### NC

#### Permissibility and presumption negate a. the aff has the burden of obligation, negate if they don’t meet the burden b. statements are more likely to be false than true

#### The aff framework fails

#### Constructivism – moral oughts aren’t facts to be discovered but imposed on the world in a struggle to be the dominant creator of meaning.

Rick Parrish ["Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Bft6jgrQb6TPvaerQ6SGeB2VL4AHy4rb/view?usp=sharing] Bracketed for Gender

Perhaps the single most telling quote from Hobbes on this point comes from The Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society (usually known by its Latin name, De Cive), in which he states that “to know truth, is the same thing as to remember that it was made by ourselves by the very usurpation of the words.” “For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality” so the “Connections between names and objects are not natural.” They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms “are ever used with relation to the person that used them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor [there is not] any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of objects themselves.” Since “there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil,” these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice."29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account,"30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every man is his own judge,"32 persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures,"33 creating labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition.”

#### Internalism—any theories that merely identify a principle we ought to follow assumes agents internalize that principle.

Richard Joyce; Myth of Morality; Port Chester, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2001. p 109; <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1VlAve-sQPlguXuTWJyZuRe2RA5-O-P8M/view?usp=sharing>) PESH AK //recut Ngong **Bracketed for clarity**

How could an external reason fulfill the condition quoted above? Let us first see how an internal reason does. Suppose I am thirsty, but unbeknownst to me the cup of coffee I am (reasonably) reaching for contains poison. I have an internal reason not to drink, in that I have a desire not to be poisoned, and refraining from drinking helps satisfy that desire. Because of my ignorance, of course, the reason explains nothing about my actions – but it could. If I [knew the truth], then I would refrain from drinking, and the reason would explain that inaction. This explanation would presumably be a matter of psychological causation: the belief that the coffee was poisoned coupled with the desire not to be poisoned causes my act of refraining. (This is not to say that these two states automatically result in that action – I may be irrational and drink the poison anyway.) Back to the external reason. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is [sacred] tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. Regardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink – I have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason [could not] even explain my refraining from drinking? Clearly in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role among the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) – I must have, in some manner, “internalized” it.

#### The sovereign resolves these conflicts.

Thomas Hobbes [Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, was an English philosopher who is considered one of the founders of modern political philosophy; Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill. By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury. Printed for Andrew Ckooke, at the Green Dragon in St. Pauls Church-Yard, 1651.]

The final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon them- selves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of war which is necessarily consequent, as hath been shown, to the natural passions of men when there is no visible power to keep them in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and obser- vation of those laws of nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters. For the laws of nature, as justice, equity, modesty, mercy, and, in sum, doing to others as we would be done to, of themselves, without the terror of some power to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our natural passions, that carry us to partiality, pride, revenge, and the like. And covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore, notwithstanding the laws of nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no power erected, or not great enough for our security, every man will and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small families, to rob and spoil one another has been a trade, and so far from being reputed against the law of nature that the greater spoils they gained, the greater was their honour; and men ob- served no other laws therein but the laws of honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives and instruments of husbandry. And as small families did then; so now do cities and kingdoms, which are but greater families (for their own security), enlarge their dominions upon all pretences of danger, and fear of invasion, or assistance that may be given to invaders; endeavour as much as they can to subdue or weaken their neighbours by open force, and secret arts, for want of other caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour. Nor is it the joining together of a small number of men that gives them this security; because in small numbers, small additions on the one side or the other make the advantage of strength so great as is sufficient to carry the victory, and therefore gives encouragement to an invasion. The multitude sufficient to confide in for our security is not determined by any certain number, but by comparison with the enemy we fear; and is then sufficient when the odds of the enemy is not of so visible and conspicuous moment to determine the event of war, as to move him to attempt. And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be di- rected according to their particular judgements, and particular appe- tites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another. For being distracted in opinions concerning the best use and application of their strength, they do not help, but hinder one another, and reduce their strength by mutual opposition to nothing: whereby they are easily, not only subdued by a very few that agree together, but also, when there is no common enemy, they make war upon each other for their particular interests. For if we could suppose a great multitude of men to consent in the observation of justice, and other laws of nature, without a common power to keep them all in awe, we might as well suppose all mankind to do the same; and then there neither would be, nor need to be, any civil government or Commonwealth at all, because there would be peace without subjection. Nor is it enough for the security, which men desire should last all the time of their life, that they be governed and directed by one judge- ment for a limited time; as in one battle, or one war. For though they obtain a victory by their unanimous endeavour against a foreign enemy, yet afterwards, when either they have no common enemy, or he that by one part is held for an enemy is by another part held for a friend, they must needs by the difference of their interests dissolve, and fall again into a war amongst themselves. It is true that certain living creatures, as bees and ants, live sociably one with another (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst political creatures), and yet have no other direction than their particular judgements and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signify to another what he thinks expedient for the common benefit: and there- fore some man may perhaps desire to know why mankind cannot do the same.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the authority of the sovereign.

#### Sovereignty is inevitable.

Rick Parrish ["Derrida's Economy of Violence in Hobbes' Social Contract." Theory & Event 7, no. 4 (2005) https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Bft6jgrQb6TPvaerQ6SGeB2VL4AHy4rb/view?usp=sharing] Bracketed for Gender

But even more significantly for his relationship with Derrida, Hobbes argues that in the state of nature persons must not only try to control as many objects as possible -- they must also try to control as many persons as possible. "There is no way for any [person] man to secure [them] himself so reasonable as anticipation, that is, by force or wiles to master the persons of all men he can, so long till he see no other power great enough to endanger him. And this is no more than his own conservation requireth, and is generally allowed."37 While it is often assumed that by this Hobbes means a person will try to control others with physical force alone, when one approaches Hobbesian persons as meaning creators this control takes on a more discursive, arche-violent character. First," says Hobbes, "among [persons in the state of nature] there is a contestation of honour and preferment,"38 a discursive struggle not over what physical objects each person will possess, but over who or what will be considered valuable. Persons, as rationally self-interested beings who "measure, not only other men, but all other things, by themselves,"39 and value themselves above all others, attempt to force that valuation on others. "The human desire for 'glory', which in today's language translates not simply as the desire for prestige, but also the desire to acquire power over others," is therefore primarily about subsuming others beneath one's own personhood, as direct objects or merely phenomenal substances. As above, the inevitability of this situation is given by the fact that the primarily egoistic nature of all experience renders the other in a "state of empirical alter-ego"41 to oneself. Those who prefer a more directly materialistic reading of Hobbes may attempt to bolster their position by pointing to his comment that "the most frequent reason why men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."42 This quote also supports my reading of Hobbes, because quite simply the primary thing all persons want but can never have in common is the status of the ultimate creator of meaning, the primary personhood, from which all other goods flow. Everyone, by their natures as creators of meaning whose "desire of power after power . . . ceaseth only in death,"43 tries to subsume others beneath their personhood in order to control these others and glorify themselves. As Piotr Hoffman puts it, "every individual acting under the right of nature views himself as the center of the universe; his aim is, quite simply and quite closely, to become a small "god among men," to use Plato's phrase. "Hobbes argues that this discursive struggle rapidly becomes physical by writing that "every man thinking well of himself, and hating to see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by strength and force of body."45 The ultimate violence, the surest and most complete way of removing a person's ability to create meaning, is to kill that person, and the escalating contentiousness of the state of nature makes life short in the war of all against all. But this does not render the fundamental reason for this violence any less discursive, any less based on "one's sense of self-importance in comparison with others"46 or human nature as a creator of meaning.

#### The affirmative must concede the neg framework: Prefer A. Reciprocity – aff already gets to choose the advocacy for the round so I should choose the framework, this equalizes which offense links where B. Aff is at an advantage in the framework debate – they have the 1AC and 1AR to establish offense, while I only have the NC creating a 11 to 7 skew.

Fairness education

#### Negate:

#### 1] Sequencing – a sovereign can’t be obligated to do anything because they are the ones who choose what ethics and truth – the rez tries to coerce the sovereign to do something which challenges its authority.

#### 2] IP rights are implicit in the creation of the sovereign in expressing creativity.

Ghosh 04 [Shubha Ghosh (B.A., Amherst College; Ph.D., University of Michigan; J.D., Stanford Law School; Professor of Law, University at Buffalo, SUNY, Law School; Visiting Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law). “PATENTS AND THE REGULATORY STATE: RETHINKING THE PATENT BARGAIN METAPHOR AFTER ELDRED”. BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL. 2004. Accessed 9/3/21. <https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1119327/files/fulltext.pdf> //Xu]

As illustration of the limits of social contract theory,46 particularly the malleability of the notions of consent and promise, consider a social contract theory of intellectual property based on the thoughts of Thomas Hobbes rather than that of John Locke. No scholar has expressly developed a Hobbesian theory of patent or of copyright, but as a challenge to social contract theory, it may be useful to imagine what such a theory would look like.47 For Hobbes, humans created the leviathan-the sovereign state-to protect themselves from each other in the state of nature. 48 Without the leviathan, the state of nature was not an idyllic paradise but a condition of savagery and brutality. In the state of nature, to the extent that any creative activity occurred, the objects of creation would be cannibalized, thoughtlessly copied, adapted, distributed, and performed or used, sold, offered to sell, and made by others. Thus, intellectual property law under the leviathan would protect individuals from this state of nature by making them absolute, immutable, bountiful, and unlimited. Humans would consent to these terms if they were enforced equally for all creations, and each author and inventor would promise to all others to abide by this form of the intellectual property social contract.

#### 3] Uncertainty would lead the sovereign to adopt passive foreign policy – international agreements are incoherent

Williams 96 [Williams, Michael C. (Professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa). “Hobbes and International Relations: A Reconsideration.” International Organization, Volume 50, Number 2, pg. 231. Spring 1996. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2704077>. Xu Recut from Premier

Skepticism about the limits of human knowledge leads Hobbes to great caution in human affairs, especially regarding the relationship of theory to practice. He warns that to act as if we can know (predict) and control the future is to court disaster. In this light, then, it is an interesting (if anachronistic) question to ask what he might have thought about, for example, the intimate relationship between the science of strategic studies and American involve- ment in the Vietnam War.50 It is probably equally fair to say that he would have had little sympathy for continuing efforts toward the creation of "policy sciences" in the discipline as a whole.51 Hobbes's skepticism also plays a role in his positing of an international system populated by sovereigns operating upon Hobbesian principles. Knowing the limitations of human knowledge, and the inability to know God's will or other visions of ultimate human fulfillment, Hobbes believes that rational sovereigns will not act in an unnecessarily aggressive manner. His vision of foreign policy is cautious and essentially pacific, a position that, as Flathman has illustrated drawing upon a passage from the Elements of Law, is condi- tioned by-or perhaps founded in-his skepticism: "Hobbes is far from a supporter of bellicose or expansionist policies. Because no preparation can assure victory, 'such commonwealths, or such monarchs, as affect war for itself ... out of ambition, or of vain-glory, or that make account to avenge every little injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they not ruin themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to expect.' "52

### 1NC – T – Spec Reductions

#### 1] Interpretation: The affirmative must specify a] which intellectual property rights they reduce and b] to what degree they reduce them.

#### Intellectual Property is a vague, meaningless term – there’s no normal means.

Chopra 18, Samir. “The Idea of Intellectual Property Is Nonsensical and Pernicious: Aeon Essays.” Aeon, Aeon Magazine, 12 Nov. 2018, aeon.co/essays/the-idea-of-intellectual-property-is-nonsensical-and-pernicious. Samir Choprais professor of philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. He is the author of several books, including A Legal Theory for Autonomous Artificial Agents (2011), co-authored with Laurence White.//sid

In the United States, media and technology have been shaped by these laws, and indeed many artists and creators owe their livelihoods to such protections. But recently, in response to the new ways in which the digital era facilitates the creation and distribution of scientific and artistic products, the foundations of these protections have been questioned. Those calling for reform, such as the law professors Lawrence Lessig and James Boyle, free software advocates such as Richard Stallman, and law and economics scholars such as William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, ask: is ‘intellectual property’ the same kind of property as ‘tangible property’, and are legal protections for the latter appropriate for the former? And to that query, we can add: is ‘intellectual property’ an appropriate general term for the widely disparate areas of law it encompasses? The answer to all these questions is no. And answering the latter question will help to answer the former. Stallman is a computer hacker extraordinaire and the fieriest exponent of the free-software movement, which holds that computer users and programmers should be free to copy, share and distribute software source code. He has argued that the term ‘intellectual property’ be discarded in favour of the precise and directed use of ‘copyright’, ‘patents’, ‘trademarks’ or ‘trade secrets’ instead – and he’s right. This is not merely semantic quibbling. The language in which a political and cultural debate is conducted very often determines its outcome. Stallman notes that copyright, patent, trademark and trade secret law were motivated by widely differing considerations. Their intended purposes, the objects covered and the permissible constraints all vary. In fact, knowledge of one body of law rarely carries over to another. (A common confusion is to imagine that an object protected by one area of law is actually protected by another: ‘McDonald’s’ is protected by trademark law, not copyright law, as many consumers seem to think.) Such diversity renders most ‘general statements … using “intellectual property”… false,’ Stallman [writes](https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.en.html). Consider the common claim that intellectual property promotes innovation: this is actually true only of patent law. Novels are copyrighted even if they are formulaic, and copyright only incentivises the production of new works as public goods while allowing creators to make a living. These limited rights do not address innovations, which is also true of trademark and trade secret law. Crucially, ‘intellectual property’ is only partially concerned with rewarding creativity (that motivation is found in copyright law alone). Much more than creativity is ‘needed to make a patentable invention’, Stallman explains, while trademark and trade secret law are orthogonal to creativity or its encouragement. Clubbing these diversities under the term ‘intellectual property’ has induced a terrible intellectual error A general term is useful only if it subsumes related concepts in such a way that semantic value is added. If our comprehension is not increased by our chosen generalised term, then we shouldn’t use it. A common claim such as ‘they stole my intellectual property’ is singularly uninformative, since the general term ‘intellectual property’ obscures more than it illuminates. If copyright infringement is alleged, we try to identify the copyrightable concrete expression, the nature of the infringement and so on. If patent infringement is alleged, we check another set of conditions (does the ‘new’ invention replicate the design of the older one?), and so on for trademarks (does the offending symbol substantially and misleadingly resemble the protected trademark?) and trade secrets (did the enterprise attempt to keep supposedly protected information secret?) The use of the general term ‘intellectual property’ tells us precisely nothing. Furthermore, the extreme generality encouraged by ‘intellectual property’ obscuresthe specific areas of contention

created by the varying legal regimes. Those debating copyright law wonder whether the copying of academic papers should be allowed; patent law is irrelevant here. Those debating patent law wonder whether pharmaceutical companies should have to issue compulsory licences for life-saving drugs to poor countries; copyright law is irrelevant here. ‘**Fair use’** is **contested in copyright** litigation; there is **no such notion in patent law**. ‘**Non-obviousness’** is **contested in patent law**; there is **no such** notion **in copyright law**. **Clubbing these diversities under the term ‘intellectual property’ has induced a terrible intellectual error**: **facile and misleading overgeneralisation**. Indiscriminate use of ‘intellectual property’ has unsurprisingly bred absurdity. Anything associated with a ‘creator’ – be it artistic or scientific – is often grouped under ‘intellectual property’, which doesn’t make much sense. And the widespread embrace of ‘intellectual property’ has led to historical amnesia. According to Stallman, many Americans have held that ‘the framers of the US Constitution had a principled, procompetitive attitude to intellectual property’. But Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution authorises only copyright and patent law. It does not mention trademark law or trade secret law. Why then does ‘intellectual property’ remain in use? Because it has polemical and rhetorical value. Its deployment, especially by a putative owner, is a powerful inducement to change one’s position in a policy argument. It is one thing to accuse someone of copyright infringement, and another to accuse of them of the theft of property. The former sounds like a legally resolvable technicality; the latter sounds like an unambiguously sinful act.

#### Reduce requires quantification.

Passarello 13 – J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2013. (Nicholas, NOTE: THE ITEM VETO AND THE THREAT OF APPROPRIATIONS BUNDLING IN ALASKA, 30 Alaska L. Rev. 125, Lexis)//BB

With respect to the item veto power, the question in the case was whether or not the governor could strike descriptive language without affecting the rest of the appropriation. The state constitution clearly guarantees the power to "strike or reduce items in appropriations bills." 61 To determine what exactly it is that the governor may strike, the Alaska Supreme Court here addressed the meaning of "item" for the first time. 62 The court concluded that "item" means "a sum of money dedicated to a particular purpose." 63 This holding rested on five lines of analysis, all of which indicate that the amount of an appropriation is the object affected by the item veto power. First, the court noted that the word "item" implies "a notion of unity between two essential elements of an appropriation: the amount and the purpose." 64 Altering the amount of an item is expressly allowed in the Constitution via the reduction power, 65 but to alter the purpose would destroy that unity by fundamentally changing the item into something else not enacted by the legislature. 66 Second, the use of the word "reduce" implies a quantitative effect**,** and the drafters likely intended the companion word "strike" to [\*136] have the same type of effect as well. 67 Third, "**reduce**" and "strike" **describe** the same **action applied to different extents:** **when an amount is "reduced**" **to the point where it is lessened to nothing**, **it is effectively "struck."** 68 **Thus, the object** of the "strike" **must be associated with an amount** of money **to the extent** **that it can be lessened**. 69 Fourth, the historical purpose of the item veto was to curtail the amount of state spending by mitigating the effects of log-rolling, a purpose most closely directed at the amount of the appropriation. 70 Fifth, "public policy disfavors a reading of "item' that would permit the executive branch to substantively alter the legislature's appropriation bills, resulting in appropriations passed without the protection our constitution contemplates." 71 For these reasons, the court concluded that the power to "strike" only refers to completely diminishing the amount of an appropriations item, not the descriptive language accompanying it.

#### Violation: they don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Shiftiness- They can redefine the 1AC’s reductions in the 1AR which allows them to recontextualize their enforcement mechanism to wriggle out of DA’s since all DA links are predicated on type of enforcement i.e. sanctions bad das, domestic politics das off of backlash, information research sharing da if they put monetary punishments, or trade das.

#### 2] Real World - Policy makers will always specify how the mandates of the plan should be endorsed. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, states can circumvent the Aff’s policy since there is no delineated way to enforce the affirmative which means there’s no way to actualize any of their solvency arguments.

#### ESpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary- it’s an active part of the WTO is central to any advocacy about international IP law since the only uniqueness of a reduction of IP protections is how effective its enforcement is.

#### F and E

#### DTD: a] Deter b] same as DTA c] cant drop nothing

#### CI: a] race to the bottom b] Collapses

#### No RVIs: a] Chilling effect b] Illogical you don’t win for being fair d] baiting

Implicate neg flex

### Theory Hedge

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] 1AR theory is skewed to the aff because they have a 2ar judge psychology warrant.

#### Infinite abuse claims are wrong- A] Spikes solve-you can just preempt paradigms in the 1AC B] Functional limits- 1nc is only 7 minutes long

### Case

No terminalized impact ev- laundry list doesn’t cut it no new 1AR impact bc its not the 2AC

Impact calc doesn’t matter they have tmerinal impacts anyays

### Top Level

#### Consequentialism fails

#### 1] Problem of induction—all experiences only explain that one instance, but there’s no reliable reason it’ll happen again

Vickers 14, John Vickers, 2014, The Problem of Induction, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/

The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.

#### 2] An infinite universe takes out util—infinite amount of pleasure and pain which means actions don’t change anything

Bostrom, Nick [Future of Humanity Institute, Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School]. "Infinite Ethics." Nick Bostrom's Home Page. 2009. Web. <http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.html>

“Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite. Moreover, If the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it **contains an infinite number of galaxies**, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets **then there is,** with probability one, **an infinite number of people. Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy.** Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person‐states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations葉here are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc.Suppose the world [does] contains an infinite number of people and a corresponding infinity of joys and sorrows, preference satisfactions and frustrations, instances of virtue and depravation, and other such local phenomena at least some of which have positive or negative value. More precisely, suppose that there is some finite value ε such that there exists an infinite number of local phenomena (this could be a subset of e.g. persons, experiences, characters, virtuous acts, lives, relationships, civilizations, or ecosystems) each of which has a value ≥ ε and also an infinite number of local phenomena each of which has a value ≤ (‒ ε). Call such a world canonically infinite. **Ethical theories that hold that value is aggregative imply that** a canonically **infinite world contains an infinite quantity of positive** value **and** an infinite quantity of **negative value.** This gives rise to a peculiar predicament. We can do only a finite amount of good **or bad. Yet** in cardinal arithmetic, **adding or subtracting a finite quantity does not change an infinite quantity. Every possible act of ours** therefore **has** the same **net effect on the total amount of good and bad** in a canonically infinite world:none whatsoever. **Aggregative consequentialist theories are threatened by infinitarian [freeze] paralysis: they** seem to **imply that** if the world is canonically infinite then **it is always ethically indifferent what we do**. In particular, they would imply that it is ethically indifferent **whether we cause another holocaust** or prevent one from occurring. If any non‐contradictory normative implication is a reductio ad absurdum, this one is.

### 1NC—Warming Defense

#### Best science proves no warming impact.

Idso et al 18 (Craig, Geography@ArizonaState, David Legates, Climatology@ Delaware, ProfClimatology@ Deleware, Fred Singer, Physics@ Princeton, ProfEnviroScience@ Virginia, Climate Change Reconsidered II: Fossil Fuels, NIPCC, Ch.2, p. 108-109, http://climatechangereconsidered.org/climate-change-reconsidered-ii-fossil-fuels/)

Methodology The Scientific Method is a series of requirements imposed on scientists to ensure the integrity of their work. The IPCC has not followed established rules that guide scientific research. Appealing to consensus may have a place in science, but not as a means of shutting down debate. Uncertainty in science is unavoidable but must be acknowledged. Many declaratory and predictive statements about the global climate are not warranted by science. Observations Surface air temperature is governed by energy flow from the Sun to Earth and from Earth back into space. Whatever diminishes or intensifies this energy flow can change air temperature. Levels of carbon dioxide and methane in the atmosphere are governed by processes of the carbon cycle. Exchange rates and other climatological processes are poorly understood. The geological record shows temperatures and CO2 levels in the atmosphere have not been stable, making untenable the IPCC’s assumption that they would be stable in the future in the absence of human emissions. Water vapor is the dominant greenhouse gas owing to its abundance in the atmosphere and the wide range of spectra in which it absorbs radiation. Carbon dioxide (CO2) absorbs energy only in a very narrow range of the longwave infrared spectrum. Controversies Reconstructions of average global surface temperature differ depending on the methodology used. The warming of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has not been shown to be beyond the bounds of natural variability. General circulation models (GCMs) are unable to accurately depict complex climate processes. They do not accurately hindcast or forecast the climate effects of human-related greenhouse gas emissions. Estimates of equilibrium climate sensitivity (the amount of warming that would occur following a doubling of atmospheric CO2 level) range widely. The IPCC’s estimate is higher than many recent estimates. Solar irradiance, magnetic fields, UV fluxes, and cosmic rays are poorly understood and may have greater influence on climate than general circulation models currently assume. Climate Impacts There is little evidence that the warming of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has caused a general increase in severe weather events. Meteorological science suggests a warmer world will see milder weather patterns. Arctic ice is losing mass, but melting commenced before there was a human impact on climate and is not unprecedented. Antarctica is either gaining ice mass or is unchanged. Best available data show sea-level rise is not accelerating. Local and regional sea levels continue to exhibit typical natural variability. The link between warming and drought is weak, and by some measures drought decreased over the twentieth century. Changes in the hydrosphere of this type are regionally highly variable and show a closer correlation with multidecadal climate rhythmicity than they do with global temperature. Plants have responded positively to rising temperatures

and carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, a trend that is likely to continue beyond the twenty-first century. Why Scientists Disagree Climate is an interdisciplinary subject requiring insights from many fields of study. Very few scholars have mastery of more than one or two of these disciplines. Fundamental uncertainties arise from insufficient observational evidence and disagreements over how to interpret data and how to set the parameters of models. Many scientists trust the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to objectively report the latest scientific findings on climate change, but it has failed to produce balanced reports and has allowed its findings to be misrepresented to the public. Climate scientists, like all humans, can have tunnel vision. Bias, even or especially if unconscious, can be especially pernicious when data are equivocal and allow multiple interpretations, as in climatology. Appeals to Consensus Surveys and abstract-counting exercises that are said to show a “scientific consensus” on the causes and consequences of climate change invariably ask the wrong questions or the wrong people. No survey data exist that support claims of consensus on important scientific questions. Some survey data, petitions, and peer-reviewed research show deep disagreement among scientists on issues that must be resolved before the man-made global warming hypothesis can be accepted. Some 31,000 scientists have signed a petition saying “there is no convincing scientific evidence that human release of carbon dioxide, methane, or other greenhouse gases is causing or will, in the foreseeable future, cause catastrophic heating of the Earth’s atmosphere and disruption of the Earth’s climate.” Prominent climate scientists have said repeatedly that there is no consensus on the most important issues in climate science.

### Disease

#### Lethal – Burnout Double Bind – Either the disease kills quickly and it burns out – there’s no hosts – or it doesn’t kill fast enough and biotech solves the impact

#### No impact

Farquhar et al 17 [Sebastian Farquhar (PhD Candidate in Philosophy at Oxford and Project Manager at Future of Humanity Institute), John Halstead (climate activist and one of the co-founders of 350 Indiana-Calumet), Owen Cotton-Barratt (PhD in pure mathematics at Oxford. Previously worked as an academic mathematician and as Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism), Stefan Schubert (Researcher at Department of Experimental Psychology at University of Oxford), Haydn Belfield (Associate Fellow at the Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence. He has a background in policy and politics, including as a Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister, as a Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, and a degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oriel College, University of Oxford), Andrew Snyder-Beattie (Director of Research at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, Holds degrees in biomathematics and economics and is currently pursuing a PhD in Zoology at Oxford), Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, Global Priorities Project (Bostrom’s Institute), 2017-01-23, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf] TDI

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off

by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39