# Health Care DA

#### Nurse strikes devastates hospitals

Wright 10 Sarah H. Wright July 2010 "Evidence on the Effects of Nurses' Strikes" <https://www.nber.org/digest/jul10/evidence-effects-nurses-strikes> (Researcher at National Bureau of Economic Research)

U.S. hospitals were excluded from collective bargaining laws for three decades longer than other sectors because of fears **that strikes by nurses might imperil patients' health**. Today, while unionization has been declining in general, it is growing rapidly in hospitals, with the number of unionized workers rising from 679,000 in 1990 to nearly one million in 2008. In Do Strikes Kill? Evidence from New York State (NBER Working Paper No. 15855), co-authors Jonathan Gruber and Samuel Kleiner carefully examine the effects of nursing strikes on patient care and outcomes. The researchers match data on nurses' strikes in New York State from 1984 to 2004 to data on hospital discharges, including information on treatment intensity, patient mortality, and hospital readmission. They conclude that nurses' strikes were **costly to hospital patients**: in-hospital mortality **increased by 19.4 percent** and hospital readmissions **increased by 6.5 percen**t for patients admitted during a strike. Among their sample of 38,228 such patients, an estimated **138 more individuals died than would have without a stri**ke, and 344 more patients were readmitted to the hospital than if there had been no strike. "Hospitals functioning during nurses' strikes **do so at a lower quality of patient care,"** they write. Still, at hospitals experiencing strikes, the measures of treatment intensity -- that is, the length of hospital stay and the number of procedures performed during the patient's stay -- show no significant differences between striking and non-striking periods. Patients appear to receive the same intensity of care during union work stoppages as during normal hospital operations. Thus, the poor outcomes associated with strikes suggest that they might reduce hospital productivity. These poor health outcomes increased for both emergency and non-emergency hospital patients, even as admissions of both groups decreased by about 28 percent at hospitals with strikes. The poor health outcomes were not apparent either before or after the strike in the striking hospitals, suggesting that they are attributable to the strike itself. And, the poor health outcomes do not appear to do be due to different types of patients being admitted during strike periods, because patients admitted during a strike are very similar to those admitted during other periods. Hiring replacement workers apparently does not help: hospitals that hired replacement workers **performed no better** during strikes than those that did not hire substitute employees. In each case, patients with conditions that required intensive nursing were more likely to fare worse in the presence of nurses' strikes.

#### Hospitals are the critical internal link for pandemic preparedness.

Al Thobaity 20, Abdullelah, and Farhan Alshammari. "Nurses on the frontline against the COVID-19 pandemic: an Integrative review." Dubai Medical Journal 3.3 (2020): 87-92. (Associate Professor of Nursing at Taif University)

The majority of infected or symptomatic people seek medical treatment in medical facilities, particularly hospitals, as a high number of cases, especially those in critical condition, will have an impact on hospitals [4]. The concept of hospital resilience in disaster situations is defined as the ability to recover from the damage caused by huge disturbances quickly [2]. The resilience of hospitals to pandemic cases depends on the preparedness of the institutions, and not all hospitals have the same resilience. A lower resilience will affect the **sustainability of the health services**. This also affects healthcare providers such as doctors, nurses, and allied health professionals [5, 6]. Despite the impact on healthcare providers, excellent management of a pandemic depends on the level of **preparedness of healthcare providers, including nurses**. This means that if it was impossible to be ready before a crisis or disaster, responsible people will do all but the impossible to save lives.

#### New Pandemics are deadlier and faster are coming – COVID is just the beginning

Antonelli 20 Ashley Fuoco Antonelli 5-15-2020 <https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2020/05/15/weekly-line> "Weekly line: Why deadly disease outbreaks could become more common—even after Covid-19" (Associate Editor — American Health Line)

While the new coronavirus pandemic suddenly took the world by storm, the truth is public health experts for years have warned that a virus similar to the new coronavirus would cause the next pandemic—and they say **deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common**. Infectious disease experts are always on the lookout for the next pandemic, and in a report published two years ago, researchers from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health **predicted that the pathogen most likely to cause the next pandemic would be a virus similar to the common cold**. Specifically, the researchers predicted that the pathogen at fault for the next pandemic would be: A microbe for which people have not yet **developed immunities**, meaning that a large portion of the human population would be susceptible to infection; Contagious during the so-called "incubation period"—the time when people are infected with a pathogen but are not yet showing symptoms of the infection or are showing only mild symptoms; and Resistant to any known prevention or treatment methods. The researchers also concluded that such a pathogen would have a "low but significant" fatality rate, meaning the pathogen wouldn't kill human hosts fast enough to inhibit its spread. As **Amesh Adalja**—a senior scholar at the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security, who led the report—told Live Science's Rachael Rettner at the time, "**It just has to make a lot of people sick" to disrupt society**. The researchers said RNA viruses—which include the common cold, influenza, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (or SARS, which is caused by a type of coronavirus)—fit that bill. And even though we had a good bit of experience dealing with common RNA viruses like the flu, Adalja at the time told Rettner that there were "a whole host of viral families that get very little attention when it comes to pandemic preparedness." Not even two years later, the new coronavirus, which causes Covid-19, emerged and quickly spread throughout the world, reaching pandemic status in just a few months. To date, officials have reported more than 4.4 million cases of Covid-19 and 302,160 deaths tied to the new coronavirus globally. In the United States, the number of reported Covid-19 cases has reached more than 1.4 million and the number of reported deaths tied to the new coronavirus has risen to nearly 86,000 in just over three months. Although public health experts had warned about the likelihood of a respiratory-borne RNA virus causing the next global pandemic, many say the world was largely unprepared to handle this type of infectious disease outbreak. And as concerning as that revelation may be on its own, **perhaps even more worrisome is that public health experts predict life-threatening infectious disease outbreaks are likely to become more common—meaning we could be susceptible to another pandemic in the future**. Why experts think deadly infectious disease outbreaks could become more common As the Los Angeles Times's Joshua Emerson Smith notes, infectious disease experts for more than ten years now have noted that "[o]utbreaks of dangerous new diseases with the potential to become pandemics have been on the rise—from HIV to swine flu to SARS to Ebola." For instance, a report published in Nature in 2008 found that **the number of emerging infectious disease events that occurred in the 1990s was more than three times higher than it was in the 1940s**. Many experts believe the recent increase in infectious disease outbreaks is tied to human behaviors that disrupt the environment, "such as **deforestation and poaching**," which have led "to increased contact between highly mobile, urbanized human populations and wild animals," Emerson Smith writes. In the 2008 report, for example, researchers noted that about 60% of 355 emerging infectious disease events that occurred over a 50-year period could be largely linked to wild animals, livestock, and, to a lesser extent, pets. Now, researchers believe the new coronavirus first jumped to humans from animals at a wildlife market in Wuhan, China. Along those same lines, some experts have argued that global climate change has driven an increase in infectious diseases—and could continue to do so. A federally mandated report released by the U.S. Global Change Research Program in 2018 warned that warmer temperatures could expand the geographic range covered by disease-carrying insects and pests, which could result in more Americans being exposed to ticks carrying Lyme disease and mosquitos carrying the dengue, West Nile, and Zika viruses. And experts now say continued warming in global temperatures, deforestation, and other environmentally disruptive behaviors have broadened that risk by bringing more people into contact with disease-carrying animals. Further, experts note that infectious diseases today are able to spread much faster and farther than they could decades ago because of increasing globalization and travel. While some have suggested the Covid-19 pandemic could stifle that trend, others argue globalization is likely to continue—meaning so could infectious diseases' far spread.

#### Future pandemics will cause extinction – it only takes one ‘super-spreader’ – US prevention is key

Bar-Yam 16 Yaneer Bar-Yam 7-3-2016 “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world” <http://necsi.edu/research/social/pandemics/transition> (Professor and President, New England Complex System Institute; PhD in Physics, MIT)

Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

# NGA

#### CP Text: All just governments should recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike except the United States federal government. The fifty states and all relevant sub-federal governments should inform the White House that state cooperation with federal initiatives will be contingent on the United States federal government recognizing the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The counterplan solves the aff by forcing the federal government to adopt the plan through the use of uncooperative federalism.

Gerken ’17 – Dean and professor at Yale Law School and one of the country’s leading experts on constitutional law and election law

Heather Gerken, “We’re About To See States’ Rights Used Defensively Against Trump,” Vox, January 20 2017, <https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2016/12/12/13915990/federalism-trump-progressive-uncooperative>

People assume that if Congress changes a law, everything changes on a dime. They forget that Congress depends heavily on states and localities to implement federal policy.

The federal government doesn’t have enough resources to deal with immigration, enforce its own drug laws, carry out its environmental policies, build its own infrastructure, or administer its health care system. Instead, it relies on the states to do much of this work. We call such arrangements between the states and federal government “cooperative federalism.” But we forget that they create many opportunities for what Jessica Bulman-Pozen and I have called “[uncooperative federalism](http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/symposia/gerken/330/10/).”

Progressives at the state and local level can influence policy simply by refusing to partner with the federal government. By doing so, they force issues onto the national agenda, foregrounding debates that the Republicans would rather avoid. More importantly, defeating state or local opposition costs fiscal resources and political capital the federal government would rather employ elsewhere.

The GOP-controlled federal government can’t put cops on every beat or bureaucrats at every desk; it needs state and local officials to get its agenda through. If blue states and cities refuse to implement Trump’s agenda, Republicans will sometimes be forced to compromise rather than pay a political and fiscal price.

Deploying federalism against the Patriot Act and education reform

Sometimes states engaged in uncooperative federalism simply refuse to participate in federal programs, or they do so begrudgingly. Some states have refused to carry out the [Patriot Act and federal immigration law](http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/symposia/gerken/330/10/). States didn’t just denounce the Patriot Act’s broad surveillance and detention rules as an attack on civil liberties. Blue and red states [instructed their own officials](https://www.cga.ct.gov/2005/rpt/2005-R-0858.htm) not to collect or share information with the federal government unless there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, or they forbade state officials to engage in activities inconsistent with the states’ constitutions.

Other states have repeatedly stymied federal education reform just by dragging their feet. States resisted the No Child Left Behind Act by manipulating testing standards and by slow-walking reforms. State recalcitrance was so great that eventually the Bush Administration threw in the towel and granted states so many waivers that the federal program was [basically gutted](http://law.slu.edu/sit).

Federal dependence on states is so pronounced in criminal law that the Vanderbilt law professor [Robert Mikos](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1356093) has suggested that states can effectively “nullify” federal marijuana law simply by withdrawing enforcement resources, as did Colorado and Washington. To be sure, Jeff Sessions, Trump’s choice for attorney general, can try to change the equation by selectively targeting a few businesses, but it will be an uphill climb.

Sometimes states take advantage of the gaps that are inevitable in any regulatory scheme to take a program in a direction Congress never anticipated. In the early 1990s, [Michigan and Wisconsin](http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/symposia/gerken/330/10/), led by their Republican governors, enacted the models for “Welfare to Work” inside the very federal welfare scheme they aimed to topple. Their successes eventually won over Bill Clinton to their cause and pushed Democrats on the Hill to junk the existing system and follow their model. National welfare reform was the still-controversial result.

States used their powers under the State Children’s Health Insurance program to provide coverage for adults. Back in 2006, Massachusetts used Medicaid funds to help enact “Romneycare,” which would become the model for Obamacare. And when states are pushed too hard, uncooperative federalism can even devolve into outright defiance (as in the case of the Patriot Act).

Uncooperative states and towns

[Uncooperative “localism”](http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3383&context=dlj) — resistance at the level of city or town — can be just as effective as uncooperative federalism. When cities refuse to assist homeland security or deportation efforts, there is relatively little the federal government can do. That’s presumably why the Trump administration is so panicked about [sanctuary cities](http://www.pri.org/stories/2016-11-15/sanctuary-cities-around-us-promise-defy-trumps-threats) that have promised not to implement his immigration policies. (“Sanctuary cities” is not a legal term, but it typically refers to municipalities that refuse to assist with certain types of deportation efforts — for instance, instructing their police not to ask about a person’s immigration status).

The Trump administration already threatened to [cut off all federal funding](https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf) to such cities. While the federal government can entice states to carry out federal policy by offering financial incentives, a decision [penned by Chief Justice Roberts](https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf) forbids the federal government from using conditional spending to coerce state officials. (The case involved the Obama administration’s attempt to force states to expand Medicaid as part of the Affordable Care Act, lest they lose all Medicaid funding.)

Even if President Trump spends enough political capital to win this or that battle against blue cities and states, he cannot win the war. The federal government doesn’t have the resources to carry out Trump’s policies. Spending political capital and legal resources to win the marijuana dispute, for instance, takes away resources from the immigration fight or battling California on climate change. Political scientists have long talked about the power of the [“street-level bureaucrat”](https://www.russellsage.org/publications/street-level-bureaucracy) to thwart the law the legislature enacts. But in today’s federalism, the power of the street-level bureaucrat is rarely confined to the street.

Federal dependence on states and localities thus creates an enormous incentive for moderation and compromise. Often the only way for a national program to succeed is to have a national consensus behind it. Just ask President Obama, who had to [compromise a great deal](https://hbr.org/2013/04/real-state-power-means-getting) to bring Obamacare to the red states, offering individual red states waivers and incentives to convince them to join. Trump may not have to cooperate with Democrats on the Hill, but he’s going to need the support of blue states and cities if he wants to get things done. A federal program that doesn’t touch California, New York, or Illinois won’t affect a large swath of the American economy. That should create a healthy incentive for moderation going forward.

#### Uncooperative federalism allows for effective climate change mitigation.

Galbraith ’17 - Jean Galbraith is a scholar of public international law and U.S. foreign relations law. She has published extensively on the separation of U.S. foreign affairs powers and on the design of international treaty regimes. She received her BA summa cum laude from Harvard University and her JD from Berkeley Law School, where she was the Editor-in-Chief of the California Law Review. After graduating law school, she clerked for Judge David S. Tatel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, for Justice John Paul Stevens of the Supreme Court of the United States, and for Judge Theodor Meron of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. She practiced as an associate at Hangley Aronchick Segal & Pudlin and continues to litigate appellate cases as the Co-Director of Penn Law’s Appellate Advocacy Clinic. In 2017 and again in 2020, she received the Harvey Levin Memorial Award for Teaching Excellence, which is awarded by vote of the graduating 3L class

Jean Galbraith, “Cooperative and Uncooperative Foreign Affairs Federalism,” Penn Law, June 10, 2017, <https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2772&context=faculty_scholarship>

Mitigating climate change is a challenge for all levels of government — international, national, state, and local. As Glennon and Sloane note, some states and cities have embraced climate change mitigation measures (pp. 62–63). In doing so, states have often coordinated with each other and with foreign counterparts in both practical and expressivist ways (pp. 62–63). California’s efforts are exceptionally notable. State legislation requires sweeping emissions reductions; California and Quebec have sought to integrate their cap-and-trade programs. and California has spearheaded a coalition of state and local governments around the world who have committed to climate policy. California even sent a large and high-profile delegation to the United Nations conference on climate change in Paris in 2015.

The issue of climate policy is a rebuttal to all three of the “myths” identified by Glennon and Sloane. It is self-evidently a matter of both domestic and foreign affairs; states and local governments are acting in this space; and some states and local governments are doing so in progressive ways. The actions of state and local governments in this space invite constitutional inquiry. Can California constitutionally regulate carbon emissions, enter into a highly formalized agreement with Quebec and softer agreements with other subnational governments, and send delegations to international negotiating conferences?

Yet focusing exclusively on these questions would lead to a highly incomplete sense of the legal scope of California’s power to act. For although Glennon and Sloane do not mention it, California is acting amidst a welter of federal laws, regulations, and other executive branch actions applicable to climate change. In 2007, in a lawsuit brought by liberal states against the EPA, the Supreme Court held that the federal Clean Air Act supplies to greenhouse gas emissions. This Act explicitly delegates authority to California to pursue stronger emissions measures for new motor vehicles than are undertaken at the federal level and in general involves states in the Act’s enforcement through cooperative federalism.

During the Obama Administration, state and local government efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions were not only congruent with the aims of the Clean Air Act (as interpreted to apply to greenhouse gases), but also with the goals of the executive branch. The EPA during the Obama Administration applauded and sought to facilitate state and local efforts. Its leading rule on climate change mitigation measures, known as the Clean Power Plan, explicitly gave states substantial autonomy in crafting their own approaches,73 although this rule is currently facing a court challenge brought by states that oppose federal efforts to reguate emissions. The Obama White House expressed approval of the transnational coalitions that California and other state and local governments have joined in seeking to address climate change.

All this positive reinforcement will presumably diminish or disappear under the Trump administration. The Trump Administration may even try to roll back climate change mitigation efforts by progressive states and cities, in addition to undermining or reversing Obama- era regulations and international commitments. If it does so, however, the legal questions that such efforts would raise probably have fairly little to do with the constitutional issues posed by traditional foreign affairs federalism. Instead, they would center on administrative law — around the interpretation of the Clean Air Act and the laws and norms that govern regulatory practice — as they had already come to do by the end of the George W. Bush Administration.

These four illustrations are far from unique. Sometimes state and local government activity in relation to foreign affairs occurs against a backdrop of federal inaction, as is the case with the incorporation of unratified human rights treaties into the municipal law of progressive cities. But interaction is far more common, sometimes cooperative and sometimes full of contestation. The executive branch approves of and provides some support for states and cities seeking to promote tourism or encourage exports abroad. The federal government collaborates with states in determining U.S. international negotiating positions with respect to insurance. In private international law, the federal government has shown strong interest in using state law rather than federal law to implement certain treaties. And all levels of government deal with security — both traditional and cyber — and inter- act with each other over it. To understand what is going on, we must focus on the political branches as much as (or even more than) the courts. And we must think not just in terms of constitutional law, but also in terms of international law, administrative law, and state law.

III. COOPERATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

IN THE CONTEXT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As foreign affairs federalism becomes increasingly interactive, how much will it resemble cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the domestic context? At the very least, scholarship on cooperative and uncooperative federalism as a domestic matter, especially work focused on the political branches, provides a valuable starting point for under- standing foreign affairs federalism today. This scholarship offers in- sights into how the federal government can incentivize state and local governments to help advance federal interests, how these state and local governments can in turn influence and resist federal policy, and how Congress and the executive branch can each use state and local action to build power at the expense of the other branch. These broad themes manifest themselves in the foreign affairs context as well. Yet the foreign affairs context brings some additional complexities because of its ties to international law and global governance and because it comes with stronger presidential powers. This leads to certain differences between cooperative and uncooperative federalism in the realm of foreign affairs, in terms of both how practice proceeds and of what doctrine should be.

A. Structural Implications

The interactions between the federal government and state and lo cal governments in relation to foreign affairs mean that federal policy shapes state and local policy. By providing assistance, financial and otherwise, to the sister-cities program, the federal government makes it easier for cities to participate. By signaling its support for state “Buy American” laws, Congress encourages them — and the Department of Transportation incentivizes them even further by refusing to partici- pate in contracts governed by state “Buy American” laws that are less strict than the federal ones. In the context of immigration and climate change, the federal government incentivizes (and sometimes comes close to forcing) state and local action in support of federal policy. All of these examples in the foreign affairs context reflect an “increasing concentration of power at Washington in the instigation and supervision of local policies, just as cooperative federalism arrangements do in the domestic context.

In work focused on the domestic context, Heather Gerken shows that the interactive nature of modern federalism also provides state and local governments with ways to influence federal policy. State and local actors exercise “the power . . . of the servant,” which offers the chance “not just to complain about national policy, but to help set it. In shaping federal policy, these actors are not simply employing the traditional tools of process federalism; rather, it is their role in adminis tering federal policy that gives them a say in the shape that this implementation will take. Yet the scope of this role also limits what they can do: “power dynamics are fluid; minority rule is contingent, limited, and subject to reversal by the national majority. In related work, Gerken and Jessica Bulman-Pozen elaborate on the ways in which state and local governments can engage in “uncooperative federalism,” including by resisting federal policies that they are charged with enforcing.

Building on the core insight that state and local governments can help shape federal policy through their roles in implementing federal law, Bulman-Pozen further shows that these interactions can affect the distribution of power between Congress and the executive branch. In a pair of articles, she describes the ways in which state and local activities can strengthen the powers of one branch against the other. The more that Congress invites or effectively requires state and local participation in the administration of a federal statutory regime, the more these actors can serve as checks on the executive branch’s power to implement this regime. On the flip side, such shared roles in implementing previously enacted statutory schemes can empower the executive branch and subnational executive actors to work together in ways that crowd out the current Congress.

Similar dynamics can occur with respect to foreign affairs federal- ism. Indeed, some of the examples that Gerken and Bulman-Pozen focus on are issues that have transnational implications. to climate, for example, they show how states have used the power of the servant to try to shape federal policy, including efforts by conserva-tive states to push back against the federal regulatory scheme and by progressive states to make it stronger. Bulman-Pozen also uses climate as an example of how “federal and state executives negotiate without Congress once a broad statutory scheme is in place. Some payoffs for the foreign affairs context here are simply derivative: the more that state and local governments enhance or reduce federal efforts to mitigate climate change, then the more or less the United States does with respect to addressing this global problem. But other implications relate specifically to how the United States engages inter- nationally. Continuing with the climate context, the extent to which President Obama could make commitments on behalf of the United States during the negotiations for the 2015 Paris Agreement was largely limited by the scope of the Clean Air Act, since he had no realistic chance of getting new congressional legislation that would advance his since he had no realistic chance of getting new congressional legislation that would advance his goals with respect to climate. But since California and other progressive state and local actors were doing more than what the Clean Air Act required, President Obama could take this into account in set- ting the target to which the United States was committing with respect to climate change mitigation. President Obama’s option set was thus enhanced by state and local action in the climate context.

#### Climate change causes extinction.

Weston ’21 – Biodiversity writer for The Guardian

Phoebe Weston, “Top Scientists Warn Of Ghastly Future Of Mass Extinction And Climate Disruption,’ The Guardian, January 13, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/13/top-scientists-warn-of-ghastly-future-of-mass-extinction-and-climate-disruption-aoe>

The planet is facing a “ghastly future of mass extinction, declining health and climate-disruption upheavals” that threaten human survival because of ignorance and inaction, according to an international group of scientists, who warn people still haven’t grasped the urgency of the biodiversity and climate crises.

The 17 experts, including Prof Paul Ehrlich from Stanford University, author of The Population Bomb, and scientists from Mexico, Australia and the US, say the planet is in a much worse state than most people – even scientists – understood.

“The scale of the threats to the biosphere and all its lifeforms – including humanity – is in fact so great that it is difficult to grasp for even well-informed experts,” they write in a report in[Frontiers in Conservation Science](https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fcosc.2020.615419/abstract)which references more than 150 studies detailing the world’s major environmental challenges.

The delay between destruction of the natural world and the impacts of these actions means people do not recognise how vast the problem is, the paper argues. “[The] mainstream is having difficulty grasping the magnitude of this loss, despite the steady erosion of the fabric of human civilisation.”

The report warns that climate-induced mass migrations, more pandemics and conflicts over resources will be inevitable unless urgent action is taken.

Dealing with the enormity of the problem requires far-reaching changes to global capitalism, education and equality, the paper says. These include abolishing the idea of perpetual economic growth, properly pricing environmental externalities, stopping the use of fossil fuels, reining in corporate lobbying, and empowering women, the researchers argue.

The report comes months after the world [failed to meet](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/sep/15/every-global-target-to-stem-destruction-of-nature-by-2020-missed-un-report-aoe) a single UN Aichi biodiversity target, created to stem the destruction of the natural world, the [second consecutive time](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/apr/29/international-failure-biodiversity-decline) governments have failed to meet their 10-year biodiversity goals. This week a coalition of more than 50 countries [pledged](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/jan/11/50-countries-commit-to-protection-of-30-of-earths-land-and-oceans) to protect almost a third of the planet by 2030.

An estimated one million species are at risk of extinction, many within decades, according to a recent [UN report](https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2019/05/nature-decline-unprecedented-report/#:~:text=The%20Report%20finds%20that%20around,20%25%2C%20mostly%20since%201900).

“Environmental deterioration is infinitely more threatening to civilisation than Trumpism or Covid-19,” Ehrlich told the Guardian.

In The Population Bomb, published in 1968, Ehrlich warned of imminent population explosion and hundreds of millions of people starving to death. Although he has acknowledged some timings were wrong, [he has said he stands by](https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/mar/22/collapse-civilisation-near-certain-decades-population-bomb-paul-ehrlich) its fundamental message that population growth and high levels of consumption by wealthy nations is driving destruction.

He told the Guardian: “Growthmania is the fatal disease of civilisation - it must be replaced by campaigns that make equity and well-being society’s goals - not consuming more junk.”

Large populations and their continued growth drive soil degradation and biodiversity loss, the new paper warns. “More people means that more synthetic compounds and dangerous throwaway plastics are manufactured, many of which add to the growing toxification of the Earth. It also increases the chances of pandemics that fuel ever-more desperate hunts for scarce resources.”

# Cap K

#### The telos of the 1ac’s politics is the strike – that naturalizes capital’s control and is parasitic on political organizing. Strikes are an ineffective vehicle for changing the system, and only redistribute the capitalist system.

Eidlin 20 Barry Eidlin (assistant professor of sociology at McGill University and the author of Labor and the Class Idea in the United States and Canada), 1-6-2020, “Why Unions Are Good – But Not Good Enough,” Jacobin, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/01/marxism-trade-unions-socialism-revolutionary-organizing

Labor unions have long occupied a paradoxical position within Marxist theory. They are an essential expression of the working class taking shape as a collective actor and an essential vehicle for working-class action. When we speak of “the working class” or “working-class activity,” we are often analyzing the actions of workers either organized into unions or trying to organize themselves into unions. At the same time, unions are an imperfect and incomplete vehicle for the working class to achieve one of Marxist theory’s central goals: overthrowing capitalism. Unions by their very existence affirm and reinforce capitalist class society. As organizations which primarily negotiate wages, benefits, and working conditions with employers, unions only exist in relation to capitalists. This makes them almost by definition reformist institutions, designed to mitigate and manage the employment relationship, not transform it. Many unions have adapted to this conservative, managerial role. Others have played key roles in challenging capital’s power. Some have even played insurgent roles at one moment and managerial roles at others. When unions have organized workplace insurgencies, this has sometimes translated into political pressure that expanded democracy and led to large-scale policy reforms. In the few revolutionary historical moments that we can identify, worker organization, whether called unions or something else, has been essential. Thus, labor unions and movements have long been a central focus of Marxist debate. At its core, the debate centers around the role of unions in class formation, the creation of the revolutionary working-class agent. The debate focuses on four key questions. First, to what degree do unions simply reflect existing relations of production and class struggle, or actively shape those relations? Second, if unions actively shape class struggle, why and under what conditions do they enhance or inhibit it? Third, how do unions shape class identities, and how does this affect unions’ scope of action? Fourth, what is the relation between unions and politics? This question is comprised of two sub-questions: to what degree do unions help or hinder struggles in the workplace becoming broader political struggles? And how should unions relate to political parties, the more conventional vehicle for advancing political demands? The following is a chapter from [The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx](https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780190695545) (Oxford University Press, 2019). It assesses Marxist debates surrounding trade unions, oriented by the four questions mentioned previously. It proceeds historically, first examining how Marx and Engels conceived of the roles and limitations of trade unions, then tracing how others within Marxism have pursued these debates as class relations and politics have changed over time. While the chapter includes some history of labor unions and movements themselves, the central focus is on how Marxist theorists thought of and related to those movements. Marx and Engels wrote extensively about the unions of their time, although never systematically. The majority of their writings on unions responded to concrete labor struggles of their time. From their earliest works, they grasped unions’ necessity and limitations in creating a working-class agent capable of advancing class struggle against the bourgeoisie. This [departed](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/wusa.12021) from previous variants of socialism, often based in idealized views of rebuilding a rapidly eroding community of artisanal producers, which did not emphasize class organization or class struggle. Writing in The Condition of the Working Class in England about emerging forms of unionism, Engels observed that even though workers’ primary struggles were over material issues such as wages, they pointed to a deeper social and political conflict: What gives these Unions and the strikes arising from them their real importance is this, that they are the first attempt of the workers to abolish competition. They im­ ply the recognition of the fact that the supremacy of the bourgeoisie is based wholly upon the competition of the workers among themselves; i.e., upon their want of cohesion. And precisely because the Unions direct themselves against the vital nerve of the present social order, however one-sidedly, in however narrow a way, are they so dangerous to this social order. At the same time, Engels saw that, even as union struggles “[kept alive] the opposition of the workers to the … omnipotence of the bourgeoisie,” so too did they “[compel] the admission that something more is needed than Trades Unions and strikes to break the power of the ruling class.” Here Engels articulates the crux of the problem. First, unions are essential for working-class formation, creating a collective actor both opposed to the bourgeoisie and capable of challenging it for power. Second, they are an insufficient vehicle for creating and mobilizing that collective actor. Marx and Engels understood that unions are essential to working-class formation because, under capitalism, the system of “free labor,” where individual workers sell their labor power to an employer for a wage, fragments relations between workers and makes them compete with each other. As described in the Communist Manifesto, the bourgeoisie “has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment,’” leaving workers “exposed to all the vicissitudes of competition, to all the fluctuations of the market.” While workers organized based on other collective identities, such as race, ethnicity, or religion, only unions could unite them as workers against the source of their exploitation — the bourgeoisie. Unions serve “as organized agencies for superseding the very system of wage labor and capital rule.” But just as unions could allow the proletariat to take shape and challenge the bourgeoisie for power, Marx and Engels also saw that they were a partial, imperfect vehicle for doing so for two reasons. First, unions’ fundamentally defensive role, protecting workers against employers’ efforts to drive a competitive race to the bottom, meant that they [limited themselves](https://www.amazon.com/Wage-Labour-Capital-Value-Price-Profit/dp/0717804704) “to a guerrilla war against the effects of the existing system, instead of simultaneously trying to change it.” Thus, even militant trade unions found themselves struggling for “a fair day’s work for a fair day’s wage” without challenging the bourgeoisie’s fundamental power, particularly the wage labor system. And some layers of the trade union officialdom were content to fight for privileges for their small segment of the working class, leaving most workers behind. Second, unions’ focus on wages and workplace issues tended to reinforce a division between economic and political struggles. This division was explicit with the more conservative “old” unions in Britain, which “bar[red] all political action on principle and in their charters.” But even with more progressive formations, such as the early nineteenth century’s Chartists, or the late nineteenth century’s “new” unions, Marx and Engels saw that the transition from workplace struggles to politics was not automatic. For one, it varied across national contexts. Engels observed that French workers were much more likely to mobilize politically, while English workers “fight, not against the Government, but directly against the bourgeoisie.” But beyond national variation, they saw a recurring pattern of division, separating economic and political struggles by organization. Reflecting on the early to mid-nineteenth century English working-class movement, Engels noted a threefold divide between “socially-based” Chartists, “politically-based” Socialists, and conservative, craft-based trade unions. While the Chartists were “purely a working-men’s [sic] cause freed from all bourgeois elements,” they remained “theoretically the more backward, the less developed.” Socialists may have been more theoretically sophisticated, but their bourgeois origins made it difficult to “amalgamate completely with the working class.” Although young Engels thought an alliance of Chartism and socialism was underway, the alliance proved elusive. By the 1870s, Marx opined that politically, the English working class was “nothing more than the tail of the great Liberal Party, i.e., henchmen of the capitalists.” Likewise, Engels had soured on the English working class. Both saw promise in the militant worker protest in the United States at the time, seeing the seeds of a nascent labor party. But that too fell short. Thus, unions failed in Marx and Engels’s central task: the formation of “a political organization of the working class as a whole.”

#### Capitalism results in environmental destruction, mass violence, surveillance, war, and fascism—culminates in extinction.

Robinson ’14 – Professor of sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, researches political economy, globalization, and historical materialism

William I. Robinson, “Global Capitalism: Crisis of Humanity and the Specter of 21st Century Fascism,” June 2014, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.739.2380&rep=rep1&type=pdf

1. The system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. Global capitalism now couples human and natural history in such a way as to threaten to bring about what would be the sixth mass extinction in the known history of life on earth.3 This mass extinction would be caused not by a natural catastrophe such as a meteor impact or by evolutionary changes such as the end of an ice age but by purposive human activity. According to leading environmental scientists there are nine “planetary boundaries” crucial to maintaining an earth system environment in which humans can exist, four of which are experiencing at this time the onset of irreversible environmental degradation and three of which (climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and biodiversity loss) are at “tipping points,” meaning that these processes have already crossed their planetary boundaries.

2. The magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as is the concentration of the means of global communication and symbolic production and circulation in the hands of a very few powerful groups. Computerised wars, drones, bunker-buster bombs, star wars, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare. Warfare has become normalised and sanitised for those not directly at the receiving end of armed aggression. At the same time we have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication, images and symbolic production. The world of Edward Snowden is the world of George Orwell; 1984 has arrived;

3. Capitalism is reaching apparent limits to its extensive expansion. There are no longer any new territories of significance that can be integrated into world capitalism, deruralisation is now well advanced, and the commodification of the countryside and of pre- and non-capitalist spaces has intensified, that is, converted in hot-house fashion into spaces of capital, so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. Capitalism must continually expand or collapse. How or where will it now expand?

4. There is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums,”4 alienated from the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction - to a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. This includes prison- industrial and immigrant-detention complexes, omnipresent policing, militarised gentrification, and so on;

5. There is a disjuncture between a globalising economy and a nation-state based system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to play the role of what social scientists refer to as a “hegemon,” or a leading nation-state that has enough power and authority to organise and stabilise the system. The spread of weapons of mass destruction and the unprecedented militarisation of social life and conflict across the globe makes it hard to imagine that the system can come under any stable political authority that assures its reproduction.

Global Police State

How have social and political forces worldwide responded to crisis? The crisis has resulted in a rapid political polarisation in global society. Both right and left-wing forces are ascendant. Three responses seem to be in dispute.

One is what we could call “reformism from above.” This elite reformism is aimed at stabilising the system, at saving the system from itself and from more radical responses from below. Nonetheless, in the years following the 2008 collapse of the global financial system it seems these reformers are unable (or unwilling) to prevail over the power of transnational financial capital. A second response is popular, grassroots and leftist resistance from below. As social and political conflict escalates around the world there appears to be a mounting global revolt. While such resistance appears insurgent in the wake of 2008 it is spread very unevenly across countries and regions and facing many problems and challenges.

Yet another response is that I term 21st century fascism.5 The ultra-right is an insurgent force in many countries. In broad strokes, this project seeks to fuse reactionary political power with transnational capital and to organise a mass base among historically privileged sectors of the global working class – such as white workers in the North and middle layers in the South – that are now experiencing heightened insecurity and the specter of downward mobility. It involves militarism, extreme masculinisation, homophobia, racism and racist mobilisations, including the search for scapegoats, such as immigrant workers and, in the West, Muslims. Twenty-first century fascism evokes mystifying ideologies, often involving race/culture supremacy and xenophobia, embracing an idealised and mythical past. Neo-fascist culture normalises and glamorises warfare and social violence, indeed, generates a fascination with domination that is portrayed even as heroic.

The need for dominant groups around the world to secure widespread, organised mass social control of the world’s surplus population and rebellious forces from below gives a powerful impulse to projects of 21st century fascism. Simply put, the immense structural inequalities of the global political economy cannot easily be contained through consensual mechanisms of social control. We have been witnessing transitions from social welfare to social control states around the world. We have entered a period of great upheavals, momentous changes and uncertainties. The only viable solution to the crisis of global capitalism is a massive redistribution of wealth and power downward towards the poor majority of humanity along the lines of a 21st century democratic social- ism, in which humanity is no longer at war with itself and with nature.

#### The alternative is to build a dual power strategy—forming institutions that help meet the needs of those in a capitalist crisis and demonstrating the possibility of revolutionary projects that can destroy capitalism.

Escalante ’19 – Marxist, feminist, and anti-imperialist activist

Alyson Escalante, “Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach,” March 26, 2019, <https://regenerationmag.org/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/>

Much has been written over the last few years about a dual power approach to communist strategy. I have written extensively about it[at The Forge News](https://theforgenews.org/2018/08/24/against-electoralism-for-dual-power/), and discussed in video format in my YouTube video,[Climate Change, Imperialism, and The End of The World](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLzZ-H4tpBM). I will not be using this article to give a comprehensive recap on what dual power strategy is, so I suggest checking out those two links. In short: dual power strategy is an approach to communist revolution which seeks to build independent socialist institutions which exist in parallel to the currently existing capitalist state, in order to serve the masses. The goal of a dual power strategy is not to compete with capitalism or reform it out of existence, but rather to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, to recognize and politicize capitalist crisis as it occurs, and to have a real infrastructure in place for a revolutionary movement to self-sustain at the point that it must inevitably combat the capitalist state. This strategy focuses on building counter-institutions like tenants’ unions, agricultural cooperatives, radical labor unions, and Serve the People programs that not only demonstrate on-the-ground worker power but can provide for the needs of the masses without an appeal to reforming the currently existing capitalist state.

I previously argued that a crucial advantage to dual power strategy is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis. Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of literally saving lives in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks to destroy rather than reform capitalism.

One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The[Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts](https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report) that we have twelve years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are inevitable, and we are now in a post-brink world, where damage control is the primary concern. The question is not whether we can escape a future of climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly.

In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market-based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and the left-wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends.

The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure,[National Geographic reports](https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2014/11/141111-solar-panel-manufacturing-sustainability-ranking/) that “Fabricating [solar] panels requires caustic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and the process uses water as well as electricity, the production of which emits greenhouse gases.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure only perpetuates environmental harm. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis.

The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the US can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant militarism from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates constant warfare as imperial states compete for spheres of influence in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the US. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the US military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change.

Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever-shrinking twelve-year time frame.

There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. The pressing question we now face is: how are we going to save ourselves?

Revolution and Dual Power

If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America-backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well-funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the US, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within twelve years.

While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the meantime? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the US today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a harsh truth, but it is true.

Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, we will accomplish nothing in the next twelve years. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these twelve years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development.

Dual power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through tenants organizing and serve the people programs. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop mutual aid programs that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society.

To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

# Framing

#### Default to a utilitarianist framework.

Cummisky 96 (David, professor of philosophy at Bates, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 131)

Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill's example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.8

#### Prioritize preventing extinction.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

#### Even unlikely threats spiral into extinction---lots of cascading effects.

--AT Ks of Predictions

--good warming real + defensible/cascading effects

Guy 20 - PhD Candidate and Lecturer in International Relations, University of Oxford

Kate Guy, “Coronavirus Shows We Are Not At All Prepared From the Security Threats of Climate Change”, The Conversation, 4-15-20, https://theconversation.com/coronavirus-shows-we-are-not-at-all-prepared-for-the-security-threat-of-climate-change-136029

How might a single threat, even one deemed unlikely, spiral into an evolving global crisis which challenges the foundations of global security, economic stability and democratic governance, all in the matter of a few weeks?

My research on threats to national security, governance and geopolitics has focused on exactly this question, albeit with a focus on the disruptive potential of climate change, rather than a novel coronavirus. In recent work alongside intelligence and defence experts at the think-tank Center for Climate and Security, I analysed how future warming scenarios could disrupt security and governance worldwide throughout the 21st century. Our culminating report, [A Security Threat Assessment of Global Climate Change](https://climateandsecurity.org/a-security-threat-assessment-of-global-climate-change/), was launched in Washington just as the first coronavirus cases were spreading undetected across the US.

The analysis uses future scenarios to imagine how and where regions might be increasingly vulnerable to the resource, weather and economic shocks brought about by an increasingly destabilised climate. In it, we warn:

Little did we know when writing these words and imagining the rapidly evolving shocks to come, that a very similar test of our global system was already brewing as governments sputtered to contain the damage of COVID-19.

Over the first few crucial weeks of this crisis, we’ve seen world leaders take a number of actions that indicate how climate shocks could destabilise the world order. With climate change disasters, as with infectious diseases, rapid response time and global coordination are of the essence. At this stage in the COVID-19 situation, there are three primary lessons for a climate-changing future: the immense challenge of global coordination during a crisis, the potential for authoritarian emergency responses, and the spiralling danger of compounding shocks.

An uncoordinated response

First, while the COVID-19 crisis has engendered a massive public response, governments have been largely uncoordinated in their efforts to manage the virus’s spread. According to Oxford’s [COVID-19 Government Response Tracker](https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/oxford-covid-19-government-response-tracker), countries vary widely in the stringency of their policies, with no two countries implementing a synchronised course of action.

While traditionally a great power like the US might step forward to direct a collective international response, instead the Trump administration has repeatedly chosen to blindside its allies with the introduction of new limitations on trade and movement of peoples. This mismanagement has led to each nation going on its own, despite the fact that working together would net greater gains for all. As the [New York Times’s Mark Landler](https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/world/europe/coronavirus-leadership-trump.html) put it, the voices of world leaders are forming “less a choir than a cacophony”, leading to mixed global messages, undetected spread, and ongoing fights over limited resources.

In the face of climate change, such a lack of coordination could be highly destabilising to world social and economic order. The mass displacement of people, the devaluation of assets, rising seas and natural disasters will call for shared practices and common decency in the face of continued tragedy. Many climate impacts will raise new questions the world has yet to answer. What do we do with nation-states that can [no longer reside in their homeland](https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2019/may/16/one-day-disappear-tuvalu-sinking-islands-rising-seas-climate-change)? How do we compensate sectors for ceasing harmful practices such as fossil fuel extraction and deforestation, especially where national economies may depend on them?

We also face new global governance questions around the use of risky geoengineering technologies, which can be deployed unilaterally to alter local climates, but with the potential for vast unintended regional or even global consequences. These are challenges which, like climate change itself, can only be solved collectively through [coordinated policies and clear communication](https://theconversation.com/why-you-need-to-get-involved-in-the-geoengineering-debate-now-85619). The sort of wayward responses and lack of leadership in response to COVID-19 would only lead to further destruction of livelihoods and order in the decades to come.

Authoritarian agendas

This historic moment is also offering new opportunities for leaders to further dangerous, illiberal agendas. Authoritarians have long used emergency situations as a pretext to further curtail individual rights and consolidate personal power against backdrops of real or imagined public danger. We’ve seen these actions spiral worldwide in the past month in autocracies and backsliding democracies, alike.

President Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines has given security services the directive to [open fire on protestors](https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/dead-duterte-warns-violating-lockdown-200401164531160.html) while Vladimir Putin is deploying mass surveillance technologies and new criminal penalties to [monitor the Russian population](https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/01/825329399/moscow-launches-new-surveillance-app-to-track-residents-in-coronavirus-lockdown?t=1585910941227). Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán has forced new emergency powers through parliament that muzzle political opposition and [allow for his indefinite rule](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/04/europe-hungary-viktor-orban-coronavirus-covid19-democracy/609313/). Even the supposed democratic bastions of the US and the UK are seeing worrying signs of autocratic policies, as surveillance drones are deployed to monitor citizens, scientific expertise is undermined, and open-ended [emergency powers](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/19/coronavirus-suspects-may-be-detained-under-uk-emergency-powers) are granted to police forces for undetermined time frames.

A warming world will only result in more disaster-related events for power-hungry leaders to take advantage of in the years ahead. From the nationalisation of resources to the deployment of militaries in response to climate shocks, it can be all-too-easy for public safety needs to bleed into personal political opportunities. The second-order effects of climate change, from supply chain instability to the migration of peoples, will also provide authoritarian leaders more fodder for their ethno-nationalist ideologies, which inflame divisions in society and could help broaden their personal appeal. Without clear and sturdy limits on executive power, the disruptive impacts of climate change will be used to further chip away at democratic freedoms across the world.

Overlapping shocks are the new normal

Finally, this situation is teaching the globalised world new lessons on the devastating consequences of compounding shocks. Managing a deadly global pandemic is bad enough, even before you layer on the massive unemployment, trade disruptions and economic shutdown that its mitigation sets in motion.

The months ahead will bring about additional crises – some related to the pandemic, like a massive uptick in public debt used to bail out national economies. But other near-term shocks may themselves be climate change-induced, from new forecasts for [large-scale floods this spring](https://www.freightwaves.com/news/noaa-predicts-widespread-us-river-flooding-this-spring) in the central US, to a prospective repeat of [2019’s severe summer heat waves](https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2019/08/22/europe-see-third-major-heat-wave-this-year-temperatures-soar-france-scandinavia/) across Europe.

These disasters have the potential to strike just at the time when people are being advised to shelter inside, many in at-risk areas and without adequate indoor cooling. Overlapping, historic shocks like this are becoming the new normal in our climate-changed era. As public disaster response budgets spiral and loss of life mounts each year, governments will continue to struggle to contain their compounding damage.

Scientists and security professionals alike have long warned about the devastating potential of climate change, alluding to how it might rattle our global governance systems to breaking point. But few could have expected that the fissures in our institutions would be revealed so soon, let alone on such a disturbingly large scale.

We can treat the current global crisis as a sort of “stress test” on these institutions, exposing their vulnerabilities but also providing the urgent impetus to build new resilience. In that light, we could successfully rebound from this moment with more solid global security and cooperation than we knew going into it. Decision-makers should take a hard look at their current responses, problem-solving methods, and institutional design with future climate forecasts like our [Threat Assessment](https://climateandsecurity.org/a-security-threat-assessment-of-global-climate-change/) in mind.

We know that even steeper and more frequent global shocks are in store, particularly without serious climate change mitigation efforts. What we don’t yet know is whether we’ll repeat current patterns of mismanagement and abuse, or if we’ll chart a more proactive and resilient course through the risks that lie ahead.

# Case

#### Strikes hurt everybody including innocent people not at the company

McElroy 19 John McElroy 10-25-2019 "Strikes Hurt Everybody" <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody> <https://www.wardsauto.com/ideaxchange/strikes-hurt-everybody> (MPA at McCombs school of Business)

But **strikes don’t just hurt the people walking the picket lines or the company they’re striking against.** They **hurt suppliers, car dealers and the communities** located near the plants. The Anderson Economic Group estimates that 75,000 workers at supplier companies were temporarily laid off because of the GM strike. Unlike UAW picketers, those supplier workers won’t **get any strike pay** or an $11,000 contract **signing bonus**. No, most of them lost close to a month’s worth of wages, which must be financially devastating for them. GM’s suppliers also lost a lot of money. So now they’re cutting budgets and delaying capital investments to make up for the lost revenue, which is a further drag on the economy. According to CAR, the communities and states where GM’s plants are located collectively lost a couple of hundred million dollars in payroll and tax revenue. Some economists warn that if the strike were prolonged it could knock the state of Michigan – home to GM and the UAW – **into a recession.** That prompted the governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, to call GM CEO Mary Barra and UAW leaders and urge them to settle as fast as possible. So, while the UAW managed to get a nice raise for its members, the strike **left a path of destruction** in its wake. That’s not fair to the innocent bystanders who will never regain what they lost.

#### By hurting the business, strikes also hurt the workers

Mlungisi Tenzam LLB LLM LLD Senior Lecturer, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2020, The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa, http://www.scielo.org.za/scielo.php?script=sci\_arttext&pid=S1682-58532020000300004

The relationship between the business of the employer and its customers is based on loyalty and confidence. The employer is expected to keep this relationship going by supplying goods or deliver services to clients when needed. It is expected that this would take place without disturbance. However, during strikes or conduct in furtherance of a strike, this relationship gets affected since the level of production or service delivery is reduced or does not take place.

It is well known that the continued existence of a business relies on customers' satisfaction with services or goods provided. A business that does not have customers can hardly survive as they are the backbone of the business. If a strike is violent and takes long to resolve, this may chase away customers or clients as the possibility of not getting what they want is high if less or no production takes place. The possibility that customers could shift loyalty to other businesses doing the same business as the employer is high. The end result is that a prolonged strike has the potential of chasing away customers or clients as they may not want to associate themselves with a business environment that poses a risk to their lives. In addition, customers may want to share solidarity with employees and refuse to associate with a business whose employees are on strike. To stop this from taking place, the employer and the union need to speed up the process of resolving their dispute through a non-violent mechanism such as a collective bargaining process.