and machine architectures of our machines. 3) The specter of revolution is everywhere visible if one knows how to see it. 4) For the first time in history a thoroughgoing revolution is possible that does not replicate the failed strategies of the radical break so tragically characteristic of twentieth-century revolutionary movements, but instead works to decolonize computation by transforming the money-form from within. I take it as axiomatic that the items telegraphically listed in the previous paragraph have become inseparable. What we thought of simply as computation is in fact computational capital—a supple and adaptive machine-mediated calculus on the social metabolism, one that can be gleaned through a deeper reflection on the notion of convergence. To illustrate aspects of convergence, we note that racialization and nationalization, along with regimes of gender, sexuality, borders, and incarceration, are part and parcel of the overall process of corporeal inscription, codification, and programmatic control endemic to digitization. Niche marketing and profiling are but two of the ways in which our bodies and practices are coded for capitalist and state-capitalist processing. One could add here the attempted subsumption of entire demographics under codifications indexed by “thug” and “terrorist.” Historical codes, including but not limited to race, gender, nation, class, and sexuality, are inscribed on our bodies, read, written, and rewritten by informatic machines. This functionalization of social difference (representational, biometric), to say nothing of the branding and scarring of bodies that is both past and present at so many levels, serves both as a means and a medium of capitalization and value extraction and as a necessary substrate to the development of computation. Within and at the scenes of inscription, the code works us and we work the code—again with historically overdetermined statistical variance. This is how it is at both the micro and the macro levels of struggle and organization. IBM’s role in the Holocaust, to give but one example, must also be understood as the Holocaust’s role in IBM and in the development of Hollerith punch cards and computational architectures, including search engines. Sociality and global lifetimes themselves have become the conditions of possibility for what, writ large, is the totalitarian emergence of the World Computer. That is why no existing political discourse can approach this horizon because current concepts and the activities of thought itself are fully circumscribed by it—ideas themselves have become operators (media) fully functionalized by and in the matrix of information. Understanding the transformation of semiotic process by information functioning as a form of capital, we can take the general formula for capital M-C-M’ (where M is money, C is commodity and, M’ is a greater quantity of money) and rewrite it as M-I-C-I’-M’, where I is image and C is code. The commodity as a distributed social relation has, with computation, become both produced and distributed in nonlinear networked operations that, unlike the assembly line, depend upon digital forms of attention, cognition, images, and codes for full valorization. This dependence on transformed conditions of labor germane to the social factory is (now) true even of older forms of production (e.g., automobiles) inasmuch as they are also networked in the world of information, advertising, Instagram, and the like. The valuation of a commodity requires a calculus of the image that modifies code, as does any interaction that transfers rights and value to said commodity (what used to be called sales). Production, circulation, valuation are all mediated by image and code, and that mediation occurs on a global scale. As the Anthropocene and its derivative concepts might testify, little or nothing remains untouched by this process of computational capital that penetrates down to the level of atoms. Here I want to propose further that this formula can be further modified to read M-I-M’, where I is information. To put this modification simply, money becomes more money through the movement of discrete state machines, the motor force of which is ultimately the bios (what was once thought of as the human life-world) struggling to survive its informatic capture. Labor becomes informatic labor and, as I endeavor to show in The Message is Murder, M-I-M’ means less that the commodity is one form of information, and more that the domain of intelligibility known as “information” directly emerges in the footprint of the value-form. Data visualization by computational processes screen-interfaced with the bios is a fundamental condition of the current regime of accumulation sometimes called post-Fordism. In generating M’ from M, it also effects what Paolo Virno calls “the communism of capital.” The programmable image as a worksite transforms and colonizes nearly all mental, sensual, and neuronal process while submitting them to interoperable regimes of background monetization. This financialization of everyday life, where everyone is forced to continuously throughput information in order to manage volatility and risk, facilitates a machinic enslavement profoundly enabled by and integrated with inherited forms of oppression. Navigating the matrix of capital-information is not an option, it is a matter of survival. Somewhere along the way, “consumer society” and “conspicuous consumption” became a semiotic game of survival. In the dominant order, these encodings are among the terms of wealth and power and only those who strive to organize in accord with a different order (or disorder) altogether have more than an inkling that there are better ways to be. We are dealing with the failure of revolutions, the overcoding of bodies and practices, and the absorption of political energy by strategies of accumulation. Computational capital names the integration of discrete state machines with fixed capital and sociality such that Marx’s “vast automaton” has become a global financialized socio-cybernetic system. “Politics” has been operationally reduced to a mere subroutine in the encroachment of this computationally integrated system on planetary life, and as Harney and Moten have pointedly underscored, “politics” and “policy” are today always on the side of the state—and the state is a state of capital.

#### Thus, we advocate militant preservation.

#### Militant preservation is a mode of resistance that harnesses social energy against coercive policymaking. Refusing violence and endorsing modes of undercommons endurance with “*the capacity to feel through others, for others to feel through you, for you to feel them feeling you*.”3 Militant Preservation is touch without any coercive endpoint of policy response just as a mode of understanding the interpersonality of violence and planning modes of endurance.

#### This is a process of Haptic care, understanding our mutual indebtedness to each other. Instead of abiding by the rules of financialization pre-figured by the resolution’s call for state care, we affirm communal care. Caring for each other no matter what, no matter who. You should “feel at home with the homeless, at ease with the fugitive, at peace with the pursed”.[4] This feeling is the Undercommons.

3Moten and Harney 13 [Fred and Stefano, “The Undercommons”, from Fantasy in the Hold]

[4]Harney and Moten 13 (Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. "The undercommons: Fugitive planning and black study." (2013): 1. Pgs 87-91 (Stefano Harney is the Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University., Fred Moten is the professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa)//Elmer

#### The Role of the Ballot is to affirm Debate as an act of Planning, not Policy – instead of forcing normative outcomes via spaces of study, you should affirm acts of self-preservation within political spaces

For spec – orientations to politics matters first, debate is a site of planning which means our affirmation of a model of debate outweighs

Greer 18, G. H. "Who Needs the Undercommons? Refuge and Resistance in Public High Schools." Brock Education: A Journal of Educational Research and Practice 28.1 (2018): 5-18. (Concordia University (Canada), Art Education Department, Graduate Student.)//Elmer

Planning While study in the undercommons is a sociality that provides **refuge, joy, and resilience**, planning is the ongoing process of resistance which protects study. In the terms of complexity theory, planning creates the conditions for study to emerge. Planning defends study, for example, by attending **to methods**, when economic forces are oriented toward outcomes. In such a case, study thrives in the fascination required to build a car from scratch but is extinguished by a production line. Planning may then take the form of activism against the process of de-skilling workers. Generally, study is in trouble where labour is detached from purpose, discovery, and agency; and planning poses resistance to such divisions. Resistance may take a passive form like absenteeism or an active form like student strikes; it is an ongoing social experiment. The subjects of difference who inhabit the undercommons initiate planning in support of further difference: “planning in the undercommons is not an activity, not fishing or dancing or teaching or loving, but the ceaseless experiment with the future presence of the forms of life that make such activities possible” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 74). Importantly, “[p]lanning is self-sufficiency at the social level, and it reproduces in its experiment not just what it needs, life, but what it wants, life in difference…” (p. 76). Planning resists the austerity of conformity. Difference may bring the concept of diversity to mind for social justice educators. There are a number of distinctions between the difference that propels planning in the undercommons and diversity as it is understood in the field of education. Social justice education organized around diversity involves “eliminating the injustice created when differences are sorted and ranked in a hierarchy that unequally confers power…” (Adams, Bell, Goodman, & Joshi, 2016, p. 3, emphasis in original). In this sense, equitable diversity is an end goal that is, significantly, often supported by the implementation of policy. Planning, on the other hand, is a process, rather than an outcome, that resists policy, as explained below. Planning appears distorted, if at all, **from the commons where the rules are made**: “Because from the perspective of **policy it is too dark in there, in** the black **heart of the undercommons, to see**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 79). Planning may become invisible or **appear criminal in the light**. Historical examples of such distortions are plentiful. The Freedom Riders were planning in 1961, boarding buses into their own brutalization to desegregate the southern United States; in the light of curricular history, Freedom Riders disappear and are replaced by parliamentary motions. There was planning at the Stonewall Riots in June of 1969 when homeless queer kids led by trans women of colour revolted against police brutality; the political necessity of Stonewall disappears in the parade lights of Pride every year on its own anniversary. Planning made visible but distorted is apparent in current events in the criminalization of self-preservation: from immigration (Ackerman & Furman, 2013), to activism (Matthews & Cyril, 2017; Alonso, Barcena, & Gorostidi, 2013), to panhandling (Chesnay, 2013). Educators who wish to see the planning of the undercommons, or to make it visible to students, must research to discover the exclusions of curriculum. When we include stories like the Stonewall Riots or the Freedom Riders in our teaching, we offer a connection to students who see their lives reflected therein. Stories of resistance to injustice, particular to local contexts, are important educational resources. In addition to these, pedagogical models which support the development and scholastic direction, of planning skills among students include: problem-based learning (Walker, Leary, Hmelo-Silver, & Ertmer, 2015), choice-based art education (Douglas, & Jaquith, 2009), critical media literacy (Funk, Kellner, & Share, 2016), and anti-oppressive education (Kumashiro, 2000). Policy From the perspective of the undercommons, policy inevitably conflicts with the forms of study and planning described above. Policy is the **instrument of efficiency**; it seeks measurable, predictable outcomes. The immeasurable social experiments and emerging differences of planning and study cannot be reconciled with administrative control as exercised through policy. Policy from the perspective of the undercommons operates under three rules. First, it diagnoses planners as problematic and prescribes itself as the solution; “This is the first rule of policy. It **fixes others**” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 78). Second, policy requires the participation of planners in the fixing of themselves; “Participating in change is the second rule of policy.” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 80). In this way, participantsimplicate themselvesin order to fulfill the third rule of policy: that “wrong participation” (Harney & Moten, 2013, p. 81) provokes all manner of crises. If there is no crisis then the participant is fixed and may be deputised in order to fix others. More commonly, any crisis at all proves that policy was right about the planners all along; and of course, they were bound to fail. The circular logic of policy as viewed from the undercommons reflects what Spade (2015) calls administrative violence. Spade (2015) details a story which I relate here to clarify the operations of policy. Bianca, a trans girl, was sent home from her high school in 1999 for wearing clothing that affirmed her gender. She was not allowed to return to her classes. Bianca’s parents called the school and received no response. Spade met Bianca in 2002 when she was homeless, unemployed, and attempting to leave an abusive relationship. Bianca had enrolled in a welfare work program but was outed as a trans woman by her male identification (ID). She was subsequently harassed and forced to quit, losing her income and making her ineligible for Medicaid. She became homeless, and because of her male ID she was barred from women’s shelters and fearful of further abuse at shelters for men. Without an address, medical benefits, or an income Bianca was unable to complete the process to correct her ID and could not afford the hormone treatments that allowed her to maintain a feminine appearance. Bianca’s ability to pass as a cisgender woman protected her on the street from further harassment by both the public and the police. In order to afford hormone injections, Bianca engaged in sex work. The injections were not regulated because they had to be obtained illegally which placed Bianca at increased risk of infection by HIV, hepatitis, and other diseases. Although Bianca’s story is not recent, the factors that contributed to her difficulties are relevant: transgender youth are still significantly over-represented in groups of early school leavers, homeless youth, and survivors of violence (Morton et al., 2018; Keuroghlian, Shtasel, & Bassuk, 2014). In the language of the undercommons Bianca planned to survive by expressing her gender, but this plan was subverted by school policy, causing her not to graduate and significantly reducing her prospects for employment. Following the first rule of policy according to the undercommons, Bianca’s school would not accept her attendance until she fixed her gender. Bianca then followed the second rule of policy and made attempts to become a participant. She tried to stay at shelters and enrolled in a social welfare work program. In each of these cases, she experienced the crisis of harassment. Following the third rule of policy, these crises were framed as the result of Bianca’s wrong participation: she did not have the right identification. For survival, Bianca must then become a fugitive by engaging in criminalized activity: sex work and the illegal procurement of hormones. In an educational context, considering policy, according to The Undercommons, pushes educators to ask how the rules in our schools create, rather than respond to, fugitivity among students. Fugitivity Being a fugitive according to The Undercommons means being marked as an outsider. Fugitivity happens to people when: first they act, and second policy outlaws those actions. But fugitivity must also be embraced. Those who refuse the rules of policy, as outlined above, become fugitive. Fugitives will not be fixed, refuse to participate, and deny responsibility for the crises that befall them. Fugitivity recognises systemic racism, classism, ableism, and cis/heteronormativity in the disallowance of demographic-specific behaviour. It is fugitive sociality that composes the undercommons in order to provide refuge and resistance. In high schools, the undercommons provides social refuge in the form of patient listening and covert smiles to: hat wearing, cell phone texting, hall running, affection displaying, fugitive students; and granola bar giving, grade fudging, student failing, smiling before Christmas, fugitive teachers. These now-fugitive activities are planning behaviours, they sustain study for those that commit them. These things have been happening since before policy determined that education is a predictable and measurable thing. Fugitive planners generate study with unforeseeable ends and immeasurable learning. Turning planners into fugitives has some effects: ease of administration and evaluation is one; the reinforcement of unjust hierarchies is another.

### UV

The constant drive for space appropriation invests into the tools of the race war.

Eric Niiler 19, 7-11-2019, "Why Civil Rights Activists Protested the Moon Landing," HISTORY, <https://www.history.com/news/apollo-11-moon-landing-launch-protests>

More than a million people gathered along Florida’s Space Coast to watch the Apollo 11 lift off from Launchpad 39A on the sunny afternoon of July 16, 1969. The event was the culmination of a technological race started by President John F. Kennedy in 1963 with the goal of beating the Soviet Union to the moon. But not everyone was cheering that summer day. A group of 500 mostly African American protesters led by civil rights leader Ralph Abernathy arrived outside the gates of the Kennedy Space Center a few days before the launch. They brought with them two mules and a wooden wagon to illustrate the contrast between the gleaming white Saturn V rocket and families who couldn’t afford food or a decent place to live. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor People's marchers line up mules near the gates to the Kennedy Space Center on July 15, 1969. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Poor People's marchers line up mules near the gates to the Kennedy Space Center on July 15, 1969. Bettmann Archive/Getty Images Abernathy was one of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s closest aides. After King’s assassination in April 1968, Abernathy led the Poor People’s March on Washington that summer. A year later, as NASA prepared to launch Apollo 11, the Alabama preacher led a group of mostly Black Americans to show NASA and the assembled media that all was not well in America’s cities. “There was a debate about what America was at the time,” says Neil Maher, author of 2017’s Apollo in the Age of Aquarius, and a professor of history at the New Jersey Institute of Technology. Maher says the Apollo space program divided Americans among supporters who thought it would energize a country that had gotten lost, and those who believed that it represented a huge waste of money that instead should go to solving societal problems. “Was it a country to spend $20 billion to land two men on a dead rock in space or try to solve some of the problems closer to home on Earth?” Maher says. “A lot of grass roots movements argued to use the [NASA] money to solve problems here.” The protest began peacefully with Abernathy and the others gathered in front of the NASA gates for a candlelight vigil on the evening of July 14 followed by a march on July 15. As NASA administrator Thomas Paine came out to the NASA perimeter under a lightly falling rain to meet Abernathy and the others in an open field, the group began singing “We Shall Overcome” and media crews recorded the event. Protesters carried signs reading “$12 a day to feed an astronaut, we could feed a child for $8.” Reverend Ralph Abernathy, flanked by associate Hosea Williams stand on steps of a mockup of the lunar module displaying a protest sign while demonstrating at the Apollo 11 moon launch site. Reverend Ralph Abernathy, flanked by associate Hosea Williams stand on steps of a mockup of the lunar module displaying a protest sign while demonstrating at the Apollo 11 moon launch site. The two men—Paine the Stanford-educated engineer, and Abernathy the Alabama-born Baptist preacher (who also earned a bachelor’s degree in mathematics)—talked for a while. Paine later recorded his account: “One-fifth of the population lacks adequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care, [Rev. Abernathy] said. The money for the space program, he stated, should be spent to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, tend the sick, and house the shelterless.” Abernathy told Paine that he had three requests for NASA, that 10 families of his group be allowed to view the launch, that NASA “support the movement to combat the nation’s poverty, hunger and other social problems,” and that NASA technical people work “to tackle the problem of hunger.” “If we could solve the problems of poverty in the United States by not pushing the button to launch men to the moon tomorrow,” Paine said while holding a microphone, “then we would not push that button.” [NASA Administrator] Paine added that he hoped Abernathy would “hitch his wagons to our rocket, using the space program as a spur to the nation to tackle problems boldly in other areas, and using NASA’s space successes as a yardstick by which progress in other areas should be measured.” The meeting ended and the two men shook hands. Paine offered tickets to Abernathy’s group for the VIP viewing area to watch the moonshot on the following day. Abernathy then prayed for the safety of the astronauts and said he was as proud as anyone at the accomplishment. NASA Administrator Thomas Paine wears a miniature "hangman's noose" around his neck with a note that reads "I Helped Hang Poverty,"given to him by Reverend Ralph Abernathy on July 15, 1969. NASA Administrator Thomas Paine wears a miniature "hangman's noose" around his neck with a note that reads "I Helped Hang Poverty,"given to him by Reverend Ralph Abernathy on July 15, 1969. "On the eve of man's noblest venture, I am profoundly moved by the nation's achievements in space and the heroism of the three men embarking for the moon,” he said, according to a UPI report. But, he added, "What we can do for space and exploration we demand that we do for starving people." “The Abernathy protest was an example that Apollo did not happen in bubble,” said Teasel Muir-Harmony, author of Apollo to the Moon: A History in 50 Objects, and curator of space history at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. “It was very connected to everything else that was going on in the country.” In the months and years that followed the meeting, NASA tried to make good on the promises Paine made that day at Cape Canaveral. NASA engineers took sensors initially used to detect contaminants in space capsules and converted them to measure urban air pollution. Another project took spacecraft insulation and made new kinds of walls and windows for public housing. But Maher says the efforts didn’t amount to much. “It was more of an advertising effort,” he said. The Apollo 11 moon landing on July 20, 1969, was for many people the apogee of NASA’s popular support. A year after the Apollo 11, Gil Scott-Heron released a spoken-word critique of the space missions “Whitey on the Moon” (a song featured in the 2018 film First Man.) And, in the months and years following Apollo 11, public and political support for space exploration waned. The nation’s focus had shifted to the Vietnam War, campus protests and movements focused on civil rights, women’s rights and the environment. By 1970, NASA officials scrubbed the final three moon landings and President Richard Nixon rejected a new NASA recommendation to build a station on the moon that could be used as a base for exploration of Mars. “We must build on the successes of the past, always reaching out for new achievements,” Nixon said on March 7, 1970. “But we must also recognize that many critical problems here on this planet make high priority demands on our attention and our resources.”The last astronaut to walk on the moon left in December 1972.’

#### The race war is a uniqueness question that demands putting procedurals on hold to analyze how debate itself is complicit within violence.

Kelsie 19 – Amber Kelsie, University of Pittsburgh, Communication and Rhetoric, Graduate Student, “Blackened Debate at the End of the Word”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 52, Number 1, 2019, pp. 63-70 (Article), Penn State University Press)//Shreyas

We are haunted by the specter of civil war. Liberal and conservative politicians and commentators openly express anxiety about the possibility of outright hostilities and the “unravelling [of ] our national fabric” (Gambino 2017). Increasing polarization, identity politics that destroys persuasion, an atmosphere of conspiracy regarding the deep state or foreign puppet masters, apparent disenchantment with institutions, general mistrust in electoral politics, a gridlocked and weak congress, and open skirmishes between white nationalist and antifascists are put forth as signs of the end times (see, e.g., Blight 2017; Wright 2017; DeGroot 2018; Smith 2018). The looming crisis of the end of politics that everywhere drives the nostalgic desire for a return to a normalcy and civility invites us to rethink debate and to pose a different question that does not seek to redeem a past that never was and continues to come at too high a cost for the wretched of the earth. Rather than “make debate great again,” I’d like to sit with the vertigo so as to consider debate’s (im)possible outside. Such a quest for a horizon that is before-after-immanent to the End (of politics or history or the world) will require that we rethink the spatiotemporal coordinates of the entire liberal project that secures the parameters of debate as the dialectical and agonistic contestation of the possible. My central interlocutor here will be blackness: that (non-)ontological constitutive outside of the modern grammar that is relegated to the realm of absolute necessity, negativity, incapacity, and pathology that subtends the political and the rhetorical. As that which is always already outside the World/History, blackness provides an anoriginary nonplace from which to think crisis and a politics of actualizing the impossible. Imminent civil war is an interesting but unsurprising anxiety; it is unsurprising because the U.S. Civil War informs so much of the popular narrative of the United States and its ethical position that confirms the progressive nature of time, and because liberal sovereignty was always a war waged against civil war.1 And it is interesting because the Greeks referred to civil war as “stasis.” Today standing, state, and stability are also meanings of stasis, as it emerges from histemi. Stasis then doubles both as sovereignty and as sovereignty’s undoing and evokes a constant permanence of war even in peace. Stasis in rhetorical studies takes on the meaning of “issue” and serves as a hermeneutic for coming to consensus on the point of contention from which debate proceeds. Stasis here also means standing in the sense that there is some “ground” in the form of prior consensus on the nature of the disagreement.2 The somewhat paradoxical relationship between consensus and dissensus found in stasis speaks to a kind of disavowal of ungroundedness that precedes even the point from which to begin speaking. Must one have a presupposed potentiality for a common ground to be able to proceed in argument? Refusing this disavowal of groundlessness as it emerges in contemporary figurations of agonistic debate might enable us to more accurately think of rhetoric in its modern inflection as the presupposition of a ground as a war against its own void via antiblackness. The inversion of Clausewitz’s proposition is salient: rhetoric is the continuation of war by other means; rhetoric as a mode of war in an effort to ontologize itself against its groundless outside.3 The (im)possible is always at stake in debate since rhetoric regards the contingent as its necessary presupposition. According to Dilip Gaonkar, this “key, but largely unnoticed, assumption in contemporary rhetorical theory” finds its basis in Aristotle’s response to Plato’s charge of the unspecifiability of rhetoric (2004, 5). Instead of freeing us to reflect explicitly on the nature of contingency, Aristotle’s domestication of rhetoric by placing rhetoric within the domain of the “contingent, yet probable” has prompted most rhetorical scholars to forgo consideration of contingency in favor of the thematic of probability: doxa, constraints, norms, ideology. Contingency in these schemas tends to be considered as a property ascribed to statements, propositions, and rhetorical acts—to the ontic world that constitutes the context of the rhetor—rather than as a mode of the subject or the singular encounter that constitutes a rhetorical situation. The possibility of rhetorical dialectic, that exigency that provides the opportunity for agonistic argument that can be sublated into judgment, animates historical progress and places debate as the ground for civic life. In the liberal understanding of contemporary debate, contingency takes on an interior spatial dimension as the possible content through a disavowal of the contingency of debate’s outside that is rendered impossible. To say that debate is impossible is then to beckon to war on the horizon. It is to recognize the state of emergency as the end of the state of debate.

#### The promise of future improvement is a form of bad-faith negotiation that is weaponized by logistics.

Sullivan 17 (Shannon Sullivan, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at UNC Charlotte, “Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice”, 2017)//Shreyas recut //Jay

IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, significant racial inequalities and anti-black violence continue to be rampant in the United States. Decades, even centuries, of political and legal struggle have deco lisle to change that fact. This chapter will argue that black Americans need new tactics and strategies for responding to the white class privilege and white supremacy that fundamentally structure the country.' They need to increase the number and type of tools in their racial justice toolkit, expanding beyond liberal faith in civil rights and white people's good intentions to cooperate with racial change. The political and legal work that black and other people of color (along with some white people) have done to eliminate antiblack racism isn't working. Pragmatists in particular need to be able to face up to that fact given that we value the practical work that ideas, concepts, and truths can do. Why then, as Calvin Warren pragmatically asks in the epigraph above, would we expect people fighting racism to keep doing the same thing? Why would anyone hope that the same failed actions and strategies would mm out any differentia the future? This kind of hope can function as a cruel optimism that "works" by keeping black people focused on the very thing that undercuts their flourishing (Warren 2015, 221). In line with Warren's concerns, I argue that black America' hope that political struggle can achieve racial justice tends to be a harmed emotion they should avoid. I maim my case in a pragmatist spirit that opposes Comet West's influential argument for black hope In contrast to West, I contend that pragmatists and others concerned about racial injustice would do better to draw on Derrick Bell's racial realism and Warren's blank nihilism to develop alternative strategies for addressing antiblack racism In related ways, Bell and Warren urge their readers to reckon with the permanence of racism and to give op hope that additional political struggle will eliminate it. After exploring their complementary accounts, I augment them with concrete evidence from the health sciences that black hope can be physically harmful to black people, weathering their bodies nod damaging their psychosomatic health such that they are less able to withstand the inequities of anti-black racism. I conclude by arguing for the advantages of reading Bell's and Warren's claims about the permanence of racism pragmatically, that is, by assessing the truth of their claims via their effects. The result m the working hypothesis that black people will have a much greater chance of developing new practices, habits, and strategies of flourishing in an anti-black world if they no longer hope that political struggle will eliminate racism.

#### [Sullivan Continues Later]

Sullivan 17 (Shannon Sullivan, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at UNC Charlotte, “Setting Aside Hope: A Pragmatist Approach to Racial Justice”, 2017)//Shreyas recut //Jay

De facto white class privilege in the form of racial microaggressions contributes to people of color's "racial battle fatigue," which entails "the constant use or redirection of energy for coping against mundane racism which depletes psychological and physiological resources needed in other important, creative, and productive area of life" (Smith, Hung, and Franklin 2012, 40). Racial battle fatigue has been linked empirically to depression, tension, and generalized anxiety disorder in African Americans, and the stress associated with all of these psychological problems also contributes to physiological weathering that harms black health, contributing to high rates of hypertension, cardiovascular disease, pre-term birth rates, and infant mortality to name a few (Smith, Hung and Franklin 2012, 37, 40; D. Smith 2012). The effects of white racism literally get inside and help constitute the bodies of black people in harmful ways. They wear down the body's various systems by creating a high allostatic load via stressors that accumulate over time. The results are health problems such as disproportionately high rates of pre-term birth, infant mortality, cardio-vascular disease, diabetes, and accelerated physiological aging (Blitstein 2009). Racism hurts—literally—and it also kills in ways that am subtler but no less deadly than the lyncher's noose or the neighbors Met (Drexler 2007). These effects, moreover, can be transgenerational, physiologically passed onto subsequent generations through various epigenetic changes (Sullivan 2013).

#### Voting affirmative is externally valuable to create moments of realization among those insulated from racialized violence.

**Warren 11**Warren Waren University of Central Florida, Orlando, Using Monopoly to Introduce Concepts of Race and Ethnic Relations The Journal of Effective Teaching, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, 28-35 [Shreyas] recut //Jay

Undergraduate students often enter our classrooms convinced that the battles of the Civil Rights Era solved the issue of race in America. They are generally unacquainted with the long history of race in the United States and almost universally underestimate the structural forces which carry racial disparities into their new century. As sociologists and teachers, it is our responsibility to tell that story and explain those forces. Our new challenge is: How do we teach students the extent of racism in America when, from their point of view, the problem of the color-line has been solved? One option is to use a game. Sociologists have used games or simulations to spark the sociological imagination (Dorn, 1989; Jessup, 2001; Fisher 2008), to stimulate critical thinking (Pence 2009), and to introduce social stratification (Ender, 2004; Waldner & Kinney, 1999). When students from relatively privileged backgrounds “experience” a temporary bout of unfairness in a simulated game, it creates the opportunity to change their perspective (Coghlan & Huggins, 2004; Haddad & Lieberman, 2002). The injustice of the situation, if directly connected to broader theory, can lessen a student’s social distance from marginalized groups. A game may help a student to understand some of the previously inexplicable attitudes and behaviors of actors on either side of a power relationship. Also, as this paper demonstrates, a properly constructed simulation can give the student a sense of the structural nature and lasting legacy of racial discrimination—a fuller sense of the “history and biography” of race in the United States (Mills, 1959). The great advantage of a game is that it is a completely controlled environment—there are no unexplained variables. In fairness to all the players, all rules are explicitly stated at the outset of game play and apply to all players equally (Waldner & Kinney, 1999). Ordinarily, in a competitive game this assumption of fairness supports an ideology of individualism. However, a pedagogical game is concerned with learning, not winning. In order to disentangle a complicated issue, the instructor may purposefully introduce inequality into an otherwise “just” world. Again, because all rules are explicit (even unfair ones), the problem exists in the game without confounding effects. This simplification allows students to easily focus on the nature and development of the problem. By extension, it is hoped that the game encourages students to reassess similar problems in the real world. Use of Pedagogical Games Dorn (1989) identifies multiple criteria for games or simulations to be effective in the classroom as pedagogical tools. He argues the games must: reflect reality; motivate students through "experience"; develop awareness of personal values through moral and ethical implications of the game; connect abstract concepts with concrete experiences; create a shared experience from which the students can draw; offer a form of debriefing to both address emotional issues and to connect theory to experiences. In the technique I describe below, I try to incorporate these ideas with Straus’ (1986) emphasis on simplicity for in-class games. In teaching and learning, the goal of simulation is the “experience” itself. Jessup (2001) argues that simulation should be the “experiential anchor for the elaboration of conceptual tools” (p.108). Therefore, this game is created to offer a chance for relatively privileged students to experience the unfairness of structural inequality. After temporary exposure to an analog of racial discrimination, students with no prior familiarity of racial discrimination will have a deeper understanding of the effects of racism on many levels. Pedagogical games are used to challenge our assumptions about how the world works (Waldner & Kinney, 1999). For example, the basic assumption of competitive games is fairness. This assumes that the world is fair (i.e., a meritocracy) and that individual effort or talent is the main factor in success (i.e., an ideology of individualism akin to Ross’ (1977) fundamental attribution error). In competitive games therefore, groups are treated equally and the best players win. But a pedagogical game may challenge the assumption of fairness directly by having structural inequality built into the game. The experience of a good player losing an unfair game creates cognitive dissonance—that cognitive dissonance is our teaching moment. I assume that students as game players can easily identify games that are “unfair” based on unequal outcomes for equivalent behavior. As a pedagogical tool, I want it to be relatively easy for them to spot the explicit rules which cause the inequality.

#### Debate is a question of competing models – if ours is good you should give us the ballot.

#### Political Hope is a tool of coercion that blocks planning through constant envisionment of a future if poltiical dissolution and breeds complacency with the system of logistics.

Moten and Harney 13 (Fred Moten, an American poet and scholar whose work explores critical theory, black studies, and professor of Performance Studies at New York University, Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University and co-founder of the School for Study, “The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study”, 2013. //Jay

They need hope. They need vision. They need to have their sights lifted above the furtive plans and night launches of their despairing lives. They need vision. Because from the perspective of policy it is too dark in there, in the black heart of the undercommons, to see. You can hear something, can feel something present at its own making. But the deputies can bring hope, and hope can lift planners and their plans, the means of social reproduction, above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses. Deputies fix others, not in an imposition upon but in the imposition of selves, as objects of control and command, whether one is posited as being capable of selfhood or not. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. Having been brought to light and into their own new vision, planners will become participants. And participants will be taught to reject essence for contingency, as if planning and improvisation, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity, were opposed within an imposition there is no choice but to inhabit, as some exilic home where policy sequesters its own imagination, so they can be safe from one another. It is crucial that planners choose to participate. Policy is a mass effort. Intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers, philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias, bloggers will debate, and politicians will compromise here, where change is policy’s only constant. Participating in change is the second rule of policy. Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. Tis is the hope policy rolls like tear gas into the undercommons. Policy not only tries to impose this hope, but also enacts it. Those who dwell in policy do so not just by invoking contingency but by riding it, and so, in a sense, proving it. Those who dwell in policy are prepared. They are legible to change, liable to change, lendable to change. Policy is not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward display. Tis is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance.

#### The algorithmic drive for improvement hardens logistical control over bodies in a rush for productivity. That leads to land conflicts, ecocide, poverty, war and turns the aff.

Moten and Harney 17 (Fred Moten – Professor of English at the University of California, Riverside. Stefano Harney – Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University. Edited by Gaye Theresa Johnson and Alex Lubin. "Improvement and Preservation Or, Usufruct and Use" Futures of Black Radicalism, pgs. 83-91, DOA: 7-4-2020, jzn) recut //Jay

Exception is a categorization one grants oneself only at the price of imagining that it has been granted by an Other. To declare one'; exceptionalism is not a matter of exempting. or excluding. or excusing oneself, all of which are transitive. Exceptionalism imagines the intransitive and attributes action to Others and, more importantly. an originary kind of power to someone else. And it is here that we see how the pre-text Serequeberhan identifies is in fact pre-given in a double sense, it must be given but in order to be given it must also haw: been granted. there is no dialectic here. Rather we might say it is only the European who has ever been both master and slave. This is his drama, held in the body. and enacted in the world. He has to have. The exception will have been a power given by an Other to selves who, in taking it and its accompanying knowledge on, are supposed to have been provided. in this give and take, their own confirmation. But the pre-text is never truly grounded. never truly granted. never truly given. Europe is constantly disestablished by what it seeks to envelop. which, in and out of turn. envelops it. What surrounds the European even in his midst is the native informant Gayatri Spivak identifies as a creation text for a world of exception. against, but nonetheless within. the general antagonism of earthly anarrhythmia and displacement. The paradox of the pre-text is thus that being exceptional can no more be taken than it can be given and can no more be claimed than it can be granted. This simultaneity of being-master and being- slave is sovereignty's static, omnicidal decline. This is what it is to be chained to the struggle for freedom, a "rational" instrument run amok in place. as man's perpetually stilled motion. What does it mean to stand for improvement? Or worse, to stand for what busi- ness calls a "commitment to continuous improvement"? It means to stand for the brutal speciation of all. To take a stand for speciation is the beginning of a diabol- ical usufruct. Improvement comes to us by way of an innovation in land tenure, where individuated ownership; derived from increasing the lands productivity. is given in the perpetual. and thus arrested. becoming of exception': miniature. 'This is to say that from the outset. the ability to own-and that abillty's first deriv- ative, self-possession-is entwined with the ability to make more productive. in order to be improved. to be rendered more productive, land must be violently reduced to its productivity; which is the regulatory diminishment and manage- ment of earthly generativity. Speciation is this general reduction of the earth to \_productivity and submission of the earth to techniques of domination that isolate and enforce particular increases in and accelerations of productivity. In this regard. (necessarily European) man. in and as the exception. imposes speciation upon himself. in an operation that extracts and excepts himself from the earth in order to confirm his supposed dominion over it. And just as the earth must he forcefully speciated to he possessed. man must forcefully speciate himself in order to enact this kind of possession. This is to say that racialization is present in the very idea of dominion over the earth; in the very idea and enactment of the exception; in the very nuts and bolts of possession-by-improvement. Forms of racialization that both Michel Foucault and. especially and most vividly, Cedric Robinson identify in medieval Europe become usufructcd with modern posses- sion through improvement. Speciated humans are endlessly improved through the endless work they do on their endless way to becoming Man. This is the usufruct of man. in early modern England, establishing title to land by making it more productive meant eliminating biodiversity and isolating and breeding in species-barley or rye or pigs. Localized ecosystems were aggressively trans- formed so that monocultural productivity smothers anacultural generativity. The emergent relation between speciation and racialization is the very conception and conceptualization of the settler. Maintenance of that relation is his vigil and his eve. For the encloser. possession is established through improvement--this is true for the possession of land and for the possession of self. The Enlightenment is the universalization/globalization of the imperative to possess and its corol- lary, the imperative to improve. However. this productivity must always confront its contradictory impoverishment: the destruction of its biosphere and its estrangement in. if not from. entanglement. both of which combine to ensure the liquidation of the human differential that is already present in the very idea of man. the exception. To stand for such improvement is to invoke policy, which attributes depletion to the difference, which is to say the wealth, whose simulta- neous destruction and accumulation policy is meant to operationalize. This attri- bution of a supposedly essential lack. an inevitable and supposedly natural dimi- nution, is achieved alongside the imposition of possession-by-improvement. To make policy is to impose speciation upon everybody and everything. to inflict impoverishment in the name of improvement. to invoke the universal law of the usufruct of man. in this context. continuous improvement, as it emerged with decolonization and particularly with the defeat of national capitalism in the is the continuous crisis of speciation in the surround of the general antag- onism. This is the contradiction Robinson constantly invoked and analyzed with the kind of profound and solemn optimism that comes from being with, and being of service to, your friends.

#### No fairness in a race war – they just prevent real change.

Wilderson 8 (Frank B. Wilderson, “Incognegro: A Memoir of Exile and Apartheid”, South End Press, pp. 406-411)//CoppellDR

Just two years ago, in December of 1999, I'd written a letter and stuffed it, late one night, in the faculty mailboxes. It began with what must have appeared to the faculty's confused eyes as a red herring. It spoke not about my excruciating encounters with them, but began, instead, out of left field by discussing the plight of two students whose troubles with the College had been the topic of recent debate. Reading of Sonia Rodriguez's and Selma Thornton's troubles with the Student Senate and its White liberal adviser Tim Harold reawakened my disdain for Cabrillo as an institution and for the English Division as one of its flagship entities. I then went on to explain how Selma and Sonia had resigned their posts in the Student Senate in protest over Harold's decision not to allow thirty students of color to have funds to travel to a conference on race at Hartnell College. Instead, Harold spent the money on T-shirts. He had also put the sign-up sheet for the conference not in the Student Center, but in some obscure location where it would never be found thus sabotaging the excursion further. This seemed like a trivial enough matter, but it compounded the hurt and sense of isolation and rebuke which so many Black and Latino students felt at Cabrillo but could not name. I felt a piqued kinship with their unspeakable pain and used the rare moment of it having turned into a tangible event as a way into what I wanted to say to the faculty and administration...and to Alice. In defense of his actions, and as a way of indicating the absurdity of Selma and Sonia's objections, Harold issued a public statement in which he did not comment (or at least the newspaper did not report his comments) on his funding priorities; rather, he simply said "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." To this, I wrote: Whereas Selma Thornton attempts an institutional analysis of the Student Senate by way of a critique of Tim Harold and his practices, Harold responds with a ready made institutional defense and, later in the article, a defense of his integrity (a personalized response to an institutional analysis). He brings the scale of abstraction back down to the level most comfortable for White people: the individual and the uncontextualized realm of fair play. It's the White person's safety zone. I'm a good person, I'm a fair person, I treat everyone equally, the rules apply to everyone. Thornton and Rodriguez's comments don't indict Harold for being a "good" person, they indict him for being White: a way of being in the world which legitimates institutional practices (practices which Thornton and Rodriguez object to) accepts, and promotes, them as timeless—without origin, consequence, interest, or allegiance—natural and inevitable. "The sign-up sheet was posted for a week, the same way we treat any workshop." The whole idea that we treat everyone equally is only slightly more odious than the discussion or how we can treat everyone equally; because the problem is neither the practice nor the debates surrounding it, but the fact that White people can come together and wield enough institutional power to constitute a "We." "We" in the Student Senate, "We" in Aptos, "We" in Santa Cruz, "We" in the English department, "We" in the boardrooms. "We" are fair and balanced is as odious as "We" are in control—they are derivations of the same expression: "We" are the police. The claim of "balance and fair play" forecloses upon, not only the modest argument that the practices of the Cabrillo Student Senate are racist and illegitimate, but it also forecloses upon the more extended, comprehensive, and antagonistic argument that Cabrillo itself is racist and illegitimate. And what do we mean by Cabrillo? The White people who constitute its fantasies of pleasure and its discourse of legitimacy. The generous "We." So, let's bust "We" wide open and start at the end: White people are guilty until proven innocent. Fuck the compositional moves of substantiation and supporting evidence: I was at a conference in West Oakland last week where a thousand Black folks substantiated it a thousand different ways. You're free to go to West Oakland, find them, talk to them, get all the proof you need. You can drive three hours to the mountains, so you sure as hell can cut the time in half and drive to the inner city. Knock on any door. Anyone who knows 20 to 30 Black folks, intimately—and if you don't know 12 then you're not living in America, you're living in White America—knows the statement to be true. White people are guilty until proven innocent. Whites are guilty of being friends with each other, of standing up for their rights, of pledging allegiance to the flag, of reproducing concepts like fairness, meritocracy, balance, standards, norms, harmony between the races. Most of all. Whites are guilty of wanting stability and reform. White people, like Mr. Harold and those in the English Division, are guilty of asking themselves the question. How can we maintain the maximum amount of order (liberals at Cabrillo use euphemisms like peace, harmony, stability), with the minimum amount of change, while presenting ourselves—if but only to ourselves—as having the best of all possible intentions. Good people. Good intentions. White people are the only species, human or otherwise, capable of transforming the dross of good intentions into the gold of grand intentions, and naming it "change." ...These passive revolutions, fire and brimstone conflicts over which institutional reform is better than the other one, provide a smoke screen—a diversionary play of interlocutions—that keep real and necessary antagonisms at bay. White people are thus able to go home each night, perhaps a little wounded, but feeling better for having made Cabrillo a better place...for everyone... Before such hubris at high places makes us all a little too giddy, let me offer a cautionary note: it's scientifically impossible to manufacture shinola out of shit. But White liberals keep on trying and end up spending a lifetime not knowing shit from shinola. Because White people love their jobs, they love their institutions, they love their country, most of all they love each other. And every Black or Brown body that doesn't love the things you love is a threat to your love for each other. A threat to your fantasy space, your terrain of shared pleasures. Passive revolutions have a way of incorporating Black and Brown bodies to either term of the debate. What choice does one have? The third (possible, but always unspoken) term of the debate, White people are guilty of structuring debates which reproduce the institution and the institution reproduces America and America is always and everywhere a bad thing this term is never on the table, because the level of abstraction is too high for White liberals. They've got too much at stake: their friends, their family, their way of life. Let's keep it all at eye level, where whites can keep an eye on everything. So the Black body is incorporated. Because to be unincorporated is to say that what White liberals find valuable I have no use for. This, of course, is anti-institutional and shows a lack of breeding, not to mention a lack of gratitude for all the noblesse oblige which has been extended to the person of color to begin with. "We will incorporate colored folks into our fold, whenever possible and at our own pace, provided they're team players, speak highly of us, pretend to care what we're thinking, are highly qualified, blah, blah, blah...but, and this is key, we won't entertain the rancor which shits on our fantasy space.

#### Debates about the “fiated consequences of the plan” promote ethical failure.

**Locke ’19** [Jessica; May 13; Associate Professor of Buddhism at Loyola University of Maryland; *Buddhism and Whiteness: Critical Reflections*, *Philosophy of Race*, “Chapter 9,” p. 161-175]

In Buddhist ethics and whiteness studies, we can find rich discussions of the problems and possibilities that stem from the perceptual habits that ground our ways of having a world. While the content of these traditions, on the face of it at least, appears to deal with radically different problems, they both point to the depth of the ethical ramifications of our phenomenological rapport with the world. The entire Buddhist path is predicated upon human beings’ ability to work to transform our phenomenological orientation in order to extirpate ourselves from the fundamental ignorance that causes our suffering and our ethical failures. Anti-racism likewise hinges upon not only the possibility but the necessity of working to revise racialized perceptual habits and thereby challenge the racist valuations that arise within and because of white supremacy.

In what follows, I use moral phenomenology as the unifying concept through which to read Buddhist ethics and whiteness alongside one another. My aim is to draw forth the structural similarities between the Buddhist account of releasing oneself from the self-cherishing attitude and the antiracist task of challenging racialized perceptual habits. The latter task is especially urgent for white people, for whom whiteness is often difficult to single out as a subjective structure of experience. Whereas people of color are much more aware of white privilege, racism, and the way norms of whiteness function as a standard of value in American culture, white people more often lack perceptual attunement to our own privilege, to racialized dynamics in society, and indeed to our own racialized styles of thinking and perceiving. For this reason, much (but not all) of my analysis of whiteness as a moral-phenomenological problem will problematize it within white peoples’ experience.

My approach to these moral phenomenologies is not just descriptive. Ultimately, reading these moral phenomenologies alongside one another helps draw into focus the available trajectories for working on the structure of conscious experience to change ourselves at the dispositional level. The aspiration to cultivate ethical subjectivity and transform consciousness in this way is bold; it asks much more of us than subscription to moral norms. Instead, it makes experience itself an ethical project. While the task of transforming our way of having a world sounds impossibly vast or possibly even naïve, both Buddhist ethics and anti-racism demonstrate how indispensable this form of ethical self-cultivation is to our flourishing.

Moral phenomenology addresses the ethical salience of experience itself. The qualities of my experience—the valuations that I bring to the objects of my experience and my affective responses to those things—comprise the scene in which my moral life unfolds. I am disposed to the world—pushed and pulled by certain ideas, objects, people, and courses of action—because of the meanings that supervene on all of these things. These meanings guide my navigation of the world; they comprise the frames of reference within which I think, feel, and act. The values and significances that populate my world come to me with a “wake of historicity,” as Merleau-Ponty would say; they are invested in the objects of experience by way of perceptual habits that sediment over time through repeated engagement and practice. This kind of habituation finds myriad instantiations in our perception. One would not have to search too long to find two Americans who perceive a semi-automatic weapon according to vastly different perceptual habits: such a weapon is either revolting—a grotesque, infuriating symbol of the NRA’s cold-blooded grasp on American policy and public safety—or it is evocative of American independence, self-determination and freedom from the always-lurking threat of tyranny or threat of the “Other.”

While the significance of our world seems seamless and totalized, in fact the specificity of its meaning for us is underwritten by the subjective styles by which we experience it. Our perceptual habits draw forth the meaningful particularities of our world. In this sense, we see ourselves reflected within the world that we help to constitute; the significances that stand out to us as meaningful are not objective facts of our world per se but rather are given to us through the subjective structures that we provide for having a world at all. Nonetheless, the subjective contribution we make toward its appearance for us is hidden behind its seamlessness and totalized quality. We do not see our perceptual habits but rather we see and experience through our perceptual habits, and our ethical lives—every choice we make and even how the terms of our choices appear to us as such—are grounded first and foremost in perception.

What moral phenomenology highlights for us, therefore, is that how we comport ourselves in the world is profoundly conditioned by the habitual, phenomenological structures that run much deeper than our explicit intellectual commitments. Our ethical flourishing and the fullness of our character are not matters of subscribing to a “correct” view at an intellectual level, and we cannot eschew ethical infelicities simply by intellectually assenting to a philosophical or a political tenet. The real ethical work that moral phenomenology suggests lies in addressing the contradiction between our reflective, consciously avowed values and our pre-reflective, unconscious feelings and responses that comprise the conditions under which we gear into our ethical lives.

UNDOING THE HABIT OF SELF-CHERISHING: MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHIST ETHICS

In the traditional Buddhist iconographic representation of the human condition known as the Wheel of Life, the cyclic suffering of our existence turns on the “hub” of the so-called three poisons—the afflictions of passion, aggression, and ignorance, represented by a rooster, a snake, and a pig, respectively. In many renderings, the rooster and the snake are depicted emerging from the mouth of the pig, symbolizing how passion and aggression are in fact products of our fundamental ignorance (Sanskrit: avīdya). This ignorance names our fundamental, primal misapprehension of the way things truly are—interdependent and impermanent.2 We hypostasize the content of our experience and our own atomic, individualized selfhood, projecting upon them a permanence and a substantial reality that they in fact lack. Then, based upon that misapprehension, we perceive and experience the world through a structure of subject-object duality.

Clinging to the self and phenomena as permanent entities skews our experience. Everything that we perceive is understood relative to the reified self as either worthy of desire and pursuit (passion, the rooster) or revulsion and avoidance (aggression, the snake). This is a mediated world “full of symbolic representations,” as twentieth-century Tibetan teacher Traleg Kyabgon puts it.3 By clinging to the self and to the meanings and values that we project onto the content of our world as intrinsically existent, we establish a highly polarized, ego-centered frame of reference that serves as the map with which we navigate our world.

We interrogate the world through a perceptual habit of this clinging to “permanent essences,” and this imputation of intrinsic reality of a self and a world produces an ethical orientation that is an expression of confusion. By postulating a substantial self dialectically opposed to a solid world “outside,” populated by essential objects to which we are either attached or from which we are repulsed, we engage in an exhausting, never-ending drama of fighting to defend or fortify ourselves. As Traleg Kyabgon puts it, “We do objectify things in the sense of seeing everything in a dualistic fashion—subject and object, perceiver and perceived—but we also fail to objectify things, and so end up seeing it all too personally.”4 In postulating a fixed, objective world, we effectively give ourselves a profoundly subjective world with ourselves placed at the center of it.

This dualistic way of taking up the world is the origin of suffering, the central problem addressed by Buddhist ethics.5 Fundamentally, the Buddhist ethical approach to ending suffering and promoting human flourishing problematizes the conventional phenomenological orientation that is the cause of our suffering. It calls us to transform that orientation in the interest of ethical self-transformation. Following Jay Garfield,6 I read this ethics as a moral phenomenology;7 it calls for a process of ethical self-cultivation that moves the practitioner from a state of deluded egocentrism toward a liberated state of non-clinging, allowing her to become fully open to and skillful in the task of benefiting sentient beings. When we posit the “I” as our own mobile center of the universe, we automatically develop the instinct to protect and privilege its interests, producing an orientation classically termed “self-cherishing.” The twentieth-century Tibetan scholar Geshe Lhundub Sopa is unsparing in his emphatic warnings about the perils of self-cherishing, which he refers to as “the real enemy” and as a “demonic attitude” through which both “you and others will be harmed by your egocentric behavior.”8 Self-cherishing harms us because it reinscribes the reification of self and other, thus entrenching us ever more deeply in ignorance and prompting us toward exclusive selfconcern and indifference to the interests of others.

Self-cherishing is therefore an ethical problem with epistemological roots, and Buddhist ethics addresses it by asking us to unweave the habits of perception that polarize our experience. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, this takes the form of cultivating bodhicitta, the “awakening mind” (Tibetan: byang chub kyi sems). Bodhicitta names the realization of the selflessness of one’s own identity and the emptiness of all phenomena, together with the compassionate intention to become enlightened in order to benefit sentient beings. Altogether, this marks a total dissolution of the self-other binary that motivates self-cherishing. Of course, this binary is already refuted by Buddhist metaphysics; philosophically speaking, this is the “View” to which all Mahāyāna practitioners subscribe. Simply subscribing to this view does not quite suffice as a method for extirpating ourselves from ignorance, however. The view of emptiness and the ethical comportment that pairs with it have to be integrated at a deep, intrapersonal level, and that requires an ongoing practice of working with phenomenological habits.

The Tibetan Buddhist Mind Training (Tibetan: blo sbyong) tradition is dedicated to the project of cultivating bodhicitta. The Wheel-Weapon Mind Training, a text attributed to the eleventh-century Indian sage Dharmarakṣita, is an especially provocative example of this moral-phenomenological training.9 One of its most prominent tropes is the repeated listing of various types of suffering, such as social alienation, mental anguish, sickness, failure (both worldly and spiritual), destitution, unwieldy mental states, and the list goes on, and then pairing them with a meditation upon the sort of ego-clinging that is its cause. For example, one such verse reads: “When there is disagreement as soon as my companions gather, it is the weapon of my own evil deeds turned upon me for peddling my discontent and evil disposition everywhere. From now on without any ulterior motive, I shall behave well toward all.”10 The primary exercise here is a reorientation of the practitioner’s understanding of her own suffering. Rather than seeing it from the standpoint of being victimized by something “out there,” again and again the practitioner locates the cause of suffering in herself, in her own ego-clinging mind, and commits herself to reversing this tendency by doing the opposite of the habitual behavior that led to the suffering in the first place.

The text goes on to celebrate the value of suffering and its role in pointing out to us the fact of our self-cherishing. In wonderfully florid language, the text supplicates for the destruction of ego-clinging: “Roar and thunder on the head of the destroyer, false construction! Mortally strike at the heart of the butcher, the enemy, Ego!”12 This move—of turning our attention toward the ego-centricity of our phenomenological orientation to the world— interrupts the conventional attitude of experiencing the world antagonistically, from the “zero point” of our own atomistic selfhood. In his commentary on this text, Geshe Lhundub Sopa summarizes this instruction as follows: “We usually blame countless external causes [for our suffering], but now we should place the blame only on the view of a real personal identity and the self-cherishing attitude. Nobody and nothing else should be blamed.”13 This is not a moralistic instruction toward self-flagellation. It is a method for training the mind away from our habitual responses to suffering. It hinges first and foremost upon the exercise of stepping outside of our ordinary ways of navigating the world and contesting the objectivity of the assumptions and values that supervene on our experience. There is nothing esoteric about this mind training practice; it engages with our most mundane irritations, social obstacles, and personal challenges, explaining them in a way that reveals their potency as nearly endless objects of moral-phenomenological practice, so long as we relate to them skillfully.

At one point, the text acknowledges the profound effects of our habituation in creating the conditions for our suffering: “Habituated to attachment and aversion, I revile everyone opposed to me. Habituated to envy, I slander and deprecate others.”14 The Tibetan verb that is the root of the term “habituated” in this verse is goms, which is also the root of the verbs “meditate” and “cultivate.” Indeed, elsewhere in the text, this verb is used in a highly phenomenological sense to describe the consequences for “cultivating impure vision” and the need to “cultivate only pure vision.”15 The difference between these two uses of the root verb goms involves a subtle but revealing detail of Tibetan grammar. Goms can take a volitional or a non-volitional valence, distinguished by a difference in spelling; to be “habituated” is to dwell within the dualism and afflictive emotions of our confusion non-volitionally, whereas “to cultivate” involves a volitional engagement and intervention upon the structure of our experience. The moral-phenomenological lesson here is that the habitual structures that we dwell within come together through a process of cultivation that is accessible to us if we actively engage with it. Meditation and the moral-phenomenological self-cultivation of Buddhist ethics writ large are volitional acts that can become part of the non-volitional, background structure of our experience. This grammatical quirk in Tibetan points to the link between the “active” and “passive” aspects of our subjectivity that Buddhist moral phenomenology exploits.

Altogether, the Wheel–Weapon is an extended exercise in reframing the significance of suffering, making suffering an instruction that points back at us, at the practitioner, to our own attitudes and ways of experiencing the world. This exercise restructures those habitual patterns that define and condition our suffering and self-cherishing. This practice of mind training is a rigorous method for eradicating the orientation that has proceeded from the reification of self and other and for setting the practitioner aright with a more epistemologically and ethically felicitous orientation. It shows how true ethical flourishing relies upon a process of transforming the practitioner’s way of having a world through a practice of de-habituation from ignorance and toward bodhicitta.

CONTESTING HABITS OF WHITENESS: MORAL PHENOMENOLOGY IN WHITE ANTI-RACISM

bell hooks argues that it is necessary “for concerned folks, for righteous white people, to begin to fully explore the way white supremacy determines howthey see the world, even as their actions are not informed by the type of racial prejudice that promotes overt discrimination and separation.”16 She notes that well-meaning white people face an obstacle in recognizing the elements of our own experience—the ways we perceive and navigate the world, the subtleties of our values and feelings—that are, in fact, rooted in racism and therefore play a collaborative role in white supremacy. Even if white people disavow the harms caused by racism, we often unwittingly re-enact those harms by embodying a stance of white normalcy to which we have become habituated by our culture. This recalls James Baldwin’s assertion that white people are “trapped in a history which they do not understand; and until they understand it, they cannot be released from it.”17 For white people to truly engage with anti-racism means not just addressing overt bigotry or structural racism but what hooks calls the “encompassing and profound reality” of the holistic, world-forming impact of white supremacy, which carries the past into the present at each instant, in our social discourse as well as our subjective experience within which white supremacist values and attitudes supervene, though they may not be obvious as such.

hooks goes on to call for “a paradigm, a practical model for social change that includes an understanding of ways to transform consciousness that are linked to efforts to transform structures.”19 The moral-phenomenological significance of a practical model for transforming consciousness is what I examine in the following section.20 My objective in drawing out this moral phenomenology is to go beyond a diagnosis of whiteness as a totalized phenomenological and social structure and to move toward a more proactive engagement with the possibilities for transforming consciousness on the order of what hooks says is necessary.

Whiteness provides a set of norms, meanings, and values based upon a centering and valuation of whiteness and white people and a decentering and devaluation of blackness and black people. There is nothing essential or ultimately ontologically true about whiteness or white normalcy, but even in its contingency it is a powerfully regulative norm of social discourse and embodied subjectivity. As George Yancy puts it, whiteness is a “relationally lived phenomenon”; it is not a metaphysical reality.21 People of color are marked and “Otherized” by the norms of whiteness; Yancy describes the experience of being black under the white gaze as an invasion, a distortion, and as a rupture of one’s own body schema.22 Conversely, white people experience whiteness as an absence, as being the unraced “norm” against which blackness and all other racial categories are dialectically known, raced, marked, and named. Whiteness remains unmarked, while blackness becomes the object of the white gaze. Black “Otherness” is marked, disciplined, and made to stand out as “abnormal”—outside the norm of whiteness—while whiteness remains “unremarkable.” Yancy illustrates this point by recounting an encounter at an annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association, in which a white philosopher admonished Yancy not to use African American vernacular in his writing and remarked that Yancy “[speaks] very well.” The implication was that Yancy was out of turn in using a writing style that did not conform to “standard” American English and that, from the unspoken but centered standpoint of the white philosopher’s authority on language, style and professional mores, Yancy’s blackness marked him as problematic and at the margin of the profession.23 For a white person, the experience of being centered as “the standard” in this way elides the contingency of the highly polarized valuation conferred upon us. As Sara Ahmed puts it, whiteness “becomes the very ‘what’ that coheres a world” but also functions as “a category of experience that disappears as a category through experience.”24 Whiteness orients subjects and dictates how they inhabit and navigate their world, but it does so while disappearing into their implicit, background experience.

In taking the valuations that define our experience of the world as objective and failing to appreciate all the ways in which our subjectivities are constituted in contradistinction to the violently targeted “Other” of blackness, white people are indeed beset by a specific and pernicious form of ignorance. This is the “white ignorance” that Charles Mills defines as “a particularly pervasive—though hardly theorized—form of ignorance.”25 This ignorance yields an inaccurate rendering of the world, because the biases that inhere in white ignorance entail not seeing what is there but instead “seeing” a fictionalized Other. On the other end of this fictionalization is, of course, a person of color who can and does realize that “they are not seen at all.”26 The regulatory work being done by whiteness is thus not equally invisible to everyone; as Ahmed points out, privilege is only invisible to those who have it.27 White ignorance is not simply one standpoint among others; there is a veridical viewpoint that this white ignorance precludes, a knowledge to which those situated outside the “zero point” of white normalcy have access.28 Phenomenologically speaking, the norms and valuations of whiteness become sedimented in perceptual habits as preferences toward whiteness and aversions toward blackness. These perceptual habits are often so seamlessly integrated into the lifeworld of the perceiving subject that he [they] does not even realize they are at play, though for the well-meaning, liberal white person, they undercut his explicitly held beliefs about race.

Implicit bias is a telling example of how this process of undercutting functions. In the years since the Civil Rights era, the number of white people in the United States who avow racially discriminatory views has declined.29 However, as many social-psychological studies across decades suggest, even well meaning, liberal white people still perceive and respond to people of color in a racist, biased way. While on the whole it has become far more taboo to be explicitly bigoted (notwithstanding the recent resurgence of flagrant white supremacist rhetoric in the era of Donald Trump’s election and presidency), and while more and more white Americans now profess racially egalitarian values, in point of fact, even these white people still instantiate racist views in their lived experience and social comportment. For example, in their study of bias in hiring decisions, Dovidio and Gaertner assigned white people who had claimed not to hold racially discriminatory views the task of rating the resumés of hypothetical job applicants. In cases when the standard for judging qualifications was ambiguous, the study subjects demonstrated a bias in favor of candidates with stereotypically white-sounding names and against candidates with stereotypically black-sounding names.30 That is, “moderate qualifications are responded to as if they were strong qualifications when the candidate is wh ite, but as if they were weak qualifications when the candidate is black.”31 Despite professing liberal, egalitarian ideals, these subjects saw potential job applicants through a gaze that inflected black applicants with disfavor and projected preference for white applicants. The gaze with which these study subjects met their world (and these potential job applicants) constitutes an ethical failure, a mismatch between their explicitly held morals and their actual, practical discourse with the world and with others.

What this shows is that even if white people intellectually assent to antiracist politics, we are still subject to the powerfully influential historicity of white supremacy that shows itself in pervasive, unconscious racist perceptual habits that influence feelings about and behavior toward people of color. Examining an encounter with a white woman in an elevator whose discomfort with being alone with a black man was palpable, Yancy writes that even if she comes to “judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically false, . . . her racism may still have a hold on her lived body. I walk into the elevator and she feels apprehension.”32 Conceptually agreeing with racial justice does not undo all of the subtleties of the embodied, affective, symbolic, and perceptual facets of racial bias that have sedimented as part of our phenomenological rapport with the world.

Implicit bias is a manifestation of a phenomenological orientation conditioned by the standards of norms of whiteness that distort perception. Through this distortion, what is seen is not the black person but the racism of the white gaze itself. On this point, Yancy writes, “The white gaze defines me, skewing my own way of seeing myself. But the gaze does not ‘see’ me, it ‘sees’ itself.”33 That the white gaze is polarized at all is not obvious to the white person, however. The error and distortion rendered by the white gaze is belied by its totalizing function, and what is given through the white gaze, while clearly both product and reproduction of a cultural patrimony of white supremacy, is experienced as ahistorical and objective. What appears vis-àvis the white gaze arises within the seamless, totalized lived experience of the white subject. Again, we return to bell hooks: “When liberal whites fail to understand how they can and/or do embody white-supremacist values and beliefs even though they may not embrace racism as prejudice or domination . . . , they cannot recognize the ways their actions support and affirm the very structure of racist domination and oppression that they profess to wish to see eradicated.”34 Problematizing racism and white supremacy in the world and in American society does not equate to routing the effects of white supremacy in one’s own thinking, perception, and ways of having a world.

For the white subjects in the implicit bias studies to truly live out their ideals of racial equality, they must not only ascribe to those politics in a nominal fashion but also work to inculcate those valuations at the level of their structures of perception, so that in their everyday discourse, their perceptual practices, and their various forms of bodily comportment they do not reinscribe and re-enact the long history of white supremacy that they claim to disavow. White anti-racism must go beyond offering “corrections” to mistaken views about race and offer practical ways for transforming consciousness. This is why Shannon Sullivan argues that the unconscious habits of white privilege are not simply the result of naïveté that can be cast out by informing a white person of the factual errors embedded in her assumptions about race.35 There is something durably pernicious about the unconscious habits of white privilege such that even well-meaning and well-informed attempts to rout it often miss the mark. Simply acknowledging the fundamental fictitiousness of racial categories or the injustice of white supremacy, for example, is not enough to unfurl the tapestry of racialized habits of perception. Metaphysics and intellectualization are not enough, an insight that is the subtext of hooks’ call for a pedagogy that can transform consciousness to address the “encompassing and profound reality” of white supremacy at the level of how we see and experience the world.

An example of a pedagogy in this vein comes from Patricia Devine and her colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, who developed a multifaceted implicit bias intervention program.36 The program included five types of interventions: stereotype replacement, counter-stereotypic imaging, individuation, perspective taking, and increasing opportunities for contact that together produced “encouraging evidence . . . in promoting enduring reductions in implicit bias.”37 Each of these interventions, while mutually reinforcing, takes a distinct approach to undermining negative stereotypes of blackness.38 To delve into but one example, the intervention of counter- stereotypic imaging provides rich fodder for moral-phenomenological analysis. This intervention utilizes the explicit thought process of “mental imagery” to show that implicit stereotyping processes are malleable and indeed more “interdependent” with explicit thought processes than they might otherwise appear.39 Subjects were asked to repeatedly and in detail draw forth “positive exemplars” whose identity or characteristics cut across conventionally negative valuations of blackness. These exemplars could be “abstract, embodying a specific quality (e.g., smart Black people), famous (e.g., Barack Obama), or non-famous (e.g., a personal friend).”40 In subsequent tests of their implicit bias, these subjects showed a diminished proclivity for racial stereotyping, effectively showing that a practice of counter-stereotyping— together with the full complement of other interventions prescribed by the program—can make a racial stereotype less hegemonic in dictating how one thinks about and perceives members of an out-group.

At first blush, this intervention may appear shallow or tokenistic. After all, having the “positive exemplars” of Barack and Michelle Obama in the White House for eight years quite manifestly did not “end” racism in the United States.41 From a moral-phenomenological standpoint, however, actively engaging in a practice of counter-stereotyping goes much deeper than tokenizing or making an empty gesture toward the value of diversity. What makes this intervention more meaningful and fruitful than that is its repeated, sustained practice and its active confrontation with habitual thinking as such. Rather than papering over racialized perceptual habits, it seeks to displace them by developing a rich, detailed competing narrative about blackness. What is underway in a practice of mental imagery such as this is a regime of de-habituation; it uses explicit thought processes to intervene upon implicit values, and its primary tool is affective and aesthetic rather than strictly rational or argumentative. It uses the intimacy of a visualization process to disrupt the totalization of a single, stereotypical perceptual habit over and over again. The stylizing function of the white gaze is confronted by a competing narrative that foregrounds black positivity. This process interrupts the seamless totalization of the white gaze, and, as a result, the valuations of whiteness become less hegemonic.

In similar fashion, other recent social-psychological research has studied the effects of a traditional Buddhist meditation technique known as lovingkindness meditation upon implicit bias with promising results. Loving-kindness meditation can take several forms, but a classic technique is to visualize a specific person and mentally repeat to oneself again and again phrases such as, “May you be at ease and happy.”42 At the University of Sussex, Alexander Stell and Tom Farsides found that practicing loving-kindness meditation toward a member of a racial out-group increased explicit, controlled cognition and decreased automatic, implicit cognition, resulting in a diminution of implicit bias toward the target group, as measured by the Implicit Association Test.43 (In this particular study, the loving-kindness was practiced with a specific black person in mind and resulted in decreased implicit bias toward black people in general.) Put more simply, this evidence suggests that this loving-kindness meditation makes subjects less beholden to their “knee-jerk,” stereotypical responses. Utilizing Buddhist meditative techniques in this specifically anti-racist way highlights the moral-phenomenological ramifications of actively countering stereotypical thinking and habituated responses. On the whole, studies such as these point to the potential of “Buddhistinspired,” contemplative anti-racist pedagogies to help reshape the racialized perceptual habits that cannot be accessed by intellectual learning alone.

Nonetheless, the potential gains of anti-racist pedagogies such as these are still, admittedly, modest, and we should not become too grandiose in our hopes that something like a solitary practice of counter-stereotypic mental imagining can “solve” racism. While this research on implicit bias does indicate the malleability and mutability of our phenomenological structures, it also underscores what an incremental and long-term commitment the revision of these structures will require. Even Devine’s report warns that “effort [is] necessary for implicit bias reduction” and “it is also likely that there is no single ‘magic bullet’ that, by itself, prompts the regulation of implicit bias.”44 The weight of a lifetime’s sedimentation of whiteness is certainly heavy, which is why even those of us who want not to be racist still may find ourselves manifesting racialized perceptual habits in our quotidian discourse.

Nonetheless, research such as this gives us meaningful insight into the moral-phenomenological project of transforming consciousness in the interest of anti-racism. These findings highlight the revisability of our perceptual processes. The phenomenological structures through which we have a world are indeed historical. These perceptual habits are not primordial, and the fact that they have a history should also draw our attention to their futurity. Specific, targeted interventions such as counter-stereotyping practice show that all experience changes us, and what we choose to bring into our milieu can work either to further entrench or to undermine the totalization of our racial categories. Doing so is not tantamount to disavowing whiteness or casting off white privilege, which is simply not possible to do in a racist society. Rather, it is a way of consciously naming how one’s position is conditioned by whiteness and becoming less embedded in the ignorance that it entails.

THE MORAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL VALUE OF NAMING AND DE-CENTERING OUR ORIENTATION

Reading the moral phenomenologies of Buddhist ethics and white anti-racism alongside one another highlights the value of naming our phenomenological orientation as a phenomenological orientation and then working to displace its centrality in our way of having a world. Naming the self-cherishing attitude as such—as the product of the avoidable ignorance of a reified self-other binary—uproots phenomenological structures and calls into question the objectivity of what is given in experience. The entire 2,500-year history of Buddhist practice hinges upon the human capacity to accomplish this profoundly radical moral-phenomenological shift. Likewise, for white people, the practice of taking stock of and challenging how whiteness inflects our way of having a world is required if we are truly to decenter white supremacy in our own thinking as well as in the broader culture. Refusing to own the specificity of one’s orientation as a white person only reinforces the status of whiteness as the basic standard of “the human” and the “Otherness” of anything defined in contradistinction to whiteness.

Traleg Kyabgon reminds us that “our nature is one of tremendous potentiality, but a potentiality seldom explored. Due to our habits, we have done almost every conceivable thing except take full advantage of our potentiality. In fact, we have achieved the opposite, firmly putting a lid on our potential.”45 Exploring the tremendous potentiality of our subjectivity does not begin and end with embracing an intellectual anti-foundationalist metaphysical point about the fluidity of subjectivity. Such an exploration likely begins with an admission that the terms of our experience are mutable, but the real ethical work lies in taking up a practice of working on those terms in the interest of ethical self-cultivation. We can understand the temporality and historicity of our subjectivity as invitations to their revision, but we also must take responsibility for the hard, incremental work required to accomplish such revision. This recalls the famous line from the twelfth-century Tibetan lama Gampopa, who admonished his students to practice with such urgency “as if a snake had crawled into your lap or your hair had caught fire.”46 Self-cherishing has deep roots, and the opportunity that we have to practice the Buddhist dharma is precious. If nothing else, what Buddhist ethics can help the aspiring white anti-racist appreciate is the need for a long, sustained commitment to this practice. There are no instantaneous “fixes” for moral-phenomenological infelicities; these are structures of our consciousness that have come together over a long history and require dedicated practice in order to challenge.

Those who are pessimistic about the likelihood that white people will engage deeply with their own moral phenomenology cannot be blamed for drawing that conclusion; the phenomenon of white fragility speaks to the unwillingness of many white people to earnestly examine the racist norms that structure our thinking and perception. Not only must a white person be willing to contest their privileged, centered position in the epistemic, social and economic regime of whiteness; they must also submit to the disorientation and dissolution of their self-constitution that accompanies phenomenological self-transformation. Even the most committed white anti-racist must be prepared for the potential uncertainty and groundlessness that come with being de-centered from one’s conventional orientation to the world.

This brings to mind a notable distinction between Buddhist ethics and white anti-racism, which is the motivation to practice. The lodestone and primary driver of Buddhist practice is the painful, lived reality of suffering. We are all ensconced in suffering, and it is up to us and us alone to find a way out of it. This gives us a powerful reason for us to address our ignorance. Many Buddhist texts foreground the painful reality of the human condition in order to encourage the practitioner to exert herself on her path of practice. For example, the popular Tibetan teaching known as the Four Reminders outlines four key points that are meant to help motivate the practitioner: the difficulty of attaining the freedoms and advantages of human life, the reality of death and impermanence, the defects and suffering endemic to our cyclic existence, and the weight of karmic cause and effect. The second of these, the contemplation of death, deliberately evokes fear in order to spur the practitioner to take seriously the opportunity she has to practice. In her book on the Four Reminders, the contemporary Tibetan teacher Jetsun Khandro Rinpoche writes, “Reflecting on the impermanence of all phenomena should give rise to a sense of fear—not a paralyzing fear that keeps us from generating positive tendencies or bringing our potential to fruition, but a genuine sense of urgency in the face of impermanence.”47 Buddhist literature frequently invokes the value of this fear (Sanskrit: saṃvega), which Lajos Brons defines as “a religiously and morally motivating state of shock or agitation.”48 This fear can be highly productive inasmuch as it “produces and deepens insights in the nature of suffering and the brevity and irretrievability of an individual’s life,” which makes suffering intolerable and motivates the practitioner to decrease suffering in oneself and in others.49 All this is to say, Buddhist practitioners are given many opportunities to consider the urgency of the moral-phenomenological task before them. Although this task may be intensely challenging at times, it is framed as the only viable alternative to an endlessly repeating cycle of suffering. Buddhist practitioners are responding to a real and urgent existential problem.

White people likewise need to generate a motivational state similar to the Buddhist use of fear, a “white saṃvega.” The subjects in Dovidio and Gaertner’s study on implicit bias espouse ethical ideals of racial equality but then fail to enact them in their lived, embodied social discourse. Is this not a profound failure to achieve ethical flourishing? What I think this indicates is that altruistic motivation and positive emotions such as compassion—while good and likely necessary—may not on their own prompt the kind of deep self-examination and self-critique required for finding and challenging the parts of our moral subjectivity that go against how we see ourselves or how we wish to be in the world. For those of us who wish not to collaborate with white supremacy, the extent to which any of us are able to remain unaware of or indifferent to the racist patterns and habits that structure our experience of the world should be deeply disturbing, provoking a genuine sense of urgency to unseat the embodied, affective, perceptual habits that are undermining our explicitly held ethical values. In the same way that Khandro Rinpoche qualifies the difference between fear that paralyzes us and fear that motivates us, white people must learn to discern the difference between fearing racism because it is taboo to be racist (and therefore avoiding the topic altogether) and fearing racism because it stands between us and the values by which we wish to be guided in our ethical lives and that we wish to see manifest in our communities and society.50 Cultivating this motivational fear is a moralphenomenological exercise in itself, inasmuch as it reorients the significance of white people’s relative comfort within white supremacy—both material and epistemic—as in fact an obstacle to flourishing.

In sum, these moral phenomenologies of Buddhist ethics and white antiracism offer a vivid, highly relevant illustration of what it means to transform consciousness. The Buddhist project of releasing oneself from self-cherishing can sound archaic, grandiose or simply beyond reach of any normal person in a way that elides the quotidian intimacy of what bodhicitta might mean in our ordinary discourse, while the project of challenging racialized perceptual habits likewise might seem impossibly unrealistic or too personally taxing to attempt. Nonetheless, this comparative moral-phenomenological analysis shows us that by engaging wholeheartedly in practices that uproot our ordinary, habitual orientations, we can exploit the always-unfinished trajectory of our ethical subjectivity.

#### Their model of clash recreates debate as a microcosm.

**Power 16** (Nina Power, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Roehampton University, PhD in Philosophy from Middlesex University, It’s Not a Debate It’s a War! Hostis Journal Online, April 8 2016, Zine, <http://incivility.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/power-not-a-debate-imposed.pdf>, [AB])

One thing the ruling class loves above all else is ‘debate’. Although the rule of law came about as a consequence of the bourgeoisie getting sick of being thrown in jail by whimsical aristos, today’s elites, all of them, know that the law is always on their side, regardless of whether they are really old school feudal elites or only posh since the last 300 years. Debate is class war, as determined by them. ‘Debate’ is what future arms dealers are taught to engage in, how future prime ministers are taught to eradicate all residual human feeling, how judges are able to sleep at night and how the powerful are able to pretend that the normal running of things is in any way ‘fair’. When the 2011 Eton entrance exam asks 13- year-old boys to hypothesise being Prime Minister and to defend the shooting dead of protesters, we catch a glimpse of this taught moral flexibility: The year is 2040. There have been riots in the streets of London after Britain has run out of petrol because of an oil crisis in the Middle East. Protesters have attacked public buildings. Several policemen have died. Consequently, the Government has deployed the Army to curb the protests. After two days the protests have stopped but 25 protesters have been killed by the Army. You are the Prime Minister. Write the script for a speech to be broadcast to the nation in which you explain why employing the Army against violent protesters was the only option available to you and one which was both necessary and moral. But unfortunately for everyone else, this kind of imaginative exercise doesn’t remain hypothetical for very long. These people move from volatile scenario on page to violent action in real life without ever encountering people who might have reason to protest, protected as they are by gated communities, boarding schools, poorly-treated nannies, private education, money to burn, member’s clubs and, above all, money, assets and private property. Being trained to argue anything so long as it preserves the existing order is the definition of law as practiced by the state. The moral flexibility that private schools and debating societies teach is the rhetorical lubricant that ensures that the ruling class will always win. No one else will ever win ‘the debate’ because the entire purpose of debate is to prevent anything truly disruptive from happening, all the while masking real violence from being seen. While Britain brutally colonised half the globe, its posh young men were learning to equivocate over glasses of sherry. Just as the police are trained to regard members of the public as dangerous, incomprehensible beings best handled at the end of a baton, so the people who give them orders are trained to eliminate all normal human feeling. The notorious hierarchy and cruelty of British boarding schools is no coincidence: how else to treat the rest of the world as inferior without having internalised a hard, intractable kernel of inhumanity inside your soft young self? Debate is merely one disciplining technique among many, but it’s a technique that runs all the way up from school to court to parliament. If anyone deviates from the ‘rules’, that is to say sees the debate-form for the sham it is, or takes to the streets, displacing the imposed ‘platform’ for the construction of a new order, then the true face of all those who defend ‘debate’ is revealed: suddenly those who are most powerful pretend that they are under siege by those who are ‘unreasonable’ – we see this lately at universities where those with bigoted views pretend that they are forced to pull out because of the menace of protest, to cities when politicians responding to the riots fall over themselves not to understand why people might resent being killed and harassed by police officers who never suffer any consequences. Debate is a cover-story: never having to be honest about your true intentions while pretending to be open-minded. Debate dissociates argument from passion; phony talking-points from real life. There are multiple things we do not agree about – and we also disagree with the way in which you want us to say it. The narrowness of the debate-form allows those with power to dictate the boundaries of ‘reasonable’ discussion and ignore (or police) everything that happens outside it. But really, from Oxbridge to courts to government, we can easily see it’s not a debate, it’s a war.

#### Debate is a site of ideological warfare that regulates who can participate in dialogue – a vision of clash that “adds black participants and stirs” is superficial multiculturalism that intensifies racial terror.

Hawthorne and Heitz 18. University of California-Berkeley (Camilla and Kaily, “A seat at the table? Reflections on Black geographies and the limits of dialogue,” Dialogues in Human Geography 2018, Vol. 8(2) 148–151) ipartman

As Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) rightly argue, certain voices have been systematically excluded from the physical and metaphorical spaces of dialogue within the field of human geography. The marginalization of Black geographic scholarship within the discipline cannot be understood separately from the marginalization of Black scholars at all levels within geography. This means that the academy can itself be a site of violence that regulates who can participate in scholarly dialogue. But, at the same time, we want to argue that the project of Black Geographies is more than simply **a project of ‘add Black people and stir’**. It is about moving beyond a liberal politics of superficial and provisional inclusion to think seriously about which voices, intellectual genealogies, and traditions of thought are deemed sufficiently canonical or scholarly—and why. **Claims to dialogue** within human geography, and the academy writ large, are frequently invoked to **obscure a lack of engagement** with noncanonical scholarship. Yet we are still convinced that geography has important things to offer our understanding of blackness, and vice versa—that centering blackness can actually tell us important things about space and place, about power and the politics of resistance. The Black Geographies Symposium, for instance, was centered on a shared understanding of blackness as a fundamentally spatial relation, of space as profoundly racialized, and of the history of geography as entangled with racism, colonialism, and enslavement. What would it mean, for instance, if geographers were to read Marx on the factory alongside W.E.B. Du Bois and C.L.R. James on the plantation, or Jamaica Kincaid alongside Doreen Massey on relational understandings of place? A Black geographical scholarly praxis entails a willingness to subvert arborescent models of intellectual lineage in favor of queerings, rhizomes, undercommons (Harney and Moten, 2013), provincializations, or even the Sankofa (Benjamin, 2013). These are, in other words, nonhierarchical and nonlinear modes of study that can attend to the complex geographical itineraries and interconnected struggles that continue to shape our understandings of the relations of capitalism, racism, and sexism that structure the modern world. Perhaps, then, we should be striving for something more radical than dialogue. Rose-Redwood et al. (2018) point toward the possibilities of dialogue as embodied action; but **what if we instead take liberatory knowledges as the point of departure, rather than ‘democratic’ dialogue or abject embodiment**? In her keynote presentation at the Black Geographies symposium, Katherine McKittrick suggested that scholarly dialogue necessarily invokes the materiality of humanness in both body and place: ‘The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, the counsel we give each other, is an ongoing referential conversation about Black humanity. [ . . . ] The materiality of intellectual inquiry, the ideas we share, is a referential conversation that begins from Black humanness’. Dialogue from a place of Black humanness refutes cursory lip service to Black scholarship, and thereby necessitates a politics of engagement that recognizes how deeply consequential intellectual praxis is to our spatial and material realities. Furthermore, our citational practice in dialogue may be thought of in who we emulate both on and off the page. Citing long excluded, marginalized, and delegitimized scholars in our debates within geography is as important as the way that we cite movement leaders, activists, and artists—such as Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza, Opal Tometi, Martin Luther King Jr, James Baldwin, Claudia Jones, June Jordan, Angela Davis, Fannie Lou Hamer, or Malcolm X—to interrogate and decolonize spaces of intellectual dialogue. This labor entails a sort of cross-generational call-and-response with our intellectual–political forbearers. As young scholars, **we vehemently reject the individuating pressures of the neoliberal academy and recognize instead that we stand on the shoulders of giants. Generations of Black scholars have persistently carved out spaces** within the discipline of geography **even when they are not formally offered a ‘seat at the table’ of dialogue**— from Clyde Woods to Katherine McKittrick, from George Lipsitz to Ruth Wilson Gilmore, from Harold Rose to Carolyn Finney (and many, many more). Through their engagements with issues ranging from residential segregation to the prison industrial complex, these scholars have set powerful examples of how Black geographical scholarship should reside in the world. Thus, when we enter into an online debate, record an injustice using our phones, or make space for colleagues who are typically silenced in meetings, **we are implicitly citing the radical Black tradition** and our co-conspirators engaged in the ongoing project of liberation. To engage the ‘spatialities of scholarly dialogue’ is also to critically consider how our situated geographies of knowledge are informed by latent, inequalities made speakable through the spatialities of blackness. That the spatialities of dialogue have profoundly material consequences is particularly important to remember now, when words that appear harmless online manifest as real harms for their targets. These are not purely intellectual exercises—they are tied to the urgency of our current conjuncture. We are seeing directly how White supremacy, environmental racism, border militarization, urban displacement, and racial capitalism are deeply spatial and lived. When we stand by as White supremacists come to our campuses under the premise of engaging in free-speech dialogue, we forgo the embodied threat that their words online—and militarized in-person presence—pose for marginalized students, faculty, and staff. Dialogue like this comes at a high cost; it creates a real sense of harm that implicitly excludes these participants from the discussion space, thereby reinforcing structural barriers to entry. From the gates of the university to streets of Oakland, to as far afield as the shores of Lampedusa, we are thus seeing how Black liberation must be understood as a spatial praxis that challenges the limits of dialogue under **the structural conditions of White supremacy**.

#### Welcome to the Haptic Party ☺

Chambers-Letson 18. Joshua, Associate Professor in Performance Studies at Northwestern University, “*After the Party: A Manifesto for Queer of Color Life*.” NY: New York University Press, 2018

The weekend after your death, everyone converges at your apartment. I get the call, but wait a day to catch my bearings before catching a flight from Chicago to New York. A cab through the Village to your building where your doorman doesn’t stop us and we walk right in. When the elevator hits your floor, the familiar sound of a party pouring through the opening doors and into the empty space beside us where you used to be. I don’t know why it surprised me that it would be a party. Even though, or maybe because it belonged to your employer, your apartment was our party’s headquarters. It was something you stole back to give to those who didn’t have a home. Now, in the wake of your death, every room is full of people who are full with the loss of you. Someone puts a drink in my hand. This is just the first of an endless string of parties. Our party was the formation of a new communist party. The party: an organic entity, a living, breathing being, a gathering together of the multiple in the one, an obscure order, a whole which is not one, a many that is singular, a kind of provisional “we” at difference with itself from the inside out. The party, writes Fred Moten, “could be called the house party but don’t let that mislead you into thinking that house implies ownership; this house party is of and for the dispossessed, the ones who disavow possession, the ones who, in having been possessed of the spirit of dispossession, disrupt themselves.” The party is as much a site of refuge as it is the site of revolutionary planning, but “even though the party is, and takes place in, and takes place as, a kind of refuge, refuge still indicates that those who take it are refugees and people tend not to want to have to live like that.” The party, as refuge, is a place to catch one’s breath when you can’t breathe. It is a way of staying alive and of keeping each other alive. In your case, it was a way of sustaining your life after your death. And it was akin to what you called the punk rock commons or the “commons of the incommensurate.” Our parties go on for days, for years. They would begin around ten a.m., when the hangover was starting to wear off and we’d roll from one gathering to the next: cocktails, a memorial, breakfast with drinks, lunch with drinks, a family dinner, an impromptu gathering at some­ one’s house, a joint on the balcony, a talk in the hallway. Repeat. After your first memorial, we pick up drinks to take to a friend’s apartment and converge with an endless flood of smiling faces smiling sometimes. They verge, fall, pull toward and apart from each other. All the wars are briefly suspended and for a few flickering moments, as Wallace Stevens might have said, “We collect ourselves, out of all the indifferences, into one thing.” Though we were collected out of indifference by the shock of your death, we remain in difference from each other, which is to say that were not quite one thing but instead a singular being made up of the many, or what Jean-Luc Nancy calls being-singular-plural: “Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, circulating in the with and as the with of this singularly plural coexistence.” So rather than the coercive “we” that dominated the communist parties of historical communism, we became a “we” in difference from itself, gathered together in the wake of your death. I’ll be honest, I was kind of devastated. After your death I spent a lot of time trying to find you in the places you used to hide and especially the songs you used to listen to. The first thing I put on was the Germs (you loved Darby Crash) but that didn’t last long. I never shared your attachment to punk. Being manifestly uncool, my relationship to punk was pretty much Siouxsie Sioux, to whom I cathected around the age of twelve. There was something about her rejection of the domestic, suburban, and normal that made sense to teenage me—a queer black, brown, and blue boy adrift and alone in Northern Colorado. I don’t think you had strong feelings for Siouxsie one way or the other, but there is more than a passing resemblance between my teenage attachment to Siouxsie and yours to Crash. Both began as bad objects in their scenes: Crash in Los Angeles and Siouxsie in London. They were unlikely figures for two queer of color kids to identify with, least of all because both attempted (and failed) to appropriate (ironically or otherwise) the symbols of white supremacy by employing the swastika in their early acts. The swastika was something Siouxsie tried to atone for and that Crash refused to atone for and didn’t have time to do anyway because he, like you, died too young. Siouxsies name was itself an appropriation of the tribal name of the Sioux people, another chapter in the ongoing dispossession of the already dispossessed. We shouldn’t forget these transgressions, their unnerving entanglements with the violence of whiteness and white supremacy, but something about them nonetheless helped us sustain life in spite of the odds stacked against us. And the odds are stacked against queer teen­ agers of color in these United States. Darby’s and Siouxsie’s performances became the stage for what you described as the punk rock commons, “a being with, in which various disaffected, antisocial actants found networks of affiliation and belonging that allowed them to think and act otherwise, together, in a social field that was mostly interested in dismantling their desire for different relations within the social.’” In this punk essay, you cited Tavia Nyong’o, who argues that the word “punk” owes a debt to blackness, queerness, and the violent measures through which a phobic world responds to both. Siouxsie acknowledged a part of that debt when describing the queerness of the parties that gave birth to Londons early punk scene: It was a club for misfits, almost. Anyone that didn’t conform. There was male gays, female gays, bisexuals, non-sexuals, everything. No-one was criticized for their sexual preferences. The only thing that was looked down on was being plain boring, that reminded them of suburbia. Notice here how Siouxsie’s party resonates with the one described by Moten: “This is the party of the ones who are not self-possessed, the non-self-possessive anindividuals. This is the party of the ones in whom the trace of having been possessed keeps turning into this obsessive compulsive drive for the total disorder that is continually given in continually giving themselves away.” Which is a way of saying that our party owes a debt to the black radical tradition as much as to the radical tradition of black and brown queer house parties on Chicago s South and West sides. Unlike Crash, Siouxsie survived the early 1980s and with her survival came the emergence of a new sound characterized by thick, textured melodies, lush orchestration, and heavily processed vocals. Some people described it as post-punk and others described it as goth, but everyone seemed to agree that it lingered in the darkness—perhaps an unacknowledged way of acknowledging her debt to blackness. Like blackness, Siouxsie’s darkness wasn’t merely negative space. Her dark­ ness was from the underside, the B-Side, the upside-down world of the normative, retrenched, dystopian, suburban, white, neoliberal hell that took hold in Thatcher’s Britain and Reagan’s United States. Siouxsie’s darkness was a pharmakon to the annihilating “light” cast by the shining city on the hill. It was dense, dark negation as the negation of the negation. Darkness, for the members of Siouxsie’s party, was a place where the freaks could gather, take cover, and keep each other alive as the “light” tried to burn them out of their holes and snuff them out of existence. If their party was increasingly imperiled by the normative regimes of social comportment demanded by Thatcher and Reagan, the 1986 song “Party’s Fall” tells the story of the breakdown and falling apart as a condition of possibility. In the song, the collapse of each party becomes the condition for the emergence of something new the next night: “Your parties fall around you Another night beckons to you Your parties fall around you Another night beckons to you” That the party falls apart only to come back another night is why, following Moten, “the party I’m announcing is serially announced.” In “Party’s Fall” the present is always returning to itself, as Siouxsie points us toward a future in which the very thing that has fallen apart (the party) reconstitutes itself. Which is a good thing, it turns out, because the party is the one thing standing between the subject of her address and annihilating loneliness. About a year after your death, a friend and I are talking about you in a bar. He looks at his drink and says, “I used to be alone. And then I met him and I wasn’t alone. Now he’s gone and I’m alone again.” The party is a way of ameliorating loneliness, and the endlessly renewable capacity to throw another party becomes Siouxsie’s condition for a practice of being with in which the misfit’s loneliness becomes the conditions for a relation of being together in difference and discord with other misfits that are lonely and (un)like her. I suspect that this is why we threw so many parties after you died. They were a way of bringing you back to us, of making us a little less alone again. Ours was not a political party, like The Communist Party. Political parties endure, but they often endure through coercion, violence, and force. Instead, I mean our communist party as a name for what Siouxsie describes as the endlessly renewable chain of events performed into being by a plurality of broken people who are trying to keep each other alive. For you. Crash’s performances were an antidote to (but not a denial of) loneliness. Loneliness is common, and it is often crushing for queers and trans people of color. But it can also be a condition for the emergence of queer sociality and the undercommons. While it would be easy to assume that your punk essays are about the white boys in them (Crash in particular), it would be more accurate to say that they are about the work to which queers of color put these performances while struggling to stay alive, get free, and open up other ways of being (and surviving) in the world together. “Through my deep friendships with other disaffected Cuban queer teens who rejected both Cuban exile culture and local mainstream gringo popular culture,” you wrote in Cruising Utopia, “and through what I call the utopia critique function of punk rock, I was able to imagine a time and a place that was not yet there, a place where I tried to live.”” Today, we place an emphasis on “tried.” Near the end of Siouxsie’s song, she utters the phrase “maybe you’re alone,” breathlessly as if it were an aside. But this is the kind of aside that matters so she repeats it again, supporting the voice with the fullness of a wail. As she sings this bridge to nowhere, you would have noticed that the lyrics reach melodic resolution, which has been otherwise absent in a song that lingers in the minor key. Siouxsies wail stretches across the lyric, her voice breaking on the word happiness : My happiness depends on knowing / this friend is never alone / on your own.” I can’t help but imagine that as she begs her friend not to cry, applying her signature wail to the lyric and promising “a party on our own,” that she’s singing to a much younger version of you or me or some other teenage queer and trans black and brown boy and girl perched on the precipice of self-obliteration. Her wanting for a commons (to be with and take care of a friend in need) is Siouxsie’s precondition for a life in happiness. It was yours as well. If I follow you, Siouxsie, and Moten in suggesting that the party has some kind of relationship to the making of the (under)commons, I am also following Nancy when he writes that it is death that gives birth to community. After all, our communist party was formed in the wake of your death. “It is death—but if one is permitted to say so it is not a tragic death, or else, if it is more accurate to say it this way, it is not mythic death, or death followed by a resurrection, or the death that plunges into a pure abyss; it is death as sharing and as exposure,” he writes, “it is death as the unworking that unites us.” Our party was born from your death. So in the wake of your death we threw parties to resurrect you. Though yours was a death without resurrection, performance and parties were a way of sustaining you, bringing you back, and keeping you alive. Your death was tragic, brutal in its suddenness. But in spite of what people might think, there was nothing mythic about it. It was mundane. You were another gay brown man dead before fifty. To say that queer and trans of color death is mundane is not to diminish their horror, but on the contrary to name the shocking fact of this kind of deaths everydayness. Trans and queer of color life is lived in constant and close proximity to death. “In any major North American city,” writes Rinaldo Walcott, the numerous missing black women (presumed murdered), the many ‘missing’ and murdered trans-women, the violent verbal and physical conditions of black life often leading to the deaths of gay men, lesbian women, and trans people remain a significant component of how black life is lived in the constant intimacy of violence on the road to death. Death is not ahead of blackness as a future shared with others; death is our life, lived in the present.” For similar reasons Christina Sharpe describes black life thus: "I want... to declare that we are Black peoples in the wake with no state or nation to protect us, with no citizenship bound to be respected, and to position us in the modalities of Black life lived in, as, under, despite Black death.” If I think of your death in relation to the forms of black life and death named by Walcott and Sharpe, it is not to suggest that they are commensurable. This would distract us from the way the history of black death in the Americas from the Middle Passage forward produces a present in which, as Walcott insists, “Black people die differently.” But what I could see clearly in the wake of your departure is that black and brown queer and trans death, like the deaths of women of color, produced by different yet overlapping histories of colonialism, capital accumulation, white supremacy, and cis-heteropatriarchy, share something with each other not in spite of but because of their difference. I want to suggest that black and brown people’s emancipation from these conditions are mutually implicated, not in spite of but in relation to our incommensurability. What we share is that under such conditions, which are far beyond our ability to control them, survival can be hard. So, if I call your death mundane, it’s not to underplay the importance of your life. It’s only meant to serve as a bitter acknowledgment of the ubiquitous and disproportionate distribution of death toward queers, women, and trans people of color. Dying for different reasons, often dying before really living, but dying nonetheless. It can be as hard to survive as it is to live on in the wake of those who didn’t. But you taught me that performance is imbued with a weak power of resurrection, or at least the power to sustain some fragment of lost life in the presence of a collective present. Performance, you wrote, is what allows minoritarian subjects to “take our dead with us to the various battles we must wage in their names—and in our names. And performance is also a way of drawing people together. Throwing parties was a way of resurrecting you and keeping you alive. Being with each other was a way of being with you. In the wake of your death we became common to each other. We became communists.