### T- Framework

#### Interp: The affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation of The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines.

#### Resolved requires policy action

Louisiana State Legislature (<https://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx>) Ngong

**Resolution**

**A legislative instrument** that generally is **used for** making declarations, **stating policies**, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution **uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### We’ve inserted a list of the 164 members of the WTO

WTO ND. Members and Observers. https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\_e/whatis\_e/tif\_e/org6\_e.htm

Afghanistan — 29 July 2016 Albania — 8 September 2000 Angola — 23 November 1996 Antigua and Barbuda — 1 January 1995 Argentina — 1 January 1995 Armenia — 5 February 2003 Australia — 1 January 1995 Austria — 1 January 1995 B Bahrain, Kingdom of — 1 January 1995 Bangladesh — 1 January 1995 Barbados — 1 January 1995 Belgium — 1 January 1995 Belize — 1 January 1995 Benin — 22 February 1996 Bolivia, Plurinational State of — 12 September 1995 Botswana — 31 May 1995 Brazil — 1 January 1995 Brunei Darussalam — 1 January 1995 Bulgaria — 1 December 1996 Burkina Faso — 3 June 1995 Burundi — 23 July 1995 C Cabo Verde — 23 July 2008 Cambodia — 13 October 2004 Cameroon — 13 December 1995 Canada — 1 January 1995 Central African Republic — 31 May 1995 Chad — 19 October 1996 Chile — 1 January 1995 China — 11 December 2001 Colombia — 30 April 1995 Congo — 27 March 1997 Costa Rica — 1 January 1995 Côte d’Ivoire — 1 January 1995 Croatia — 30 November 2000 Cuba — 20 April 1995 Cyprus — 30 July 1995 Czech Republic — 1 January 1995 D Democratic Republic of the Congo — 1 January 1997 Denmark — 1 January 1995 Djibouti — 31 May 1995 Dominica — 1 January 1995 Dominican Republic — 9 March 1995 E Ecuador — 21 January 1996 Egypt — 30 June 1995 El Salvador — 7 May 1995 Estonia — 13 November 1999 Eswatini — 1 January 1995 European Union (formerly EC) — 1 January 1995 F Fiji — 14 January 1996 Finland — 1 January 1995 France — 1 January 1995 G Gabon — 1 January 1995 Gambia — 23 October 1996 Georgia — 14 June 2000 Germany — 1 January 1995 Ghana — 1 January 1995 Greece — 1 January 1995 Grenada — 22 February 1996 Guatemala — 21 July 1995 Guinea — 25 October 1995 Guinea-Bissau — 31 May 1995 Guyana — 1 January 1995 H Haiti — 30 January 1996 Honduras — 1 January 1995 Hong Kong, China — 1 January 1995 Hungary — 1 January 1995 I Iceland — 1 January 1995 India — 1 January 1995 Indonesia — 1 January 1995 Ireland — 1 January 1995 Israel — 21 April 1995 Italy — 1 January 1995 J Jamaica — 9 March 1995 Japan — 1 January 1995 Jordan — 11 April 2000 K Kazakhstan — 30 November 2015 Kenya — 1 January 1995 Korea, Republic of — 1 January 1995 Kuwait, the State of — 1 January 1995 Kyrgyz Republic — 20 December 1998 L Lao People’s Democratic Republic — 2 February 2013 Latvia — 10 February 1999 Lesotho — 31 May 1995 Liberia — 14 July 2016 Liechtenstein — 1 September 1995 Lithuania — 31 May 2001 Luxembourg — 1 January 1995 M Macao, China — 1 January 1995 Madagascar — 17 November 1995 Malawi — 31 May 1995 Malaysia — 1 January 1995 Maldives — 31 May 1995 Mali — 31 May 1995 Malta — 1 January 1995 Mauritania — 31 May 1995 Mauritius — 1 January 1995 Mexico — 1 January 1995 Moldova, Republic of — 26 July 2001 Mongolia — 29 January 1997 Montenegro — 29 April 2012 Morocco — 1 January 1995 Mozambique — 26 August 1995 Myanmar — 1 January 1995 N Namibia — 1 January 1995 Nepal — 23 April 2004 Netherlands — 1 January 1995 New Zealand — 1 January 1995 Nicaragua — 3 September 1995 Niger — 13 December 1996 Nigeria — 1 January 1995 North Macedonia — 4 April 2003 Norway — 1 January 1995 O Oman — 9 November 2000 P Pakistan — 1 January 1995 Panama — 6 September 1997 Papua New Guinea — 9 June 1996 Paraguay — 1 January 1995 Peru — 1 January 1995 Philippines — 1 January 1995 Poland — 1 July 1995 Portugal — 1 January 1995 Q Qatar — 13 January 1996 R Romania — 1 January 1995 Russian Federation — 22 August 2012 Rwanda — 22 May 1996 S Saint Kitts and Nevis — 21 February 1996 Saint Lucia — 1 January 1995 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines — 1 January 1995 Samoa — 10 May 2012 Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of — 11 December 2005 Senegal — 1 January 1995 Seychelles — 26 April 2015 Sierra Leone — 23 July 1995 Singapore — 1 January 1995 Slovak Republic — 1 January 1995 Slovenia — 30 July 1995 Solomon Islands — 26 July 1996 South Africa — 1 January 1995 Spain — 1 January 1995 Sri Lanka — 1 January 1995 Suriname — 1 January 1995 Sweden — 1 January 1995 Switzerland — 1 July 1995 T Chinese Taipei — 1 January 2002 Tajikistan — 2 March 2013 Tanzania — 1 January 1995 Thailand — 1 January 1995 Togo — 31 May 1995 Tonga — 27 July 2007 Trinidad and Tobago — 1 March 1995 Tunisia — 29 March 1995 Turkey — 26 March 1995 U Uganda — 1 January 1995 Ukraine — 16 May 2008 United Arab Emirates — 10 April 1996 United Kingdom — 1 January 1995 United States — 1 January 1995 Uruguay — 1 January 1995 V Vanuatu — 24 August 2012 Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of — 1 January 1995 Viet Nam — 11 January 2007 Y Yemen — 26 June 2014 Z Zambia — 1 January 1995 Zimbabwe — 5 March 1995

#### Intellectual property protections

Yinan Wang.2012 HANDLING THE U.S.-CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE – THE ROLE OF WTO’S DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM. https://etd.ohiolink.edu/apexprod/rws\_etd/send\_file/send?accession=miami1336224534&disposition=inline

In short, intellectual property is “information with commercial value.”84 Primo Braga defines intellectual property rights as “a composite of ideas, inventions, and creative expressions and the public willingness to bestow the status of property on them.”85 The WTO has divided intellectual property rights into two broader areas—copyright and rights related to copyright; and industrial property. Copyright protects “[t]he rights of authors of literary and artistic works (such as books and other writings, musical compositions, paintings, sculpture, computer programs and films)… for a minimum period of 50 years after the death of the author.”86 Copyright also covers the rights of performers, such as singers, actors, and musicians, phonograms producers, and broadcasting organizations. Industrial property consists of trademarks (as well as service marks) and patents. Maskus defines trademark as “a symbol or other identifier that conveys information to the consumer about the product.”87 Trademark is the protection of distinctive signs which identify a product, company or service. If consumers believe that the mark is a reliable indicator of desirable characteristics of a good or service, they would be willing to pay a premium for the good or service. Related to trademarks is geographic indications, “which identify a good as originating in a place where a given characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin”.88 Other types of industrial property include primarily patents, but also industrial designs and trade secrets. According to Mertha, “[p]atents provide inventors with the right of exclusion from the use, production, sales, or import of the product or technology in question for a specified period of time”.89 Protection of these types of industrial properties is to “stimulate innovation, design and the creation of technology.”90

#### Medicine

Google No Date [Google. “medicine”. No Date. Accessed 8/6/21. <https://www.google.com/search?q=medicines+definition&rlz=1C1CHBF_enUS877US877&oq=medicines+&aqs=chrome.1.69i59l3j69i60.2379j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8> //Xu]

the science or practice of the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of disease (in technical use often taken to exclude surgery).

**Violation: x**

#### 1] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. It allows someone to specialize in one area 4 years giving an huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched clash.

2] Clash---forfeiting government action sanctions retreat from controversy and forces the negative to concede solvency before winning a link -- clash is the necessary condition for distinguishing debate from discussion, but negation exists on a sliding scale -- that jumpstarts the process of critical thinking, reflexivity, and argument refinement. It’s also key to movement building—no critical testing means

#### TVA: <sabotage>

#### 1- SSD solves offense – if you read this on neg as a counter methodology

#### 2 – any DA to the TVA negates – proves that there’s workable clash under my interp.

#### Procedural fairness outweighs

#### (1) Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB. Can’t weigh case since I couldn’t disprove it.

#### (2) Inescapable – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness: i.e. that the judge will evaluate your arguments. Absent some judge-debater reciprocal relationship, they could just hack against or for you.

#### (3) Quality of discussion – Debate’s unique value is that it forces engagement and contestation of issues – but this is impossible if I don’t even know what to prepare for.

#### (4) We can always read into this stuff later but a loss is permanent

#### (5) Tangibility – voting aff has no terminal impact- it doesn’t educate anyone or cause us to make some societal shift whereas theory norms are set all the time like nibs and brackets.

#### DTD- T is question of models of debate and the damage is already done

#### No impact turns – a. higher layer bc it indicts the aff b. baiting c. illogical

#### CI- they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

### k- ballot

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for the better team. Anything is self serving, arbitrarily limits the scope of engagement, and begs the question of the rest of the debate.

#### Reject framing arguments that parametricize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else staticizes knowledge which their ev would obviously disagree w/.

#### The rob –

#### 1. Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### 2. Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### 3. Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

#### 5. No evidence for the power of the ballot – debate specific – negate on presumption.

**Ritter 13**[Michael, JD UTexas Law, B.A. cum laude Trinity University. September 2013. “Overcoming the Fiction of ‘Social Change Through Debate’: What’s to Learn From 2Pac’s Changes?” <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/9896ec_8b2b993ec42440ecaab1b07645385db5.pdf>]

Up to this point, this article has shown how each of the essential components of “**competitive interscholastic debate**” makes it very different from any other kind of debate. But one thing that is persuasive in any kind of debate is some sort of properly conducted study (or even a mere survey) that provides empirical proof or even substantial anecdotal support. To date, **none of the many academics** who coach or participate in the debate community have published a study or survey to support **the social change fiction**. (Perhaps they have tried, and discovered they were just wrong.) But until such an empirical study of competitive interscholastic debate is conducted, **students, judges, and coaches should not take it for granted**

### Case

Reject independent pre fiat voting issues.

#### A – Systems – the 1AC argues that material institutions create the social realities that replicate violence but ceding the state refuses to alter these conditions

#### B – Spillover – the aff assumes that its advocacy of a certain affect is sufficient to result in the liberation of the flesh BUT they are missing a robust internal link to solving oppression inside OR outside the round

#### C- Ineffective-there’s no benefit to affirming the aff in debate-the round won’t spill up since nobody monitors individual rounds-means they don’t get their subjectivity offense – debate never solves the ontological revolution

### Cards

#### Abstract critique keeps us from forefronting political reform to create material change for disability.

Ruckelshaus 17 [Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education. 01/18/17 "The Non-Politics of Disability.” <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html>] JCH-PF

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.

#### Future not sole province of the child

Ruti, professor of Critical Theory at the University of Toronto, March, ‘17

(Mari, *The Ethics of Opting Out: Queer Theory's Defiant Subjects*, Columbia University Press, pg. 90-91)

The stakes of Muñoz’s accusation are high, revolving around the question of who can afford to relinquish all hope of a better future in the way that Edelman’s rendering of queer negativity—with includes the derisive critique of the child as a sentimental emblem of reproductive futurity that I mentioned in chapter 1—calls for. Muñoz suggests that only those who “have” a future in the first place have the luxury of flirting with the idea of rejecting it; conversely, those whose futures are concretely (empirically) threatened are unlikely to advocate the annihilation of these futures. More specifically, Muñoz contends that it would be disastrous to “hand over futurity to normative white reproductive futurity,” arguing that the fact that this version of futurity is currently winning “is all the more reason to call on a utopian political imagination that will enable us to glimpse another time and place: a ‘not-yet’ where queer youths of color actually get to grow up” (2009, 95–96). In this manner, Muñoz alerts us to the fact that while Edelman elevates the child to an icon of reproductive futurity, “the future” has never been the province of all children; that is, though Muñoz agrees with the broad outlines of Edelman’s critique of reproductive futurity, he reminds us that this critique does not apply to the vast majority of the world’s children,

that “racialized kids, queer kids, are not the sovereign princes of futurity” (95).

Like Edelman, Muñoz admits that the world as it stands is “not enough” (2009, 96), not able to offer adequate resources for subjective flourishing. But in his view, the way to deal with the world’s insufficiency and messiness is not to reject the future wholesale but rather to reconfigure its parameters. This, Muñoz asserts, can only be done by resurrecting “various principles of hope that are, by their very nature, relational” (94). As he elaborates, relationality may not always be “pretty,” “but the option of simply opting out of it, or describing it as something that has never been available to us, is imaginable only if one can frame queerness as a singular abstraction that can be subtracted and isolated from a larger social matrix” (94).

#### None of this is real. Combinng cap science is still cap- that is the thesis of the aff

Paris ‘17

[Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6

Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of “neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.

Solms39 has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity. This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be incompatible with empirical data.40,41

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods

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or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.