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#### The 1ACs opposition to the excesses of modernity through the refusal of academic modes positions the aff as a critical savoir of the negligent other in whose name they speak. This is the professionalism of the academy par excellence, where negligence is appropriated and weaponized in favor of an auto-encylopedic mode of recognizing the litany of abuses – this is the worst form of counter insurgency and the most subtle and damning mode of incorporation and turns the aff which means alternative ethical theory is possible but not here answers 1nc push

The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Stefano Harney & Fred Moten Released by Minor Compositions 2013 Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson Pg 30-34 – Strikes for language

THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION. But surely if one can write something on the surface of the university, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a conference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the nation of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint? The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organization, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism. Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the Undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its foundation, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, without admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercommons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and professionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste. But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ~~ignorant,~~ unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which critical education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negligence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion. A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write of or write up the undercommons. The Universitas is always a state/State strategy. Perhaps it’s surprising to say professionalization – that which reproduces the professions – is a state strategy. Certainly, critical academic professionals tend to be regarded today as harmless intellectuals, malleable, perhaps capable of some modest intervention in the so-called public sphere. But to see how this underestimates the presence of the state we can turn to a bad reading of Derrida’s consideration of Hegel’s 1822 report to the Prussian Minister of Education. Derrida notices the way that Hegel rivals the state in his ambition for education, wanting to put into place a progressive pedagogy of philosophy designed to support Hegel’s worldview, to unfold as encyclopedic. This ambition both mirrors the state’s ambition, because it, too, wants to control education and to impose a worldview, and threatens it, because Hegel’s State exceeds and thus localizes the Prussian state, exposing its pretense to the encyclopedic. Derrida draws the following lesson from his reading: the Universitas, as he generalizes the university (but specifies it, too, as properly intellectual and not professional), always has the impulse of State, or enlightenment, and the impulse of state, or its specific conditions of production and reproduction. Both have the ambition to be, as Derrida says, onto- and auto-encyclopedic. It follows that to be either for the Universitas or against it presents problems. To be for the Universitas is to support this onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the State as enlightenment, or enlightenment as totality, to use an old-fashioned word. To be too much against the Universitas, however, creates the danger of specific elements in the state taking steps to rid itself of the contradiction of the onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the Universitas and replacing it with some other form of social reproduction, the anti-enlightenment – the position, for instance, of New Labour in Britain and of the states of New York and California with their “teaching institutions.” But a bad reading of Derrida will also yield our question again: what is lost in this undecidability? What is the price of refusing to be either for the Universitas or for professionalization, to be critical of both, and who pays that price? Who makes it possible to reach the aporia of this reading? Who works in the premature excess of totality, in the not not-ready of negligence? The mode of professionalization that is the American university is precisely dedicated to promoting this consensual choice: an antifoundational critique of the University or a foundational critique of the university. Taken as choices, or hedged as bets, one tempered with the other, they are nonetheless always negligent. Professionalization is built on this choice. It rolls out into ethics and efficiency, responsibility and science, and numerous other choices, all built upon the theft, the conquest, the negligence of the outcast mass intellectuality of the undercommons. It is therefore unwise to think of professionalization as a narrowing and better to think of it as a circling, an encircling of war wagons around the last camp of indigenous women and children. Think about the way the American doctor or lawyer regard themselves as educated, enclosed in the circle of the state’s encyclopedia, though they may know nothing of philosophy or history. What would be outside this act of the conquest circle, what kind of ghostly labored world escapes in the circling act, an act like a kind of broken phenomenology where the brackets never come back of and what is experienced as knowledge is the absolute horizon of knowledge whose name is banned by the banishment of the absolute. It is simply a horizon that does not bother to make itself possible. No wonder that whatever their origins or possibilities, it is theories of pragmatism in the United States and critical realism in Britain that command the loyalty of critical intellectuals. Never having to confront the foundation, never having to confront antifoundation out of faith in the unconfrontable foundation, critical intellectuals can float in the middle range. These loyalties banish dialectics with its inconvenient interest in pushing the material and abstract, the table and its brain, as far as it can, unprofessional behavior at its most obvious.

#### Their investment into philosophical discussion about our relationship towards otherness is a tool of speed-elitism. Not complete abandonment but rather the move for more transparent discussions about ethics mystifies the reliance on highly exlcusive and unethical technologies of travel and communication which solves the 6 point on the k. By figuring those technics as the metrics for liberatory theology, that expands Debate’s state of exploitation.

**Hoofd 10**(Ingrid M. Hoofd is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, "The Accelerated University: Activist-Academic Alliances and the Simulation of Thought." Ephemera: Theory and politics in organisation, Vol. 10, No.1 (September 2010), http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought) //KB+TR Collab

Cries announcing the **demise** of the university abound, in particular in Europe and North America. Those who utter these cries often do this in an admirable attempt to **renew** the original mandate of the university, namely the fostering of **truth**, **justice** and **democratic debate**. Giving up on the now largely neoliberal and managerial university system that plagues Europe and the United States, some such critics try to mobilise a renewal of this mandate **outside academia’s institutional walls** with people and groups who represent an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Much of this mobilisation is in turn done through technologies and discourses of mobility and tele-communication. Examples here are the European anti-Bologna ‘new university’ projects like Edu-Factory, the various autonomous virtual universities, and the intellectual collaboration with local and international activists and non-Western academics. I am referring here in particular to the promising formation of various extra-academic ‘activist-research’ networks and conferences over the last years, like Facoltà di Fuga (Faculty of Escape), Mobilized Investigation, Rete Ricercatori Precari (Network of Precarious Researchers), Investigacció (Research), Universidad Nómada (Nomadic University), and Glocal Research Space. Characteristically, these projects organise events that try to set up dialogues between non-Western and anti-neoliberal activists and academics, and carve out spaces for offline and web-based discussion and participation. Initiators and participants of these projects often conceptualise their positions as relating closely to **alter-globalist activism** – positions which hence are **hoped** to effectively **subvert neo-liberalism** as well as the **elitist-managerial university space** and its problematic method of scientific objectification for capitalist innovation.

In this paper, I will explain how such announcements of **the university’s demise**, the conceptualisation of its current situation as **one of crisis**, as well as the mobilisation of **the true academic mandate** today which often segues into a **nostalgia for the original university** of independent thought, truth and justice, are themselves paradoxically **complicit in the techno-acceleration that** precisely **grounds and reproduces neo-liberalism.** This is because the playing out of such nostalgia typically runs through the problematic invocation of **the humanist opposition between doing and thinking.** This causes the terms and their mode of production to become increasingly intertwined under contemporary conditions of capitalist simulation in which ‘thinking’ is more and more done in service of an economist form of ‘doing’. The aforementioned commendable projects thus paradoxically appear foremost as symptoms of acceleration.

Moreover, I will argue that this acceleration increasingly renders certain groups and individuals as **targets of techno-academic scrutiny and violence.** This increasing objectification that runs through the contemporary prostheses of the humanist subject hence spells disaster for non-technogenic forms of **gendered**, **raced** and **classed otherness.** I therefore suggest that this disastrous state of affairs is precisely carried out by the humanist promise of transcendence, democracy and justice that currently speeds up institutions like the university, and vice versa. Following this line of thought through, I claim that technological acceleration then surprisingly also harbours the promise of the coming of **a radical alternative** to neo-liberalism, and that it is precisely through the eschatological performance of this promise – arguably a repetition of the Christian belief in the apocalypse – that these activist-research projects and their neo-liberal mode of production may fruitfully **become the future objects of their own critique.** In short then, this paper attempts to affirm and displace the projects’ call for reinstating the original ‘true’ or transcending the current ‘spoilt’ university, in the hope of gesturing towards yet another alterity, through its own accelerated argument.

I argue that the complicity of projects like Edu-Factory and Facoltà di Fuga in technological acceleration should primarily be understood in terms of what I in my work call **speed-elitism** (Hoofd, 2009: 201). I extrapolate the idea of speed-elitism largely from the work of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neoliberal capitalism. In turn, I will argue that these activist-academic projects exacerbate speed-elitism by connecting the latter to Jacques Derrida’s ideas on technology and thought, as well as the late Bill Readings’ and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s critiques of the contemporary university. In ‘Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed’, Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of communication and the logic of speed. They connect the logic of speed specifically to a certain militarisation of society under neoliberalism. In line with Virilio’s Speed and Politics, they argue that the areas of war, communication and trade are today intimately connected through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that ‘**circulation** has become **an essential process** of capitalism, **an end in itself**’ (Armitage and Graham, 2001: 118) and that therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied up in this logic.

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West.

Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the *fantasy* of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as the desire for a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation.

So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal history** of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307).

*Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

#### **The Conditioning of debate as a sight for liberal discussions about our orientations towards ethics merely engenders a semiotic fantasy of radicalism – paving over very real conditions of pain and death that make this space possible. Its try or die for a semiotic insurrection.**

www.AnarchistNews.org 10. “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” https://web.archive.org/web/20171110115921/http://anarchistnews.org/content/university-social-death-and-inside-joke

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### Thus The alternative is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_Sike You Thought\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Voting neg is a withdrawal from the instrumental game of call-and-response into an *aesthetic under-commons of redaction, opacity, and fugitive resonance*. The refusal of demands for transparent or professionalized theory of ethics frustrates the professional logistics of academia.

Moten & Harney 13 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2013 (Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pgs. 28-32)

In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching ver- sus the individualisation of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

As Fredric Jameson reminds us, the university depends upon “Enlightenment-type critiques and demystification of belief and committed ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning and ‘development.’” This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in its homeland security. It needs labor power for this “enlightenment- type critique,” but, somehow, labor always escapes.

The premature subjects of the undercommons took the call seriously, or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning, too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot reproduce itself, it must be reproduced. The university works for the day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realisation and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burn- ing roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth. And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below, informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a re- sult of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shal- low place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor force, whose increasing specialisation and managerialist tendencies, again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful in- tegration of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that commands restorationist loyalty.

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

There is no distinction between the American University and Professionalization

But surely if one can write something on the surface of the univer- sity, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself ? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a con- ference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the na- tion of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint?

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ~~ignorant~~ without acknowledging the unregulated, ~~ignorant~~, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

## 2

### Case

### Theory

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation C] Flex decks clash and fairness since they can weigh on theory while I have to weight my interp against all possible interps

### ADV

#### 1] Non-Unique Status Quo solves it – Biden cranked up Vaccine Diplomacy in the wake of China’s Failures – this also answers their China Rise U/Q

Wee and Lee 8-20 Sui-Lee Wee and Steven Lee Myers 8-20-2021 "As Chinese Vaccines Stumble, U.S. Finds New Opening in Asia" https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/business/economy/china-vaccine-us-covid-diplomacy.html (Sui-Lee Wee is a China correspondent for The New York Times. She was part of the team that won the 2021 Pulitzer in public service for coverage of the coronavirus pandemic)//Elmer

SINGAPORE — The arrival of the **Chinese vaccines** was supposed to help stop the spread of the coronavirus in Southeast Asia. Instead, **countries** across the region are **quickly turning elsewhere** to look for shots. Residents in Thailand vaccinated with one dose of China’s Sinovac are now given the AstraZeneca shot three to four weeks later. In Indonesia, officials are administering the Moderna vaccine as a booster to health care workers who had received two doses of Sinovac. Malaysia’s health minister said the country would stop using Sinovac once its supply ran out. Even Cambodia, one of China’s strongest allies, has started using AstraZeneca as a booster for its frontline workers who had taken the Chinese vaccines. Few places benefited from China’s vaccine diplomacy as much as Southeast Asia, a region of more than 650 million that has struggled to secure doses from Western drugmakers. Several of these countries have recorded some of the fastest-growing number of cases in the world, underscoring the desperate need for inoculations. China, eager to build good will, stepped in, promising to provide more than 255 million doses, according to Bridge Consulting, a Beijing-based research company. Half a year in, however, that campaign has lost some of its luster. Officials in several countries have raised doubts about the efficacy of Chinese vaccines, especially against the more transmissible Delta variant. Indonesia, which was early to accept Chinese shots, was recently the epicenter of the virus. Others have complained about the conditions that accompanied Chinese donations or sales. The setback to China’s vaccine campaign has created a diplomatic opening for the United States when relations between the two countries are increasingly fraught, in part because of the coronavirus. China has criticized the American handling of the crisis at home and even claimed, with no evidence, that the pandemic originated in a military lab at Fort Detrick, Md., not in Wuhan, where the first cases emerged in late 2019. **As more countries turn away from Chinese shots**, **vaccine aid from the U**nited **S**tates **offers** an **opportunity to restore relations** **in a region that** American officials **have** mostly **ignored for years while China extended its influence**. The **Biden** administration has **dispatched** a crowd of **senior officials,** including Vice President Kamala Harris, who is scheduled to arrive on Sunday to visit Singapore and Vietnam. It has **also**, at last, **made its own vaccine pledges to Southeast Asia**, **emphasizing** that the **American contribution of** roughly **23 million shots** as of this week **comes with “no strings attached,”** an implicit reference to China. **Several countries** in the region have been **eager to receive** the **more effective, Western doses.** Although they remain far outnumbered by Chinese shots, they present an attractive alternative. China’s “early head-start advantage has lost its magic already,” said Hoang Thi Ha, a researcher with the Asean Studies center of the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. For most of the year, many developing countries in Southeast Asia did not have much of a choice when it came to vaccines. They struggled to acquire doses, many of which were being made by richer nations that have been accused of hoarding them. China sought to fill those needs. The country’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, traveled through the region in January, promising to help fight the pandemic. In April, he declared that Southeast Asia was a priority for Beijing. About a third of the 33 million doses that China has distributed free worldwide were sent to the region, according to the figures provided by Bridge Consulting. Much of Beijing’s focus has been directed at the more populous countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, and its longstanding allies like Cambodia and Laos. Indonesia was China’s biggest customer in the region, buying 125 million doses from Sinovac. The Philippines obtained 25 million Sinovac shots after the president, Rodrigo Duterte, said he had turned to Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, for help. Cambodia received more than 2.2 million of China’s Sinopharm doses. It has inoculated roughly 41 percent of its population, achieving the second-highest vaccination rate in the region, after Singapore. Then, signs started emerging that the Chinese vaccines were not as effective as hoped. Indonesia found that 10 percent of its health care workers had become infected with Covid-19 as of July, despite being fully vaccinated with the Sinovac shot, according to the Indonesian Hospital Association. In July, a virologist at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok said a study of people who had received two doses of the Sinovac vaccine showed that their level of antibodies, 70 percent, was “barely efficacious” against the Alpha variant of the coronavirus, first detected in Britain, or against the Delta variant, first detected in India. The governments in both Indonesia and Thailand decided that they had to make a switch to other vaccines, like those provided by the United States, Britain and Russia. “Now that they have more choices, they can make other decisions,” said Nadège Rolland, senior fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research in Washington. “I don’t think it’s politically motivated. I think it’s pragmatic.” Yaowares Wasuwat, a noodle seller in Thailand’s Bangsaen Chonburi Province, said that she hoped to get the AstraZeneca vaccine for her second shot after being inoculated with Sinovac, but that she would take whatever was available. “I have nothing to lose,” she said. “The economy is so bad, we are gasping for air. It’s like dying while living, so just take whatever protection we can.” China’s early moves in the region stand in marked contrast with the United States, which was **slow to provide assistance**. The calculus **has now changed** under President Biden. Both Lloyd J. Austin III, the American secretary of defense, and Antony J. Blinken, the secretary of state, had meetings with top officials in Southeast Asia in recent weeks. They **noted** the **donations of roughly 20 million shots**. After Mr. Austin visited the Philippines, Manila restored a defense agreement that had been stuck in limbo for more than a year after Mr. Duterte threatened to terminate it. The agreement, which would continue to allow American troops and equipment to be moved in and out of the Philippines, could thwart China’s goal to push the American military out of the region.

### FW

#### 1] No 1ar extinction pivot – leads to recursively answers method cards

**Parisi and Dixon-Román** ‘20 (Luciana research lays at the intersection of continental philosophy, information sciences, digital media, computational technologies. Ezekiel’s interdisciplinary scholarship is focused on the cultural studies of quantification and critical theories of difference, 11-4- 20, “Recursive Colonialism and Cosmo-Computation”)//Joey

Apocalypse & Universal Epistemology **The apocalypse now** occurring around the world **is a continuation of** yet another iteration of **recursive colonialism**. Apocalypse is about the end of the world. It is the **liminal space** warded off by the **self-determining subject of Western history**. Invoking the threat of uncertainty that can never become real, the end of the world is feared but never allowed. Instead, **violent acts of pre-emption** perpetuate the threat of an apocalypse that is constantly denied. **The more the fear becomes real, the more violent reactions spread everywhere**. The apocalyptic scenarios have been actualized in the planetary pandemic of 2020. The **new world order**, under the COVID-19 pandemic, has seen the backlash of **white supremacy** and anti-Black violence, the entitlement of **brutal practices of policing** that have re-programmed the liminal space of apocalypse. Our concern here is with how the liminal space is always the point at which the recursive logic of colonialism returns to re-gain ground to remind us of the onto-epistemological auto-immunity of Universal Man (i.e., the European conception of the subject, discussed further below). As we have seen throughout history, **the horizon of the apocalypse** comes first in the **messianic** Judeo-Christian **image of total destruction** through which slavery becomes justified as a **mean of salvation of the Prometheus Man**. The apocalypse finds in techno-scientific progress a universal model of civilization rooted in the **mathematics of divide-and-conquer**, where space becomes subsumed by the nexus of whiteness, patriarchy, and capitalist logics, which constantly anticipate the end by constantly reproducing its unconditional violence. Then this space moves from a disciplinary **modification of the flesh** (i.e., a constant self-checking; a discourse on risk and resilience) **to strategies of control acting to fully preclude the future** through the socio-techniques of prediction and its emergentist actions. As theorized throughout the literature, the **constitution of whiteness necessitates the fabrication of Blackness**; masculinity necessitates the creation of femininity; heterosexuality needs the construction of homosexuality; and ability will not exist without the formation of disability. While the double-edged sword of capital oscillates between these polarities and keeps the apocalypse as the placeholder of the full self-annihilation of the Western subject, on the other hand, in Octavia Butler’s The Parable of the Sower and Xenogenesis we see that “the **end of the world** as we know it” **has already happened** and the possibility to keep on living on this planet includes a becoming-alien and the abolition of all forms of enslavement to allow the thought, the image of trans-collective “difference without separability.” The recursivity of colonialism is **materially and discursively** shaping the apocalypse, as illustrated in Chinua Achebe’s classic colonial studies fictional work Things Fall Apart, which was a response to Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, where the dread of the unknown at the core of humanity coincides with Blackness—and returns yet again to **depict madness as a symptom of post-war American empire** shocked by the alien war machine of Vietnam in Francis Ford Coppola’s movie Apocalypse Now. Each of these works portrays different variations of the colonial matrix of divide-and-conquer, re-constituting its interiority at the liminal space of apocalyptic self-destruction. A frequent theme in Judeo-Christian theology, the apocalypse **demarcates the place** where the **problem of the finitude of White** Man requires the **establishment of a scientific method** that enables the **transduction of the liminal space of the unknown** into **postulates of logic or mathematical reason**. With computational feedback systems, however, the liminal space is no longer formal but becomes rather self-regulated through the encounter with contingencies. The liminal space of the apocalypse becomes actualized at the liminal space of the computational halting problem. Recursivity is about reflecting on, **self-regulation** of, **self-adaptation** to, and **self-regeneration** of the interiority of a system. The monologic universalism in the epistemic response to the emergence of contingency creates the apocalyptic scenario where the end of capital is also the end of the human and of freedom. If, as Mark Fisher reminds us, the end of the world is easier to imagine than the end of capitalism, the state of emergency of the **pandemic reminds humans** that **they cannot let colonial capital die**. Indeed, like COVID-19, **the colonial is** aerial and it’s **aerosolized**: it takes on the very chance of breathing. The pandemic has intensified Western methods of enslavement and technology, even enslavement as technology and the technological displacement of the enslaved subject, toward the protecting and maintaining of capital accumulation. The reparative pattern of enslavement and the epistemological ground of enslavement are one and the same: accumulation strategies of capital. **Recursive technologies** are modes and systems of thinking, a technological episteme that **enable**s the changing same of universal epistemology. The planetary world of **automated incarceration** (i.e., a total dependence on technosocial systems) has arrived as the only response to the pandemic, instituting apocalyptic scenarios through the recursivity of colonial epistemology. What could not have been anticipated is how the pandemic would actualize the apocalypse globally and unleash the imperceptible pressures of, according to Gilles Deleuze’s characterization of control, a process of becoming. The **recursivity of self-modulation** coincides with the microdiffusion of **policing,** the transparency of which **directs the behavior of the users across technosocial systems**. But the pandemic is also a technopolitical acceleration of the destruction of white institutions. In concert with multiple other forces—including neoliberalism, patriarchy, and anti-Black violence—the **pandemic arrival of the planetary apocalypse** has met the repetitive **brutality of Black killing** that has suddenly **accelerated the unconditional demand** for the **destruction of the institution** of the state and of state violence by the Black Lives Matter movement. The planetary becoming of recursive systems has been supervened by the global uprising for the abolition of all forms of colonialism at all scales. On Recursivity Recursion is a concept that has long been a part of theories of cybernetics. In its basic form, recursion refers to the **feedback loops from the outputs to the inputs of systems**. It can also be described as one of the steps or functions within a procedure calling back the procedure. Recursion is conceptualized in computational systems (e.g., the Turing Machine and artificial neural networks), in biological and cognitive systems (Maturana and Varela), and ecological and cultural systems (Gregory Bateson). The process of the past becoming reconfigured in the present, a mythopoetics that shapes the **collective cultural ways of knowing**, is what Bateson called a “recursive epistemology.” For Bateson, recursion or continuous looping is a departure from the linear progress of modernity and the Cartesian subject. Bateson’s conceptualization of recursive epistemology, especially his explanations of the influence of mythopoetics, was taken up by Sylvia Wynter in her articulation of the autopoetic turn/overturn. For Wynter, the flesh inherits Western histories of Man that enter the constitution of new assemblages in a system of sociopolitical relations. An idea first named by Franz Fanon, the sociogenic principle is a concept that Wynter further developed as a way to account for how the sociopolitical becomes flesh. For Wynter, the **sociogenic principle** is an **ontological account of how** the sociopolitical assemblages of Man and **the logic of symbolic “difference” become programmed** in the body through the **ontogenic formation of identity** that **brands the flesh**. This sociopolitical assemblage of Man, what Wynter also calls Western Man, entails a process of auto-determinations based on the cosmogonies of human origin. She argues that the current iteration of cosmogony corresponds to a biohumanist homo oeconomicus, as informed by the economic theories of Adam Smith. Here the **correlation between biological and economic survival**, through the forces of selection and optimization of survival, defines the epistemological explanation of **who is and who is not successful** as a species. It is this correlation that consolidates the formation of the **sociogenic code** and ensures the reproduction of **the racialization of the world**. This also corresponds to what could be called the sociopolitical constitution of Man, as a fictive (and yet dominant) genealogy that tells the story of being human, for Wynter understands the reproduction of racialization in terms of autopoetic and self-regulatory practices that are imprinted within the flesh and as such enable the ontogenic self-replication of this originary myth. By drawing from **neurobiology,** Wynter **explains how** symbolic **“difference” materializes** as ontologies **via neurochemical processes that produce a racialized** e/**affect**, making the materiality of “difference” **seem natural** and thus granting a monological explanation of the human. However, it is important to suggest that the autopoetic institution of the sociogenic code permeates not just human ontologies but also more-than-human ontologies including the sociotechnical assemblages of data and algorithms. The sociogenic coding of the other as the negative marker, it is argued, is necessary to the recursive loops of the colonial enterprise, whereby the naturalization of the dyadic structure of equivalence between Man and the world ensures that all remains the same under the Western sun. However, a dynamic view of computation suggests that temporal processing in artificial intelligence systems can radically challenge the reproduction of the sociogenic principle in technosocial systems. According to Yuk Hui, Gilbert Simondon refuses Descartes’s rationalism by demonstrating that the cybernetic principle of feedback adds a new temporal structure to thinking that is described in terms of a spiral. As Hui further explains, according to Simondon, cybernetics replaces the telos of thought with a self-regulatory process. In particular, insofar as the recursivity of feedback makes the cybernetic system possible, it also impedes the system to become systematic, complete, and a reproductive whole. However, since human relations are abstracted and re-integrated into the temporality of machines, which constitute the engine of artificial intelligence, the question of temporality—and thus of recursive temporality in nonorganic machines—still needs to be further explored. For Hui, margins of indeterminacy not only describe the recursive temporalities of machines, but more importantly also describe a recursive thinking in machines. This argument suggests that the technical machine is not simply a mirror of the normative apparatus of knowledge reproduction. Computation instead can include both contingency and chance within itself because the temporality of the technical object or cybernetic machines precisely admits that errors, incident, and failure are part of the causal process of system’s learning. Recursion, however, does not coincide with representation as the repetition of the given set of symbolic concepts of a self-determining subject. It is not that machines extend the Kantian transcendental schema rooted in universal intuitions of space and time. Instead, recursion entails a temporal or processual model of dominance entangled to contingency. Within the discourse of race, recursive colonialism is not limited to representational categories but, in fact, enables processual and imminent modes of racialization. In short, recursivity proceeds with the movement of a spiral that embraces spatio-temporal vectors of alien alternatives and even transformative potentialities. The overdetermined mono-technologism of recursive colonialism is breakable. The “germ” of the Other cannot be pre-incorporated by the same self-determining subject without change. **The** horizon of the **apocalypse is incomplete because it** always **needs the Other**, in word and matter, to exist. The horizon is a parasite: fundamentally capital can do nothing without the subjection of the Other. There have been many apocalypses. Each of which enfolds within itself the incompleteness of the system in order to restore the unifying interiority of the human. Every time there is an apocalypse there is an **expansion of enslavement**, and each iteration brings an even more **intensified form of enslavement**. Apocalypse, in other words, is the sign of the **limit** and incompleteness **of recursive knowledge, of science, technology, and governance**. Cosmo-Computations Since **recursivity** exposes the incompleteness of self-regulating systems adapting to contingencies, it also **discloses the incompleteness of** the **modern** epistemological order of **truth** founded on the universal model of technology. It is in the name of the axiomatics of modern science that technology became the measure of progress against which the global world became measured. The self-posited universality of Western technology resides in the epistemologies of racial capitalism founded on principles of causal efficiency where knowledge becomes equivalent to automated tasks that carry out other tasks in a mindless chain of effects. Echoing Cedric Robison, Lisa Lowe argues that “**the** organization,**expansion**, and ideology **of capitalist society was** expressed **through** race, racial subjection, and **racial differences**.” Similarly, the global order of racial capitalism was technologically actualized through the standardization of knowledge. The recursive **adaptability of racial capital** subsumed techno-cultural diversity under the **efficient causality of industrial automation**. Its operative mode of subsumption involved the inclusion/exclusion dyad, where unknowns (of non-Western techno-cultures) were used to sustain the Western epistemology of progress. From this standpoint, how to take the limit of recursivity as the moment at which universal colonial epistemology can be turned into the epistemological proliferation of cosmotechnics? How can one open recursivity to many different and thus transversal epistemologies?

#### 2] Cosmopolitics Da: Philosophical Cosmopolitics are a priori – Accelerating the drive of the Anthropocene as well as technology predicated on recursive empires throughout the university - You should apriori reject militarism and imperialism that targets black and brown countries and subjects them to endless torture.

**Hui ‘17** (Yuk Hui. . “Cosmotechnics as Cosmopolitics”. No Publication. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/86/161887/cosmotechnics-as-cosmopolitics/. Accessed 9-24-2021)//Joey

The end of **unilateral globalization** and the arrival of the **Anthropocene force** us to talk about **cosmopolitics**. These two factors correlate with one another and correspond to two different senses of the word “cosmopolitics”: cosmopolitics as a commercial regime, and cosmopolitics as a politics of nature. Second, the human species on earth is confronting the crisis of the Anthropocene. The earth and the cosmos have been transformed into a gigantic technological system, the culmination of the epistemological and methodological rupture which we call modernity. The loss of the cosmos is the end of metaphysics in the sense that we no longer perceive anything behind or beyond the perfection of science and technology. When historians like Rémi Brague and Alexandre Koyré write about end of the cosmos in seventeen- and eighteenth-century Europe, this should be read in our present Anthropocene context as an invitation to develop a cosmo-politics, not only in the sense of cosmopolitanism but also in the sense of a politics of the cosmos. In response to this invitation, I would like to suggest that in order to develop such a cosmopolitics it is necessary to elucidate the question of cosmotechnics. I have been developing this concept of cosmotechnics in order to reopen the question of technology by undoing certain translations that were driven by the search for equivalence during modernization. This problematization can be presented in terms of a Kantian antinomy: Thesis: Technology is an anthropological universal, understood as an exteriorization of memory and the liberation of organs, as some anthropologists and philosophers of technology have formulated it; In order to elaborate the relation between cosmotechnics and cosmopolitics, I will divide this article into three parts. First, I will demonstrate how the Kantian concept of cosmopolitics is rooted in Kant’s concept of nature. In the second part, I situate the “multi-naturalism” proposed by the “ontological turn” in anthropology as a different cosmopolitics, one which, in contrast to Kant’s pursuit of the universal, suggests a certain relativism as the condition of possibility for coexistence. In the third part, I will try to show why it is necessary to move from cosmology to cosmotechnics as a politics to come. §1. Cosmopolitanism: Between Nature and Technology The main difficulty of all cosmopolitics is the reconciliation between the universal and the particular. The universal tends to contemplate the particulars from above, as in the way that Kant regarded the French Revolution, like a spectator considering a violent piece of theater from the mezzanine. Universality is the view of a spectator, never that of an actor. Kant writes, in his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim”: There is no other way out for the philosopher—who, regarding human beings and their play in the large, cannot at all presuppose any rational aim of theirs—than to try whether he can discover an aim of nature in this nonsensical course of things human; from which aim a history in accordance with a determinate plan of nature might nevertheless be possible even of creatures who do not behave in accordance with their own plan … [Nature] did produce a Kepler, who subjected the eccentric paths of the planets in an unexpected way to determinate laws, and a Newton, who explained these laws from a universal natural cause. In Beyond Culture and Nature, Descola has proposed an ontological pluralism that is irreducible to social constructivism. He suggests that recognizing these ontological differences can serve as an antidote to the dominance of naturalism since the advent of European modernity. But does this focus on nature (or the cosmos, we might say) in the interest of opposing European naturalism actually revive the enchantment of nature, this time in the name of indigenous knowledge? This seems to be a hidden problem with the ontological-turn movement: many anthropologists associated with the ontological turn have focused on the question of nature and the politics of the nonhuman (largely animals, plants, minerals, spirits, and the dead). This is evident when we recall that Descola proposes to call his discipline an “anthropology of nature.” Furthermore, this tendency also suggests that the question of technics is **not** sufficiently **addressed** in the ontological-turn movement. For example, Descola talks often of practice, which may indicate his (laudable) desire to avoid an opposition between nature and technics; but by doing so, he also obscures the question of technology. Descola shows that analogism, rather than naturalism, was a significant presence in Europe during the Renaissance; if this is the case, the “turn” that took place **during European modernity** seems to have resulted in a completely different ontology and epistemology. If naturalism has succeeded in dominating modern thought, it is because such a peculiar cosmological imagination is compatible with its techno-logical development: nature should be mastered for the good of man, and it can indeed be mastered according to the laws of nature. Or put another way: nature is regarded as the source of contingency due to its “weakness of concept,” and therefore it has to be overcome by logic. These oppositions between nature and technics, mythology and reason, give rise to various illusions that belong to one of two extremes. On the one hand, there are rationalists or “progressivists” who hysterically struggle to maintain their monotheism after having murdered god, wishfully believing that the world process will stamp out differences and diversities and lead to a “theodicy.” On the other hand, there are left intellectuals who feel the need to extol indigenous ontology or biology as a way out of modernity. A French revolutionary thinker recently described this situation thus: A funny thing to see these days is how all these absurd modern leftists, all unable to see anything, all lost in themselves, all feeling so bad, all desperately trying to exist and to find their existence in the eyes of the Other—how all these people are jumping on the “savage,” the “indigenous,” the “traditional” in order to escape and not face themselves. I am not speaking of being critical towards one’s “whiteness,” towards one’s “modernism.” I am talking of the ability to peer inside [transpercer] oneself. My refusal of the above two extremes does not come out of any postcolonial “political correctness,” but rather out of an attempt to go beyond postcolonialism’s critique. (Indeed, I have elsewhere reproached postcolonialism for its failure to tackle the question of technology.) I hold the thesis that an **ontological pluralism** can only be realized by **reflecting** on the question of technology and a **politics of technology**. Kant was aware of the importance of technology in his comment on trading as communication; however, he didn’t pay much attention to the technological difference that finally led to planetary modernization, and now planetary computation, since what was at stake for him was the question of the whole that absorbs all differences. Kant criticized the impolite guests, the greedy colonizers who brought with them “oppression of the native inhabitants, the incitement of the different states involved to expansive wars, famine, unrest, faithlessness, and the whole litany of evils that weigh upon the human species.” Commenting on the defense strategies of China and Japan, Kant said that both countries have wisely, limited such interaction. Whereas the former has allowed contact with, but not entrance to its territories, the latter has allowed this contact to only one European people, the Dutch, yet while doing so it excludes them, as if they were prisoners, from associating with the native inhabitants. When Kant wrote this in 1795, it was too early for him to anticipate the modernization and colonization that would take place in Japan and China. If this phase of globalization was able to take place, it was because of the technological advancement of the West, which allowed it to defeat the Japanese, the Chinese, and other Asian civilizations. Nature, the guarantee of perpetual peace, didn’t really lead us to perpetual peace but rather to wars and more wars. To appeal for a cosmopolitanism today, I think we must reread Kant’s cosmopolitanism according to the process of modernization and revisit the question of nature and technology anew. The arrival of modern technology in non-European countries in recent centuries has created a transformation unthinkable to European observers. The restoration of “indigenous natures” itself has to first be questioned, not because it doesn’t exist but because it is situated in a new epoch and is transformed to the extent that there is hardly any way to go back and restore it.

#### Their Technic demands structure out inventible Colonial Cyber Wars

**Dyer-Witheford & Matviyenko ’19** (Nick Dyer-Witheford, Svitlana MatviyenkoCyberwar and Revolution: Digital Subterfuge in Global Capitalism. University of Minnesota Press, 2019. JSTOR, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctvcwnzsd. Accessed 9/24 Sep. 2021](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctvcwnzsd.%20Accessed%209/24%20Sep.%202021). Strike added for abled language)//Joey

Warfare permeated the entire fabric of everyday life in the “total wars” of the twentieth century, with their mobilization not only of vast armed forces but of the industry, hospitals, bureaucracies, logistic systems, and psychological and propaganda apparatuses that supported the battlefronts (Black 2006; Dreiziger 2006; Chickering, Förster, and Greiner 2005). The persistent power of national security apparatuses in times of Cold War, memorialized in Eisenhower’s reference to the “military–industrial complex” and continuing to the present, has been well documented (Brooks 2016). Yet it might seem that, with **nuclear dangers** supposedly pacified since 1989 by the advent of global capitalism, and the deployment of conscripted armies largely replaced by highly professionalized special-forces operations, an all-encompassing military activation of society is past. The recognition that digital technologies might raise the reach of war to a new scope and intensity has been slowly dawning. **Cyberwar** has therefore emerged as a topic of **global concern** at a moment when the teleological certainties of Marxism seem broken or reduced to cruel caricature. This is not a coincidence. As we will argue, the emergence of cybernetics from the military–industrial complex of the United States at the end of the Second Word War was an important part of that nation’s ascent as a new imperial leader for the capitalist system. Computers and networks, both in their **military** and **economic** applications, played an important role in eventual U.S. victory over the USSR in the Cold War. And their extension into electronic commodities, industrial automation, **supply-chain logistics**, and financial trading was a **crucial** part of the **globalization** in which a reinvigorated capitalism from 1989 on disseminated itself around the planet, under the shelter of the global hegemon’s cruise missiles, smart weapons, and satellite intelligence. This armed pacification of a world market has, however, not had the finality many expected. Rather, it has generated new wars, of two major types, both misnamed and ill defined but each a consequence of capital’s global triumph over its socialist opponents. **Cyberwar**, a neologism that asserts war has left the armored train from which Trotsky directed revolutionary troops far, far behind, is a term that has abruptly risen in prominence in recent years but that possesses more than a quarter century of genealogy (Healey 2013; Rid 2016). As we discuss later, cybernetics originated in the American and British military research of the Second World War, setting a path for the development of computers and networks that continued throughout the Cold War. However, the contemporary use of cyberwar, with specific reference to attacks in and on digital networks, did not emerge until the 1980s. Fred Kaplan (2016) suggests that U.S. military concern about this possibility was sparked by President Reagan’s viewing of the film WarGames (1983), about computer-gaming teenagers breaking into the networks of U.S. Strategic Air Command. This anxiety-inducing event purportedly set in motion the first of what would become a long series of invariably urgent reports about the vulnerabilities of the United States (and its foes) to digital attack, produced by competing defense agencies and departments, only to be shelved, then rediscovered and repeated by successive administrations. The actual conjoining of cyber with war was, however, the work of popular culture, reflecting the rapid uptake of science fiction author William Gibson’s (1984) cyberspace to designate the increasingly widespread experience of internet use. According to Thomas Rid (2016), cyberwar first appeared in the digital avant-garde magazine Omni in a 1987 article about giant military robots. It was taken up more seriously in a 1992 essay by Eric H. Arnett in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists that declared, “The leading military concept of the new era might be called cyberwar” and applied it to a range of **computerized** “autonomous weapons,” including crewless tanks, cruise missiles, advanced air-defense missiles, and antimissile satellites. This probably inspired the Chicago Sun-Times news report of the same year, titled “Cyberwar Debate,” about an alleged dispute between “scientists and the military” as to “who should wage war, man or machine,” which the Oxford English Dictionary records as the earliest usage of the phrase. The episode presents a situation in which three major hacker groups, each of which has an alleged association with a nation-state, are implicated in a worldwide network breakdown of significant proportions. While WannaCry was a malware infection of exceptional scope, it is far from unique; other ransomware attacks have affected several regions. As early as **2012**, it was reported that zero-day exploits incorporated into the Stuxnet worm, used in the U.S.–Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear reactors, had been picked up and used widely by cybercriminals, who were also copying sophisticated design elements of weapons, such as forged Microsoft security certificates (Simonite 2012). Other forms of attack, such as the Mirai botnet, which effectively turned the huge amounts of data generated by video surveillance systems into a means for disabling websites, have also **intensified** in scale. As Tim Maurer (2018, 161) observes, distinctions between “crimeware” and “milware,” that is, between criminal malware and military malware, are becoming “less meaningful.” Of special concern to some cybersecurity experts is that some attacks that appear initially to be extortion attempts are in fact “wiper” attacks that destroy their targets with the possibility of ransomed restoration—leading them to believe that, rather than commercial criminal attacks, these may be tests for attacks simply intended to destroy network capacity (Schneier 2016). Cybercrime is an ambiguous issue. Its threat is **frequently** invoked to justify enhancements in the powers and budgets of police and spy agencies and to **encourage** the sale of **cybersecurity** products. However, the realization that security establishments themselves are involved in, and exacerbate, criminal enterprise opens the way to a progressive appropriation of lawand-order issues that would have a precisely contrary direction and argue for the deescalation and decommissioning of cybernetic armaments. Dirty wars. Cyberwar **fosters fake news** and **digital crimes**, but above all, it **fosters war**. Its damage cannot be estimated simply in terms of deceived voters, frustrated internet users, or even canceled **medical operations** (in **hospitals** ~~crippled~~ by malware), freezing homes (amid electrical blackouts), or destroyed centrifuges (in sabotaged nuclear plants). It includes now the dead, maimed, and wounded. We have stressed the difficulty, indeed, the impossibility, of segregating cyberwar as a distinct domain of military activity; on the contrary, we have argued that it is characterized by a tendency, intrinsic to the constantly growing scope of the digitization of all spheres of life, to overspill boundaries. And nowhere is that truer than in the realm of war itself, where, as a recent article in a U.S. defense journal put it, “‘**Cyber War’** Is Quickly Becoming Just ‘War’” (Tucker 2017). Or, as we have put it already, “hybrid wars” that synthesize cybernetic and kinetic elements are today becoming the norm. This means that opposition to cyberwar is inseparable from resistance to other types of war. Here we will look at how this cyberlogic plays out in in the relation to **dirty wars** (Scahill 2013), also known as small wars, irregular wars, shadow wars, or ghost wars. These are the wars without official declarations of hostilities, at and beyond the boundaries of international law, that today proliferate as counterinsurgency operations or proxy conflicts antagonizing different populations against each other. Such wars now involve advanced digital systems for intelligence gathering and analysis, coordination, and weapons delivery, functions **fused in weapon platforms** that are also integral parts of cyberwar. Thus among the first, and most representative, victims of cyberwar can be numbered the populations of areas in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Yemen living under visible and audible overflight by CIA Predator and Reaper drones, from which death suddenly and unpredictably descends. Drone warfare has been widely discussed (Turse 2012; Benjamin 2013; Chamayou 2015; Cockburn 2015; Scahill 2016; Shaw 2016), but we want here to put it in the wider context of digitized and networked conflict. As semiautonomous flying vehicles, drones push toward the full robotization that was always a goal of cybernetics. Their remote operations depend on streams of digitized information, flowing from the Nevada bases that house their video game–trained “pilots” to satellite relays in Germany, boosting the signals onward to the aeronautical entities roaming the heavens of the Middle East, entities whose navigation is a matter of computerized geolocation and which are targeted largely on the basis of electronic signals intelligence (SIGINT). In their overflights, U.S. drones are not merely surveilling territory and attacking targets; they are also **sucking up** vast quantities of **wireless data**, primarily cell phone signals, which can be collected through machines like the Gilgamesh device, which can be attached to the base of the drone and operates as a “fake cell phone tower,” forcing targeted SIM cards, purportedly in phones belonging to suspect terrorists, to contact it (Scahill 2016, 66). Information gathered in this way is relayed back to data fusion centers for combination and crossmatching with other intelligence sources. For Cronin, cyberwar is a matter of “mobilization.” Geoffrey WinthropYoung (2011, 134–35), discussing the military writings of Kittler, describes the category of mobilization well and makes the connection to issues of subjectivity: Mobilization erodes the boundaries between war and peace because it takes place in both; it erodes the boundary between the military and civilian population because it affects one as much as the other; and it erodes the distinction between material hardware and psychic software because it deals as much with the optimization of logistics, transport, and technology as with increasing mental preparedness and overall combat readiness. But what kind of human is most equipped (or least under-equipped) to deal with the acceleration and incomprehensibility of modern war? What kind of mind is available to make rapid, on the spot decisions, or even make up new rules when no fiat, no commanding authority, is in sight? What has been programmed to fight with a free will? The modern subject. It could be argued that cyberwar, a form of highly **technocratic warfare**, is in some regards the opposite of the levée en masse, a type of war that, like nuclear weapons, frees states from their politically problematic dependence on mass armies. However, as we suggested in the previous chapter, this idea of cyberwar simply as a series of hacker-team exploits ignores the wider base of technosocial knowledge and practice on which such feats depend. It also ignores the global networked populations that cyberwar hacking traverses, targets, and exploits. There are, therefore, serious limitations to purely tactical, and technical, movement adaptations to the surveillance state. An alternative is political and legal contestation of surveillance. In North America, some of the most important of these challenges come from Afro-Americans, First Nations, and Arab-Muslims, who, on the basis of collective historical experience, point out how profiling systems at once constitute and control specific suspect racialized social groups (Kundnani and Kumar 2015), demonstrating how Virilio’s “endocolonization” is most virulently applied to the already colonized. In many cases, such challenges also point directly to the military aspects of **racialized surveillance**. Thus the digital tracking of Black Lives Matter activists and leaders by both state agencies (Joseph 2015) and private cybersecurity firms (Buncombe 2015) stands as an extension of the paramilitary combination of “stingray” mobile phone signaling interceptions, drone observation, and information “fusion center” cross-checking transferred from Middle Eastern wars to the **policing** of **Afro-American neighborhoods** (Collins et al. 2015), practices that in turn build on a lineage of white vigilance rooted in fear of slave revolt (Browne 2015). At the time of writing, two activist groups, the Color of Change and the Center for Constitutional Rights, are suing the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security on the surveillance of protests in eleven cities, arguing that it undermines free speech while serving to “chill valuable public debate” (Timberg 2017). The **increasing frequency** and intensity of cyberwar reveal that a world dominated by the market is not necessarily peaceful or one from which the prospect of catastrophic conflict has been abolished. While neoliberalism not only acknowledges but enthusiastically celebrates competition and its associated “disruptions” and “creative destruction” as a spur to innovation and wealth creation, its official message is that, ultimately, the invisible hand of the market anneals this into the greater good of optimal resource allocation. What is denied in such discourse is the possibility that the conflicts of an agonistic and increasingly ahuman system might explode into noncreative destruction and that the ultimate “disruption” is to be found in the horror of war. Cyberwar is a secretive but **increasingly irruptive** manifestation of this possibility, a partially contained yet now escalating expression of the world market’s destructive tendencies. Its rise may be a symptom of a new era of capitalist war, a pattern of covert but escalating conflict between great powers, and between these powers and the terrorist movements they have beckoned into existence, in a concatenation of conflicts running from Central Europe to the Middle East and the South China Sea. Yes, we are at war. Or rather, henceforth, we are all in war. We deal blows, and we take blows in turn. We are in mourning, suffering the consequences of these terrible events, in the sad knowledge that others will occur. Each person killed is irreplaceable. But which war are we talking about? It is not an easy war to define because it is formed of various types which have been pushed together over time and which today appear inextricable. Wars between states (even a pseudo state like “ISIS”). National and international civil wars. Wars of “civilization” (or something that sees itself as such). Wars of interest and of imperialist patronage. Wars of religions and sects (or justified as such). This is the great stasis or “split city” of the twenty first century, which we will one day compare to its distant parallels (if indeed we escape intact): the Peloponnesian War; the Thirty Years War; or, more recently, the “European civil war” that raged from 1914 to 1945. And this prospect brings a terrifying ambiguity: that of a deep **destabilization** of the existing order, of the very type that has in the past created openings for new social protagonists and collective experiments, but also for disasters and atrocities whose potential scale today **extends** to nuclear species **extinction**. Any contemporary radical politics should be unsparing about the relation of revolution to war. The preface to the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was written in the ledgers of war debts that bankrupted absolutist monarchies and in the main chapters inscribed in blood spilled on battlefields from Naseby to Valmy. In socialist revolutions, the prelude to successful armed uprising has been a period of sustained capitalist self-destruction: the Paris Commune, the October Revolution, and the Chinese communist revolution all demonstrate this; if there are exceptions, they are relatively minor. One can say that the lesson of the twentieth century for revolutionary politics is that only **capital** can **destroy capital**: nothing other than its own massive apparatus of destruction is adequate to the task of utterly disrupting a dominant, gargantuan, consolidated mode of production.

#### 3] The aff violates the categorical imperative and is non-universalizable- governments have a binding obligation to protect creations

**Van Dyke ‘18** Raymond Van Dyke, 7-17-2018, "The Categorical Imperative for Innovation and Patenting," IPWatchdog, <https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/07/17/categorical-imperative-innovation-patenting/id=99178/> SJ//DA recut SJKS

As we shall see, applying **Kantian logic entails first acknowledging some basic principles; that the people have a right to express themselves, that that expression (the fruits of their labor) has value and is theirs (unless consent is given otherwise), and that government is obligated to protect people and their property. Thus, an inventor or creator has a right in their own creation, which cannot be taken from them without their consent.** So, employing this canon, **a proposed Categorical Imperative (CI) is the following Statement: creators should be protected against the unlawful taking of their creation by others. Applying this Statement to everyone, i.e., does the Statement hold water if everyone does this, leads to a yes determination. Whether a child, a book or a prototype, creations of all sorts should be protected, and this CI stands.** This result also dovetails with the purpose of government: to protect the people and their possessions by providing laws to that effect, whether for the protection of tangible or intangible things. **However, a contrary proposal can be postulated: everyone should be able to use the creations of another without charge. Can this Statement rise to the level of a CI? This proposal, upon analysis would also lead to chaos. Hollywood, for example, unable to protect their films, television shows or any content, would either be out of business or have robust encryption and other trade secret protections, which would seriously undermine content distribution and consumer enjoyment.** Likewise, inventors, unable to license or sell their innovations or make any money to cover R&D, would not bother to invent or also resort to strong trade secret. Why even create? This approach thus undermines and greatly hinders the distribution of ideas in a free society, which is contrary to the paradigm of the U.S. patent and copyright systems, which promotes dissemination. By allowing freeriding, innovation and creativity would be thwarted (or at least not encouraged) and trade secret protection would become the mainstay for society with the heightened distrust.

#### 4] Intellectual property is an inalienable personal right of economic use

**Pozzo ‘6** Pozzo, Riccardo. “Immanuel Kant on Intellectual Property.” Trans/Form/Ação, vol. 29, no. 2, 2006, pp. 11–18., doi:10.1590/s0101-31732006000200002. SJ//DA recut SJKS recut Cookie JX

Corpus mysticum, opus mysticum, propriété incorporelle, proprietà letteraria, geistiges Eigentum. All these terms mean **intellectual property, the existence of which is intuitively clear because of the unbreakable bond that ties the work to its creator.** The book belongs to whomever has written it, the picture to whomever has painted it, the sculpture to whomever has sculpted it; and this independently from the number of exemplars of the book or of the work of art in their passages from owner to owner. The initial bond cannot change and it ensures the author authority on the work. Kant writes in section 31/II of the Metaphysics of Morals: “Why does unauthorized publishing, which strikes one even at first glance as unjust, still have an appearance of being rightful? Because on the one hand a book is a corporeal artifact (opus mechanicum) that can be reproduced (by someone in legitimate possession of a copy of it), so that there is a right to a thing with regard to it. On the other hand a book is also a mere discourse of the publisher to the public, which the publisher may not repeat publicly without having a mandate from the author to do so (praestatio operae), and this is a right against a person. The error consists in mistaking one of these rights for the other” (Kant, 1902, t.6, p.290). The corpus mysticum, **the work considered as an immaterial good, remains property of the author on behalf of the original right of its creation. The corpus mechanicum consists of the exemplars of the book or of the work of art. It becomes the property of whoever has bought the material object in which the work has been reproduced or expressed.** Seneca points out in De beneficiis (VII, 6) the difference between owning a thing and owning its use. He tells us that the bookseller Dorus had the habit of calling Cicero’s books his own, while there are people who claim books their own because they have written them and other people that do the same because they have bought them. Seneca concludes that the books can be correctly said to belong to both, for it is true they belong to both, but in a different way **The peculiarity of intellectual property consists thus first in being indeed a property, but property of an action; and second in being indeed inalienable, but also transferable in commission and license to a publisher. The bond the author has on his work confers him a moral right that is indeed a personal right. It is also a right to exploit economically his work in all possible ways, a right of economic use, which is a patrimonial right. Kant and Fichte argued that moral right and the right of economic use are strictly connected, and that the offense to one implies inevitably offense to the other.** In eighteenth-century Germany, the free use came into discussion among the presuppositions of a democratic renewal of state and society. In his Supplement to the Consideration of Publishing and Its Rights, Reimarus asked writers “instead of writing for the aristocracy, to write for the tiers état of the reader’s world.” (Reimarus, 1791b, p.595). **He saluted with enthusiasm the claim of disenfranchising from the monopoly of English publishers expressed in the American Act for the Encouragement of Learning of May 31, 1790. Kant, however, was firm in embracing intellectual property. Referring himself to Roman Law, he asked for its legislative formulation not only as patrimonial right, but also as a personal right.** In Of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing, he considered the moral faculties related to **intellectual property as an “inalienable right (ius personalissimum) always himself to speak through anyone else, the right, that is, that no one may deliver the same speech to the public other than in his (the author’s) name”** (Kant, 1902, t.8, p.85). Fichte went farther in the Demonstration of the Illegitimity of Pirate Publishing. **He saw intellectual property as a part of his metaphysical construction of intellectual activity, which was based on the principle that thoughts “are not transmitted hand to hand, they are not paid with shining cash, neither are they transmitted to us if we take home the book that contains them and put it into our library.** In order to make those thoughts our own an action is still missing: we must read the book, meditate – provided it is not completely trivial – on its content, consider it under different aspects and eventually accept it within our connections of ideas” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). At the center of the discussion was the practice of reprinting books in a pirate edition after having them reset word after words after an exemplar of the original edition. Given Germany’s division in a myriad of small states, the imperial privilege was ineffective against pirate publishing. Kant and Fichte spoke for the acceptance of the right to defend the work of an author by the usurpations of others so that he may receive a patrimonial advantage from those who utilize the work acquiring new knowledge and/or an aesthetic experience. In particular, Fichte declared the absolute primacy of the moral faculties within the corpus mysticum. He divided the latter into a formal and a material part. “This intellectual element must be divided anew into what is material, the content of the book, the thoughts it presents; and the form of these thoughts, the manner in which, the connection in which, the formulations and the words by means of which the book presents them” (Fichte, 1964, t.I/1, p.411). Fichte’s underlining the author’s exclusive right to the intellectual content of his book – “the appropriation of which through another is physically impossible” (ibid.) – brought him to the extreme of prohibiting any form of copy that is not meant for personal use. In Publishing Considered anew, Reimarus considered on the contrary copyright in its patrimonial aspects as a limitation to free trade: “What would not happen were a universal protection against pirate publishing guaranteed? Monopoly and safer sales certainly do not procure convenient price; on the contrary, they are at the origin of great abuses. The only condition for convenient price is free-trade, and one cannot help noticing that upon the appearance of a private edition, publishers are forced to substantially lower the price of a book” (Reimarus, 1791a, pp.402-3). Reimarus admitted of being unable to argue in terms of justice. Justice was of no bearing, he said, for whom, like himself, considered undemonstrated the author’s permanent property of his work (herein supported by the legislative vacuum of those years). What mattered, he said, was equity. In sum, Reimarus anticipated today’s stance on free use by referring to the principle that public interest on knowledge ought to prevail on the author’s interest and to balance the copyright. Moreover, Reimarus extended his argument beyond the realm of literary production to embrace, among others, the today vital issue of pharmaceutical production on patented receipts. “Let us suppose that at some place a detailed description for the preparation of a good medicine or of any other useful thing be published, why may not somebody who lives in places that are far away from that one copy it to use it for his own profit and but must instead ask the original publisher for the issue of each exemplar?” (Reimarus, 1791b, t.2, pp.584). To sum up, Reimarus’s stance does not seem respondent to rule of law. For in all dubious case the general rule ought to prevail, fighting intellectual property with anti-monopolistic arguments in favor of free trade brings with itself consequences that are not tranquilizing also for the ones that are expected to apply the law. **By resetting literary texts, one could obviously expurgate some errors. More frequently, however, some were added, given the exclusively commercial objectives of the reprints. The valid principle was, thus, that reprints were less precise than original editions, but they were much cheaper for the simple reason that the pirate publisher had a merely moral obligation against the author and the original publisher. In fact, he was not held to pay any honorarium to the author upon handling over the manuscript, nor to paying him royalties, nor to pay anything to the original publisher. The** only expense in charge of the pirate publisher was buying the exemplar of the original edition out of which he was to make, as we say today, a free use.

#### 5] Nonideal theory is necessary—even Korsgaard concedes different situations justifies moral loopholes

Korsgaard PhD 02 [Christine, PhD in Philosophy, works at Harvard] “Internalism and the Sources of Normativity” RE

But actions are also events in the world (or correspond to events in the world, at least), and they too have consequences. There are a number of different ways in which one can deal with worries about what happens to the consequences in Kant’s ethical theory. It is worth pointing out that Kant himself not only did not ignore the consequences, but took the fact that good actions can have bad effects as the starting point for his religious philosophy. In his religious thought, Kant was concerned with the question how the moral agent has to envision the world, how he has to think of its metaphysics in order to cope with the fact that the actions morality demands may have terrible effects that we never intended, or may simply fail to have good ones. I myself see the development of what Rawls has called “nonideal theory” to be the right way of taking care of a certain class of cases, in which the consequences of doing the right thing just seem too appalling for us to simply wash our hands of. But I do not want to say that just having bad consequences is enough to put an action into the realm of nonideal theory. I think there is a range of bad consequences that a decent person has to be prepared to live with, out of respect for other people’s right to manage their own lives and actions, and to contribute to shared decisions. But I also think that there are cases where our actions go wrong in such a way that they turn out in a sense not to be the actions we intended to do, or to instantiate the values we meant them to instantiate. I think that some of these cases can be dealt with by introducing the kind of double-level structure into moral philosophy that I have described in the essay on “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil.”3 But I also think there are cases that cannot be domesticated even in this way, cases in which, to put it paradoxically, the good person will do something “wrong.” I have written about that sort of case too, in “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution.”4

#### 6] Reject the a priori’s – they don’t have truth testing to function under which means that there is normative implications coming from them

#### 7] Kantian philosophy is homophobic — universality justifies homophobic actions since Kant held that actions like being gay weren’t universizable and means you should reject their fw because its bad for inclusion. They make debate unsafe by literally rejecting LGBTQ+ individuals.