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#### The 1ACs opposition to the excesses of modernity through the refusal of academic modes positions the aff as a critical savoir of the negligent other in whose name they speak. This is the professionalism of the academy par excellence, where negligence is appropriated and weaponized in favor of an auto-encylopedic mode of recognizing the litany of abuses – this is the worst form of counter insurgency and the most subtle and damning mode of incorporation and turns the aff.

The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, Stefano Harney & Fred Moten Released by Minor Compositions 2013 Wivenhoe / New York / Port Watson Pg 30-34

THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY AND PROFESSIONALIZATION. But surely if one can write something on the surface of the university, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a conference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the nation of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint? The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unassimilated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organization, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism. Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the Undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its foundation, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, without admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercommons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and professionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste. But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which critical education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negligence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion. A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write of or write up the undercommons. The Universitas is always a state/State strategy. Perhaps it’s surprising to say professionalization – that which reproduces the professions – is a state strategy. Certainly, critical academic professionals tend to be regarded today as harmless intellectuals, malleable, perhaps capable of some modest intervention in the so-called public sphere. But to see how this underestimates the presence of the state we can turn to a bad reading of Derrida’s consideration of Hegel’s 1822 report to the Prussian Minister of Education. Derrida notices the way that Hegel rivals the state in his ambition for education, wanting to put into place a progressive pedagogy of philosophy designed to support Hegel’s worldview, to unfold as encyclopedic. This ambition both mirrors the state’s ambition, because it, too, wants to control education and to impose a worldview, and threatens it, because Hegel’s State exceeds and thus localizes the Prussian state, exposing its pretense to the encyclopedic. Derrida draws the following lesson from his reading: the Universitas, as he generalizes the university (but specifies it, too, as properly intellectual and not professional), always has the impulse of State, or enlightenment, and the impulse of state, or its specific conditions of production and reproduction. Both have the ambition to be, as Derrida says, onto- and auto-encyclopedic. It follows that to be either for the Universitas or against it presents problems. To be for the Universitas is to support this onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the State as enlightenment, or enlightenment as totality, to use an old-fashioned word. To be too much against the Universitas, however, creates the danger of specific elements in the state taking steps to rid itself of the contradiction of the onto- and auto-encyclopedic project of the Universitas and replacing it with some other form of social reproduction, the anti-enlightenment – the position, for instance, of New Labour in Britain and of the states of New York and California with their “teaching institutions.” But a bad reading of Derrida will also yield our question again: what is lost in this undecidability? What is the price of refusing to be either for the Universitas or for professionalization, to be critical of both, and who pays that price? Who makes it possible to reach the aporia of this reading? Who works in the premature excess of totality, in the not not-ready of negligence? The mode of professionalization that is the American university is precisely dedicated to promoting this consensual choice: an antifoundational critique of the University or a foundational critique of the university. Taken as choices, or hedged as bets, one tempered with the other, they are nonetheless always negligent. Professionalization is built on this choice. It rolls out into ethics and efficiency, responsibility and science, and numerous other choices, all built upon the theft, the conquest, the negligence of the outcast mass intellectuality of the undercommons. It is therefore unwise to think of professionalization as a narrowing and better to think of it as a circling, an encircling of war wagons around the last camp of indigenous women and children. Think about the way the American doctor or lawyer regard themselves as educated, enclosed in the circle of the state’s encyclopedia, though they may know nothing of philosophy or history. What would be outside this act of the conquest circle, what kind of ghostly labored world escapes in the circling act, an act like a kind of broken phenomenology where the brackets never come back of and what is experienced as knowledge is the absolute horizon of knowledge whose name is banned by the banishment of the absolute. It is simply a horizon that does not bother to make itself possible. No wonder that whatever their origins or possibilities, it is theories of pragmatism in the United States and critical realism in Britain that command the loyalty of critical intellectuals. Never having to confront the foundation, never having to confront antifoundation out of faith in the unconfrontable foundation, critical intellectuals can float in the middle range. These loyalties banish dialectics with its inconvenient interest in pushing the material and abstract, the table and its brain, as far as it can, unprofessional behavior at its most obvious.

#### Their investment into philosophical discussion about our relationship towards otherness is a tool of speed-elitism. The move for more transparent discussions about ethics mystifies the reliance on highly exlcusive and unethical technologies of travel and communication. By figuring those technics as the metrics for liberatory theology, that expands Debate’s state of exploitation.

**Hoofd 10**(Ingrid M. Hoofd is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, "The Accelerated University: Activist-Academic Alliances and the Simulation of Thought." Ephemera: Theory and politics in organisation, Vol. 10, No.1 (September 2010), http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought) //KB+TR Collab

Cries announcing the **demise** of the university abound, in particular in Europe and North America. Those who utter these cries often do this in an admirable attempt to **renew** the original mandate of the university, namely the fostering of **truth**, **justice** and **democratic debate**. Giving up on the now largely neoliberal and managerial university system that plagues Europe and the United States, some such critics try to mobilise a renewal of this mandate **outside academia’s institutional walls** with people and groups who represent an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Much of this mobilisation is in turn done through technologies and discourses of mobility and tele-communication. Examples here are the European anti-Bologna ‘new university’ projects like Edu-Factory, the various autonomous virtual universities, and the intellectual collaboration with local and international activists and non-Western academics. I am referring here in particular to the promising formation of various extra-academic ‘activist-research’ networks and conferences over the last years, like Facoltà di Fuga (Faculty of Escape), Mobilized Investigation, Rete Ricercatori Precari (Network of Precarious Researchers), Investigacció (Research), Universidad Nómada (Nomadic University), and Glocal Research Space. Characteristically, these projects organise events that try to set up dialogues between non-Western and anti-neoliberal activists and academics, and carve out spaces for offline and web-based discussion and participation. Initiators and participants of these projects often conceptualise their positions as relating closely to **alter-globalist activism** – positions which hence are **hoped** to effectively **subvert neo-liberalism** as well as the **elitist-managerial university space** and its problematic method of scientific objectification for capitalist innovation.

In this paper, I will explain how such announcements of **the university’s demise**, the conceptualisation of its current situation as **one of crisis**, as well as the mobilisation of **the true academic mandate** today which often segues into a **nostalgia for the original university** of independent thought, truth and justice, are themselves paradoxically **complicit in the techno-acceleration that** precisely **grounds and reproduces neo-liberalism.** This is because the playing out of such nostalgia typically runs through the problematic invocation of **the humanist opposition between doing and thinking.** This causes the terms and their mode of production to become increasingly intertwined under contemporary conditions of capitalist simulation in which ‘thinking’ is more and more done in service of an economist form of ‘doing’. The aforementioned commendable projects thus paradoxically appear foremost as symptoms of acceleration.

Moreover, I will argue that this acceleration increasingly renders certain groups and individuals as **targets of techno-academic scrutiny and violence.** This increasing objectification that runs through the contemporary prostheses of the humanist subject hence spells disaster for non-technogenic forms of **gendered**, **raced** and **classed otherness.** I therefore suggest that this disastrous state of affairs is precisely carried out by the humanist promise of transcendence, democracy and justice that currently speeds up institutions like the university, and vice versa. Following this line of thought through, I claim that technological acceleration then surprisingly also harbours the promise of the coming of **a radical alternative** to neo-liberalism, and that it is precisely through the eschatological performance of this promise – arguably a repetition of the Christian belief in the apocalypse – that these activist-research projects and their neo-liberal mode of production may fruitfully **become the future objects of their own critique.** In short then, this paper attempts to affirm and displace the projects’ call for reinstating the original ‘true’ or transcending the current ‘spoilt’ university, in the hope of gesturing towards yet another alterity, through its own accelerated argument.

I argue that the complicity of projects like Edu-Factory and Facoltà di Fuga in technological acceleration should primarily be understood in terms of what I in my work call **speed-elitism** (Hoofd, 2009: 201). I extrapolate the idea of speed-elitism largely from the work of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neoliberal capitalism. In turn, I will argue that these activist-academic projects exacerbate speed-elitism by connecting the latter to Jacques Derrida’s ideas on technology and thought, as well as the late Bill Readings’ and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s critiques of the contemporary university. In ‘Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed’, Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of communication and the logic of speed. They connect the logic of speed specifically to a certain militarisation of society under neoliberalism. In line with Virilio’s Speed and Politics, they argue that the areas of war, communication and trade are today intimately connected through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that ‘**circulation** has become **an essential process** of capitalism, **an end in itself**’ (Armitage and Graham, 2001: 118) and that therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied up in this logic.

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West.

Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the *fantasy* of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as the desire for a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation.

So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal history** of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307).

*Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

#### **The Conditioning of debate as a sight for liberal discussions about our orientations towards ethics merely engenders a semiotic fantasy of radicalism – paving over very real conditions of pain and death that make this space possible. Its try or die for a semiotic insurrection.**

www.AnarchistNews.org 10. “The University, Social Death, and the Inside Joke,” https://web.archive.org/web/20171110115921/http://anarchistnews.org/content/university-social-death-and-inside-joke

Universities may serve as progressive sites of inquiry in some cases, yet this does not detract from the great deal of military and corporate research, economic planning and, perhaps most importantly, social conditioning occurring within their walls. Furthermore, they serve as intense machines for the concentration of privilege; each university is increasingly staffed by overworked professors and adjuncts, poorly treated maintenance and service staff. This remains only the top of the pyramid, since a hyper educated, stable society along Western lines can only exist by the intense exploitation of labor and resources in the third world. Students are taught to be oblivious to this fact; liberal seminars only serve to obfuscate the fact that they are themselves complicit in the death and destruction waged on a daily basis. They sing the college fight song and wear hooded sweatshirts (in the case of hip liberal arts colleges, flannel serves the same purpose). As the Berkeley rebels observe, “Social death is our banal acceptance of an institution’s meaning for our own lack of meaning.”[43] Our conception of the social is as the death of everything sociality entails; it is the failure of communication, the refusal of empathy, the abandonment of autonomy. Baudrillard writes that “The cemetery no longer exists because modern cities have entirely taken over their function: they are ghost towns, cities of death. If the great operational metropolis is the final form of an entire culture, then, quite simply, ours is a culture of death.”[44] By attempting to excel in a university setting, we are resigning ourselves to enrolling in what Mark Yudoff so proudly calls a cemetery, a necropolis to rival no other. Yet herein lies the punch line. We are studying in the cemeteries of a nation which has a cultural fetish for things that refuse to stay dead; an absolute fixation with zombies. So perhaps the goal should not be to go “Beyond Zombie Politics” at all. Writes Baudrillard: “The event itself is counter-offensive and comes from a strange source: in every system at its apex, at its point of perfection, it reintroduces negativity and death.”[45] The University, by totalizing itself and perfecting its critiques, has spontaneously generated its own antithesis. Some element of sociality refuses to stay within the discourse of the social, the dead; it becomes undead, radically potent. According to Steven Shaviro’s The Cinematic Body, “zombies mark the dead end or zero degree of capitalism’s logic of endless consumption and ever expanding accumulation, precisely because they embody this logic so literally and to such excess.”[46] In that sense, they are almost identical to the mass, the silent majorities that Baudrillard describe as the ideal form of resistance to the social: “they know that there is no liberation, and that a system is abolished only by pushing it into hyperlogic, by forcing it into excessive practice which is equivalent to a brutal amortization.”[47] Zombies do not constitute a threat at first, they shamble about their environments in an almost comic manner and are easily dispatched by a shotgun blast to the face. Similarly, students emerge from the university in which they have been buried, engaging in random acts of symbolic hyperconsumption and overproduction; perhaps an overly enthusiastic usage of a classroom or cafeteria here and there, or a particularly moving piece of theatrical composition that is easily suppressed. “Disaster is consumed as cheesy spectacle, complete with incompetent reporting, useless information bulletins, and inane attempts at commentary:”[48] Shaviro is talking about Night of the Living Dead, but he might as well be referring to the press coverage of the first California occupations. Other students respond with horror to the encroachment of dissidents: “the living characters are concerned less about the prospect of being killed than they are about being swept away by mimesis – of returning to existence, after death, transformed into zombies themselves.”[49] Liberal student activists fear the incursions the most, as they are in many ways the most invested in the fate of the contemporary university; in many ways their role is similar to that of the survivalists in Night of the Living Dead, or the military officers in Day. Beyond Zombie Politics claims that defenders of the UC system are promoting a “Zombie Politics”; yet this is difficult to fathom. For they are insistent on saving the University, on staying ‘alive’, even when their version of life has been stripped of all that makes life worth living, when it is as good as social death. Shaviro notes that in many scenes in zombie films, our conceptions of protagonist and antagonist are reversed; in many scenes, human survivors act so repugnantly that we celebrate their infection or demise.[50] In reality, “Zombie Politics are something to be championed, because they are the politics of a multitude, an inclusive mass of political subjects, seeking to consume brains. Yet brains must be seen as a metaphor for what Marx calls “the General Intellect”; in his Fragment on Machines, he describes it as “the power of knowledge, objectified.”[51] Students and faculty have been alienated from their labor, and, angry and zombie-like, they seek to destroy the means of their alienation. Yet, for Shaviro, “the hardest thing to acknowledge is that the living dead are not radically Other so much as they serve to awaken a passion for otherness and for vertiginous disidentification that is already latent within our own selves.”[52] In other words, we have a widespread problem with aspiring to be this other, this powerless mass. We seek a clear protagonist, we cannot avoid associating with those we perceive as ‘still alive’. Yet for Baudrillard, this constitutes a fundamental flaw: "at the very core of the 'rationality' of our culture, however, is an exclusion that precedes every other, more radical than the exclusion of madmen, children or inferior races, an exclusion preceding all these and serving as their model: the exclusion of the dead and of death."[53] In Forget Foucault, we learn the sad reality about biopower: that power itself is fundamentally based on the separation and alienation of death from the reality of our existence. If we are to continue to use this conception, we risk failing to see that our very lives have been turned into a mechanism for perpetuation of social death: the banal simulation of existence. Whereas socialized death is a starting point for Foucault, in Baudrillard and in recent actions from California, we see a return to a reevaluation of society and of death; a possible return to zombie politics. Baudrillard distinguishes himself as a connoisseur of graffiti; in Forget Foucault, he quotes a piece that said “When Jesus arose from the dead, he became a zombie.”[54] Perhaps the reevaluation of zombie politics will serve as the messianic shift that blasts open the gates of hell, the cemetery-university. According to the Berkeley kids, “when we move without return to their tired meaning, to their tired configurations of the material, we are engaging in war.”[55] Baudrillard’s words about semiotic insurrectionaries might suffice: "They blasted their way out however, so as to burst into reality like a scream, an interjection, an anti-discourse, as the waste of all syntatic, poetic and political development, as the smallest radical element that cannot be caught by any organized discourse. Invincible due to their own poverty, they resist every interpretation and every connotation, no longer denoting anyone or anything."[56]

#### Thus The alternative is \_\_\_\_\_\_\_Sike You Thought\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Voting neg is a withdrawal from the instrumental game of call-and-response into an *aesthetic under-commons of redaction, opacity, and fugitive resonance*. The refusal of demands for transparent or professionalized theory of ethics frustrates the professional logistics of academia.

Moten & Harney 13 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2013 (Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pgs. 28-32)

In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching ver- sus the individualisation of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

As Fredric Jameson reminds us, the university depends upon “Enlightenment-type critiques and demystification of belief and committed ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning and ‘development.’” This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in its homeland security. It needs labor power for this “enlightenment- type critique,” but, somehow, labor always escapes.

The premature subjects of the undercommons took the call seriously, or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning, too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot reproduce itself, it must be reproduced. The university works for the day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realisation and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burn- ing roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth. And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below, informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a re- sult of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shal- low place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor force, whose increasing specialisation and managerialist tendencies, again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful in- tegration of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that commands restorationist loyalty.

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

There is no distinction between the American University and Professionalization

But surely if one can write something on the surface of the univer- sity, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself ? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a con- ference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the na- tion of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint?

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

### Case

### ADV proper

#### 1] Innovation turns and outweighs the aff – squo is better than the aff for least advantaged.

Resnik, D.B. (2004). Fair Drug Prices and the Patent System. Health Care Analysis 12, 91–115 <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:HCAN.0000041185.52817.8c> JS

Rawls can provide an answer to Wreen’s concerns about the justice of the patent system. Since a patent holder has a limited monopoly on his or her invention, he or she can earn a great deal of wealth from his or her useful invention. Patents can therefore have profound consequences for the distribution of wealth in society, and may benefit the advantaged members of society more than the disadvantaged members. To address these concerns from a Rawlsian perspective, we should consider his second principle of justice. The second principle allows for social and economic inequalities provided that there is fair equality of opportunity in society and that these inequalities benefit the least advantaged members of society. To simplify our analysis, let us assume that fair equality of opportunity has been satisfied in a particular society. We could then focus our discussion on the following question: does the patent system benefit the least advantaged members of society? If it does, then it would be fair, and its effects on the prices of patented inventions would also be fair. The argument that the patent system benefits the least advantaged members of society goes as follows: 1. The patent system provides incentives for inventors, investors, and entrepreneurs to develop new technologies. 2. While the least advantaged members of society cannot afford these new technologies when they are first developed, over time these new technologies become less expensive and affordable. 3. Although these new technologies have potential benefits as well as potential harms, and some technologies are very harmful, on the whole, the benefits of technological innovation outweigh the harms. 4. Thus, the patent system benefits the least advantaged members of society (in the long run) by stimulating the development of new technologies.

#### 2] The veil of ignorance requires respect for property rights, which means the aff is bad.

Resnik, D.B. Fair Drug Prices and the Patent System. Health Care Analysis 12, 91–115 (2004). <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:HCAN.0000041185.52817.8c> JS

One can approach the justification of patents from two different perspectives, from the perspective of patent rights and the perspective of the utility of the patent system. Although the courts tend to favor the utilitarian approach, the rights-based approach plays an influential role in policy debates as well (Wreen 1998, Resnik and De Ville, 2002). While one might view a patent as simply a privilege that the government grants to inventors, it can also be viewed as a right—an intellectual property right. If inventors have rights pertaining to their inventions, then those rights should be respected. In section 4.1, we observed that Rawls’ first principle of justice implies that societies should protect human rights, including property rights. However, Rawls defends what he calls a narrow conception of property rights: property rights need not extend farther than is necessary to promote a person’s independence and self-respect. What is the relationship between independence/self-respect and patent rights? To promote self-respect, society should always give inventors proper intellectual credit for their inventions, since giving someone also the credit would be simply stealing the person’s idea. To promote independence, society should also allow inventors to profit from their inventions, since commercialize activity can promote economic independence. But beyond these minimum requirements for patent protection, societies could take a number of steps to restrict patent rights, such as limiting the term of patents, narrowing the scope of patents and perhaps even engaging in compulsory licensing, under certain conditions. This is where utility considerations could come into play: as long as society recognizes some basic patent rights, it could limit these rights to achieve worthwhile social goals, such as promoting commerce and industry, scientific research or national defense, or to deal with a national emergency. Indeed, the history of U.S. jurisprudence relating to patents reflects a careful balancing of patents rights and the public good, and the courts have been willing to limit patent rights to promote the progress of science and the useful arts

#### 3] Abstraction DA - Rawls assumes a theory of strict compliance, which ignores a state that systemically slaughters minorities.

**Mills ‘05** Mills, Charles [Caribbean philosopher from Jamaica. He is known for his work in social and political philosophy, particularly in oppositional political theory as centered on class, gender, and race] “Ideal Theory as Ideology” *Hypatia,* Volume 20 (Number 3). Summer 2005. RP

Strict compliance. Finally, **some theorists, such as**, famously, John **Rawls** in *A Theory of Justice*, also **endorse “ideal theory” in the sense of “strict compliance as opposed to partial compliance theory”**: the examination of “the principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. **Everyone is presumed to act justly** and to do his part in upholding just institutions.” **Rawls concedes that “the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent matters**. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life.” But, he argues, “The reason for beginning with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these more pressing problems” (Rawls 1999, 8). Since **Rawls’s** text **is widely credited with reviving** postwar Anglo- American **normative political theory, and** of being the most important book of the twentieth century in that tradition, **this methodological decision can plausibly be argued to have been a significant factor in influencing the whole** subsequent direction of the **field**, though I would also claim that **his decision** and its general endorsement **also reflect deeper structural biases** in the profession. **He adds:**  Silence on oppression. Almost by definition, **it follows from the focus of ideal theory that little or nothing will be said on actual historic oppression** and its legacy in the present, or current ongoing oppression, though these may be gestured at in a vague or promissory way (as something to be dealt with later). **Correspondingly, the ways in which systematic oppression is likely to shape the basic social institutions** (as well as the humans in those institutions) **will not be part of the theory’s concern, and this will manifest itself in the absence of ideal-as-descriptive-model concepts** that would provide the necessary macro- and micro-mapping of that oppression, and that are requisite for understanding its reproductive dynamic. Ideal social institutions. **Fundamental social institutions such as the family, the economic structure, the legal system, will therefore be conceptualized in ideal-as-idealized-model terms, with little or no sense of how their actual work- ings may systematically disadvantage women, the poor, and racial minorities.**

#### 4] Dissent Da - Their interpretation obscures antagonism which results in violence and erases dissent

Mouffe ‘09 (Chantal, University of Westminster professor of political theory, “The Democratic Paradox,” Verso, 2009, p. 30-31)

What Rawls’s view of the well-ordered society eliminates is the democratic struggle among ‘adversaries’, that is, those who share the allegiance to the liberal-democratic principles, but while defending different interpretations of what liberty and equality should mean and to which kind of social relations and institutions they should apply. This is why in his ‘liberal utopia’ legitimate dissent would have been eradicated from the public sphere. How has he been led to defend such a position? Why doesn’t his conception of democracy leave any space for the agonistic confrontation among contested interpretations of the shared liberal-democratic principles? The answer lies, I believe, in his flawed conception of politics, which is reduced to a mere activity of allocating among competing interests susceptible to a rational solution. This is why he thinks that political conflicts can be eliminated thanks to a conception of justice that appeals to individuals’ idea of rational advantage within the constraints established by the reasonable. According to his theory, citizens need as free and equal persons the same goods because their conception of the good – however distinct their content – ‘require for their advancement roughly the same primary goods, that is, the same basic rights, liberties, and opportunities, and the same all-purpose means such as income and wealth, with all of these supported by the same social bases of self-respect’. 11 Therefore, once the just answer to the problem of distribution of these primary goods has been found, the rivalry that previously existed in the political domain disappears. Rawls’s scenario presupposes that political actors are only driven by what they see as their rational self-advantage. Passions are erased from the realm of politics, which is reduced to a neutral field of competing interests. Completely missing from such an approach is ‘the political’ in its dimension of power, antagonism and relationships of forces. What ‘political liberalism’ is at pains to eliminate is the element of ‘undecidability’ which is present in human relations. It offers us a picture of the well-ordered society as one from which – through rational agreement on justice – antagonism , violence, power and repression have disappeared. But it is only because they have been made invisible through a clever stratagem: the distinction between ‘simple’ and ‘reasonable pluralism’. In that way, exclusions can be denied by declaring that they are the product of the ‘free exercise of practical reason’ that establishes the limits of possible consensus. When a point of view is excluded it is because this is required by the exercise of reason; therefore the frontiers between what is legitimate and what is not legitimate appear as independent of power relations. Thanks to this legerdemain, rationality and morality provide the key to solving the ‘paradox of liberalism’: how to eliminate its adversaries while remaining neutral. Alas, it is not enough to eliminate the political in its dimension of antagonism and exclusion from one’s theory to make it vanish from the real world. It does come back, and with a vengeance. Once the liberal approach has created a framework in which its dynamics cannot be grasped, and where the institutions and the discourses are missing that could permit that potential antagonisms manifest themselves under an agonistic mode, the danger exists that instead of a struggle among adversaries, what will take place is a war among enemies. This is why, far from being conducive to a more reconciled society, this type of approach ends up by jeopardizing democracy.