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#### Settler Colonialism is a structure not an event that becomes a system of fungibility severing people from land resulting in chattel slavery, indigenous, genocide, and ecocide. Systems of the University are complicit overdetermining how we engage and relate with the world making forefronting Settler Colonialism a prior question.

Paperson 17 la paperson or K. Wayne Yang, June 2017, “A Third University is Possible” (an associate professor of ethnic studies at the University of California, San Diego)//Elmer

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to seize and exploit but to stay, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006.[2] However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire.[3] The critical literatures of the colonized have long positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement as a spatial immediacy of empire: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place. On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations.[4] Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, settler colonialism is something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is happening for them/us right now. Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as settler colonial technologies that enable the “eventful” history of plunder and disappearance. Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, recasts Black Indigenous people as black bodies for biopolitical disposal: who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom.[5] In the alienation of land from life, alienable rights are produced: the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), the right to have rights (humanity). In a word, what is produced is whiteness. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.[6] “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies —a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. This chapter proceeds with the following insights. (1) The settler–native– slave triad does not describe identities. The triad—an analytic mainstay of settler colonial studies—digs a pitfall of identity that not only chills collaborations but also implies that the racial will be the solution. (2) Technologies are trafficked. Technologies generate patterns of social relations to land. Technologies mutate, and so do these relationships. Colonial technologies travel. In tracing technologies’ past and future trajectories, we can connect how settler colonial and antiblack technologies circulate in transnational arenas. (3) Land—not just people—is the biopolitical target.[7] The examples are many: fracking, biopiracy, damming of rivers and flooding of valleys, the carcasses of pigs that die from the feed additive ractopamine and are allowable for harvest by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. The subjugation of land and nonhuman life to deathlike states in order to support “human” life is a “biopolitics” well beyond the Foucauldian conception of biopolitical as governmentality or the neoliberal disciplining of modern, bourgeois, “human” subject. (4) (Y)our task is to theorize in the break, that is, to refuse the master narrative that technology is loyal to the master, that (y)our theory has a Eurocentric origin. Black studies, Indigenous studies, and Othered studies have already made their breaks with Foucault (over biopolitics), with Deleuze and Guatarri (over assemblages and machines), and with Marx (over life and primitive accumulation). (5) Even when they are dangerous, understanding technologies provides us some pathways for decolonizing work. We can identify projects of collaboration on decolonial technologies. Colonizing mechanisms are evolving into new forms, and they might be subverted toward decolonizing operations. The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land and thus is shaped to fit modes of empire. Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship between the immune humanity of the white settler and the impugned humanity of the native. For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado- Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people.[8] This creates a host of post+colonial problems that have come to define modernity. Because the humanity of the settler is predicated on his ability to “write the world,” to make history upon and over the natural world, the colonized is instructed to make her claim to humanity by similarly acting on the world or, more precisely, acting in his. Indeed, for Fanon, it is the perverse ontology of settler becomings—becoming landowner or becoming property, becoming killable or becoming a killer—and the mutual implication of tortured and torturer that mark the psychosis of colonialism. This problem of modernity and colonial psychosis is echoed in Jack Forbes’s writings: Columbus was a wétiko. He was mentally ill or insane, the carrier of a terribly contagious psychological disease, the wétiko psychosis. . . . The wétiko psychosis, and the problems it creates, have inspired many resistance movements and efforts at reform or revolution. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have failed because they have never diagnosed the wétiko.[9] Under Western modernity, becoming “free” means becoming a colonizer, and because of this, “the central contradiction of modernity is freedom.”[10] Critiques of settler colonialism, therefore, do not offer just another “type” of colonialism to add to the literature but a mode of analysis that has repercussions for any diagnosis of coloniality and for understanding the modern conditions of freedom. By modern conditions of freedom, I mean that Western freedom is a product of colonial modernity, and I mean that such freedom comes with conditions, with strings attached, most manifest as terms of unfreedom for nonhumans. As Cindi Mayweather says, “your freedom’s in a bind.”[11]

#### The Accessibility and promotion of Crispr is an attempt to rectify settler Eugenics resulting in Colonial Ableism

**Sufian ‘21** (Sandy Sufian. . “The Threat That CRISPR Poses to Disabled People”. 3-15-2021. BRINK – Conversations and Insights on Global Business. https://www.brinknews.com/the-threat-that-crispr-poses-to-the-disabled/. Accessed 9-15-2021)//Joey

There are serious debates going on in bioethics circles about using CRISPR for “embryo editing,” that is, germline editing. Behind this goal lies a commonsense assumption that it is invariably a good thing to get rid of “bad genes.” “Of course,” proponents argue, “why wouldn’t we want to eliminate all disease? Why wouldn’t we want to get rid of anything that’s causing suffering?” By contrast, critics argue that proponents of germline editing are following a utopian future that is essentially eugenic. The whole idea of eugenics historically was to “improve” the human race by promoting the reproduction of white, Western, wealthy, healthy, young, able-bodied and non- immigrant populations. Simultaneously, eugenics discouraged the propagation of poor people and those considered inferior, while it also promoted the elimination of populations considered defective, immoral and weak, like people of color, Jewish people and disabled people. Germline CRISPR uses methods different from eugenic measures in the past, but it nonetheless disallows people with genetic differences from coming into the world, while simultaneously claiming to “improve” the human race by eliminating genetic diseases in future generations. In a piece that my co-author Rosemarie Garland Thomson and I wrote in Scientific American, we wanted to call out the main assumptions underlying the perspective that invites germline editing on the basis that it is “of course” good to alleviate genetic disease; that is, that people with disabilities are in a constant state of suffering, that there is absolutely nothing good that can come of disability and that our lives are, therefore, not worth living. We also wanted to expose what we see as the problematic, conceptual disaggregation between “disease” and “people” in the debate over CRISPR. We argue that one cannot separate the two since having a genetic disease is a key part of one’s identity and of one’s lived experience. Moreover, the move to separate disease and people allows a person to claim the moral higher ground while also distancing themselves from a eugenic agenda. Fundamentally, taking that position assumes that disability is only and all about suffering. How can anyone claim that they are alleviating suffering by editing people like me out of the human community, while also claiming to fully embrace people like me with genetic differences? If you were to say that a technology could change African American people’s skin to make them white in order to alleviate their suffering of racism, we would be up in arms, as we should. So how do you embrace genetic differences if you are in favor of getting rid of them? To use the race analogy: If we had a project to get rid of black skin, how can you do that while also saying you are embracing Black people? If this type of argument is unacceptable — as it should be — for our society, then why do we think that sort of logic should apply to people with genetic differences? BRINK: So what’s the solution then, in policy terms? SUFIAN: At the moment, scientists have called for a self-imposed temporary, international moratorium on editing inherited genes and a global governance mechanism that regulates its use. I think this is a good first step, and we would support a longer-term moratorium that is not voluntary, with a standardized governance structure across nations, rather than letting each country set its own rules. There is a widespread belief in what we call “common sense able-ism,” the sort of, “of course we would want to get rid of and cure all diseases,” and, “of course, that would be the best thing for everyone.” Post the ADA (the Americans with Disabilities Act), some people’s attitudes toward people with disabilities shifted and became more tolerant, at least in the United States, but we still have a long way to go in our attitudes toward disability. There is still widespread discrimination based on disability in employment, education, family and medical care. COVID has actually revealed a lot of underlying attitudes in terms of questions about who is disposable, particularly in medical rationing: Who deserves a ventilator? Who does not deserve a ventilator?

#### Debate replicates the actions of academia via the misrecognition of genocide as “settlement” and native thought as “land-centered pedagogy” is

#### Communicative practices work to secure the monopoly of white-manhood. The trick of liberalism is its transmogrification of radicalism into a palliative in order to fuel the counter-insurgency and racial capital. You should vote neg to reject politics of reginiton which only a refusal to commitment can solve

Brough 20 [Brough, Taylor J., the GOAT, May 2020, Counter-Insurgency, Liberalism, & the transmogrification of radical meaning, master’s thesis, Wake Forest University, [https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/96863/Brough\_wfu\_0248M\_11531.pdf]](https://wakespace.lib.wfu.edu/bitstream/handle/10339/96863/Brough_wfu_0248M_11531.pdf%5d) )//Raunak Dua + Joey

The moment that inaugurated privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political” as counter-hegemonic terms was also conditioned by the cultural politics of what has routinely been described as the death of the subject. The narrative goes, the subject – conceptualized by these discourses as white and male – and his monopoly, having been successfully challenged by his racialized others, was dethroned, and subsequently the cultural and racial others who undermined the subject’s hegemony were able to lay claim to a properly political voice through cultural representation. As Denise Ferreira da Silva explains, “[S]ocial analysts described these circumstances as the onset of a new site of political struggle —the politics of representation, that is, the struggle for the recognition of cultural difference —that registered the demise of the metanarratives of reason and history that compose modern representation.” 1 Thus a struggle around representation ensued, and the battlefields of that struggle expanded through social media sites, university classrooms, and activist contexts where the question of the representation of modernity’s cultural and racial others remains primary.

Unfortunately, these representational politics remained wedded to the durability of liberal modernity’s subject. As da Silva continues, What was probably less self-evident, perhaps, was that the subject’s passing would not result in its complete annihilation. I am not referring here to how the former private holdings of the subject, Truth and Being, were being invaded by its others, because it was precisely their “fragmentation” that led many observers to announce his death. What has yet to be acknowledged, however, is how this invasion belies the productive powers of the very tools that carved and instituted the place of the subject.2 The counter-hegemonies that felt so ineffably resistive were themselves animated by a melioristic model of subjectivity whose claim on liberatory representation was modeled after the subject of its critique.

Now terms like privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political” have come to feel like the closing in of counterinsurgents on revolutionary meaning. A recent Millenial Revolution article, entitled “Why Privilege Makes You Soft” champions the skills learned from growing up in poverty as opportunities to succeed in the financial marketplace, which apparently, along with creating a seven-figure investment portfolio and frugal spending habits, constitutes “a revolution.”3 A blog post from the ACPA argues for “starting a revolution” by asking how to make college campuses more diverse and welcoming to multiply marginalized students, such as offering advising outside business hours and including gender neutral bathrooms.4 A personal blog post from Robin Morgan explains that “the personal is political” is a revolutionary phrase, and one decidedly aligned with “the American spirit,” because it can motivate calls for expansions of healthcare in service of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”5 The “revolution” explained by these think pieces is a far cry from the liberation movements and radical traditions that inspired the coinage of privilege, intersectionality, and “the personal is political.” The above blog posts advocate for expansions of racial capitalism, the university, and the nation-state form through an affirmative relationship to marginality and a welcoming attitude towards racial and cultural difference. This so-called revolution, then, invites a limited reading of history and violence. In other words, the left’s culture of political correctness is limited by that very thing which it understands to be most advantageous to it: its preoccupation with ethicality, goodness, and being on the right side of history. The terms have shifted, or I have shifted, or both.

I began writing this thesis not because I have transcended the need for those terms, or because I think that power must no longer be challenged, but instead because I have come to find the desire to be the right kind of radical itself a kind of enclosure, a delimitation of what can be thought, enunciated, and felt. Even charting the history of my radicalization as beginning when I started to use these terminologies belies a refusal to read my younger experiences, structured by genocide, racial capitalism, antiblackness, the nation-state form, and coercive gender assignation, as radicalizing moments or opportunities for refusal. In other words, I am always re-learning that I do not want to be right – not on the right side of history, the right side of discourse, the right side of the library, the right side of the classroom, or the right side of the most recent Twitter or Facebook fight. I want to be wrong. And I want the revolution – not the expansion of liberalism but instead the destruction of it – to win.

This project, then, emerged from my sense that radical meanings are being transmogrified into political sense-making through the logics of multiculturalism, representative democracy, and a really vile insistence on non-violent consciousness-raising. The politics of representation, a phenomenon which I explore in depth throughout this project, emerged in the last fifty years or so as a counterinsurgent strategy to manage revolutionary uprising. The successes of multiculturalism and the politics of representation have been most apparent in moments where liberal institutions (the university, capital, and the state, among others) have utilized them to route desires for upheaval in the register of raciality back into the community of liberal Humanity. Liberalism’s ability to domesticate the political imaginations carried by radical terminologies has endured through the politics of representation. This politics performs its counterinsurgency through changes to the terrain that do not fundamentally change the battlefield itself, by preserving what the counterinsurgency has always been trying to protect: its own monopoly on the proper use of violence in service of the protection of the ascendancy of white life.

#### This genocidal logic naturalizes itself into the unconscious whereby the settler dream becomes extermination.

Young 17 (Bryanne Huston, Doctoral Student at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill “Killing the Indian in the Child: Materialities of Death and Political Formations of Life in the Canadian Indian Residential School System,” pp. 95-100) NIJ

Whiteness, the Child, and the Logics of Futurity Against the politicized topographies and temporalities of indigeneity and race, I now move into a consideration of the contributions of psychoanalytic theory to the questions of politics and time presented thus far. The kinds of questions psychoanalysis is interested in asking, the registers upon which it performs analysis, and its unique emphasis on temporality, language, and difference provide an excellent conceptual apparatus through which we might begin to trouble/problematize stable, taken-for-granted oppositions between psychic and social, personal and political, self and other. Freud’s interest in time is evident in his work on the uncanny, and in his inaugural work on what we might now call trauma studies and conditions we now call post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For Freud, this theory of hysteria introduces a provocative temporality in which traumatic events reoccur, flashing up in perfect replication of themselves, as though happening again and again. In his diagnosis of so-called shell-shocked soldiers returning from World War I, Freud was keenly aware that time did not always progress along an even plane. Though Freud’s analysis of trauma is captivating and critically rich, it is not within my purview here to take on the full extent of this scholarship. Instead, what is most salient to my analysis are the capacities of psychoanalytic theory to move critique outside and beyond prevailing notions of time and narratives of progress that only mean moving forward. This chapter writes from a stance that views it as imperative that scholarship reaches beyond, and thinks outside, the paradigms that invented it. Psychoanalytic theory, with its idiosyncratic temporal logics—particularly in conjunction with Foucauldian theory—offers a productive and robust way to critique the continuing primacy of normative disciplines whose chronologics have historically warranted a politics that kills in the name of life. Such an approach allows us to hold in productive tension any definition of “the political” as stable and finite, with—as in the case of liberal political philosophy—the legally constructed “person” as its primary epistemological unit. This conceptual capacity of psychoanalysis, in turn, allows us to politicize a form of life and modality of corporeal personhood hitherto constructed as what, in Bataillean parlance, we might call colonialism’s accursed share—colonialism’s pure waste. Additionally, psychoanalytic notions of the death drive, whose proper movement is explicitly circular, allows us to begin to locate the child within logics of futurity, onto which is laminated a kind of indelible whiteness. For the purpose of my analysis I engage Lacanian psychoanalysis, limiting myself to a consideration of the structure of the drives and to a Lacanian conceptualization of language, and its role in the formation of self and the suturing of the psyche to sociality. Freud, as Teresa De Lauretis (2008) emphasizes, elaborated the death drive between the First and Second World Wars, in a Europe living “under the shadow of death and the threat of biological and cultural genocide” (1). Situating her analysis of the death drive in the contemporary moment, De Lauretis points to this contextual, historical darkening, writing: “I wonder whether our epistemologies can sustain the impact of the real … If I return to Freud’s notion of an unconscious death drive, it is because it conveys the sense and the force of something in human reality that resists discursive articulation as well as political diplomacy, an otherness that haunts the dream of a common world” (9). Using psychoanalysis as reading practice, Freud’s suspicion that human life, both individual and social, is compromised from the beginning by something that undermines it, works against it, is (darkly?) generative. The death drive indicates a tension bordering psychic and libidinal relations, which marks Freud’s radical break with Cartesian rationality and points to a negativity that counteracts the optimistic affirmations of human perfectability. This dimension of radical negativity cannot be reduced to an expression of alienated social conditions, nor is it entirely something the body does on its own. Theorized as the destruction drive, the antagonism drive, or sometimes, simply “the drive,” it is impossible to escape. In psychoanalytic theory, therefore, particularly in the clinical setting, the objective is not to overcome the drive, but rather to come to terms with it, in what Slovenian Lacanian psychoanalytic theorist Slavoj Žižek (1989) calls “its terrifying dimension” (4). It is a fundamental axiom of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory that attempts to abolish the drive antagonism are precisely the source of totalitarian temptation. Žižek writes: “The greatest mass murders and holocausts have always been perpetrated in the name of man as harmonious being, of a New Man without antagonistic tension” (5). So it is that one of Canada’s greatest atrocities— the genocide of its First Peoples—took place in the name of Canada itself, that sought progress and unification as a single body politic with claims on a shared futurity. The fulfillment of this destiny relied upon the negation of the other, the bad race, the dangerous race, the race that stood outside the purview of the norm and had no share in its time-zone, the ones called to live in the between space—as nobody. As the relatively more benign civilization policies failed to convert Aboriginal forms of life into separate but civilized, Christian communities on reserves, the federal government intensified its tactics. Policies became more aggressive. As these more aggressive policies (such as enfranchisement) also failed, the federal government intensified its tactics once again, escalating the stakes and the strategies towards the horizon of assimilation. This ‘doubling down’ in the face of failure is a primary trace effect of the death drive, and indeed, it is not unreasonable to argue that the federal government Indian policy has, since confederation, been death driven. Because the aim of fully eradicating the otherness of the other can only fail—in Freudian parlance, it cannot be mastered—the trajectory of the aiming turns in a circularity, orbiting around that which can never be had: perfection. Caught in death drive circularity, the aiming towards the objective (i.e. a unified body politic) authorizes, and indeed recruits, escalating violence in the interest of—finally—closing the open. For Žižek, this compulsive ‘doubling-down’ in the face of failure to arrive at the impossible horizon of perfection tips towards totalitarian temptation, which, he tells us, is implicated in the drive to unify a singular body politic, a new man without antagonistic tension. The drive aims for the return to a moment of unity before the intrusion of language and the entrance of the subject into what Lacan calls the Symbolic—the universe of symbols in which all human subjects share. Because this economy of signifiers operates through a modality of difference by association, on the premise that language does not reflect or carry within it universal a priori meaning, spirit, or Truth, signifiers are always and already sliding along a chain of signification that is never truly fixed. Rather, for Lacan, meaning is constructed through quilting points, durable concepts that affix ideas to their signifiers and which, in their durability, structure entire fields of meaning. For Lacan, subjects are formed by their entrance into this system of sliding difference from a pre-linguistic state retroactively constructed through nostalgic affective associations with unity, perfection, and completion. The loss or lack occurs in the imaginary, the order of presence and absence, and is formalized in the symbolic. This is experienced by the subject as a loss of that to which she/he can never again return, but for which she/he perpetually yearns, and toward which she/he perpetually moves. The circularity of movement toward this impossible horizon is precisely the movement of the drive. It is my argument that the concept of “the Indian” is a quilting point through which the field of politics in Canada is sutured into signification, a durable concept that organizes the meaning of nation, citizen, sovereignty, and subjecthood. Further, the hypoxic vision of national unity and a harmonious white(ned) citizenry is a movement propelled by the drive, a circularity impelled by the belief that what is lacking in the present can be made good in the future—an imaginary that activates/harnesses a kind of libidinal energy that is, by its very nature, inexhaustible. It matters, in the instance of the Canadian Indian Residential Schools and their mandate, that before child subjects enter into the structuration of language/the Symbolic, their bodies are already marked as disprized, abject, inscribed into the signification for, and, I argue, as, loss itself. As I have argued above, reading through psychoanalytic theory facilitates a conceptualization of subject-formation that includes the role of signification in the contouring of subject/ivities. This analytic rubric is importantly brought to bear in my analysis of “the child” the Canadian Indian Residential School System announces into presence: a child fundamentally and constitutively tied to a death whose temporal structure is always deferred, always impartial, always unfolding, and yet always still to be. Indeed, even in circumstances in which her/his mode of being in the world is not a deliberate practice of making- spectral, “the child” remains a notoriously ambivalent, slippery signifier. This plasticity—differently stated, this over-abundant availability of “the child” as concept—takes on an interesting significance within political thought, functioning not as that which is politicized, but as the signifier in whose name the political mobilizes itself. In this way, the child functions as the absolute outside to political thought and the logics of its temporality, functioning instead to condition its possibilities and organize, from beyond its borders, its spatial and temporal limits. An example of this conceptualization of the child as signifier—and certainly one of the more provocative articulations of this phenomena in the contemporary neoliberal moment—is the polemic Lee develops in his monograph No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. For Edelman, the Child—in its conflation with the kind of futurity toward which the teleology of (neo)liberal discourse is mobilized—is not simply important to contemporary politics, but is that which “serves to regulate political discourse [itself]” (ii). Indeed, as Edelman points out, “the figural Child alone embodies the citizen as ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation’s good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights ‘real’ citizens are allowed. For the social exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). In Edelman’s polemic, it goes without saying that the figural child is a white child and that children of colour, children of mixed heritage, Indian children—within the Ideological State Apparatus of the Indian Residential Schools—far from carrying the over-abundant significance Edelman so adeptly parses, signify on only the most spectral of registers. This child, I argue, as a kind of spectral(ized) partial subject, instantiates a subjectivity simultaneously over-exposed to the political and over-determined by the word of the law, while barely accorded even the status of bare life. This is a subject that is hailed into a circularity of misrecognition in a relationship with death that is virtually inescapable. This relationship with death is the suture that connects this subject to the social. Edelman’s argument does not address racialized formations of self-hood, but is no less relevant to the argument I seek to develop here. Indeed, it is perhaps all the keener in what it omits—which is the child of color. This omission points to the level of signification and the way in which the whitened child is effortlessly lifted from the problematically raced body—the body whose racialized status is found problematic. This fantasy of purification through signification speaks, in ways that are eloquent and disturbing in equal measure, precisely the fantasy of the Canadian Indian Residential School System: that the body of the Indian could be left behind in a transcendent movement away from the vexatious quagmire posed by the Indian body toward the realm of what Kantian philosophy calls pure spirit, the realm of whiteness, purity, and hypoxic visions of what Edelman calls, “a national freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself” (ii). This fantasy of corporeal abandonment points to the latent desire of Western philosophical thought that seeks, through the disavowal of bodily finitude and a fetishization of the logos, access to purity of form, a fantasy that relegates, leaves trapped, the sometimes racialized, sometimes feminized other, mired in flesh and finitude from which it is allowed no escape. The Indigenous person, we remember from Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, is imagined as always already outside the teleology of history, already extinct. This way of understanding difference, through the rubric of historical progress, remains central to liberal and neoliberal political thought, economic practices, and policies in the current moment. Prising the child away from the Indian, meanwhile, continues to have important implications in the way we imagine colonial forms, not only of life, but also of death.

#### Moves to eliminate disease to secure health is a tactic of genocidal biopolitics since it attempts to codify Native bodies into the Western body politic

Maxwell 17, Krista. "Settler-humanitarianism: healing the indigenous child-victim." Comparative Studies in Society and History 59.4 (2017): 974-1007. (Professor of Anthropology at the University of Toronto)//Elmer

In her ethnography of how Canadian humanitarianism affects Inuit, Lisa Stevenson (2014) makes a provocative observation. She notes that Inuit do not experience settler-state interventions aimed at making them live, such as mid-twentieth-century sanatorium-based tuberculosis treatment, and contemporary suicide-prevention programs, as forms of care, but rather as erasures of their identities, cultures, and histories. She analyses this disjuncture as flowing from “the psychic life of biopolitics” in the settler-colonial context: “In the psychic lives of both the colonizer and the colonized, the biopolitical commandment to stay alive at all costs is haunted by the desire on the part of the colonist to murder the colonized, and also by the recurring sense the colonized have that what appear to be the most benign public health programs are, in fact, genocidal” (2014: 44). Stevenson’s account depicts how Indigenous peoples, in their everyday lives, must grapple with the settler-state’s efforts to ameliorate the effects of ongoing dispossession through paternalistic care. The case of Aboriginal healing shows how settler-humanitarianism shapes such settler-state interventions and also how Indigenous people experience the after-effects. In the process of producing Canadian Aboriginal healing policy, a host of Indigenous and non-Indigenous **political actors transmuted “healing” from a collective, social process** with anticolonial underpinnings into an individualized, **marketized set of biopolitical interventions**. We should not be surprised, then, that many residential school survivors, and their families and communities, have experienced the psychic life of these ostensibly benevolent “healing” interventions as ongoing settler-colonial violence that reinforces the political status quo. Here I consider the psychic life and troubling social effects of, first, the regime for implementing the Settlement Agreement (IRSSA), and second, the discourse on historical trauma that has become central to Aboriginal healing in Canada. Some close observers of the social effects of the Common Experience Payment (that made to all claimants able to prove attendance at an institution recognized by the state as a residential school), found their assessment complicated by the belief that the payments constituted a form of wealth redistribution, benefitting the most marginalized (see also de Costa 2009). One such observer is Leslie Saunders, long-time coordinator of the Meeting Place, a Toronto drop-in center serving homeless and marginally-housed people, many of whom struggle with addictions. They include many residential school survivors, mostly Cree and Anishinaabeg from northern Ontario, who submitted claims under the Settlement Agreement. Commencing her account to me of how participation in this process had affected many regular users of the Meeting Place, Leslie stated, “I think the Aboriginal school money is a positive thing, generally speaking, because it does give some money to people that previously didn’t have any money at all.” Like many commentators, she applauded the Common Experience Payment as a form of wealth redistribution, and hoped the settlement would redress the racialized socio-economic inequities that characterize contemporary Indigenous-settler relations in Canada. But this was neither the purpose nor the effect of the compensation. Rather, these payments were embedded in a continuing colonial relationship, and they stamped the recipients with an enduring label of “damaged goods.” Leslie made this clear as she elaborated: However, having said that, it has also spiked the addictions and the suicides, because people are drinking themselves to death with this money. Some of them are so re-traumatized by the process that is required to get that money that it’s putting them in a terrible mental state, because they’re forced to dredge up all these horrible memories that they’ve worked so hard to try to numb out.50 And then after they’ve been re-traumatized, they’re handed this cheque, and so, of course, they do the only thing many of them know how to do, and that’s numb out the pain with more drugs and alcohol. So, I really wished that they could have come up with a different process.51 Cree and Anishinaabe residential school survivors using the Meeting Place are arguably among the most socially and economically marginalized of claimants. But research with a broader range of survivors confirms that their experiences were not atypical (Reimer 2010a; 2010b). For many, seeking reparations under the Settlement Agreement has been harmful in itself, entrenching their victim status and exacerbating everyday forms of suffering. Many claimants struggled to obtain the required evidence of attendance due to inconsistent church and government record-keeping. Nearly twenty-five thousand endured the distress of having their Common Experience Payment applications dismissed when their claims of suffering were judged illegitimate, and many of them initiated appeals.52 Those seeking compensation became entangled in state bureaucratic procedures “in which they carry the burden of proof of their … damage while experiencing the risk of being delegitimised in legal, welfare, and medical institutional contexts” (Petryna 2002: 216). Residential school survivors’ responses to the Settlement Agreement underscore the inherently anti-political effects of humanitarian interventions, which work to bolster, rather than transform, the established, settler-colonial political order (see Ticktin 2011). Many beneficiaries rejected the assumption, fundamental to the Settlement Agreement, that cash payments would be healing, and instead equated acceptance of them with capitulation to dominant interests (Reimer 2010a). Some concluded that “to settle for individual monetary compensation was misguided and insufficient” (Reimer 2010a: 93–94). Only about one-quarter of recipients described the payment in terms suggesting the possibility for positive transformation, for example, as a meaningful symbol of public recognition of their suffering and admission of government wrongdoing, or an important step towards reconciliation (ibid.). Infrequent but powerful Indigenous challenges to settler-humanitarianism continued in public events organized by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While anthropologists have documented how the workings of the TRC generated significant momentum for “historical trauma” discourse, some exceptional contributions deviated from the TRC’s “template” for survivor testimonies, which centered on traumatic experience and suffering counterbalanced by a measure of hope (Niezen 2016; see also Molema 2016). Instead, some former students used this forum to condemn the “retraumatizing and dehumanizing” effects of the Independent Assessment Process (IAP), which those seeking compensation for sexual and physical abuse must undergo (Molema 2016: 141). Speaking at an event in Vancouver, residential school survivor and former chief Jillian Harris reported that “a family member had hung himself the day before his IAP adjudication, and that over the course of the IAP, it was ‘like the spirit of suicide roared through our community’” (ibid.). In his ethnographic account, Arie Molema further documents how some survivors vociferously disrupted presentations to the Commission by Indigenous and settler political leaders. At one event, during a presentation from British Columbia Premier Christy Clark, a group of Indigenous protestors53 brandished a banner proclaiming “We Are Walking Dollars,” and threw bags marked with dollar signs onto the stage where Clark stood (ibid.). The administration of the Settlement Agreement is virtually completed at the time of this writing, but “historical trauma” discourse continues to gain momentum. Canadian health and social work professionals increasingly employ historical trauma as shorthand for Indigenous communities’ psychosocial damage, understood as originating in residential school experiences and transmitted inter-generationally within families. In health and child development literatures, a family history of residential school attendance is now an individual “risk factor” that explains a range of complex social phenomena in Indigenous communities, from lack of parenting skills (Ball 2008) to sexual assault (Patterson et al. 2008), Hepatitis C infection (Craib et al. 2009), and suicide (Elias 2012). These theorized relationships are, of course, impossible to prove empirically and can only be demonstrated as correlations. Invoking “historical trauma” to explain contemporary Indigenous social suffering has problematic, if unintended, corollaries, echoing settlerhumanitarianism. First, historical trauma discourse perpetuates settler-colonial assumptions about the inherent dysfunction of Indigenous families, assumptions that date to the imperial child-rescue movement’s universalization of middle-class British values. The persistence of these assumptions among health and social service professionals contributes to the continuing, disproportionate apprehension of Indigenous children by child welfare authorities (Blackstock 2008; de Leeuw et al. 2010; Richardson and Nelson 2007). Second, privileging past experiences of abuse diverts attention from how contemporary (neo)liberal settler-colonialism over-determines Indigenous social suffering. Finally, historical trauma discourse legitimates the indefinite deferral of Indigenous sovereignty over social reproduction, pending attainment of “capacity” (see also Irlbacher-Fox 2009) that is to be built through a host of behavioral interventions such as early childhood education and parenting programs, which themselves constitute assimilationist projects. CONCLUSION Indigenous healing has been co-opted by the Canadian state and reworked as settler-humanitarianism, partially displacing the **critical, collectivist analyses of earlier Native healing activists**. While some Indigenous leaders and professionals have enabled this process, many Indigenous intellectuals continue to advance alternative frameworks in public discourse. These link contemporary Indigenous experiences of social suffering—including interpersonal violence, substance abuse, and suicide—with collective, historical experiences of dispossession and violence, and ongoing racism, marginalization, and violent assaults on the land. Recent writings by Indigenous feminist environmental and sovereignty scholars and activists, for example, offer analyses comparable to those characterizing earlier understandings of Native healing praxis.54 Time will tell how such analyses may resist co-option; the case of Aboriginal healing as settler-humanitarianism offers trenchant lessons in this regard. Meanwhile, “reconciliation” is supplanting “healing” as the keyword for contemporary Canadian settler-humanitarianism. On 5 December 2015, recently elected Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly responded to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s final report. Having delivered brief remarks promising a “national reconciliation framework,” Trudeau conspicuously wiped his eyes with a tissue. This widely circulated image was later pronounced by the Huffington Post as one of “The 30 Best Canadian Political Photos of 2015.” As I observed in the introduction, the work of the Commission has enabled the Canadian settler-state to redeem itself in humanitarian terms, while failing to reckon with the implications of the residential school system as a settler-humanitarian project that continues to have not only psychosocial effects but also systemic continuities in the present. Trudeau’s compelling performance of settler sympathy (including the latest official apology for residential schools) is consistent with his government’s continuing disregard for Indigenous sovereignty, exemplified by its support for oil-pipeline construction on Indigenous territory and its failure to allocate adequate resources to redress gross inequities in public services funding on First Nations reserves. As I have argued here, settler expressions of sympathy for Indigenous suffering, and the interventions they justify, serve to simultaneously enable and conceal ongoing Indigenous dispossession. As the current Canadian government moves to develop a national reconciliation framework, critical observers should scrutinize the resulting discourses and interventions for settler-humanitarianism.

#### The Aff relegates indigenous possibility to reservation, accelerating death-making – only an orientation of refusal as generative can solve. This the ROTB is to reject systems of settler colonialism. Group their method cards

King 17, Tiffany Lethabo. "Humans involved: Lurking in the lines of posthumanist flight." Critical Ethnic Studies 3.1 (2017): 162-185. (Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State)//GZ but re-cut by Elmer

Within Native feminist theorizing, ethnographic refusal can be traced to Audra Simpson’s 2007 article, “On Ethnographic Refusal.” In this seminal work, Simpson reflects on and gains inspiration from the tradition of refusal practiced by the people of Kahnawake.14 Simpson shares that Kahnawake refusals are at the core and spirit of her own ethnographic and ethical practices of refusal. I was interested in the larger picture, in the discursive, material and moral territory that was simultaneously historical and contemporary (this “national” space) and the ways in which *Kahnawakero:non*, the “people of Kahnawake,” had *refused* the authority of the state at almost every turn. The ways in which their formation of the initial membership code (now replaced by a lineage code and board of elders to implement the code and determine cases) was refused; the ways in which their interactions with border guards at the international boundary line were predicated upon a refusal; how refusal worked in everyday encounters to enunciate repeatedly to ourselves and to outsiders that “this is who we are, this is who you are, these are my rights.”15 Because Simpson was concerned with applying the political and everyday modes of Kahnawake refusal, she attended to the “collective limit” established by her and her Kahnawake participants.16 The collective limit was relationally and ethically determined by what was shared but more importantly by what was not shared. Simpson’s ability to discern the collective limit could only be achieved through a form of relational knowledge production that regards and cares for the other. Simpson recounts how one of her participants forced her to recognize a collective limit. Approaching and then arriving at the limit, Simpson experiences the following: And although I pushed him, hoping that there might be something explicit said from the space of his exclusion— or more explicit than he gave me— it was enough that he said what he said. “Enough” is certainly enough. “Enough,” I realised, was when I reached the limit of my own return and our collective arrival. Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why? And “enough” was when they shut down (or told me to turn off the recorder), or told me outright funny things like “nobody seems to know”— when everybody *does* know and talks about it *all the time*. Dominion then has to be exercised over these representations, and that was determined when enough was said. The ethnographic limit then, was reached not just when it would cause harm (or extreme discomfort)—the limit was arrived at when the representation would bite all of us and compromise the *representational* territory that we have gained for ourselves in the past 100 years.17 Extending her discussion of ethnographic refusal beyond the bounds of ethnographic concerns, Simpson also ponders whether this enactment of refusal can be applied to theoretical work. Simpson outright poses a question: “What is theoretically generative about these refusals?”18 The question that Simpson asks in 2007 is clarified by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang in the 2014 essay “R- Words: Refusing Research.” Arguing that modes of refusal extended into the theoretical and methodological terrains of knowledge production are productive and necessary, Tuck and Yang state: For the purposes of our discussion, the most important insight to draw from Simpson’s article is her emphasis that refusals are not subtractive, but are theoretically generative, expansive. Refusal is not just a “no,” but a redirection to ideas otherwise unacknowledged or unquestioned. Unlike a settler colonial configuration of knowledge that is petulantly exasperated and resentful of limits, a methodology of refusal regards limits on knowledge as productive, as indeed a good thing.19 In line with Simpson’s intervention, Tuck and Yang posit that “refusal itself could be developed into both method and theory.”20 For Tuck and Yang, a generative practice of refusal and a decolonial and abolitionist tradition is making Western thought “turn back upon itself as settler colonial knowledge, as opposed to universal, liberal, or neutral knowledge without horizon.”21 In fact, the coauthors suggest “making the settler colonial metanarrative the object of . . . research.”22 What this move effectively does is question the uninterrogated assumptions and exposes the violent particularities of the metanarrative. Scrutiny as a practice of refusal also slows down or perhaps halts the momentum of the machinery that allows, as Tuck and Yang argue, “knowledge to facilitate interdictions on Indigenous and Black life.”23

#### FW Interp: Evaluate the 1AC as a scholarly artifact – this means that the aff has to defend its epistemic and rhetorical investments prior to weighing the hypothetical consequences of the 1AC

#### A.] Smoke Screen DA – Every time the 1AR and 2AR say they get to weigh the fiated impacts against the K is a new link and a settler move to innocence – that allows for them to not be held accountable for violence. If they said the N word – in a model of plan focus they can still win the debate because the aff is a good idea. This OW their offense because it creates a violent and inaccessible model of debate premised on exclusion – try or die for my interp.

#### B.] Resolvability – Voting aff can not magically pass the affirmative – but rather your ballot can have an impact on the type of scholarship circulated within debate. Empirically proven within debate – the success of the Louisville project forced debate to shift away from making args like K’s are cheating, Mcdougnough winning the TOC resulted in a proliferation of alternative approaches to fiat. Competitive incentives flip negative because if a team keeps losing – it forces them to go back to the drawing board and read something different.

#### C.] Survivalism DA

Juárez 15 Nicolas Juárez is a Native American studies scholar with a focus on the political ontology of Amerindians within the Western hemisphere, the settlerist politics of love, and the connections between racialization and psychopathology. My current research is focused on Lacanian psychoanalysis and Indigenous cosmology. [“To Kill an Indian to Save a (Hu)Man:Native Life through the Lens of Genocide”]//Mberhe

I am inclined to agree with Wilderson that the Leninist question of “what is to be done” is in the wrong direction. The question itself fails to grasp the severity of the problem we face. To ask “what is to be done” is to first understand the problem one faces and secondly presumes that the problem one faces can be articulated, that one is deprived of something that can be named rather than deprived of being able to lose. To address this, what is needed is a radical shift in orientation in our scholarship and ethics that focuses on the question of understanding and ending the structures that make our, Red and Black, existence impossible rather than asking what is to be done within the epistemologies and ethics of those structures. When Subcomandante Marcos asks Presidente Salinas why do we need to be pardoned, when he asks what are we to be pardoned for, and when he asks who should ask for pardon, and who can grant it, he is not merely exposing the gratuitous violence of the Settler upon Red bodies, he is revealing the impossibility of an answer. If this paper is forced to offer a solution, however meager, it is for Red bodies to relinquish their desire to be structurally adjusted into the Human fold, a fold which will never solve or relieve our problems because our problems are the condition of possibility for that fold’s existence. In realizing how our desire is structured not only as a fear of Slaveness, but of Savageness, we can better come to form survival strategies for our communities and, as Fanon suggests, set to work.

#### D.] Colonial Worldmaking DA

Byrd 11 (Jodi, (Chickasaw) Associate Professor of English and Gender and Women's Studies at the University of Illinois *The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism*, pp. 36-38.

In many ways, one might argue that this transit of Indianness is the condition of possibility that informs even Berlant’s understanding of the “slow death” of obesity that “refers to the physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence.” ¹²¹ Here, in the interstices of affect and queer theory, between Lauren Berlant and Judith Butler, I want to elaborate on what indigenous critical theory might offer to such understandings of “bare life.” According to Butler and Berlant, the contemporary present is a necessary condition for affect and relation to draw lives into commensurable vulnerability and may, they hope, re- structure governance and help make lives more livable. A core set of questions emerges for me as I read Berlant’s discussions of “cruel optimism” and “slow death,” and they revolve around her delineations of ordinary life. Judith Butler in Precarious Life and Frames of War takes up Berlant’s concerns with the ordinary life in the overwhelmingly present moment and reframes them in the question “When is life grievable?” The concern for me is to consider whether indigenous peoples are understood to be a part of the present within liberal democracy and within the theories Butler and Berlant are articulating to provide possible reframings of relation to reconcile questions of citizenship, sovereignty, recognition, and nationalism. Do Indians live the ordinary life in the contemporary now? Are Indians part of the present tense? And finally, do Indians live grievable lives? I may be begging the question here, given that Butler does not really consider Indians and that Berlant avoids indigeneity even when it is a thematic concern within the text, as her reading of Was indicates. But because their projects work to dismantle the normative state structures that also op- press indigenous peoples whether they actively involve indigenous peoples in their theorizations or not, here we can see how indigenous critical theory transforms queer theory and critical theory more broadly to intervene in the colonialist structures that continue to underwrite racialized and gendered oppressions despite every attempt to disrupt or refuse those structures. To return to Tocqueville and Michelle Obama, we can notice this problem with tenses present—and that Indians are not present at all in the case of the latter. As Tocqueville describes the Choctaw, “their calamities were of ancient date, and they knew them to be irremediable.” Even in the present of their removal, the Choctaws are always already past perfect: they had left, they had stepped, they had been promised. According to Butler, in order for life to be grievable, it needs to be faceable; to exist, it needs to “cast a face, a life, in the tense of the future anterior” in what Barthes has described as the present absolute pastness of the photograph. Butler writes: “The photograph relays less the present moment than the perspective, the pathos, of a time in which ‘this will have been.’” ¹²² Even for Ryman’s Dorothy, who perceives Indians in spite of their invisibility, Indians are “Was.” So the most we can say, given the lack of possibility of an Indian future anteriority in which Indians will have been decolonized, is that Indians are lamentable, but not grievable. The dogs howl and throw themselves to their deaths in the frozen waters of the Mississippi, but the humanity of the scene is still: “No cry, no sob was heard amongst the assembled crowd; all were silent.” The lamentable is pitiable, but not remediable. It is past and regrettable. Grieving, on the other hand, calls people to acknowledge, to see, and to grapple with lived lives and the commensurable suffering, and in Butler’s frame apprehend—in the sense of both its definitions that include to under- stand and to stop—the policies creating unlivable, ungrievable conditions within the state-sponsored economies of slow death and letting die. As the queer makes claims to an affective indigenous generosity that can welcome all arrivants in the hope that those moves, those approximations of traditional kinship sovereignties and tribal affiliations will transform the normative and transgress the dialectics of state sovereignty that conscript, expel, and police whose bodies and lives count as full citizens in the United States, the indigenous must be absent both from the contemporary now and from the spaces and tenses of grief. In order to transcend what many theorists engaged in confronting state-sponsored violence perceive as a retrograde return to nativism, claims of indigeneity are read as conservative neoliberal discourses of normativity rather than a reassertion of the basic fundamental principles of restorative justice in the face of colonization and genocide. Given the push toward kinship, affect, and futurity that queer theory troubles as a way to intervene within and through discourses of sovereignty, nationalism, and citizenship, it seems that indigenous strategies should not be just a return push that demonstrates difference—that move is anticipated and already silenced. Possible sites of intervention depend then on interrogating how the impulse to world is the setting-to-work of the colonizer, even if that work is to reconfigure the world so that it might be kinder and gentler and be a world more possible to live, and grieve, within. The future anterior of such a world that exists outside the cruel optimisms and violences constitutive of liberalism’s very structures must also be a future in which indigenous peoples will have been and will remain decolonized, if there is to be any hope at all.

#### C] Equality – Util is bad and not neutral.

Mignolo 7, Walter D. "The de-colonial option and the meaning of identity in politics." (2007). (Professor at Duke)//Elmer

The rhetoric of modernity (from the Christian mission since the sixteenth century, to the secular Civilizing mission, to development and modernization after WWII) occluded—under its triumphant rhetoric of salvation and the good life for all—**the perpetuation of** the logic of **coloniality**, that is, of massive appropriation of land (and today of natural resources), massive exploitation of labor (from open slavery from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, to disguised slavery, up to the twenty first century), and the dispensability of human livesfrom the massive killing of people in the Inca and Aztec domains to the twenty million plus people from Saint Petersburg to the Ukraine during WWII killed in the so called Eastern Front.4 Unfortunately, not all the massive killings have been recorded with the same value and the same visibility. The unspoken criteria for the value of human lives is an obvious sign (from a de-colonial interpretation) of the hidden imperial identity politics: that is, the value of human lives to which the life of the enunciator belongs becomes the measuring stick to evaluate other human lives who do not have the intellectual option and institutional power to tell the story and to classify events according to a ranking of human lives; that is, according to a racist classification.5

#### E] Calculability – Settler Colonialism is unable to be calculated on a utilitarian or a consequentialist metric – it is both a spiritual and cultural genocide that leads to a psychological and emotional genocide that can’t be accounted for by body count.

## 2

### Case

#### 1] No impact – the patent disputes will be resolved, at which point all the 1AC innovation begins – make them prove that it’s try or die now

#### The Aff causes Bioterrorism – two internal links –

#### 1] Eliminating CRISPR Patents cause rise of unethical biohacking.

Zettler 19, Patricia J., Christi J. Guerrini, and Jacob S. Sherkow. "Regulating genetic biohacking." Science 365.6448 (2019): 34-36. (Ohio State University Moritz School of Law)//Elmer

Genetic **biohacking** is also potentially **subject to U.S. laws that are enforced by private** rather than government **actors**. These may fill some of the gaps in public regulators’ ambit (9). **Patent owners**, for example, **can impose ethical restrictions on licensees,** such as the Broad Institute’s licenses for its CRISPR patents to Bayer (formerly Monsanto), **with conditions that** Bayer **avoid research activities that are potentially harmful to public health**, **including** **tobacco research and germline editing** (10). **Such license restrictions can**—and should—**be used to police commercial manufacturers of genome-editing kits and reagents popular in biohacking communities**, just as they have previously been used to prevent activities that pose national security, environmental, or public health risks (11). Even without a license in place, **patent owners can enforce restrictions through threats of patent infringement litigation against any recalcitrant biohackers or manufacturers of biohacking products**. A similar model was proposed as an attempt to restrict the use of “gene drive technology”—inheritable versions of CRISPR designed to drive a specific allele through generations of a population (12). Beyond patents, people injured by genetic biohacking materials could potentially bring tort law claims against biohackers and component suppliers to seek compensation for their injuries. A person injured while using a DIY CRISPR kit, for example, would likely be able to sue the seller of the kit —a potentially strong deterrent to marketers of unsafe biohacking materials.

#### Expanded Biohacking risks Bioterrorism.

Wikswo 14, J., S. Hummel, and V. Quaranta. "The Biohacker: A Threat to National Security." CTC Sentinel 7.1 (2014). (a biological physicist at Vanderbilt University. He was born in Lynchburg, Virginia, United States. Wikswo is noted for his work on biomagnetism and cardiac electrophysiology.)//Elmer

The **ability of non-scientists to create** and deploy **a biological weapon** highlights the emergence of **a new threat, the “biohacker.”** “Biohacking” is not necessarily malicious and could be as innocent as a beer enthusiast altering yeast to create a better brew. Yet the **same technology** **used by** a benign **biohacker** **could** easily **be transformed into** a tool for the disgruntled and disenfranchised12 to modify existing or emerging **biological warfare agents** **and employ them as bioterrorism**. A 2005 Washington Post article by Steve Coll and Susan Glasser presciently stated that “one can find on the web how to inject animals, like rats, with pneumonic plague and how to extract microbes from infected blood…and how to dry them so that they can be used with an aerosol delivery system, and thus how to make a biological weapon. If this information is readily available to all, is it possible to keep a determined terrorist from getting his hands on it?”13 This article argues that the biohacker is a real and existing threat by examining evasive biohacking strategies and limitations of current detection methods. The article finds that more active measures are required to stem the growing, long-term threat of modified BW agents employed by individuals. The **biohacker is** not only **a credible threat**, but also one that can be checked through improved detection and by disrupting BW agent delivery methods.

#### Bioterrorism causes Extinction – overcomes any conventional defense.

Walsh 19, Bryan. End Times: A Brief Guide to the End of the World. Hachette Books, 2019. (Future Correspondent for Axios, Editor of the Science and Technology Publication OneZero, Former Senior and International Editor at Time Magazine, BA from Princeton University)//Elmer

I’ve lived through disease outbreaks, and in the previous chapter I showed just how unprepared we are to face a widespread pandemic of flu or another new pathogen like SARS. But a deliberate outbreak caused by an engineered pathogen would be far worse. We would face the same agonizing decisions that must be made during a natural pandemic: whether to ban travel from affected regions, how to keep overburdened hospitals working as the rolls of the sick grew, how to accelerate the development and distribution of vaccines and drugs. To that dire list add the terror that would spread once it became clear that the death and disease in our midst was not the random work of nature, but a deliberate act of malice. We’re scared of disease outbreaks and we’re scared of terrorism—put them together and you have a formula for chaos. As deadly and as disruptive as a conventional bioterror incident would be, an attack that employed existing pathogens could only spread so far, limited by the same laws of evolution that circumscribe natural disease outbreaks. But a virus engineered in a lab to break those laws could spread faster and kill quicker than anything that would emerge out of nature. It can be designed to evade medical countermeasures, frustrating doctors’ attempts to diagnose cases and treat patients. If health officials manage to stamp out the outbreak, it could be reintroduced into the public again and again. It could, with the right mix of genetic traits, even wipe us off the planet, making engineered viruses a genuine existential threat. And such an attack may not even be that difficult to carry out. Thanks to advances in biotechnology that have rapidly reduced the skill level and funding needed to perform gene editing and engineering, what might have once required the work of an army of virologists employed by a nation-state could soon be done by a handful of talented and trained individuals. Or maybe just one. When Melinda Gates was asked at the South by Southwest conference in 2018 to identify what she saw as the biggest threat facing the world over the next decade, she didn’t hesitate: “A bioterrorism event. Definitely.”2 She’s far from alone. In 2016, President Obama’s director of national intelligence James Clapper identified CRISPR as a “weapon of mass destruction,” a category usually reserved for known nightmares like nuclear bombs and chemical weapons. A 2018 report from the National Academies of Sciences concluded that biotechnology had rewritten what was possible in creating new weapons, while also increasing the range of people capable of carrying out such attacks.3 That’s a fatal combination, one that plausibly threatens the future of humanity like nothing else. “The existential threat that would be most available for someone, if they felt like doing something, would be a bioweapon,” said Eric Klien, founder of the Lifeboat Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to helping humanity survive existential risks. “It would not be hard for a small group of people, maybe even just two or three people, to kill a hundred million people using a bioweapon. There are probably a million people currently on the planet who would have the technical knowledge to pull this off. It’s actually surprising that it hasn’t happened yet.”

#### The Disease Impact –

#### 1] They can’t solve it – their impact is about future pandemics BUT their CRISPR I/L is about prior-known disease that we can find genetic cures to.

#### 2] The Aff will say “CRIPSR solves their turns” – that’s incorrect – CRISPR isn’t a silver bullet for Disease.

Radcliffe 17 Shawn Radcliffe 8-26-2017 "Will Gene Editing Allow Us to Rid the World of Diseases?" <https://www.healthline.com/health-news/will-gene-editing-allow-us-to-rid-world-of-diseases> (Shawn Radcliffe is a science writer and yoga teacher in Ontario, Canada.)//Elmer

Safety and ethical concerns **CRISPR**-Cas9 is a powerful tool, but it also **raises several concerns**. “There’s a lot of discussion right now about how best to detect so-called ‘**off-target effects**,’” said Hochstrasser. “This is what happens when the [Cas9] protein cuts somewhere similar to where you want it to cut.” Off-target cuts could lead to **unexpected genetic problems** that cause an embryo to die. An **edit** **in the wrong gene** **could** also **create an entirely new genetic disease that would be passed onto future generations**. Even using CRISPR-Cas9 to modify mosquitoes and other insects raises safety concerns — like what happens when you make large-scale **changes to an ecosystem** or a trait in a population that **gets out of control**. There are also many ethical issues that come with modifying human embryos. So will **CRISPR**-Cas9 help rid the world of disease? There’s no doubt that it will make a sizeable dent in many diseases, but it’s **unlikely to cure all** of them any time soon. **We** already **have tools for avoiding genetic diseases** — like early genetic screening of fetuses and embryos — but these are not universally used. “**We still don’t avoid** tons of genetic diseases, **because** a lot of **people don’t know that they harbor mutations that can be inherited**,” said Hochstrasser. **Some** genetic mutations also **happen spontaneously**. This is the case with many cancers that result from environmental factorsTrusted Source such as UV rays, tobacco smoke, and certain chemicals. People also make choices that increase their risk of heart disease, stroke, obesity, and diabetes. So unless scientists can use CRISPR-Cas9 to find treatments for these lifestyle diseases — or genetically engineer people to stop smoking and start biking to work — **these diseases will linger** in human society. “Things like that are always going to need to be treated,” said Hochstrasser. “I don’t think it’s realistic to think we would ever prevent every disease from happening in a human.”

#### 3] No Impact

#### a] Inverse relationship between infection and lethality AND decreasing virulency

Ord 20 Dr. Toby Ord 20, Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at Oxford University, DPhil in Philosophy from the University of Oxford, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity, Hachette Books, Kindle Edition, p. 124-126

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10

The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11

When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox.

During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13

Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined.

Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15

[FOONOTE]

In addition to this historical evidence, there are some deeper biological observations and theories suggesting that pathogens are unlikely to lead to the extinction of their hosts. These include the empirical anti-correlation between infectiousness and lethality, the extreme rarity of diseases that kill more than 75% of those infected, the observed tendency of pandemics to become less virulent as they progress and the theory of optimal virulence. However, there is no watertight case against pathogens leading to the extinction of their hosts.

[END FOOTNOTE]

In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale.

The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16

It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk.

#### Economy Impact – Regionalism solves it – the internal link is interdependence which we solve.

#### Group the Trade Impact:

#### 1] Current Regional Trade isn’t Great Power Competition – it’s regional integration that’s far more open which takes out their Exclusion I/L – that’s 1NC Brkic.

#### 2] Regionalism solves – it’s a building block – prefer gradual change to immediate ones.

Brkić 13, Snježana, and Adnan Efendic. "Regional Trading Arrangements–Stumbling Blocks or Building Blocks in the Process of Global Trade Liberalization?." 5th International Conference «Economic Integration, competition and cooperation», Croatia, Opatija. 2013. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2239275 (Economics Prof at U of Sarajevo) //Elmer

There are **over 180 independent states** in the modern world, most of which **differ** enormously **in economic development and power**. World economy is therefore a battlefield of varied interests expressed in the action of different national economic policies. In such conditions, **attempts to integrate** world **economy** **by global liberalization of** international **trade cannot yield** significant **results overnight.** Global free trade is considered the first best solution, but is not feasible immediately and at once, since too many people believe that they would lose with global liberalization. According to the view believed to be optimistic, creation of international economic integrations could be a distinctive inter-step in the process of free world market creation. Lester Thurow points out: "In the long run, **regionalism** development **could be favorable** for the world. **Free trade within regions** and regulated trade between regions **could be** the **proper road to free world trade in a long term**. The shift from national to world economy at once would be too big a jump. One should first make a few smaller inter-steps, and pseudo-trading blocs coupled with regulated trade could be such a necessary inter-step." The essential rationale of this view is actually the speed of reforms - the gradual versus “big bang” approach. Many contemporary economists, in their analyses of world economy trends, conclude that political forces behind regional integration show signs of consistency with those acting towards global world trade. According to the optimistic view, the multilateralization process is slowed down by different standpoints on the free trade usefulness, by economic nationalisms, even by varying political interests, and therefore another way had to be found in order to achieve the world market integration – a slower one, but more effective in the existing constellation of international economic relations. This view denies the opposition between regionalism and multilateralism, and explains it as follows: Since integration improves economic relations between members through removing trading and other barriers, and since all these integrated regions are part of the world territory, the advancement of economic relations within regions can be understood as the advancement of global economic relations. Regional trading, i.e. economic blocs would in this case be only a bypass towards the creation of unified world market. "... What could not be achieved in global relations was achieved within regions, through multilateralization of the European economic area. These achievements were later followed by many countries in other world regions, in their mutual relations practice. Practically, we thus got regional multilateralisms." Regionalism advocates also point out that the formation of economic integrations could facilitate the pending WTO negotiation rounds. Actually, the Uruguay round was partly protracted due to a great number of participants and the "free riders" issue. Viewed in broader context, one could say that regionalism contributes to overall globalization as well, since these are processes motivated from the same source. Both regionalism and globalization are driven by big capital interests, and that these two phenomena are actually ways to make the centuries-long capitalism aspiration – unified world market - come true. According to this view, the globalization process as a process of world economy functional integration under the circumstances of imperfect market and hegemony weakening early in the 20th century has to be supported by the institutional component, either on a multilateral basis through international organizations and institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO, or on regional scale through regional trading arrangements.