# 1NC

## 1

#### Counterplan: Do the aff tomorrow. It competes- cx proves the plan happens now.

#### Patience is a virtue- net benefit under your framing and solves the aff.

Tony **Blair**, A musician with a desire to entertain, enlighten, inspire, and write about it all. #stayhungry #letsconnect “Patience Is A Virtue, And Other Reasons I Try To Practice It Everyday” 20**18** [https://medium.com/@BlairOutLoud/patience-is-a-virtue-and-other-reasons-i-try-to-practice-it-everyday-468b8e1590a9 //](https://medium.com/@BlairOutLoud/patience-is-a-virtue-and-other-reasons-i-try-to-practice-it-everyday-468b8e1590a9%20//) sosa

Although I can’t really remember my mother saying, “Son, patience is a virtue!”, I do for some reason have that saying stuck in my head from my childhood. As if just saying that to a child helps them to understand the importance of patience… I suppose that saying this over and over to children helps to build value around the concept thus aiding in development of their moral system. I learned so much from my parents as I grew older about being patient, humble, and honest. And even when our relationship was strained (another story for another time), I still credit them for raising me to develop the awareness needed to be more patient with everyone and everything in my life. I believe that patience is a virtue, as well as being humble, and being honest in it’s full capacity (which is really tough sometimes.. [I wrote about that over here](https://medium.com/@BlairOutLoud/shedding-guilt-that-comes-from-being-brutally-honest-56336f726c8b)). But in this post today I’d like to focus on my experience and daily reminder to myself to be patient.

We live in a world of immediacy, constantly checking our smartphones for reactions to our blog posts, shared pictures, messages, etc, that we send out into the world. We crave that feedback, either positive or negative. Its a reaction, and a dopamine hit to our system. We are being programmed to think and feel a certain way because of the technology that we use (plenty of good articles on this subject out there recently, most notably one I read today from [Arianna Huffington](https://medium.com/u/f76807050198?source=post_page-----468b8e1590a9--------------------------------) [here](https://medium.com/@ariannahuff/the-great-awakening-8bf08fa95eda)). This is a fast-paced world and if you aren’t moving as fast as everyone else you’re going to miss out… so you believe. I personally have always had a love for technology, always researching the latest and greatest thing on the market. And I’m a musician so I’m constantly searching for new sounds, and new ways to make my stage performance life even better and more efficient. This also means that when I find new technology to use to bring my tribe of people together, I push hard for everyone around me to join in that technology as well. It’s working great for me so I’m certain that it will work great for you, right?! Over the years I have ran into many situations where business partners, trusted friends, or even close family members have reacted negatively towards me. In some cases, I have been too confident. Or sometimes I am so certain of an idea that I’ve blocked out those with opposing opinions. If I’m asked to guide someone with a new piece of technology, I’ve become easily frustrated and defaulted to handing them over to a separate entity to solve their problem. As I’ve grown older and wiser (hopefully), I realize that there are so many opportunities that I’ve passed over to be more influential, to be more loving and understanding. I think back to situations where I could have just taken a deep breath, chose to spend a little more time diving into a problem, and maybe just maybe I would have learned more about others and/or myself in the process. I learn more everyday through the practice of patience. Here are a few benefits that come to mind: 1) I learn so much from keeping proper perspective**.** I learn so much more about myself, and how to conduct my life, when I choose to keep proper perspective. If I’m frustrated with any person or specific situation, I have to tell myself to mentally and physically step back. What are the situations that led to this specific moment? If someone feels a certain way, and it contradicts everything that I believe, I have to step back, remain calm, and ask myself this question: What type of environment did/do they have, and how is different from my experience, and what about that would lead them to draw conclusions that are opposed to me? I have found that EVERY TIME that I have mentally asked that question to myself, I end up feeling calm and reserved. If I was arguing, I don’t feel the need to immediately respond. I’m trying to divide my emotion from the thought process of discovering a solution to bring to terms. This practice has led to much better friendship, relationships, and overall I feel that I’m much more comfortable to be around (I guess you’d have to ask my friends about that, but ultimately that’s my goal).

## 2

### OFF

#### AFFIRMATIVES must demonstrate how they engage efforts to advocate the plan BEYOND hypothetical imagination – ONLY this model centers wake work beyond after-life of slavery EVEN IF content of non resolutional theory or black framework is bad it’s form signals spiritual life AND prevents ascetic tourism.

Shanara Reid-Brinkley 2020, “The Future is Black: Afropessimism, Fugitivity, and Radical Hope in Education”, Edited by Carl Grant, Ashley Woodson, Michael Dumas, https://books.google.com/books?id=SMHyDwAAQBAJ&pg=PR5&source=gbs\_selected\_pages&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false//WY

What lies in the wake" of competitive policy debate? How are Black debaters doing wake work? In the following section I take two examples from the National Debate Tournament Final Round to demonstrate wake work in competitive debate. Next, I ana-lyze the central argument in the final round characterizing the current clash of civilizations in debate and the ramifications of building community in debate. The final round of the 2017 National Debate Tournament was not just a com- petition, it was a referendum on the notion of a universal community and the structural exclusions and fairness issues that characterize the traditions and norms of competitive practice. Georgetown is affirmative in the debate and of fer a federal policy toward Alaska as an example of a specific proposal to combat catastrophic climate change. Based on the norms of competition, Georgetown presents a coherent affirmative argument providing an effective stasis point for fair deliberation of the climate change resolution. After the affirmative's speech Rutgers is allowed to cross-examine the speaker. Devane Murphy asks, “When is the first life saved as a result of the afffirmative]?” (2017). While Georgetown admits that a debate round cannot save lives directly, they argue that discuss- ing climate change policy is a valuable academic conversation. Rutgers then asks a series of questions about Georgetown's relationship as individuals to the people and places targeted by the federal policy they suggest: “Do you know any people in the arctic? Do you know any communities in the arctic? Can you name a family in the arctic?” (Murphy, 2017). While Georgetown answers no to these questions, they argue that a focus on debaters as individuals rather than the policy option they have presented is a distraction from the stasis point they have set for the debate. Using Afropessimism as a heuristic for engaging the resolution, debaters like Rutgers, reject any affirmation of the United States Federal Government. For these students, the federal government is always an unethical actor. In as much as the resolutional statement requires the affirmative to posit federal govern- ment action as an ethical response to public need, the vast majority of Black debaters refuse to take such a position. To combat this refusal to follow com- petitive norms, the Framework argument developed to confront the disruption of the normative form and content of policy debate competition. Framework debaters (mostly White and non-Black POCs) argue that if a team violates the norms of common practice they reject the normative stasis points for delibera-tion destroying the educational benefits of policy debate. Framework has operated as a strategic tool of capture and exclusion of Black thought in competitive debate. However, as "the holds multiply" so too does Black innovation. Rutgers' strategy in the final round took the form of the traditional Framework argument, but using Black thought to revise the content and turn it against the norms of traditional debate. Black Framework, Rutgers' strategy, argued that the affirmative must embody their politics and demonstrate how they directly engage in efforts to reduce climate change. Rutgers' argues that Georgetown is disconnected from their politics which is why they can advocate a policy that may affect the people of the Arctic while having little knowledge of those people or their lives. This kind of orientation toward policy action is dangerous, encouraging what Rutgers refers to as “ascetic tourism" by which debaters role-playing policy advocates “tour [the] trauma of various populations without ever acting to alleviate the harm” (Murphy, 2017). When Georgetown seeks further clarification of Black Framework, Rutgers' responds: "We provided an interpretation of what we think debate should look like, the same way in which when you're negative and you read my affirmative and you say we should not be able to do what we do. Very simple” (Murphy, 2017). Georgetown often runs the traditional Framework argument against Black Debate teams who fall outside their interpretation of a fair stasis point for debate about the resolution. Rutgers' turns the tables on Georgetown argu- ing that the traditional form of policy debate produces poor policy advocates and that Black Debate practice which centers embodied political practice is a superior method of training political advocates**.** Black Framework is an exam- ple of political theorizing from the hold. It operates from the perspective that anti-blackness is the stage upon which all political deliberation is played and then strategically identifies a tactic and an exigency for disruption.Rutgers capitalizes on the growing middle majority of judges who agree that Black Debate practice is an effective training tool for political advocacy. The use of Black Framework flips the script; it is a jarring (re)performance of the acts of exclusion that Black debaters have faced for decades. It took the form of Framework, paired with Black content, to argue that the neo-liberal norms of civil society would no longer get a free pass as the base frame for political negotiation. Rutgers turned a mirror on debate and offered a reflection of itself haunted by the specter of Black death. Arguing Black Framework was an act of bringing out the dead.

#### **Vio – They don’t**

#### This is a debate about whether the negative can effectively contest their truth claims in the first place – their conversation is captured better by reading it on the neg because it gives them an object of critique which makes the conversation more specific. Default to competing interpretations – debating about debate is good. Reasonability justifies judge intervention which is intensified in the context of debates about debate.

#### No RVI’s - 1] Forces the 1NC to go all-in on Theory which kills substance education, 2] Encourages 3] Illogical – you shouldn’t win for not being abusive.

#### Reject 1AR theory- A] 7-6 time skew means it’s endlessly Aff biased B] I don’t have a 3nr which allows for endless extrapolation

## 3

### OFF

#### The 1ACs opposition to the excesses of modernity through the refusal of academic modes positions the aff as a critical savoir of the negligent other in whose name they speak. This is the professionalism of the academy par excellence, where negligence is appropriated and weaponized in favor of an auto-encylopedic mode of recognizing the litany of abuses – this is the worst form of counter insurgency and the most subtle and damning mode of incorporation and turns the aff.

The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Stefano Harney & Fred Moten Released by Minor Compositions 2013 Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson Pg 30-34

THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION. But surely if one can write something on the surface of the university, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a conference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the nation of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint? The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organization, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism. Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the Undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its foundation, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, without admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercommons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and professionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste. But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which critical education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negligence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion. A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write of or write up the undercommons. The Universitas is always a state/State strategy. Perhaps it’s surprising to say professionalization – that which reproduces the professions – is a state strategy. Certainly, critical academic professionals tend to be regarded today as harmless intellectuals, malleable, perhaps capable of some modest intervention in the so-called public sphere. But to see how this underestimates the presence of the state we can turn to a bad reading of Derrida’s consideration of Hegel’s 1822 report to the Prussian Minister of Education. Derrida notices the way that Hegel rivals the state in his ambition for education, wanting to put into place a progressive pedagogy of philosophy designed to support Hegel’s worldview, to unfold as encyclopedic. This ambition both mirrors the state’s ambition, because it, too, wants to control education and to impose a worldview, and threatens it, because Hegel’s State exceeds and thus localizes the Prussian state, exposing its pretense to the encyclopedic. Derrida draws the following lesson from his reading: the Universitas, as he generalizes the university (but specifies it, too, as properly intellectual and not professional), always has the impulse of State, or enlightenment, and the impulse of state, or its specific conditions of production and reproduction. Both have the ambition to be, as Derrida says, onto- and auto-encyclopedic. It follows that to be either for the Universitas or against it presents problems. To be for the Universitas is to support this onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the State as enlightenment, or enlightenment as totality, to use an old-fashioned word. To be too much against the Universitas, however, creates the danger of specific elements in the state taking steps to rid itself of the contradiction of the onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the Universitas and replacing it with some other form of social reproduction, the anti-enlightenment – the position, for instance, of New Labour in Britain and of the states of New York and California with their “teaching institutions.” But a bad reading of Derrida will also yield our question again: what is lost in this undecidability? What is the price of refusing to be either for the Universitas or for professionalization, to be critical of both, and who pays that price? Who makes it possible to reach the aporia of this reading? Who works in the premature excess of totality, in the not not-ready of negligence? The mode of professionalization that is the American university is precisely dedicated to promoting this consensual choice: an antifoundational critique of the University or a foundational critique of the university. Taken as choices, or hedged as bets, one tempered with the other, they are nonetheless always negligent. Professionalization is built on this choice. It rolls out into ethics and efficiency, responsibility and science, and numerous other choices, all built upon the theft, the conquest, the negligence of the outcast mass intellectuality of the undercommons. It is therefore unwise to think of professionalization as a narrowing and better to think of it as a circling, an encircling of war wagons around the last camp of indigenous women and children. Think about the way the American doctor or lawyer regard themselves as educated, enclosed in the circle of the state’s encyclopedia, though they may know nothing of philosophy or history. What would be outside this act of the conquest circle, what kind of ghostly labored world escapes in the circling act, an act like a kind of broken phenomenology where the brackets never come back of and what is experienced as knowledge is the absolute horizon of knowledge whose name is banned by the banishment of the absolute. It is simply a horizon that does not bother to make itself possible. No wonder that whatever their origins or possibilities, it is theories of pragmatism in the United States and critical realism in Britain that command the loyalty of critical intellectuals. Never having to confront the foundation, never having to confront antifoundation out of faith in the unconfrontable foundation, critical intellectuals can float in the middle range. These loyalties banish dialectics with its inconvenient interest in pushing the material and abstract, the table and its brain, as far as it can, unprofessional behavior at its most obvious.

#### Their investment into philosophical discussion about our relationship towards otherness is a tool of speed-elitism. The move for more transparent discussions about ethics mystifies the reliance on highly exlcusive and unethical technologies of travel and communication. By figuring those technics as the metrics for liberatory theology, that expands Debate’s state of exploitation.

**Hoofd 10**(Ingrid M. Hoofd is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, "The Accelerated University: Activist-Academic Alliances and the Simulation of Thought." Ephemera: Theory and politics in organisation, Vol. 10, No.1 (September 2010), http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought) //KB+TR Collab

Cries announcing the **demise** of the university abound, in particular in Europe and North America. Those who utter these cries often do this in an admirable attempt to **renew** the original mandate of the university, namely the fostering of **truth**, **justice** and **democratic debate**. Giving up on the now largely neoliberal and managerial university system that plagues Europe and the United States, some such critics try to mobilise a renewal of this mandate **outside academia’s institutional walls** with people and groups who represent an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Much of this mobilisation is in turn done through technologies and discourses of mobility and tele-communication. Examples here are the European anti-Bologna ‘new university’ projects like Edu-Factory, the various autonomous virtual universities, and the intellectual collaboration with local and international activists and non-Western academics. I am referring here in particular to the promising formation of various extra-academic ‘activist-research’ networks and conferences over the last years, like Facoltà di Fuga (Faculty of Escape), Mobilized Investigation, Rete Ricercatori Precari (Network of Precarious Researchers), Investigacció (Research), Universidad Nómada (Nomadic University), and Glocal Research Space. Characteristically, these projects organise events that try to set up dialogues between non-Western and anti-neoliberal activists and academics, and carve out spaces for offline and web-based discussion and participation. Initiators and participants of these projects often conceptualise their positions as relating closely to **alter-globalist activism** – positions which hence are **hoped** to effectively **subvert neo-liberalism** as well as the **elitist-managerial university space** and its problematic method of scientific objectification for capitalist innovation.

In this paper, I will explain how such announcements of **the university’s demise**, the conceptualisation of its current situation as **one of crisis**, as well as the mobilisation of **the true academic mandate** today which often segues into a **nostalgia for the original university** of independent thought, truth and justice, are themselves paradoxically **complicit in the techno-acceleration that** precisely **grounds and reproduces neo-liberalism.** This is because the playing out of such nostalgia typically runs through the problematic invocation of **the humanist opposition between doing and thinking.** This causes the terms and their mode of production to become increasingly intertwined under contemporary conditions of capitalist simulation in which ‘thinking’ is more and more done in service of an economist form of ‘doing’. The aforementioned commendable projects thus paradoxically appear foremost as symptoms of acceleration.

Moreover, I will argue that this acceleration increasingly renders certain groups and individuals as **targets of techno-academic scrutiny and violence.** This increasing objectification that runs through the contemporary prostheses of the humanist subject hence spells disaster for non-technogenic forms of **gendered**, **raced** and **classed otherness.** I therefore suggest that this disastrous state of affairs is precisely carried out by the humanist promise of transcendence, democracy and justice that currently speeds up institutions like the university, and vice versa. Following this line of thought through, I claim that technological acceleration then surprisingly also harbours the promise of the coming of **a radical alternative** to neo-liberalism, and that it is precisely through the eschatological performance of this promise – arguably a repetition of the Christian belief in the apocalypse – that these activist-research projects and their neo-liberal mode of production may fruitfully **become the future objects of their own critique.** In short then, this paper attempts to affirm and displace the projects’ call for reinstating the original ‘true’ or transcending the current ‘spoilt’ university, in the hope of gesturing towards yet another alterity, through its own accelerated argument.

I argue that the complicity of projects like Edu-Factory and Facoltà di Fuga in technological acceleration should primarily be understood in terms of what I in my work call **speed-elitism** (Hoofd, 2009: 201). I extrapolate the idea of speed-elitism largely from the work of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neoliberal capitalism. In turn, I will argue that these activist-academic projects exacerbate speed-elitism by connecting the latter to Jacques Derrida’s ideas on technology and thought, as well as the late Bill Readings’ and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s critiques of the contemporary university. In ‘Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed’, Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of communication and the logic of speed. They connect the logic of speed specifically to a certain militarisation of society under neoliberalism. In line with Virilio’s Speed and Politics, they argue that the areas of war, communication and trade are today intimately connected through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that ‘**circulation** has become **an essential process** of capitalism, **an end in itself**’ (Armitage and Graham, 2001: 118) and that therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied up in this logic.

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West.

Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the *fantasy* of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as the desire for a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation.

So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal history** of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307).

*Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

#### **The Conditioning of debate as a sight for liberal discussions about our orientations towards ethics merely engenders a semiotic fantasy of radicalism – paving over very real conditions of pain and death that make this space possible. Its try or die for a semiotic insurrection.**

www.AnarchistNews.org 10. “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” https://web.archive.org/web/20171110115921/http://anarchistnews.org/content/university-social-death-and-inside-joke

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### Thus The alternative is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_Sike You Thought\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Voting neg is a withdrawal from the instrumental game of call-and-response into an *aesthetic under-commons of redaction, opacity, and fugitive resonance*. The refusal of demands for transparent or professionalized theory of ethics frustrates the professional logistics of academia.

Moten & Harney 13 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2013 (Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pgs. 28-32)

In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching ver- sus the individualisation of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

As Fredric Jameson reminds us, the university depends upon “Enlightenment-type critiques and demystification of belief and committed ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning and ‘development.’” This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in its homeland security. It needs labor power for this “enlightenment- type critique,” but, somehow, labor always escapes.

The premature subjects of the undercommons took the call seriously, or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning, too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot reproduce itself, it must be reproduced. The university works for the day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realisation and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burn- ing roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth. And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below, informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a re- sult of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shal- low place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor force, whose increasing specialisation and managerialist tendencies, again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful in- tegration of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that commands restorationist loyalty.

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

There is no distinction between the American University and Professionalization

But surely if one can write something on the surface of the univer- sity, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself ? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a con- ference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the na- tion of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint?

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

## 4

### Case

#### 1] in a world we have found anti blackness, the only ethical framework is an anti-ethical approach, one that is against the values of the world and against the ideal of preserving a perfect world itself.

#### 2] Dissimulation DA: Double Bind — either the harms are the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for their impacts before they control the levers of power which means you can vote negative on presumption OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which means you can vote negative on principle.

**Their simulated game playing is insidiously removed from the real, inculcating a erasure of materiality while simultaneously facilitating a broader network of technocratic domination**

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The conception outlined in Chap. 1 of media technologies as not neutral but inherently bound up in aggravating the aporia at the heart of the university immediately suggests that they are a multi-faceted and ambiguous force in the constitution of any learning platform and its pedagogical aims, regardless of the module’s specific content and the assignments that are disseminated through these media. E-learning content itself may in many ways point towards the non-neutrality of the larger socio-economic landscape, in which the medium operates by virtue of the relationship between aesthetics and the context in which this aesthetic is enunciated. The problematic common sense discourse which educators and administrators uphold within higher education, that claims that media are neutral conduits of learning, is therefore itself already symptomatic of a cultural context in which the idea of transparent mediation functions to obscure forms of oppression and disenfranchisement. We can see this misguided claim around neutrality or objectivity that problematically [[[this]]] dissimulates the Eurocentric assumptions behind these tools while simultaneously forcing radical alterity and inter-subjective interpretation and rapport out of the communicative relation in the ‘digital humanities.’ This common sense discourse, as with the very notion of the university itself, is after all historically related to Eurocentric and masculinist ideas of the subject and his potential to autonomously and intentionally transmit as well as control meaning and knowledge through any medium of communication, about which more in Chap. 4 . Instead, I hold to the view in this book that the medium of learning co-constitutes knowledge and engenders certain subject-positions that are consecutively required by the larger economic and social imperatives that universities, and by extension their academic staff, serve. In other words, if the tools and ideology of e-learning are built on a set of assumptions that have historically tended to favour a Western and male elite, what does this mean for local [[[implicates]]] student empowerment and disempowerment along the lines of gender, ethnicity, and class within and outside especially the non-Western classroom? Also, how may the teacher’s responsibility for teaching students, that is, to become profi cient at learning and communicating through new media tools as demanded by the academic institution to ensure the students’ future empowerment and employability lead to a host of tensions within the pedagogical scene between her own in-class authority and the relinquishing of such authority due to the students’ capacity to do ‘self-guided’ online learning? What are the potentials and pitfalls of the displacement of pedagogical authority and responsibility into the e-learning medium, in which, as Lyotard reminds us, power gets uncoupled from truth (or rather, technological power risks becoming the only truth), leaving little space for questioning its automation? This also explains why the advocating of new media in the academic classroom is often simply in and of itself perceived as a ‘good thing’ which will ‘enhance’ learning, as new media themselves problematically come to stand in for humanist ideas of democracy and emancipation. But this ‘virtual emancipation’ for the happy few is then intimately bound up with an accelerated subjugation of the not-so-happy majority, as its prerogative is the sustenance and advancement of neo-liberal globalisation and [[[through]]] its new economic speed-elites. This means that e-learning, through its inherent validation of active, vocal, masculine, connected, and cosmopolitan personhood, is implicated in the reproduction and generation of new hierarchies between students inside as well as outside the university classroom, even though its explicit rhetoric is often about the elimination of these very divisions and disconnections, as well as about an inclusion of the marginalised into the universitas . Some good examples of this paradoxical logic of differential student empowerment (and connection) through oppression (and the dissimulation of disconnection) by way of e-learning are the new learning tools called ‘educational games.’ Educators and teachers logically explore using educational games in the classroom because most of today’s young learners often have ample experience with electronic gaming. Also, the argument is often put forward that if studying can be presented as play, students may be more willing to subject themselves to the ‘un-pleasantries’ of learning. Work as play (or the material confusion of production and play through new media) is nonetheless also one of the hallmarks of the aforementioned contemporary creative economy and its quest for knowledge workers, in which the consumption of electronic media has become thoroughly enmeshed with creative production and circulation. Educational games not only seek to present a learning environment that is in many ways an aesthetic and technical microcosm of a larger current socio-economical context, learning and thinking themselves have [[[becomes]]] a direct extension of the perpetual need for capitalist circulation and innovation, which is itself in turn implicated in forms of highly unequal globalisation and distribution. Electronic games therefore relate to this uneven form of globalisation on two levels: in terms of their technique of instantaneity and acceleration, as well as on the level of their inherently militaristic aesthetics or content (see for instance, also Kline et al. 2003). Learning through educational games must then lead to what I would call a ‘double objectifi cation’ by way of the bilateral speedy dissimulations of oppression that it engenders, especially when it claims to empower the student and seek larger social justice. Let me illustrate this claim with the example of an (at fi rst glance) sympathetic American educational game called Real Lives . According to its online manual, the pedagogical aim of Real Lives is for students to “learn how people really live in other countries” (Educational Simulations 2010). The makers of the game argue that Real Lives is an “empathybuilding world,” which will grant students an “appreciation of their own culture and the cultures of other peoples”—a clear indicator of the speedelitist validation of (virtual) mobility and cross-cultural dialogue. The game starts by assigning to each player a randomly selected character of a certain country, class, and gender. Since the ascription of the game character is based on actual statistical possibilities in terms of place of birth and economic status, the likelihood is high that the character gets born poor in countries like India, Mexico, or in other densely populated places. During the game, the player can take virtual actions like deciding to put her or his character in a school or have her staying at home to help her parents. The player can also determine which hobbies the game character will take up, what job she should take, and so forth. The game time takes one-year leaps at which the student-player can see the impact of external events like disease or fl oods, and his or her own actions on the character and her family. The game software also shows a map of the character’s birth region and its statistics, like its population density, gross annual income, currency, health standards, and such. The character would also possess traits like happiness, athleticism, musicality, and health. While the player’s actions defi nitely infl uence the character and her family’s health and economic status, the potentially interesting part of the game lies in the fact that it contains events and situations that are beyond the player’s control. Such a game structure potentially endows the student with a sense that wider meritocratic or competitive discourses may be fl awed. It is nonetheless obvious that the attributions in Real Lives , while based on statistical facts, may be problematic as they may easily lead students to a simplistic view of a country and its inhabitants. While India, for instance, certainly has many poor people, and while the girls in its poorer areas are frequently not allowed or able to go to school, to have the white Western student come across such representations of ‘India’ time and again can lead to the reproduction of stereotypes and a failure to grasp the complexities of Indian society. Moreover, ‘other’ parts of the world are continually framed through lenses that appeal to a Western mind-set, for instance, through suggesting romantic love interests when the game character reaches adolescence. This then is the fi rst level of objectifi cation that educational games inhabit. But even more serious than such stereotypical representation is the formal mode of objectifi cation and its distancing effects that the game generates. This second objectifi cation resides in how the interface—the ‘flight simulator’—like visual layout on the screen which displays an overview of the categories and character attributes, the major actions and events in the character’s life which can be activated at the stroke of a key—grants the player a false sense of control, as students engage with a machine programmed in such a way that it appears to let them identify with and act out his or her empathy vis-à-vis a ‘real’ child in need. This discursive confusion of reality and simulation is problematic because while students are engrossed in playing this game, the actual children in need disappear from the student-player’s field of vision. Real children in need become a large but distant and vague group of ‘others’ who are effectively beyond the student’s and teacher’s reach of immediate responsibility. As such, time spent engaging in virtual empathy eclipses the real oppressions from the student’s view and experience. In addition, Real Lives eclipses the intricate social and economic relationship between the material production and consumption of such virtual play and the continuous exploitation of people on the brink of social, economic, and environmental disenfranchisement. While relatively affluent young students may indulge in turning other peoples’ distress into an enjoyable and instructive game, such indulgence is precisely based on a speed-elitist neo-liberal structure that exploits the environment, especially that of the poor in countries like India and Mexico, and allows for the outsourcing and feminisation of ever cheaper Third World labour for the computer assembly industry. Long-term attitudinal changes in the student notwithstanding, Real Lives’ disconnecting properties as a technology of acceleration can therefore [[[displacing]]] the effect of the teachers,’ makers,’ and students’ good intentions and empathy into an instantaneous technocratic and symbolic violence. We can see here that the game content is indeed symptomatic of the larger global structures of disenfranchisement, and that the speed-elitist quest for social justice always claims empowerment in the future while engendering disempowerment right now. Although one could counter that such e-learning is only entangled with such negative effects on a macro or global scale, I would nonetheless argue that similar forms of objectifi cation and disenfranchisement also occur within the university classroom as part of e-learning’s justifi cation for residing in speed-elitist discourses and techniques. Four major pieces of evidence of such stratifi cation can be found among the university student body itself, namely issues of ubiquitous teaching and learning, new techniques for surveillance, real-time and spatial disconnection, and the displacement of teacher authority and student responsibility into new media technologies that have become oppressive vision machines.

#### 3] This can’t guide action: a) Virtues conflict – sometimes we have to choose to be kind or be honest, there’s no way to pick – my FW solves by finding universal principles B) Values vary from across cultures – we can’t arbitrate cultural conflicts

#### 4] Virtue ethics isn’t normative – even if it tells us certain character traits are desirable, it misses a link between that desirability and an obligation for other actors to make someone else be virtuous. Their framework dissolves to mine – only we explain what moves us to action – IR is structured as the driving force of violence.

#### 5] Their framework misses a link since they don’t clarify what action is legitimate in moving people to virtue – e.g. you shouldn’t torture someone in order to inspire compassion for people suffering – means my framework is a constraint on the aff since only it can constrain action

#### 6] This argument is infinitely regressive – it’s impossible to come to any conclusion about the true human form since any definition will arbitrarily exclude a certain group of humans who don't share a certain set of characteristics – there’s no common denominator that defines humanity

#### 7] Attempts at defining “good” never succeed because they result in uninformative and non-normative tautologies. Saying that goodness is defined by function is essentially saying function is function. That answers your impact calc.

**Hurka ‘05** Hurka, Thomas, 1-26-2005, "Moore’s Moral Philosophy (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," SEP, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moore-moral/

Especially in Principia Ethica, Moore spent much more time defending his other non-naturalist thesis, of the autonomy of ethics, which he expressed by saying goodness, is simple and unanalyzable and is unanalyzable in non-moral terms. This meant the property is “non-natural,” which means that it [Goodness] is distinct from any of the natural properties studied by science. Views that denied this committed what he dubbed “the naturalistic fallacy,” which he found in hedonists such as Jeremy Bentham, evolutionary ethicists such as Herbert Spencer, and metaphysical ethicists such as T.H. Green. Moore's main argument against their view was what has come to be known as the “open-question argument.” Consider a particular naturalist claim, such as that “x is good” is equivalent to “x is pleasure.” If this claim were true, Moore said, the judgment “Pleasure is good” would be equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure,” yet surely someone who asserts the former means to express more than that uninformative tautology. The same argument can be mounted against any other naturalist proposal: even if we have determined that something is what we desire to desire or is more evolved, the question whether it is good remains “open,” in the sense that it is not settled by the meaning of the word “good.” We can ask whether what we desire to desire is good, and likewise for what is more evolved, more unified, or whatever (Principia Ethica 62–69). Sidgwick had used the same argument against Bentham and Spencer, but only in passing; Moore made it central to his meta-ethics. The open-question argument was much discussed in the 20th century and met with many objections. One said the argument's persuasiveness depends on the “paradox of analysis”: that any definition of a concept will, if successful, appear uninformative. If an analysis does capture all its target concept's content, the sentence linking the two will be a tautology; but this is hardly a reason to reject all analyses. Moore could respond that in other cases accepting a definition leads us to see that the sentence affirming it, while seeming informative, in fact is not. But this does not happen in the case of “good” Even if we agree that only pleasure is good, no amount of reflection will make us think “Pleasure is good” equivalent to “Pleasure is pleasure.”

#### 8] Even if you accept their view of virtues, they are non-codifiable. This means we cannot use virtue theory as a criterion, since the criterion is codified. My opponent can claim they are virtuous, and “knows” the resolution is false because they possesses the virtues. But they can't claim “virtue theory” implies that the resolution is false.